CHAPTER FIVE

War in the Pacific: Battles and Defeats

At the beginning of 1943 the US Navy was in a very strong position. Although it had lost the carriers Lexington, Yorktown, Hornet and Wasp, it still had the Saratoga, Ranger and Enterprise in service, while the first of the Essex class had entered service, with another twenty-three scheduled to slide down the slips until 1946. Supporting the major fleet carriers were the escort or jeep carriers, which included the USS Charger, four ships of the Sangamon class, eleven Bogue, fifty Casablanca, nineteen of the Commencement Bay class and the nine vessels of the Independence light carrier class.

This Grumman F6F Hellcat of VF-2 has run off the flight deck of the escort carrier USS Charger. Recovery requires the deck crew to counterbalance the weight of the aircraft so that it can be rolled back on deck. Although this particular vessel was not deployed on operations, its primary task was to train pilots for the Pacific campaign.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

In contrast, the Imperial Japanese Navy was in very bad shape, having lost the Akagi, Kaga, Ryujo, Soryu, Hiryu and Shoho. These losses left the Japanese with the Hosho, Chitose, Chiyoda, Zuiho, Shokaku, Zuikaka, Taiyo, Unyo, Chuyo, Hiyo, Junyo, Ryuho, Taiho, Ibuki, Unryu, Amagi and Shinano, although many of these would never be deployed due to the lack of aircraft, crews and fuel. While on paper this seemed a strong force, the IJN was suffering from a lack of trained crews, as many had been lost during the carrier battles of 1942, while the training regime was not robust enough to provide replacements quickly enough and in large enough quantities. Not helping the Japanese with their expansion plans was the need to withdraw from the Guadalcanal campaign, as it was consuming vast resources and had become unwinnable.

After sustained operations through the Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal, the US Navy aircraft carriers spent a short period in repair and re-equipment, as they were desperately in need of them for the next major operation. This would be Operation Cartwheel, which was intended to be a multi-pronged attack on Japanese forces throughout the Pacific theatre. The gambit of this operation took place on 29 June 1943 when the Americans managed to land troops on New Georgia in the central Solomon Islands, and this was followed by further landings early the next morning on Rendova. Supporting these first landings was Task Force 36.3, whose carriers were the USS Saratoga and HMS Victorious, these in turn being supported by numerous cruisers and destroyers plus a large contingent of battleships. The second carrier group was designated TF.36.5, which had the escort carriers Sangamon, Suwanee and Chenango, plus the usual destroyer escort. During these landings the carrier-based aircraft were more concerned with supporting the ground forces, and so the major naval battles took place between the surface vessels and submarines, with losses being experienced by both sides. The carrier groups continued to provide air support for various attacks on Japanese-held Islands in the Pacific. Between 15 and 26 August support was provided for the US III Amphibious Force during their landing upon Vella Lavella in the central Solomon Islands, and this was followed by landings upon Nekufetau in the Ellice Islands, which in turn was followed by a further landing in the Solomon Islands, when Arandul Island was captured. As each of these territories was captured, various construction units were landed, their primary purpose being to construct air bases and harbourage as needed.

As the year progressed, a further reshuffle took place in the carrier task force. On 31 August 1943 the newly formed US Fast Carrier Task Force came into being, designated TF.15, under the command of Rear Admiral Pownell. TF.15 went straight into action on 31 August, the force consisting of the carriers Yorktown, Essex and Independence, whose support was led by the battleship USS Indiana, plus the cruisers Nashville and Mobile with eleven destroyers and a fleet oiler. By this time the battleships of the US Navy were covering two vital roles–the first was to use their main armament for bombardment, while the second was that of air defence, for which they started to sprout masses of anti-aircraft guns. The first target for TF.15 was Marcus Island, a Japanese stronghold. Although 257 sorties were flown against the Japanese installations during six attacks, very little damage was inflicted for the loss of four aircraft. While TF.15 was trying to unseat the Japanese on Marcus Island, TF.11, under the command of Rear Admiral Lee, was supporting the 804th Aviation Battalion of the US Army to land on Baker Island on 1 September so that an airstrip could be constructed. The carriers assigned to TF.11 were the USS Princeton and Belleau Wood.

VB-1 was one of the Curtiss Helldiver units assigned to the USS Yorktown, an Essex-class carrier that replaced the carrier of the same name lost in 1942.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

Having learned from the Marcus Island adventure, TF.15 was back in action on 17 September, when it attacked Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands. The carriers assigned to this task force were the Lexington, Princeton and Belleau Wood, plus the usual selection of cruisers and destroyers. The carriers launched 190 sorties as part of the softening-up process, during which four aircraft were lost. After these attacks the task force retired, although Tarawa was attacked on 19 September by USAAF B-24 Liberators that pounded the island, destroying twelve Japanese aircraft and two torpedo boats, and damaging installations around the island. The assault on these various islands had the desired effect, as the Japanese tried to evacuate first Kolombangara and then Vella Lavella. The former was mostly successful, while the latter was headed off by a US Navy destroyer force. Having started the evacuation of Kolombangara on 25 September, the Japanese finally recovered their remaining personnel on 3 October.

Wake Island would be the next target for the American carriers. On 5 October, TF.14, under the command of Rear Admiral Montgomery, carried out attacks on the Japanese forces using aircraft from the carriers Essex, Yorktown, Lexington, Cowpens, Independence and Belleau Wood. Given the number of aircraft carriers, there was an extensive escort force, composed of seven cruisers and twenty-four destroyers. Over a twenty-four-hour period the aircraft carriers launched 738 sorties, during which twelve aircraft were lost due to enemy action, while a further fourteen were lost to accidents. After this action the task force withdrew toward Hawaii, during which transit the carrier USS Cowpens was damaged after colliding with the destroyer USS Abbot.

The Allied plan to drive the Japanese from the South-West Pacific Area, Operation Cartwheel, aimed to isolate Rabaul and reduce its importance by air raids, a complete change from its more peaceful existence earlier in 1943. When the attacks on Rabaul began, Japanese ground forces were already retreating from New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, abandoning Guadalcanal, Kolombangara, New Georgia and Vella Lavella. Rabaul, on the island of New Britain, was one of two major ports in the Australian Territory of New Guinea, and had become the main Japanese naval base for the Solomon Islands and New Guinea campaigns. Simpson Harbour, captured in February 1942, held a similar position for Japan as Pearl Harbor did to America, and was well defended by an extensive array of anti-aircraft guns and five airfields. Lakunai and Vunakanau airfields were pre-war Australian constructions. Lakunai had an all-weather runway of sand and volcanic ash, while Vunakanau was surfaced with concrete. Another airfield, Rapopo, which was fourteen miles to the south-east, had became operational in December 1942, complete with concrete runways and extensive support and maintenance facilities. Tobera, halfway between Vunakanau and Rapopo, had been completed in August 1943, and also featured concrete runways. The four airfields had 166 protected revetments for bombers and 265 for fighters, all having additional unprotected dispersal parking areas. The fifth airfield, protecting Rabaul, was Borpop airfield, located across the St George’s Channel on New Ireland, which had been completed in December 1942.

The anti-aircraft defences were well co-ordinated by army and naval units, as the IJA manned 192 of the 367 anti-aircraft guns, while the IJN manned the remainder. The naval anti-aircraft guns protected Simpson Harbour and its shipping, plus the three airfields of Tobera, Lakunai, and Vunakanau. The army units were charged with defending Rapopo airfield, supply dumps and army installations. An effective early-warning radar system provided ninety-mile coverage from Rabaul, being backed up by extended coverage with additional radars on New Britain, New Ireland, and at Buka. These radar outposts provided between thirty and sixty minutes’ early warning of an air attack.

On 12 October 1943, as part of Operation Cartwheel, the USAAF 5th Air Force, in company with the Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal New Zealand Air Force, launched a sustained campaign of bombing against the airfields and port of Rabaul. After the first raid of 349 aircraft, bad weather reduced the options to bomb Rabaul, and only a single raid by fifty B-25s was mounted on 18 October. Once the weather cleared, sustained attacks resumed on 23 October and continued over the next six days, before culminating in the large raid of 2 November. Nine squadrons of B-25 Mitchells, totalling seventy-two bombers, and six squadrons of P-38 Lightning escorts attacked the anti-aircraft defences and Simpson Harbour with low-altitude strafing and bombing attacks.

Putting even greater pressure on the Japanese forces was the invasion of Bougainville on 1 November 1943, which placed Rabaul under increased threat from another direction. A hurried attempt to drive Allied forces off Bougainville had been defeated in the Battle of Empress Augusta Bay. Admiral Koga, the commander-in-chief of the Japanese Fleet after the death of Admiral Yamamoto, then planned to reinforce Rabaul and overwhelm the limited Allied forces around Bougainville while most of the American Navy was involved in preparations for the invasion of Tarawa. Rear Admiral Sherman planned to counteract this threat by a carrier raid from Task Force 38, and so the carriers Saratoga and Princeton were ordered to head for New Britain, using a weather front for cover. Upon their arrival on 5 November, the carriers launched ninety-seven aircraft against Rabaul. Although no ships were sunk in the raid, six cruisers were hit, of which four were badly damaged. The Atago suffered three near-misses by 500 lb bombs that caused extensive underwater shock damage, while shrapnel shards killed twenty-two crewmen, including the captain. The Maya was hit by one bomb above one of the engine rooms, which caused extensive damage and killed seventy of the crew. The Mogami was struck by a single 500 lb bomb that set the vessel afire, as well as causing heavy damage and killing nineteen crewmen. The Takao was hit by two 500 lb bombs that caused heavy damage and killed twenty-three crewmen, while the Chikuma was slightly damaged by several near-misses. The Agano suffered a near-miss from one bomb, which damaged one anti-aircraft gun and killed one crewman. Three destroyers also suffered damage, although this was light in nature. Most of the Japanese warships departed for Truk the next day for repairs and to escape further Allied airstrikes. The 5th Air Force followed up the Navy strikes an hour after the American carrier attacks had ceased with a raid by twenty-seven B-24 Liberator heavy bombers escorted by P-38 Lightnings.

