Chapter 14:
Hitler’s last great offensive in the West in December 1944.
Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt announced the following to his men in the West on the evening of 15 December 1944: “Soldiers of the West Front! Your great hour has arrived. Large attacking armies have started against the Anglo-Americans. I do not have to tell you anything more than that. You feel it yourself. WE GAMBLE EVERYTHING. You carry with you the holy obligation to give everything to achieve things beyond human possibilities for our Fatherland and our Führer!”
This stirring message was read to his attack troops as they moved up to their start-lines in the heavily wooded Eifel region of Germany. At 05:30 hours the following day, 1600 German guns and rocket launchers drenched the American frontline in deadly shrapnel. Then the first attack waves of infantry moved forward to clear a route for the panzer columns, who were to be unleashed to capture their first objective – the bridges across the Meuse – within 48 hours. The panzers would push on to Antwerp and victory.
“Sepp” Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army was placed on the right flank of the assault and it would be the Schwerpunkt, or main effort, for the attack. I SS Panzer Corps would lead the advance to the Meuse, with II SS Panzer Corps following close behind. Once the vital river crossings were secure, Bittrich’s divisions would spearhead the advance on Antwerp. To help Dietrich reach the bridges before the Americans had time to destroy them, Otto Skorzeny’s special forces brigade – with small teams wearing US uniforms taking the lead – was to race ahead of the Waffen-SS panzers and capture them in a coup de main operation. A regiment of Luftwaffe paratroopers was also to be dropped ahead of Dietrich’s corps to capture a key road junction.
The sister Leibstandarte and Hitlerjugend Divisions would advance side-by-side towards the Meuse, after army Volksgrenadier divisions had cleared a way through the string of weak American units holding the front along the Belgian–German border. Once unleashed, the two divisions would race through the narrow forested valleys of the Ardennes until they reached the open countryside in the Meuse valley. The region’s roads were winding and poorly maintained and, in most places, could barely take single-file traffic. The constricted road network in the Ardennes meant Dietrich’s divisions had to be split up into self-contained columns, each of which was assigned its own specific route, or Rollbahn. All told, more than 6000 Waffen-SS vehicles had to be squeezed through the Ardennes road system. The speed of the Waffen-SS advance was determined as much by the commanders’ traffic-control abilities as their tactical skills.
The Leibstandarte Division was divided into three large Kampfgruppen, centred on the panzer regiment and its two panzergrenadier regiments, and a “fast group” based on the division’s reconnaissance battalion. Hitlerjugend was organized in the same way. The most powerful Kampfgruppe was Jochen Peiper’s, which had all the Leibstandarte’s tanks, its King Tigers, a panzergrenadier battalion carried in armoured half-tracks, and a battalion of army howitzers. All told, he had more than 5000 men, 117 tanks, 149 halftracks, 24 artillery pieces, 40 antiaircraft guns, and more than 500 other vehicles. It was the Leibstandarte’s lead unit and the success of the offensive would depend on its progress.
The atrocious road network meant that each division was allocated no more than two Rollbahns each, so their Kampfgruppen were lined up behind one another waiting for the lead troops to blast open a way forward. With little room for manoeuvre off-road, the lead Kampfgruppe was effectively reduced to relying on the handful of tanks it could place at its head to win through. Behind Peiper’s Kampfgruppe were nose-to-tail columns of tanks and trucks.
Traffic jams
Although the Germans had amassed more than 17 million litres (3.73 million UK gallons) of fuel to support the offensive, the jammed road network meant the troops at the front of the convoys could not rely on refuelling tankers getting through to them. So Peiper and his colleagues in the lead Kampfgruppe were ordered to seize US petrol dumps to maintain the pace of their advance.
Hitler had wanted to launch the offensive in early November, but delays in massing the necessary troops and supplies had put it back until December. This brought with it one advantage: the fog, rain and low cloud that shrouded the Ardennes provided cover from the Allied fighter-bombers that had paralyzed German panzer columns in Normandy in the summer.
On the freezing night of 15 December, the Leibstandarte moved into its forward assembly areas behind the sector of front held by the 12th Volksgrenadier and 3rd Parachute Divisions. These were units that had been decimated in Russia and Normandy, and then rapidly rebuilt with personnel from rear-echelon units. They lacked heavy equipment and trained infantry commanders. The Hitlerjugend was waiting a few kilometres to the north, behind the 277th Volksgrenadier Division.
