England’s first great land victory over the French in the Hundred Years War came at the battle of Crécy in western France in August 1346. A naval victory over the French at Sluys six years earlier had given the English command of the channel, affording Edward III the chance to pursue his hereditary claim to the French throne in a direct challenge to French suzerainty. On 12 July, Edward landed near the western tip of Normandy and set off on a raiding expedition. Edward’s strategy was three-pronged: to pillage Normandy and evade French attempts at interception, to draw off French forces menacing English possessions in the south, and to rendezvous with an allied Flemish army invading France from the north-east. After a successful chevauchée across Normandy, Edward finally turned east and approached the Seine River near the large city of Rouen. Here he found that the French monarch, Philip VI (r. 1328–1350), had arrived in the city first and now blocked all the fords and bridges across the river.
Marching east toward Paris, with the French army following on the opposite bank, Edward won a bridge near Poissy by brilliant feinting and counter-marching, only to be beaten to the Somme River at Amiens by Philip’s army. Unable to secure a bridge across the Somme and trapped between an advancing French army and the river, Edward was forced to risk crossing the waterway at low tide. A blocking French force on the opposite bank further complicated the crossing. Ordering his rearguard to hold off the French army moving in for the kill down the left bank of the Somme, Edward commanded his vanguard archers to wade across the river and secure a bridgehead through which the English army could pass to safety. Unable to pursue the English because of the rising tide, Philip was forced to recross the Somme farther upstream, giving Edward time to find a suitable defensive position from which to fight the battle he now knew was inevitable.
Treasure-laden and exhausted after a 300-mile long chevauchée, King Edward’s men retreated to the small village of Crécy, pursued by a numerically superior French army. Early in the morning of 26 August, Edward drew up his army of 8,500 men (two-thirds of whom were light infantry longbowmen) in a defensive position on a low hill facing the road where the French would approach (Map 5.7(a)). Edward arrayed his heavy infantry and dismounted knights in three battles on the forward slope of the east rise of the Crécy–Wadicourt road. The right battle was under the nominal command of the king’s eldest son, the future Edward IV, the prince of Wales, then a seventeen-year-old, while the earl of Northampton commanded the left corps. Edward commanded the centre division, and used the nearby woods as rear protection and his baggage wagons for flank protection, while a windmill provided his command post.
The village of Crécy’s steep, terraced hillside allowed the English monarch to deploy his longbowmen to best advantage on the flanks of the heavy infantry line. To further protect themselves against enemy cavalry charges, the longbowmen spent the day preparing the battlefield by digging ditches and driving iron-shod wooden stakes into the ground in front of their positions. These makeshift obstacles usually had the added benefit of funnelling enemy cavalry into the dismounted cavalry and infantry ranks, allowing archers to rake the mounted attackers’ flanks.
The pursuing King Philip divided his army of 20,000 into eight divisions for marching, placing his 6,000 Genoese crossbowmen in the vanguard. The French, expecting a long chase, were surprised to find the English army arrayed for battle on the hillside. Since it was now late in the day, Philip gave orders to defer action until the next morning. But the French knights, seeking personal glory, insisted on an attack, even though most of the main army had yet to arrive, depriving the noblemen of most of their supporting cavalry and infantry (except for the Genoese crossbowmen who arrived in the van). Unable to control his troops, Philip gave the order to attack (Map 5.7(b)).
The Genoese crossbowmen were sent forward first to exchange fire with the English archers, but the crossbowmen lacked the protection of their pavises, large rectangular body shields that were still on the baggage wagons. The medieval chronicler Jean Froissart tells us that the English longbowmen:
Then advanced one step forward, and shot their arrows with such force and quickness, that it seemed as if it snowed. When the Genoese felt these arrows, which pierced their arms, heads, and through their armor, some of them cut the strings of their crossbows, others flung them to the ground and turned around and retreated.
Unprotected and unable to match the rate of fire of the longbowmen, the Genoese were outshot and forced back down the slope (Map 5.7(c)). As the Italian light infantry fell back, the French heavy cavalry rode them down in disgust on their way up the hill (Map 5.7(d)).
The English longbowmen next turned their arrows on the advancing French knights. Under a withering barrage of arrows, none of the French cavalry from the first charge reached the English line:
For the bowmen let fly among them at large, and did not lose a single shaft, for every arrow told on horse or man, piercing head, or arm, or leg among the riders and sending the horses mad. For some [horses] stood stock still, and others rushed sideways, and most of all began backing in spite of their masters, and some were rearing and tossing their heads at the arrows, and others when they felt the bit threw themselves down. So the knights in the first bataille fell, slain or sore stricken, without seeing the men who slew them.
The second charge failed as well, as the heavy cavalry’s barding proved incapable of stopping the longbow’s shaft (Map 5.7(e) and (f)).