An additional carrier task group from the American Fifth Fleet reached Halsey on 7 November, commanded by Rear Admiral Montgomery, consisting of the carriers Bunker Hill, Essex and Independence. Halsey used these ships as part of Task Force 38 to undertake a double carrier strike against Rabaul on 11 November. The cruiser Agano, which had remained at Rabaul after the 5 November strike, was torpedoed during these attacks and suffered further extensive damage. The Japanese launched a series of counterattacks, which involved 120 aircraft against the American carriers, but this force was intercepted en route, losing thirty-five aircraft without inflicting damage on the task force.

Even as Rabaul was being attacked, TF.38 under the command of Rear Admiral Sherman was approaching the Solomon Islands from the west. The carriers in this group, Saratoga and Princeton, would launch air strikes against the Japanese airfields at Buna and Buka over 1 and 2 November. On 3 November the Japanese 2nd Fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral Kurita, with elements of the 3rd Fleet, was dispatched from Rabaul to intercept TF.38. However, the Japanese vessels were spotted by a reconnaissance aircraft, and in response B-24 Liberators of the 5th AAF attacked as the ships neared Bismark Archipelago, being backed up by a strike force launched by the carriers. This comprised twenty-two dive-bombers, twenty-three torpedo-bombers and fifty-two escorting fighters. During this attack ten aircraft were shot down, while the Japanese had six cruisers and a destroyer badly damaged. During this period the Japanese counter-attacks saw the loss of 121 carrier aircraft of the 173 available, which rendered the carrier forces nonoperational, while those pilots who survived claimed the destruction of five battleships, ten aircraft carriers, nineteen cruisers, seven destroyers, nine transports and twenty-four other vessels.

The next major battle for the US Navy carriers would be Operation Galvanic, whose preparations began on 10 November 1943.

After the success at Midway and the positive conclusion of the Guadalcanal campaign it was becoming obvious to the American Joint Chiefs that the Japanese dominance in the Pacific was on the wane. To keep the pressure on the Japanese High Command, the Joint Chiefs determined that it was important to set up forward air bases capable of supporting operations across the mid-Pacific, this in turn leading to retaking the Philippines and thence on to Japan. To that end it was decided that the American forces would need to take the Marianas Islands. The downside was that the Marianas were heavily defended, and so in order for attacks against them to succeed, land-based bombers provided by the USAAF would be needed to soften up the defences. The nearest islands capable of supporting long-range bombers were the Marshall Islands, located north-east of Guadalcanal. Capturing these islands would provide the base needed to launch such an offensive on the Marianas. But the Marshall Islands were cut off from direct communications with Hawaii by a Japanese garrison on the small island of Betio, located on the western side of Tarawa Atoll in the Gilbert Islands. Therefore it was determined that to launch an invasion of the Marianas the battle had to start at Tarawa.

The Japanese High Command in Tokyo was well aware of the Gilberts’ strategic location, and had invested considerable time and effort in fortifying the island. The 7th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force under the command of Commander Sugai, the 111th Pioneers and personnel of the Fourth Fleet’s construction battalion were deployed, although many of the men in these groups were Korean forced labourers. Peripheral coastal defence guns were located around the island, being placed in concrete bunkers for protection. Further defences involved 500 pillboxes built from logs and a further forty artillery pieces placed around the island at strategic points. To provide for possible aircraft support, an airfield was cut into the bush along the high point of the island, while trenches connected all points of the island, allowing troops to move where needed under cover.

Ship’s personnel swarm round a battle-damaged Grumman Avenger assigned to VT-84 aboard the Essex-class carrier USS Bunker Hill

. (US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

The island of Betio is shaped like a long, thin, curved triangle with the point to the east and the base on the west. Any attack would almost certainly have to approach from the lagoon, as the deeper waters to the south presented no really usable landing areas. Therefore, in order to prevent this happening, a huge wall was constructed across the lagoon just above the high-water mark. Behind the wall was a series of machine-gun posts and pillboxes that could fire on any invaders trying to climb over the wall. The American invasion force was the largest yet assembled for a single operation in the Pacific, consisting of seventeen aircraft carriers, six fleet carriers, five light carriers and six escort carriers. The carriers were supported by twelve battleships, eight heavy and four light cruisers, plus sixty-six destroyers and thirty-six transports. This force carried the 2nd Marine Division and a part of the Army’s 27th Infantry Division, giving a total of about 35,000 soldiers and Marines. These forces were divided into two separate groups: the Northern Attack Force, TF.52, would depart from Pearl Harbor on 10 November, while the Southern Attack Force, designated TF.53, would leave the New Hebrides on 13 November. Refuelling of the TF.52 vessels would take place between Baker and Canton Islands, while TF.53 would do the same off Funafuti, both groups undertaking this on 15 November. Two days later both groups would join up at a point halfway between Baker and Nanomea Islands. The carrier groups were designated TF.50.1 and TF.50.2, these having sailed from Pearl Harbor while TF.50.3 and TF.50.4 had sailed from Espiritu Santo. Task Force 50.1, under the command of Rear Admiral Pownall, had the carriers Yorktown, Lexington and Cowpens available, plus the battleships USS South Dakota and Washington for bombardments and air defence duties, while anti-submarine duties were covered by six destroyers. Task Force 50.2, under the command of Rear Admiral Radford, utilised the carriers Enterprise, Belleau Wood and Monterey, these being protected by the battleships USS Massachusetts, North Carolina and Indiana, together with a screen escort of another six destroyers. Task Force 50.3, with Rear Admiral Montgomery in command, had the carriers Essex, Bunker Hill and Independence at its core, while defence duties were provided by four cruisers and a similar number of destroyers. The final group, TF.50.4, was smaller, as only two carriers were assigned, these being the USS Saratoga and Princeton, plus two cruisers and four destroyers, all under the command of Rear Admiral Sherman.

The other task forces were concerned with supplying the land forces with close air support, and to that end TG.52.3, under the command of Rear Admiral Mullinex, launched air attacks from the escort carriers Luscombe Bay, Coral Sea and Corregidor against the Japanese. For the landings at Betio, Tarawa air support was provided by TF.53.6, whose carriers were Suwanee, Chenango, Barnes and Nassau, under the command of Rear Admiral Ragsdale.

The heavy units of the naval forces opened fire on the Japanese positions on 20 November, shelling continuing for over ninety minutes, being briefly interrupted to allow dive-bombers from the carrier groups to bomb various fixed positions on the island. The aircraft were launched from the carriers of TF.50.1, their primary target being Mili, while the aircraft from TF.50.2 concentrated their efforts upon the Japanese positions at Makin. The carriers of Task Force 50.3 launched their aircraft against Tarawa, while those of TF.50.4 attacked the enemy positions at Nauru. The majority of the larger-calibre Japanese guns were destroyed during this initial attack. The island was at some points only a few hundred yards wide, and the bombardment turned much of it into rubble. Given the level of destruction it was thought that by the time of the landings no one would remain to defend the tiny island.

The American assault plan centred around landings on three beaches, designated Red 1 to Red 3, located along the northern coast of the island. Red 1 was on the extreme west of the island, while Red 3 was to the east, close to the pier, with Red 2 in the centre. The airstrip was located east to west and divided the island into north and south sectors. The US Marines started their attack on the lagoon somewhat later than expected, and promptly found themselves stuck on the reef some 500 yards off shore. The campaign planners had allowed for Betio’s neap tide and therefore expected the normal rising tide to provide a water depth of five feet over the reef, allowing the larger landing craft, whose draughts were at least four feet, to pass over with room to spare. However, on that day and the next there was little tidal movement, which left a mean depth of three feet over the reef. When the supporting naval bombardment stopped to allow the troops to land, the Japanese emerged from the deep shelters where they had sheltered from the shell-fire, and manned their protected gun positions. The landing craft launched by Task Force 52 caught on the reef were soon hit, and were set on fire by the defenders’ artillery and mortar fire, even though air support was being supplied by the carriers of TF.52.3. The Marines abandoned the boats and started making their way ashore, being assailed by machine-gun fire the entire time. Initial early attempts to land tanks and break through the wall failed when the landing craft were hit by shellfire on the way in and either sank or had to withdraw while taking on water.

By 21 November the Marines were holding a defensive line on the island, and the American forces concentrated upon dividing the Japanese forces in two by expanding the bulge near the airfield until it reached the southern shore. Other forces on Red 1 were then instructed to secure Green beach, which encompassed the entire western end of the island. Operations along Red 2 and Red 3, in contrast, were considerably more difficult, as the defenders had set up several new machine-gun posts between the closest approach of the forces from the two beaches, and so fire from these machine-gun nests split the American forces from each other for a period. By the end of the day, however, the entire western end of the island was under American control, as was much of the area around the airfield. During the American assault the Japanese commander, Rear Admiral Shibasakit, was killed in his concrete command post, and this disrupted the Japanese command structure.

On 22 November, the third day of the battle, the American forces consolidated their position, while bringing ashore additional heavy equipment and tanks needed to complete the operation. By that afternoon the Marines began the task of clearing out the remaining Japanese forces. As evening approached, the remaining forces were either contained within a pocket of land to the east of the airstrip or in other smaller areas near the eastern edge of the airstrip. During the final day of the battle, 23 November, the Japanese launched a counter-assault in the early hours of the morning. When the fighting ended, 200 of the estimated 300 attackers were found dead in front of the American defensive positions, the vast majority having been killed by artillery fire. At the conclusion of the fighting only one Japanese officer, sixteen enlisted men and 129 Koreans were captured. The total Japanese and Korean casualties were approximately 4,713 dead. In contrast, the Marine Corps losses were 990 killed, with a further 2,296 wounded, while 687 USN personnel also lost their lives during the landing. While the losses at Tarawa were much higher than expected, the lessons learned at Tarawa would be applied to the Battle of Iwo Jima that would follow.

