Chapter 7
After schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 left a lasting impression on the British on 11 July 1944, the Tiger crews were understandably in a good mood. The German tanks had proven superior in a tank-on-tank engagement, and the armor leaders on the other side had proven too cautious.
It proved at cross purposes, however, that the assembly areas of the battalion were located within engagement range of the enemy artillery. This questionable measure was justified by saying that bringing the tanks forward at the start of the attack would scarcely be possible when the expected enemy offensive started with its corresponding preparation through aerial attacks and wide-ranging naval artillery.
A similar discussion at operational level had taken place even before the invasion started, e.g., between Generalfeldmarschall Rommel and General der Panzertruppen Geyr von Schweppenburg. This discussion resulted in almost all of the German armored formations being held considerably to the rear. But that which is expedient at the operational level does not necessarily hold true at the lower tactical level.
Today we are familiar with the events of 18 July 1944 and how this deployment close to the front was quite certainly an incorrect decision.
In expectation of the enemy offensive east of the Orne, Generalfeldmarschall Rommel, the commander-in-chief of Heeresgruppe B, visited the Orne area during the afternoon of 15 July 1944. He visited first the 346. Infanterie-Division, then the 16. Luftwaffen-Feld-Division and, finally, the 21. Panzer-Division. He was briefed by the leaders on the situation and the organization of the forces. Details concerning countermeasures for the expected offensive were discussed.
During the discussions at the command post of Generalmajor Feuchtinger (21. Panzer-Division) at Billy (4.5 kilometers southwest of Argences), the 6th of June and the missed opportunities on that fateful day became the topic of conversation once again. The field marshal complained that the 21. Panzer-Division had been echeloned too far to the rear. Rommel overlooked the fact—or simply did not want to see—that he could have determined from the map where the elements of the 21. Panzer-Division were during his visits of 11 and 18 May 1944. Rommel could have effected change quickly through the issuance of clear orders.
Generalmajor Feuchtinger sought to vindicate himself and pointed out an order from Panzergruppe West, which he had followed, to explain the positioning of his division. For his part, Feuchtinger complained that elements of his division were attached to the 716. Infanterie-Division on 6 June 1944. The latter division had moved Panzer-Jäger-Abteilung 200 against his will from the area north of Caen to the west.
The commander-in-chief of Heeresgruppe B then pointedly complained about the personal absence of the divisional commander in those decisive first hours of the invasion. The field marshal was in a position in which he did not have to justify his own absence. By 15 July 1944—the seventh week of the lost battle to stop the invasion—all of this discussion certainly made little sense.
All the same, Generalfeldmarschall Rommel depicted the overall strategic situation without pulling any punches in a letter to Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge, the commander-in-chief in the West. His letter ended with the words: “Our forces are fighting heroically at every location, however, the unequal struggle is drawing to a close. I must ask you to draw your own conclusions from this situation.”
On the afternoon of 17 July 1944, Generalfeldmarschall Rommel was badly wounded during his return from a visit with the I. SS-Panzer-Korps during a strafing attack at St. Foy-de-Montgomery (nomen est omen?). A few hours before the start of the British offensive, he became a casualty. Von Kluge assumed command of Heeresgruppe B as well.
On 17 July 1944, the commander-in-chief of Panzergruppe West, General der Panzertruppen Eberbach, reported to the commander-in-chief West that his armored forces were facing an imminent British attack. Enemy concentrations were being reported east of the Orne, in Caen and in the area between Noyers and Vendes to the west of Caen. The request for more personnel and equipment and the introduction of fresh formations was categorically turned down by Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge, who stated that there was absolutely nothing left.
The British forces in question were the newly formed British VIII Corps, which had relieved the British XII Corps in the Odon sector. It probably does not need to be emphasized that the British casualties suffered during Operation “Epsom” had immediately been made good, in contrast to the Germans.
Because the enemy had carefully camouflaged his approach march and kept his tanks in the area north of Caen and west of the Orne until the last moment, Panzergruppe West was not certain when and where the attack would take place. Quite to the surprise of the German forces at the front, there were two substantial German air attacks against enemy concentrations on the Orne during this time period.
How did all this shape up from the point of view of the employment of the Tigers?
