CHAPTER THREE
On the morning of 7 December 1941 the peace was shattered by the roar of piston aero engines. Personnel at Pearl Harbor were nonplussed as no flying from the island was scheduled for that day. As the roar grew louder it soon became apparent that the aircraft were not American, and the next thought was that they were under attack. Out of the sky swept a strong force of Japanese Navy dive-bombers, torpedo aircraft and supporting fighters. Battleship Row was the intended target, with wave after wave of attackers heading towards the steel behemoths safely tied up at their anchorages. Some of the battleship crews were more alert than others and began to mount a spirited defence to the fleet-wide order, ‘Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill’, against the aerial intruders, even though most of the ammunition lockers were secured. After ninety minutes the air over Hawaii grew quiet as the Japanese aircraft departed for their carriers. Behind them they left a scene of utter devastation: four battleships were sunk at their mooring, four more were damaged and another seven vessels were sunk or damaged. Personnel losses were grievous, with 2,402 being killed and another 1,282 suffering wounds. As well as the loss to the fleet, much of the island’s infrastructure was also damaged and destroyed, including the power station, the shipyard and other maintenance facilities. But while all this was a major blow to the US Navy, the Japanese missed the most vital naval vessels, the aircraft carriers.
The attack on Pearl Harbor had its roots in many areas. At the conclusion of the Great War in 1918 there was a veritable pause in warship construction, all the participants realising that the building of capital ships would place a great strain on their already shaky economies. However, such a situation would not remain static for long, as Britain, Japan and the United States were close to bringing new battleship construction planning to fruition in 1920. Having seen one arms race that ran from 1909 to 1918, it was obvious to all the major powers that starting another arms race was not a good idea. The result would be the Washington Treaty, or Five Nations Treaty, that was designed to limit the amount of naval tonnage constructed by the signatories. The five nations that signed the treaty were Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States. All met in Washington in December 1921 to negotiate the tonnages allowable for each class of vessel. The various wrangles were finally cleared by late January 1922, the treaty being signed on 6 February. Following the Washington Treaty came the London Treaty signed in 1930, which modified the terms of the treaty. A second London Treaty was signed in 1936, although by this time Japan was completely ignoring the amounts and tonnages for each vessel class, as they regarded the treaties as limiting their sovereign rights and their plans for the future. Adding to the Japanese sense of grievance was the global economic collapse that started in 1926 and from which Japan emerged in the mid-1930s. Allied to this was the fact that the touted free trade around the world was being totally ignored by the major powers. In fact the practice was to protect their special economic rights within their own areas of influence while taxing imports from other areas heavily.
A fire vessel assists the crew of the USS Nevada, BB-36, as the crew battles with the fire caused by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The crew eventually grounded their damaged battleship, their actions allowing the vessel to be rebuilt quickly and to rejoin the war effort
. (US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
The USS California was also hit by the Japanese attack aircraft on 7 December 1941. This battleship was also rebuilt and served through the remainder of the war.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
This fine portrait of a Vought SB2U Vindicator shows the markings applied to pre-war aircraft of the US Navy. This aircraft was assigned to VS-72 aboard the USS Wasp.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
By this time Japan had increased her sphere of influence to encompass Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria, from where she exported goods to America and Europe at greatly reduced prices while charging extortionate tariffs on incoming goods. While much of the civilian raw materials were readily available within the Japanese sphere of influence, two vital materials, oil and rubber, were not easily obtainable, as the former came from America and the
When Pearl Harbor was attacked, the USS Wasp was operating in the Atlantic, although it would be quickly transferred to the Pacific to bolster the carrier force operating there.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
latter from the British colonies in the Far East. Fearing Japanese expansion, both of these nations sought to restrict Japanese military growth by controlling the export of both of these materials. In order to further control any possible Japanese plans, President Franklin D. Roosevelt placed an embargo on exporting oil to Japan. Helping to increase the Japanese oil and rubber deficiencies were the military adventures being undertaken in China, where Russian resistance to the Japanese expansion was strong. It was at this point that the military-controlled government decided that a naval request to invade the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya was formulated, as the capture of both would give Japan easy access to both vital raw materials. The first move made by Japan outside her earlier territory conquests was the invasion of French Indo-China in 1940. This was the final straw for President Roosevelt, who completely banned the export of oil and steel to Japan in an effort to stop any further territorial gains.
While President Roosevelt and his senior advisers were rightly concerned about the Japanese adventurism in the Far East and the Pacific, it would be difficult for the Federal Government to sell a possible war against an enemy half a world away to the American people. In order to keep the vital assets of the US Navy safe, the President ordered the Pacific Fleet to abandon its exercises off Hawaii and return to port in Pearl Harbor on 7 May 1940 and to stay there until further notice. While the fleet was in port the President ordered the US Navy to undertake an evaluation of its available ships and to report on any deficiencies. The report was studied during August 1940, the result being the issue of contracts at the beginning of September for the construction of new vessels. The orders covered a total of 210 ships, which included two Iowa-class battleships, five Montana battleships, twelve Essex-class aircraft carriers, six Alaska-class battlecruisers, four Baltimore-class heavy cruisers, nineteen Cleveland-class light cruisers and four Atlanta-class light cruisers, while the remainder were various classes of destroyer.
Although the battleships were ordered to remain in Pearl Harbor, the remainder of the US Navy was ordered to resume normal patrols and visits. The first of these was undertaken in April 1941 when the heavy cruisers Chicago and Portland, plus a selection of destroyers and an oiler, departed Hawaii for Samoa as TG.9.1. From Samoa the task group headed for Sydney, Australia, this being followed by Brisbane, Tahiti and Auckland before it headed to Hawaii at the end of the month. A further US Navy visit was undertaken in August, taking in ports in Australia, plus Port Moresby and Rabaul.
While the Americans were busy supporting the convoys in the Atlantic, and patrolling that ocean, the Japanese and the Germans were busy in the Pacific. Although Japan had not formerly declared war in support of Germany, she was providing vital supplies to that nation. Instead of German blockade runners entering a Japanese friendly port where they could be spotted, the plan was for both parties to meet out at sea where exchanges could be made with greater privacy. While many of these were undertaken without any interference, some of the blockade runners were intercepted en route by Royal Navy patrols, and their valuable cargoes were impounded.
In October 1941 the President finally rescinded his ‘stay in port’ order to allow the battleships to gain some sea time. However, this was not without incident as the battleships Arizona and Oklahoma managed to collide, forcing an early return to port. A further move saw the submarines Narwhal and Dolphin arrive off Wake Island to undertake a simulated war patrol. During this ‘not at war’ period it was obvious that the Federal Government and the armed forces were gearing up for a potential conflict. To that end the American Neutrality Law was altered on 13 November to allow merchant ships to enter all zones and to provide for the arming of same. Twelve days later the US Navy introduced compulsory convoys for merchant shipping operating in the Pacific. On 25 November President Roosevelt, in negotiation with a Japanese delegation concerning their future plans, was forced to break off negotiations as the Japanese were proving intractable. The following day the American government through Secretary of State Hull handed the Japanese Ambassador in Washington a ten-point note that requested their compliance. The Japanese refused to accept these conditions and threatened to break off diplomatic relations. In response the Americans increased their intelligence gathering in the Pacific.
