There are three main military characteristics of the Middle Bronze Age in Mesopotamia. First, we see the increasing importance of non-Mesopotamian peoples who migrate into, and in various ways come to militarily dominate, Mesopotamia. These include Elamites from south-western Iran, Hurrians from eastern Anatolia, and most importantly Amorites from the steppe fringes of Syria. In the early Middle Bronze period Amorite warlords managed to usurp control over most of the city-states of Mesopotamia, establishing a series of Amorite dynasties. While most of the population of Mesopotamia remained Akkadian or Sumerian speakers, the military elites tended to be Amorites. The domination of Mesopotamia by non-Mesopotamian military aristocracies was to remain a regular, though not constant, feature of Mesopotamian military history for the next four thousand years.1
The second major military development was the disappearance of political unity for the first two-and-a-half centuries of the Middle Bronze Age, and the reintegration of Mesopotamia into a single state under Hammurabi of Babylon {1792–1750}, himself a descendant of Amorite warlords. The period of disunity is often called the Isin-Larsa period {2017–1792}, after the two dominant city-states of Mesopotamia. The second phase is known as the Old Babylonian period {1792–1595}, during which Babylon arises as the predominant power and reunites Mesopotamia. The period ends in 1595 with the destruction of Babylon by an invading Hittite army under Mursilis I (see pp. 183–4, 301–2).
Isin-Larsa period {2017–1792}
For the two centuries after the fall of Ur, southern Mesopotamia was embroiled in a complicated see-saw struggle between numerous city-states for domination of the region. Although the broad outline of events can be established, the precise details are often elusive, due to numerous lacunae and ambiguities in the evidence. The internecine and often chaotic warfare characterizing the Isin-Larsa period culminates in the early eighteenth century as two new centers of military power begin to emerge in Mesopotamia: Assyria in the north under Shamshi-Adad, and Babylon in the center under Hammurabi. The Isin-Larsa period begins with the migration of the Amorites into Mesopotamia and the fall of Ur, as described in Chapter Four.
The Amorites (MAR.TU, Amurru) {2200–2000}2
In some ways the predominance of the Amorites marks the commencement of the Middle Bronze Age. Beginning around 2200 from their original homeland in the Syrian steppe country to the west of Mesopotamia, they migrated throughout Syria, Mesopotamia, and Canaan during the following centuries. Amorite is a linguistic term defining an ethnic group speaking a North-west Semitic language. The name derives from the Sumerian MAR.TU (Akkadian, Amurru), meaning “West” or “Westerner” – a reference to the land and people in the deserts and semi-arid regions to the west of the Euphrates River. The Amorites were a nomadic people who “from ancient times have known no cities” (R3/2:364); their nomadic background is clearly reflected in Sumerian administrative texts, where Amorites are frequently associated with livestock and animal products which they exchange for manufactured goods from the cities (AUP 16–45, 282–302). From the Sumerian perspective they are described as:
Tent dwellers buffeted by wind and rain, who dig up mushrooms at the foot of the mountain; he does not know how to bend the knee [to Sumerian royal authority]. He does not cultivate grain, but eats uncooked meat. In his lifetime he does not have a house, and on the day of his death he will not be buried. The Amorite does not know house or city; [he is] an awkward man living in the mountains.3
From a military perspective, the Amorites were described as fierce warriors, “as powerful as the southern wind” (AUP 94), who frequently created fear among the Sumerians (AUP 336–7). “The hostile Amorites” are “a ravaging people, with the instincts of a beast, like wolves” (R3/2:299; AUP 332). Centuries later their fierceness and military prowess remained legendary; the Israelite prophet Amos describes “the Amorite, whose stature equaled the cedar, and whose strength equaled the oak” (Amos 2:9).
Nomadic herders predominated in many of the ecological zones of the Near East, both mountain pastures and steppe, during much of the Bronze Age.4 Care must be taken to distinguish between the pastoralism of the Bronze Age and that of later periods. The full domestication and integration of the camel and horse into nomadic economies and military systems significantly changed the nature and military impact of nomadic groups in the Near East, especially after the development of horse-archery in the tenth and ninth centuries. The Arabian camel was probably domesticated by the late third millennium, but military camelry did not have extensive impact before the early Iron Age.5
There were, however, several military advantages for Bronze Age nomads. Their way of life created hardened warriors, with instinctive survival skills often not found in sedentary populations. As non-agricultural tribal groups, a greater percentage of their male population were available for military service, since they were not bound to agricultural work on the land for lengthy periods of time. A tribe of a few thousand could produced as many effective warriors as a city-state with many times their numbers, since most of the male population of the cities knew little of warfare and were required to spend much of their time caring for their farms. Furthermore, their lack of a central city and fields meant that they were difficult to defeat permanently, since they could simply flee into the wilderness with their herds where sedentary armies found it logistically difficult to operate for any period of time.
The agriculturalists admired the martial skills of the nomad, while despising their perceived barbarism. Uncontained nomads represented a serious military threat to sedentary kingdoms, either from raids on fields, villages, and caravans, or from widespread invasion and plunder. One standard sedentary response was to use various means to hire the nomads to provide protection and military service.
The highlander pastoralists were viewed much the same as the steppe nomads, and are described as being “warriors constantly coming to raid the cities” (HTO 238). The archetypal leader of the highlanders is the mythic demon Azag, a “fearless warrior” whose “attack no hand can stay, it is very heavy” (HTO 237, 239). Demonic warriors in mythic texts are described in terms probably reflecting the Mesopotamian view of nomad mercenaries:
The men who went after him for the king were a motley crew
They knew not [civilized] food, knew not drink,
Ate not flour strewn [before the altars as offerings]
Drank not water [poured to the gods] as a libation …
They set not tooth into the pungent garlic;
They were men who ate not fish, men who ate not onions.…
[They] stunk of camelthorn and urine of the corner …
Around their necks hung fly-shaped beads [stolen] from anointed priests …
Weapons and severed heads [were] tied to their hips (HTO 35–7, cf. 222).
In the Bronze Age, nomads generally fought on foot, or occasionally in war-carts, as did all other armies. Whereas horse and camel riding were spreading during the Middle Bronze Age, actual combat on horseback was rare or unknown during this period.
The earliest recorded Amorite homeland was in the area around Mount Bashar (or Basalla, modern Jebel Bishri in Syria), the “mountain of the Amorites” (AUP 236–41; HE2 116–21). Although originally nomads and semi-nomads on the western fringes of Mesopotamia, Amorites began to migrate into Sumer in the early third millennium, drawn to the fertility and wealth of the cities in the river valley. They are mentioned in documents as living in Sumer as early as the twenty-sixth century; eventually Sumerian administrators developed a specific officer in charge of Amorite affairs, the “Inspector of the Amorites”.6 The earliest Amorites lacked political unity, being divided into several different and often feuding tribes, ruled over by tribal chiefs known as the abum or “father” (R3/2:297; AUP 332–6). These chiefs could hold high status in Mesopotamian society; some apparently married into royal Sumerian families (AUP 338–9). Among the most important early Amorite tribes are the Yahmadu, Tidnum (Didnum), and Yahmutum (AUP 242–5). Despite these tribal divisions, feuding Amorite clans were known to have joined together on occasion into larger confederations to fight the Sumerians (AUP 334). Another important fact to remember is that, although the Amorites were originally nomadic, by the year 2000 many can be found already settled in cities and farming villages. While generally retaining their old tribal bonds and loyalties, many Amorites had become city-dwellers or farmers. Others became semi-nomads, farming part of the year in semi-permanent houses, but wandering part of the year to care for their herds. Still others remained pure nomads, continuing to herd their animals in their original mountain and desert wilderness.
It is impossible to tell for certain if the crisis at the end of the Bronze Age was caused by the Amorites, or was created by conditions – ecological stress in pasturelands, combined with political and military weakness in sedentary lands – which facilitated the migration and conquests of the Amorites. Most likely a complex combination of factors contributed to the Early Bronze crisis, in which the Amorites were both a cause and an effect: climatic, ecological, social, and political difficulties created conditions which facilitated Amorite migration and conquest, while the Amorite migration exacerbated the already existing political crisis in Mesopotamia. It must also be emphasized that, while from an archaeological perspective this transition seems rather rapid, it in fact transpired over two hundred years, roughly equivalent to the time from Napoleon to the present day. If only one major city-state was conquered by the Amorites every five years, the cumulative effect over the course of two centuries would be the transition of power in forty city-states – in other words, most of the major cities in the Near East.
The migration of Amorites from their original homeland around Mount Bashar in Syria clearly began before 2200, and spread in all directions. However, the crisis at the end of the Early Bronze Age created a military climate of anarchy which facilitated more extensive Amorite migrations, as well as their ability to usurp power in the city-states and regions into which they migrated. From around 2200 to 1900 Amorite tribes and warlords migrated and conquered much of the Near East, seizing power in a number of important city-states in Canaan, Syria, and Mesopotamia. During this same period the Hurrians spread south and east from their core zone in the Khabur triangle (see pp. 303–7). The specific impact of Amorite conquests will be discussed in the chapters devoted to each of these regions.
The rise of the Amorites in Mesopotamia {2100–1900}
The first military appearance of the Amorites in the historical consciousness of the Sumerians occurs in the Akkadian period, when Naram-Sin {2255–2218} claims to have defeated the Amorites who formed part of a rebellious coalition against him. His son Shar-kalli-shari {2217–2192} undertook an expedition against their mountain stronghold at Mount Bashar in Syria.7 Thereafter the Amorites appear with increasing frequency in Mesopotamian texts.
Amorite migration into Mesopotamia occurred by both peaceful and military means. Many Amorite tribes traded with Sumerian cities, and sent envoys on diplomatic missions (AUP 337–8), thereby becoming accustomed to urban ways and products (AUP 323–62); people with Amorite names were found in many cities in Sumer during the late Ur III period, but most prominently in Drehem (near Nippur), Isin, and Lagash (AUP 253–73). Some became fully integrated into Sumerian society, taking service with Sumerian lords, as indicated by references to Amorites on government ration distribution lists (AUP 34–64). Others became agriculturalists or engaged in other sedentary occupations (AUP 46–7). Still others were allowed to graze their herds in marginal pastures surrounding the rich irrigated agricultural land of Mesopotamia. Amorites passing through Sumerian land are once described as having a Sumerian military escort, presumably to prevent pillaging or other trouble (AUP 343). Increasing interaction between Sumerians and Amorites also led to some transfer of military technology; wagons or carts (gigir) are described as being given to the Amorites (AUP 24), though it is not certain if these vehicles were for transportation or war. The process of partial integration combined with continued nomadism in the hinterlands was to have important military consequences in the following centuries.