American resistance
The 12th and 3rd Divisions’ attacks quickly stalled in the face of very determined, but poorly coordinated, American resistance. They were supposed to have captured the town of Losheim and its key road junction in a couple of hours, to allow Peiper’s tanks to roar into action as dawn broke. Minefields held up the attack, and the two divisions were still fighting their way through American positions in the early afternoon. When a breach was opened, it was found a key bridge was blocked and a temporary one had to be built by army engineers. Furious at the delay, Peiper ordered his own Waffen-SS engineers to begin building their own. It was not until well after dark that his column got into Losheim, where Peiper was dismayed to find the commander of the lead parachute regiment had allowed his men to go to sleep, rather than press on with the advance. The determined Waffen-SS officer “took” the paratroopers under his command and they were soon loaded onto the back of his King Tigers which pressed on into the night. Several tanks and vehicles were lost when the column ran into a minefield, but Peiper ordered the advance to continue regardless.
Peiper’s column presses on
All night Peiper’s men forged on, with two Panthers leading the way until they surprised an American scout company parked up in a village just before dawn. Most of the GIs were captured and subsequently filmed by Nazi propaganda teams accompanying Peiper’s column. The weather briefly cleared to allow some American fighters to attack, but they were unable to inflict much damage or delay the column. Running short of fuel, Peiper now made a diversion to raid a large US fuel dump. His tanks were soon being refuelled by sullen American prisoners. The Germans turned north towards the town of Malmédy.
When the lead Panzer IVs approached a crossroads in the hamlet of Baugnez they spotted a column of US soft-skinned vehicles ahead of them. They immediately started firing on the Americans, then raced at full speed towards them. Panzergrenadiers in armoured halftracks were close behind. Outgunned, the Americans offered no resistance and, in a few minutes, Waffen-SS men had herded almost 100 stunned Americans into a nearby field. Peiper then passed by in his armoured command halftrack and ordered the advance to continue, racing off westwards with his lead tanks. Learning that a US artillery brigade had its headquarters nearby, Peiper set off to capture it and its general. The American general escaped with a few minutes to spare before Peiper’s tanks burst into his compound. Back at Baugnez, the captured Americans were being machine-gunned by Peiper’s men in an incident that would become notorious as the “Malmédy Massacre”, even though it occurred several kilometres outside the town. Peiper and more than 70 other members of the Leibstandarte would later face war crimes charges for their involvement in this horrific incident.
Stopping at Stavelot
Peiper continued to drive his men forward. They kept going even after it grew dark. The Waffen-SS column was unopposed until it approached the village of Stavelot, where the lead panzers were fired upon by a single bazooka rocket. Fearing a tank ambush in the night, the Kampfgruppe pulled back to wait for daylight, not knowing that the village and its strategic bridge was held by only a few dozen Americans.
Behind Jochen Peiper’s spearhead, the Leibstandarte’s other Kampfgruppe, led by SS-Standartenführer Max Hansen, had already managed to break free and was advancing westwards. Containing the bulk of a panzergrenadier regiment and most of the division’s Panzerjäger IVs, it was operating slightly to the south of Peiper on a parallel Rollbahn.
The Eisenborn ridge
The Hitlerjugend Division was not faring so well in its attempt to open up the northern Rollbahn and seize the strategic Eisenborn ridge. The US 99th Infantry Division put up stiff resistance and held the attacks by the 326th Volksgrenadier Division. Rather than being used to exploit a breach in the American line, the division’s two lead Kampfgruppen had to be committed to the assault action. Although the Waffen-SS Panthers inflicted heavy losses on the few American tanks barring their way, soon GIs with bazookas were picking off the German tanks at an alarming rate. This fierce fighting in a string of border villages allowed time for the Americans to form a firing line with their Shermans, M10 and M18 tank destroyers, and 105mm howitzers in the antitank role.