Map 5.7 The Battle of Crécy, 1346. (a) Phase I: King Edward carefully arrays his army on a terraced slope near Crécy, digging ditches in the field to the front (1) to disrupt cavalry attacks and driving stakes in front of the archers’ positions (2). Woods protect his rear (3), his baggage train covers the left flank (4), and a windmill (5) provides the king with a view of the approaching foe. (b) Phase II: King Philip VI’s army approaches the English position. Philip attempts to order a delay until the next day, when the remainder of his army will be up. Some of his knights halt (1), but most of the others press forward (2) in a search for glory and Philip gives in, unable to control his nobles. He orders his lead formations, Genoese crossbowmen, forward (3), even though their pavises, large rectangular body shields, are loaded on baggage wagons far to the rear. (c) Phase III: As the Genoese crossbowmen approach the English lines, Edward’s longbowmen let fly (1). An earlier rainstorm had dampened the strings of the crossbows, while the English were able to easily unstring and protect theirs from the elements. This, coupled with the already greater range of the longbow, results in disaster for the unprotected Genoese. Without their pavises, they lose heavily to the English arrow storm and soon break for the rear (2). (d) Phase IV: Disgusted with the performance of their foot, the French knights ride down the Genoese fugitives (1) as they advance up the slope towards the English position (2).
(e) Phase V: Their advance disrupted by the ditches dug by the enemy archers (1), the first French charge is greeted by clouds of English arrows (2). Tightly packed and pressed from behind by their comrades, the French offer a large target to the longbowmen and the casualties swiftly mount. (f) Phase VI: The French continue launching charges against the English position, the archery fire funnelling their remaining forces towards the centre of the field. (g) Phase VII: French knights manage to close with the English line several times, but with little effect, though the young Black Prince finds he is a repeated target for enemy attacks (1). The French have launched perhaps as many as fifteen assaults on the English line without making an impression on their foe, all the while suffering greatly from the merciless longbow fire (2). (h) Phase VIII: The French survivors finally turn and retreat (1), unable to shake Edward’s forces on the ridge line. In contrast to Philip’s heavy losses, the English suffer little in the battle.
With the archers on the flanks, the French charges were funnelled towards the centre of the English lines where Edward’s son, the teenage ‘Black Prince’, commanded. The prince himself became the target of many direct attacks, and despite being ‘compelled to fight on his knees’, he and his men held their position against the continual onslaughts of French cavalry (Map 5.7(g)). In all, the French heavy cavalry charged the English position fifteen times, and though some French horsemen did manage to meet the defenders’ lines, Edward’s dismounted knights and heavy infantry proved irresistible to the cavalry charges (Map 5.7(h)).
When the mists cleared on the morning of 27 August and the last of the French were driven away, Edward allowed his men to break ranks and strip the dead. In spite of a numerical superiority of two to one, the French lost 1,500 knights and squires, including the king of Bohemia, the duke of Lorraine, 10 counts, 83 bannerets and perhaps as many as 16,000 men-at-arms. English casualties were stated as two knights, one squire, and 40 infantrymen and archers.
Sixty-nine years later, in 1415, another English king, Henry V (r. 1413–
1422), faced a strategic situation similar to that which Edward III met at Crécy. After decades of conflict, the French were beginning to adjust to the English defensive tactical system by dismounting the majority of their nobility and attacking the invading English on foot. Throughout the remainder of the Hundred Years War, the French knight strapped on more plate armour to defend himself from enemy arrows and bolts, and adopted heavier and shorter hammers, maces, flails and staff weapons (halberds, billhooks, glaives, military forks and poleaxes) more suitable for dismounted heavy infantry. Because these weapons often required two hands to be effective, the shield was discarded for practical use, only surviving for heraldic display.
A man of unlimited ambition and great military skill, King Henry decided to take advantage of the political division in France and revive Edward III’s claim to the French throne. Henry then assembled an army at Southampton, and on 13 August 1415 landed it near the mouth of the Seine and besieged the city of Harfleur, which capitulated on 22 September. After providing a garrison for Harfleur, Henry set out on 8 October for Calais with a small army of about 6,000 men (5,000 longbowmen and 900 dismounted knights and men-at-arms) and a week’s rations, enough for the 100-mile march (see Map 5.6).
But the French, conspicuously absent from the siege of Harfleur, chose then to attack the invading English army. Unable to cross the Somme River because of flooding and French defences, the English were forced to swing inland on their return journey to Calais and cross at Amiens. The delay allowed the pursuing French army to block Henry’s path, forcing the English monarch either to continue to try to evade the French, or to stand and fight. Henry decided to fight. On the evening of 23 October he ordered his small army, hungry, tired and sick from dysentery, to make camp south of the villages of Tramecourt and Agincourt. The larger French army encamped between the two villages, north-west of the English position.