Most importantly from the military perspective, some Amorites who settled in Mesopotamia eventually became mercenaries or government officials (AUP 340–1, 357). As the Ur III political order disintegrated during the reign of Ibbisin {2028–2004}, high officials or military commanders of a number of city-states became functionally independent. These included the Amorite Nablanum {2025–2005}, who became king of Larsa after the fall of Ur III, as discussed on pp. 117–20. His successor, Zabaia of Larsa {1941–1933}, and others of the early dynasty continued to use the title “chief of the Amorites” (rabian Amurrim) as part of their royal nomenclature (R4:112, 122). At the same time, Amorite warbands invaded and conquered much of Mesopotamia, eventually taking control of a number of cities where their chiefs were established as kings. By the nineteenth century Amorite dynasties were in control of most of the major Sumerian city-states, including Larsa, Kish, Babylon, Sippar, Marad, and Urah, becoming the most powerful military force in Mesopotamia.
The rise to power of Amorite warlords in Mesopotamia is illuminated to some degree by our fragmentary knowledge of the Amorite chieftain (rabian Amurrim) Abda-El and his son Ushashum. They appeared around 2000 in north-central Mesopotamia, where they astutely played the game of power politics in the anarchy following the fall of Ur. Abda-El made an important alliance by marrying Ushashum to the daughter of Nur-Ahum, ruler of Eshnunna. In return for this alliance, Eshnunna was protected from Amorite raids, and could call on the clansmen for military service as allies. At the same time, other Amorites are also found serving as mercenary-allies for Ishbi-Irra of Isin in his wars against the Elamites. After a victory, Ishbi-Irra instructed his officials to divide the booty from the Elamite campaign with the Amorites, giving “890 sheep and goat skins for wrapping silver as gifts for the Amorites when Elam was defeated” (PH 10). On the other hand, Amorite soldiers also campaigned on their own accord. One text describes how “the [Amorite] tribe of Hadam has defeated 1500 troops of [Zabazuna, son of] Iddin-Sin” (PH 11), indicating that the Amorites were militarily capable of raising enough men to defeat an army of 1500 from a Mesopotamian city-state. This defeat was considered serious enough for the garrison commander of Eshnunna to be warned to “guard your city!” (PH 11).
Taken together, this evidence indicates that a judicious combination of royal marriage, mercenary service, increased wealth from plunder, and independent campaigns allowed Abda-El and other Amorite chiefs to become significant military powers in the region. In a sense the Amorites could become arbiters of the political balance of power. Those rulers who could draw the Amorites to their side gained a significant military advantage. In the end, the funeral of Abda-El was an event of international importance in Mesopotamia. A letter from Eshnunna describes how “the ambassadors of the whole land are coming for the funeral of Abda-El and all the Amorites are gathering. Whatever you intend to send [as a gift for the Amorites] for the funeral of Abda-El, your father, send separately” (OBLTA 49; PH 15–16). Presumably this process broadly paralleled the migration, integration, and conquests by Germanic peoples in the later Roman period, or Turkic peoples in the medieval Near East. The ultimate result is that, by the end of the twentieth century, most Mesopotamian city-states had come under the domination of Amorite royal dynasties, either through usurpation by Amorite warlords or conquests by outside tribes. Most of these royal dynasties of Amorite ancestry became integrated into the Mesopotamian political, cultural, and religious order, ruling in the style of traditional Sumerian or Akkadian kings. The following sections will examine the fortunes of the most important of these Amorite warlords and dynasties, culminating with the most successful of them all, Hammurabi of Babylon.
The Kingdom of Isin {2017–1794}8
Ishbi-Irra (Ishbi-Erra) of Isin {2017–1985}9
As the military situation in Mesopotamia worsened under the ineffectual leadership of Ibbisin of Ur, regional Sumerian governors and commanders were increasingly left to their own devices for defending their territory against the mounting Amorite and highlander threats. The most important of these was Ishbi-Irra of Isin {2017–1985}, the most successful Sumerian warlord of the age of the Amorite invasions. Ishbi-Irra began his career as governor of Isin for the faltering Ibbisin. Their deteriorating relations, leading to Ishbi-Irra's decision to declare independence, have been discussed earlier, on pp. 117–20.
In a remarkable letter to one of his rivals, Puzur-Shulgi of Kazallu, Ishbi-Irra outlined his justifications for usurping the kingship of Mesopotamia, and the mechanisms by which he planned to assume control:
[The god] Enlil, my king, by his command, has given me [Ishbi-Irra] the kingship of Sumer. Enlil commanded me to bring the cities, gods and people from the bank of the Tigris to the bank of the Euphrates, from the bank of the Abnunme [canal] to the bank of the Me-Enlila [canal], and from the land of Hamasi to the sea of Magan [Persian Gulf], to the presence of Nin-Isina, to set up Isin as the chief cult place of Enlil, to make it have a reputation, to carry off spoils, and to conquer cities. Why do you [Puzur-Shulgi] resist me? I swore by [the god] Dagan, my lord: “Let my hand overwhelm Kazallu!” For each city of the land which Enlil entrusted to me, [I] will build thrones [for their gods] in Isin, and will celebrate their [divine] monthly festivals. I will settle my statues, my emblems, my en priests and my gods in their giparu chapels. Let their citizens utter their prayers before Enlil in [the temple] Ekur and before Nanna in [the temple] Ekishnugal!… [Ishbi-Irra] has taken Nippur, set his men as the garrison, and captured Nigugani, the highest priest of Nippur.
(PH 9)
Here Ishbi-Irra clearly outlined the standard ideological and programmatic plan for conquest in ancient Mesopotamia. First, you must act only at the command of the gods. Second, the purpose of the conquests is always to insure proper order and worship and fame of the gods; plunder from the cities is given by the gods. Third, Ishbi-Irra offered his rival Puzur-Shulgi the chance to submit peaceably to the will of the gods: “Why do you [Puzur-Shulgi] resist me?” Fourth, the statutes of gods of captured cities and lands were apparently provided thrones in Isin, and given proper divine honors. Fifth, the priests of the gods were systematically replaced by priests appointed by Ishbi-Irra, while royal statues and emblems were set up in the temple precincts, with a garrison to insure compliance. Finally, the conquered people were required to perform some type of ritual act of allegiance to Ishbi-Irra's new order as part of their temple rituals. Although not all elements of this program are always manifest in the surviving sources, these basic elements continue across most of the Near East throughout antiquity.
His early years as independent king were spent securing his position in central Mesopotamia against both Amorite invaders and Sumerian rivals. In 2014 {Y4} he conquered the city of Girtab (IYN 13), probably from an Amorite. An unnamed city in Amorite hands was defeated in 2010 {Y8} (IYN 13; AUP 93). By this time Ishbi-Irra was well on his way to military predominance in central Mesopotamia. An agent of the king of Ur wrote the following report of Ishbi-Irra's advances to his lord Ibbisin:
[Ishbi-Irra] has built the wall of Isin.… He has taken Nippur, set his men as the garrison, and captured Nigugani, the highest priest of Nippur. He has made [his general] Idi enter Malgium and plundered Hamasi. He has put Zinnum, governor of Subartu, in prison. He has returned Nur-Ahum, governor of Eshnunna, Shu-Enlil, governor of Kish, and Puzur-Tut, governor of Borsippa to their [former] positions [from which Ibbisin had removed them for disloyalty?].… Ishbi-Irra proceeds at the head of his army.… He captured the banks of the Tigris, Euphrates, [and] the Abgal and Me-Enlila canals. He brought in Idin-Malgium [as an ally]. He quarreled with Girbubu, the governor of Girkal … and took him prisoner. His battle cry lies heavy upon me. Now he has set his eye upon me. I have no ally, no one to go [to battle] with! Although his hand has not yet reached me, should he descend upon me, I shall have to flee.
(PH 9; MC 253–68)
In the following years Ishbi-Irra focused attention on fortifying his domain, building a “great wall” to protect his capital Isin, as well as several other fortifications (IYN 14–17; OBLTA 25–6). Thereafter he felt secure enough to go on the offensive. In the meantime the city-states of Mesopotamia were coalescing into two major confederations. The first was under the leadership of Zinnum of Shubartu, and included the cities of Nippur, Girkal, Kazallu, and the Elamites. The second was headed by Ishbi-Irra, including Eshnunna, Kish, and Borsippa. Initially Zinnum's confederation seems to have been victorious, capturing Eshnunna, Kish, and Bad-Ziabba and driving their kings into temporary exile. In year 12 {2006}, Ishbi-Irra campaigned northward, decisively defeating the combined army of Zinnum of Subartu and Kindattu of Elam, thereby establishing himself as the leading military power in central Mesopotamia (R3/2:434; PH 6–7). In the volatile situation of the collapsing kingdom of Ur, thrones could be quickly won and lost based on a single battle, while alliances shifted in favor of the current winner. The successful Ishbi-Irra thus quickly became the champion of Sumerians against Elamites, Hurrians, and Amorites.
Following this victory, Ishbi-Irra was able to restore his former allies to their thrones as vassals, thereby establishing hegemony the region.
Ishbi-Irra took captive Zinnum, lord (ensi) of Subartu, plundered Khamazi and returned Nur-akhum, lord of Eshnunna, Shu-Enlil, lord of Kish, and Puzur-Tutu, lord of Bad-Ziabba each to his own place
(OBLTA 23).
Presumably “returning” each of these rulers to their thrones was not an act of selfless generosity, but a ritual of vassalization (PH 6).