Meanwhile, beginning on 20 November, the Japanese launched air attacks against the American naval forces, during which the USS Independence was hit by a torpedo, the carrier being put out of commission for the next six months while repairs were carried out. A further grievous loss occurred on 24 November when the Casablanca-class escort carrier USS Liscombe Bay was sunk by torpedoes launched by the Japanese submarine I-175 off the Gilbert Islands. The torpedoes struck the ammunition and fuel areas and set off a massive explosion that tore the vessel apart; of the crew, 644 were killed, including the vessel’s commander, Captain Wiltsie USN, and the task group commander, Rear Admiral Mullinex. Such was the strength of the explosion that wreckage landed on the battleship USS New Mexico, which was cruising a distance away. Surprisingly, 272 survivors were rescued by the destroyers Morris and Hughes. Now aware that there was a strong Japanese submarine group working in the Tarawa area, the Americans increased their antisubmarine patrols, and this paid off when among other successes the carrier USS Chenango sank the I-21 on 29 November. From Tarawa the US Fast Carrier Task Force set out for Kwajalein to attack the Japanese fortifications there. The carrier component was designated TG.50.1, under the command of Rear Admiral Pownall, and included the Yorktown, Lexington and Cowpens, while the support consisted of four cruisers and six destroyers. A second carrier group, TG.50.3, consisted of the carriers Essex, Enterprise and Belleau Wood, under the command of Rear Admiral Montgomery, with five cruisers and five destroyers in support. During the carrier-launched air attacks 386 sorties were dispatched. The attacks saw six transports and three other vessels sunk, while a pair of Japanese cruisers were damaged. During the air battles fifty-five Japanese aircraft were shot down for a total of five American aircraft lost.

The deck crews unhook a Grumman Avenger of VT-20 as it stops on the deck of the USS Enterprise.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

In a retaliatory attack on 4 December, the USS Lexington, an Essex-class carrier, was struck by a torpedo launched by a Japanese torpedo-bomber. The crew managed to control the flooding, so that the injured carrier was able to reach Puget Sound Navy Yard for much-needed repairs. On 8 December TG.50.8, with the carriers Bunker Hill and Monterey to provide air cover, mounted an attack on Nauru. The main attack was a bombardment undertaken by the battleships USS South Dakota, Washington and Massachusetts, which fired 810 rounds of 16-inch ammunition, while the escort vessels fired 3,400 5-inch rounds. The next attack undertaken by the US Navy took place on Christmas Day 1943, when TG.50.3, commanded by Rear Admiral Sherman, with the carriers Bunker Hill and Monterey, mounted an attack on Kavieng, the capital of New Ireland. The carriers were accompanied by six destroyers. This attack was in response to Japanese reinforcements being moved from Truk to Rabaul and Kavieng, these troops being moved by four IJN cruisers and escorting destroyers. It had been planned to deploy the battleship Yamato, although this had been stopped by a torpedo launched from the submarine USS Skate. Although damaged, the Yamato would be quickly repaired for further service. During the air assault three ships were sunk and another was damaged. On New Year’s Day the carrier group had a further success when two Japanese cruisers dispatched from Truk with reinforcements, and a destroyer, were damaged. Three days later TG.50.8 returned to Kavieng to undertake further air strikes, during which another Japanese destroyer was damaged.

All of the foregoing were part of the preparations for the attack and invasion of Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands. These early movements were not without incident, as the escort carrier Sangamon was damaged when one of its aircraft crash-landed into the barrier. To add insult to injury, the Sangamon and Suwanee collided the following day, 25 January 1944. While the two Sangamon-class carriers were trying to put themselves out of action, TF.58, under the command of Vice-Admiral Mitscher, began attacks on targets in the Marshall Islands on 29 January as part of Operation Flintlock. The carrier group TG.58.1, commanded by Rear Admiral Reeves, had the carriers Enterprise, Yorktown and Belleau Wood assigned, while the main support came from the battleships Massachusetts, Indiana and Washington and the cruiser Oakland. Further support was given by nine destroyers. The first aerial attacks were undertaken on 29 January against Maloelap, while further attacks were launched the following day against Kwajalein.

A second carrier group, TG.58.2, was also assigned to this enterprise, this group being commanded by Rear Admiral Montgomery, whose carriers included the USS Essex, Intrepid and Cabot, while the supporting battleships were the South Dakota, Alabama and North Carolina, plus the cruiser USS San Diego with nine destroyers. This group attacked Roi over the period 29–31 January and again on 1–3 February. The third task group, TG.58.3, commanded by Rear Admiral Sherman, had the carriers Bunker Hill, Monterey and Cowpens assigned, while the battleships included the Iowa and New Jersey, assisted by the cruiser Wichita and nine destroyers, which undertook attacks upon Eniwetok from 30 January to 2 February. The final carrier group was TG.58.4, commanded by Rear Admiral Ginder, whose carriers were the Saratoga, Princeton and Langley, plus three cruisers and eight destroyers, whose task was to initially attack Wotje on 29 January, followed by aerial attacks on Maloelap on 30/31 January. After the group had refuelled on 1 February, it returned to the fray by attacking Eniwetok between 3 and 6 February. Overall a total of 6,232 sorties were flown, during which twenty-two aircraft were lost to the Japanese defences and a further twenty-seven to accidents. While the carriers were attacking from the air, the battleship contingent was also getting in on the act. On 30 January the USS Washington, North Carolina, Indiana and Massachusetts, plus a destroyer escort, laid down a heavy bombardment on Kwajalein during which three Japanese ships were sunk.

On 31 January the main phase of Operation Flintlock began. The primary force was the US 5th Fleet under the command of Admiral Spruance USN. The Southern Attack Force was designated TF.52, under the command of Rear Admiral Turner, whose land forces were the 7th Infantry Division under the command of Major-General Corlet USA. The air support group was designated TF.52.9, the carriers assigned being the Manila Bay, Coral Sea and Corriegidor, under the command of Rear Admiral Davison. Fire support was covered by four battleships, the USS Idaho, Pennsylvania, New Mexico and Mississippi, these in turn being escorted by three cruisers and eleven destroyers, all being designated TF.52.8, with Rear Admiral Giffin in command. Another ten destroyers were allocated to supporting the landings directly.

The Northern Attack Force commanded by Rear Admiral Connolly was known as TF.53, and the assigned ground force was the 4th Marine Division commanded by Major-General Smith USMC. The Air Support Group was designated TF.53.6, and had the carriers Sangamon, Suwanee and Chenango, under the command of Rear Admiral Ragsdale. Fire support was courtesy of the battleships Tennessee, Colorado and Maryland, commanded by Rear Admiral Oldendorf, being designated TF.53.3. Supporting the capital units were six cruisers and twenty destroyers. Initial landings began on 31 January, with the Army division targeting Kwajalein while the Marines were due to land on Roi. Within seven days over 21,000 troops had been landed by the Southern Attack Force, while the northern group had landed over 20,000 troops. Total losses during these attacks were 372 killed and a further 1,582 listed as wounded. The Japanese force, commanded by Rear Admiral Akiyama, had over 8,000 men. While being a small force, the Japanese put up a stout resistance that would see no more than 256 surviving to be taken prisoner. Kwajalein and Roi were completely in American hands by 7 February 1944. A slightly easier target was Majuro Atoll, which was completely in American hands by 2 February. The task force was designated TG.51.2, under the command of Rear Admiral Hill, while the assigned carriers were the USS Nassau and Natoma Bay. The ground force was the 27th Infantry Division, which landed without meeting any resistance on 31 January. After occupation, this atoll would become an important base for future American operations in the Pacific.

During the assault on the main Japanese naval base at Truk, the air fleets hurled everything they had at the attacking carriers. Here a Japanese torpedo-bomber heads towards the USS Yorktown.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

Having captured the atolls the Americans turned their attentions to the next target on the list, Eniwetok. Designated Operation Catchpole, the primary group was TF.51.11, commanded by Rear Admiral Hill, whose troop-carrying vessels had the troops of the 22nd Marine RCT and two battalions of the 106th Regiment/27th US Infantry Division aboard, some 8,000 men in total. The carrier group, commanded by Rear Admiral Ragsdale, had the carriers Sangamon, Suwanee and Chenango assigned. The heavy units were the battleships Pennsylvania, Colorado and Tennessee, with Rear Admiral Oldendorf in command. The lighter support vessels included three cruisers and nineteen destroyers. Further aerial support was provided by TG.58.4, which had completed its task of supporting the Wotje landings earlier.

Running at the same time was Operation Hailstone, under the overall command of Vice-Admiral Mitscher, whose task was to attack the main Japanese naval base at Truk. The air support was provided by TG.58.1, under the command of Rear Admiral Reeves, the carriers assigned being the USS Enterprise, Yorktown and Belleau Wood, and TG.58.2, whose carriers were the USS Essex, Intrepid and Cabot, commanded by Rear Admiral Montgomery. The third group, TF.58.3, was commanded by Rear Admiral Sherman, the assigned carriers being the Bunker Hill, Monterey and Cowpens. The battleships in the force comprised the USS North Carolina, Massachusetts, South Dakota and Alabama, and the supporting vessels consisted of six cruisers and at least fifteen destroyers. A further addition was Task Force 50.9, whose commander was Vice-Admiral Spruance, this group having the battleships USS Iowa and New Jersey, plus the usual range of cruisers and destroyers in support.

The opening move by the Americans began early in the morning of 17 February, when a fighter strike launched by the five fleet carriers attacked the 365 Japanese aircraft based on Truk, while the lighter carriers launched their aircraft against shipping in and around Truk. In response to these attacks the Japanese launched a retaliatory air strike using seven Kate torpedo-bombers, whose persistence paid off when one of their torpedoes hit the carrier USS Intrepid. Escorted by the Cabot and a cruiser and a destroyer screen, the Intrepid was escorted to Majuro for repair work. On the following day strike forces were launched by the four remaining fleet carriers against shipping in and around Truk. Overall 1,250 sorties were flown, during which 400 tons of bombs were dropped. Unfortunately for the US Navy, the Japanese Combined Fleet, which included the capital vessels such as carriers and battleships, had already been withdrawn from Truk to Singapore. However, the aerial armada made the most of the available targets by sinking the small number of warships present and many of the numerous auxiliaries anchored at Truk. As well as the twenty-six ships sunk, the strikes had also destroyed 250 of the resident aircraft. The withdrawal of the Japanese heavy units indicated to the Americans that their foe was beginning to realise that his war was lost, so that Truk became a less important base of operations.