When the Hitlerjugend’s Panthers rolled forward on the morning of 18 December, they ran into a hail of well-aimed antitank fire. They made it to the American lines but soon 15 Panthers, 1 Panzer IV and 2 Panzerjäger IVs were ablaze. A retreat was ordered before more of the Hitlerjugend’s valuable armour was lost. Kraas and Dietrich ordered a rethink, and the division’s Schwerpunkt was now shifted south in order to try to bypass the strong defence on Eisenborn ridge. More fanatical American resistance was encountered, and the division spent four days trying to batter its way through. Dietrich concentrated four corps artillery regiments to support a large attack on 21 December, but the Americans were fighting stubbornly and were not to be moved. When the panzer regiment attacked, it lost 11 more tanks. A further attack on the following day met a similar fate, and the division was pulled out of the line to be re-assigned to push through behind the Leibstandarte Division.
The last push for victory
The stalling of the Hitlerjugend’s attacks on the morning of 18 December meant that Peiper’s Kampfgruppe was now I SS Panzer Corps’ Schwerpunkt. Even so, he was still 30km (18.6 miles) from the Meuse and 48 hours behind schedule. This was not a time to worry about his flanks. Peiper pushed all his tanks forward for one last, desperate lunge for victory.
At dawn that day, Peiper renewed his attack with added vigour. The Panthers rolled at full speed into Stavelot to seize its key bridge. The now reinforced defenders knocked out the lead Panther, and Peiper – along with the lead panzergrenadiers – took cover at the edge of the village.
Grabbing a Panzerfaust, Peiper set off to take out the offending antitank gun. Another Panther arrived and destroyed the 76mm antitank gun before driving over the bridge in a hail of bullets and shells. Their position unhinged, the Americans now withdrew to safety. This action left Peiper now in control of the vital bridge.
The Ardennes Offensive: 19–25 December
With time critical, Peiper pressed on to seize his next objectives, the bridge over the River Amblève at Trois Ponts, and another bridge slightly farther south across the River Salm. The bulk of the Kampfgruppe headed for Trois Ponts and a small contingent was sent to the Salm. American engineers were hard at work in Trois Ponts, laying demolition charges on the key bridge and mines on the roads as Peiper’s lead Panthers rolled into town just before 11:00 hours.
A well-placed antitank gun immobilized the lead tank and, as the following Waffen-SS tank manoeuvred around the wreckage, the GIs pressed the plunger on their demolition charges. The vital bridge disappeared in a massive mushroom cloud. The same thing happened to the assault team sent to capture the Salm bridge, leaving Peiper’s route on the main road westwards blocked. He therefore turned his troops around, and sent them northwards on a side road, which led through the village of La Gleize, in order to bypass the downed bridges.
Two hours later, his Panthers were through the village and heading westwards to the crossing at Cheneux. It was undefended and Peiper’s tanks were soon across and heading westwards again. Allied fighter- bombers now swooped down, knocking out two Panthers and a dozen vehicles. The damage inflicted was minor, but the delay proved fatal to Operation Autumn Mist. It gave a group of American engineers just the time they needed to plant demolition charges on Peiper’s next target, the bridge at Habiemont. As his Panthers arrived at the bridge at 16.45 hours, the structure was blown in front of Peiper’s eyes. Twice in one day his ambitions had been thwarted. He now had to turn his column around and head back to La Gleize to rethink his options. He had only 31 operational tanks: 6 Tigers, 6 Panzer IVs and 19 Panthers. Once back there, he met up with Gustav Knittel’s reconnaissance battalion which had now made its way forward, along with a small convoy of fuel tankers. News also came in that American troops had recaptured Stavelot, so Knittel was ordered to retrace his steps and open up a supply route for Peiper.
After a night spent refuelling and reorganizing his tired troops, Peiper launched them into the attack again the following morning. This time he headed northwest towards Stoumont. The first elements of a US blocking force had moved into place in the village during the night, and when his tanks advanced, they were met by 90mm antitank gunfire. One King Tiger and four Panzer IVs were hit before German infantry cleared the village. When the advance continued, the panzers ran into a battalion of Shermans emerging out of the afternoon gloom. His route blocked, Peiper ordered the panzers back to La Gleize. With American columns closing in from four sides, Peiper was effectively trapped. He held out until the evening of 23 December, when he was given permission to break out. The details of this episode are recounted in the introduction of this book. The majority of his troops were left dead or wounded on the battlefield, along with more then 25 tanks, 50 armoured halftracks and other vehicles. Peiper’s lunge for victory had failed.
