2

The First Battle for Caen, 6–10 June 1944

6 June 1944

I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12¹ (Le Neubourg):

Level II Luftwaffe alarm at 0235 hours. Level I alarm for the remaining Kompanien of the Abteilung at 0250 hours. The commander², who went to St. André with the new tanks for training with SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 25, is notified by the Adjutant.³ The alarm-word “Blücher” is given at 0615 hours by the regiment. The beginning of the march from Le Neubourg is scheduled for 1300 hours by the order of the regiment. Kompanien are drawn forward to the departure point. Hauptsturmführer Waldemar Schütz, as Kompanieführer, is responsible for the remaining Kompanien.

March of the Kompanien via Epreville–La Riviere–Thibouville–Fontaine la S. to Boissy, where the Stab and the Stabskompanie establishes itself from 1500 hours. Position of the other Kompanien: 1.Kompanie Berthouville, 2.Kompanie Borsan, 3.Kompanie Le Theil-Nolent, 4.Kompanie St. Claire, Versorgungskompanie Le Mitaterie, workshop Kompanie on the Evreux–Liseux road, in the mansion in front of Boissy. The immobile vehicles remain in the former quarters area with most of the workshop Kompanie. They concentrate on the armoured fighting vehicle quarters area, south of Le Neubourg. The pack column remains in Le Neubourg until further order.

One truck of the 3.Kompanie is counted as a loss because of an accident. At 1810 hours British air raid of fighter–bombers near Boissy on the advance route. No material losses or casualties.

The Abteilung was again set to march via Thiberville– Orbec– Monnai towards Gace in order to join the main strength of the Abteilung.

II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12⁴ (Vimoutiers):

0330 hours: alarm of the forces of the II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 directed to SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 25 for eight days training. The following are sent:

• command and control staff

• 7., 8. and 9.Kompanien with 10-10 Panzer IVs

• 5. and 6.Kompanien 14-14 Panzer IVs

• Werkstatt Kompanie (without 1 Zug) with the Schlepper Zug

• Stabskompanie with 6 supply and 3 ammunition trucks

The basis of German infantry tactics in the Second World War rested on the general-purpose machine gun. This photograph shows German Panzergrenadiers using a 7.92 mm MG 34 machine gun, which was also used by the forces of the 12. SS-Panzer Division “Hitlerjugend” in Normandy. (Hungarian Institute and Museum of Military History 41294)

0415 hours: the Abteilung is ready for departure.

0530 hours: notice from SS-Panzer Regiment 12 by telephone. As ordered by the regiment, the parts of the Abteilung mentioned above are to remain by SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 25, and are ordered to cooperate. The parts that remain in the quarters area are to stay there until ordered otherwise.

1015 hours: Order of Standartenführer Meyer⁵ for the commander of the II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12. The parts of the II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 being positioned in the quarters area of SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 25 are subordinated to SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 25, and march with the battalions where they are positioned like so:

A Panzer IV Ausf J from II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 moving to the front, June 1944. (Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-493-3355-10, photo: Siedel)

• 7. and 8.Kompanien with the I. Bataillon;

• 9.Kompanie with the II. Bataillon;

• 5. and 6.Kompanien with the III. Bataillon.

I.Bataillon marches from Vimoutiers via Livarot and Le Mesnil-Eudes to St. Pierre des Ifs. The command and control staff, the 7. and 8.Kompanien join the column of the I.Bataillon in the following marching order:

• 8.Kompanie at the head

• command and control staff with the reconnaissance platoon;

• 7.Kompanie

• remaining parts of the Stabskompanie and the train.⁶

1230 hours: departure from Vimoutiers. Column order as described above. No notable events at the II.Abteilung.

1600 hours: new command post between St. Pierre des Ifs and the Lisieux–St. Pierre sur Dives road.

No engagement with the enemy. Enemy activity: fighter aircraft and battle noise from the north. Vehicle losses: none.

Weather: cloudy and rainy with sunny intervals.