The inevitable breakdown in relations between America and Japan began to accelerate as a large carrier-based striking force assembled at Hitokapou Bay set out towards Pearl Harbor on 26 November. In this fleet were the aircraft carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku with a total complement of 423 aircraft. Escorting the carriers were eight destroyers and a light cruiser. The support group consisted of the two battleships Hiei and Kirishima, plus two heavy cruisers. A smaller cruiser and destroyer force would also depart, although their target was Midway. Although the strike target had not been confirmed, the Federal Government issued a War Warning to all overseas commanders. The warning had been issued in response to signal analysis and gathered intelligence that revealed unusual concentrations of Imperial Japanese Navy vessels. The information only covered the IJN forces under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Fleet, Vice-Admiral Kindo, which were taking up positions around Formosa, Hainan, Indo-China and Palua. Missing from this intelligence-gathering effort were the vessels gathered together for the Pearl Harbor strike, Operation Kido Butai. While some signals traffic was intercepted from this force, these were not decoded due to lack of source material and the small number of Japanese-speaking translators available. In fact this scarce resource was concentrating upon the telegrams and other signals traffic being generated by the various Japanese diplomatic embassies around the world, and the war would have ended before the remaining signals traffic was finally decoded. To make matters even more difficult for the Americans, the Japanese changed all the callsigns for their warships and task forces. In response to the IJN movements the US Navy stationed the submarines Tambour and Triton off Wake Island, while the Argonaut and Trout were stationed off Midway for reconnaissance purposes. On 4 December the Japanese caused even more consternation among the American intelligence community by changing the super-cypher codebook for its naval units and task groups.
As the Pearl Harbor task force continued towards its target, a further task force assigned for the capture of Malaya departed Hainan on 4 December. Also departing was the task force escorts plus the Southern Expeditionary Force, which departed from Saigon. Their intended targets were Prachuab, Jimbhorn, Bandon and Nakhorn to block off the Kra isthmus. A larger force attacked Signora and Patani, while a further, smaller group headed for Khota Bharu and Kurita. Two days later another assault force departed on 6 December from Palau and set sail for the Philippines with the aircraft carrier Ryujo. The carrier launched thirteen bombers and nine fighters to attack Davao, while the support group held a position off Mindanoa. Operating in conjunction with the air strike, other naval forces entered the Gulf of Davao to undertake bombardment duties. A further assault group also departed Palau on 8 December and headed towards Legaspi. En route the escort force laid mines in the San Bernadino Strait and the Surigo Strait in order to frustrate any possible American reprisals.
The Japanese battle group assigned to attack Pearl Harbor reached its launch point just north of Oaha, and the first wave of aircraft, led by Commander Fuchida, departed the carriers at 06.00 hrs. This wave of aircraft consisted of fifty high-level bombers, forty torpedo-bombers, fifty-one dive-bombers and forty-three escorting fighters. Not long afterwards the second wave was launched, consisting of fifty-four high-level bombers, eighty-one dive-bombers and thirty-six fighters. As the Japanese air armada headed towards Pearl Harbor the intention had been for the Japanese Ambassador to deliver a formal note declaring that a state of war existed between America and Japan. Timed to coincide with the first bombs being dropped, problems with translation meant that the declaration of war was delivered late.
While the United States intelligence services were aware of the movements of the various Japanese forces heading to other parts of the Pacific, they had also been monitoring the communications of the Japanese Consul, Kita. However, those that had been deciphered had given no strong indications that any such attack was forthcoming. As the Pearl Harbor strike force sailed towards Hawaii some of the escorting submarines had been detected by the destroyer USS Ward, while the incoming aerial strike force had been detected on long-range radar. Adding to the marginal intelligence was a warning telegram from General George Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff, that highlighted the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor and the other major military establishments on Hawaii. The warning signals were not regarded as significant by Washington, and the telegram from General Marshall was misdirected, so that it reached the President after the bombs had begun falling. While some post-war critics would claim a conspiracy was in place to allow the attack to take place and force the United States into the war, it was more the lack of positive intelligence that allowed the strike to take place, as in truth America was only one short step from hostilities. To add to the American woes, Germany and Italy formally declared war on 11 December.
Fortunately the two aircraft carriers assigned to the Pacific fleet were already at sea. The USS Lexington was the core of Task Force 11 under the command of Rear Admiral Newton, and was heading at full speed towards Midway with a full load of US Marine Corps aircraft to defend the island. As the US Navy was already on a war footing the carrier was provided with a full flotilla of escorting destroyers, while the submarine USS Trout was still stationed close to Midway. The other Pacific carrier, USS Enterprise, was assigned to Task Force 8 under the command of Admiral Halsey, and was returning to Hawaii after delivering aircraft for the defence of Wake Island. However, these were attacked by the Japanese as they passed near Ford Island. As the Enterprise headed towards Hawaii the Japanese submarines strung out along various patrol lines attempted to intercept the carrier and its escorts. Fortunately the carrier’s aircraft and the escorts were fully alert and managed to drive off the intruding submarines.
Fortunately for the US Navy, the aircraft carriers were away from Pearl Harbor. One of them was the USS Lexington, seen here.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
With its protective destroyer in the background, the deck crews of VT-6 prepare their charges aboard the USS Enterprise prior to the Battle of Midway.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
While the Japanese were devastating Pearl Harbor, another Japanese combat group was beginning its assault upon the Philippines. The North Philippines Force began its attack on Luzon on 8 December when a force of 192 aircraft under the command of Vice-Admiral Tsukahara struck against the aircraft based at Clark and Ida Fields, while other aircraft from Formosa attacked the bases at Tuguegaro and Baguio. While the aircraft were keeping the Americans occupied, a further task force landed on Bataan, catching the defenders totally by surprise. Following the first Luzon assault came the second wave of vessels, carrying more troops, who were landed north of Luzon on 10 December, although by this time the defenders were more organised and were able to launch a force of Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bombers and Curtiss P-40 Warhawk fighters to attack the assault fleet. While the attack was mainly unsuccessful, the USAAC aircraft did manage to badly damage one of the escort vessels. A third force commanded by Rear Admiral Nishimura attempted to land another assault force at Padan near Luzon, but bad weather stopped the landing taking place. While standing off from shore the ships were attacked by USAAC aircraft, during which one of the escorts was sunk and two transports were damaged. A successful landing took place twenty-four hours later at Vingan. With the beachheads secured the naval aircraft undertook a devastating attack on the USAAC bases at Luzon on 12 December which destroyed the bulk of the Far East Air Force, the survivors managing to make their way to Mindanao and Australia.
With the Philippines under Japanese control, their next target was Guam. As the task force advanced they sank the minesweeper USS Penguin, after which the way was clear to take the island. After a period of token resistance the American garrison surrendered on 10 December. During that same period another assault group hit the Gilbert Islands, which after some resistance also fell into Japanese hands.
As the Japanese assault forces spread across the Pacific, another large assault group was heading towards their main prize, Malaya. The assault started on 7 December on the Thai coast, the Japanese meeting little opposition until they reached Kota Bharu. Here the Royal Air Force attempted to intervene, attacking targets on land and at sea. However, the British defence would soon crumble, as the Japanese aircraft would attack and sink the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser HMS Repulse on the afternoon of 8 December, with great loss of life on both vessels. This victory seemed to spur the invaders on as they raced down Malaya sweeping all before them. Even the Royal Air Force would fail to make much of an impact, as its obsolescent aircraft were outflown and outgunned by their Japanese counterparts. A second landing by the Japanese Malaya Force would take place on the night of 16/17 December near Kuantan. While Dutch naval submarines attempted to stop the attack, their efforts, while praiseworthy, only caused minimal delay, as only one transport was sunk. Borneo would also be the subject of Japanese attention as another assault convoy attacked on 16 December. Again the Allied forces attempted to stem the attacks without much success.