The remainder of the Leibstandarte Division, led by Kampfgruppe Hansen, was making desperate efforts to catch up with Peiper, and this soon turned into a rescue mission when the commander of the division’s panzer regiment found himself cut off by American reinforcements.
Stalled until morning
Hansen’s advance had at first gone well, brushing aside a column of US reconnaissance troops near Recht on 18 December. Then it was ordered to push northwards towards Stavelot, but traffic chaos in the village prevented it moving until the morning of 19 December. Ten Tigers and Panzer IVs moved in on the village from the south, but their attack was literally stopped in its tracks when an American M-10 tank destroyer hit the lead King Tiger’s side armour, penetrating the monster panzer and causing it to explode. Access to the bridge was blocked. Knittel’s reconnaissance unit mounted its own attack on Stavelot from the west on that day, backed by two of Peiper’s King Tigers. His men reached the centre of the village but they were too late to stop American engineers blowing the bridge.
The following day, Hansen’s panzergrenadiers renewed their attack on Stavelot but they now were ordered to bypass the village from the south and use forest tracks to find a route through to Peiper. The fighting in the village was some of the fiercest of the whole Ardennes campaign and a number of civilians were killed. Later, Leibstandarte men would stand trial for their deaths.
Hansen by the Salm
The move westwards was more successful and soon Hansen had troops situated overlooking the Salm River. US paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division had now arrived in strength, and were starting to build up a strong line blocking the route through to Peiper. The rescue effort eventually proved futile, and all Hansen’s men could do was hold open a bridgehead to receive their beleaguered colleagues. By the time Peiper’s men had reached safety on Christmas Day, the Leibstandarte Division had shot its bolt. The destruction of Peiper’s Kampfgruppe had ripped the heart out of its offensive power. It would be three days before it was able to take the offensive again.
Skorzeny’s 150th Panzer Brigade fared little better than the other elements of I SS Panzer Corps. Only a handful of its sabotage teams were able to penetrate American lines, and none of them managed to seize the vital Meuse bridges. The psychological effect of their presence on the battlefield was far more important than their actual achievements. Indeed, they have entered popular legend after their exploits were immortalized in the Hollywood movie “The Battle of the Bulge”. In the end, Otto Skorzeny’s brigade was committed to a half-hearted frontal assault against Malmédy that was easily repulsed, giving the Americans time to destroy the town’s vital bridges.
Committing II SS Panzer Corps
Four days into Operation Autumn Mist, it was becoming clear that I SS Panzer Corps was stalled. Peiper’s Kampfgruppe was stuck at La Gleize and the Hitlerjugend was getting nowhere on the Eisenborn ridge. It was time to commit Bittrich’s II SS Panzer Corps to action. The rapid advance of Peiper created one opportunity for Dietrich. The US 7th Armored Division and parts of three other divisions were still holding out in the town of St Vith, and were preventing the Germans from securing its vital road junctions. Bittrich’s mission was to push his two panzer divisions to the north and south of the St Vith salient, trapping the American force, before pushing westwards to the Meuse. It looked good on a map, but Das Reich and Hohenstaufen’s Kampfgruppen had to contend with a road network that was hopelessly overloaded. Roads were already congested with units moving to the front, supply columns and the charred remains of US vehicles. Bittrich’s Blitzkrieg soon bogged down.
The Hohenstaufen Division led the northern pincer, pushing through Recht to attempt to seize Vielsalm. They were hoping to block this area, as it was the main escape route for American troops trapped in St Vith. SS-Sturmbannführer Eberhard Telkamp led the Hohenstaufen’s panzer regiment into action on 21 December, and it soon ran into a strong 7th Armored Division Combat Command, with almost 80 Shermans and tank destroyers.
Christmas carnage
Telkamp had a Panther shot out from under him in his first clash with the Americans. Over the next two days, Hohenstaufen troops pressed forward time and again, only to be rebuffed. The battle came to a climax on Christmas Eve, when Telkamp ordered an all-out effort to break through to Vielsalm. Just as his panzer regiment was forming up to attack, USAAF P-47 Thunderbolt fighter-bombers swooped down in waves and massacred his column. Now the Hohenstaufen’s northern pincer was well and truly blocked.