During the march the drivers and the escort proved to be well-trained. However, the lack of battle experience was apparent. Instead of staying 100 metres apart as was ordered, this distance was reduced when enemy aircraft appeared. The training of the drivers of out of service vehicles with the SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Bataillone will be more intensive. One man shall be placed by the side of the out of service vehicle to notify the approaching column, otherwise there is a danger that the units coming behind them would find their advance interrupted.

From left to right: Standartenführer Kurt Meyer (commander, SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 25), Brigadeführer Fritz Witt (commander, 12.SS-Panzer Division) and Obersturmbannführer Max Wünsche (commander, SS-Panzer Regiment 12), Ardenne Abbey, the command post of the division, early June 1944. (Cody Images)

7 June 1944

I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 (on the march):

At 0030 hours the first soldier of the 1.Kompanie was killed in a low-level air raid. Most of the Abteilung was in march on the St. André–Damville–Breteuil–La Ferté Frênel road, joining the other Kompanien at 0600 hours.

March of the whole Abteilung via Trun–Falaise–Ussy–Thury Harcourt, then on the western bank of the Orne towards Amayé. From Maizet the Kompanien took positions along the route of the march. One fuel truck of the Kompanie was destroyed in a fighter-bomber raid. One truck of the Versorgungskompanie, loaded with armour-piercing shells, was blown up in a low-level air-raid. The supply truck of the workshop Kompanie was burnt out in a low-level air-raid. One anti-aircraft vehicle⁷ burnt out, the vehicle of the maintenance unit was destroyed, and two trucks were temporarily unfit for deployment due to a raid against the column of the Stabskompanie.

A formal portrait of Max Wünsche in black Panzer uniform after being awarded the Knight’s Cross (see Appendix II and main text). (Mark C. Yerger)

Daily losses: Six trucks lost as a consequence of enemy engagement, eight trucks damaged.

Briefing at 2300 hours for the Kompanie Chefs.

II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

General situation: the enemy succeeded in invading the shoreline between Le Havre and Cherbourg in the early morning hours of 6 June 1944. Large numbers of airborne troops were reported to have landed in the area northwest of Caen⁸.

Task of the 12.SS-Panzer Division “Hitlerjugend”: departure from the quarters area, attack the enemy in Caen, destroy them and push them back into the sea.

For this, SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 25 with the units of the II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 prepare north of the Caen–St. Germain–Bretteville road.

The II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 occupies the attack position in the following battle order: 8.Kompanie on the right, the 5. and 6.Kompanien on the side, and the 9. and 7.Kompanien behind them as reserves. Order for the II.Abteilung: attack and destroy the enemy. Launch attack on the orders of the Abteilungskommandeur. Pack at Etterville on the Venoix-Evrecy road. The workshop Kompanie remains in Meulles on the Orbec– Vimoutiers road until further [orders].

1330 hours: the II.Abteilung occupies the allocated attack position.

1400 hours: appearance of enemy tanks at Franqueville and Authie. The 5. and 6.Kompanien instantly engaged the enemy and destroyed a number of Sherman tanks⁹. The enemy retreated. Ammunition expenditure: 300 high explosive shells, 235 armour-piercing shells, 800 steel core [machine-gun ammunition].

1730 hours: the II.Abteilung departs against the enemy, which advances towards Caen from the northwest. The Abteilung marches through the positions of the SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Bataillone lying under enemy fire, and attacks the enemy tanks and anti-tank guns. Scores:

• the 5.Kompanie knocked out 9 Shermans at Franqueville and Authie

• the 6.Kompanie knocked out 14 Shermans, 3 armoured personnel carriers and 4 anti-tank guns at Authie

• the 7.Kompanie knocked out 5 Shermans at Bouron

• the 8.Kompanie knocked out 1 Sherman at la Folie¹⁰

The 5. and 6.Kompanien took 450 prisoners of war¹¹ altogether, who were taken back by the soldiers of the SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Bataillone. Our own losses that day:

• 3 Panzer IVs of the 5.Kompanie

• 4 Panzer IVs of the 6.Kompanie

• 4 Panzer IVs of the 7.Kompanie

• 1 Panzer IV of the 8.Kompanie

The Flak Zug of the II.Abteilung advanced with the attack, and shot down five enemy fighter-bomber aircraft.

