CHAPTER FOUR
While the Battle of the Coral Sea had some positive results for both combatants, it would be the Americans who would take the greater benefit from the engagement. While the loss of a fleet carrier was a serious blow, the United States production base was running at full tilt, and the US Navy, having learnt valuable lessons, had put in place an extensive training programme to produce combat-ready airmen ready to join the variety of aircraft carriers as they became available. From the Japanese point of view the eventual loss of the USS Lexington was seen as a positive step. However, the Japanese High Command was well aware that the US Navy carrier groups were the linchpin of the American fight-back in the Pacific. This had been reinforced by the bombing of the home islands by B-25 Mitchell bombers launched from the USS Hornet.
To reduce the risk of further American attacks, Admiral Yamamoto, the IJN commander, saw his primary strategic objective as the elimination of the American carriers, which were seen as the main obstacle to the success of the overall Pacific campaign. Therefore the destruction of the American aircraft carriers and the seizure of Midway was seen as the only way of nullifying this threat. Yamamoto initially reasoned that an operation against the main naval base at Pearl Harbor would induce the US Navy to come out and fight. However, upon reflection, and given the strength of the land-based air power on Hawaii, it soon became obvious that the base could not be attacked directly. Avoiding Hawaii completely, Admiral Yamamoto selected Midway, located at the extreme north-west end of the Hawaiian island chain. Midway Island was not over-important in the Japanese scheme of things, but the Japanese felt that the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost for Pearl Harbor and would therefore strongly defend it.
Typical of Japanese naval planning during the Pacific conflict, the Yamamoto battle plan was very complex and was based on optimistic intelligence suggesting that the USS Enterprise and USS Hornet, forming the core of Task Force 16, were the only carriers available to the US Navy Pacific Fleet at the time, as the Lexington had been sunk and the Yorktown had been severely damaged during the Battle of the Coral Sea a month earlier. Japanese intelligence were also aware that the USS Saratoga was undergoing repairs on the west coast after suffering torpedo damage. Also reinforcing the Japanese point of view was Yamamoto’s belief that the Americans had been demoralised by their frequent defeats during the preceding six months, although he misread the situation, as the Doolittle Raid and events in the Coral Sea had strengthened the nation’s morale.
Late evening, and the deck crews aboard the carrier USS Lexington prepare the Douglas SBD Dauntless of VB-16 for the next day’s missions.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
Admiral Yamamoto also felt deception would be needed to lure the American fleet into a decisive confrontation. To that end, he dispersed his forces so that their full extent would not be discovered by the Americans prior to battle. The theory behind this plan was that supporting battleships and cruisers would follow the carrier striking force, commanded by Vice-Admiral Chuichi, by several hundred miles, and so the heavy surface units would be able to destroy whatever part of the American fleet might come to Midway’s relief, once Nagumo’s carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun duel. However, Yamamoto was unaware that the United States had broken the main Japanese naval code, known as JN-25 by the Americans. The Admiral’s emphasis on spreading his forces also meant that none of his groups could provide support for each other. This resulted in the only warships larger than Nagumo’s destroyer screen fleet being two battleships and three cruisers, even though the carriers were expected to carry out the strikes and bear the brunt of American counter-attacks.
In contrast, the flotillas of Yamamoto and Kondo had between them two light carriers, five battleships and six cruisers, none of which would see any combat at Midway. Their distance from Nagumo’s carriers would also have further implications during the battle, as the larger warships in Yamamoto and Kondo’s forces carried scout planes, an invaluable reconnaissance capability denied to Nagumo.
To fight an enemy that was reported to have four or five carriers, Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, called in every available flight deck. To hand were Vice-Admiral Halsey’s carriers, the Enterprise and Hornet, although Halsey was taken ill and was temporarily replaced by Rear Admiral Spruance, normally Halsey’s escort commander. Nimitz also called back Rear Admiral Fletcher’s task force, which included the carrier Yorktown, although this had been severely damaged during the Battle of the Coral Sea. Original engineering estimates stated that the Yorktown would require several months of repairs at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. However, the elevators were intact, while much of the flight deck was undamaged. The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard worked flat out round the clock, so that in seventy-two hours the carrier was declared to be battle ready, and was judged good enough for two to three weeks of operations. The effected repairs included patching the flight deck, while complete sections of the internal frames were cut out and replaced. To bring the carrier finally up to speed several new squadrons were drawn from the Saratoga, although the pilots would need to undertake training en route. After one of the quickest turnarounds, the Yorktown was declared ready to depart even though repairs were continuing as the carrier sailed, with work crews being based aboard the repair ship USS Vestal.
On Midway Island the USAAF increased the island’s strength by stationing four squadrons of Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses there, along with several B-26 Marauders for target towing. The Marine Corps had nineteen Douglas SBD Dauntless dive-bombers, seven Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats, seventeen Vought SBU-3 Vindicators, twenty-one Brewster F2A-3s and six Grumman TBF-1 Avenger torpedo-bombers, although the latter were a detachment of VT-8 from the Hornet.
After the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese carrier Zuikaku was berthed at Kure, awaiting a replacement air group. However, none was immediately available due to a failure of the IJN crew training programme, which was unable to cope with replacing combat losses. In an attempt to provide enough pilots, instructors from the Yokosuka Air Corps were deployed to make up the shortfall. Meanwhile the heavily damaged Shokaku was undergoing repair in dry dock after suffering three bomb hits during the Battle of the Coral Sea, and so the aircraft of both vessels were combined to re-equip the Zuikaku with a composite air group, although the Japanese made no serious attempt to prepare the ship for the forthcoming battle. Therefore Admiral Nagumo would only have four fleet carriers: the Kaga and Akagi would form Carrier Division 1, while the Hiryu and Soryu would form Carrier Division 2. The primary Japanese strike aircraft were the Aichi D3A1 dive-bomber and the Nakajima B5N2, which was capable of being used either as a torpedo-bomber or as a level attack bomber, while the main carrier fighter was the Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero. However, the Japanese carriers were suffering from a shortage of front-line aircraft as production of the D3A had been drastically reduced and that of the B5N had been stopped completely. As a consequence, there were no spare aircraft available to replace the outstanding losses. This also meant that many of the aircraft being used during this period had been operational since late November 1941, and as a consequence, while having been well maintained, they were fatigued and had become increasingly unreliable. These factors meant that the carriers were operating with fewer than their designed aircraft complement.
Making the task more difficult was the Japanese strategic scouting arrangements, which were in disarray, as the picket line of Japanese submarines was late moving to their operational positions, and this allowed the American carriers to reach their assembly point north-east of Midway, Point Luck, undetected. A second attempt at reconnaissance, using four-engine Kawanishi H8K flying-boats to overfly Pearl Harbor prior to the battle to check on the location of the American carriers, Operation K, also failed, as Japanese submarines assigned to refuel the search aircraft discovered that the intended refuelling point near French Frigate Shoals was patrolled by American warships. As a consequence Japan was deprived of any intelligence concerning the movements of the American carriers immediately prior to the battle. Japanese radio intercepts of US Navy traffic did reveal an increase in both American submarine activity and messages. This information was passed to Yamamoto prior to the battle. However, Yamamoto, at sea on the battleship Yamato, could not inform Nagumo for fear of exposing his position, and assumed that Nagumo had received the same signal from Tokyo. However, Nagumo’s radio antennae were unable to receive such long-wave transmissions, and so he was left unaware of the American ship movements.