The Elamites, although part of the coalition defeated by Ishbi-Irra, were by no means decisively crushed. The following year {2005} they besieged and conquered Ur, bringing to an end any semblance of the old order. This propelled Ishbi-Irra, now the de facto protector of Sumerian civilization, into a lengthy war with the Elamites. In 2002 {Y16}, in alliance with Nur-Ahum of Eshnunna, Ishbi-Irra launched an attack against king Kindattu of the Elamites (IYN 16; PH 7). The war against the Elamites was probably ongoing for several years, culminating in 1992 {Y26}, when “Ishbi-Irra the king brought down by his mighty weapon the Elamite who was dwelling in Ur” (IYN 20). His victories over the Elamites are celebrated in the poem, “Ishbi-Irra and Kindattu” (PH 6).10 For this campaign Ishbi-Irra also allied himself with Abda-El, the Chief of the Amorites of central Mesopotamia; a document describing the dividing of Elamite booty survives, in which “890 sheep and goat skins for wrapping silver [were given] as gifts for the Amorites when Elam was defeated” (PH 10). In the next several years the struggle against the Elamites continued in southern Mesopotamia, until finally “Ur was made safe in its dwelling place” in 1987 {Y31} (IYN 21). Thus, by the end of his reign Ishbi-Erra had caused Isin to replace the devastated Ur as the dominant military power in south-central Mesopotamia and the new champion of Sumerian civilization. He had forestalled the Amorite advance, driven out the Elamites from Sumer and avenged the sack of Ur. Ishbi-Irra's victory, however, was not absolute. Both Elamites and Amorites were still powerful, and much of Sumer was still independent of Isin (M = CAM 109a).
Successors to Ishbi-Irra {1985–1787}11
Throughout much of the subsequent Isin-Larsa period our major source of information about military affairs is year names. It was the practice in Mesopotamia to name each year after a major event. Frequently these are religious – a great festival or the dedication of statue. Year names are also often linked with building programs of temples, canals, or fortresses. Military victories are another major category of events for year names. Furthermore, vassal cities would frequently use the year names of their overlord; thus, by seeing what city is naming its years by which king's year name, we can begin to see patterns of dominance and vassalage. It must be emphasized, however, that year names do not record all major events or military campaigns. Each year has only one name, and if a great military victory was won and a great temple built, the year may be named after the temple, and the military victory, however significant, could go completely unrecorded. By carefully collating the data from year names and royal inscriptions, Douglas Frayne has analysed the details of the shifting fortunes of the city-states and kingdoms of south-central Mesopotamia during the next two centuries.12
The successors to Ishbi-Irra did not record inscriptions of continued military offensives; most of their year names focus on ritual activities. This is characteristic of most of Mesopotamia during this period. Although warfare continued unabated, military affairs cease to be a significant part of ritual activities that were the focus of royal art and inscriptions. A few elements of Isin's later military history can be gleaned from the sparse sources. Shu-ilishu {1984–1975} was content to improve the fortifications of Isin (IYN 23), which continued to be maintained by subsequent kings (IYN 29–30, 32, 41). We are aware of one major campaign in the 1950s, when the city of Nippur was attacked and sacked by an unknown enemy. Iddin-Dagan {1974–1954} regained control of the city, going to great expense to rebuild the temples of this important ritual center. By 1910 Isin's predominance in Sumer was declining (CAM 109b); the northern cities were conquered by another Amorite dynasty known as Marad-Kazallu after their twin capitals, while at the same time another Amorite dynasty at Larsa was expanding northward (see pp. 163–6). For the most part the kings of Isin were content merely to retain control of their slowly dwindling kingdom by building fortifications (IYN 23, 29, 30, 32, 41). Only Erra-imitti of Isin recorded some type of counterattack: around year 1865, when he “destroyed the fortifications of Kazallu” which at that time was in the hands of Babylon (IYN 32). By 1800 Isin was a minor power in Mesopotamia, flanked by the mighty Babylon to the north and Larsa to the south; in 1794 it was conquered by its great rival Rim-Sin of Larsa; by 1787 Hammurabi absorbed Isin into his expanding empire (see pp. 172–7).
The Kingdom of Larsa {c. 2000–1762}13
Larsa seems to have become independent under the Amorite warlord Naplanum {c. 2025–2005} during the period of the decline of Ur. We have little information on Larsa for the next 70 years, during part of which it may have been a vassal of Isin. Larsa's ascent to military eminence began under Gungunum {1932–1906}, who spent his early military career securing his south-eastern flank by campaigns against the Elamite provinces of Bashimi {1930, Y3} and Anshan {1928, Y5} (LYN 7). He thereafter turned his attention to the kingdom of Isin, conquering the city of Ur from Isin by 1923 {Y10}, and taking the title “king of Ur” (R4:115). In subsequent years he campaigned up the Kishkattum canal; in 1914 {Y19} “by the order of [the gods] An, Enlil and Nanna, the army of Malgium was destroyed by the weapons [of Larsa]” (LYN 9). His ultimate triumph was his conquest of the supreme cultic center Nippur from Isin by 1911 {Y22} (R4:114, LYN 10; FSW 21–2), an ideological victory, allowing him to use the title “king of Sumer and Akkad” (R4:115, 118), thereby proclaiming his nominal supremacy in Mesopotamia. Many of his successors continued to use this title. Gungunum was also active in fortifying his domain, constructing the “great gate of Ur”, and walls at Larsa and Ka-Geshtinanna (LYN 9–10).
At the same time that Larsa was expanding in the south, an Amorite warlord, Ibni-Shadum, founded the kingdom of Kazallu (Kazallu-Marad) northwest of Isin on the Kazallu-Arahtum canal. Although almost no details of this kingdom are known, it appears that the five Amorite kings of this dynasty conquered all the cities on the central Euphrates from Kazallu to Marad, which became the twin capitals of the state (FSW 23). In roughly this same period a third Amorite warlord named Manana founded a small kingdom north-east of Isin based on the city-states of Ilip and Akusum, to which Kish was added by king Halium (R4:660–7). Through these victories of Larsa, Kazallu, and Manana, the balance of power in Mesopotamia shifted dramatically; the previously predominant Isin was reduced to a small kingdom.
The military chaos of the period is evocatively described in an inscription of Ipiq-Ishtar, king of Malgium: “At that time all the land in its entirety came down, made a great clamor, and performed an evil deed” (R4:670). The plight of the petty ruler of a small city-state during this period is movingly expressed in an inscription by Ashduni-Yarim of Kish.
When the four quarters [of the whole world] became hostile against me, I made battle for eight years. In the eighth year my adversary was turned to clay [= died?]. My army was reduced to three hundred men. When the god Zababa, my lord, made a favorable judgment for me and the goddess Ishtar, my lady, came to my help, I took some food to eat and went on an expedition of only a day. But for forty days I made the enemy land bow down to me. I built anew the wall [of Kish called] Inuh-Ilum.
(R4:654–5)
Many kings of small threatened city-states must have had similar experiences during these internecine wars.
The death of the expansionist king Gungunum of Larsa {1906} allowed Isin to launch a temporary counter-offensive under Ur-ninurta {1923–1896}, who recaptured Nippur and several other cities on the Kishkattum canal. Ur-ninurta's offensive was finally stopped around the city of Adab by Abisare of Larsa {1905–1894}, who “defeated the army of Isin with his weapons” in 1896 {Y9} (LYN 13). Thereafter Larsa again took to the offensive against Isin under Sumu-El {1893–1865}. Expansion against the well fortified heartland of Isin proved difficult. He claimed victory over the army of Kazallu {1890} and Kish {1883} (LYN 16, 18, 19), but strategically decided to attempt to bypass and surround Isin. His most innovative strategy was economic. By conquering the small town of Eduru-Nanna-isa on the canal north of Isin, Sumu-El gained control of Isin's water supply. However, his construction of a dam in an attempt to cut off the irrigation water proved unsuccessful (FSW 23–5).
During the reign of Sumu-El two new players emerged on the political scene in southern Mesopotamia: Uruk and Babylon. It is not certain if Uruk had been a vassal of Larsa during the late 1900s, but by 1889 it is clearly an independent city-state, which Sumu-El of Larsa claims to have defeated (LYN 14, 16). It may have become independent some years earlier under its first two Amorite warlords, Alila-hadum and Sumu-kanasa (R4:439). An exact chronology for the dynasty cannot be established, but at the height of its power in the 1870s it ruled over Kisurra and Darum (R4:460), and briefly controlled Nippur. The rise of Babylon had much greater long-term implications for the future of Mesopotamia, and will be discussed below. Thus, by the mid-nineteenth century, military power in Mesopotamia was fragmented between half a dozen different Amorite-controlled city-states.
The military history of Larsa during the coming decades is only fragmentarily recorded in the year names. These were decades of low-level internecine warfare in which the kings of Larsa claimed several victories, but no major shifts in the balance of power seem to have occurred. Sin-iddinam {1848–1842} claimed to have defeated Babylon in 1845 (LYN 24), and Elam in 1843 (LYN 24). Sin-iqisham {1839–1836} seemed to feel under military pressure, for he refortified Larsa in 1837 (LYN 28), after which he claimed to have defeated “Uruk, Kazallu, the army of the land of Elam and Zambia king of Isin” (LYN 29). Overall, however, Larsa seemed generally in decline and on the defensive until the usurpation of Kudur-Mabuk.
Kudur-Mabuk {c. 1850–1834} and Warad-Sin {1834–1824}
Kudur-mabuk was an Amorite warlord operating in southern Mesopotamia in the mid-nineteenth century, probably as an ally or vassal of Larsa. Late in the reign of Sili-Adad of Larsa, the king of Kazallu invaded and defeated Larsa. Sili-Adad seems to have not been able to offer effective resistance, at which point Kudur-Mabuk usurped the throne to defeat the invaders and save the city. He “gathered the scattered [Amorite] people and put in order their disorganized troops, [he] made the land peaceful, [he] smote the head of its foes … [and] smashed all the enemies [of the Amorite tribes and Larsa]” (R4:220). He not only drove the king of Kazallu from Larsa but captured and sacked his capital:
Kudur-Mabuk, father of the Amorite land … [with Warad-sin, his son] smote the army of Kazallu and Muti-abal in Larsa and Emutbala, [and] by the decree of the gods Nanna and Utu seized Kazallu, tore down its wall, and made it submit.
(R4:206–10; LYN 31)
Thereafter he continued his victories in central Mesopotamia:
King Kudur-Mabuk … by the supreme decree of the gods Enlil, Ninurta, Nanna, and Utu, having conquered Silli-Eshtar [king of Mashkan-shapir] … [brought him] captive in a hand-stock, in the main courtyard of the Gagisshua, the temple of the goddess Ninlil, striding with his foot placed on Silli-Eshtar's head.