With this success the II.Abteilung managed to stop the American [sic.] ¹² attack against Caen, take the towns northwest of Caen into German control, and carry out the counterstroke.

Weather: dry and warm.

Ammunition expenditure: 944 high explosive shells, 721 armour-piercing shells, 1500 rounds of 2cm anti-aircraft ammunition.

The Panzergrenadiers must not remain lying in their positions, but should follow the attack of the armoured fighting vehicles. Otherwise their offensive force will not be utilised.

8 June 1944

I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 (Maizet):

At 0200 hours order was given to march into the attack positions. This order could not be carried out because the fuel supply did not arrive in time. The columns departed at 0930 hours towards the attack positions assigned north of Caen; the 1.Kompanie was at the head. Arrival around 1600 hours.

Around 2000 hours the 1., 3. and 4.Kompanien departed against Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse]. The 3.Kompanie¹³ took over the securing of Gruchy¹⁴ with the support of an infantry unit. Heavy artillery fire, no losses. Movement of armoured fighting vehicles was discovered within 7000 metres.

Task of the 4.Kompanie: fight against the enemy armoured fighting vehicles in the Le Bourg–Rots area, and against enemy gunners withdrawn into Bretteville.

The Kompanie followed the enemy. Machine gun fire from 100–200 metres away 1 km west of Rots. Fire was returned, destroying the crew of six small American [sic.] tracked vehicles.¹⁵ Most of their infantry mounted on the tanks were shot down. The Panthers advanced further towards Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse]. 150 metres from the village heavy anti-tank gun fire; four British [sic.]¹⁶ anti-tank guns were disabled, and one or two small tracked vehicles were destroyed. Heavy anti-tank gun, tank and machine gun fire. The tanks returned the fire and stopped the enemy fire. Tank no. 427 was damaged by anti-tank gun hit (by hitting the gun mantlet) and was burnt out.

Reorganization of the Kompanie. Tank no. 418 leading the column was damaged by a direct hit of an anti-tank gun and was knocked out. The burning and exploding leading tank prevented the leading platoon from resuming their advance as the road was thus blocked. The village was bypassed from the left. Heavy anti-tank gun and tank gun fire from its southern parts. The village was set ablaze by gunfire. After suppressing the enemy’s preventive fire, the Kompanie attacked and reached the north-western exit of Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse]. Following the given orders, they advanced through the next village. After this no enemy activity was detected, hence the Kompanie withdrew as ordered. On the way back, machine gun, pistol and rifle fire from the burning Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse] and anti-tank gun fire again. Anti-tank gun hit tank no. 425, piercing the turret. The enemy infantry tried to approach the armoured fighting vehicles under the cover of the fog. The Kompanie was hurriedly withdrawn and following orders is withdrawn into the area south and west of Le Bourg–Rots for securing tasks.

Due to the descending darkness, the 1.Kompanie aborted its attack around 2100 hours. The Kompanie assembled on the Caen–Bayeux main road then renewed its attack. Tank no. 116 counts as total loss due to anti-tank gun hit, the turret of tank no. 115 was damaged by an anti-tank gun hit. Securing the road together with the mounted infantry. [Next day] morning at 0700 hours turned to the new securing position west of Rots.

War Diary Appendix no.3.

12.SS-Panzer Division “Hitlerjugend”O.U., 15 July 1944

4.[Kompanie]/SS-Panzer Regiment 12

Attack against Rots–Le Bourg–Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse] on 06. 08. 1944¹⁷

Situation:

The Abteilung prepared to attack north of the Caen–St. Germain road in the direction of St. Aubin-sur-Mur. The enemy dominated the air. The launch of an enemy assault with armoured fighting vehicles in the direction of Caen airfield, towards our southern flank, meant that the direction of our planned assault was altered and set to the westn in order to reach the enemy’s left flank.

Task:

The 4.Kompanie to attack the villages of Le Bourg and Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse] right of the Caen–Bayeux road, and secure the hills north and northwest of Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse].