The first setback for the Japanese forces took place over the night of 10/11 December, when the assault force under the command of Rear Admiral Kajioka was repulsed by the defenders based on Wake Island. As the attack began, the 450 US Marines under the command of Major Devereaux, with the support of the island’s coastal batteries, drove the invaders back into the sea. Also on the island were sixty-eight US Navy personnel and 1,200 civilian workers who were finishing off the recently completed military works on the island. The USMC force was armed with six guns for coastal defence, and twelve M3 guns. Further defensive weaponry included thirty machine-guns of various manufacture and serviceability. On 28 November 1941 Commander Winfield S. Cunningham USN arrived on Wake to assume overall command of the forces on the island. During the following two weeks he examined the available defences and increased the training of his men before hostilities began. On 8 December 1941 thirty-six Mitsubishi G3M bombers flown from bases on the Marshall Islands attacked Wake Island, destroying eight of the twelve Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat fighter aircraft belonging to USMC fighter squadron VMF-211 on the ground. All of the Marine garrison’s defensive emplacements were untouched during the raid, although twenty-three Marines were killed and a further eleven were wounded. Ten civilian employees of Pan American Airways based on the island were also killed.
A Grumman F4F Wildcat assigned to VF-71 aboard the USS Wasp taxies out to undertake a training sortie before returning to its carrier home.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
In the early hours of the morning of 11 December, the garrison, with the support of the four remaining Wildcats, successfully repulsed the first Japanese landing attempt, the force consisting of the light cruisers Yubari, Tenry and Tatsuta, eight destroyers and two troop transport ships containing 450 Special Naval Landing Force troops. The US Marines fired at the invasion fleet with the coastal artillery guns, although Major Devereux had ordered the gunners to hold their fire until the enemy moved within effective range of the guns. Battery L under the command of Sergeant Henry Bedell on Peale islet succeeded in sinking the Hayate at a distance of 4,000 yards with direct hits to the magazines, which caused the ship to explode and sink within two minutes. The four remaining Wildcats also succeeded in sinking another destroyer by dropping a bomb on the stern, where the depth charges were stored. Both Japanese destroyers were lost with all hands, with the Hayate becoming the first Japanese surface warship to be sunk during the Second World War. The severity of the defence caused the Japanese force to withdraw before landing. This was also the first Japanese defeat of the war. After the initial raid was beaten off the United States news media reported that, when asked about the need for reinforcement and resupply, Cunningham retorted, ‘Send us more Japs!’
Commander Cunningham had sent a long list of critical equipment requirements, which included gunsights for the defensive guns and fire-control radar, to his immediate superior, Commandant, 14th Naval District. The siege of the island continued, punctuated by frequent air attacks on the Wake garrison. The strong resistance offered by the garrison prompted the Japanese Navy to detach the two aircraft carriers Soryu and Hiryu from the force that had attacked Pearl Harbor to support the second landing attempt. The projected American relief attempt by Task Force 11 commanded by Admiral Frank Fletcher, and supported by Task Force 14 commanded by Admiral Wilson Brown, consisted of the fleet carrier Saratoga, the fleet oiler USNS Neches, the seaplane tender Tangier, the cruisers Astoria, Minneapolis and San Francisco plus ten destroyers. The convoy carried the 4th Marine Defence Battalion, VMF-221 fighter squadron equipped with Brewster F2A Buffalo fighters. Also carried by the force were 9,000 5-inch rounds, 12,000 3-inch rounds, and three million machine-gun rounds, as well as ammunition for mortars and other small arms. Task Force 14, consisting of the fleet carrier Lexington, three heavy cruisers, eight destroyers and one oiler, was ordered to undertake a diversionary raid on the Marshall Islands to distract the Japanese. On 22 December, after receiving intelligence that indicated the presence of two Japanese carriers plus two fast battleships near Wake Island, Vice-Admiral William S. Pye, the Acting Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Fleet, ordered TF.14 to return to Pearl Harbor as he feared for its safety. Also, problems with refuelling at sea had delayed the arrival of the task force, and this hastened its recall.
The Brewster Buffalo was already outdated when hostilities began. Even so, in some distant outposts their pilots fought well against overwhelming odds.
(John Ryan Collection)
The second Japanese invasion force, under the command of Rear Admiral Kajioka, departing from Kwajalein on 20 December and arriving on station by 23 December, was composed mostly of the same ships from the first attempt with extra additions plus 1,500 Japanese marines. The landings began in the early hours of the morning, the opening gambit being a preliminary bombardment. During the initial landings Patrol Boat No. 32 and Patrol Boat No. 33 were beached and burned in their attempts to land the invasion force. After a full night and morning of fighting, the Wake garrison surrendered to the Japanese during the afternoon. The USMC lost forty-seven killed during the entire fifteen-day siege, with three Navy personnel and at least seventy civilians killed, while a further twelve civilians were wounded. Japanese losses were recorded at between 700 and 900 killed, while a further 300 were wounded. During the assault the Japanese lost two destroyers in the first invasion attempt, plus twenty-eight land-based and carrier aircraft either shot down or damaged. The Japanese captured all men remaining on the island, the majority being civilian contractors employed by the Morrison-Knudsen Company. Captain Henry T. Elrod, one of the pilots from VMF-211, was later awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for his actions defending the island during the second landing attempt, having shot down two Japanese A6M Zero fighters and sunk the Japanese destroyer Kisaragi. A special military decoration, the Wake Island Device, was also created to recognise those who had fought in the defence of the island.
A mix of Wildcat fighters and Dauntless dive-bombers run up their engines to full power prior to launching from the USS Saratoga.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
Ranged on the foredeck of the USS Lexington are these Douglas Dauntlesses of VB-16 being prepared for a mission. (
US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
On 17 December 1941 there was a change of command for the Pacific fleet when Admiral Chester W. Nimitz replaced Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, although during the intervening period Admiral Pye had assumed temporary command. The Japanese forces, having undertaken their initial conquests, would start to consolidate their hold on their new territories. The first to experience reinforcement were the Philippines, when further forces were landed on 17 December. The following day the final battle for Hong Kong took place, the British forces finally surrendering as they were faced by overwhelming odds. At the year’s end further Japanese forces were landed throughout Malaya, with others invading Sarawak, Labuan, Brunei Bay and North Borneo. The next year, 1942, would open with a United Nations meeting in Washington, where twenty-six nations agreed that they would not conclude a separate peace with either Germany or Japan.
