The Battles of Sagrajas and Las Navas de Tolosa

In the last decades of the eleventh century, Christian armies swept south into central Spain and Portugal, but they were soon challenged by a resurgent Berber power from north Africa, the Almoravids (1085–1147). Berber involvement was initially spurred in 1085 by King Alfonso VI of Castile-Leon’s capture of the Muslim stronghold of Toledo. The Muslim ruler of Seville, al-Mu’tamid (r. 1069–1091), appealed for aid from north Africa, and the Almoravids sent troops to blunt further Christian expansion. The Almoravid commander, Yusuf ibn Tashufin, moved his army from his secured port of Algeciras in north Africa to Badajoz in Castile. Shortly after landing, Yusuf’s ranks were swollen by al-Mu’tamid and his Moorish contingents from Granada, Seville and Malaga.

King Alfonso, now besieging Saragossa, was forced to lift his siege and raise an army for a fossato (major expedition). In addition to his levies from Castile and Leon, Christian contingents were sent by the king of Aragon. A Castilian mercenary force under the command of Alvar Fanez was recalled from Valencia, and individual knights from elsewhere in Christendom (France and Italy) are reported to have joined Alfonso’s banner. After a year of preparation, the two forces met at Sagrajas on 20 October 1086.

There are no precise records on the size and composition of each host, but the Muslims probably possessed superior numbers. Yusuf, not trusting al-Mu’tamid and his Andalusian contingents, placed them in front of his own Almoravid troops, with a ditch and a small hill separating the two Muslim forces. Perhaps Yusuf intended his unreliable Moorish allies to slow down or diffuse the Christian assault, and then counter-attack with his superb Berber army. The Christians camped about 3 miles away. Between the two hosts lay the Guadiana River.

For three days the armies watched, waited and observed each other’s tactical capabilities, as heralds attempted to negotiate a day for the battle (contemporary sources do not tell us if a date was reached). Finally, before daybreak on 23 October (a Friday, the Muslim sabbath), the Christians crossed the river and attacked the forward Moorish formation in two waves, the first wave of Aragonese commanded by Fanez, and the second by King Alfonso himself (Map 3.9(a)). Al-Mu’tamid’s Andalusian contingents barely had time to form a line when the Aragonese crashed into their ranks. Within moments, most of the Moorish line crumbled and fled south-west in the direction of the nearest Muslim fortress at Badajoz, with Fanez and his men in hot pursuit. Only the Sevillians, under the command of al-Mu’tamid, held their ground.

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Map 3.9 The Battle of Sagrajas, 1086. (a) Phase I: After three days of mutual observation by the two armies, the Christian forces, organized into two waves, launch an attack across the Guadiana River (1). Alvar Fanez’s Aragonese mercenaries strike al-Mu’tamid’s Moors in the first Muslim line (2). The Andalusians’ formations are broken, with the exception of the Sevillians under al-Mu’tamid himself, and flee towards the Muslim stronghold at Badajoz (3). (b) Phase II: Fanez and his Aragonese cavalry set off in pursuit of the Moors fleeing towards Badajoz (1). King Alfonso orders his larger Spanish contingent to charge the Almoravid line beyond the protective ditch (2). As the Muslim line gives way (3) and Alfonso presses on to the Berber camp (4), Yusuf orders his reserves into action using drum signals. Abu Bakr leads a division of Moroccans into action to assist al-Mu’tamid (5), while Yusuf sweeps past the Christians’ unprotected flank to fall on Alfonso’s camp (6). (c) Phase III: Learning of the attack on his camp, Alfonso hastily confers with his subordinate commanders and orders a return to the Christian camp (1). The Spanish forces suffer heavy casualties fighting their way back (2) but succeed in reaching their camp where they form a new line (3). As Alfonso organizes his surviving knights into a defensive line, Fanez returns from his pursuit (4), only to abandon the king after quickly assessing the grim situation (5). (d) Phase IV: Emboldened by the defection of Fanez’s mercenaries, the now reinforced Moorish forces from the first line launch a counter-attack (1). The Muslim forces are soon joined by some of the Andalusians that had earlier fled towards Badajoz in an apparent karr-wa-farr (2). The situation grows increasingly desperate for Alfonso. As night approaches, Yusuf spots a gap in the Spanish line (3) and orders in his elite ‘Black Guard’ (4). Alfonso is wounded, but the king’s bodyguard rallies and carries him out of the fray to the safety of a nearby hill (5). The Muslim forces sack the Christian camp as the king and some 500 survivors manage to escape the scene of their defeat under cover of darkness.