Course of battle:

The Kompanie prepared to carry out the ordered attack with the II.Zug on the left, the I.Zug on the right, between them the Kompanie Chef ’s unit, and behind it the III. Zug. The Grenadiers mounted the Panthers. The Kompanie reached Le Bourg with a swift advance and without contacting the enemy. The Kompanie formed a column with Hauptsturmführer Hans Pfeiffer at the head, then the II.Zug, the I. and III. Züge. After reaching the western exit of Le Bourg, close contact was made with the enemy infantry. Fire was returned by machine guns and the Panzergrenadiers. When asked, the inhabitants told us that the enemy retreated in the direction of Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse]. Radio message to the Kompanie: “The Kompanie is to follow them with utmost speed!” Between Le Bourg and Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse] heavy enemy antitank and machine gun fire from six armoured personnel carriers (small tracked vehicles) between Le Bourg and Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse]. The Grenadiers suffered losses and dismounted the Panthers. The Kompanie advanced without delay to the entrance of Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse], where they again met heavy enemy tank, anti-tank and machine gun fire from the perimetres of Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse]. Panther no. 404 discovered an enemy tank at the entrance of the village, opened fire and knocked out a Sherman. Order for the Kompanie on the radio: “The II.Zug left of the road, the I.Zug right of the road are to draw up in firing line and engage the enemy armoured fighting vehicles and anti-tank guns!” Meanwhile the no. 427 tank of Unterscharführer Hartmann was put out of action because of a hit on its turret. The commander, the gunner and the loader were wounded. The Regiments- and Abteilungskommandeur reached the Kompanie. Order of the Regimentskommandeur: “The Kompanie – with a Zug at the head, followed by the others in column – will advance through Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse] and reach the assigned aim of attack!”

With the I.Zug at the head, the first vehicle – Unterscharführer Mühlhausen’s tank no. 418 – departed at 2400 hours. The first tank had reached the centre of the village when its turret was hit by an anti-tank gun from 50 metres away. After three more hits tank no. 418 burnt out. The commander, the driver and the gunner were killed, the loader wounded. New order of the Regimentskommandeur: “The Kompanie retreats and flanks the village from the left!”

The III.Zug was at the head, followed by the II. and the I. Züge, and the Kompanie Chef was behind the III.Zug. The III.Zug formed a firing line and fired at Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse] from all sides. Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse] was on fire. The enemy resistance was weakening. At around 0100 hours the Kompanie reached the hill north of Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse] and secured the position. Heavy firing by the enemy artillery prevented the Grenadiers’ advance. New order of the Regiment on radio: “The Kompanie retreats to the western exit of Le Bourg and secures in the direction of Bretteville towards Norrey!” The enemy resistance revived itself upon the disengagement. Untersturmführer Johannes Hillig was wounded by an anti-tank gun hit; Unterscharführer Unglaub received a wound in the head from a machine-gun round. The Kompanie reached the area west of Le Bourg to be secured, as ordered.

Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, supreme commander of the British-Canadian 21st Army Group. His command, though suffering severely, successfully contained most of the German armoured divisions deployed against the Allied beachheads in Normandy. However, he also launched a number of unsuccessful attacks in order to capture Caen leading to severe British-Canadian armoured losses. (Hungarian Institute and Museum of Military History 26797)

Pohl

Leutnant and Kompanieführer

I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

The Kompanien of the II.Abteilung remained in the positions they occupied the day before. No combat activity. Heavy artillery harassing fire on all securing positions of the Abteilung. The tanks left at the previous quarters area near Elbeuf only arrived that day. The following list contains the tank strength of the deployed units of the II.Abteilung on the evening of 08. 08. 1944.

War Diary Appendix no. 1.

Tank strength on the evening of 08.06.1944.