Meanwhile, in the Pacific the American war to repulse the Japanese was passed to the submarine service, which set about sinking as many ships as possible. Surface activity resumed on 6 January when a convoy departed San Francisco, consisting of five troop transports escorted by Task Force 17 with the fleet carrier USS Yorktown, recently transferred from Atlantic duties. Their destination was Pago Pago on Samoa, and this force was also escorted by another task force, TF.8, with the USS Enterprise as its aircraft carrier. On 9 January, TF.14 with the carrier USS Saratoga was ordered to join these task groups. However, en route the carrier was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine, one of a patrol line stationed off Hawaii. Luckily personnel losses were kept to six men, while structural damage was limited to three compartments. Fortunately the Saratoga had undergone major modifications at Bremerton Naval Yard, which included the fitment of external bulges that helped limit the damage. Even so the carrier had to return to Hawaii for more extensive repair work. While the United States was continuing to build up her war machine, the Japanese forces were undertaking further assaults throughout South-East Asia. One of the first reinforcement attacks took place on 14 January against Rabaul and Kavieng. As the Japanese High Command had anticipated great resistance, at least four aircraft carriers and escorts were assigned to the mission. Their assault was successful, and the covering forces, carriers and battleships departed the area and returned to the main naval base that had been established at Truk Atoll.
Like all the available carriers, the USS Saratoga had its air wing updated as new types came into service. Here a Grumman F6F prepares to launch to undertake another sortie.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
Pearl Harbor would be the scene of much activity on 22 January when Task Force 11 under the command of Rear Admiral Brown set out to mount an attack on Wake Island. At the core of TF.11 was the carrier USS Lexington, plus an array of escorting cruisers and destroyers. It would be the Japanese who would spoil the progress of the mission, as one of their submarines managed to sink the oiler USS Neches. With no mobile fuel supply, the task force had to return to Pearl Harbor, as the destroyers needed the oiler for refuelling. Another attack would be mounted on 25 January, although this time the target was the Marshall and Gilbert Islands. Two carrier groups would be involved in this raid, these being TF.8 under the command of Vice-Admiral Halsey and TF.17 with Vice-Admiral Fletcher commanding. Their assigned carriers were the Enterprise and Yorktown respectively. Operations began on 1 February when aircraft from the Enterprise were launched, including eighteen torpedo and forty-six dive-bombing aircraft against the islands of Wotje, Maloelap and Kwajalien. During the attack seven IJN vessels, including a cruiser, were damaged, while one vessel was sunk for the loss of six aircraft. The Japanese would launch an aerial counter-attack during which the Enterprise suffered minor damage. The Yorktown group undertook an attack on the islands of Jaluit, Mili and Makin for the loss of six aircraft. At the completion of the raids the US Navy forces withdrew. However, the IJN decided to send a carrier group in pursuit, although this was recalled three days later on 4 February, as the High Command was worried about raids on the Japanese home islands.
Everywhere was a tight fit aboard, the early carrier reveals. Here ground crews prepare their charges, Douglas Dauntlesses of VT-6, aboard the USS Enterprise.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
Having returned to Hawaii after the loss of the group’s oiler, Task Force 11 would depart from Pearl Harbor on 31 January. Its mission was to provide protection for two convoys that had passed through the Panama Canal and were heading to the south Pacific. The first convoy consisted of six vessels packed with troops heading for Bora Bora, while the second consisted of eight ships, with 20,000 troops aboard, destined for New Caledonia. The journey was completed with little incident, and so the carrier group was assigned to ANZAC under the overall command of Vice-Admiral Leary USN. The first mission for TF.11 was to undertake an attack on Rabaul, departing from the New Hebrides on 17 February. En route the task force was spotted by Japanese Emily flying-boats, of which two were shot down by the carrier’s air cover. At this point the task force was some 300 miles short of its target, and would come under attack from Japanese aircraft based on Rabaul. During the defensive effort Lieutenant O’Hare, one of the fighter pilots from the USS Enterprise, managed to shoot down five enemy aircraft. Having been discovered, the task force commander decided to cancel the attack and return to harbour. Instead of pressing on towards Rabaul, TF.11 would undertake a patrol of the Coral Sea before joining up with TF.17 on 6 March, just off the New Hebrides. Both carrier groups then returned to Pearl Harbor for repairs and restoring. On 14 February Task Force 8 departed from Pearl Harbor to undertake raids on Marcus and Wake Islands. The first raid was undertaken on 24 February, thirty-six bombers being launched, with six fighters as escort. During the raid one aircraft was lost. The aircraft from USS Enterprise undertook a further raid this time against Marcus on 4 March during which one aircraft was lost. Following on from the Enterprise raid, Task Group 17 would depart from Hawaii on 16 February to undertake a raid on Eniwetok Atoll in the Carolines. However, this raid was called off as the task force was desperately needed to provide cover for a convoy heading to the south-west Pacific. At the completion of the escort run the carrier group headed for the Phoenix Islands on 17 February, arriving off the New Hebrides on 6 March, where the group joined up with TF.11.
On 24 February 1942 the renumbered TF.8, now known as TF.16, under the command of Vice-Admiral Halsey, departed from Hawaii to undertake a raid on Wake Island. The carrier’s air group bombed the Japanese positions on the island while the escorts shelled other installations. All of the aircraft returned to the carrier safely. While the Americans were making some progress and honing their battle skills, the Japanese were making further inroads into the Dutch East Indies. These began on 25 February, with Java being the main target, the invasion being completed by 9 March. Although the Enterprise task force had been unable to attack Wake Island, the group was reassigned to attack Marcus Island, setting out on 4 March. While the Enterprise group was en route to Marcus the Lexington, at the core of TF.11 under the command of Vice-Admiral Brown, joined up with TF.17 under the command of Rear Admiral Fletcher to undertake a combined raid on the Japanese landing-points on the south of the Papuan Peninsula. On 10 March the carriers launched a total of 104 aircraft to attack the harbours on the other side of the Owen Stanley Mountains. During the attack three vessels were sunk, and a further seven naval vessels were damaged. A further transport was so damaged that it had to be beached. At the conclusion of these raids the carrier task forces would withdraw and return to Pearl Harbor.
On 30 March 1942 the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to divide the Pacific Ocean into two separate commands. The first was the Pacific Ocean Area under the command of Admiral Nimitz, while the other, the South-West Pacific Area, would be under the command of Lieutenant-General MacArthur. One of the first tasks of the rehashed naval command was to undertake the Doolittle Raid. This mission, undertaken on 18 April 1942, was the first air raid by American forces to strike at the Japanese home island of Honsu. It demonstrated to the Japanese that they were vulnerable to Allied air attack, and provided some reparation for Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. The raid was conceived, planned and led by Lieutenant-Colonel James ‘Jimmy’ Doolittle. Sixteen North American B-25B Mitchell bombers were launched from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet deep within enemy waters. The plan called for them to bomb military targets in Japan and then land in China. All of the aircraft involved in the bombing were lost and eleven of the crewmen were either killed or captured. One of the B-25s landed in Soviet territory, where its crew remained interned for over a year. The complete crews from thirteen of the sixteen aircraft, and all but one of a fourteenth, returned to America or other Allied forces The raid itself caused little material damage to Japan, but it did succeed in its goal of lifting American morale. It also resulted in the Japanese High Command withdrawing a carrier group from the Indian Ocean to defend the home islands.
