By the last decades of the fifteenth century, European tactical systems were becoming very specialized. The English demonstrated the value of light infantry archers on the battlefields of western Europe, and though they alone had effective longbowmen, all armies integrated crossbowmen and handgunners into their tactical mix. Heavy infantry was also experiencing a renaissance with the rise of the well-articulated Swiss battle square, while its imitators were beginning to diffuse to other European armies. In the Mediterranean basin, Spanish and Italian commanders reintroduced infantry who used swords and shields in a manner reminiscent of the Roman legionary at war. Still, despite regional tactical specialization, all European armies had one thing in common – the plate-armoured heavy cavalryman remained the fundamental weapon system of late medieval warfare, whether mounted or dismounted for battle.
But the increased use of foreign mercenaries within national armies also accelerated tactical synthesis, as regional weapon systems and tactical perspectives rubbed shoulders with one another on the battlefields of Europe as either friend or foe. Though this so-called ‘military revolution’ was actually an evolution taking the duration of the early modern period to complete, by the beginning of the sixteenth century new technologies and tactics were becoming more common. Over the course of the sixteenth century a new combined-arms tactical synthesis emerged, marrying the new trends in gunpowder technologies with increased co-operation between infantry and cavalry.
The mixing of these regional weapon systems and tactical perspectives was a feature of the long international conflict between France and regional powers in Italy known as the Italian Wars (1494–1559) – see Map 7.1. The origin of these wars lay in the hereditary claim of the French king Charles VIII (r. 1483–1498) to the kingdom of Naples. In the autumn of 1494 Charles crossed the Alps with an army of 25,000 men and invaded the Italian peninsula. Allied with Lodovico Sforza of Milan, the French king met little opposition as he marched south, routing the Medici from Florence, advancing on Rome, and finally marching into Naples and expelling the Spanish administration there.
Charles used his modern professional army and state-of-the-art field and siege artillery, mounted on carriages for greater tactical and strategic mobility, to smash all opposition. Unaccustomed to this aggressive style of warfare, the Italian condottieri left the field of battle and withdrew behind the traditional safety of city and castle walls, only to have Charles’s modern artillery reduce the medieval walls in a few hours. But French dominance in Italy eventually failed because of its excessive reliance on Swiss pikemen, heavy cavalry and siege guns. Though possessing a limited combined-arms tactical system, the French army did not adapt fast enough to the changing technologies and tactics of the period. In early modern warfare, the army willing to experiment with handguns as a supplement to heavy infantry pikemen would win the day.
The emergence of France in the beginning of the Italian Wars as the dominant political and military power in western Europe forced its neighbours to take action. In 1495 a Spanish army entered southern Italy to expel the French, only to suffer a decisive defeat at the battle of Seminara at the hands of the duke of Nemours. Following this defeat, the Spanish army was modernized by strengthening its heavy cavalry, by hiring German heavy infantry Landsknechts and, most importantly, by adding companies of light infantry equipped with arquebus and musket. The Spanish improved on the shock and defensive capabilities of the battle square by combining swordsmen with the pikemen and halberdiers, so that when their infantry met enemy pikemen, the swordsmen won the battle by getting under the enemy pikes, often by raising them on their shields and then engaging with edged weapons.
Map 7.1 The Italian Wars.
The Spanish commander Gonsalvo de Cordova, known as ‘El Gran Capitan’ to his followers, avenged his defeat at Seminara by taking the measure of the duke of Nemours again, this time at the battle of Cerignola in April 1503. The Spanish army continued to evolve with the introduction around 1505 of the colunela, the forerunner to the modern battalion. This consisted of 1,000 to 1,250 men (mixed pikemen, halberdiers, arquebusiers and sword-and-buckler men) organized into five companies. It was a combined-arms tactical system integrated into one battle square under the command of a cabo de colunela (chief of column), or colonel.
In the colunelas, the pikemen and halberdiers formed a square with arquebusiers massed on its flanks in formations as many as sixteen ranks deep. The arquebusier at the head of each file practised an early form of the countermarch, firing his weapon and then retiring to the rear of the file and reloading as he worked his way up the file to fire again. Unfortunately, lack of co-ordination between gunners and the constant moving within the ranks made concentration of volley fire impossible, while the early firearm’s short range, its slow rate of fire, and the vulnerability of early handgunners to enemy shock cavalry and heavy infantry exacerbated the light infantry gunner’s problem.
The battle of Cerignola was a hallmark battle in a century where tacticians searched for a combined-arms synthesis that could win victories on the battlefield. The two major powers of the era, France and Spain, experimented with new martial technologies, tactical formations and field fortifications designed to mitigate the effects of artillery. This penchant for experimentation can be seen in the various outcomes of major battles during the first three decades of the Italian Wars. In 1512 the Spanish suffered a defeat at the battle of Ravenna, a defeat that may have caused them to abandon the sword and buckler in favour of an infantry force equipped entirely with pikemen and handgunners. A Spanish victory in 1513 at Motta was the result of this increased light infantry firepower, though old shock tactics, specifically a ‘push of the pike’, won the day for the Spanish at Novara later that year. French artillery dominated the battlefield at Marignano in 1515, opening up the Spanish squares for French cavalry to exploit. To counter the superior French artillery, the Spanish increasingly took up position behind field fortifications and relied on greater missile fire to carry the day. This tactic ensured victory at Bicocca in 1522, when some 3,000 enemy Swiss were shot down in front of the Spanish lines.