For days before the two armies camped, French contingents had been arriving to swell the ranks of the defending army. By the evening of 23 October, it numbered perhaps 25,000 men, a huge army for the period. The constable of France, Charles d’Albret, commanded the large French host in name, but his leadership was undermined by the presence of so many dukes and counts that his position was more analogous to a president of an unruly war council than a battlefield general. And though the constable, aware of the effectiveness of the English longbowmen, wanted to receive Henry’s army in a defensive engagement, the dukes and counts of France convinced him to move from the defensive and attack the English.
The resulting French battle plan advocated a combined-arms approach, first sending light infantry archers and crossbowmen forward against the English right flank while heavy cavalry charges simultaneously attacked the English rear in a double envelopment. Finally, dismounted French knights and their men-at-arms were to engage the English centre on foot as allied light infantry archers and crossbowmen pinned down the enemy longbowmen. Attacked from all directions and overwhelmed by superior numbers, the English centre would collapse; the French would win the day.
The narrow frontage forced the French to array in three batailles, one behind the other. The first division contained 8,000 heavy infantry, 4,000 archers and 1,500 crossbowmen, commanded by the constable himself. Behind this stood a second heavy infantry bataille of similar size. The third division contained the heavy cavalry, a formidable force between 8,000 and 10,000 knights and mounted men-at-arms.
Realizing the size and complement of his foe, King Henry chose a position at the end of a muddy, ploughed field between two patches of woods in order to narrow the front to 800 yards, thereby mitigating French numerical superiority. Conforming to the English defensive tactical doctrine so successful decades earlier at Crécy and Halidon Hill, Henry placed two divisions of dismounted cavalry and foot soldiers in the centre and his light infantry longbowmen on each flank. His centre numbered about 900 men, including many great lords from England and their armed retinues. Henry split his 5,000 archers into two equal divisions of 2,500, then placed them on the flanks of the small centre of heavy infantry.
Both armies arrayed for battle about 1,000 yards apart at around eight in the morning. As the French sat around their standards eating breakfast and forgiving each other for old quarrels, King Henry was deliberating with his war council. The council agreed that there was nothing to be gained by waiting to attack. English troops were already weakened by hunger and disease, and, unlike the French who were in friendly territory, there was no chance of gathering much needed supplies. Believing the only option was to attack, Henry ordered his tiny force to advance against the enormous French host (Map 5.8(a)). Exercising great care in their slow advance over ground sodden from autumn rain, the English army moved within bowshot of the French, perhaps 220–250 yards from the enemy. Once in position, the longbowmen made an irregular hedge of sharpened stakes, then took position behind it in preparation for enemy cavalry charges. As the French reacted to the audacity of the English advance, Henry ordered his longbowmen to fire into the enemy vanguard (Map 5.8(b) and (c)).
Under a rain of longbow shafts, the French crossbowmen in the van hastily returned fire, then retreated back through the ranks of their heavy infantry and effectively out of the battle (Map 5.8(d)). The initial heavy cavalry charge against the English archers also did not go as planned. The two flank charges were seriously disorganized and undermanned, and could not be directed at the invaders’ flanks because they rested on woods. Instead, the French horsemen attacked the English light infantry across the recently ploughed, rain-soaked field, charging headlong into the archers’ stake defences. Although only three French knights died in this attempt at the English lines, the retreating mounts made easy targets for English bowmen. Maddened horses bolted from the battlefield or, worse, into the 8,000 men of the now advancing French first infantry division, causing it to lose its cohesion. Exhausted by the clinging mud, the French infantry had little momentum when they reached the English line. And though the dismounted French knights and their heavy infantrymen did manage to meet the English centre in hand-to-hand combat, their numbers suffered from being culled by devastating longbow fire (Map 5.8(e)).
Moments later the second French division joined in, numbering perhaps 6,000 knights, but on the narrow and congested front their numbers were no advantage. The closely packed soldiers could not wield their weapons, and those who fell to the ground could not easily regain their feet because of the weight of their plate armour. Henry then ordered his agile and unencumbered archers into the mêlée. Dropping their longbows, the archers drew axes and swords and sallied out from behind their stakes to meet the dismounted French knights (Map 5.8(f)). As the third French division looked on, refusing to enter the fray, the English army pressed forward, killing, beating down or capturing all who opposed them.
In an engagement perhaps a half-hour in duration, thousands of French knights, squires and common soldiers were killed, and some 2,000 French notables surrendered to the English. While the English were sorting out the living from the dead, their camp was sacked by the local French militia (Map 5.8(g)). Fearing that he was being attacked from the rear while a third French division of several thousand men remained in front of his position, Henry ordered the massacre of all prisoners. His English knights refused the ignoble act and the massacre was carried out by one squire and 200 of his archers. Many important Frenchmen were murdered, including the constable, three dukes and seven counts. Since Henry returned to England with at least 1,000 noble prisoners, he must have called a halt to the slaughter. Nevertheless, Henry’s actions at Agincourt demonstrated a coldly professional approach to warfare, one decidedly different from the stereotype of a chivalrous monarch.