The scourge of the American carrier fleet was the Kawanishi H6K Mavis flying-boats that were used by the Japanese to track the task forces. Unfortunately for the Japanese shadowers, their missions frequently ended like this–in flames.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
In complete contrast, Admiral Nimitz had one priceless asset: the US Navy crypto-analysts had broken the JN-25 code, and so they were able to confirm Midway as the target of the impending Japanese strike and to determine that the date of the attack was either 4 or 5 June. They were then able to provide Nimitz with a complete IJN order of battle. The Japanese intention to introduce a new code-book had been delayed, and this gave the analysts several extra days to decrypt the signals and pass on garnered intelligence. As a result the Americans, when they entered the battle, had a very good picture of where, when, and in what strength the Japanese would appear. Nimitz was aware that the vast Japanese numerical superiority had been diluted by its division into no fewer than four task forces, while the escort for the Carrier Striking Force was limited to just a few fast ships. With this knowledge Nimitz could calculate that his three carriers, plus Midway Island, gave the US Navy parity, as the American carrier air groups were larger than those of the enemy. In contrast, the Japanese remained almost totally unaware of the Americans’ true strength and dispositions, even after the battle began. The first air attack took off just after midday on 3 June, and consisted of nine Boeing B-17s operating from Midway. After four hours’ flying they found the Japanese transport group 570 miles to the west. The vessels put up heavy antiaircraft fire, but even so they dropped their bombs. While hits were reported, none of the bombs actually landed on target, and so no significant damage was inflicted. Early the following morning the Japanese oil tanker Akebono Maru sustained the first hit when a torpedo from an attacking PBY Catalina flying-boat struck just after midnight.
In the early hours of 4 June, Nagumo launched his initial attack on Midway itself, consisting of thirty-six Aichi D3A dive-bombers and thirty-six Nakajima B5N torpedo-bombers, escorted by thirty-six Zero fighters. At the same time a combat air patrol was launched, plus eight search and rescue aircraft. Japanese reconnaissance arrangements for this operation were paltry, with too few aircraft assigned to cover the assigned search areas adequately. They were also beset by poor weather conditions to the north-east and east of the task force, while Yamamoto’s faulty fleet dispositions had now become a serious liability.
American radar picked up the enemy at a distance of several miles, and fighters were soon scrambled to intercept, while unescorted bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carrier fleet, their fighter escorts remaining behind to defend Midway. Two hours after launching, the Japanese carrier aircraft bombed and heavily damaged the American base on the island. The Midway-based Marine fighter pilots who were flying obsolescent Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats and outdated Brewster F2A-3s intercepted the Japanese and suffered heavy losses, although they managed to shoot down four bombers and at least three Zeros. The majority of the defending aircraft were downed in the first few minutes, while several were damaged, so that only two remained flyable. In all, three F4Fs and thirteen F2As were shot down, but American anti-aircraft fire was accurate and intense, damaging many Japanese aircraft and claiming a third of the Japanese aircraft destroyed. While the Japanese had launched an extensive strike force they did not succeed in neutralising Midway, and so another attack would be necessary if troops were to go ashore on 7 June as planned. Until Midway was neutralised, American bombers could still use the airbase to refuel and attack the Japanese invasion force.
Having departed from Midway prior to the Japanese attack, American bombers from the base made several attacks on the Japanese carrier fleet. The strike force included six TBF Avengers from the USS Hornet’s VT-8, the crews undertaking their first combat operation and being supplemented by four USAAF B-26 Marauders armed with torpedoes–the first and last time that the B-26 was used in this role. The Japanese managed to avoid these attacks with minimal losses, only two fighters being lost. In return the Japanese shot down five of the six Avengers and two of the B-26s. One B-26, badly damaged by anti-aircraft fire from the Akagi, narrowly missed crashing directly into the carrier’s bridge. This attack would see Nagumo launching another air strike on Midway Island in order to suppress the possibility of further American attacks, though this was in direct contravention of Yamamoto’s order to keep the reserve strike force armed for anti-ship operations. Admiral Nagumo, in accordance with Japanese carrier doctrine of the time, had retained half of his aircraft in reserve. These comprised two squadrons each of dive-bombers and torpedo-bombers, should any American warships be located. As a result of the attacks mounted by the Midway forces, Nagumo ordered that the reserve planes be rearmed with contact-fused general-purpose bombs for use against land targets. However, Nagumo received contradictory intelligence that an American carrier task force was close, and so he quickly reversed his order and requested that the scout plane confirm the composition of the American force. After forty minutes’ wait the scout finally confirmed the presence of a single carrier in the American force, TF.16.
Admiral Nagumo was stuck in a dichotomy. Should the strike be mounted against Midway or were the American carriers the primary threat? Rear Admiral Tamon, commanding Carrier Division 2, the Hiryu and Soryu, recommended that Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand, these consisting of eighteen Aichi D3A2 dive-bombers on the Soryu and Hiryu, plus half the ready-cover patrol aircraft. However, for Nagumo the opportunity to attack the American ships was now limited, as the Midway strike force was en route to the carriers and would need to land promptly or be lost. Due to the constant flight deck activity required for the launching and recovery of the defensive fighter screen, the Japanese were unable to spot their reserve for launch. The few aircraft arrayed on the Japanese flight decks at the time of the attack were defensive fighters or fighters being prepared to augment the task force defences. To realign the carrier decks to rearm and launch strike aircraft would have required at least thirty to forty-five minutes. However, by rehashing the available aircraft and launching immediately, Admiral Nagumo would be committing a percentage of his reserve to an attack without proper anti-ship munitions. Japanese carrier doctrine stated that only fully constituted strikes would be launched, and without confirmation of whether the American force included carriers, the Admiral was inclined to follow established doctrine reaction. Also adding to the Admiral’s confusion was the arrival of another American air strike, which gave impetus to attacking the island again. In response Nagumo decided to wait for the first strike force to land, clear the decks and then launch the reserve, which would by then be properly armed and ready.
This side view is of a Douglas SBD Dauntless of VT-6 from the USS Hornet. This unit took part in the battle of Midway.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
While the Japanese were deciding which target to attack, the Americans had already launched their carrier aircraft against the Japanese. Admiral Fletcher, aboard the USS Yorktown, and benefiting from Catalina patrol sighting reports delivered in the early morning, ordered Spruance to launch against the Japanese carrier groups as soon as was practical. Spruance ordered the attack launch close to dawn, the first aircraft departing nearly an hour later from the carriers Enterprise and Hornet. Admiral Fletcher would launch the Yorktown air group an hour later. Even as the Spruance force was departing, the Admiral ordered the task force to head towards the enemy warships, having decided that the need to attack the Japanese as soon as possible was more important than the need for a co-ordinated attack among the different types of aircraft. The American squadrons were therefore launched piecemeal, and proceeded to the target in separate groups. This would reduce the overall effectiveness of the American attacks and greatly increase their casualties. However, it also reduced the Japanese ability to counterstrike, and left Nagumo with his decks at their most vulnerable.
The American carrier aircraft initially had difficulty locating the target, but VT-8 from the USS Hornet finally sighted the enemy carriers and began its attack, followed by the aircraft of VT-6 from the USS Enterprise. Without the much-needed fighter escort, every TBD Devastator of VT-8 was shot down without hitting any targets. The aircraft of VT-6 nearly met the same fate, also having no hits to show for their effort. During these attacks the abysmal performance of the American Mark 13 aircraft torpedoes was revealed in full. The Japanese defensive fighters flying Mitsubishi A6M2 Zeros made short work of the unescorted, slow, under-armed TBDs.