(R4:266–7)
Kudur-Mabuk thus not only saved Larsa from conquest, but launched Larsa into a second period of several decades of expansion and military predominance. He was apparently quite old when he became king of Larsa, and he left much of the actual governing in the hands of his son Warad-Sin {1834–1824}, who served as co-ruler. When Warad-Sin ascended the throne in his own right it was as king of all southern Mesopotamia, including “Ur, Larsa, Lagash, and the land of Kutalla” (R4:202–6). In 1830 Warad-Sin added Zabalam (LYN 32) and in 1829 Nippur to his domain. In his tenth year Warad-Sin renovated the monumental walls of Ur (R4:236–43) and other cities (R4:253). He was succeeded as king of Larsa by his brother Rim-Sin.
Rim-Sin {1822–1763}14
Rim-Sin's sixty-year reign is the longest in Mesopotamian history (though it is dwarfed by Pepy II of Egypt's incredible ninety-four years {2300–2206}). Militarily he led Larsa to predominance in southern Mesopotamia, and lived to see the loss of his entire kingdom to Hammurabi of Babylon (see p. 176). We have little military information for his early reign, but the supremacy of Larsa was challenged in 1808 {Y14} by a coalition of most of the major kings of Mesopotamia (LYN 44), which Rim-Sin claims to have defeated. He …
smote with weapons the army of Uruk, Isin, Babylon, Rapiqum and Sutium, seized Irnene, king of Uruk [in that battle,] and put his foot on his [Irnene's] head as if he were a snake. [He captured] the various cities of the land of Uruk.… The booty, as much as there was, of the various cities of the land of Uruk which I smote, I brought to Larsa. (R4:285)
The defeat of this coalition and the fall of Uruk left him pre-eminent in the south. In subsequent years he captured a number of small cities, expanding his power northward: “by the decree of the ‘great mountain’ [Enlil] he conquered the city … the city Bit-Shu-Sin, the city Imgur-Gibil, Durum, Kisurra and Uruk – their kings and their lands he overthrew, and tore down their walls” (R4:291; LYN 44–9). In year 20 {1802} he took the important cult center of Nippur, giving him great religious prestige
(R4:270).
There followed a confusing five-year struggle with Babylon for control of Isin {1797–1792) in which the city seems to have changed hands several times. In 1792 {Y30}, “the true shepherd Rim-Sin with the help of the mighty weapon of An, Enlil and Enki, had Isin, the royal place, and its inhabitants – whose life he spared – taken, and he made great his fame” (LYN 60). The city was held only until 1786, when “Uruk and Isin were conquered” by Hammurabi (ANET 270). At this point Rim-Sin was probably in his eighties and no longer seems to have been an active campaigner; we have little evidence from the records of Larsa of major military campaigns, though Larsa appears as a participant in the wars described in the Mari archive. In the coming decades Larsa took part in the great six-way struggle for ascendancy in Mesopotamia (see pp. 173–7), not so much as a serious contender but as a major ally who could shift the balance of power in favor of one coalition or the other. In 1763 Hammurabi attacked his former ally, captured Larsa after a siege of four or five months (L 150–7), and incorporated the country into his kingdom (see p. 176).
The Old Assyrian Kingdom {2300–1741}15
The city-state of Ashur before Shamshi-Adad {2300–1814}16
The city of Ashur – from which the name Assyria derives – lay in northern Mesopotamia in the land known to the Sumerians in the third millennium as Subartu. Little is known of the military history of Assyria before the rise of Shamshi-Adad. The city-state had been founded by at least 2400 (OAC 28). Later traditions, as recorded in the Assyrian King-lists,17 remember “seventeen kings who lived in tents”, referring to the traditional Amorite nomadic ancestors of Shamshi-Adad (AR 1:1). The names of the first twelve of these kings bear remarkable parallels to the names of the ancestors of Hammurabi, indicating that the Amorite warlords who took control of both Assyria and Babylon were probably from related branches of one Amorite tribe (AR 1:1; OAC 36–7). These nomads are followed by another list of “ten kings whose fathers are known”, but whose names are not confirmed by any inscriptional evidence (AR 1:4); these rulers also seem to be the ancestors of Shamshi-Adad, but not early rulers of Assyria (see p. 168).
This archaic section of the Assyrian King-list has no contemporary confirmation. Instead, two inscriptions indicate that, in the late third millennium, Ashur was controlled by Akkad under Manishtushu {2269–2255} (A1:8), and later by Ur III under Amar-Sin {2046–2038} (A1:9), and presumably by other southern rulers who did not leave inscriptions. On the other hand, archaic Ashur was not always dominated by foreign kings. During this period one apparently independent ruler, Ititi, dedicated booty from his victory over Gasur (Nuzi) to the goddess Ishtar (A1:7; OAC, 31–2).
Beginning about 2015 a dozen kings – numbers 26 to 38 on the Assyrian King-list – are also confirmed from sparse inscriptional evidence (AR 1:5–18, A1:11–46). The Assyrian kings began marking their independence from Ur III at this time by proclaiming in their stylized inscriptions, “[the god] Ashur is king, [the mortal ruler] is XXX, vice-regent of [the god] Ashur” (A1:13, 21); the title “vice-regent (išši'ak) of Ashur” is used by all Assyrian kings of this period for whom inscriptions survive. Despite their great fame and military power in later times, the original Assyrian kingdom was merely one city-state among many in Mesopotamia, with no particular military importance.
The rise of Assyria to significance began under Puzzur-Ashur {c. 1970–1950},18 who founded a dynasty lasting over a century-and-a-half {c. 1970–1809} until the usurpation by Shamshi-Adad (ANE 1:82). As is typical of this age, the vast majority of the inscriptions of this dynasty deal with religious affairs and temple building, giving us little military information. The major exception to this rule is an inscription by Ilu-shumma {c. 1920–1906}, who claims:
I established the freedom of the Akkadians and their children. I purified their copper. I established their freedom from the border of the marshes and Ur and Nippur, Awal, and Kismar, Der of the god Ishtaran, as far as the city Ashur.
(A1:18)
This text has been interpreted by some to imply a major military expedition or some type of political hegemony over southern Mesopotamia. However, Larsen has interpreted the “freedom” (addurarum) as referring to economic freedom from tariffs on the textiles and tin trade in an attempt to establish a monopoly on that trade from Mesopotamia to Anatolia (see pp. 290–1).19
Ilu-shumma's successor was his son Erishum I {1906–1867}, for whom a number of inscriptions survive, again with unfortunately only incidental military references which provide no information on campaigns. A blessing in a temple inscription asks that the god Ashur “give [the king] sword, bow and shield”, (A1:21), perhaps indicating the major weapons of an Assyrian warrior of the period. Erishum also improved the walls of Ashur “from the Sheep Gate to the People's Gate; I made a wall higher than the wall my father had constructed” (A1:22; AR 1:11; OAC 60–3), indicating ongoing maintenance of fortifications. The military strength of the terrain of the city of Ashur was praised in a metaphorical description of the god Ashur: “Ashur is like reed swamps that cannot be traversed, terrain that cannot be trodden upon, canals that cannot be crossed” (A1:21). During this period the Assyrians were noted as great merchants on the Tin-Road to Kanesh in Anatolia, where they founded a number of merchant colonies. The military implications of this are discussed in Chapter Eleven.
Assyrian kings in the nineteenth century {1906–1814}
Assyrian military history in the nineteenth century is only fragmentarily known. The Assyrian King-list and royal inscriptions (AR 1:16–18; A1:39–46) provides the names of five kings: Ikunum, Sargon I, Puzur-Ashur II, Naram-Sin, and Erishum II. The precise dates of these rulers are not known because that portion of the document is damaged, and the royal inscriptions provide no information on military campaigns.
The rise of Shamshi-Adad {1832/1809–1776}20
The two centuries of fragmentation and anarchy in Mesopotamia following the fall of Ur culminated in the rise of two great Amorite warlords, both of whom were nearly successful in reuniting Mesopotamia. These were Shamshi-Adad of Assyria and Hammurabi of Babylon. These two rulers would lay the foundations for the fluctuating military and cultural predominance of Assyria or Babylon over Mesopotamia for the next 1300 years. Shamshi-Adad was not ethnically Assyrian, and did not begin his reign as ruler of Assyria. Although later Assyrian kings declared Shamshi-Adad their predecessor (CS 1:464), he was, in fact, an Amorite usurper. The Assyrian King-list begins with “seventeen kings who lived in tents” – the Amorite nomadic ancestors of Shamshi-Adad – followed by “ten kings whose fathers are known”, who appear to be Amorites who had infiltrated into Mesopotamia perhaps beginning around the time of the fall of Ur III {2005}. This portion of the King-list ends with the brother and father of Shamshi-Adad (CS 1:463–4). His grandfather, Yaskur-El (or Yadkur-El) {c. 1850} may have been the Amorite ruler of the city-state of Zaralulu (Tel al-Dhibai) – one of dozens of such petty Amorite warlords during this period (PH 62–3).
Shamshi-Adad's father, Ila-kabkabu {c. 1850–1832}, was the Amorite ruler of the city-state of Terqa21 on the middle Euphrates, and engaged in ongoing war with Mari. Their armies fought at least one major battle in which “many soldiers of [Ila-kabkabu] fell and so did those of [king] Yahdun-Lim [of Mari]”, probably indicating that the battle was a draw (PH 70). Ila-kabkabu, however, was victorious in another battle, conquering the city-state of Suprum, only a day's march from Mari (PH 66–69). It is in this situation that Shamshi-Adad appears on the scene in 1832.
The Assyrian King-list provides a laconic description of the rise of Shamshi-Adad:
Shamshi-Adad [I], son of Ilu-kabkabi: In the time of Naram-Sin [king of Assyria] he went to Kar-Duniash [i.e. Babylon]. In the eponymy of Ibni-Adad, Shamshi-Adad marched out from Kar-Duniash [in Babylonia]. He seized the town of Ekallatum [near Ashur]. He stayed in Ekallatum for three years. In the eponymy of Atamar-Ishtar, he marched out from Ekallatum. He removed [the Assyrian king] Erishum [II], son of Naram-Sin, from the throne [of Ashur]. He seized the throne [of Ashur]. He ruled as king [of Ashur] for thirty-three years [1809–1776].
(ANE 1:86)
Beyond this, the background to Shamshi-Adad's early life is quite obscure. A number of different interpretations have been offered.