While the main groups were concentrating on attacking Truk, TF.50.9 had steamed to the other side of Truk in order to intercept any ships fleeing the Japanese base. During this phase of the operation the ships of TF.50.9 intercepted and sank two cruisers, five destroyers, a submarine chaser, two submarines and two support vessels. Only one IJN vessel escaped, this being the destroyer Nowake. Further Japanese losses were inflicted by submarines stationed in the exit channels, which managed to sink eight escaping ships. Moving on from Truk, the carriers of TG.58.1 launched their aircraft to attack Jasluit on 20 February, this being followed three days later by bombardments of Tinian and Rota by TG.58.3, while TG.58.2 bombarded Saipan and Tinian. A further bombardment took place against one of the alternative targets between 18 and 20 March. The target was Kavieng, and the deployed ships included the battleships New Mexico, Tennessee, Idaho and Mississippi, under the command of Rear Admiral Griffin. Air support was provided by the carriers Manila Bay and Natoma, while a screen of fifteen destroyers protected against submarines. During the bombardment over 13,000 rounds of 14-inch and 5-inch ammunition was expended. While Kavieng was under fire another task group was heading towards Emirau in the Bismark Archipelago. Commanded by Commodore Reifsnider, TG.31.2 landed the 4th Marine Division under the command of Brigadier-General Noble from nineteen destroyers. Support for the operation was provided by seven USN cruisers plus the fleet carriers Enterprise and Belleau Wood, and the escort carriers Coral Sea and Corregidor. No Japanese resistance was encountered, and so the establishment of an airfield and harbour facilities was quickly achieved. In a further encounter on Bougainville, the defending Japanese forces, under the command of Lieutenant-General Hyakutake, committed 12,000 troops to attack the American bridgehead near Cape Torokina as Operation TA. At the end of the battle, which lasted from 9 to 24 March, over 5,000 Japanese troops had been killed, for the loss of 263 Americans.

Caught at the moment of touchdown is this Grumman F6F Hellcat of VF-25, landing on the USS Cowpens, an Independence-class light aircraft carrier.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

With engines turning, the first flight of Curtiss Helldivers from VB-5 aboard the USS Yorktown are prepared for departure.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

After the minor diversions earlier, the Americans launched Operation Desecrate on 23 March. The overall commander was Admiral Spruance, while the commander of TF.58 was Vice-Admiral Mitscher. The targets for this group were the islands of Palau, Yap and Woleai, all of which were Japanese bases. As these were to be carrier-based raids, TG.58.1, under the command of Rear Admiral Reeves, took the carriers Enterprise, Belleau Wood and Cowpens from Espiritu Santo on 23 March, while TG.58.2, under the command of Rear Admiral Montgomery, was also dispatched, taking the carriers Bunker Hill, Hornet, Cabot and Monterey. A third task group, TG.58.3, commanded by Rear Admiral Ginder, took the carriers Yorktown, Lexington, Princeton and Langley, departing from Majuro accompanied by the usual selection of battleships, cruisers and destroyers. En route to their targets the forces were spotted by a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft from Truk on 25 March. The combined force was spotted again the following day. As a result of the American force in the vicinity of Truk, the Japanese naval vessels based at Palau departed and headed off to join the remainder of the fleet at Tawi-Tawi. The Japanese suffered further losses when the C-in-C of the IJN, Admiral Koga, was killed when his Emily flying-boat crashed en route to Mindanao on 31 March. Adding to the woes of the Japanese, another Emily flying-boat, carrying the IJN Chief of Staff, Vice-Admiral Fukudome, made a forced landing. The Admiral was captured by Filipino guerrillas at Cebu, together with the important documents the aircraft was carrying. The loss of these senior officers resulted in the appointment of Vice-Admiral Takasu as interim commander, although he would be replaced on 5 May by Admiral Toyoda. As TF.58 proceeded towards its targets it was attacked by a force of Japanese aircraft on 28 March, but with little success. By 30 March all three carrier groups were in a position to launch the first wave of attacks against Palau. The aircraft from the Lexington, Bunker Hill and Hornet would specifically be tasked to lay mines across the access channels. During the air attacks thirty-five vessels of various sizes were sunk. Further Japanese vessels were sunk outside Palau. Having pounded Palau, the task force moved on to Yap on 31 March, and on 1 April all three carrier groups unleashed their wrath upon the Japanese positions on Woleai.

Following the completion of Operation Desecrate, TF.58 moved on to attack Hollandia after refuelling and replenishment of stores. The task force departed from Majuro on 13 April and undertook a further refuel just off the Admiralty Islands on 19 April, finally moving into its attack position two days later. The air support group, TG.58.1, under the command of Rear Admiral Clark, launched aircraft from the carriers USS Hornet, Belleau Wood, Cowpens and Bataan that attacked Japanese positions on Wakde and Sarmi during the day, while the support vessels shelled the same areas at night. The same carrier group undertook another raid on 22 April, while over the following two days a second carrier group, TF.58.2, under the command of Rear Admiral Montgomery, whose carriers Bunker Hill, Yorktown, Monterey and Cabot carried out strikes on Hollandia. The third task group, TG.58.3, had already launched attacks on Hollandia on 21 April with aircraft launched from the Enterprise, Lexington, Princeton and Langley. After these attacks TG.58.3 supported the landings on Tanahmerah Bay during 22–24 April. During these operations twenty-one aircraft were lost, although by now a very efficient rescue operation recovered most of these crews. The entire task force launched an aerial attack on Truk over 29 and 30 April. During this assault fifty-nine Japanese aircraft were destroyed in aerial combat, while a further thirty-four were destroyed on the ground. This assault badly depleted the 104 aircraft that had originally been based on the atoll. The cost to the United States was twenty-six aircraft shot down and a further nine lost through accident. In a secondary action near Truk, aircraft from VT-30 from the USS Monterey sank the Japanese submarine I-174. A further mission on 1 May saw a battleship group, the Iowa, New Jersey, North Carolina, Indiana, Massachusetts, South Dakota and Alabama, under the command of Vice-Admiral Lee, plus a screen of protective destroyers, bombard the Japanese positions on the island of Ponape. Air support was provided by TG.58.1. After completion, this group returned to Eniwetok on 4 May, and on the same day TG.58.2 and 58.3 anchored in Majuro.

With its arrester hook deployed and its weapons racks empty, this Douglas Dauntless of VB-10 prepares to enter the landing pattern of the USS Enterprise.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

While the carriers of TG.58 were preparing for their next mission, Task Force 77 was being prepared for Operations Reckless and Persecution, the landings on Hollandia and Aitape. Overall commander for both operations was General MacArthur, while the naval commander was Vice-Admiral Kinkaid. Air support was provided by TG.78.1 under the command of Rear Admiral Ragsdale, the carriers assigned being the escort carriers Sangamon, Suwanee, Chenango and Santee. A second air support force was also assigned, this being TG.78.2, whose commander was Rear Admiral Davison. The assigned escort carriers were the USS Natoma Bay, Coral Sea, Corregidor and Manila Bay. The troops came from US I Corps, commanded by Major-General Eichelberger, and personnel from the 41st Infantry Division. Support vessels consisted of fifty destroyers and five cruisers, plus the landing ships carrying the troops. The landings at both locations were undertaken against little Japanese resistance, all being secured by 28 April. After their successes against Hollandia and Aitape, the US Navy again turned its attention to Ponape when TG.58.1 bombarded the defences once more on 1 May. At the conclusion of the operations the battle groups arrived at Eniwetok, while the carrier groups anchored at Majuro.

After the success of the American operations it was becoming obvious to the Japanese High Command that the next target for US forces would be the Marianas. Its response was Operation A-Go, which would see large groups of troops being transported over 11 and 12 May, these being joined by groups dispatched from Tawi-Tawi and Lingga Bay. Most of the Japanese battleships, supported by the 1st and 2nd Carrier Squadrons and a vast array of cruisers and destroyers, all headed towards the Marianas group. During the transit the US Navy submarines would sink at least ten vessels, three of which were very vital tankers.

Having noted the Japanese movements towards the Marianas, the US Navy sent TG.58.2, commanded by Rear Admiral Montgomery, with the carriers Essex, Wasp and San Jacinto, plus five cruisers and twelve destroyers, from Majuro on 14 May, heading for Marcus Island, a location en route to the Marianas. Aerial attacks and bombardments were carried out on 19 and 20 May before the same force moved on to Wake Island to carry out the same task on 23 May. TF.58.6 was also in action when the force’s carrier aircraft carried out an aerial attack on Marcus Island on 20 May. Rear Admiral Montgomery’s task force would carry out another attack on 23 May, this time the target being Wake Island. After these raids the carrier groups would return to their forward operating bases to prepare for the next operation.

During the period after the various nuisance raids undertaken in May, the escort carriers were used for escort duties and to hunt down Japanese submarines. One of these sinkings involved a Grumman Avenger from VT-60 aboard the USS Suwanee that depth-charged and destroyed the I-158 on 21 June south of Guam. While the Suwanee was operating off Guam, the majority of vessels in TF.58 were beginning the movements that would be designated Operation Forager. Beginning on 11 June, the targets were the Marianas and the Vulcan Islands. TF.58.1, under the command of Rear Admiral Clark, had the carriers Hornet, Yorktown, Belleau Wood and Bataan assigned, accompanied by four cruisers plus nine destroyers as escorts. The second carrier group was TF.58.2, with the carriers Bunker Hill, Wasp, Monterey and Cabot, under the command of Rear Admiral Montgomery, with four cruisers and nine destroyers as escorts. The third carrier group was designated TF.58.3, and had the carriers Enterprise, Lexington, San Jacinto and Princeton under the command of Rear Admiral Reeves, these being accompanied by five cruisers, the extra being used as a command ship by Admiral Spruance, plus thirteen destroyers. The final carrier group was TF.58.4 commanded by Rear Admiral Harrill, the assigned carriers being the Essex, Langley and Cowpens, with four cruisers and fourteen destroyers as escorts. Accompanying the carrier groups was TG.58.7, whose vessels included the battleships USS Washington, North Carolina, Iowa, New Jersey, Indiana, South Dakota and Alabama, with four cruisers and fourteen destroyers, all under the command of Vice-Admiral Lee.