An unidentified Douglas SBD Dauntless releases a bomb while dive-bombing its target. While not the quickest of aircraft, the SBD played a vital part in the opening rounds of the war in the Pacific.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
Having suffered grievous losses, the American torpedo attacks indirectly achieved three important results. Firstly, the attacks unsettled the routine of the Japanese carriers so that they had no ability to prepare and launch their own counterstrike. Secondly, the attacks pulled the Japanese defensive fighters out of position. The third point was that many of the Zeros were running low on ammunition and fuel. The appearance of a third torpedo attack wave from the south-east by VT-3 would draw the majority of the Japanese fighters to the south-east quadrant of the fleet. At the same time as VT-3 was sighted by the Japanese, two separate formations of American SBD Dauntless dive-bombers were approaching the Japanese fleet from the north-east and south-west. While the aircraft were running low on fuel because of the time spent looking for the enemy, the squadron commander decided to continue the search, after spotting the wake of the Japanese destroyer Arashi. The destroyer was steaming at full speed to rejoin Nagumo’s carrier force after having attempted to depth-charge the submarine Nautilus, which had unsuccessfully attacked the battleship Kirishima.
The decision by the strike commander to continue the search was credited by Admiral Nimitz as deciding the fate of the carrier task force and the forces at Midway. The American dive-bombers arrived at the perfect time to attack, as the flight decks were packed with armed Japanese strike aircraft being refuelled: fuel hoses snaked across the decks while the repeated change of weapon loads meant bombs and torpedoes were stacked around the hangars rather than being stowed safely in the magazines. All these circumstances made the Japanese carriers extraordinarily vulnerable to attack.
The Enterprise air group began its attacks, during which it scored multiple hits on the carrier Kaga, while to the north the Akagi was struck minutes later by three of the Enterprise bombers. The Yorktown’s aircraft headed for the Soryu, and the VT-3 aircraft targeted Hiryu, which was sailing between the Soryu, Kaga and Akagi, although they failed to score any hits. In contrast the dive-bombers had, within six minutes, left the Soryu, Kaga and Akagi blazing merrily. The Akagi was hit by just one bomb that penetrated the upper hangar deck, where it exploded among the armed and fuelled aircraft. One bomb exploded underwater very close astern, the resulting blast and water pressure distorting the flight deck upwards and causing damage to the rudder. The Soryu received three bombs in the hangar deck, while the Kaga was hit by at least four. All three carriers were so badly damaged that they were put out of action and were deemed beyond repair; therefore they were abandoned and scuttled.
The Hiryu, as the sole surviving Japanese aircraft carrier, would waste little time in mounting a counter-attack. The first wave of Japanese dive-bombers badly damaged the Yorktown with three bomb hits that shut down the boilers. This immobilised the carrier initially. However, the damage-control teams repaired the damage quickly, so that when the second wave of torpedo-bombers arrived the carrier was mistaken for an undamaged vessel. Despite Japanese intentions to even the odds by sinking two carriers with two strikes, the Yorktown absorbed both Japanese attacks, as the second wave believed that she had already been sunk and they were attacking the USS Enterprise. After two torpedo strikes the Yorktown lost power and developed a 26-degree list to port, which put the carrier out of action. It also forced Admiral Fletcher to move his command staff to the heavy cruiser Astoria. In contrast, both carriers of Spruance’s Task Force 16 were undamaged.
News of the two carrier attacks, coupled with the reports that each wave had sunk an American carrier, greatly improved morale among the IJN command staff. The few surviving aircraft were all recovered aboard the Hiryu, where they were prepared for a further strike against what was believed to be the only remaining American carrier. However, late in the afternoon a Yorktown scout aircraft located the Hiryu, prompting the Enterprise to launch a final strike of dive-bombers, including ten aircraft from the Yorktown that had landed on the alternative carrier. This attack delivered a fatal blow that left the Hiryu burning fiercely despite being defended by a strong fighter cover of more than a dozen Zero fighters. Vice-Admiral Yamaguchi chose to go down with his ship, which cost Japan her best carrier commander. The Hornet strike was launched late due to a communications error. This wave concentrated on the remaining escort ships, although they failed to score any hits.
As the light faded, both sides took stock and made plans for continuing the battle. Admiral Fletcher, having abandoned the derelict Yorktown, felt he could not adequately command the fight from a cruiser, and so he ceded operational command to Admiral Spruance. Spruance was already aware that America had won a great victory, but he was still unsure of the strength of the remaining Japanese forces, and was determined to safeguard both Midway and the carriers. To assist the aircraft crews, who had launched at extreme range, the carriers had continued to close with Nagumo during the day, persisting as night fell. Fearing a possible night encounter with Japanese surface forces, Spruance changed course and withdrew to the east, later turning back west towards the enemy at midnight.
Listing to port after being struck by three torpedoes, the USS Yorktown was not far from sinking. No power was available to rescue the ship as the escorting destroyer had been sunk.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
This view shows a flight of Douglas SBD Dauntlesses of VS-6 from the USS Enterprise heading towards Santa Isobel.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
In contrast Yamamoto was determined to continue the engagement, and sent his remaining surface forces searching eastwards for the American carriers. At the same time a cruiser raiding force was detached to bombard Midway Island. The Japanese cruiser force failed to make contact with the American carriers due to Spruance’s decision to briefly withdraw eastwards, and so Yamamoto ordered a general retirement to the west. American search aircraft failed to detect the departing Japanese task forces on 5 June, while an afternoon strike narrowly missed finding the Yamamoto main force. They also failed to score hits on a straggling Japanese destroyer. The strike aircraft returned to the carriers after dark, which prompted Spruance to order the Enterprise and Hornet to turn on searchlights in order to assist their landings.
In the early hours of 5/6 June the submarine USS Tambor, stationed some ninety nautical miles west of Midway, made the second of the Submarine Force’s two major contributions to the outcome of the battle. Cruising the patrol line, they sighted several ships that could not be identified. However, they reported their presence to Admiral Robert English, Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. Unaware of the exact location of the Yamamoto main force, Admiral Spruance assumed that this was the invasion force. Therefore he moved to block it, taking station some one hundred nautical miles north-east of Midway. This resulted in Yamamoto’s efforts being frustrated, and the night passed without any contact between the opposing forces. The naval units that had been spotted by the American submarine were Yamamoto’s bombardment group of four cruisers and two destroyers, which were then ordered to withdraw to the west with the rest of his forces. The Tambor was sighted at around the same time by the escort destroyers, but when the force turned to avoid the submarine the cruisers Mogami and Mikuma collided, the result being serious damage to the Mogami’s bow. In the early hours of the morning the sky brightened enough for Murphy to be certain that the ships were Japanese, although by this time staying on the surface was hazardous. Therefore the submarine dived to approach for an attack. Over the next two days, first the base at Midway and then Spruance’s carriers launched several successive strikes against the stragglers, which resulted in the Mikuma being sunk by Dauntlesses, while the Mogami survived severe damage to return home for repairs.