Montgomery had already received a bloody nose several times with his massed attacks west of Caen (Hill 112, among other locations) and also east of it. In spite of oppressive superiority and also acute losses on the German side, the British had not been able to succeed in making the decisive breakout out of the invasion area. It was intended to finally bring this about as the result of a special effort.
Field Marshal Montgomery, seen here with Prime Minister Churchill, wanted to force the decision and finally break out of the bridgehead. For the first time, he committed three entire armored divisions.
To this end, it was intended for three complete armored divisions—an operational first—to bring the exhausted British and Canadian infantry forward. They would move out of the bridgehead on the Orne en masse. Another factor of note was the willingness to establish new “standards” with regard to air and ground-based fire preparations. Air support of a hitherto unknown extent was assembled after the target catalog of the strategic air forces of both the British and the Americans was effectively exhausted for the express purpose of supporting Montgomery’s field-army group. Never before had such a concentration of bombs been dropped on such a small area. A few numbers should make this clear.
From 0545 to 0630 hours on 18 July 1944, no less than 1,056 British heavy bombers (Lancasters and Halifaxes) bombed target area “A” (eastern edge of Caen), “H” (Sannerville to Emiéville) and “M” (Cagny). From 0700 to 0730 hours, 529 US medium bombers attacked target areas “C” to “G” (the breakthrough area running from Cuverville—Giberville—Démouville—Mandeville). The final attack was formed by 482 American bombers, which attacked target area “P” (Bourguébus—Hubert-Folie—Grentheville). In all, some 7,800 tons of bombs were dropped by 2,077 aircraft. By way of comparison: Dresden was attacked by “only” 1,084 bombers in February 1945, which dropped 3,425 tons of bombs.
In terms of artillery support, there were 720 medium and heavy guns with up to 250,000 shells available for firing. The artillery preparation started at 0630 hours and lasted more than an hour. Not included in these totals are the light artillery and the mortars that were used for direct fire support.
In addition, several hundred fighter-bombers, which were always in the skies during the day anyway, need to be counted as well.
It is important to mention that bombs with fragmentation effect were employed in the actual breakthrough sector, whereas heavy high-explosive bombs were used elsewhere. The British wanted to avoid serious restrictions on armored movement as a result of the formation of large craters. They had already made this discovery to their detriment in a few previous operations.
Finally, thirty-three artillery regiments of all calibers as well as naval artillery were employed.
The devastating effect of such area bombardments of this duration on the forces in position and the tank crews can scarcely be judged by those who were not there. The statements of those effected, such as the one by former Leutnant Freiherr von Rosen, the acting company commander of the 3./schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503, speak for themselves. The same also applies to the pictures of tanks that were hit:
I was in the position we had dug out under my Tiger 311 with Unteroffizier Werkmeister. Although it was a bit cooler there, it was more comfortable than in the tank. The remaining three members of the crew were sleeping in the tank. On 18 July, I was awakened at about 0600 hours by the intense noise of engines in the air. Still half asleep, I heard the sound of falling bombs. They hit about 200 meters in front of us, but the concussion was so strong that the tank shook. It was immediately clear to me that the attack was aimed at us, but there was no time to think about it. The air was filled with the rushing of the falling bombs, and I instinctively pressed firmly against the ground. Then came the ear-bursting crash of the detonation. The earth heaved, but I was not yet hit. I was still alive. And then, again, I heard the rush of the falling bombs and again the detonations. I felt completely helpless against that power, there was no escaping, I could not think of anything at all. I have no idea how long that lasted. All conception of time was lost.
Suddenly, Unteroffizier Werkmeister and I were thrown into a corner by the concussion. I was completely covered with earth and lay, unconscious, for a while, until the slow return of consciousness and the realization I was still alive. But then the next bombs came and with them, the realization that this was not all a bad dream, but that, at that instant, I truly had no choice but to let that firestorm engulf me again. As I remember, it lasted—with short pauses—a good two and a half hours. It is hardly possible to describe that period of time with words. I only know that I lay under my tank, held my ears and bit the blanket so as not to scream. Finally the attack seemed to come to an end. As I crept out from under the tank … what a picture!