After Bicocca, the French also began to rely on defensive earthworks, but this tactic backfired at the battle of Pavia in 1525. The Italian Wars had entered a new phase known to history as the Franco-Habsburg Wars (1521–1559), and the election of Charles V, duke of Burgundy, king of Spain and archduke of Austria as holy Roman emperor in 1519 made the Habsburg ruler the strongest monarch in Europe. His territories surrounded France, whose own king, Francis I (r. 1515–1547), declared war on the new holy Roman emperor, choosing, like his predecessors, northern Italy as his battleground.
Following the French defeat at Bicocca in 1522, the French position in Italy collapsed. Francis retook Milan in late 1524, then went on to besiege Pavia and its 5,000-man garrison in October with a Franco-Swiss army of 28,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 53 cannon (Map 7.2(a)). But the French siege was weakened by the detachment of a column to attack Naples and the desertion of some 6,000 Swiss infantry. An imperialist relief force of 23,000 German, Spanish and Italian troops and 17 guns arrived and immediately set up camp across from their enemy’s fortified position, further compounding Francis’s problems. But the relief army, under the command of Ferdinando Francesco d’Avalos, was also under some stress, threatening mutiny because of lack of pay. Ferdinando realized he needed to attack before his army evaporated. Not wanting to have his men and horses shot to pieces in a futile assault against the French entrenchment, Ferdinando decided to pull his adversary from behind the safety of his own defences and attempt an audacious turning movement.
During the stormy night of 24 February, Ferdinando marched his army north along the eastern side of the Vernacula Brook, crossed the waterway and had his sappers make three breaches through the walls of the enclosed Mirabello Park (Map 7.2(b)). The imperialists filed through the holes and drew up in a line of battle as dawn broke on 25 February. Ferdinando placed his infantry arquebusiers on the flanks, his pikemen and cavalry in the centre, and awaited the inevitable counter-attack. French scouts alerted the king, who ordered his army into the park. First to arrive were some 2,000 cavalry accompanied by small field artillery, setting up across from the imperialist left. Behind them advanced 5,000 mercenary Landsknechts in a large battle square, supported by additional Swiss heavy infantry, both of whom deployed in the centre.
Map 7.2 The Battle of Pavia, 1525. (a) Phase I: Francis I’s French army is situated in its trenches and camps (1) surrounding the city of Pavia and its imperial garrison, as well as in the park of Mirabello (2). An imperial army, commanded by Ferdinando d’Avalos, arrives to confront the French and entrenches on the eastern side of the Vernacula Brook (3). (b) Phase II: Ferdinando decides his best chance for victory is to draw Francis’s army out of their trenches. The imperial army sets out during a night-time storm, heading north along the wall enclosing the Mirabello park (1). Engineers create breaches in the wall (2), and the imperial army deploys inside the park grounds (3). French scouts soon report the move to Francis, and the French army deploys into the park to confront the foe (4). (c) Phase III: The French open the battle, engaging the imperial formations with artillery fire (1). A cavalry charge is launched (2) against one of the breaches in the wall through which the imperialists are trying to move their artillery (3). (d) Phase IV: While the French horsemen contend for possession of the imperialists’ cannon (1), Francis personally leads his gendarmes in a charge (2) against pistol-armed imperial cuirassiers (3). The attack bogs down and French losses mount as the gendarmes find themselves fixed by the enemy’s pikemen (4) and subjected to murderous fire by the imperial arquebusiers (5).
(e) Phase V: Francis’s Swiss infantry advance against the imperialists’ lines (1), but are also thrown back by the fire of the arquebusiers (2). Landsknechts in the pay of the French king in defiance of the emperor try their hand next (3), but fare no better at the hands of Spanish pikemen and their supporting arquebusiers (4). The combined-arms tactics of the imperial army inflict horrific casualties on Francis’s troops. (f) Phase VI: The desperate situation in the Mirabello grows bleaker for the French as the Pavia garrison sallies out against the now undermanned French lines (1). The French troops and their allies break in the face of overwhelming odds (2) and the king himself is captured (3) as his surviving gendarmes are surrounded by imperialist soldiers.
The battle of Pavia began when French field artillery opened fire on the attacking imperialist squares, followed by a cavalry charge against one of the breaches where imperialist artillery was being hauled onto the battlefield (Map 7.2(c)). At the same time Francis personally led a detachment of heavy cavalry gendarmerie (a French term for heavy horse) against imperial light horse cuirassiers (pistol-wielding cavalrymen), repulsing them with some casualties. Ultimately, the French assault faltered when many of the king’s horsemen were held in by the imperialist pikemen and then shot to pieces by arquebus fire. The failed cavalry assault was followed by an attack by allied Swiss mercen-aries, who were also thrown back by the arquebusiers (Map 7.2(d) and (e)). A final offensive by the Landsknechts was defeated by a combined-arms force of Spanish pikemen and handgunners. At this moment, Pavia’s garrison sallied out of its gates and attacked the French siege lines (Map 7.2(f)).