Das Reich had been ordered south of St Vith, but its column was soon halted when the division’s tankers were unable to get past road congestion and deliver the vital fuel to the vehicles. The commander of the reconnaissance battalion of Das Reich, SS-Sturmbannführer Ernst-August Krag, was allocated the bulk of his division’s scarce fuel on 21 December for the vital task of infiltrating behind the St Vith salient to close the American escape route. The prize was to be the entrapment of 20,000 American troops. Krag’s reconnaissance troopers were reinforced with a company of Panzerjäger IVs and a battalion of Wespe 105mm self-propelled guns.
Using back roads and tracks, Krag managed to slip through the American lines and by the evening of 23 December, he was in the village of Salmchâteau, only 3km (1.8 miles) from Vielsalm. Tanks of the 7th Armored Division were still holding the northern escape route open through that town, but Krag’s appearance effectively blocked the southern route out of St Vith. His Kampfgruppe caught the last convoy out of St Vith to use this route.
In a confused night-time ambush, Krag’s Panzerjägers quickly shot up the Americans’ M5 light tanks, then his artillery started to rake the escaping convoy. The destruction of the American convoy was complete when Panther tanks of the army’s Führer Begleit Brigade attacked it from the south. The remainder of the trapped American force had chosen to use the northern route and managed to get through to Vielsalm by 19:00 hours, and then the rearguard blew up the town’s bridges.
Denied his prize at St Vith, Bittrich was now determined to push Das Reich forward to exploit a gap in the American defences at Manhay, which offered a route westwards to the Meuse. SS-Obersturmbannführer Otto Weidinger’s Der Führer Panzergrenadier Regiment at last received fuel on 22 December and was launched forward with a company of Panzer IVs and StuG IIIs in the lead. It ran into a battalion-sized force of 82nd Airborne paratroopers, artillery batteries, and a platoon of Sherman tanks during the early hours of 23 December at the key Barque de Fraiture crossroads.
When the initial attack was repulsed by the Americans, Weidinger pulled back and brought up his artillery battery to soften up the defenders who were fighting in the woods around the crossroads. After several hours spent bombarding the US position, Weidinger launched a two-pronged attack. With Panzer IVs and StuG IIIs leading the way, the Waffen-SS then closed in on the Americans. They were soon almost surrounded, then the German tanks started to pick off the Shermans and 105mm howitzers from long range. The three surviving American tanks pulled out through the last escape route, leaving the 100 paratroopers on their own amid 34 destroyed tanks and vehicles. They were soon being rounded up by the Waffen-SS men. Only 44 managed to escape in the confusion.
Americans at Manhay
The main road to Manhay was now blocked by an American task force, so an infiltration attack was ordered to bypass its positions along narrow forest tracks westwards. Waffen-SS pioneers spent the day widening the roads to take the division’s Panthers, while Lammerding’s two panzergrenadier regiments were brought forward in preparation for the assault. Several fuel tankers had also pushed through the clogged roads, so the Das Reich Division was set to launch a divisional-sized assault.
Setting off just after last light, the Das Reich columns got to within a few metres of the American positions to the southwest of Manhay when American sentries at last realized that something was wrong and started to issue challenges. At this point, it was too late. German commanders fired volleys of flares to illuminate the battlefield and then the Panthers opened fire. Within minutes, 17 Shermans were ablaze and the outlying defences of Manhay were breached. Hearing firing behind them, the bypassed American task force attempted to intervene, but well- placed Panzerjäger IVs knocked out its lead two Shermans. The task force’s commander then ordered his men to take to the woods, every man for himself!
The American defenders of Manhay now realized the danger they were in and a retreat was ordered. At this point, a Waffen-SS Panther that had become lost in the night attack just outside the town took a wrong turn on a forest track and drove into the centre of Manhay. When the Americans at last realized that they had a German tank in their midst, all hell broke loose. The tank’s commander, SS-Oberscharführer Ernst Barkmann, ordered his driver to reverse out of the town, as he fired off smoke grenades in order to cover their escape. Gun rounds from the Shermans and machine-gun bullets ricocheted off the Panther’s armour as it made a speedy exit.
This single incident turned what had been a well-organized tactical withdrawal into a rout. Hundreds of Americans were streaming north out of the town, at the same time as the remainder of Das Reich’s Panthers appeared from the south. Their appearance completed the American rout, and the equivalent of a brigade of troops was now in full flight.