The raid had its roots in a desire by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, expressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a meeting at the White House on 21 December 1941, for Japan to be bombed as soon as possible to boost public morale after the disaster at Pearl Harbor. The idea for the attack came from Captain Francis Low USN, Assistant Chief of Staff for anti-submarine warfare, whose report to Admiral Ernest J. King on 10 January 1942 stated that it would be possible for twin-engined USAAF bombers to be successfully launched from an aircraft carrier. Requirements for the aircraft included a cruising range of 2,400 miles with a 2,000 lb bomb load, and this resulted in the selection of the North American B-25B Mitchell to carry out the mission. Subsequent flight trials with a B-25 indicated they would be able fulfil the mission requirements. Doolittle’s first report suggested that the bombers could land in Vladivostok, Russia, thus shortening the outbound flight by 600 miles, after which they would be turned over as Lend-Lease supplies. When planning indicated that the B-25 was the aircraft that best met all specifications of the mission, two were loaded aboard the aircraft carrier USS Hornet at Norfolk, Virginia, and subsequently flown off the deck without difficulty on 3 February 1942. The raid was immediately approved, and the 17th Bomb Group (Medium) was chosen to provide the pool of crews from which volunteers would be recruited. The 17th BG had been the first group to receive B-25s, with all four of its squadrons equipped with the bomber by September 1941. The 17th BG was originally flying anti-submarine patrols from Pendleton, Oregon, and was ordered to move to Lexington County Army Air Base, South Carolina, to prepare for the mission against Japan. The group officially transferred to Columbia on 9 February, where its combat crews were offered the opportunity to volunteer for an extremely hazardous, but unspecified, mission.
Initial planning called for twenty aircraft to fly the mission. Therefore twenty-four of the group’s B-25B Mitchell bombers were diverted to the Mid-Continent Airlines modification centre in Minneapolis for alterations that included removal of the lower gun turret, installation of de-icers and anti-icers, steel blast plates fitted on the fuselage around the upper turret, installation of three additional fuel tanks and support mounts in the bomb bay, crawl way and lower turret area to increase fuel capacity, and mock gun barrels installed in the tail position. Two bombers also had cameras mounted to record the results of bombing. The crews selected for the mission collected the modified bombers from Minneapolis and flew them to Eglin Field, Florida, during March 1942. There the crews received intensive training for three weeks in simulated carrier-deck take-offs, low-level and night flying, low-altitude bombing, and over-water navigation. On 25 March the B-25s took off from Eglin for McClellan Field, California. They arrived on 27 March for final modifications by the Sacramento Air Depot. A total of sixteen B-25s were subsequently flown to Alameda, California, on 31 March.
A Douglas Dauntless angles onto the deck of the USS Hornet, while the control batsman prepares to dive clear of the slightly off-centre dive-bomber.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
With their restraining struts still in position, this pair of Grumman Wildcats come up on the elevator from the hangar aboard the USS Enterprise.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
Fifteen raiders would be assigned to the mission, while a sixteenth aircraft would be carried on the deck to be flown off shortly after departure from San Francisco to provide feedback to the Army pilots about take-off characteristics. On 1 April 1942 the sixteen modified bombers were loaded onto the USS Hornet at Alameda, with each aircraft carrying four specially constructed 500 lb bombs. Three of these were high-explosive munitions, while the other was a bundle of incendiaries. After loading aboard the carrier, the aircraft were tied down on the carrier’s flight deck in the order of their expected launch. The Hornet and Task Force 18 left the port of Alameda on 2 April, and a few days later rendezvoused with Task Force 16, which included the USS Enterprise, commanded by Vice-Admiral Halsey, in the mid-Pacific Ocean north of Hawaii. The Enterprise fighters and scout planes would provide protection for the entire task force in the event of a Japanese air attack, since the Hornet’s fighters were stowed below decks to allow the B-25s to use the flight deck. Early in the morning of 18 April the task force was sighted by a Japanese picket boat, which radioed a warning to Japan. Although the boat was fatally damaged by gunfire from the cruiser USS Nashville, Doolittle and the Hornet commander, Captain Mitscher, decided to launch the bombers immediately, at least ten hours early and 170 miles farther from Japan than originally planned. After respotting to allow for engine starts and run-ups, all sixteen aircraft departed safely. This would be the only time that USAAF bombers were launched from an aircraft carrier on a combat mission.
A B-25 Mitchell departs from USS Hornet, en route to bomb Japan. While the raid caused little physical damage, the lift to American morale was tremendous.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
With throttles wide open, the first of the Doolittle Raiders lifts off from the deck of the USS Hornet. Unlike normal operational B-25s, these aircraft had fake tail guns and increased fuel tankage in the fuselage, among other modifications.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
Safely airborne, the B-25s then flew towards Japan in groups of two to four aircraft before changing to single file at wave-top level to avoid detection. The aircraft then arrived over Japan and bombed ten military and industrial targets in Tokyo, two in Yokohama, and one each in Yokosuka, Nagoya, Kobe and Osaka. Although some B-25s encountered light anti-aircraft fire and a few enemy fighters over Japan, no aircraft was shot down. Only the B-25 of Lieutenant Joyce received any battle damage–minor hits from anti-aircraft fire. Aircraft No. 4, piloted by Lieutenant Everett W. Holstrom, jettisoned its bombs before reaching its target when it came under attack by fighters after its gun turret malfunctioned. Fifteen of the sixteen aircraft then proceeded south-west along the southern coast of Japan and out across the East China Sea towards eastern China, where several airfields in Chekiang Province were supposed to be ready to guide them in, using homing beacons for refuelling. The raiders faced several unforeseen challenges during their flight to China, as night was approaching, the aircraft were running low on fuel and the weather was rapidly deteriorating. As a result of these problems, the crews realised they would probably not be able to reach the intended bases in China, leaving them the option of either baling out over eastern China or crash-landing along the Chinese coast. Following the Doolittle Raid, the crews that came down in China eventually made it to safety with the help of Chinese civilians and soldiers. While the raid created little material damage, unlike the B-29 raids later in the war, the psychological effects were more widespread. The attack revealed that the Japanese homelands were vulnerable to further raids, even as their forces were pushing through south-east Asia towards Australia.
Grumman F6F Hellcats of VF-20 are prepared for flight aboard the USS Lexington. Note the widespread use of helmets for head protection among the deck crews.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
After launching the Mitchells, the USS Hornet group steamed at full speed towards Pearl Harbor, while the carrier Enterprise as part of TF.11 was heading in the other direction towards Palmyra Island, where it offloaded a much-needed cargo of USMC fighters on 18 April. The Yorktown group, TF.17, under the command of Admiral Fletcher, would strike the next blow against the Japanese in early May. The Japanese High Command had decided that their next move would be to invade Port Moresby on New Guinea, while another force was headed towards to Tulagi on the Solomons. To ensure success the IJN provided a large number of cruisers and destroyers to escort the transports for both missions. The first strike from the Yorktown involved ninety-nine aircraft directed against the Tulagi assault force. The attack took place on 4 May, during which four naval vessels were sunk and a further four were badly damaged. Having realised that the Americans had a pair of carriers in the area, the Japanese High Command decided to undertake a decisive strike against the American carriers. On 7 May the carrier forces from the both navies exchanged air strikes that continued over the next two days.