Map 5.8 The Battle of Agincourt, 1415. (a) Phase I: King Henry V orders his tired, sick and hungry men to array themselves for battle (1), his dismounted men-at-arms in the centre flanked by longbowmen. The French ready their bivouac between the villages of Agincourt and Tramecourt, separated from the English by a ploughed field (3) bordered with woods. Henry seizes the initiative and orders his men forward (4). (b) Phase II: The English advance to a point within bowshot of the enemy, their flanks protected by the woods approaching the edge of the field (1). Henry’s archers are ordered to drive stakes into the ground in front of their positions (2) to defend themselves against the inevitable French onslaught. (c) Phase III: The French advance (1) behind a screen of crossbowmen (2), and Henry orders the English archers to open fire (3) on the approaching foe. (d) Phase IV: After an ineffective return of fire, the French crossbowmen retreat through the ranks of the infantry following them (1), unable to withstand the English longbow fire. The planned French flank attack fails as well, as the English flanks are protected by the trees, forcing the horsemen to approach the archers’ stake-lined fronts (2). Lacking strength, and hampered by the wet, ploughed ground, the knights retreat (3). The English arrows find their mark in the French mounts, and the maddened horses plunge into the ranks of the oncoming foot (4), severely disrupting the advance.
(e) Phase V: Their formations in ruins from the deadly longbow fire, remnants of the French first division (1) manage to engage the English centre, but with little effect. Right behind them are the heavy infantrymen of the second division (2), but the narrow frontage and the added congestion created by the incessant archery fire from the flanks negate their numerical advantage. (f) Phase VI: Unable to effectively wield their weapons in the tight press of men and slipping in the slick mud, the French cannot maintain a cohesive front. Henry orders his archers to drop their bows and attack their disadvantaged foe with axes and swords (1). As the slaughter on the flanks escalates, the remaining Englishmen press forward (2), killing or capturing thousands. The heavy cavalry of the French third division looks on (3), unwilling to advance into the mêlée.
(g) Phase VII: While the English gather prisoners (1), a local militia force attacks the English camp and baggage train (2). Fearing an attack from the rear while still faced with a fresh division of French heavy cavalry to his front, Henry orders the prisoners slaughtered (3). The English knights bulk and the order is finally carried out by a squire and 200 longbowmen, though there is evidence to suggest that Henry ordered a halt to the massacre at some point. The French third division does not attack and the English win a victory against heavy odds.
The English victory at Agincourt was astonishing considering the odds against the invaders. Outnumbered perhaps four to one and fighting on perfectly open, flat ground, the English deviated from the defensive doctrine so successful at Crécy and Halidon Hill and brought the battle to the French. Once within bowshot, English archers swept the French light infantry from the field, then concentrated their fire on the cavalry charges. Here, the sodden terrain slowed the attacks and those horses that did make the English line failed to negotiate the archers’ stakes. In the end, the battle was won in a contest between dismounted knights and their infantry allies, a battle that favoured the agile and less encumbered English light infantryman-turned-shock trooper over his well-armoured French adversary.
Henry V went on to conquer Normandy and negotiate the French crown for his dynasty. In 1420 he signed the Treaty of Troyes and married the French princess Catherine of Valois (daughter of the periodically insane Charles VI, who agreed to take Henry V as his regent and successor). But sickness overtook the brilliant English king, resulting in his untimely death in 1422 at the relative young age of thirty-five. Charles died only two months after Henry, and the future of France was again in question.
The final phase of the Hundred Years War is closely associated with the reign of the French monarch Charles VII. After the death of Joan of Arc in 1431, Charles continued to press his advantage. He made peace with Burgundy in 1435, denying England its most potentally on the continent. He liberated Paris from the English a year later, after a fourteen-year occupation. After their defeat at Fromigny, the English lost Bayeux and Cherbourg, and consequently their traditional bastion of Normandy. The French went on to dislodge the English from their stronghold at Bordeaux in Gascony, the same region that sparked the conflict 116 years before. By 1453 only Calais remained as an English possession.
After the success of the Hundred Years War, English longbowmen found themselves a wanted commodity in the ranks of continental armies. This recognition of the power and importance of missile weapons in combat would solidify the return of light infantry tactics throughout western Europe. No longer was the light infantry arm subservient to heavy cavalry: by the end of the Hundred Years War it had fully returned to European military doctrine. But without well-articulated heavy infantry, the return of a balanced combined-arms tactical synthesis was still incomplete. While the Anglo-French struggle was under way, another tactical awakening was taking place in the Swiss Alps, one which, when combined with the return of light infantry, would forever destroy the dominance of heavy cavalry in western Europe.