With the majority of the Moorish line routing, King Alfonso ordered the second, larger Spanish force into action (Map 3.9(b)). These better-armed and more heavily armoured Christian cavalry pushed through the remnants of the first Muslim formation and hit the second Almoravid line, smashing the Berber front, then crossed the ditch to strike the Berber camp beyond. At this moment, Yusuf ordered most of his reserves into the fray, orchestrated by drumbeats. A division of Moroccan tribesmen under the command of Yusuf’s lieutenant Abu Bakr reinforced al-Mu’tamid, while Yusuf himself swept around the Christian flank and fell on Alfonso’s camp. When the king of Castile-Leon learned of this attack on his rear, he held a hasty war council and decided to remove himself from his precarious position (Map 3.9(c)). Despite heavy casualties, the Spanish knights fought their way back to their camp and formed a new line.

About the same time Alfonso had re-established the line in front of his camp, Fanez returned to the battlefield, only to leave again after appraising the situation. The flight of Fanez and his mercenaries invigorated the Muslim first line, who counter-attacked aggressively, soon joined by many of the Andalusians who had originally fled toward Badajoz in an apparent karr-wa-farr (Map 3.9(d)). Alfonso now was confronted with the very real possibility of being surrounded and annihilated, and as the afternoon waned, the Christian position became more desperate. Finally, Yusuf saw a gap in the Spanish ranks and ordered his elite ‘Black Guard’ into the fray. This reserve was made up of 4,000 black Africans, who cut their way through the Christian lines and severely wounded Alfonso. The king’s bodyguard successfully rallied, and in the confusion which often accompanies nightfall on a battlefield, pulled their fallen king to a nearby hill as the Muslims sacked and burned the Christian camp. Under the cover of darkness, Alfonso and 500 of his knights, most of whom were wounded, escaped.

Despite their predominance in heavy cavalry, the Christians were unable to carry the day at Sagrajas. Here, the individual initiative, skill and courage of the Christian knights were unable to overcome the sheer numbers, steadiness and tenacity of their Muslim adversaries. The retreat of Fanez complicated matters for Alfonso, who had to face the full force of Yusuf’s fury without any relief.

The Christian defeat at Sagrajas gave the Muslims control over southern Spain, though they failed to press their advantage. Yusuf returned to north Africa to cope with a succession crisis, leaving only 3,000 cavalry to assist al-Mu’tamid in consolidating his new possessions. Alfonso, beaten but not broken, made a play for Valencia in 1087, this time with the famous Spanish mercenary Rodrigo Diaz de Vicar (c.1040–1099), known to history as ‘El Cid’ (from the Arabic for ‘The Lord’), on his side. The Cid was actually under Muslim contract during the battle of Sagrajas protecting the city of Saragossa, but he came back to the Christian cause only months after the Spanish defeat.

Christian successes in Valencia forced al-Mu’tamid to appeal once again to Yusuf for aid, and the Almoravid leader crossed to the Iberian peninsula again in the spring of 1089, laying siege to Aledo. In response, Alfonso raised a new royal army for another fossato and called for the Cid to join him in relieving the city. But the two Christian armies failed to converge on the Muslim force as planned, and Alfonso blamed the Cid for the mishap. Now without royal sponsorship, the Cid moved up the Spanish Levant and captured numerous coastal cities, Christian and Muslim alike. The Cid’s successes ended only at his death in 1099, but while he lived he embodied the martial and political skill required to survive and even flourish in late eleventh-century Spain. Although essentially a mercenary who fought for both Christian and Muslim rulers, he became a national hero for Spain. His legend is immortalized in the Poem of the Cid, the earliest and greatest surviving literary epic of Castilla, composed several decades after his death. As time went on, his life became surrounded by heroic and pious legends. In the process, Rodrigo the man was transformed into ‘El Cid’, the legend whose exploits against the Muslims symbolized the spirit of the age.