On the following day the Japanese fleet carrier Shokaku was heavily damaged, while the main fleet carrier USS Lexington was scuttled as a result of major structural damage, and the Yorktown was damaged. With both sides having suffered heavy losses in aircraft and carriers damaged or sunk, the two fleets disengaged and retired from the battle area. Due to the loss of vital carrier air cover, Admiral Inoue recalled the Port Moresby invasion fleet with the intention of trying again later. While the Battle of the Coral Sea was a tactical victory for the Japanese in terms of vessels sunk, the battle would prove to be a strategic victory for the Allies, for several reasons. The first was that the Japanese expansion in the Pacific, seemingly unstoppable till then, had been repulsed for the first time. Of greater importance was the reduction of the Japanese fleet carriers, with the Shoho being sunk and the Shokaku damaged, while the Zuikaku had a severely depleted aircraft complement. They were therefore unable to participate in the Battle of Midway that took place the following month. However, the Japanese Port Moresby Invasion Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Koso Abe, which included eleven transport ships carrying approximately 5,000 soldiers from the IJA South Seas Detachment, plus approximately 500 troops from the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force, was dispatched towards the intended target. Escorting the transports was the Port Moresby Attack Force with one light cruiser and six destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Kajioka. Abe’s ships departed Rabaul for the voyage to Port Moresby on 4 May, being joined by the Kajioka force the next day. Leading the attack on Tulagi was the Tulagi Invasion Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Shima, consisting of two minelayers, two destroyers, six minesweepers, two submarine chasers, and a transport ship carrying approximately 400 troops from the 3rd Kure SNLF.
Supporting the Tulagi force was the Covering Group with the light carrier Shoho, four heavy cruisers and one destroyer, commanded by Rear Admiral Goto. A separate Cover Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Marumo, and consisting of two light cruisers, a seaplane tender and three gunboats, joined the Covering Group in providing distant protection for the Tulagi invasion. Once Tulagi had been secured, the Covering Group and Cover Force were to reposition to help screen the Port Moresby invasion. The Goto force departed the main naval base at Truk on 28 April, passing through the Solomons between Bougainville and Choiseul, and took station near New Georgia Island, while the Marumo support group left New Ireland on 29 April and headed for Thousand Ships Bay, Santa Isabel Island, to establish a seaplane base, and the Shima invasion force departed Rabaul on 30 April.
The Carrier Strike Force, with the carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku, two heavy cruisers, and six destroyers, left Truk on 1 May. The strike force was commanded by Vice-Admiral Takagi, with Rear Admiral Hara in tactical command of the carrier air forces. The Carrier Strike Force was to proceed down the eastern side of the Solomon Islands and enter the Coral Sea south of Guadalcanal. Once in the Coral Sea the carriers would provide air cover for the invasion forces, eliminate Allied air power at Port Moresby and intercept and destroy any Allied naval forces that entered the Coral Sea in response to the attacks. To give advance warning of the approach of any Allied naval forces, the Japanese had dispatched submarines I-22, I-24, I-28 and I-29 to form a scouting line in the ocean about 450 nautical miles south-west of Guadalcanal. The forces under the command of Admiral Fletcher had already entered the Coral Sea prior to the submarines taking station, and so the Japanese were unaware of the Allies’ presence. On the morning of 1 May 1942 TF17 and TF11 came together approximately 300 nautical miles north-west of New Caledonia. Admiral Fletcher immediately sent TF.11 to refuel from the oiler Tippecanoe, while TF.17 refuelled from the oiler Neosho. TF.17 was ready to proceed the next day, but TF.11 reported that it would take until 4 May before all its ships were fully replenished.
Not wishing to wait for TF.11, Fletcher elected to take TF.17 north-west towards the Louisiades, ordering TF.11 to join up with Task Force 44, which was en route from Sydney and Nouma, once refuelling was complete. TF.44 was a joint Australian-American warship force under the command of General MacArthur, being led by Rear Admiral John Crace RAN. This force consisted of the cruisers HMAS Australia, HMAS Hobart and USS Chicago, plus three destroyers. In the early hours of 3 May the Shima force arrived off Tulagi and began disembarking the naval troops to occupy the island. Tulagi was undefended, as the small garrison of Australian commandos and an RAAF reconnaissance unit had been withdrawn just before the Japanese arrival. After landing, the Japanese forces immediately began construction of a seaplane and communications base. On the evening of 3 May Admiral Fletcher was notified that the Japanese Tulagi invasion force had been sighted the day before approaching the Solomons. However, Fletcher was unaware that TF.11 had completed refuelling that morning, earlier than expected, and was only sixty nautical miles east of TF.17, but was unable to communicate its status because of standing orders to maintain radio silence. TF.17 changed course and proceeded at speed towards Guadalcanal to launch air strikes against the Japanese forces at Tulagi the next morning.
On 4 May some one hundred nautical miles south of Guadalcanal, a total of sixty aircraft from TF.17 were launched in three consecutive waves against the Shima force off Tulagi. The Yorktown’s aircraft surprised Shima’s ships and sank the destroyer Kikuzuki and three of the minesweepers, while four other ships were damaged. Also destroyed were four seaplanes that had been supporting the landings. In return the US Navy lost one dive-bomber and two fighters in the strikes, although all of the aircrews were eventually rescued. After recovering its aircraft late in the evening, the Yorktown and TF.17 departed to the south. In spite of the damage suffered during the carrier attacks, the Japanese continued construction of the seaplane base and began flying reconnaissance missions from Tulagi on 6 May. The Takagi Carrier Force had been refuelling 350 nautical miles north of Tulagi when word of the US Navy strike on 4 May was received. Takagi ceased refuelling and headed south-east, sending scout aircraft to search east of the Solomons, as they believed that the American carriers were in that area. On 5 May TF.17 rendezvoused with TF.11 and TF.44 at a predetermined point 320 nautical miles south of Guadalcanal. During this period four Grumman F4F Wildcats from Yorktown intercepted a Kawanishi Type 97 reconnaissance aircraft from the Yokohama Air Group of the 25th Air Flotilla based at the Shortland Islands, and shot it down eleven nautical miles from TF.11. The aircraft had been unable to send a report before it crashed, but when it failed to return to base the Japanese correctly reasoned that it had been shot down by carrier aircraft.
A coded message from Pearl Harbor notified Admiral Fletcher that radio intelligence gathering had deduced that the Japanese planned to land their troops at Port Moresby on 10 May, with their fleet carriers operating close to the invasion convoy. With this information, Fletcher directed TF.17 to refuel from the oiler Neosho. Refuelling was completed on 6 May, after which he planned to take his forces north towards the Louisiades and to engage the enemy on 7 May. While the Americans were repositioning, the Takagi carrier force steamed down the east side of the Solomons throughout 5 May before turning west to pass south of San Cristobal and entering the Coral Sea in the early morning hours of 6 May. Takagi commenced refuelling his ships 180 nautical miles west of Tulagi in preparation for the carrier battle he expected would take place the next day. On 6 May Admiral Fletcher combined TF.11 and TF.44 into TF.17 to create a larger strike group. During mid-morning a Kawanishi reconnaissance flying-boat from Tulagi sighted TF.17, and notified its headquarters by radio of the force’s position. When this information was received by the Takagi force it was approximately 300 nautical miles north of Fletcher, close to the maximum effective range for his carrier aircraft. Takagi concluded, based on the sighting report, that TF.17 was heading south, away from the Japanese. As well as the aircraft range problem, the American vessels were under a large, low-hanging overcast that the IJN senior officers felt would make it difficult for their aircraft to detect the American carriers. Takagi detached two carriers with two destroyers to intercept TF.17 at 20 knots in order to attack the Americans at first light the next day.