A crucial problem related to the rise of Shamshi-Adad is the question of whether there are two separate rulers named Naram-Sin, or only one. The basic problem is that a king named Naram-Sin was ruling in both Eshnunna and Ashur at the same time. Is this a single person, or two people with the same name? If it is a single person, did Naram-Sin of Eshnunna conquer Ashur,22 or did Naram-Sin of Ashur conquer Eshnunna?23 A third scenario posits two contemporary kings, both named Naram-Sin, one the ruler of Eshnunna and one of Ashur (PH 80–7). Obviously the data is both insufficient and ambiguous, and does not allow a certain reconstruction; I will follow the interpretation that there were two distinct rulers named Naram-Sin.
Shamshi-Adad's personal reign did not begin auspiciously. His initial years, roughly 1832–1814, were spent as a minor prince at Terqa, where he was engaged in internecine wars with other petty princes. The documentation for this period is fragmentary, but Shamshi-Adad is mentioned being involved with fighting his neighbors on several occasions (PH 80), not always successfully. In 1831 he was defeated by nomadic brigands known as the Lullum, who were considered “criminals” (PH 65) and who had been marauding for some time throughout the countryside (PH 80), indicative of the anarchy of the age.
Initially a tense peace treaty was formulated between Shamshi-Adad and his most powerful neighbor, Yahdun-Lim of Mari {1820–1796}, who had earlier been at war with Shamshi-Adad's father Ila-kabkabu.
Shamshi-Adad … and Yahdun-Lim [king of Mari] … took a grave oath between them by the god [Nergal], and Shamshi-Adad never committed a sin against Yahdun-Lim [i.e. he followed the treaty]. It is Yahdun-Lim who committed a sin against Shamshi-Adad [by breaking the treaty].… [The god Nergal] went at the side of Shamshi-Adad and punished [Yahdun-Lim] so that [Shamshi-Adad's] servants killed [Yahdun-Lim in battle]. [Nergal] decided to … turn over the city of Mari and all the banks of the Euphrates to the hand [of Shamshi-Adad, who] assigned his son [Yasmah-Addu in 1796] to the lordship of Mari; thereafter, [Yasmah-Addu] built for [Nergal] an everlasting temple [at Mari].
(PH 68)
Apparently Yahdun-Lim's “sin against Shamshi-Adad” had been to renew the war against Shamshi-Adad in alliance with Naram-Sin of Eshnunna. In this war Shamshi-Adad was defeated and ousted from the throne of Terqa around 1814, and his former domain was divided between his two enemies (PH 84). Thereafter Shamshi-Adad fled to his distant Amorite relative Apil-Sin of Babylon, the grandfather of Hammurabi.
Presumably Shamshi-Adad arrived in Babylon around 1814 with a band of Amorite warriors who had served with him at Terqa. Always on the lookout for trained mercenaries, Apil-Sin enlisted this warband, giving them land in the Kar-Dunaish area of northern Babylonia. Around 1812 some type of crisis left Ekallatum vulnerable, and Shamshi-Adad grasped the opportunity, taking his warband – either under instructions from his overlord Apil-Sin of Babylon, or perhaps entirely on his own initiative – and conquered Ekallatum, where he established himself as an independent ruler. After three years securing his base of power there, he captured Ashur around 1809.
Shamshi-Adad the Assyrian {1809–1776}24
With the conquest of Ashur, Shamshi-Adad was in a position to become a serious military force in Mesopotamia. By this time military power in Mesopotamia was divided into eight major kingdoms, involved in rapidly shifting alliances and balances of power politics: Ashur, Babylon, Eshnuna, Larsa, Elam, Mari, and Aleppo and Qatna in Syria. During the next twenty-five years Shamshi-Adad dominated the military scene in Mesopotamia like a colossus.
Shamshi-Adad's first order of business was to deal with Yahdun-Lim of Mari, who had been at war with Shamshi-Adad's father, and who had broken a treaty with Shamshi-Adad himself (PH 68). Yahdun-Lim's kingdom of Mari controlled the Middle Euphrates and dominated the great nomadic Amorite tribes, giving him a good source of warlike mercenaries (PH 93–9). Shamshi-Adad began by encroaching on the territory of Abi-Samar, a vassal of Yahdun-Lim, who pleaded with his overlord to make peace or come to his assistance (PH 106–7). With twelve vassal kings by his side, Yahdun-Lim fought a great battle with Shamshi-Adad, but was disastrously defeated (PH 107); Assyria thereafter overran much of the domain of Mari. In the midst of the crisis Yahdun-Lim was deposed by his son Sumu-Yama, who busied himself fortifying his land against further incursions by Shamshi-Adad. Sumu-Yama himself was assassinated by one of his own ministers, possibly at Shamshi-Adad's instigation (PH 109–10); Mari quickly surrendered to Shamshi-Adad {1796}. With the fall of Mari, Shamshi-Adad now ruled northern Mesopotamia from the Tigris to the Euphrates, and established three provinces. In the center he reigned personally from his new capital at Shubat-Enlil (Tell Leilan, EA 3:341–7) in the Khabur Triangle of north-eastern Syria. His eldest son Ishme-Dagan ruled from the original capital at Ekallatum in Assyria, and was in charge of the frontier with the Turukkiean highlanders (who had replaced the Gutians in the Zagros mountains in western Iran), and the rival city-state of Eshnunna. His younger and inexperienced son Yasmah-Adad {1796–1776} ruled from Mari as viceroy, in charge of Syrian and Amorite nomadic military affairs. Shamshi-Adad, of course, was in ultimate command of the empire, and sent numerous letters to his sons training them and instructing them in imperial strategy; many of these letters survive in the Mari Archive, reflecting the character of the great warlord, and his imperial policies (ARM 1–6).
In Syria Shamshi-Adad claims to have marched to the sea and erected a victory monument in imitation of Sargon (C2/1:3), but if so it was a short-lived raid. His main strategic problem was Aleppo, where Zimri-Lim, the heir to the throne of Mari, had fled for protection. Shamshi-Adad and his son, the viceroy Yasmah-Adad, maneuvered to isolate and destroy Aleppo by a political and marriage alliance with Qatna, the dominant power in southern Syria. As described on pp. 257–60, Shamshi-Adad managed to gather a coalition of Qatna, Carchemish, and Ursha against an isolated Aleppo, but, for unknown reasons, they failed to take the city. It may in part be that the Syrian kings realized that Shamshi-Adad was more of a real threat to them than Aleppo, and only unwillingly participated in the anti-Aleppo campaigns. Sumu-Epuh of Aleppo {1810–1780} played the diplomatic game masterfully, forming a coalition with Shamshi-Adad's enemies in the south and east, including Sutean and Turukkean nomads, to attack him from those directions (C2/1:3; PH 114–47). The final disruption of Shamshi-Adad's hopes in the west, however, may have come from a plague which ravaged Mari at this time (PH 147–52).
On the eastern frontier Shamshi-Adad's son and viceroy Ishme-Dagan faced a series of four enemies: Turukkean highlanders to the north-east, Eshnunna to the east, Elam to the south-east, and Babylon and Larsa to the south. Babylon, with the longest border with Shamshi-Adad, seemed most intimidated by Assyrian power. Alliances in the east were unstable and opportunistic, with kingdoms attacking Assyria at one time and allying with it at another. Overall, Shamshi-Adad captured Qabra and Arrapha in the north-east (PH 181–5), but was forced to campaign regularly in the Zagros against both recalcitrant city-states and Turukkean highlanders; although he was generally victorious, the Turukkeans proved intractable in their mountain highlands, and desultory warfare continued on that front throughout most of his reign (PH 186–235). At his death, Shamshi-Adad was hegemon of Mesopotamia, but surrounded by marginally subdued enemies.
Ishme-Dagan of Assyria {1780–1741}
The death of Shamshi-Adad engendered an immediate military crisis, as recalcitrant vassals and barely subdued enemies rose up almost simultaneously to achieve independence and revenge. Although Ishme-Dagan was a competent ruler, he lacked the skill and aura of invincibility of his father, and was unable to retain control of the empire. The most disastrous event was the restoration of Zimri-Lim to the throne of Mari with the assistance of the king of Aleppo {1776}, resulting in the loss of the western portion of the empire (see pp. 261–3). Thereafter, all the surrounding kings made common cause against Ishme-Dagan, and his empire was whittled away during the coming years by Eshnunna, Mari, and Hammurabi of Babylon, until he was left with only the enclave around Ashur on the upper Tigris. The Old Assyrian kingdom had lasted less than two generations.
The Old Babylonian Empire {1894–1595}
The Foundation of the Old Babylonian Empire {1894–1793}25
In the third millennium, Babylon was a minor city, never playing a major political role. Its rise to importance occurred in the years of anarchy following the collapse of Ur III. As with most other cities in Mesopotamia, power in Babylon fell into the hands of an Amorite clan under the leadership of Sumu-abum {1894–1881}. Sumu-abum apparently exercised some type of suzerainty over nearby Sippar,26 as well as being chief of several surrounding Amorite clans (PH 28–31). His son Sumu-la Il {1880–1845} permanently annexed Sippar and rebuilt its walls, which may have been damaged in his conquest. The next three successors27 slowly added other nearby city-states by diplomacy or conquest until, in 1792, at the ascension of Hammurabi, Babylon controlled most of central Mesopotamia, including Dilbat, Sippar, Kish, and Borsippa (M = CAM 109d). Their most important victory during this period was the defeat of the rival Amorite kingdom of Marad/Kazallus, which controlled the central Euphrates basin.
Hammurabi {1792–1750}28
As one of the great conquerors and cultural figures of ancient Mesopotamia, Hammurabi of Babylon was the first ruler to reunite Mesopotamia in the almost 250 years since the fall of Ur III in 2005. The military aspects of his reign can be divided into three periods: early {1792–1776}, middle {1776–1764}, and late {1763–1750}.