While the active part of the American task force was still engaging the Japanese, the salvage efforts on the Yorktown were encouraging, the carrier being taken in tow by the USS Vireo. This was continuing successfully until late afternoon on 6 June when the Yorktown was struck by two torpedoes from the Japanese submarine I-168. There were very few casualties aboard the Yorktown as most of the crew had already been evacuated. However, a third torpedo from this salvo also struck and sank the destroyer USS Hammann, which had been providing auxiliary power to the Yorktown. The Hammann broke in two, with the loss of eighty lives, while the Yorktown remained afloat until the early hours of 7 June, when the list increased rapidly and the carrier went down with its battle flags still flying. An exploration by Robert Ballard in May 1998 would find the Yorktown resting the right way up and looking almost pristine after its time under the sea.
At the conclusion of the Coral Sea and Midway actions, not only did the US Navy undergo some much-needed reinforcement, but the entire Pacific Fleet was restructured to fit it for the forthcoming campaign. The reinforcements included the carrier USS Wasp, returned from its duties with the Royal Navy Home Fleet. The Wasp passed through the Panama Canal on 10 June 1942 in company with the cruiser USS Quincy, a protective destroyer screen plus some new vessels that included the battleship USS North Carolina, the escort carrier USS Long Island and another five escort destroyers. The reorganisation of the US Navy Pacific Fleet began on 15 June and resulted in the creation of TF.1 commanded by Vice-Admiral Pye, and including the battleships Pennsylvania, Colorado, Maryland, Tennessee, Idaho, Mississippi and New Mexico, plus ten destroyers; TF.8 under the command of Rear Admiral Theobald, consisting of five cruisers and five destroyers; TF.11 commanded by Rear Admiral Flitch, including the carrier USS Saratoga, three cruisers and seven destroyers; TF.16 with the carrier USS Enterprise, escorted by three cruisers and seven destroyers; TF.17 with the carrier USS Wasp, plus four cruisers and seven destroyers, commanded by Rear Admiral Mitscher; TF.18 commanded by Rear Admiral Noyes with the carrier USS Wasp supported by the battleship USS North Carolina, four cruisers and four destroyers; and the final unit, TF.44, which was commanded by Rear Admiral Crutchley RN and was a mixed force consisting of three RAN cruisers, Australia, Canberra and Hobart, plus the USS Chicago with an escort of nine destroyers.
Coming home, a flight of Curtiss Helldivers assigned to VB-86 head towards their home, the USS Wasp, CV-18.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
Once these machinations had been completed, the US Navy in the Pacific began preparations for its next major operation, the capturing of Guadalcanal, part of the Solomon Islands Group. The Americans, with British permission, chose the Solomon Islands as their first target, specifically the southern Solomon Islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida. The Imperial Japanese Navy, IJN, had occupied Tulagi in May 1942, and then constructed a seaplane base there. Allied concern increased in early July 1942 when the IJN began constructing a large airfield at Lunga Point on nearby Guadalcanal. By August 1942 the Japanese had about 900 naval troops on Tulagi and nearby islands, plus 2,800 personnel on Guadalcanal. These bases upon completion would protect the Japanese major base at Rabaul and threaten the Allied supply and communication lines in the Pacific. The base would also establish a staging area for a planned offensive against Fiji, New Caledonia, and Samoa, designated Operation FS. The Japanese planned to deploy forty-five fighters and sixty bombers to Guadalcanal, once the airfield was complete, these aircraft being required to provide air cover for Japanese naval forces advancing farther into the South Pacific.
The American plan to invade the southern Solomons was conceived by Admiral Ernest King USN, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. He proposed the offensive in order to deny the use of the islands to the Japanese as bases to harass the vital supply routes between the United States and Australia, and after their capture to use them as starting points for a series of counter-invasions. With the tacit support of President Roosevelt, Admiral King also advocated the invasion of Guadalcanal, although General George C. Marshall USA would resist this course of action, as well as who would command the operation. Given the opposition of the Army, King stated that the Navy and Marines would carry out the operation using their own resources, and instructed Admiral Nimitz to undertake the preliminary planning. Admiral King eventually won his argument, and the invasion would proceed with the backing of the Joint Chiefs.
The invasion of Guadalcanal would be carried out in conjunction with an Allied offensive in New Guinea under General Douglas MacArthur, who was ordered to capture the Admiralty Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago, which included the major Japanese base at Rabaul. The intention was that this would lead eventually to the American retaking of the Philippines. The Joint Chiefs of Staff created the South Pacific theatre, with Vice-Admiral Ghormley USN taking overall command in June 1942, his mandate being to direct the offensive in the Solomons. Admiral Chester Nimitz, based at Pearl Harbor, was then designated as the overall Allied commander-in-chief for Pacific forces. In preparation for the future offensive in the Pacific in May 1942, Major-General Alexander Vandegrift USMC was ordered to move his 1st Marine Division from America to New Zealand, while other Allied land, naval, and air force units were sent to establish bases in Fiji, Samoa, the New Hebrides, and New Caledonia. Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides, was selected as the headquarters and main base for the offensive, which was codenamed Operation Watchtower, the commencement date being set for the invasion being 7 August 1942. In the beginning the Allied offensive was planned to cover just Tulagi and the Santa Cruz Islands, omitting Guadalcanal. However, Allied reconnaissance would discover the Japanese airfield construction efforts on Guadalcanal, and so its capture was added to the plan while the Santa Cruz operation was later cancelled. The Japanese were aware, courtesy of signals intelligence, of the large-scale movement of Allied assets in the South Pacific area, although they concluded that the Allies were reinforcing Australia and Port Moresby in New Guinea.
The USS Saratoga fought its way across the Pacific and took part in most of the major engagements, all of which would lead to the carrier’s retirement soon after the end of the war due to general fatigue.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
The Watchtower force would consist of seventy-five warships and transports, and the fleet, including vessels from both America and Australia, would assemble near Fiji in July 1942, undertaking a single rehearsal landing prior to leaving for Guadalcanal on 31 July. The tactical commander of the Allied expeditionary force was Vice-Admiral Frank Fletcher USN flying his flag aboard the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga. Commanding the amphibious forces was Rear Admiral Richmond Turner USN. Major-General Vandegrift commanded the 16,000 Allied infantry earmarked for the landings, most of these being USMC personnel. Inclement weather allowed the Allied expeditionary force to arrive off Guadalcanal undetected by the Japanese on the morning of 7 August, after which the landing force split into two groups, one group to assault Guadalcanal, and the other to attack Tulagi, Florida and nearby islands. As preparation for the landings, Allied warships bombarded the invasion beaches, while US Navy carrier aircraft bombed Japanese positions on the target islands, successfully destroying Japanese seaplanes at their base near Tulagi. Two nearby small islands, Gavutu and Tanambogo, were attacked by 3,000 US Marines, although the IJN personnel manning the naval and seaplane bases on the three islands fiercely resisted the Marine attacks. Eventually the Marines secured all three islands after overcoming stiff resistance; Tulagi fell on 8 August, while Gavutu and Tanambogo were under Allied control by 9 August.
The Japanese defenders were killed almost to the last man, while the USMC lost 122 Marines. In contrast to the fierce resistance experienced on Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo, the landings on Guadalcanal encountered less opposition. On 7 August Major-General Vandegrift and 11,000 US Marines came ashore on Guadalcanal between Koli Point and Lunga Point. Advancing towards Lunga Point, they encountered no resistance except from forces in the rain forest, and so they halted for the night close to the Lunga Point airfield. The next day the Marines advanced all the way to the Lunga river and secured the airfield in the afternoon of 8 August. The Japanese naval construction units and combat troops had panicked after the warship bombardment and aerial bombing, and had abandoned the airfield area and fled west to the Matanikau river and Point Cruz area, leaving behind them food, supplies, intact construction equipment and vehicles, plus thirteen dead. During these landing operations over 7/8 August Japanese naval aircraft based at Rabaul attacked the Allied amphibious forces several times, setting fire to the American transport George F. Elliot, which would sink two days later. Also hit and badly damaged was the destroyer USS Jarvis. During the air attacks over the following two days the Japanese lost thirty-six aircraft and the Americans lost nineteen, including fourteen carrier-borne fighters.