A Grumman Avenger of VT-1 aboard the USS Yorktown prepares to depart on an Operation Forager on Saipan.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

The first attack carried out by this force was the shelling of Saipan before all four carrier groups launched a massive air strike against the Marianas Island group, during which thirty-six Japanese aircraft were destroyed. At the conclusion of this action TF.58.4 launched an air strike towards Saipan, which intercepted a convoy that had just left the island. During the attack ten merchant vessels and four warships were sunk. Two days later TG.58.1 launched an attack against Guam, while the other three carrier groups launched their aircraft against Saipan and Tinian. Over 14 and 15 June carrier activity was reduced to patrol sorties as the carriers and escorts refuelled. Once ready to resume operations, TG.58.1 and 58.4, under the combined command of Rear Admiral Clark, undertook attacks on Iwo Jima, Chichi Jima and Hahajima over 15 and 16 June. Further attacks were undertaken by TG.58.4 on the island of Pagan while en route to join Task Force 58. The main part of Operation Forager started when the vessels of TF.52, commanded by Vice-Admiral Turner, began to land the V Amphibious Corps commanded by Lieutenant-General Smith on Saipan. Prior to the landings the battleships and cruisers undertook a heavy bombardment of the Japanese positions on the island. Joining the main task groups was TG.52.14 commanded by Rear Admiral Bogan, with the escort carriers Fanshaw Bay, Midway, White Plains and Kalinin Bay, plus an escort of destroyers, providing aerial support. Also supporting the landings was TG.52.11, commanded by Rear Admiral Sallada, with the escort carriers Kitkun Bay, Gambier Bay, Corregidor and Coral Sea, and a destroyer escort. Further landings took place on 15 June, by which time some 67,000 troops had reached the beachheads. Facing them was the reinforced 43rd Infantry Division commanded by Lieutenant-General Saito. After heavy fighting between the two opposing forces, the island was finally captured on 9 July. Japanese casualties at the conclusion of the fighting included nearly 24,000 dead and 13,000 wounded, while the American casualties totalled nearly 3,500 killed and 13,000 wounded.

Having completed the Saipan operation, TF.58 prepared to provide support for the capture of the Philippines. Before that, the Battle of the Philippine Sea took place. On 13 June the Japanese fleet departed from Tawi-Tawi to undertake Operation A-Go, the attempt to trap the US fleet in the Marianas. Unfortunately for the Japanese, the US Navy had spread a line of submarines across the potential routes of transit, and so by 18 July Admiral Spruance was already aware of the Japanese approach. Heading towards the Americans was the Japanese fleet commanded by Vice-Admiral Kurita, whose light carriers were the Chitose, Chiyoda and Zutho, with the battleships Yamato, Musahi and Kongo. Supporting this force were four cruisers and eight destroyers. Two further groups also set sail with the primary group. Group A was under the command of Vice-Admiral Ozawa, with the carriers Taiho, Shokaku and Zuikaku, plus three cruisers and six destroyers in support, while Carrier Group B, commanded by Rear Admiral Joshima, had the carriers Junyo, Hiyo and Ryuho assigned, plus the battleship Nagato, and a single cruiser and nine destroyers as escorts. Supporting the battleships, carriers and other vessels were six tankers and six escorting destroyers.

The escort carriers not only carried aircraft for the fleet, they were not averse to launching aircraft for the USAAF. Here a Republic P-47 Thunderbolt is launched for the forces based on Saipan in the Marianas Islands.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

Japanese reconnaissance aircraft spotted some of the TF.58 vessels in the evening of 18 June, while further flights early the next morning detected others. With the ships of TF.58 detected, the Japanese decided to fly off 372 aircraft in four waves to attack the Americans. The incoming attack was detected by radar some 200 miles away, and so the US Navy carriers were able to launch 300 fighters to intercept the raid. Of the 372 Japanese aircraft airborne that day, ships’ anti-aircraft fire and the fighters shot down 242, and this later became known as the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. Of the attackers only two got through, one managing to dive-bomb the South Dakota, while a kamikaze struck the USS Indiana. The Bunker Hill, Wasp, Minneapolis and the destroyer Hudson were damaged by near-misses, but were still able to function. During this engagement only twenty-nine American fighters were lost in action. The landings on Guam continued, during which the US Navy fighters shot down thirty Japanese aircraft and a further nineteen that attempted to land on Guam were destroyed. The Japanese carriers were also in trouble, as the Taiho, part of Carrier Group A, was torpedoed by the submarine USS Albacore, the carrier sinking after the torpedo hit set off a massive explosion. Another carrier from the same group, the Shokaku, was also hit by torpedoes from the USS Cavalla, these strikes sinking the vessel. The remainder of Carrier Group A refuelled from the tankers on 20 June. However, they had been spotted, and so Admiral Mitscher launched an aerial attack from the carriers Hornet, Belleau Wood, Lexington, Monterey and San Jacinto at maximum range. A total of 216 aircraft were launched by the American carriers, encountering no more than thirty-five Japanese defending fighters, which were easily dealt with. The dive-bombers and torpedo-bombers from the USS Belleau Wood sank the remaining Japanese carrier, Hiyo, while aircraft from the USS Wasp badly damaged two of the tankers, which were later sunk by the Japanese escort destroyers. During the attack twenty US Navy aircraft were shot down, while a further seventy-two were lost in crash landings as they attempted to make night landings, even though the carrier decks were floodlit. Over the night of 20/21 June the commander-in-chief of the IJN, Admiral Toyoda, ordered the remaining Japanese vessels to withdraw. Admiral Mitscher was keen to pursue the fleeing Japanese ships with the fast battleships and carriers, but he was overruled by Admiral Spruance. After the carrier groups had completed refuelling over 22/23 June, they return to Eniwetok, although Admiral Clark with the carriers Hornet, Yorktown, Bataan and Belleau Wood carried out an attack on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima on 24 June, during which a further sixty-six Japanese aircraft were destroyed.

The landings on Guam began on 21 July when III Amphibious Corps commanded by Major-General Geiger was landed by vessels of TF.53 under the command of Rear Admiral Connolly. Providing the destructive firepower for this assault were the battleships of TG.53.5, while the air support component was supplied by TG.53.7 under the command of Rear Admiral Ragsdale. The carriers assigned to this group included the USS Sangamon, Suwanee, Chenango, Corregidor and the Coral Sea. During the landing phase over 54,000 troops were put ashore, annihilating the defending Japanese forces under the overall command of Lieutenant-General Obata. Of the approximately 11,000 Japanese troops on Guam, over 10,500 were killed and ninety-eight were taken prisoner. In response the American forces lost 1,200 dead, 145 missing and more than 5,500 wounded. Some of the Japanese troops escaped into the jungle and would continue to provide a nuisance value till the end of the war, and one soldier would finally be convinced that the war had ended when discovered in 1972. The seaborne support was reduced when the majority of the fleet departed Guam on 23 July and headed west to undertake attacks on Palau, Yap, Ulithi, Tais, Ngulu and Sorol. All three carrier groups, TG.58.1, 58.2 and 58.3 undertook these attacks, suffering minimal losses in the process. At the completion of this engagement TG.58.1 and 58.3 were refuelled and headed off to carry out raids on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima. During these attacks, carried out over 4 and 5 August, a number of Japanese transports were sunk, and a destroyer was sunk by three of its US Navy counterparts.

The invasion of Tinian began on 24 July 1944, with TF.52, commanded by Rear Admiral Hill, landing the V Amphibious Group, commanded by Major-General Schmidt. Fire support for the landing was supplied by TG.52.17 and TG.52.10, while air support was courtesy of TG.52.14 under the command of Rear Admiral Bogan and TG.52.11 commanded by Rear Admiral Sallada. While the Japanese defenders, under the command of Vice-Admiral Kakuta, mounted a stiff resistance, the might of the American forces inflicted grievous losses on the defenders. Overall, 6,000 Japanese were killed, with 252 being taken prisoner. The American forces lost 389 killed and 1,800 wounded. In response to these latest American successes, the Japanese C-in-C Combined Fleet Admiral Toyoda would implement Operation Sho-Go-1, which would result in a redeployment of all forces in the Pacific in order to create a defensive ring. To that end the land-based forces were concentrated upon the Philippines and Formosa, the main fleet was redeployed to Brunei Bay to protect the oil field, and the remaining aircraft carriers moved to the Inland Sea within the bounds of the Japanese home islands.

Rear Admiral Montgomery, in command of TG.58.3, carried out aerial attacks against Iwo Jima, Chichi Jima and Haha Jima, while TG.58.3, commanded by Rear Admiral Clark, with the carriers USS Bunker Hill, Lexington and Cabot, plus four cruisers and seven destroyers, undertook an attack on Japanese convoy 4804 near Muko Jima, sinking an escort destroyer and five transports, while two corvettes and another transport were damaged.

On 28 August, TF.38 with Vice-Admiral Mitscher departed from Eniwetok, its purpose being to undertake attacks in support of the Palau and Morotai operations. TG.38.1, with the carriers Wasp, Hornet, Cowpens and Belleau Wood, was commanded by Rear Admiral McCain, while TG.38.1 was commanded by Rear Admiral Bogan, and included the carriers Bunker Hill, Intrepid, Hancock and Cabot, plus the Independence, specially modified for night operations. The third carrier group was designated TG.38.3, and was commanded by Rear Admiral Sherman, with the carriers Lexington, Essex, Princeton and Langley assigned. TG.38.4 was the fourth assigned carrier group, which included the Franklin, Enterprise, Monterey and San Jacinto, being commanded by Rear Admiral Davison. The battleships in the force included the Iowa, New Jersey, Washington, Indiana, Massachusetts and Alabama. Escorting these vessels were twelve cruisers and sixty-four destroyers. TG.38.4 launched its aircraft against targets on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jiman, during which a transport was badly damaged. The USS Monterey was detached to cover the bombardment of Wake Island being undertaken by the cruiser group TG.12.5. This was followed up over the period 6–8 September when all four carrier groups launched attacks on Mindanao, this being followed by attacks on Visayas in the Philippines. During these raids twenty-one enemy ships were sunk and many others were damaged. Following on from Visayas, the carrier groups received intelligence information that revealed that the Japanese forces defending Leyte were smaller than expected. Admiral Halsey therefore proposed to bring forward the invasion date from 20 December to 20 October. This change was confirmed on 16 September at the 2nd Quebec Conference.

The carrier task groups undertook a further attack on Mindanao on 14 September, when another transport was sunk. Up to this point over 2,400 sorties had been flown, during which 200 enemy aircraft were destroyed. A few days off the line saw the carrier groups being replenished before they began their attacks on Luzon on 21 and 22 September, concentrating upon Manila and Visayas, these areas being attacked again on 24 September. During the first raids a destroyer, a corvette, five tankers and sixteen freighters were sunk, while on the second raid four naval ships, two tankers and seven freighters were destroyed. Overall 1,000 Japanese aircraft were destroyed, while the shipping losses were 150 vessels of various types and sizes, all for the loss of fifty-four US Navy aircraft, plus eighteen damaged.