Of that once so beautiful park, all that were left were splintered trees that lay every which way, plowed up meadows and gigantic bomb craters that were so numerous that they overlapped each other. It was a gray, hostile moonscape enveloped in an impenetrable dust cloud that made it hard to breathe. Trees were on fire, as were the fields of grain, and one saw the red reflection of the fires in the thick clouds of smoke. I went to the tank beside me, Unteroffizier Westerhausen’s tank. It had taken a direct hit and tongues of flame played in the wreckage. There was no trace left of the crew. I worked my way through the craters and over giant trees, through a true primeval forest, and then got to Oberfeldwebel Sachs’s tank. In front of it there was a giant crater. The tank had been tossed by the concussion and lay on its turret, the running gear in the air. We found two of the crew, dead, and no trace of the others. Two excellent men of the company maintenance section had been killed. They, too, had sought refuge under that tank.
I immediately ordered the tanks readied for action. First they had to be shoveled free, since they were covered in earth right up to the turrets. Trees had been toppled onto them, tracks torn off—how were we to ever get the company ready for action? The work had to be broken off frequently, because the naval artillery began to register on us with heavy 42 cm [16 inch] rounds. At that point I also noticed that, 15 meters in front of my tank, there was a 6- or 8-meter-deep crater in which the Tiger could have easily fitted. The heavy armor plate on the rear of the tank was severely deformed, as if a shell had struck it. The concussion had torn off the engine’s radiator. It is still unclear to me today what could have caused that. In any case, my tank was unserviceable and I had to change tanks yet again.
Our situation became ever more uncomfortable. We could hear tank and machine-gun fire at a short distance. Had the British already gotten as far as our position? It was impossible to establish communications with the battalion. So I set out on foot to try to accomplish that. Leaping from crater to crater, diving for cover at every on-rushing salvo, I reached the route to Emiéville. Fewer bombs had fallen there, and I was able to make better progress. Around a curve in the road, Tiger“I” approached me with the commander in it. The carpet bombing had also hit the area of the battalion command post, but the attack had not been as intense there as it had been at the location of the 3rd Company. The battalion commander, Hauptmann Scherf, and the officers and soldiers of the battalion staff survived the carpet bombing packed tight together in the narrow winding staircase in the steeple of the building. The building itself was demolished, but the steeple remained standing.
I received orders from the battalion commander to set out with the 3rd Company as rapidly as possible and form a defensive front on the left flank of the attack corridor at the buildings of the stud farm at Mandeville. It might have been 1000 hours, perhaps even later, when we finally had six tanks ready. They were ready for a maintenance facility, but at least they could move and bring their weapons to bear. It was difficult to find a route through the sea of craters without having a tank slip into a gigantic hole. But we succeeded and, after a 1.5 kilometer move along the park wall, we took up position southwest of Mandeville.
But even tank crews that were not directly affected by the bombing attacks left their vehicles demoralized and awaited their capture.
It is nothing short of a miracle that the few remaining operational tanks were able to launch counterattacks a few hours later and that there were devastating British tank losses as a result of it.
The wall to the stud farm mentioned in the text, with the water tower of Cagny in the background. The repaired tanks were supposed to go into position along the viewer’s right.
This series of photographs shows how badly hit the 3rd Company of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 was. Four Tigers—such as 322 above—were total write-offs. All of the rest were badly damaged to varying degrees. In the best of cases, they were only conditionally operational.
The idyllic Manneville stud farm was badly damaged (current view above). All of the tanks were buried under debris and knocked-over trees and had to be dug out before they could even be worked on. (Wirton)
Tiger 313 of Oberfeldwebel Sachs was hit the worst. The fifty-six ton tank was flipped over by the force of the detonations. In the process, the tracks were ripped off, as well as a portion of the actual running gear.
The 2nd Company was not affected as much as the 3rd Company. Both of these images show Tiger 213, which was flung into a bomb crater. Since the enemy was approaching, it could not be recovered. (Wirton)
British tanks—Shermans armed with the 75mm main gun—are bunched up. That main gun was essentially ineffective against the Tiger.
During the advance of the 1st Company of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 in the direction of Démouville, Tiger 101 was knocked out. As a result of an explosion in the fighting compartment, the main gun was apparently blown off.