The first decades of the twelfth century witnessed a resurgence in military activity in Spain, spurred on by the military successes of the First Crusade and the recapture of Jerusalem in the Holy Land (Map 3.10). As western Europe ‘took up the cross’ and went on crusade, many lay nobles and knights offered their military service to the Christian monarchs in the Spanish March instead of making the long journey to the Levant. Eager for success on two fronts against Islam, the papacy gave permission for the Knights Templars and Hospitallers to establish themselves in Iberia, and by 1156 the Spanish had created their own military order, the Knights of Calatrava, to police the area south of the Guadiana River.

But by the 1140s, Almoravid power was in decline, and a new north African caliphate, the Almohads (1147–1220s), became a force in Iberia. In 1147 the Almohads crossed the strait and captured Seville, while that same year English, German and Flemish crusaders captured Lisbon after an extraordinary siege. For the next half-century, the Almohads sparred with the Christians for control of central Spain. The Christians, now led by King Alfonso VIII of Castile (1158–1214), managed to make headway with the assistance of the Spanish military orders (Knights of Calatrava, Knights of Santiago, formed in 1170, and Knights of Alcantara, formed in 1176), captured Cuenca in 1177, and pushed south to Plasencia and Trujillo. Routed by the Almohads at Alarcos in 1195, Alfonso would avenge this defeat at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212.

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Map 3.10 Spain and Portugal during the Reconquista.

The Christians resumed the Reconquista against Moorish territory in the south of Spain at the beginning of the thirteenth century. Alfonso severed a peace treaty with the Almohad caliph, al-Nasir (known to Christians as Miramamolin), and raided as far south as Granada. In 1212 al-Nasir brought a large army across from Morocco, landing in Seville, and prepared to defend his realm against the Christian invaders.

The Christian host that gathered in Toledo in the spring of 1212 was a multinational army organized under the papal banner of Innocent III (pope 1198–1216), the greatest of the papal monarchs. Besides Alfonso, the kings of Aragon, Portugal, Leon and Navarre also joined the army, making the campaign a national effort. Knights and soldiers soon flocked in from France, Italy and even as far away as Germany to swell the ranks of Alfonso’s army. By Easter an army of perhaps 30,000 heavy cavalry and infantry prepared to march south to face a Moorish and Berber army that probably outnumbered them.

On 20 June the crusaders left Toledo and headed south. As the Christian army marched, the French contingent broke away and, seeking plunder, attacked Malagon on 24 June, massacring the garrison. A week later, the French broke ranks again and captured Calatrava, the seat of power of the military order of the same name. But Alfonso denied the French pillaging rights and instead returned the city to the crusader order. Infuriated by the king of Castile’s decision and frustrated by the lack of plunder, all but 130 knights of the French contingent abandoned their bishops and returned home to France.

Encouraged by this desertion, al-Nasir left his base at Jaen and moved to the foot of the Losa canyon to block the Christian advance. With the assistance of a shepherd, the crusaders descended down a narrow defile into the plain of the Mesa del Rey to the west of the Muslim vanguard, forcing al-Nasir to take a strong defensive position on the slopes of a nearby hill (Map 3.11(a)). The Almohad caliph formed his infantry into square, placing his heavy infantry in the first rank. Next came light infantry with spears, javelins and slings. Archers stood in the rear ranks. Al-Nasir placed his Andalusian heavy cavalry and Berber light horsemen on the wings. Shallow rocky ravines now separated the two hosts. Both armies spent the next day, Sunday 15 July, preparing for the battle ahead.

Alfonso organized his army in typical medieval fashion into three divisions, with a reserve. The centre was made up of men from Castile and Leon under the command of Diego Lopez de Haro. King Pedro II of Aragon commanded the left wing, buttressed by Knights of Santiago and Calatrava, while the right was under the banner of King Sancho VII of Navarre. Alfonso remained in the rear with the remainder of the knights of the military orders, forming the reserve division.