In the first decade of Hammurabi's forty-three-year rule {1792–1781}, Babylon remained a relatively minor player in Mesopotamian international affairs, and was quite likely a vassal, at least nominally, of Shamshi-Adad of Assyria. There are three major recorded campaigns of Hammurabi before 1764 {Y29}. The most important was in 1786 {Y7} when “Uruk and Isin were conquered” at the expense of Larsa (ANET 270), providing his kingdom with new agricultural lands to exploit to improve the economic base of his state. His second campaign {1783, Y10} focused on the Tigris south of Babylon, where “the army and inhabitants of Malgia were crushed” (ANET 270). In Hammurabi's eleventh year {1782} he records that “he conquered Rapiqum and Shalibi” on the Euphrates north-west of Babylon. More details on this campaign are found in a letter from the Mari archive, in which Hammurabi claims “Shamshi-Adad forced Rapiqum out of the king of Eshnunna's control and gave it to me. Since then my garrison stayed there … as Shamshi-Adad's garrison stayed there” (CANE 2:910). It seems, then, that Shamshi-Adad and Hammurabi allied together and took Rapiqum from the rival city-state of Eshnunna, which Shamshi-Adad obviously saw as a greater threat than Babylon in 1782. Eshnunna's power was thereby curtailed, and Assyria and Babylon shared joint control over the city.
The middle period of Hammurabi's reign {1776–1764} begins after the death of Shamshi-Adad in 1776, at which point Assyria was ruled by his son Ishe-Dagan who was much less militarily daunting that his father. The military predominance of Assyria was quickly diluted as Hammurabi and other kings were able to undertake increasingly independent foreign policies during the rule of the ineffectual Ishe-Dagan. With the death of Shamshi-Adad a new tenuous balance of power developed in Mesopotamia between six rivals: Ibalpiel of Eshnunna {c. 1780–1760}, Ishme-Dagan of Assyria {1780–1741}, Zimri-Lim of Mari {1776–1761}, Siwe-palar-huppak of Elam {c. 1770–1750}, Rim-Sin of Larsa {1822–1764}, and Hammurabi of Babylon {1792–1750}. In addition the city-states of Aleppo and Qatna in Syria often played a role in Mesopotamian power politics, especially in relation to the affairs of Mari. This military balance of power of this period is described in a famous letter by Itur-Asdu to the king of Mari:
There is no king who is strong by himself: 10 or 15 kings follow Hammurabi of Babylon, as many follow Rim-Sin of Larsa, Ibalpiel of Eshnunna and Amutpiel of Qatna, while 20 kings follow Yarim-Lim of Aleppo. (ANE 1:99)
During this early period Hammurabi's main military activities focused on building fortifications to protect his domain; the walls of Sippar were particularly well fortified {1768, Y25}, and the army was used for part of the labor needs: “By the supreme might which the god Shamash gave to me, with the levy of the army of my land, I raised the top of the foundation of the wall of Sippar with earth until it was like a great mountain. I built that high wall … for the god Shamash” (R4:335). His year names also record rebuilding the walls of Malgia {1789, Y4} and Basu {1772, Y21}, as well as constructing two fortresses, one named for the goddess Laz {1787, Y6} and the other called Igi-kharsagga {1774, Y19}. Most of his other early year names are associated with digging canals to improve economic productivity or religious rituals (ANET 270).
The Great War {1765–1763}29
A fascinating window on the military and diplomatic world of the eighteenth century is provided by letters from the palace archive of Mari. Most of these date to the period roughly from 1780 to 1761, when Mari was conquered by Hammurabi.30 This period was marked by remarkably volatile and unstable alliances as each of the six rival kings jockeyed for position, aiding, betraying, and attacking each other in dizzying turnabouts of diplomacy (CAH 2/1:178–9). Heimpel has done a masterful job of correlating and integrating the letters into a coherent picture of Mesopotamian warfare from 1765–1763. These letters give us our most complete understanding of warfare from any period of the ancient Near East; the military implications of these letters are discussed in detail in Chapters Eight and Nine. Here I will simply outline the major military events leading to the hegemony of Hammurabi.
As noted above, with the death of Shamshi-Adad the hegemony of Assyria in Mesopotamia collapsed and political order reverted to an eight-way struggle for power between Elam, Eshnunna, Assyria, Larsa, Babylon, Mari, Aleppo, and Qatna. In addition to these eight major powers there were nomadic and highlander tribes on the fringes of Mesopotamia, including the Hurrians in Anatolia to the north, Turukkeans in the Zagros mountains to the east, and Amorite tribes in the Syrian steppe to the west of the Euphrates. Each of these tribal groups took turns raiding various kingdoms, at times independently and at times as allies of one or more of the sedentary states. Each of the eight sedentary kingdoms played a machiavellian game of power-politics, formulating and breaking alliances with reckless abandon. The chaotic picture of fractious, anarchic warfare reflected in the Mari letters was probably the norm for military affairs throughout much of Mesopotamian military history, and gives quite a different picture than the pious and formulaic royal inscriptions, where the gods decree victory for a king, and it is so. Reality was always much more messy.
The final phase of Hammurabi's military history {1765–1750} begins with a crisis engendered by the growth of opposing coalitions from among the rival warlords. The unstable multi-kingdom balance of power of the middle period of Hammurabi's reign created a time of political uncertainty as alliances were formed and collapsed based on which king was perceived to be the closest to achieving hegemony. As soon as one king appeared to be nearing hegemony, everyone allied against him. In 1769 Mari, Babylon, and Elam allied against the powerful kingdom of Eshnunna, conquering that state and massacring the family of its king Ibal-pi-El II (PAE 171). King Siwe-palar-huppak of Elam rightly viewed himself as the senior partner in this enterprise. Whereas most of the allied kings called themselves “brother” – indicating an alliance among equals – they referred to themselves as the “sons” of Siwe-palar-huppak, the coalition leader. Elam thus obtained the lion's share of the spoils, including the city of Eshnunna itself (PAE 168–9; L 56–9).
This victory gave the Elamite king31 the hope of establishing complete hegemony in Mesopotamia. Hammurabi was thus faced with a crucial decision: should he submit to de facto vassalization to Siwe-palar-huppak, or risk a major war to avert the growing power of Elam. Hammurabi recognized that he was unable to risk war with Elam on his own and turned to his long-standing ally Zimri-Lim of Mari, seeking to form an anti-Elamite coalition. Zimri-Lim realized that Hammurabi was in a desperate position, whereas Mari, quite distant from Elam, was much more secure. As Zimri-Lim's ambassador's informed him: “Does my lord not know how badly Hammurabi king of Babylon wants to make an alliance with my lord?” He therefore drove a hard bargain in the negotiations. Neither side really trusted the other; as Zimri-Lim's ambassadors told him, “My lord will surely come to realize how exaggerated is [Hammurabi's] information and how full of lies are his words!” (CANE 2:909). But, on the other hand, neither king could hope to survive without allies in those perilous times. Hammurabi desperately needed this alliance, and in the end he got it. Allied armies from Mari, Babylon, and Aleppo together marched against the Elamite coalition in 1764 {Y30} (CAH 2/1:183; L 60–3). In the meantime, Siwe-palar-huppak was not idle. He marshaled his vassals to meet Hammurabi's advancing coalition. These included contingents from Marhashi (Iran), Subartu (Assyria), Gutium, the newly vassalized Eshnunna, and Malgi (ANET 270).
When Hammurabi occupied the smaller towns of Mankisum and Upi in the former domain of Eshnunna {1764}, the outraged king of Elam ordered Hammurabi to surrender the two cities and terminate his alliance with Zimri-Lim of Mari, or face immediate invasion by Elam. The crisis was compounded when Elamite soldiers temporarily conquered Ekallatum, Ishme-Dagan's capital, rendering him a vassal. Clearly Siwe-palar-huppak was intent on creating hegemony in Mesopotamia.32 Hammurabi, mustering as many troops and allies as he could, met in an indecisive battle with the Elamites at Upi, while the Elamites tried to woo Hammurabi's old adversary Rim-Sin of Larsa to their side. The Elamites focused their attention on the siege of Razama in the upper Tigris basin. The siege went on for several months until it was finally relieved by the intervention of Zimri-Lim as ally of Babylon (L 65–78). This probably represents the height of Elamite power, for, after their failure at Razama, several other cities join the anti-Elamite coalition with Babylon and Mari.
In 1764 the Elamite army was active against southern Mesopotamia, but was strongly countered by a Babylonian–Mariote army on the opposite bank of the Tigris at Mankisum in the Diyala region. The Elamites attempted a siege of the strategic city of Hiritum near Sippar, but Ishme-Dagan of Assyria joined the Mari–Babylon alliance and the coalition's forces broke the Elamite siege (L 95–100). The failure and withdrawal of the Elamites led to a revolt in Eshnunna, which threw off the Elamite vassaldom and installed a new independent king (L 108–9). With their imperial plans in shambles, peace was made with between Elam and the coalition (L 110–11).
This proved to be the decisive campaign for domination of Mesopotamia. Hammurabi described it, praising the gods for their assistance but conveniently failing to mention the aid of armies from Mari and Aleppo:
The leader [Hammurabi], after having defeated the army which Elam – from the frontier of Marhashi, also Subartu, Gutium, Eshnunna, and Malgi – had raised in masses, through the mighty power of the great gods, re-established the foundations of [the empire of] Sumer and Akkad.
(ANET 270)
Thus, according to Hammurabi's official propaganda, after his victory over Elam he re-established the traditional empire of Sumer and Akkad, formally declaring himself ruler of Mesopotamia.
With the threat removed, the anti-Elamite coalition that once had united most of the Mesopotamian kingdoms began to break up, with each king pursuing an independent foreign policy (L 117–50). This renewed regional feuding presented Hammurabi with an opportunity. Hammurabi first turned on his old rival Rim-Sin of Larsa, with the continued assistance of the trusting Zimri-Lim of Mari. In 1763 {Y31} “the great gods called Hammurabi by name [through an oracle]; with his fetters he tied up the enemy [Rim-Sin], his weapon smote the army that was hostile to him, in combat he slew the evil land [of Larsa]” (R4:338–9). His year name adds additional details:
Encouraged by an oracle given by Anu and Enlil who are advancing in front of his army, and through the mighty power which the great gods had given to [Hammurabi], he was a match for the army of Emutbal [= Larsa] and its king Rim-Sin … thereby forcing [all] Sumer and Akkad to obey his orders.
(ANET 270)
Hammurabi's great victory over Larsa made him clearly the pre-eminent military power in Mesopotamia (L 150–7). However, the victory was not without its cost; it was followed by the rapid creation of an anti-Babylonian coalition, as the remaining rulers began to see Hammurabi as the greatest threat to their independence. Hammurabi's earlier victory over the Elamites in 1763 had not resulted in the full annexation or destruction of that defeated kingdom. While Hammurabi was distracted by his Larsa campaign in 1762, king Silli-Sin of Eshnunna, the Subartu (Assyria), and the Guti highlanders marshaled an army for revenge – Elam was notably absent from this coalition. In 1761 {Y32} Hammurabi met and defeated the coalition, defeating Eshnunna and conquering the land of Mankizum (R4:339–40).