The British offensive started at 0745 hours. It received direct support from the artillery, which took the German infantry positions under fire. Immediately after the last bombers had turned away, the enemy brought his armor and infantry forces up to the line of departure running from St. Honorine to Escoville. The first armored formations to attack were A and B Squadrons of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment of the 29th Armoured Brigade of the British 11th Armoured Division. Starting at 0815, they advanced behind a rolling barrage through a line cleared through the mines and into a cloud of smoke and dust. The first thirty-two tanks initially moved in a column through the lane. Once cleared of it, they dispersed and advanced in a broad formation across the open terrain south of Escoville to the south.
Right behind them were the tanks of the 2nd Fife and Forfar Yeomanry. They were followed in turn by the 23rd Hussars. This represented the entire 29th Armoured brigade of the 11th Armoured Division. Soon there were more than 200 tanks that were advancing behind the rolling barrage of the artillery.
From a tactical assembly area east of St. Honorine, the enemy advanced with the 159th Infantry Brigade of the 11th Armoured Division. The infantry was escorted by the tanks of the 2nd Northhamptonshire Yeomanry. This force advanced through the tall grain in the direction of Cuverville. Only individual groups of light infantry of the I./Jäger-Regiment 46 offered any resistance. German artillery fired sporadically and without exactness.
The 3rd Battalion of the Monmouthshire Regiment of the 159th Infantry Brigade reached Cuverville around 0900 hours and took it around 1030 hours. As a result of the time involved, it can be seen that the British tanks only advanced slowly. They were primarily employed to support the infantry.
The tanks of the 2nd Northhamptonshire Yeomanry attacked in the open terrain between Colombelles and Cuverville. By doing so, they provided cover to the flank of the forces that were attacking past Cuverville. The 1./Sturmgeschütz-Brigade (Feld) 200 had to take the full force of the bombing at Démouville and was completely destroyed. The brigade’s 2nd Battery pulled back in the face of the overwhelming superiority of the attackers and occupied new positions south of the Caen–Troarn rail line by 1100 hours.
Panzer-Regiment 22, which was employed south of the Colombelles–Cuverville road, only had a few, conditionally operational tanks left. Several of these were knocked out by the attacking British.
Starting at 0745 hours, the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division of the Canadian II Corps also attacked. The division’s 8th Infantry Brigade attacked in the direction of Giberville and Mondeville. It was supported by tanks of the Canadian 2nd Armoured Brigade. Following behind, the 9th Infantry Brigade advanced along the Orne towards the industrial area of Colombelles. Its objective was to advance on Vaucelles so as to take the remaining portions of Caen southeast of the Orne. For the time being, the division’s 7th Brigade remained in Caen as a divisional reserve. It was intended for it to cross the Orne in the city later on. Additional objectives were the high ground north of St. André-sur-Orne and the village of Verriéres on the road running from Caen to Falaise. The mission of taking these objectives would fall to the Canadian 2nd Infantry Division during a later phase of the battle plan.
Elements of Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 192 of the 21. Panzer-Division defended against the Canadians at Colombelles. For the time being, the I./Jäger-Regiment 32 was still holding out at the palace north of Colombelles that was right on the Orne. The carpet bombing did not extend this far, so the fighting positions in the woods and at the palace were still intact. Initially, the Canadians did not make good progress at this location. The steel works at Colombelles had been a target of the bombing and had been largely destroyed. A German forward observer directed artillery missions onto Cuverville from one of the factory chimneys that was still standing. Giberville could no longer be held after the loss of the few Panzer IV’s of Panzer-Regiment 22 along the road from Colombelles to Cuverville and the withdrawal of the 2./Sturmgeschütz-Brigade (Feld) 200. The British 3rd Infantry Division attacked on the east flank, also starting at 0745 hours. It was supported by tanks of the 27th Armoured Brigade. The division’s 8th Brigade was the lead element; it was supported by the tanks of the 13th/18th Hussars. The 1st Battalion of the South Lancashire Regiment attacked Le Pré Baron; the 2nd Battalion of the East Yorkshire Regiment attacked Touffréville. The latter village had largely been spared from the wrath of the carpet bombing. The II./Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment (tgp) 125 had not been hit as hard and offered bitter resistance. The battalion was supported by fire from the assault guns of the 5./Sturmgeschütz-Brigade (Feld) 200 from Le Prieure. It was not until 1100 hours that the Yorkshires penetrated into Touffréville. The situation became increasingly critical for the German grenadiers during the course of the afternoon; around 1800 hours, they had to abandon the village.