Morotai would be the next target for the Americans, and so TF.77, the VII Amphibious Force, departed from its bases at Aitape, Wakde and Hollondia on 15 September. The task force was split into two groups–‘White’ commanded by Rear Admiral Barbey, and ‘Red’ commanded by Rear Admiral Fechteler. Air support was provided by TG.77.1, commanded by Rear Admiral Sprague, which included the escort carriers Sangamon, Suwanee, Chenango, Santee, Saginaw Bay and Petrof Bay, with an eight-destroyer escort force. Over the period 16 September to 3 October over 26,000 troops were landed, meeting little opposition from the defending Japanese forces. While TF.77 was landing on Morotai, Operation Stalemate II was also beginning, being the invasion of Palau. Overall command of TF.31 was vested in Rear Admiral Wilkinson, while the commander of III Amphibious Corps was Major-General Geiger. Initally the operation concentrated upon shelling the islands of Paella and Anger, which were scheduled to be invaded first. The main firepower was provided by the battleships Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Maryland, Mississippi and West Virginia, with nine cruisers and fourteen destroyers escorting. Air support was provided by between seven and eleven carriers as the operation continued. During the first day of the assault, 13 September, over 380 sorties were flown against enemy installations. While the Palau landings were meeting moderate resistance, those on Paella were met with much stronger efforts. So well entrenched were the Japanese forces that it took until 25 December for the final troops to be winkled out. Anger was landed on by the Americans on 17 September, and again the Japanese put up a stout resistance, their defence being broken only on 23 October. Of the 5,300 Japanese troops on the islands, only 301 survived to be captured, while the Americans suffered 1,200 dead with 6,500 wounded.

On 6 October 1944 Admiral Halsey, Commander of the 3rd Fleet, joined TF.38 as it moved to a position off Formosa in order to destroy the remaining Japanese aircraft based there and at Luzon. TF.38 had departed from Ultithi with Vice-Admiral Mitscher in command. Within the fleet were three of the available carrier task groups, these being TG.38.1, 38.2 and 38.3. The final carrier group, TG.38.4, joined the remainder of the fleet on 7 October, having arrived from a position off Palau. Even as the main fleet was heading towards the Philippines, a diversionary mission centring around TG.30.2, under the command of Rear Admiral Smith, headed towards Marcus Island to heavily bombard the Japanese based there. As the battleships were part of the main force, TG.30.2 consisted of three cruisers and six destroyers.

The TF.38 carrier groups consisted of TG.38.1 commanded by Vice-Admiral McCain with the carriers Wasp, Hornet, Monterey and Cowpens, plus an escort of four cruisers and fifteen destroyers. TG.38.2 had the carriers Intrepid, Hancock, Bunker Hill, Cabot and Independence, commanded by Rear Admiral Bogan. Escorting the carriers were the battleships Iowa and New Jersey, with Admiral Halsey aboard, plus four cruisers and nineteen destroyers. Rear Admiral Sherman was in command of TG.38.3 with the carriers Essex, Lexington, Princeton and Langley assigned, while the escorts included the battleships Washington, Massachusetts, South Dakota and Alabama, with four cruisers and fourteen destroyers. TG.38.4, which had joined the main force on 7 October, had the carriers Franklin, Enterprise, San Jacinto and Belleau Wood, and was under the command of Rear Admiral Davison. Two cruisers and eleven destroyers provided escort cover. The carrier groups were in position on 10 October, all four launching strikes. One air group was directed to attack Amani-o-Shima, two attacked Okinawa and the fourth group attacked Sakishima Gunto. These raids involved nearly 2,000 sorties, during which twenty-one American aircraft were lost. During these attacks the Japanese lost forty-two vessels of varying sizes and thirty aircraft. After the US Navy had hit its targets, the Japanese forces attempted to launch a retaliatory attack, as TF.38 had been detected by aerial reconnaissance, but poor navigation resulted in the attack formations not finding their targets. On the following day TG.38.1 and 38.4 flew off sixty-one missions against the Japanese airfield at Aparri, while the other two task groups undertook essential refuelling from TG.30.8. This vital cog in the naval logistics chain comprised thirty-four tankers with forty-three escorts. Also in this formation were the escort carriers Altamaha, Barnes, Silkoh Bay, Cape Esperance, Nassau, Kwajalein, Shipley Bay, Steamer Bay, Nehenta Bay, Sargent Bay and Rudyerd Bay, which were acting as replenishment decks and as such would send sixty-one aircraft from their on-board stocks to the front-line carriers.

Captured in flight are these Douglas Dauntless dive-bombers of VC-21 from the Bogue-class escort carrier USS Nassau. Of note are the bombs on the centre-line crutches.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

On 12 October all four carrier groups launched a continuous series of strike waves against the Japanese airfield and installations on Formosa. During the first day over 1,300 sorties were flown, while on the following day just under 1,000 missions were launched. During these sorties forty-eight American aircraft were lost, although most of the crews were recovered, but these losses were nothing compared to those suffered by the Japanese, as uncountable numbers of aircraft were destroyed in the air and on the ground. The Japanese attempted to launch raids in retaliation, ‘T’ Force dispatching fifty-six aircraft from Kyushu on 12 October, while on the following day fifty-two sorties were launched from Okinawa. During these attacks the carrier USS Franklin was narrowly missed by torpedoes and a kamikaze, although one of the Japanese torpedo-bombers crashed on the carrier’s deck, causing light damage that was quickly dealt with. On 14 October TG.38.1 launched a further 246 aircraft against targets on Formosa, during which twenty-three aircraft were lost.

While TG.38.1 was pounding Formosa, TG.38.4 was undertaking a similar exercise against Aparri. As the US Navy aircraft withdrew from the skies over Formosa, Boeing B-29s launched from bases in China continued the attacks, although they also added Okinawa to the list of targets. The Japanese again tried to turn back the increasingly large American forces forcing their way towards the home islands. The Japanese 2nd Air Force launched 419 sorties from bases on Formosa, Okinawa and Kyushu against the ships of TF.38. Of these aircraft 225 aircraft would not find their designated targets, although those that did did manage to inflict some damage. The carrier Hancock suffered some injury, as did two cruisers and a destroyer. While the damaged ships were towed out of the combat zone, their removal and that of the required escorts, including the USS Cowpens, barely dented the strength of TF.38.

On 15 October units of the Japanese 2nd Fleet dispatched 199 aircraft to attack the American fleet, although only the cruiser USS Houston was damaged by a torpedo strike. In retaliation TG.38.4 undertook attacks on the airfields north of Manila, during which there were fierce air battles over the islands. The Japanese 1st Air Fleet launched fifty fighters and 130 dive-bombers and torpedo-bombers to attack the incoming raids and the TF.38 carriers. During this fighting the USS Franklin was again damaged, although in response the US Navy shot down thirty-two enemy aircraft. During the period 12–15 October the US Navy launched 881 missions against the various Japanese installations for the loss of 321 aircraft, although as before many of the downed aircrew were rescued. Japanese claims during this period included the sinking of eleven aircraft carriers, two battleships, one cruiser and thirteen other vessels. On 16 and 17 October the Japanese 1st and 2nd Air Fleets undertook 107 sorties against TF.38, although again they failed to find their targets and in the process lost twenty-four aircraft. While the Japanese aircraft were searching in vain for the American forces, they in turn were launching further attacks against Luzon. At the completion of these attacks the majority of the carrier groups returned to Ultithi to prepare for the Leyte operation.

A pair of Grumman Avengers from VT-7 aboard the USS Hancock pose for the camera. Of note is the horseshoe emblem on the fin, denoting the Hancock.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

The Battle of Leyte would begin with air attacks that took place over 16 and 17 October utilising B-24 Liberators, with P-38 Lightnings as escort, these being provided by the 5th and 13th Air Forces. The USAAF bombing raids were supported by carriers from TG.77.4 commanded by Rear Admiral T.L. Sprague. These aircraft attacked targets on Leyte, Cebu and North Mindenao. The carriers assigned to this task included the Sangamon, Suwanee, Chenango, Santee, Saginaw Bay and Petrof Bay, escorted by eight destroyers. A second carrier group, commanded by Rear Admiral Stump, included the Natoma Bay, Manila Bay, Maces Island, Kadashan Bay, Savo Island and Ommaney Bay, with an escort of eight destroyers. Another Rear Admiral Sprague would be in command of a third carrier force, comprising the carriers Fanshaw Bay, St. Lo, White Plains, Kalinin Bay, Kitkun Bay and Gambier Bay. This group was escorted by seven destroyers.

The first carrier group entered Leyte Gulf early in the morning of 17 October and prepared to launch aerial strikes. The escort carriers were spotted as intended by Japanese coast watchers, who as expected informed Imperial Headquarters. In response the Japanese put Operation Sho-1 into force, this being the intended main fleet movements needed to counter the American movements. While the escort carrier group was entering the gulf the primary fleet carriers of TF.38 were preparing to launch a series of attack waves against the bases of the 1st and 4th Air Fleets on Luzon. The assigned carrier groups were TG.38.4, commanded by Rear Admiral Davison, whose carriers included the Franklin, Enterprise, San Jacinto and Belleau Wood. Support was provided by the battleships Washington and Alabama, with two cruisers and fifteen destroyers. On the following day two other groups, TG.38.2 and TG.38.3, also launched air strikes against Luzon. TG.38.2 consisted of the Intrepid, Hancock, Bunker Hill, Cabot and Independence, plus the battleships Iowa and New Jersey, with three cruisers and sixteen destroyers as escorts. TG.38.3 consisted of the carriers Lexington, Essex, Princeton and Langley, with the battleships Massachusetts and Indiana, plus four cruisers and twelve destroyers as escorts. The Japanese responded to the carrier attacks by launching a hundred-strong raid, none of which got through. Further attacks were made by both carrier and air force units against Luzon, during which twenty-three ships were sunk.