Available strength on 08.06.1944 – 87 Panzerkampfwagen IVs (long-barrelled)

Total losses until 08. 06. 1944		Operational on 08. 06. 1944
Staff	–	3 Panzerkampfwagen IVs
5.Kompanie	3 Panzerkampfwagen IVs	6 Panzerkampfwagen IVs
6.Kompanie	4 Panzerkampfwagen IVs	6 Panzerkampfwagen IVs
7.Kompanie	4 Panzerkampfwagen IVs	–
8.Kompanie	1 Panzerkampfwagen IV	5 Panzerkampfwagen IVs
9.Kompanie	–	10 Panzerkampfwagen IVs

En route, or under repair:

Staff:	–
5.Kompanie :	–
6.Kompanie :	7 Panzerkampfwagen IVs
7.Kompanie :	13 Panzerkampfwagen IVs
8.Kompanie :	11 Panzerkampfwagen IVs
9.Kompanie :	6 Panzerkampfwagen IVs

9 June 1944

I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 (command post: Le Bourg):

Attack of the 1.Kompanie towards Norrey [-en-Bessin] at 1200 hours. From a position hidden behind a slope, all tank guns opened fire at the church steeple, because it was probable that an artillery spotter was placed there. They had driven with the utmost speed towards Norrey [-en-Bessin]. Two anti-tank guns and infantry positions were destroyed. By the order of the Chef, the Kompanie returned to its departure position.

At the same time the 3.Kompanie also launched an attack and advanced well. Antitank gun fire from around the church and the wooded area to the right of it. Fire was returned, 2 anti-tank guns were destroyed. Tank nos. 325, 328, 335, 336 and 337 were hit by anti-tank gun fire and became total losses within five minutes (the enemy antitank guns or tanks could not be seen). Tank nos. 327 and 329 were damaged by antitank gun hits; these retreated to the repair station. The Kompanie retreated on order.

They resumed the fight from the position behind the slope. Repeated withdrawal and establishing positions behind the 1.Kompanie.

Task of the 4.Kompanie: securing, defence of the flanks of the attacking 1. and 3.Kompanien, providing supporting fire from the positions. Sudden anti-tank gun fire from Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse]. Tank no. 471 was burnt out due to the direct hit of an anti-tank gun. The Kompanie occupied new positions while securing the road, opened fire and destroyed the discovered anti-tank gun.

The hull of tank no. 404 was hit by an anti-tank gun, and was towed to the repair station. Firing on the presumed anti-tank guns. At the same time, the enemy infantry launched an attack on both sides of the road towards Rots. The attack was repulsed by units of the 15./SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 25.¹⁸

Position of the 2.Kompanien northwest of Fontenay [-le-Pesnel], where they knocked out 3 Shermans.¹⁹ In the evening, the 3 and 4.Kompanien knocked out one Sherman each.

From 2300 hours the Abteilung relocated to Fontenay [-le-Pesnel].

War Diary Appendix no. 4.

12.SS-Panzer Division “Hitlerjugend”O.U., 26 September 1944

4. [Kompanie]/SS-Panzer Regiment 12

Attack against Norrey [-en-Bessin] on 09. 06. 1944

Situation:

The enemy firmly held the villages of Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse] and Norrey [-en-Bessin] again and tried to advance on the Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse]–Caen road. The 1. and 3.Kompanien attacked Norrey [-en-Bessin].

Task:

The 4.Kompanie took over the task of securing the right flank and oversaw the advance of the two Kompanien.

Course of battle:

The sector of the attack position was under heavy enemy artillery fire. At 1440 hours departure of the 1. and 3.Kompanien towards Norrey [-en-Bessin]. The Grenadiers followed them. The 4.Kompanie covered the right flank by fire towards Norrey [-en-Bessin] and Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse]. The 1. and 3.Kompanien retreated into their original positions because of the extremely heavy enemy defence. Constant heavy artillery fire. The 4.Kompanie established firing-line in the direction of Bretteville [l’Orgueilleuse]. In the meantime tank no. 416²⁰ of Unterscharführer Voss was knocked out by anti-tank gun fire. The tank was burnt out, and the commander, the gunner and the loader were killed. The driver and the radio operator were severely burnt. The enemy advanced on the road leading to Le Bourg, and the Kompanie opened fire on them. In the meantime, tank no. 404 of Oberscharführer Heinz Lehmann was hit three times by anti-tank guns and was knocked out. The driver, Rottenführer Heckl, managed to drive the tank to a position behind a slope and save it, despite his serious wounds. Then he got out of the tank and was carried to the dressing-station. The radio operator, Schütze Finke, was killed. The Kompanie repulsed the attack of the enemy launched in the direction of Le Bourg, and secured the direction as ordered. During this further heavy enemy fire Unterscharführer Karst, tank driver of the Kompanie Chef, was killed.