After these opening engagements, Admiral Fletcher was concerned about the losses to his carrier fighter aircraft strength, and this in turn made him worried about the threat to his carriers from further Japanese air attacks. Coupled to this was the worry that his ship’s fuel levels were low, and so Fletcher withdrew from the Solomon Islands area during the evening of 8 August. As a result of the loss of the much-needed carrier-based air cover, Turner decided to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal even though less than fifty per cent of the supplies and heavy equipment needed by the troops ashore had been offloaded. However, Turner planned to offload as many supplies as possible on Guadalcanal and Tulagi throughout the night of 8 August, departing with his ships in the early hours of 9 August. As the transports were unloaded, two groups of screening Allied warships under the command of Rear Admiral Crutchley RN were surprised and defeated by a Japanese force of seven cruisers and one destroyer from the 8th Fleet, based at Rabaul. One Australian and three American cruisers were sunk, while one American cruiser and two destroyers were damaged in the Battle of Savo Island. The Japanese suffered moderate damage to one cruiser. Admiral Mikawa, who was unaware that Fletcher had withdrawn with the American carriers, immediately withdrew to Rabaul without attempting to attack the now unprotected transports. Mikawa was rightly concerned about daylight carrier air attacks had he remained in the area. Turner would withdraw all remaining Allied naval forces by the evening of 9 August, leaving the Marines ashore without much of their heavy equipment and provisions, while some troops were still aboard the transports. Therefore Mikawa’s decision not to attack the Allied transport ships when he had the chance would prove to be a crucial strategic mistake.
The 11,000 Marines on Guadalcanal initially concentrated on forming a loose defensive perimeter around Lunga Point and the airfield while moving the landed supplies within the defensive perimeter. Once these tasks had been completed they concentrated upon finishing the airfield. While the required heavy earth-moving equipment was still aboard the transports, work began on the airfield using captured Japanese equipment. On 12 August the nearly completed airfield was named Henderson Field, after a Marine aviator, Lofton R. Henderson, who was killed during the Battle of Midway. The completed airfield was ready for operations on 18 August. To increase the available air strength, the escort carrier USS Long Island delivered two squadrons of Marine aircraft to Henderson Field on 20 August. One was a squadron of nineteen Grumman F4F Wildcats, the other a squadron of twelve Douglas SBD Dauntlesses. The aircraft at Henderson would became known as the ‘Cactus Air Force’ (CAF), after the Allied codename for Guadalcanal. The Marine fighters were in action the next day, attacking one of the almost daily Japanese bomber air raids. To reinforce the air strength, five US Army P-400 Airacobras and their pilots arrived at Henderson Field on 22 August. In response to the Allied landings on Guadalcanal the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assigned the Imperial Japanese Army’s 17th Army the task of retaking Guadalcanal. The army would be supported by Japanese naval units, including the Combined Fleet under the command of Yamamoto, which had its headquarters at Truk.
The 17th Army was heavily involved in the Japanese campaign in New Guinea, and so only a few units were available. Of these the 35th Infantry Brigade under Major-General Kawaguchi was at Palau, the 4th Infantry Regiment was in the Philippines and the 28th Infantry Regiment was on board transport ships near Guam. The different units began to converge upon Guadalcanal via Truk and Rabaul immediately. However, Ichiki’s regiment, being the nearest, would arrive in the area first. The first element of Ichiki’s unit landed from destroyers at Taivu Point, east of the Lunga perimeter, on 19 August.
The Japanese had underestimated the strength of Allied forces on Guadalcanal, and so Ichiki’s unit conducted a night frontal assault on Marine positions at Alligator Creek, also known as the Ilu river on USMC maps, on the east side of the Lunga perimeter in the early hours of 21 August. Ichiki’s assault was defeated with heavy losses in what was later known as the Battle of Tenaru. At daybreak the Marine units counter-attacked Ichiki’s surviving troops, killing more, including the commander Ichiki. In total, only 128 of the original 917 members of the Regiment’s First Element were killed in the battle, and those who survived escaped to Taivu Point, where they notified 17th Army Headquarters of their defeat. Even as the Tenaru battle was ending, further Japanese reinforcements had already been dispatched. Leaving Truk on 16 August were three slow transports carrying the remaining 1,400 soldiers from the 28th Infantry Regiment, plus 500 naval marines from the 5th Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force. Escorting the transports were thirteen warships commanded by Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka, who planned to land the troops on Guadalcanal on 24 August. To support the landing of these troops and provide support for the operation to retake Henderson Field from Allied forces, Admiral Yamamoto directed Nagumo to depart from Truk with a carrier group on 21 August and proceed towards the southern Solomon Islands. The Japanese force included three carriers and thirty other warships.
Having received intelligence concerning the disposition of the Japanese forces, three American carrier task forces under Fletcher approached Guadalcanal to counter the Japanese offensive. On 24/25 August the two carrier forces became engaged in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, which resulted in both fleets retreating from the area after suffering damage, although the Japanese would lose a light aircraft carrier, the Ryujo, this being sunk by Douglas SBDs from the USS Saratoga. Tanaka’s convoy, after suffering heavy damage and the loss of a transport during the battle after an air attack by CAF aircraft operating from Henderson Field, was forced to divert to the Shortland Islands in the northern Solomons in order to transfer the remaining troops to destroyers for later delivery to Guadalcanal.
Throughout August small groups of American aircraft and their crews continued to arrive at Guadalcanal, and so by the end of August sixty-four aircraft of various types were stationed at Henderson Field. On 3 September the commander of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Brigadier-General Geiger USMC, arrived with his staff and took command of all air operations at Henderson Field. Air battles between the Allied aircraft from Henderson and Japanese bombers and fighters from Rabaul continued almost daily. Between 26 August and 5 September the American forces lost about fifteen aircraft, while the Japanese lost approximately nineteen aircraft. More than half of the downed US aircrews were rescued, while most of the Japanese aircrews were never recovered. The eight-hour flight to and from Rabaul to Guadalcanal would seriously hamper the Japanese efforts to establish air superiority over Henderson Field.
Assisting the American defenders were Australian coast watchers based on Bougainville and New Georgia islands, who were often able to provide the Allied forces on Guadalcanal with advance notice of inbound Japanese air strikes, which allowed the US fighters time to take off and position themselves to attack the Japanese aircraft as they approached the island. As the result of these early warnings the Japanese air forces were slowly losing a war of attrition in the skies above Guadalcanal. During this time Vandegrift continued to direct efforts to strengthen and improve the defences of the Lunga perimeter. Between 21 August and 3 September he relocated three Marine battalions from Tulagi and Gavutu to Guadalcanal. These units added about 1,500 troops to the original 11,000 men defending Henderson Field.