With massive air support in place, the United States 7th Fleet entered the Leyte Gulf with the 6th Army under the command of Lieutenant-General Krueger aboard. The troop landings began on 20 October, with fire support being provided by the battleships Mississippi, Maryland and West Virginia. Another fire support group consisting of the battleships Tennessee, California and Pennsylvania was stationed to the other side of the landing beachheads. Due to the strength of the US Navy bombardment, the Japanese defending forces were forced to move to prepared positions further inland. During these operations the escort carrier USS Sangamon was damaged by a Japanese bomber, while two of the escorting cruisers were damaged by a torpedo and a kamikaze, and required that both be towed away for repairs. On 21 October aircraft from TG.77.4 supported the troop landings, while those of TG.38.2 and 38.4 undertook attacks on the western Vizayan Islands, after which both groups withdrew for replenishment.

On 22 October the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet under the command of Admiral Toyoda set out to intercept TF.38, departing from Brunei with the battleships Yamato, Musashi, Nagato, Kongo and Haruna, plus twelve cruisers and fifteen destroyers as escorts. The second force, consisting of the battleships Fuso and Yamashiro, with three cruisers and seven destroyers, departed at the same time. A third force, consisting of fast transports and escorts, sailed soon afterwards. A separate force commanded by Vice-Admiral Ozawa set out to create a diversion, the intention of which was to draw TF.38 into the waiting guns and aircraft of the Japanese Navy. Included in this diversion force were the carriers Zuikaku, Zuiho, Chiyoda and Chitose, these being escorted by the battleships Ise and Hyuga. Escort was provided by three cruisers and eight destroyers. A support group comprising two tankers, a destroyer and six corvettes left at the same time as the main combat group.

Almost gutted by fire, the crew of the carrier USS Princeton fight the flames that threaten the ship. After much effort by the crew, the conflagration finally took over the ship, which finally exploded.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

Unfortunately for the Japanese force, it was spotted by an American submarine, which promptly reported it. Further submarines soon reached the Japanese position and mounted a combined attack that saw the sinking of two destroyers and the serious damaging of two more. Admiral Halsey decided to attack this force, and so TF.38 altered course towards the Japanese with the carriers of TG.38.3, 38.2 and 38.4 moving into position in preparation for these attacks. However, this was not without incident, as a bomber force from the Japanese base on Luzon reached the carrier groups, when a single attacker got through and hit the USS Princeton. The single attacker managed to release a single bomb that passed through the flight deck and entered the hangar before exploding. This caused a massive fire, which quickly spread and required assistance from other vessels to combat the flames. Further explosions ripped through the carrier, causing further extensive damage. At this point most of the surviving crew were evacuated, while the vessels alongside continued to fight the fires. By late afternoon it had become obvious that the fires aboard the Princeton were completely out of control, and the remaining crew were evacuated. There was an attempt to torpedo the hulk, but this was abandoned due to torpedo malfunctions. No further attempt was made to sink the stricken vessel as a bomb magazine eventually exploded, completely destroying the forward part of the ship and sending the debris high into the air. The rear hull section slid beneath the waves soon after. Only one other vessel was damaged, this being the cruiser USS Birmingham, which had been hit by flying debris when the Princeton exploded, and required towing clear for repairs.

On 24 October four waves of US Navy strike and fighter aircraft were launched to attack the Japanese main force in the Sibuyan Sea. The first wave was generated by the Intrepid and the Cabot, and consisted of twelve dive-bombers and twelve torpedo-bombers, escorted by twenty-one fighters, that attacked the Myoko and the Musashi, the sister vessel to the Yamato, causing serious torpedo damage on the first, and bomb and torpedo damage on the latter. The Myoko was so badly damaged that it was forced to withdraw from the conflict. A second wave from the same carriers, consisting of twelve dive-bombers and eleven torpedo-bombers, with an escort of nineteen fighters, also scored further hits on the Musashi. A third wave, launched by the Essex and the Lexington, consisted of twenty dive-bombers and thirty-two torpedo-bombers, plus a sixteen-strong fighter escort, also attacked the Musashi, scoring a further two torpedo and four bomb strikes on the battleship. The Yamato was also struck by a pair of bombs, although the vessel’s armour resisted these bombs successfully. As all three attack waves had arrived almost simultaneously, the effect of the attacks had the desired effect on the Musashi, which then sank. The remaining battleships in this group had also suffered some damage, although all were able to continue. During these attacks on the battle fleet, the US Navy lost thirty aircraft.

Resplendent in its new camouflage scheme, the USS Essex departs America to return to the fray in the Pacific.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

While the two fleets were engaging in combat, Japanese reconnaissance aircraft had detected TG.38.3. This information was passed onto Admiral Ozawa, who ordered his carrier group to launch seventy-six attack aircraft towards the American carrier group. However, the Japanese aircraft crews failed to find their targets and were forced to fly on to Luzon. The departure of this large strike force left the Japanese carriers with twenty-five aircraft between them. The US Navy had detected the Japanese aerial force en route towards the American carriers and their subsequent turn away towards Luzon. As the Americans were aware that the Japanese aircraft carriers were low on aircraft, Admiral Halsey ordered all of the task groups of TF.38 to head towards the Japanese carrier group. To ensure that there was enough fire power to utterly destroy the Japanese carriers, he recalled TG.38.1, which was heading towards Ulithi.

While Halsey was heading towards the Japanese carriers, a detachment from TG.38.4 was heading south to intercept a Japanese force that was proceeding towards the American fleet. During the engagement aircraft from the USS Franklin sank the IJN destroyer Wakana. Meanwhile, in the approaches to the Surigoa Strait, the US Navy was using its smaller vessels to attack the Japanese fleet during which activity the IJN cruiser Abukuma was hit by a torpedo, which forced it to retire from the action. Further engagements saw three destroyers sunk and badly damaged, while hits were scored upon the battleship Yamashiro. Another battleship, the IJN Fuso, was struck by numerous torpedoes from the American destroyers; they struck a magazine, causing a massive explosion that destroyed the ship completely. Even as the smaller US Navy ships were scoring successes against their larger enemies, the main TF.38 battleships and cruisers were arriving from the north-east. When they sighted the Japanese battle fleet, the six battleships and five cruisers let loose with their main armaments while the American destroyers continued their pin-prick harrying attacks. During this confused situation the battleship Yamashiro was sunk by torpedoes, while the IJN cruiser Mogami limped away badly damaged, only to collide with the approaching cruiser Nachi. After suffering such damage, the remaining crew were evacuated and the ship was sunk by an escorting destroyer.

In the dark of 24 October the Japanese force commanded by Vice-Admiral Kurita managed to pass through the San Bernadino Strait unobserved by the American forces, and was to the east of Samar in the early hours of the morning. Unfortunately for the Kurita force, it then ran straight into TG.77.4.3, commanded by Rear Admiral C.A.F. Sprague, whose escort carriers promptly flew off a strike attack force. Knowing that it had been spotted, the Japanese force flew off its available aircraft, laid down a smoke screen and used local rain squalls to evade its American attackers, while still heading towards Leyte Gulf. Commendable those these efforts were, the overwhelming strength of the US Navy forces soon bore fruit, as the cruiser IJN Kumano was brought to a standstill. The aircraft of TG.77.4.2 had come into range and were soon attacking the Japanese vessels. But careful manoeuvring by the IJN force and the arrival of the battleships Yamato and Nagato brought the American escort carriers into range of the warships’ big guns. In the ensuing carnage the escort carrier Gambier Bay was sunk. TG.77.4.2 had launched a strike against two Japanese cruisers, which were sunk, while the battleships Kongo and Haruna tried to get into a position to attack the task group. Although the Japanese forces were closing on the American force, Admiral Kurita decided to break off the engagement. As Kurita ordered his ships to break away, a kamikaze raid hit the carriers of TG.77.4.3. During this attack the carrier St. Lo was sunk, while the Kalinin Bay, Kitkun Bay and White Plains were damaged, and only Fanshaw Bay would escape injury. A further kamikaze formation attacked the escort carriers of TG.77.4.1 and damaged the Sangamon, Suwanee and Santee. In response to the Japanese attacks, the returning carriers of TG.38.1 launched retaliatory air strikes against the Kurita force. While no ships were sunk, the attacking aircraft did inflict some damage on the fleeing ships.

After a heavy landing this Douglas Dauntless of VB-16 had ripped its engine from its mounts after an undercarriage failed on touchdown aboard the USS Lexington

. (US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

Sitting on the catapult of the USS Kitkun Bay, a Casablanca-class escort carrier, is this Grumman Avenger assigned to composite squadron VC-63. Once the launch officer flags take-off clearance, the chockmen will pull the chocks clear and the aircraft will depart.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

As the fighting in the Surigoa Strait was taking place, a further battle was taking place off Cape Engano, involving the remaining task groups of TF.38. These groups had headed north at high speed to intercept the Ozawa force. In the early hours of 25 October the American carriers flew off six attack waves, including 326 dive-bombers and torpedo-bombers, with 201 fighters as escorts. During these attacks the IJN carrier Chitose was badly damaged by aircraft from the Lexington, which later resulted in the carrier sinking. The next vessel to be sunk was the fleet carrier Zuikaku, which was hit repeatedly by aircraft from the Intrepid, San Jacinto, Lexington and Cowpens. The light carrier Zuiho was also sunk by aircraft from the Essex and the Langley, while the light carrier Chiyoda and its escorting destroyer were badly damaged. The American carrier aircraft also attacked the Japanese battleships, although the Hyuga escaped after thirty-four near-misses, while the Ise escaped completely unscathed. Although Admiral Halsey had sped towards the San Bernadino Strait at high speed in order to intercept the Kurita force, he arrived too late. However, Kurita and his ships ran into TG.38.1 and 38.4, with TG.77.4, which promptly sank two cruisers and three destroyers. A further cruiser and a destroyer were later sunk by B-24 Liberators from the 5th AAF. During this final act of the Battle of Leyte Gulf the escort carrier Suwanee was damaged by five kamikazes dispatched from Cebu.

In order to maintain American control over Leyte, General MacArthur requested aerial support from the US Navy, as the USAAF units in the area were unable to provide the close-in support needed. To comply with MacArthur’s request, TF.38.3, under the command of Rear Admiral Sherman, was directed to provide fighter cover from the carriers Lexington, Langley and Essex. While most of fighters were providing the much-needed fighter cover, the remainder of the air wings were directed to attack any Japanese shipping in the area. Their efforts brought success, as aircraft from the Essex and Enterprise managed to attack a small convoy, sinking two destroyers and damaging some of the transports. Replacing TF.38.3 on support duties were TG.38.4 and 38.2, which arrived on station on 28 October. Included in the carrier groups were the vessels Franklin, San Jacinto and Belleau Wood with TG.38.3, while the other group included Intrepid, Hancock, Cabot and Independence. Soon after its arrival, TG.38.4 was attacked by forty-four Japanese aircraft, of which thirteen were shot down for the cost of four US Navy machines.