The British were concentrating their artillery fires on Sannerville, Banneville and Emiéville. Their objective was Troarn. While the fighting for Touffréville was continuing furiously, the 1st Battalion of the Suffolk Regiment attacked Sannerville starting at 1015 hours. Sannerville had been bombed to bits, and there was no appreciable resistance there. By 1220 hours, the village was considered lost; it took until 1600 hours for Banneville to fall.
While the 8th Brigade was attacking these localities—Touffréville, Sannerville and also Banneville —the 9th Brigade started its advance at 0930 against the bombed-out villages of Mandeville and Emiéville. In the latter case, there was not much left of the village. The English soldiers attacked in some areas while mounted on Shermans of the 27th Armoured Brigade, which was supporting them.
The way to Troarn was blocked by elements of the 346. Infanterie-Division, together with rapidly brought-up forces of the 711. Infanterie-Division.
With this, we have an overview of the initial phase of the British attack.
In the meantime, determined tankers of Panzer-Regiment 22 and schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 were working feverishly at Emiéville and Mandeville to try to recover at least a few tanks out of the chaos of the badly bomb-damaged assembly areas. They could hear the sound of approaching enemy tanks in their ears. Fortunately for the Tiger battalion, the 1st and 2nd Companies had not been as severely hit as the 3rd Company. Nevertheless, some of the tanks had been damaged and there were also personnel casualties. Within the 2nd Company, Tiger 213 had been hit by a bomb and flung down an embankment. There was no time left to attempt to recover it.
Towards 1000 hours, the 3rd Company succeeded in getting six tanks moving; four had been destroyed by the bombing (among them, Tigers 313 and 332). In the course of the short immediate counterattack into the left flank of the British Guards Armoured Division south of Lirose, which had been occupied by the 2nd Battalion of the King’s Own Shropshire Light Infantry since 1000 hours, it was determined that the main guns were out of adjustment. Only about every third round was a hit. Another shock for the tank crews was the fact that two Tigers were knocked out by means of clean penetrations. It was later found out that the 8.8-centimeter Flak that were in Cagny had engaged them by mistake.
About two hours later, several Tigers of the 1./schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 conducted an immediate counterattack along the road from Troarn towards Démouville along with tanks that had been dug free from Panzer-Regiment 22. In the process, the company commander’s tank got stuck in a crater and had to be blown up. Another Tiger II was knocked out. At that point, the company turned south. The loss of Tiger 112 presents an interesting story. The tank’s gunner, Gefreiter Thaysen, gave this firsthand account after the war:
As I remember it, the English attack started at 1500 hours. Up until that time we kept ourselves busy wiping away sweat. It was a blistering hot summer day. We could scarcely keep the hatches open because of the on-going artillery fire.
The attack that started at about 1500 hours was supported by a tremendous number of British tanks. The main line of resistance was overrun in a few minutes. Only the 1st Company and a few antitank guns held for a little time. Soon the British were between, in front of and behind us. As a result, neither the English nor we knew who or what was where. In the meantime, both the German and English artillery fired wildly into the midst of it all. And, of course, the British and German infantry were right in there, too.
Tiger 112, the tank in which I was the gunner, was engaged with one Englishman while others fired on us. That caused my tank commander (a newcomer, without combat experience), to well, let’s say … have the tank put in reverse, almost in a panic. We lunged back, right through a hedge, the type you usually found there.
Obviously, the tank commander was a bit out of it, since he had to have seen that another tank was behind the hedge. In any case, there was a jolt, and we were hung up with an Englishman. There was no way that we intended to ram the enemy, all the more so since we ran into him with the rear of the tank, and I was still at twelve o’clock, busy with the Tommy who was firing at us.
We had barely hit the Englishman when, an antitank gun—probably a 75 mm PaK— firing at the Englishman hit us instead. It hit us in the left between the track and the running gear. The round penetrated and sliced the seat right out from under my backside. I found myself on the turret floor. At the same time, the round tore open a shell casing and the propellant charge ignited in a jet of flame. There was nothing for us to do but to bail out, and quick. The radio operator, loader and tank commander were the first ones out. The driver, Horst Becher, was able to grab his pistol and, after bailing out, did target practice against the Englishmen who were around the tank. And that was quite a sight, since he still had his headphones on with the ripped-out cords dangling.