Small Allied naval convoys arrived at Guadalcanal on 23 August, 29 August, 1 September and 8 September, supplying the Marines at Lunga with more food, ammunition, aircraft fuel and much-needed aircraft technicians. The 1 September convoy also brought 392 construction engineers to maintain and improve Henderson Field. On 23 August the 35th Infantry Brigade reached Truk and was embarked onto slow transport ships for the rest of the voyage to Guadalcanal. The damage done to the earlier convoy during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons caused the Japanese to reconsider trying to deliver more troops to Guadalcanal by this method, and so the ships carrying the soldiers were sent to Rabaul, from where the Japanese planned to deliver the troops to Guadalcanal by destroyers that would stage through the Japanese naval base on the Shortland Islands.
The Japanese destroyers were usually able to make round trips via the New Georgia Sound to Guadalcanal and back in a single night throughout the campaign, so minimising their exposure to Allied air attack. These trips became known as the ‘Tokyo Express’ to the Allies, and were labelled ‘Rat Transportation’ by the Japanese. Delivering the troops in this manner prevented the majority of the heavy equipment and supplies, which included heavy artillery, vehicles, food and ammunition, from being carried to Guadalcanal with them. In addition these activities tied up destroyers that the IJN desperately needed for convoy protection. During the period 29 August to 4 September Japanese light cruisers, destroyers, and patrol boats were able to land almost 5,000 troops at Taivu Point, including most of the 35th Infantry Brigade, the majority of the 4th Regiment and the remainder of Ichiki’s regiment. General Kawaguchi, who landed at Taivu Point on the 31 August Express run, was placed in command of all Japanese forces on Guadalcanal. On 7 September Kawaguchi released his attack plan, which called for his forces to rout and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of the Guadalcanal Island airfield.
Deck crews push torpedoes towards a Curtiss Helldiver from VT-2 aboard the USS Hornet.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
On 15 September the Japanese command at Rabaul learned of the defeat on Guadalcanal, and forwarded the news to Imperial General Headquarters in Japan. In an emergency meeting the Japanese IJA and IJN command staffs concluded that Guadalcanal might develop into the most decisive battle of the war. The results of the battle to date began to have a telling strategic impact on Japanese operations in other areas of the Pacific. Hyakutake realised that in order to send sufficient troops and matériel to defeat the Allied forces on Guadalcanal he would not be able at the same time to continue to support the major ongoing Japanese offensive on the Kokoda Track in New Guinea. After consultation with General Headquarters, he ordered his troops on New Guinea, who were within thirty miles of Port Moresby, to withdraw until the Battle for Guadalcanal was resolved. Hyakutake then prepared to send more troops to Guadalcanal for another attempt to recapture Henderson Field.
While the Japanese regrouped west of the Matanikau, the American forces concentrated on reinforcing the Lunga defences, and to that end on 14 September a US Marine battalion was moved from Tulagi to Guadalcanal, while on 18 September an Allied convoy delivered 4,157 men from the 3rd Provisional Marine Brigade plus 137 vehicles, tents, aviation fuel, ammunition, rations and engineering equipment to Guadalcanal. These crucial reinforcements allowed Vandegrift, beginning on 19 September, to establish an unbroken line of defence around the Lunga perimeter. During the convoy’s transit the aircraft carrier USS Wasp was sunk by the Japanese submarine I-19 south-east of Guadalcanal. The three torpedoes from the submarine ruptured aircraft fuel lines, causing serious fires and explosions throughout the ship. Eventually the Wasp was abandoned, the hulk being torpedoed by the destroyer USS Lansdowne. The loss of the Wasp left only one aircraft carrier, the USS Hornet, for operations in the South Pacific area.
After such a period of frantic activity a lull occurred in the air war over Guadalcanal, with no Japanese air raids taking place between 14 and 27 September due to bad weather. During this period both sides increased the strength of their respective air units. The Japanese delivered eighty-five fighters and bombers to Rabaul, while the Americans delivered twenty-three fighters and attack aircraft to Henderson Field. Thus, by 20 September, the Japanese strength was 117 aircraft at Rabaul, and the Allies had seventy-one aircraft at Henderson Field. The air war resumed with a Japanese air raid on Guadalcanal on 27 September, which was contested by Navy and Marine fighters based at Henderson Field. The Japanese had also begun to prepare for their next attempt to recapture Henderson Field, and to that end the 3rd Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, had landed at Kamimbo Bay on the western end of Guadalcanal on 11 September, although it was too late to join Kawaguchi’s attack. Joining the 3rd Battalion were the Japanese 2nd and 38th Infantry Divisions that were transported from the Dutch East Indies to Rabaul from 13 September. Major-General Vandegrift and his staff were aware that Kawaguchi’s troops had retreated to the area west of the Matanikau and that numerous groups of Japanese stragglers were scattered throughout the area between the Lunga perimeter and the Matanikau river. Vandegrift decided to conduct another series of small-unit operations around the Matanikau valley, the purpose of these operations being to clean up the various groups of Japanese troops east of the Matanikau and to keep the main group of Japanese soldiers unbalanced, so preventing them from consolidating their positions so close to the main Marine defensive perimeter at Lunga Point.
The Japanese 8th Fleet staff scheduled a large and important Tokyo Express for the night of 11 October. This consisted of two seaplane tenders and six destroyers that were to deliver 728 soldiers plus artillery and ammunition to Guadalcanal. In parallel a separate operation involving three heavy cruisers and two destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Goto bombarded Henderson Field with special explosive shells, with the object of destroying the CAF and the airfield’s facilities. As the US Navy warships had not attempted to intercept any Tokyo Express missions to Guadalcanal, the Japanese were not expecting any opposition from Allied naval surface forces that night. But just before midnight American warships detected the Goto force on radar near the entrance to the strait between Savo Island and Guadalcanal. The Allies were in a position to cross the ‘T’ of the Japanese ships. Opening fire, the Allied warships sank one of the Japanese cruisers and one of the destroyers, while heavily damaging another cruiser, and this mortally wounded the Goto force overall, forcing the rest of the Japanese warships to abandon the bombardment mission and retreat. During the exchange of gunfire one of the Allied destroyers was sunk and one cruiser and another destroyer were heavily damaged. In the meantime the Japanese supply convoy successfully completed the unloading at Guadalcanal, beginning its return journey without being discovered by the defenders. On the morning of 12 October four Japanese destroyers from the supply convoy turned back to assist retreating, damaged Japanese warships. Air attacks by CAF aircraft from Henderson Field sank two of these destroyers later that day. The American supply convoy reached Guadalcanal as scheduled the next day, and successfully delivered their cargo and passengers to the island. In spite of the American victory off Cape Esperance, the Japanese continued with their plans and preparations for their large offensive scheduled for later in October.
On 13 October a convoy comprising six cargo ships with eight screening destroyers departed the Shortland Islands for Guadalcanal. The convoy carried troops from the 16th and 230th Infantry Regiments plus some naval marines, two batteries of heavy artillery and one company of tanks. To protect the convoy from attack by CAF aircraft, Admiral Yamamoto sent two battleships from Truk to bombard Henderson Field. In the early hours of 14 October the Japanese battleships Kongo and Haruna, escorted by one light cruiser and nine destroyers, reached Guadalcanal and opened fire on Henderson Field from a distance of 17,500 yards. Over the next hour and twenty-three minutes, the two battleships fired 973 14-inch shells into the Lunga perimeter, most of which fell in and around the airfield. Many of the shells were fragmentation shells that were specifically designed to destroy land targets. The bombardment heavily damaged both runways, burned most of the available aviation fuel, destroyed forty-eight of the CAF’s ninety aircraft, and killed forty-one men, including six CAF pilots. At the conclusion of the bombardment the battleship force immediately returned to Truk.