The crusaders opened the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa on the morning of 16 July with a series of frontal heavy cavalry charges all along the line led by Diego Lopez, but the Almohads repulsed the Christian heavy horse (Map 3.11(b)). Later in the morning, the Muslims counter-attacked in a vicious assault with their Andalusian and Berber horse, but these troops were held up in a brilliant defensive stand by the Spanish light infantry, who thinned their ranks with missile fire from slings, bows and crossbows, allowing the Christian knights to re-form (Map 3.11(c)).

What happened next turned the tide of the battle. A dispute between al-Nasir’s Andalusian and Berber troops led to the desertion en masse of the Andalusian contingent. Taking advantage of this crisis, Alfonso ordered his reserves to join the two wings under Pedro II and Sancho VII (Map 3.11(d)). This action shattered the Almohad line, with Sancho breaking through the Muslim defenders and reaching al-Nasir’s magnificent gold-embroidered tent. Despite a valiant effort by the caliph’s African ‘Black Guard’, armed in traditional fashion with spears and large hide shields, the knights of Navarre rode them down and seized the royal pavilion (Map 3.11(e)). Al-Nasir fled the field and escaped back to Jaen, where he would be dead within a year. The Muslim army he left behind was annihilated as the Spanish line surged forward. Almohad losses were substantial – perhaps as much as a third of the entire army – though this is difficult to ascertain because of the outrageous claims of contemporary Christian chroniclers and the desertion of the Andalusian troops.

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Figure 3.11 The Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, 1212. (a) Phase I: With the assistance of a local guide, the crusader army under King Alfonso VIII of Castile debouches from a narrow pass onto the Mesa del Rey and approaches al-Nasir’s Almohad host from the west (1). Al-Nasir reorients his forces from north to west to meet this threat and places his army in a strong defensive position (2) on a hillside facing the Christian forces. Separated by a ravine-dotted plain, both sides spend a day preparing for battle. (b) Phase II: The crusaders open the action, Diego Lopez (1) leading a series of heavy cavalry charges (2) against the Almohad positions on the hillside. The Spanish efforts to dislodge al-Nasir’s forces are handily repulsed (3) and the Muslims prepare to launch their own attack late in the morning. (c) Phase III: The charge of the Andalusian and Berber horse (1) is met by a shower of missile fire from the Spanish light infantry screen (2). The hail of sling stones, arrows and crossbow bolts drives the Muslim cavalry back (3) and buys the time that the Christian heavy cavalrymen need to re-form (4). (d) Phase IV: The tide suddenly turns against al-Nasir as his Andalusian cavalry deserts his army (1) after a dispute with the Berber light horsemen. Seizing the opportunity, Alfonso orders his reserves to bolster the Spanish wings (2). (e) Phase V: The crusaders surge forward against the now weakened Almohad wings (1). King Sancho’s right wing smashes through to al-Nasir’s personal tent (2). Al-Nasir’s ‘Black Guard’ fails to check the Navarrese onslaught and scatters (3). Al-Nasir flees the field (4) and the remainder of the Muslim army is crushed as the crusader line surges forward (5).

Christian casualties are stated at twenty-five or thirty knights, a farcical number when one takes into consideration the ferocity and duration of this battle. Christian casualties must have been heavy, especially among the military orders who historically had borne the brunt of the fighting. Despite the difficult terrain, the crusader victory owed much to the heavier arms and horses of the Christian forces, but was no doubt sealed with the desertion of the Moorish Andalusian contingent. Still, the Christians won using a combined-arms effort, with heavy cavalry providing the offensive punch while infantry held fast against Muslim cavalry charges.

The Spanish victory at Las Navas de Tolosa was the most important of the Reconquista, leading to continued success in campaigns on the Balearic Islands (1229–1235), Cordoba (1236), Valencia (1238) and Seville (1248), while in the west, the Portuguese pushed south and reached the Algarve coastline by 1248. After 1224 the Almohad Empire fell apart in a civil war complicated by religious and racial hatreds. Within forty years of the victory at Las Navas de Tolosa, the Christians controlled the whole of Andalusia, leaving only Granada in the south to the Muslims. In 1492 the city of Granada fell to the Spanish monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella, ending 800 years of Muslim rule in Spain.

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