On dismounting through the turret hatch, I landed on a member of the English crew who, presumably, was also somewhat out of it. Apparently he thought I was one of his crew. For a moment, we looked at each other in a daze. Then a rush of heroism awoke in both of us. Each grabbed for the place he’s normally find his pistol. Heroism failed from a lack of lethal materials. Since our tank had started to burn, both of us started to crawl away from it and, since things were lively all around, we both sought cover in a hole behind the Tommy’s tank. With one of us in the left corner and the other in the right one, we eyed each other and each tried to convince the other by gesticulation that the other was his prisoner. Since it turned out that each of us had opposite opinions about that, both of us shrugged our shoulders, grinned at each other and bolted for our own sides.
In contrast to this is the differing version offered by the opposing Sherman tank commander, Lieutenant Gordon:
My name is Gorman and, at the time of Goodwood, I was a platoon leader in the 21st Irish Guards Armoured Regiment, which was equipped with Shermans. During the afternoon of 18 July, we were fighting in the hedgerow country northeast of Cagny. Two or three groups, each with four or five Tigers that were making good use of cover, seemed to be opposing our 5th Guards Armoured Brigade. They would suddenly emerge from their cover, fire, and cost us several losses. We attempted to attack with the company closed up, whereupon the Tigers again disappeared into their cover, only to appear again and repeat the whole process anew.
This was my first time in action, and I was excited. I had got across the little stream running into Cagny from the northeast, but the rest of my troop had got stuck. However, I pushed on alone for a bit and found plenty of targets and was beginning to think this war business was not too bad after all; in fact, I was beginning to enjoy myself.
But this didn’t last too long. Glancing to my left, I saw to my horror the unmistakable shape of a [Königstiger] coming through a hedge less than 200 yards away and directly approaching me.
I ordered my gunner: “Traverse left … steady … on … fire!”
He fired, and I saw to my dismay the 75 mm round hit the front of the Tiger, bounce off and go zinging straight up into the air. I ordered the gunner to fire again, but a hollow voice came up from the bowels of the tank, saying: “Gun jammed, sir!”
This was a situation for which I had not been trained, and I did not know what to do. Glancing anxiously at the Tiger, I saw with horror that his long gun was slowly traversing around in my direction.
Someone had once told me that when in doubt the thing to do was advance, so I ordered my driver to advance at full speed and ram the Tiger. We lurched forward, gathered speed, and hit him in the middle with a terrific crash, just before he got his main gun trained on me.
Both crews bailed out upon impact and, since the air was full of lead, both crews dove for cover. My wireless operator saw a convenient slit trench and, jumping into it, found it already occupied by the Tiger’s crew. At this point, both crews were in the trench and eyed each other suspiciously.
I got out of there and crawled, brought up the 17-pounder Sherman of my platoon and succeeded in finishing off the Tiger. I then collected my crew and the Tiger’s crew, and we went back to our lines and I climbed into another tank.
I recount this little story, because it may well be the only example in the late war in which an army unit used the old naval tactic of ramming. [Reverse-translated into English from the German text.]
Gorman probably hoped that his version of what happened would be accepted without too much question. Fortunately, we are not limited to assumptions. A previously unpublished photograph from the Canadian Military Archives disproves Gorman’s story. The tracks made by the tank moving in reverse can be clearly seen in front of the Tiger. There is also a sharp turn to the left, that is, in the direction of the Sherman. This proves that the Tiger rammed the Sherman. The fact that the Tiger was in reverse is also demonstrated by the drooping of the track behind the drive sprocket. If the tank had been moving forward, it would have been tight. It is also not true that the German crew was taken prisoner immediately afterwards.
Oberleutnant Oemler led the attack of the 1st Company in Tiger 101, but his tank ran into a bomb crater. Since the tank could not be evacuated, it was blown up. (NAC)
Gorman probably intended his story to cover for his own miserable performance. If the Sherman had only run into the Tiger, it could have been put back into operation again. This was not possible, however, since the tank had been hit on the left-hand side of the turret after the Tiger had been fired at. A later engagement by a Sherman Firefly is pure fantasy. The two hits of a German antitank gun on both of the tanks are easily seen in the photos. A memorial at the scene attests to Gorman’s “heroic deed.” The victor always writes the history books …
A further advance of the British on Troarn was stopped by the 2./schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503 and the remaining tanks.