The following day more American tanks arrived to seal the front around Das Reich, backed by 18 battalions of artillery. Ordered to press on westwards, Lammerding’s men soon hit a rock-solid defence. Other American tank columns began to press in against its flanks and, two days later, Das Reich had to give up Manhay or face complete encirclement.
Triple push
Three Waffen-SS divisions were now in the line, next to each other, along the northern edge of the German salient or bulge in the US front. Das Reich had pushed the farthest west, and next to it Hohenstaufen had come into line. After being rebuffed at Manhay, Bittrich was now facing two US armoured divisions. The remnants of the Leibstandarte were still engaged in fighting the 82nd Airborne Division between Trois Ponts and Stavelot. Fuel shortages, the terrible terrain and horrendous road congestion – coupled with heavy snow and freezing nights – were still preventing Dietrich from concentrating his army’s fighting power for a decisive breakthrough. Every day that the German advance was stalled gave the Allies precious time during which to bring up reinforcements and muster their strength for their inevitable counterattack.
By 26 December, the Hitlerjugend Division had managed to battle its way through the grid-locked road systems and it was positioned on Das Reich’s western flank, ready to kick-start the stalled Sixth Panzer Army offensive. Most of the division’s panzers and artillery were still stuck in jams many kilometres to the east, so the main responsibility for the attack happened to fall on the 25th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment – helped by Das Reich’s Kampfgruppe Krag – by accident rather than design.
The regiment had to attack through a heavily wooded hillside towards the village of Erezee, which was strongly defended by American paratroopers, backed by tanks. It was impossible to get any panzers or armoured halftracks through the terrible terrain, so the only fire-support available were three 75mm antitank guns that had to be manhandled by their crews up the hillside. The only other defence against American tanks were the Panzerfaust rockets carried by every man in the Kampfgruppe.
Starting out early in the evening, the heavily loaded panzergrenadiers had to march through deep snow. It took them five hours to close on their objectives. One battalion stormed into the village of Sadzot, completely surprising its American defenders there, many of whom were trying to keep warm in farmhouses rather than stand outside on sentry duty. The panzergrenadiers soon cleared the village and took many of the defenders prisoner. Surprise was not complete, though, and the Americans managed to get off a radio message calling for help before their command post was overrun. Another panzergrenadier unit pushed on past Sadzot and moved towards Erezee.
The lost village
Kampfgruppe Krag had tried to advance along the main road to Erezee, via the village of Amonines. It ran into a strong road-block and lost a number of armoured vehicles in the dark, so its commander decided that it should turn back.
The Americans now launched their reserve battalion to retake the lost village. They were backed by several M5 Stuart tanks, and for several hours the US paratroopers and Waffen-SS men fought it out in the streets and houses of Sadzot. By dawn 40 dead Germans were left in the village and the panzergrenadier battalion had pulled back to the woods on its outskirts.
The 75mm antitank guns were now duelling with the American tanks, but the heavy US artillery support kept the Germans pinned down. A stalemate reigned throughout the day, during which the Hitlerjugend began preparations to push forward again during the course of the coming night.
After leaving behind their vehicles, Kampfgruppe Krag was to push forward through the forests to the south of Sadzot, leading two battalions of the 26th SS Panzergrenadier Regiment that had moved up into the line earlier in the day. Their advance was unopposed until they reached the far side of the forest, when heavy American small-arms fire stalled the attack. A counterattack against the 25th Regiment was rebuffed and incurred heavy losses during the morning of 29 December. Those losses included the destruction of five Stuart light tanks. In terms of manpower during these clashes, more than 120 US paratroopers were lost, either killed or wounded. But such small successes were of little use.
The German High Command ordered the Hitlerjugend Division to halt its offensive operations during the afternoon and the division was instructed to pull back. This was not so that it could rest and recuperate: it was now to concentrate for a new offensive elsewhere in the Ardennes.
This was the high water mark of the Waffen-SS advance on the northern wing during Operation Autumn Mist. The tide had now turned irrevocably in favour of the Americans. Adolf Hitler’s massive gamble in the West had failed miserably.
The fighting in the Ardennes, however, was far from over. For three more long weeks, the Waffen-SS panzer divisions would find that they were going to have many more bitter battles to fight.