The following day saw the carriers of TG.38.2 launching a massive attack on the airfields around Manila, during which seventy-one Japanese aircraft were shot down and thirteen were destroyed on the ground for the cost of eleven American aircraft. The bombers and torpedo-aircraft attacked the shipping in the area, causing damage to a Japanese cruiser. While TG.38.2 was destroying the Japanese around Manila, TG.38.4 was covering Leyte Gulf, during which six kamikazes struck the carriers Franklin and Belleau Wood, so that both vessels had to retire towards Ulithi for repairs. The two damaged carriers were followed by the remainder of TF.38, TG.38.1 arrived on 29 October and TG.38.3 the following day, while the other two groups arrived on 2 November. Over 5 and 6 November TG.38.1, TG.38.2 and TG.38.3 departed from Ulithi anchorage to undertake attacks against Luzon. The first group comprised the carriers Wasp, Hornet, Monterey and Cowpens, the second comprised Intrepid, Hancock, Cabot and Independence, and the third consisted of the Lexington, Langley and the newly arrived Ticonderoga. During these attacks over 400 Japanese aircraft were destroyed for the loss of twenty-five aircraft. The strike waves also sank two cruisers and seven other vessels. The American forces were not completely immune, however, as twelve kamikazes attacked TG.38.3, badly damaging the Enterprise in the process.

Having attacked the Japanese fixed installations, TF.38 then turned its attention to attacking and destroying the reinforcement convoys. This mission began on 11 November and utilised aircraft from the Hornet, Monterey, Cowpens of 38.1, Essex, Ticonderoga and Langley of 38.3, and Enterprise and San Jacinto of 38.4. Although the carriers lost eleven aircraft, the attacking aircraft sank four destroyers and six other ships. As these were mainly troop transports, most of the 10,000 troops embarked failed to reach their destination. A period of replenishment followed on 12 November, after which the three carrier groups undertook further attacks on the Luzon area on 13 and 14 November. Two days later the carrier air groups attacked again, although by this time TG.38.3 had been replaced by TG.38.2. During this period the carriers had sunk eighteen Japanese ships and damaged nearly as many. A further period of replenishment saw the carrier groups resume their strikes against Luzon on 25 November. This strike force included four fleet carriers, three light carriers with six battleships, and a large escort of cruisers and destroyers. During these operations aircraft from the American carriers sank two IJN cruisers and six others, and damaged half a dozen more. In return the Japanese scored some success when a twenty-five-strong kamikaze force managed to cause severe damage to the Intrepid and Cabot, while the Essex and Hancock were slightly damaged. The USS Independence was also damaged, although this was caused when one of the carrier’s aircraft crashed into the island on landing. Needing to undergo a period of repair and replenishment, TF.38 withdrew to Ulithi, arriving between 25 and 27 November.

Having undergone a much needed period of replenishment, TF.38 departed Ulithi on 11 December with Vice-Admiral McCain in command. The carrier groups assigned to this force included TG.38.1 with the carriers Yorktown, Wasp, Cowpens and Monterey commanded by Rear Admiral Montgomery, TG.38.2 commanded by Rear Admiral Bogan with the carriers Lexington, Hancock, Hornet, Independence and Cabot, and TG.38.3 comprising the Essex, Ticonderoga, Langley and San Jacinto with Rear Admiral Sherman in command. Also with TF.38 were the battleships Massachusetts, Alabama, New Jersey, Iowa, Wisconsin, North Carolina, Washington and South Dakota, with thirteen cruisers and fifty-six destroyers making up the remainder.

The war in the Pacific had another enemy–the weather. The USS Wasp had been damaged by a typhoon when photographed, and as a result of this damage the Essex class would later be rebuilt with hurricane bows that would lessen the effects of such violent weather.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

Refuelling took place on 13 December, after which the carriers moved into range to continue their attacks on the airfields around Luzon in support of the Mindoro operation between 14 and 16 December. During these attacks other aircraft from the carriers sank Japanese shipping in the area, and aircraft from the Hornet sank a transport on 14 December, and another the following day when an IJN corvette was also badly damaged. During this period over 1,400 fighter and 244 bomber sorties were flown for the loss of twenty-seven aircraft in combat and thirty-eight from accidents. In return 170 Japanese aircraft were destroyed. At the completion of these operations TF.38 withdrew for refuelling, running into Typhoon Cobra on 18 December. This was a powerful storm, which caused the destroyer USS Spence to founder, while the carriers Cowpens, Monterey, Cabot and San Jacinto were damaged, as were the destroyers Dyson, Hickox, Benham and Maddox. The support and supply group suffered even worse, as the destroyers Hull and Monaghan were sunk, while the escort carriers Altamaha, Nehenta Bay, Cape Esperance and Kwajalein, together with the cruiser Miami and the destroyers Aylwin, Dewey and Buchanan, were damaged, as were the escorts Waterman, Melvin R. Newman, Tabberer and the oiler Nantahala. Also destroyed were 146 aircraft, whose lashing to the carrier decks was not enough to save them. As the priority was to search for survivors, the planned attack on Luzon set for 19–21 December was abandoned. Once the search mission had been completed, TF.38 returned to Ulithi for repairs.

Although the attack on Luzon had been postponed, other operations did continue. Therefore, on 15 December TG.78.3, under the command of Rear Admiral Struble, began the task of landing the troops commanded by Brigadier-General Dunckel on Western Vasayas. The landing force was escorted by three cruisers and twenty destroyers. Firepower support was provided by TF.77.12 under the command of Rear Admiral Ruddock, and comprised the battleships West Virginia, Colorado and New Mexico, plus three cruisers and eighteen destroyers. The escort carriers included in this task group were the USS Natoma Bay, Manila Bay, Marcus Island, Kadashan Bay, Savo Bay and Ommaney Bay. During the landings the kamikaze threat raised its head again, causing damage to the command cruiser USS Nashville, two landing ships, two destroyers and the escort carrier Marcus Island. There was some cheer for the Allies during this period when on 20 December the Japanese resistance on Leyte finally ended.

On 30 December 1944 the 3rd US Navy Fleet under the command of Admiral Halsey set sail to lend support to TF.38, whose next task was to invade Luzon in an operation that would last until 25 January. As before, TF.38 was under the command of Vice-Admiral McCain, while TG.38.1 was commanded by Rear Admiral Radford. The carriers in this group were the Yorktown, Wasp, Cabot and Cowpens, plus the battleships South Dakota and Massachusetts, together with four cruisers and seventeen destroyers as escorts. TG.38.2 also departed Ulithi at the same time, under the command of Rear Admiral Bogan, the assigned carriers being the Lexington, Hancock and Hornet, plus the battleships New Jersey and Wisconsin, with an escort of four cruisers and twenty destroyers. The third carrier group was TG.38.3, commanded by Rear Admiral Sherman, with the carriers Essex, Ticonderoga, Langley and San Jacinto, the battleships Washington and North Carolina, and five cruisers and eighteen destroyers as escorts. The fourth carrier group was TG.38.5, commanded by Rear Admiral Gardner, with the carriers Enterprise and Independence, and six destroyers for escort duties.

The Independence-class light carrier, the USS San Jacinto, played an important part in the Pacific war. Here a Grumman Avenger of VT-45 prepares to launch on another mission.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

A flight of Vought F4U Corsair fighters from VF-86 aboard the USS Wasp patrol above the fleet, keeping a good lookout for incoming kamikazes.

(US Navy/NARA via Dennis R. Jenkins)

Refuelling of all ships took place on 2 January, after which TG.38.1 and 38.3 undertook raids on northern Formosa, while TG.38.2 and 38.5 attacked southern Formosa and the southern Ryukyu Islands. Although inclement weather caused some problems for the attacking forces, they still managed to destroy over a hundred Japanese aircraft in exchange for twenty-two US Navy machines. A refuelling break took place after this opening round before raids were mounted on the kamikaze airfields around Luzon in preparation for the landings on Lingayen. During these operations over eighty Japanese aircraft were destroyed in exchange for twenty-eight American machines. A further refuelling break followed this, after which on 8 January the carrier groups mounted further attacks on Formosa and Okinawa, part of the Ryukyu Islands. Although five American aircraft were lost, the attackers managed to sink eight Japanese ships and damage twelve more. Assisting the US Navy efforts were the Boeing B-29s based in China, which also bombed Formosa.

By 10 January TF.38 had entered the South China Sea, where the force refuelled prior to launching attacks against Can Ranh Bay, where it was suspected that the major IJN warships were based. While no IJN battleships or carriers were found, the carrier groups did manage to sink fifty-one vessels and damage a further twenty or more for the loss of twenty-three aircraft. A further refuelling took place over 13/14 January, after which the carrier groups launched raids against Formosa, the Pescadores and the Chinese province of Fukien. During these attacks five IJN ships were sunk for the loss of twelve aircraft. A further raid on the Chinese coast on 16 January saw the loss of twenty-seven aircraft, although they did sink two ships and damaged a further five. Bad weather hampered operations until 21 January, when further attacks were mounted on Formosa. Some 1,100 sorties were flown, with 104 Japanese aircraft being destroyed and ten ships sunk, while a further five were damaged. During the Japanese attacks on the fleet, a bomb hit the Langley, while a kamikaze hit the Ticonderoga. A further raid by seven kamikazes was destroyed by fighters launched by the USS Cowpens, although another attack was more successful when the Ticonderoga was hit again. The US Navy were also responsible for some of its own damage when an Avenger landing on the USS Hancock lost a bomb, which exploded and caused some damage. During these attacks on the carriers, 205 sailors and airmen were killed and a further 351 were wounded. On 22 January the carrier groups launched 628 sorties against Okinawa, this operation being completed by 23 January. After withdrawing for refuelling, TF.38 proceeded to Ulithi, where it arrived on 25 January. During this operational period over 300,000 tons of shipping were sunk, while more than 600 aircraft were destroyed in exchange for 201 American aircraft and 167 pilots.