Pohl

Leutnant and Kompanieführer

II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

Regrouping of the Abteilung:

• the 7.Kompanie occupied position directly north of Gruchy with 4 tanks

• the 5.Kompanie north of Buron with 8 tanks

• the 6.Kompanie northwest of Authie with 9 tanks

• the 8. and 9.Kompanien remained in their positions occupied the day before south of Cambes and northeast of St. Contest

1100 hours: the 5.Kompanie discovered 13 enemy tanks advancing from northeast to southwest. From appropriate firing positions we knocked out five tanks. During the morning, the 5.Kompanie also knocked out two anti-tank guns.

In the morning and during the afternoon heavy artillery harassing fire on the positions of the II.Abteilung.

One] of the Zugführer’s tanks of the 7.Kompanie received a direct artillery hit (Untersturmführer Hartfried Zick and the crew were disabled).

The 8.Kompanie repulsed an infantry attack supported by tanks, and rendered one enemy tank immobile.

Tank supported infantry attack also in the sector of the 9.Kompanie. Attack repulsed. The 9.Kompanie knocked out three Shermans and three anti-tank guns.

2000 hours: preparations of the Abteilung for regrouping to Fontenay-le-Pesnel (15 km west of Caen).

10 June 1944

I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 (Fontenay-le-Pesnel):

Occupying the securing positions around 0500 hours.

The 2.Kompanie remained in the wooded area northwest of Fontenay. The 1. and 3.Kompanien established positions north of the road to Caen. The 4.Kompanie remained in Rots to carry out securing tasks. Both the 2. and 3.Kompanien knocked out a Sherman. The 4.Kompanie damaged a Dreadnought²¹ by a hit on its turret. The tank is towed away. Wounded soldiers are observed being pulled out of the tank.

The heaviest bomber, fighter-bomber and artillery activity. Total losses: 3 trucks.

Knight’s Cross holder Wilhelm Beck in a formal portrait (see Chapter 2 Footnote 22). (Mark C. Yerger)

Hauptsturmführer d.R. Wilhelm Beck is killed at the headquarters of the Oberbefehlshaber “West”.²² Daily order of Oberstgruppenführer Josef Dietrich²³ for the Division “Hitlerjugend”.²⁴

II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12:

Until 0600 hours regrouping and establishing securing positions at Fontenay-le-Pesnel. The Kompanien occupied the positions in the following order:

Wilhelm Mohnke as a Standartenführer showing his Knight’s Cross (see Chapter 2 Footnote 25). (Mark C. Yerger)

• Stab in Fontenay-le-Pesnel

• 5. and 6.Kompanien east of the Fontenay [-le-Pesnel]–Rauray road

• 8. and 9.Kompanien directly north of the Fontenay [-le-Pesnel]–Tilly

The remaining tanks of the 7.Kompanie were allocated to the 6.Kompanie. Nothing notable occurred during the regrouping.

0900 hours: heavy artillery harassing fire in the new quarters area of the II.Abteilung.

1200 hours: relocation of the Abteilung command post. New command post 2.5 km south of [Fontenay-le-Pesnel] on the [Fontenay-le-Pesnel]–Rauray road.

1515 hours: Obersturmbannführer Wilhelm Mohnke (SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 26) requests tank support against enemy tanks which were advancing from the northwest.²⁵ The 8. and the 9.Kompanien immediately launched a flank attack against these enemy tanks. The 5. and 6.Kompanien, on alert, remained in their positions.

The enemy turned to the north even before our tanks appeared; therefore engagement with the enemy did not occur. However, the 8. and 9.Kompanien remained on the benchmark points 1 km northwest and northeast of Hill 102 and occupied securing positions there. Late afternoon the 9.Kompanie captured two soldiers.

1730 hours: the command tank no. 553 burnt out. Cause unknown. Heavy enemy harassing fire all day, and heavy (fighter-bomber) aircraft activity over the sector of the II.Abteilung. The battle casualties and vehicle losses of the Abteilung are summarized in Appendix 2.