While the airfield had suffered heavy damage, Henderson personnel quickly restored one of the runways to operational condition within a few hours. Seventeen Douglas SBDs and twenty Grumman Wildcats based at Espiritu Santo were flown to Henderson Field, while USAAF and USMC transport aircraft began to shuttle aircraft fuel from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal. Aware of the approach of the Japanese reinforcement convoy, the Americans sought some way to attack the convoy before it could reach Guadalcanal. The answer was to use fuel drained from damaged aircraft plus that held in a cache in the nearby jungle, and the CAF attacked the convoy twice on the 14th, but caused no damage; however, a Japanese cargo ship was destroyed at Tassafaronga the following day.
The main Japanese convoy reached Tassafaronga on Guadalcanal at midnight on 14 October, and immediately began unloading, continuing throughout the following day. However, a wave of CAF aircraft from Henderson bombed and strafed the unloading vessels, destroying three of the cargo ships. The remaining ships departed that night, having unloaded all of the troops and most of the supplies and equipment. While the freighters were being unloaded, Japanese heavy cruisers bombarded Henderson on the nights of 14/15 October,t destroying a few CAF aircraft, although they failed to cause significant further damage to the airfield or its facilities. The first phase of the Japanese attack took place at dusk on 23 October when two battalions of the 4th Infantry Regiment and the nine tanks of the 1st Independent Tank Company launched an attack on the USMC defences at the mouth of the Matanikau. Marine artillery, cannon, and small-arms fire repulsed the attacks, destroying all the tanks and killing many of the Japanese soldiers while suffering only light casualties. A few small groups of Japanese managed to break through the American defences, but were all hunted down and killed over the next several days. Over 1,500 of Maruyama’s troops were killed in the attacks, while the American defenders lost sixty killed. During the fighting, aircraft from Henderson Field defended against attacks by Japanese aircraft and ships, destroying fourteen aircraft and sinking a light cruiser in the process.
While the Japanese ground forces were trying to defeat their American counterparts, Japanese aircraft carriers and other large warships under the overall command of Admiral Yamamoto moved into a position near the southern Solomon Islands, from where they hoped to engage and decisively defeat any Allied naval forces, especially the US Navy carrier forces. Allied naval carrier forces in the area, now under the overall command of Admiral William Halsey Jr, who had replaced Ghormley on 18 October, were also hoping to confront the Japanese naval forces in battle. Nimitz had replaced Ghormley with Halsey after concluding that Ghormley had become too conservative to continue leading the Allied forces in the South Pacific area effectively. The two opposing carrier forces confronted each other on the morning of 26 October in what became known as the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. After an exchange of carrier air attacks the Allied surface ships were forced to retreat from the battle area with the loss of one carrier sunk, this being the USS Hornet. The ship suffered four bomb hits and sixteen torpedo hits, some of the latter having been administered by US Navy destroyers after they had failed to take the stricken carrier in tow.
Under a stormy sky the USS Hornet steams towards the Battle of Santa Cruz, where it will be sunk by a mixture of bombs and torpedoes on 27 October 1942.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
Another carrier, the USS Enterprise, was also heavily damaged and would require repair work at Pearl Harbor. The participating Japanese carrier forces were also forced to retire due to high aircraft and aircrew losses, as well as significant damage to two of their carriers. Although an apparent tactical victory for the Japanese in terms of ships sunk and damaged, the loss by the Japanese of many veteran aircrews would provide a long-term strategic advantage for the Allies, whose aircrew losses in the battle were relatively low. The damaged Japanese aircraft carriers would play no further role in the campaign, reducing the available cover for the ground forces. In order to exploit the victory in the Battle for Henderson Field, General Vandegrift sent six Marine battalions, joined later by one US Army battalion, on an offensive west of the Matanikau. The American offensive began on 1 November and succeeded in destroying the Japanese forces defending the Point Cruz area two days later, including the rear-echelon troops sent to reinforce Nakaguma’s battered forces. The Americans were on the verge of breaking through the Japanese defences and capturing Kokumbona, while other American forces discovered and attacked newly landed Japanese troops near Koli Point on the eastern side of the Lunga perimeter. To counter this new threat Vandegrift temporarily halted the Matanikau offensive on 4 November. At Koli Point early in the morning of 8 November five Japanese destroyers delivered 300 troops to support Shoji and his troops, who were en route to Koli Point after the Battle for Henderson Field. Having learned of the planned landing, General Vandegrift sent a battalion of Marines to intercept the Japanese at Koli. Soon after landing, the Japanese troops encountered and drove the USMC battalion back towards the Lunga perimeter.
Caught at the moment of touchdown is this Grumman F6F Hellcat of VF-25, landing on the USS Cowpens, an Independence-class light aircraft carrier.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
A Douglas Dauntless from the USS Yorktown overflies the USS Enterprise while both carriers are en route to Midway to face down the Japanese fleet in combat.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
The Tokyo Express runs on 5, 7 and 9 November delivered additional troops from the Japanese 38th Infantry Division to Guadalcanal to replace those so far lost. These fresh troops were quickly emplaced in the Point Cruz and Matanikau area, and helped to successfully resist further attacks by American forces on 10 and 18 November. The Americans and Japanese remained facing each other along a line just west of Point Cruz for the next six weeks. After the defeat in the Battle for Henderson Field the IJA would again plan to try to retake the airfield during November 1942; however, further reinforcements were needed before the operation could proceed. The IJA requested assistance from Admiral Yamamoto to deliver the needed reinforcements to the island and to support the next offensive. Yamamoto provided eleven large transport ships to carry the remaining troops from the 38th Infantry Division plus their equipment from Rabaul to Guadalcanal. He was also asked to provide a warship support force that included two battleships –the Hiei and the Kirishima. Loaded with special fragmentation shells, they were to bombard Henderson Field on the night of 12/13 November, and destroy it and the aircraft stationed there in order to allow the slow, heavy transports to reach Guadalcanal and unload safely the next day. The support force was commanded from the IJN Hiei by the recently promoted Vice-Admiral Abe.
In early November Allied intelligence learned that the Japanese were again preparing to try to retake Henderson Field, and so the Americans sent Task Force 67, plus a large reinforcement and resupply convoy carrying troops, to Guadalcanal on 11 November. The ships were attacked several times on 11 and 12 November by Japanese aircraft from Rabaul staging through the air base at Buin, Bougainville, although most were unloaded without serious damage. American reconnaissance aircraft spotted the approach of Abe’s warships and passed a warning to the Allied command. Now warned, Turner detached all available combat ships under Callaghan to protect the troops ashore from the expected Japanese naval attack and troop landing, and ordered the supply ships at Guadalcanal to depart by 12 November. Callaghan’s force comprised two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and eight destroyers, and he intercepted Abe’s warships between Guadalcanal and Savo Island. In addition to the two battleships, Abe’s force included a light cruiser and eleven destroyers. In the darkness the two groups of warships intermingled before opening fire at unusually short range. In the resulting mêlée, Abe’s warships sank or severely damaged all but one cruiser and one destroyer in Callaghan’s force, and both Callaghan and Scott were killed. Two Japanese destroyers were sunk, and another destroyer and the Hiei were heavily damaged. In spite of his victory over Callaghan’s force, Abe ordered his warships to depart without bombarding Henderson Field. The Hiei sank later that day after repeated air attacks by CAF aircraft and aircraft from the carrier Enterprise. Because Abe’s force had failed to neutralise Henderson Field, Yamamoto ordered the troop convoy to wait an additional day before heading towards Guadalcanal. He also ordered Kondo to assemble another bombardment force using warships from Truk and Abe’s force to attack Henderson Field again on 15 November.