The hero [Hammurabi] who proclaims the triumphs of [the god Marduk], overthrew in battle with his powerful weapon the army of Eshnunna, Subartu (Assyria) and Gutium and was a match for the country of Mankizum and the country along the bank of the Tigris as far as the frontier of the country Subartu.
(ANET 270)
During this period of intensive conquest Hammurabi was also active both in strengthening the agricultural foundation of his state through irrigation works (R4:341), and improving its defenses by fortifications. The walls of Sippar were reconstructed (R4:335), and the fortress of Dur-Sin-muballit was built on his north-western border; he “raised high a tall fortress with great heaps of earth, whose tops were like a mountain.… I named that fortress ‘Dur-Sin-muballitabim-walidiia’ [Fort Sin-muballit, father who engendered me]” (R4:342–3).
Although we are largely dependent on Zimri-Lim's archive from Mari to understand the history of the complex diplomatic relations between Mari and Babylon, it is clear from the overall results that Hammurabi played the machiavellian power-politics game of the age better than any of his rivals. With southern Mesopotamia conquered, the east subdued, and his domain secured by additional fortifications, Hammurabi turned his attention to the central Euphrates basin, where his major rival was the kingdom of Mari. It is not clear why Hammurabi went to war with his long-standing ally Zimri-Lim. Perhaps Zimri-Lim, fearing the rising power of Hammurabi, had broken the alliance. Or perhaps it was simply the next inevitable step in Hammurabi's move towards full hegemony in Mesopotamia. At any rate, in 1761 {Y33} Hammurabi “overthrew Mari and Malgi in battle … also made several other cities of Subartu, by a friendly agreement, obey his orders” by becoming his vassals (ANET 270). Zimri-Lim apparently remained on his throne of Mari as a vassal of Hammurabi, but he remained recalcitrant and rebelled two years later. Hammurabi suppressed the rebellion of his former ally with ruthlessness, and in 1759 {Y35}, “upon the command of the gods Anu and Enlil”, he “destroyed Mari's wall, and turned the land into rubble heaps and ruins” (ANET 270; R4:346).
The final years of Hammurabi's reign were focused on campaigns in northern Mesopotamia and the upper Tigris valley, where the anti-Babylonian coalition was still strong. “By the great power of the god Marduk Hammurabi overthrew the army of Sutium, Turukku, Kakmu and the country of Subartu” in 1757 {Y37} (ANET 270). Babylon's old rival Eshnunna was definitively destroyed in 1756 {Y38}, after a flood had destroyed part of the city walls, perhaps intentionally created by Hammurabi by diverting water from the canal system (ANET 270). In his last recorded campaign {1755, Y39} he again “defeated all his enemies as far as the country of Subartu” (ANET 270).
The military achievement of Hammurabi was one of the greatest of the Middle Bronze Age. Hammurabi made Babylon the center of culture of Mesopotamia, a status which it would retain for over 1500 years. His achievement, however, was also ephemeral. Since his major conquests occurred only late in his reign, he was unable to focus much attention on stabilizing his new domain. Within a decade after his death his empire began to break up during the rule of his son Samsu-iluna (see pp. 181–3).
Hammurabi and the ideal of martial kingship
Although Hammurabi's famous law code has naturally been studied mainly for its social ramifications, its introduction also provides important insights into the martial ideology of Babylonian kings.33 Hammurabi rules because of the destiny determined by the gods; his scepter and crown are bestowed upon him “by the wise goddess Mama” (LC 78–9). Anu and Enlil “named the city of Babylon”, and established “within it eternal kingship whose foundations are as fixed as heaven and earth” (LC 78; R4:334, 341); his dynasty was promised an “eternal seed of royalty” (LC 80). “Hammurabi, the pious prince, who venerates the gods … [was chosen] to abolish the wicked and evil”, which would naturally include conquering impious rival kings (LC 76). He is thus able to “stride through the four quarters of the world” conquering enemies until he “makes the four quarters obedient” to Babylon and the gods (LC 77, 80). Although he is a “warrior”, wherever he conquers he is also a restorer and builder. He “restores the [conquered] city of Eridu”, “shows mercy to the [conquered] city of Larsa”, “revitalizes the [conquered] city of Uruk”, “gathers together the scattered peoples of the [conquered] city of Isin”, and “gives life to [the conquered] city of Adab” (LC 77–8). He not only conquers cities, but protects them; he “shelters the people of the city of Malgium in the face of annihilation” (LC 79); he “sustains his people in crisis, [and] secures their foundations in peace in the midst of the city of Babylon” (LC 80). Thus, Hammurabi only conquers at the command of the gods (R4:345, 351–3, 389), and does so only to restore prosperity and order, to “spread his light over the lands of Sumer and Akkad” (LC 80). Obviously, much of this is sheer propaganda; this is especially clear in his claim that he “showed mercy to the [conquered] people of the city of Mari” (LC 80). In reality he sacked the city in 1759 and mercilessly destroyed it.
Of course, Hammurabi never undertook any of his conquests on his own initiative. He is in all things the servant of the gods. Hammurabi is always “obedient to the god Shamash”, who is thus his “ally” in all his conquests (LC 77); he acts only “upon the command” of the gods (ANET 270; R4:332–3). He is the “leader of the kings [of Mesopotamia], who subdues the settlements along the Euphrates River [including Mari] by the oracular command of the god Dagan, his creator” (LC 80).
With peace and prosperity restored to Mesopotamia, Hammurabi becomes a great temple builder “heaping up bountiful produce” and “supplying abundance” for the gods through donations to their temples from the plunder he has taken from war (LC 78). The epilogue to his law code summarizes the royal propaganda of the time:
With the mighty weapons which the gods Zababa and Ishtar bestowed upon me, with the wisdom which the god Ea allotted to me, with the ability which the god Marduk gave me, I annihilated enemies everywhere, I [thereby] put an end to [the] wars [that had afflicted Mesopotamia for decades], I enhanced the well-being of the land, I made the people of all settlements lie in safe pastures, I did not tolerate anyone intimidating them [through brigandage or threat of invasion]. The great gods having chosen me, I am indeed the shepherd who brings peace, whose scepter is just. My benevolent shade is spread over my city [Babylon], I held the people of the lands of Sumer and Akkad safely in my lap. They prospered under my protective spirit, I maintained them in peace, with my skillful wisdom I sheltered them (LC 133).… Hammurabi, the lord, who is like a father and begetter to his people, submitted himself to the command of the god Marduk, his lord [to conquer the world], and achieved victory for the god Marduk everywhere. He gladdened the heart of the god Marduk, his lord, and he secured the eternal wellbeing of the people and provided just ways for the land.
(LC 134–5)
The stylized imprecations at the end of the law code include a number of curses against anyone impudent enough to challenge Hammurabi by defacing or modifying his inscriptions, illuminating some of the subliminal fears of military rulers of the age. Hammurabi curses his enemies with the things that all Mesopotamian kings feared. The god Enlil is summoned to bring to Hammurabi's enemies “disorder that cannot be quelled and a rebellion that will result in obliteration” and “the supplanting of his dynasty and the blotting out of his name and his memory in the land” (LC 136–7). The gods likewise pass judgment on the enemies, “pronouncing the destruction of his land, the obliteration of his people, and the spilling of his life force [blood] like water” (LC 137). Ea, the god of wisdom, is summoned to deprive Hammurabi's enemies “of all understanding and wisdom” and to “lead them into confusion” (LC 136). Hammurabi summons the sun-god Shamash to “confuse [his enemy's] path and undermine the morale of his army; when divination is performed for him, may he provide an inauspicious omen portending the uprooting of the foundation of his kinship” (LC 137–8). The war-gods Zababa, Ishtar, and Nergal are particularly summoned to bring military disaster on Hammurabi's enemies:
May the god Zababa, the great warrior … who travels on [Hammurabi's] right side [in battle], smash the weapon [of Hammuarbi's enemy] upon the field of battle; may [Zababa] turn day into night for him,34 and make his enemy triumph over him. May the goddess Ishtar, mistress of battle and warfare, who bares [Hammurabi's] weapons [in battle]35 … curse the kingship [of Hammurabi's enemy] with her angry heart and great fury; may she turn his auspicious [pre-battle] omens into calamities; may she smash his weapon on the field of war and battle, plunge him into confusion and rebellion, strike down his warriors, drench the earth with their blood, make a heap of the corpses of his soldiers upon the plain [of battle], and may she show his soldiers no mercy; as for [Hammurabi's enemy], may she deliver him into the hand of his enemies, and may she lead him bound captive into the land of his enemy. May the god Nergal, the mighty one among the gods, the irresistible onslaught [in battle], who enables me [Hammurabi] to achieve my triumphs, burn his [Hammurabi's enemy's] people with his [Nergal's] great overpowering weapon like a raging fire in a reed thicket; may he [Nergal] have him [the enemy] beaten with [Nergal's] mighty weapon, and shatter his limbs like those of a clay figure.
(LC 138–9)
This remarkable curse is essentially an outline of the course of warfare in the Old Babylonian period: it begins with pre-battle divination and omens, the fight on the battlefield, the mound of corpses, the merciless treatment of defeated enemies, their captivity, and the final triumph of the king.
Middle Bronze Mesopotamian martial art
One of the remarkable features of the Middle Bronze Age in Mesopotamia is the near disappearance of monumental martial art. The reason for this is not clear. It may be because of changes in the cultic and ritual context in which martial art was generally produced. Alternatively, it is possible that martial art of this period was generally done in the form of fresco paintings such as those at the palace of Zimri-Lim at Mari (SDA 275–83). If so it is likely that little of this art has survived. On the other hand, when we remember that only nine fragments of martial art survive from the militant Akkadian period, the relative lack of Middle Bronze Mesopotamian martial art may simply be a matter of the failure as yet to discover any surviving remains.