War Diary Appendix no. 2.

Battle casualties and vehicle losses between 6 and 10 June 1944

Battle casualties²⁶:

Vehicle losses:

One medium motorcycle, two light cars, two medium cars, one prime mover, one heavy truck, one heavy motorcycle, 18 Panzerkampfwagen IVs (long barrelled).

1 Unless indicated otherwise, data has been taken from Kriegstagebuch (War Diary, hereafter abbreviated KTB) no.1. of the I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 concerning the period 6 June–29 August 1944. See Vojenský Historický Archiv, Praha (Military History Archives, Prague).

2 Sturmbannführer Arnold Jürgensen, commander of the I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12. See Appendix II.

3 Untersturmführer Heinz Hubertus Schröder, Abteilungsadjutant of the I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12.

4 Unless indicated otherwise, data have been taken from KTB no.3 of the II./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 concerning the period 6 June-30 August 1944. See Vojenský Historický Archiv, Praha (Military History Archives, Prague).

5 Standartenführer Kurt Meyer was commander of SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 25 until 14 June 1944. Command of the division passed to him after Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS Fritz Witt was killed that day by Allied naval gunfire that struck the divisional command post. A early member of the „Leibstandarte” in 1933, Witt won the Knight’s Cross commanding the I./Deutschland on 4 September 1940. Awarded the German Cross in Gold as an Obersturmbannführer with the „Leibstandarte” on 8 February 1942, he was promoted to Standartenführer on 30 January 1943. Witt then won the Oakleaves on 1 March 1943 as commander of SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 1 with the „Leibstandarte”. He was appointed the first divisional commander of „Hitlerjugend,”becoming an Oberführer on 1 July 1943 and a Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS on 20 April 1944.

6 In this context, train in its traditional military sense, meaning baggage.

7 Presumably a Flak-Panzer 38 (t) self-propelled anti-aircraft gun of the Flak Zug of the Abteilung.

8 Roads from the east and southeast leading to the Allied beachheads occupied on 6 June 1944 ran through this city in Normandy. As most of the German armoured reserves were stationed north of the Seine on the day of the invasion of Normandy, they had to march through Caen in order to strike back. According to the Allied plans, the city was to be occupied on the day following the invasion (D-Day + 1).

9 The Shermans were presumably tanks of the Canadian 27th Armoured Regiment (The Sherbrooke Fusiliers).

10 The battalion-sized 27th Armoured Regiment, from the Canadian 2nd Armoured Brigade, lost 60 soldiers (of them, 26 were killed) and 28 tanks (of these, 21 were destroyed and only seven remained, albeit damaged). See Michael Reynolds, Acélpokol. Az I. SS-páncéloshadtest Normandiában (English edition – Steel Inferno. I SS Panzer Corps in Normandy), Debrecen: Hajja és Fiai Könyvkiadó, 1999, p.90 (hereafter cited as Reynolds).

11 Mainly from the ranks of the Canadian 7th, 8th and 9th Infantry Brigades. According to the data collected by the Allies after the war, it can be confirmed that the SS-Panzergrenadiers leading them back executed at least 41 of them on 7 June 1944. For this, see Reynolds, p.115.

12 There were British and Canadian troops fighting around the Caen area, not Americans.

13 Originally the Kompanie Chef of the 3./SS-Panzer Regiment 12 was Hauptsturmführer Rudolf von Ribbentrop, but he was wounded on 3 June 1944 in an Allied fighter-bomber raid (see Appendix II). The Kompanie was then commanded by Hauptmann Lüdemann.

14 In the case of most securing tasks, German tank formations fought the enemy forces attacking the first lines of the defence with local fire control from previously surveyed positions (even from tanks covered up to their turrets, but always allowing for the possibility of withdrawal). After a few rounds vehicles had to change positions according to plan to avoid a counterstroke by the enemy. A Panzer Zug could secure a frontline of at least 200 meters (with 50 meters distance between the vehicles). A Panzer Kompanie could secure at least a 1000–1500 metres-long and 500 metres-deep frontline. For more information, see Wolfgang Schneider, Panzertaktik. German Small-Unit Armour Tactics, Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz, 2000, p.91.