USAAF Boeing B-17 bombers based in Australia that were staged through Port Moresby attacked the approaching IJN Port Moresby invasion forces several times during the day on 6 May without any success. General MacArthur’s headquarters then radioed Fletcher with reports of the B-17 attacks and the locations of the Japanese invasion forces. TF.17 then turned to head north-west towards Rossel Island in the Louisiades. By this time both sets of carriers were only seventy nautical miles apart. Overnight on 6/7 May the seaplane tender Kamikawa Maru set up a seaplane base in the Deboyne Group in order to help provide air support for the invasion forces as they approached Port Moresby. The rest of the Cover Force then took up station near the D’Entrecasteaux Islands to help screen the incoming convoy. In the early hours of 7 May TF.17 was 115 nautical miles due south of Rossel Island. Admiral Fletcher then detached a cruiser and destroyer force, designated Task Group 17.3, to block the Jomard Passage. The detachment of TG 17.3 reduced the anti-aircraft defences available to defend the carriers. However, Fletcher decided that the risk was necessary in order to ensure that the Japanese invasion forces could not slip through to Port Moresby while he was engaged with the Japanese carriers. Believing that the Takagi carrier force was somewhere north of his location, Fletcher directed the USS Yorktown to send ten Douglas SBD dive-bombers as scouts to search that area.
In the meantime the Takagi force launched twelve Type 97 carrier bombers to scout for TF.17. The senior officers believed that the US Navy carriers were located to the south, and advised Takagi to send the aircraft to search that area. Around the same time the cruisers Kinugasa and Furutaka launched four Kawanishi E7K2 Type 94 floatplanes to search south-east of the Louisiades. Augmenting their search were several float-planes from Deboyne, four Kawanishi Type 97s from Tulagi, and three Mitsubishi Type 1 bombers from Rabaul. Soon after the IJN patrols had launched, one of the Takagi carrier scouts, from Shokaku, reported that it had located American ships 163 nautical miles from the Takagi force. This was later confirmed that at least one carrier, one cruiser, and three destroyers had been located. Believing that the American carriers had been spotted, the Takagi force immediately launched all available aircraft. A total of seventy-eight aircraft–eighteen Zero fighters, thirty-six Type 99 dive-bombers and twenty-four torpedo-aircraft–began launching from the Shokaku and Zuikaku, heading towards the reported sighting. Not long after the Takagi carriers had launched, one of the Furutaka aircraft found the American carriers and immediately reported their location to Inoue’s headquarters at Rabaul, from where the report was then passed on to Takagi. Confused by the conflicting sighting reports that were arriving, Takagi decided to continue with the strike on the ships to their south, although the carriers were turned towards the north-west to reduce the distance from the Furutaka’s reported contact.
With Grumman Avengers flying past, the IJN carrier Shoho is wracked by fire and explosions prior to sinking.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
While the Japanese were spotting the Americans, a Yorktown Douglas SBD sighted the Goto force screening the invasion convoy. After receiving the report Fletcher concluded that the Japanese main carrier force had been located, and ordered the launch of all available carrier aircraft to attack. By mid-morning the American strike of ninety-three aircraft–eighteen Wildcat fighters, fifty-three SBD dive-bombers and twenty-two TBD Devastator torpedo-bombers–was airborne. As the American carriers were between him and the invasion convoy, thus placing the Japanese invasion forces in extreme danger, Takagi ordered all aircraft to be prepared for an immediate attack. The American strike aircraft sighted the carrier Shoho a short distance north-east of Misima Island and turned to attack. The Japanese carrier was protected by six Zeros and two Type 96 fighters flying combat air patrol, as the remainder of the carrier’s aircraft were being prepared below decks for a strike against the American carriers. Attacking first, the Lexington air group struck Shoho with two 1,000 lb bombs and five torpedoes, causing severe damage. This attack was followed by one from the Yorktown air group that attacked the burning and now almost stationary carrier, scoring hits with at least eleven more 1,000 lb bombs and at least two torpedoes. Torn apart by massive explosions, the Shoho sank in late morning.
Fearing more air attacks, Admiral Goto withdrew the remainder of the group to the north, although the destroyer Sazanami returned in mid-after-noon to rescue survivors. Only 203 of the carrier’s 834 man crew were recovered. Three American aircraft were lost in the attack, comprising two SBD Dauntlesses from Lexington and one from Yorktown. Of Shoho’s aircraft complement of eighteen aircraft, one was lost, while three of the defending fighter pilots were able to ditch at Deboyne and survived. The American aircraft returned and landed on their carriers just after lunch, the aircraft being quickly rearmed and prepared for launch against the Port Moresby Invasion Force or the IJN cruiser group. Admiral Fletcher’s main concern was that the whereabouts of the rest of the Japanese fleet carriers was still unknown, as he had been informed that Allied intelligence sources believed that up to four Japanese carriers might be supporting the Port Moresby operation. The Admiral then concluded that by the time his scout aircraft located the remaining Japanese carriers it would be too late to mount a strike. Therefore it was decided to hold off on another strike and remain concealed under the thick cloud overcast. Having been informed of the loss of the carrier Shoho, Admiral Inoue ordered the invasion convoy to withdraw to the north and, ordered Takagi to mount a major attack against the American carrier forces. After the invasion convoy had reversed course it was bombed by eight USAAF B-17s although none of the ships were damaged.
Just after lunchtime a Deboyne-based patrol seaplane sighted and reported the Crace cruiser force seventy-eight nautical miles from Deboyne. This was followed by a report from a Rabaul-based aircraft that sighted the force. However, the report was in error, as it stated that the force contained two carriers and was located some 115 nautical miles from Deboyne. Using these reports, Takagi, who was still awaiting the return of all of his aircraft from attacking the American oiler Neosho, turned his carriers due west and advised Inoue that the American carriers were at least 430 nautical miles to the west of his location and that he would therefore be unable to attack them as they were too far away. The senior IJN staff ordered that two groups of attack aircraft from Rabaul, already airborne, turn towards the Crace cruiser group’s reported position. The first group consisted of twelve torpedo-armed Type 1 bombers, while the second group comprised nineteen Mitsubishi Type 96 land-attack aircraft armed with bombs. Both groups would find and attack the American ships in mid-afternoon, and claim to have sunk a battleship and damaged another battleship and cruiser. In reality the US Navy ships were undamaged and shot down four Type 1s. Crace then radioed Admiral Fletcher that he could not complete his mission without air support, and so he was ordered to retire southwards to a position about 220 nautical miles south-east of Port Moresby to increase the range from the Japanese carriers or land-based aircraft while remaining close enough to intercept any Japanese naval forces advancing beyond the Louisiades through either the Jomard Passage or the China Strait.
To try to confirm the location of the American carriers, Admiral Hara sent a flight of eight torpedo-bombers as scouts to sweep an area 200 nautical miles westward. In the late afternoon TF.17, still operating under the thick overcast some 200 nautical miles west of Takagi, detected the Japanese strike force on radar, heading in its direction, and the USS Yorktown was turned south-east into the wind to launch defensive fighters. The eleven Grumman Wildcats were vectored towards the incoming aircraft. Catching the Japanese formation completely by surprise, the Wildcats shot down seven torpedo-bombers and one dive-bomber, besides heavily damaging another torpedo-bomber, which later crashed, all for the loss of three Wildcats. As nightfall had ended aircraft operations, Fletcher ordered TF.17 to head west and prepare to launch a full search at first light. While the Americans were positioning themselves for the next day’s operations, Admiral Inoue would direct Takagi to make sure he destroyed the US Navy carriers the next day. To that end the Port Moresby landings proposed for 12 May were postponed in order that the maximum number of naval vessels would be available for the coming battle.