This is not to say that monumental martial art is unknown from this period.36 The most striking example is a fragment of a stele sometimes attributed, on rather flimsy grounds, to Shamshi-Adad (AAM §204–5; SDA 252). One side shows a warrior in a long ornate robe with a spear in his left hand and an axe in his right. He has one foot on the stomach of a fallen enemy; he is thrusting a spear into the man's chest while simultaneously striking him in the forehead with an axe. The opposite side of the stele fragment shows a triumph scene with a royal prisoner with his hands tied behind his back (AAM §205). An interesting feature of this stele is the simultaneous use of two different weapons in two-handed combat.
The second major martial scene shows a king with an axe in one hand and a badly worn weapon – which appears to be a sickle-sword – in the other, striding over the walls of a conquered fortress and a diminutive prostrate enemy (SDA 291c). He is followed by a soldier with a banner. One very important feature of this scene is that it is the only artistic depiction of a Middle Bronze fortress. It shows a city wall with crenellation and a large city gate flanked by two projecting towers. The gate has a clearly depicted brick arch, quite similar to the Middle Bronze gate discovered intact at Tell Dan in Israel, which can still be seen at the site (ALB 208; Figure 7, p. 278).
A third mythic scene shows a god with a long flowing robe and a triangular-shaped bow and quiver on his back, grasping a monster by the neck and stabbing him with a large bronze dagger (AAM §211; SDA 291a). Another mythic scene shows Gilgamesh and Enkidu trampling the prostrate Humbaba while slaying him with dagger and mace (AFC 482). Both of these may depict typical weapons and their use during the Middle Bronze period.
Historical and mythic scenes from cylinder seals add to our repertoire of martial art from the Middle Bronze Age. These scenes can be categorized into a number of stylized scenes. The most common shows a god, goddess or king in a victory stance with either a curved or rectangular sickle-sword in one hand.37 Sometimes the figure is trampling a prostrate enemy.38 The smiting scene shows a king standing with raised axe, mace or sickle-sword about to smite a cowering enemy (FI §160, 541, 763). One scene shows the god or king with sickle-sword in one hand and mace in the other (AM §157b), confirming the two-handed use of weapons shown in the “Shamshi-Adad” stele discussed above. A more distinctive scene comes from Anatolia, showing a king in battle (FI §4). The king has a cross-shaped shield, rather similar to contemporary shields in Canaan and Syria. The hand holding the shield also holds the spear, with the head facing down. He has a battle-axe in the other hand, and is standing on a dead enemy; a nearby warrior uses an underhand thrust of a dagger.
If one were to guess at patterns of Middle Bronze weapons use, based on the glyptic art, it would appear that the sickle-sword was the most common weapon, but, based on archaeology, the sickle-sword is a relatively rare find compared to spears, axes, and daggers, and appears largely in royal contexts (MW 1:142–3, 170–1; see pp. 66–71). This again points to the problem of generalizing about the norms of warfare based on mythically and ritually oriented martial art.
Samsu-iluna {1749–1712}39
For the first eight years of his reign Samsu-iluna was at peace; his year names focus on economic and religious activities. The new Pax Babylonica brought at least temporary prosperity, and Samsu-iluna celebrated his coronation by declaring “freedom from taxation for Sumer and Akkad” (ANET 271). Samsu-iluna's ninth year {1741} is called “the year of the Kassite army” (ANET 271). The Kassites (Kaššu) were tribal highlanders from the Zagros region, successors to the earlier Gutians. Kassites were eventually to succeed the Babylonians after the sack of Babylon by the Hittites in 1595. They would eventually found a dynasty that would dominate Mesopotamia from 1595–1155.40 At this time, however, they were still highlanders from the Zagros, migrating in small groups, serving as mercenaries, or seeking opportunities for plunder in the rich cities of the Babylonian empire. No details of this first Kassite raid are known, but Samsu-iluna was apparently unable to defeat them decisively. This sign of imperial weakness provided a catalyst for widespread rebellion against Babylonian rule.
The instigator of this rebellion was Rim-Sin II of Larsa {1740–1738}, who quickly overran most of southern Mesopotamia. Samsu-iluna, however, reacted vigorously, suppressing the revolt and killing Rim-Sin II in 1738 {Y12} (R4:317, 379).
At that time I [Samsu-iluna] defeated with weapons, eight times in the course of one year, the totality of the land of Sumer and Akkad which had become hostile against me. I turned the cities into rubble heaps and ruins. I tore out the roots of the enemies and evil one from the land. I made the entirety of the nation dwell according to my decree.
(R4:376–7)
This campaign is recounted in greater detail, beginning with the mythical background in the world of the gods.
The god Enlil, great lord, whose utterance cannot be changed – the destiny that he determines cannot be altered – looked with his joyful face at the [warrior] god Zababa, his mighty oldest son, the one who achieves his victory, and at the [war] goddess Ishtar, his beloved daughter, the lady whose divinity is not rivaled, and spoke with them happy words: “Samsu-iluna is my mighty untiring envoy [as king on earth] who knows how to carry out the desire of my heart. May you be his shining light. May your good omen occur for him. Kill his enemies and deliver into his hands his foes that he might build the wall of Kish, make it greater than it had been previously and make you dwell in a happy abode.”
The god Zababa and goddess Ishtar … raised their faces of life brightly towards Samsu-iluna, the mighty king [of Babylon], the valiant shepherd, the creation of their hands, and joyfully spoke with him: “O Samsu-iluna, eternal seed of the gods, one befitting kingship – Enlil has made your destiny very great. He has laid a commission on us to act as your guardians for your well-being. We will go at your right side [in battle], kill your enemies, and deliver your foes into your hands. As for Kish, our fear-inspiring cult city, build its wall, make it greater than it was previously.”
(R4:385–6)
This type of language presumably represents oracular pronouncements and omens from court priests and prophets. Having received a divine mandate from the gods, Samsu-iluna marched to defeat the rebels in southern Mesopotamia and restore the sacred city of Kish to Babylonian rule:
Samsu-iluna, the capable king, the one who listens to the [oracles of the] great gods, was greatly encouraged by the words which the god Zababa and the goddess Ishtar spoke to him [through an oracle]. He made ready his weapons in order to kill his enemies and set out on an expedition to slaughter his foes. The year was not half over when he killed [the rebel king] Rim-Sin [II of Larsa], who had caused [southern Mesopotamia] to rebel, and who had been elevated to the kingship of Larsa. In the land of Kish [Samsu-iluna] heaped up a burial mound over him. Twenty-six rebel kings, his foes, he killed; he destroyed all of them. He defeated Iluni, the king of Eshnunna, one who had not heeded his decrees, led him off in a neck-stock, and had his throat cut. He made the totality of the land of Sumer and Akkad at peace, made the four quarters abide by his decree. At that time, Samsu-iluna, the mighty, by means of the force of his army built the city of Kish [in 1726 {Y24}]. He dug its canal, surrounded it with a moat, and with a great deal of earth made its foundations firm as a mountain. He formed its bricks and built its wall. In the course of one year he made its head rise up more than it had been before.
(R4:387–8)
Thus, Samsu-iluna portrays his acts as enforcing the decree of the gods by restoring order to Mesopotamia and rebuilding the gods’ sacred city of Kish. Although ultimately defeated, the revolt revealed the serious potential weakness of the Babylonian empire.
The suppression of the rebellion in the south was followed by a threat from the northeast. Eshnunna and the highlander Kassites constantly chaffed under Babylonian domination, and in 1730 {Y20} Samsu-iluna …
subjugated the land of Idamaraz from the border of Gutium to the border of Elam with his mighty weapon; he conquered the numerous people of the land of Idamaraz and demolished all the various fortresses of the land of Warum who had resisted him; he achieved his victory and made his strength apparent. After two months had passed, having set free and given life to the people of the land of Idamaraz who he had taken captive, and the troops of Eshnunna, as many prisoners as he had taken, he rebuilt the various fortresses of the land of Warum which he had destroyed and regathered and resettled its scattered people.
(R4:389–90)
Samsu-iluna's triumph, however, was short-lived. Within a few years his control over southern Mesopotamia was again threatened. In 1721 {Y29} he lost control over Nippur (R4:425), and by 1712 {Y38} the south was permanently lost to the rising power of Iluma-Ilum {c. 1735–1710}, king of the “Sealand” (or coastal) dynasty from the coastal marshes of southern Mesopotamia. Iluma-Ilum managed to fend off three offensives from Babylon during his reign (C2/1:222); in the end the kings of Babylon were forced to acquiesce to his independence. Little is known of the Sealand dynasty; it ruled much of the Mesopotamian coastland under eleven known kings for two-and-a-half centuries {c. 1735–1460}, but few inscriptions or records survive, and almost nothing is known of its military history (AI 243; C2/1:222, 442–3).
Late Old Babylonian Kingdom {1712–1595}
Although the dynasty founded by Hammurabi would endure for another century, for all practical purposes the Babylonian empire had been reduced to central Mesopotamia by the death of Samsu-iluna. Following the death of Samsu-iluna, the deeds of later Old Babylonian kings are only sparsely recorded in inscriptions. It is clear that the military power of Babylon was increasingly restricted during the seventeenth century. The year names of Abi-eshuh {1711–1684} mention several defensive campaigns against the Kassite invaders from the mountains, but no major victories in the south. Ammi-ditana {1683–1646} was also apparently on the defensive, focusing on fortifications. He repaired the walls of Babylon (R4:412), and built Fort Ammi-ditana (R4:413). A fragmentary inscription by Ammi-saduqa {1646–1626} claims that Babylonian power was temporarily restored in Nippur, where a cult figure of the goddess Ishtar was installed (R4:426). Samsu-ditana {1625–1595} was the last king of Hammurabi's dynasty. Although the details were not known, he was killed during the Hittite conquest of Babylon in 1595, bringing an end to Hammurabi's dynasty (see p. 301).
The four centuries between the fall of Ur {2005} and the fall of Babylon {1595} are characterized by a remarkable political and military instability in Mesopotamia. A number of quite successful warlords rose to power during this age – Ishbi-Irra of Isin {2017–1985}, Shamshi-Adad of Ashur {1809–1776}, and Hammurabi of Babylon {1792–1750} – but each of their empires rapidly collapsed under less talented successors. In contrast to Egypt, which emerged united and powerful under the New Kingdom in the Late Bronze Age, this long-term internal instability left Mesopotamia consistently vulnerable to outside invasions during subsequent centuries, including attacks by Elamites, Kassites, Hurrians, Amorites, and Hittites. Only in the ninth century under the great Assyrian warlords would political unity and military strength be restored to Mesopotamia.