The lead element of the 29th Armoured Brigade—the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment—was attacking in the center of the offensive sector without infantry support. It moved quickly over the wide-open plain east of Cuverville and Démouville and reached the Caen–Troarn rail line around 0840 hours. It had moved behind the rolling barrage of the artillery and had encountered no appreciable resistance. The regiment stopped briefly at the rail line. During this time, the artillery pieces were given new gun-laying information, and the tanks of the 2nd Fife and Forfar Yeomanry that were following closed up. For the time being, the tanks of the 23rd Hussars still remained a reserve behind the two battalions. The attackers, who wanted to reach the Caen–Vimont rail line quickly at this point, were entering a zone that had been spared from bombing.
The hour had come for Sturmgeschütz-Brigade (Feld) 200 and other antitank elements. Three intact batteries were in good positions at Le Prieure, Le Mesnil-Frémentel and Grentheville. In addition, the brigade’s 2nd Battery, which had pulled back from its positions north of Giberville, was directed into new positions west of Grentheville. The 8.8- centimeter Flak battery of the III. Flak-Korps that was positioned in the fruit orchards on the northern edge of Cagny had also survived the bombing fairly well and was ready to fire. The antitank guns of Panzer-Jäger-Abteilung 1039 and Panzer-Jäger-Abteilung 1053 were hidden in well-camouflaged positions. Those antitank guns and the assault guns of Sturmgeschütz-Brigade (Feld) 200 opened fire and knocked out sixteen Shermans in the space of a few minutes as they were starting to cross the rail line.
The assault guns were employed skillfully. They harassed the attackers by quickly changing positions while still maintaining camouflage and effectively engaging from covered positions. In addition, the tanks of the 23rd Hussars that were following were effectively engaged from the vicinity of Emiéville, while they were crossing the first rail line from Caen to Troarn.
As they crossed the second rail line (from Caen to Vimont), the English wound up outside the range of their own artillery. As a result, they had to continue their advance without their accustomed artillery. Despite their heavy losses, they attacked in two armored groups from the area of Grentheville in the directions of Bras–Hubert-Folie and Soliers– Bourguébus–Four.
Because the British were attacking at the time without infantry, they bypassed Grentheville on both sides and were not able to clear the village.
The 3./Sturmgeschütz-Brigade (Feld) 200 and a Nebelwerfer element with seventy-two tubes were holding out in Grentheville. Constantly changing positions, the assault guns in Grentheville engaged the enemy to the east and the west and knocked out several enemy tanks.
Around 1130 hours, Le Mesnil-Frémentel was attacked by the motorized infantry of the follow-on 8th Battalion of the Rifles Brigade. This attack was also supported by tanks. Elements of the I./Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 125, which had been demoralized and weakened by the previous bombardment and the several hours of artillery fire, marched into captivity.
The 4./Sturmgeschütz-Brigade (Feld) 200, which had lost a 10.5-centimeter assault gun as a result of the heavy artillery fire, pulled back from Le Mesnil-Frémentel starting at 1130 hours and took up new positions at Le Poirier. The 2./Sturmgeschütz-Brigade (Feld) 200 also took up new positions; it moved to Hubert-Folie.
The 3./Sturmgeschütz-Brigade (Feld) 200 held out in Grentheville until 1500 hours, before it pulled back to new positions south of Soliers. The Nebelwerfer unit in Grentheville was then overrun.
The lead tanks of the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment reached Bra and Hubert-Folie at 1115 hours.
Tanks of the 2nd Fife and Forfar Yeomanry were east of Bourguébus at 1200 hours. It now proved fortunate for Sturmgeschütz-Brigade (Feld) 200 that it had pulled back to new positions and had avoided its own destruction as a result.
The assault gun brigade then reinforced the rearward defensive sector that was being formed by elements of Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 220, Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 21, Panzer-Jäger-Abteilung 21 and the III. Flak-Korps.
German artillery and rocket launchers joined the fight throughout the day.
By noon, the British attack had lost its impetus. Although they had succeeded in overrunning the forward-most German positions and gaining terrain in the depths of the battlefield, they had still not broken through the German defensive system.