Takagi elected to take his carriers 120 nautical miles north during the night so that he could concentrate his morning search to the west and south and ensure that his carriers could provide better protection for the invasion convoy. Having suffered heavy losses in the attack that also scattered their formations, the Japanese strike leaders cancelled the mission after conferring by radio. After confirming this course of action, the Japanese aircraft jettisoned their bombs and reversed course in order to return to their carriers. Both naval forces expected to find each other early the next day, and so they spent the night period preparing their strike aircraft for the anticipated engagement. In the early hours of 8 May, from a position a hundred miles south-east of Rossel Island, Hara launched seven torpedo-bombers to search an area between 140 and 230 degrees south and up to 250 nautical miles from the Japanese carriers. Assisting in the search were three Kawanishi Type 97s from Tulagi and four Type 1 bombers from Rabaul. Soon after the launch the carrier striking force turned to the south-west being joined by two of the Goto cruisers, Kinugasa and Furutaka, for screen support. During the night the warm frontal zone with low-hanging clouds that had hidden the US Navy carriers during 7 May had moved north and east, and now covered the Japanese carriers, thus limiting visibility to between two and fifteen miles.
As the Japanese carriers were launching their scouts, TF.17, operating under Admiral Fitch’s tactical control and positioned 180 nautical miles south-east of the Louisiades, launched eighteen Dauntlesses to conduct a full 360-degree search up to a range of 200 nautical miles. By this time the skies over the American carriers were mostly clear, with visibility of seventeen nautical miles. Just over two hours later a Dauntless from the USS Lexington spotted the Japanese carriers through a hole in the clouds, and signalled TF.17. At the same time a Shokaku search aircraft sighted TF.17, notifying the IJN command. The two forces were approximately 210 nautical miles away from each other when spotted, and both sides raced to launch their strike aircraft. The Japanese carriers would launch a combined strike force consisting of eighteen fighters, thirty-three dive-bombers, and eighteen torpedo-planes, while the American carriers each launched a separate strike group. The Yorktown force of consisted of six fighters, twenty-four dive-bombers and nine torpedo-aircraft, both nations’ air strikes departing at the same time. The Lexington group of nine fighters, fifteen dive-bombers and twelve torpedo-planes departed a few minutes later. The American and Japanese carrier forces turned to head directly towards each other’s location at high speed in order to shorten the distance their aircraft would have to fly upon their return. The Yorktown dive-bombers reached the Japanese carriers just over an hour after launch, slowing slightly to allow the slower torpedo squadron to catch up so that they could conduct a simultaneous attack.
With a vast spread of vessels heading towards the horizon, the USS Santee heads towards its next target, while the deck crews prepare their charges for their next missions.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
At this time the IJN carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku were about 10,000 yards apart, with the Zuikaku hidden under a rain squall of low-hanging cloud, both carriers being protected by Zero fighters. The Yorktown dive-bombers commenced their attacks on the Shokaku and hit the violently manoeuvring carrier with two 1,000 lb bombs, blowing open the forecastle and causing heavy damage to the carrier’s flight and hangar decks. The Yorktown torpedo-planes missed with all of their weapons. During the attack two American dive-bombers and two IJN Zeros were shot down. The Lexington aircraft arrived and attacked soon afterwards. Two dive-bombers attacked the Shokaku, hitting the carrier with one 1,000 lb bomb and causing further extensive damage. Two other dive-bombers attacked the Zuikaku, although they missed with their bombs. The rest of the Lexington dive-bombers were unable to find the Japanese carriers in the heavy clouds, while the Lexington TBDs missed the Shokaku with all of their torpedoes. The defending Zeros shot down three Wildcats. With its flight deck and other primary zones heavily damaged, and 223 of her crew killed or wounded, the Shokaku was unable to conduct further aircraft operations. Given the state of the vessel, the captain requested permission from Takagi to withdraw from the battle. This was agreed, and the Shokaku, accompanied by two destroyers, departed to the north-east.
In the late morning the Lexington air defence radar detected the inbound Japanese strike force at a range of sixty-eight nautical miles, vectoring nine Wildcats to intercept. Expecting the Japanese torpedo-bombers to be approaching at a much lower altitude than they actually were, six of the Wildcats were flying too low and so missed the Japanese aircraft as they passed by overhead. Due to the heavy aircraft losses suffered previously, the Japanese were unable to execute a full torpedo attack on both carriers. The attack commander ordered fourteen aircraft to attack the Lexington, while the other four were ordered to attack the Yorktown. A Wildcat shot down one, while some Dauntlesses from the Yorktown destroyed three more as the Japanese torpedo-aircraft descended to take up their attack position. In retaliation four Dauntlesses were shot down by the Zeros escorting the torpedo-aircraft. The Japanese attack began on the carriers, which were cruising 3,000 yards apart, and as the Japanese attacked the carrier escort vessels opened fire with their anti-aircraft guns. The four torpedo-bombers that attacked the Yorktown all missed, while the remaining aircraft successfully employed a pincer attack on the Lexington, which had a greater turning radius than the Yorktown, and the carrier was hit by two Type 91 torpedoes. The first torpedo buckled the port aviation fuel stowage tanks, which caused gasoline vapour to spread into surrounding compartments. The second torpedo ruptured the port water main, which reduced the water pressure to the forward firerooms, thus forcing the associated boilers to be shut down, although the carrier was still able to make 24 knots with its remaining boilers.
Four of the Japanese torpedo-aircraft were shot down by the defensive anti-aircraft fire. The Japanese dive-bombers were circling to attack from upwind, and so they did not begin their dives from 14,000 feet until a few minutes after the torpedo-bombers had begun their attacks. Some of the dive-bombers lined up on the Lexington, while the remainder targeted the Yorktown. The escorting Zeros protected the dive-bombers from the four Grumman Wildcats defending the Lexington as they attempted to intercept. However, a further two Wildcats circling above the Yorktown were able to disrupt the bomber formation. The bombers damaged the Lexington with two bomb hits plus several near-misses, causing fires that were successfully contained. The Yorktown was hit in the centre of the flight deck by a single 551 lb semi-armour-piercing bomb that penetrated four decks before exploding. This caused severe structural damage to an aviation storage room and killed or seriously wounded sixty-six men. A further dozen near-misses damaged the carrier’s hull below the waterline. As the Japanese aircraft completed their attacks and began to withdraw they ran a gauntlet of defending Grumman Wildcats and Douglas Dauntlesses. In the ensuing aerial battle three SBDs and three Wildcats, plus three torpedo-bombers, one dive-bomber, and one Zero, were shot down. By midday the respective strike groups were on their way back to their carriers. During their return journey aircraft from the two groups passed each other in the air, which resulted in more air battles. The remaining strike aircraft reached and landed on their respective carriers in the early afternoon. In spite of the damage the Yorktown was able to recover its aircraft and those from the Lexington. The Yorktown limped back to Pearl Harbor, where the vessel was turned over to the dockyard for repairs. However, the Lexington was engulfed in flames again, even though the crew had fought valiantly to contain the conflagration. Eventually it became obvious that the Lexington was beyond saving, and so the crew were taken off and the badly damaged carrier was sunk by the destroyer USS Phelps.
As the crew abandons ship, the USS Lexington burns after a bomb hit. Although the crew fought valiantly to save their ship, it would sink on 8 May 1942.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)