15 In the original: Karetten. These were not American vehicles but presumably British-made Universal (or Bren Gun) carriers; small, open-top tracked fighting vehicles.

16 On that day there were no British troops in the area of Rots, only elements of the Canadian Regina Rifles Infantry Regiment and the anti-tank guns of the 2nd Royal Canadian Artillery Regiment.

17 In the original document 06. 11. 1944 can be seen as the date of attack, presumably because of a typing error.

18 This was the Kradschützen Kompanie of SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment25 carrying out reconnaissance tasks.

19 Written as “Cherman” in the original document. In the two Abteilung KTB of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 the Sherman tanks are often referred to as “Cherman”. The tanks knocked out were presumably duplex drive amphibious DD Shermans, and probably belonged to the 24th Lancers of the British 8th Armoured Brigade.

20 According to the KTB of the I./SS-Panzer Regiment 12, Panther no. 417 was damaged here and became a total loss.

21 Presumably a special version of the British Churchill heavy tank, equipped with a large calibre gun.

22 Hauptsturmführer d.R. Wilhelm Beck was previously Kompanie Chef of the 2./SS-Panzer Regiment 12. At this time he was serving as the liason officer of the I.SS-Panzer Korps at the headquarters of Panzergruppe “West”. That headquaters was raided by Allied fighter-bombers and twin-engine bombers on 10 June 1944 at approximately 2030 hours. 32 men were killed from the Stab and its subordinated control units, one man is missing. Beck had attended Junkerschule Braunschweig in 1940 before serving as a Zugführer in the “Leibstandarte” Sturmgeschütz Batterie. He won the Knight’s Cross on 28 March 1943 as Kompanie Chef of the 2./SS-Panzer Regiment 1 of the 1. SS-Panzer Division “Leibstandarte” and was promoted to Hauptsturmführer d.R. on 19 November 1943.

23 Oberstgruppenführer und Panzer Generaloberst der Waffen-SS Joseph (Sepp) Dietrich was then commander of the I.SS-Panzer Korps, having obtained his unique rank on 20 April 1942. The original commander of the “Leibstandarte,” he was awarded the Knight’s Cross on 4 July 1940 commanding the then SS-Infanterie Regiment (mot.) “Leibstandarte” and stayed through the unit’s development. Awarded the Oakleaves on 31 December 1941 commanding the expanded SS-Division (mot.) “Leibstandarte,” his Swords was won on 14 March 1943 when his command had become SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division “Leibstandarte”. Dietrich’s Diamonds to the Knight’s Cross (one of two awarded the Waffen-SS) came on 6 August 1944 as an Oberstgruppenführer und Panzer Generaloberst commanding the I.SS-Panzer Korps. He was one of four SS officers to attain the rank of Oberstgruppenführer and ended the war in command of the 6.SS-Panzerarmee. Josef Dietrich died in Ludwigsburg on 21 April 1966.

24 The order cannot be found in the Appendices to the KTB.

25 Wilhelm Mohnke was among the earliest „Leibstandarte“ officers, as a Hauptsturmführer commanding the 5/LSSAH in 1934. As a Sturmbannführer he led the II./LSSAH into Russia and won the German Cross in Gold on 26 December 1941. Mohnke then commanded the Ersatz Bataillon of the „Leibstandarte“. Promoted to Obersturmbannführer on 21 June 1943, he became commander of SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 26 with „Hitlerjugend“ in mid-September 1943 and won the Knight‘s Cross as its commander on 11 July 1944. Promoted to Oberführer on 9 November 1944 and to Brigadeführer und Generalmajor der Waffen-SS on 30 January 1945, Mohnke commanded the 1. SS-Panzer Division „Leibstandarte“ from 20 August 1944 to 6 February 1945. He ended the war leading the ad-hoc units defending the Reich Chancellery in Berlin and spent 10 years as a POW in Russia. Wilhelm Mohnke died in Barsbüttel on 6 August 2001.

26 In the ‘battle casualties’ chart, a key to the division of casualties between the three tiers of rank and a totals row have been added for this book.