Prior to this, on 14 November, a cruiser and destroyer force under Mikawa, which was based at Rabaul, conducted an unopposed bombardment of Henderson Field, causing some damage, although it failed to put the airfield out of operation. As the bombardment vessels retired towards Rabaul, Tanaka’s transport convoy, under the impression that Henderson Field was now inoperable, began its move towards Guadalcanal. Throughout 14 November aircraft from Henderson Field and the USS Enterprise attacked both groups of Japanese ships, sinking one heavy cruiser and seven of the transports. Most of the troops were rescued from the transports by Tanaka’s escorting destroyers and returned to the Shortland Islands. After night had fallen Tanaka with the remaining four transports continued towards Guadalcanal as Kondo’s force approached the area to bombard Henderson Field. In order to stop Kondo’s force, Admiral Halsey detached two battleships, the USS Washington and South Dakota, plus four destroyers, from the Enterprise task force. The American force under the command of Rear Admiral Lee aboard the Washington reached Guadalcanal and Savo Island just before midnight on 14 November, just before Kondo’s force arrived. The Japanese force consisted of the Kirishima, plus two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and nine destroyers. After the two forces made contact, Kondo’s force quickly sank three of the US Navy destroyers and heavily damaged the fourth. The Japanese warships then opened fire on and damaged the South Dakota. However, as Kondo’s warships concentrated on the South Dakota, the Washington approached the Japanese ships unobserved and opened fire on the Kirishima, hitting the Japanese battleship repeatedly and causing extensive damage. After pursuing the departing Washington towards the Russell Islands, Kondo ordered his warships to retire without bombarding Henderson Field. As Kondo’s warships departed, the four Japanese transports beached themselves near Tassafaronga on Guadalcanal in the early hours of the morning and quickly began unloading. Two hours after they had first beached, American aircraft and artillery began attacking the transports, destroying all four, plus most of the supplies that they carried. As fewer troops than needed for the assault had been landed, the Japanese were forced to cancel their planned November offensive on Henderson Field.
The rear section of the Enterprise flight deck is covered with armed Douglas SBDs and handling parties, as another strike wave prepares for departure. In the background is BB-56 USS Washington.
(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)
On 26 November Lieutenant-General Imamura took command of the newly formed Eighth Area Army at Rabaul, encompassing Hyakutake’s 17th Army and the 18th Army in New Guinea. One of Imamura’s first priorities upon assuming command was the continuation of the attempts to retake Henderson Field and Guadalcanal. However, the Allied offensive at Buna in New Guinea changed the General’s priorities. Because the Allied attempt to take Buna was considered a more serious threat to Rabaul, Imamura postponed the provision of further major reinforcement efforts to Guadalcanal, and decided to concentrate on the situation in New Guinea.
Due to the deteriorating condition of the troops fighting to retake Guadalcanal, the Eighth Fleet’s Guadalcanal Reinforcement Unit, better known as the Tokyo Express, was tasked with making the first of five scheduled runs to Tassafaronga on Guadalcanal on the night of 30 November. This unit consisted of eight destroyers plus a further six destroyers assigned for this run to carry between 200 and 240 drums of supplies apiece. However, the US Navy had received intelligence concerning the Japanese supply attempt. In response Admiral Halsey ordered the newly constituted Task Force 67, comprising four cruisers and four destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral Wright USN, to intercept Tanaka’s force off Guadalcanal. Late on the evening of 30 November Tanaka’s force arrived off Guadalcanal and prepared to unload the supply barrels. The TF.67 destroyers detected Tanaka’s force on radar, and the destroyer commander requested permission to attack with torpedoes. However, they were forced to wait for a few minutes, thereby allowing the Japanese force to escape from an optimum firing setup. All of the American torpedoes missed their targets, although the cruisers opened fire, hitting and destroying one of the Japanese escort destroyers. The remaining Japanese warships abandoned the supply mission, increased speed and launched a total of forty-four torpedoes in the direction of the American cruisers. The Japanese torpedoes hit and sank the USS Northampton,while others badly damaged the cruisers Minneapolis, New Orleans and Pensacola. The remainder of the destroyers escaped without damage, although they had failed to deliver any of the much-needed provisions to Guadalcanal.
By 7 December 1942 the Japanese Army was losing approximately fifty men each day from malnutrition, disease, and Allied ground or air attacks. Further attempts by Tanaka’s force to deliver provisions on 3, 7 and 11 December failed to alleviate the crisis, and one of Tanaka’s destroyers was sunk by a US Navy PT boat torpedo. Given the critical situation, the Japanese Navy proposed on 12 December that attempts to capture Guadalcanal be abandoned. At the same time several senior army staff officers at the Imperial General Headquarters also suggested that further efforts to retake Guadalcanal would be excessive in both manpower and materials. By 19 December the Japanese had decided to abandon the Guadalcanal campaign and to establish a new defence line in the central Solomons, plus a change of priorities and resources to the campaign in New Guinea. On 28 December General Sugiyama and Admiral Nagano informed Emperor Hirohito of the decision to withdraw from Guadalcanal, this being formally endorsed on 31 December. The Japanese immediately began preparations for the evacuation, called Operation Ke, which was scheduled to begin during the latter part of January 1943.
On 18 December Allied forces began attacking the Japanese positions on Mount Austen, although a strong Japanese fortified position, called the Gifu, confounded the attacks, and the Americans were forced to temporarily halt their offensive on 4 January. The offensive resumed on 10 January, reattacking the Japanese on Mount Austen as well as on the two nearby ridges, known as Seahorse and Galloping Horse, and the Allies had captured all three by 23 January. The Americans suffered 250 killed in the operation, while the Japanese suffered approximately 3,000 casualties. On 14 January a Tokyo Express run delivered a battalion of troops to act as a rearguard for the Ke evacuation. At the same time Japanese warships and aircraft moved into position around Rabaul and Bougainville in preparation to execute the withdrawal operation. Allied intelligence had detected the Japanese movements, although they had misinterpreted them as preparations for another attempt to retake Henderson Field and Guadalcanal. As part of the evacuation plan the Japanese 17th Army withdrew to the west coast of Guadalcanal, while rearguard units countered the American offensive. On the night of 1 February twenty destroyers from the 8th Fleet successfully collected nearly 5,000 soldiers from the island. On the nights of 4 and 7 February the Japanese destroyers completed the evacuation of most of the remaining Japanese forces from Guadalcanal.
Altogether the Japanese successfully evacuated 10,652 men from Guadalcanal. Two days later the Americans realised that the Japanese were gone and declared Guadalcanal secure for Allied forces, and this officially ended the campaign. After the Japanese withdrawal, Guadalcanal and Tulagi were developed into major bases supporting the Allied advance further up the Solomon Islands chain.
In addition to Henderson Field, two additional fighter runways were constructed at Lunga Point, while a bomber airfield was built at Koli Point. Extensive naval port and logistics facilities were established at Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida. The anchorage at Tulagi would become an important advanced base for Allied ships supporting the Solomon Islands campaign. After their failure to keep Guadalcanal, the Japanese were clearly on the defensive in the Pacific. The constant need to reinforce Guadalcanal had weakened Japanese efforts in other areas, which contributed to a successful Australian and American counter-offensive in New Guinea that culminated in the capture of the key bases of Buna and Gona in early 1943.