Imperialist casualties were very modest in this two-hour engagement, with only 550 killed. The French lost 13,000 men with another 6,000 taken prisoner. King Francis was captured during the mêlée, his well-armoured gendarmerie shot down all around him. Tactically, the battle of Pavia showed the prowess of heavy infantry pikemen and light infantry arquebusiers working together in the open field against enemy cavalry and battle squares. In this engagement, artillery played little part. The imperialist victory once again delayed French aspirations in northern Italy and inaugurated a long period of Habsburg and Spanish control in the region.
So one-sided was the battle of Pavia that the decisive engagement all but disappeared from European warfare for more than 100 years. It would not return until the battle of Breitenfeld in 1631. Historians have cited many reasons for this change: the defensive superiority of combining firearms with field entrenchments; a new generation of fortifications called trace italienne characterized by low, thick walls to defeat siege guns; ‘and the spread of military entrepreneurship from northern Italy beyond the Alps’.
After Pavia, the Spanish took the next logical step in the evolution of battlefield formations by mixing heavy and light infantry in the same arrangement, creating by 1534 a new tactical system called the tercio. The Spanish tercio eventually became standardized at about 3,000 men divided into three colunelas of 1,000 men (twelve companies of 250 men apiece), integrating pikemen and arquebusiers into one battle square and creating the most formidable tactical system in Europe. Like the well-articulated Swiss battle square, the tercio was capable of both withstanding cavalry attacks in the open field and charging an enemy from any direction with lowered pikes, but unlike the Swiss square, the tercio had an organic complement of light infantry gunners. On the battlefield the pikes were massed in a square formation of three lines, probably each with a front of fifty or sixty men, twenty files deep. The mass of heavy infantry pikemen was supported by square clumps of arquebusiers at the four corners. This dense but manoeuvrable battle square had a frontage of about 150 yards and was about 100 yards deep.
As firearms became more reliable, the Spanish also increased the proportion of light infantry arquebusiers and musketeers to pikemen within the tercio, giving the formation greater missile capabilities. But the early gun’s extremely slow rate of fire meant that the light infantry gunners required extra protection while reloading. The pikemen would provide this aid in return for protection against enemy gunfire and cavalry attacks. As the English authority on tactics Robert Barret put it in his work The Theorike and Practike of Moderne Warres in 1598: ‘any troupe of shot, though never so brave and expert, being in open field, having no stand of pikes, or other such weapons, nor hedge, ditch, trench, or rampier, to relieve or [secure] them, could not long endure the force of horse, especially Launciers’. Quite simply, without the advantage of terrain or the protection of a stand of pikes, handgunners would be swept from the battlefield by enemy cavalry.
At first the ratio of pikemen to handgunners was three to one, but as the sixteenth century wore on and the effectiveness and reliability of firearms improved, the ratio of gunners increased and the Spanish abandoned the offensive capabilities of the sword and shield entirely in favour of the defensive capability of the pike. As the century progressed and the Spanish tercio was adopted by other armies in western Europe, commanders experimented with the ratio of shot and pike. By the end of the sixteenth century, the number of light infantry gunners in the tercio nearly equalled the number of heavy infantry pikemen. Once again, the Englishman Robert Barret writes:
As the armed pike is the strength of the battell, so without question is the shot the furie of the field: but the one without the other is weakened the better halfe of their strength. Therefore of necessitie (according to the course of warres in these dayes) the one is to be coupled and matched with the other in such convenient proportion, that the advantage of the one may helpe the disadvantage of the other.
By the 1650s most units were composed of shot and pike in a ratio of three or four to one. And although archers and crossbowmen gave way to handgunners early in the period, pikemen persisted as a tactical entity until the invention of the ring bayonet in the eighteenth century fused heavy and light infantry into one weapons system, finally eliminating the need for the pike.
But the dominance of the densely packed infantry battle square, especially against heavy cavalry, did not go unchallenged, offering as it did an easy target to enemy field artillery and handguns. At the battles of Ravenna in 1512, Marignano in 1515 and Bicocca in 1522, gunfire inflicted serious casualties on the battle squares. The impact of a single cannonball often killed one or two dozen men in a densely packed formation, while injuring dozens more. At Ravenna, one shot allegedly killed thirty infantrymen.
Figure 7.1 Early Modern Weapon Systems Using Reiters. An illustration of general rules of dominance in conflicts between different early modern weapon systems with cavalry organized with Reiters: (1) cavalry organized as Reiters is generally dominant in the attack against both heavy and light infantry; (2) light infantry is generally dominant in the attack against heavy infantry. Cavalry organized in the traditional manner (without Reiters) results in the same relationships generally governing medieval warfare. Based on Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), schematic 3.2.
The true effects of firearms and artillery were not felt by in the men they injured, maimed and killed – they were also psychological. An eyewitness at the battle of Marignano struggled to find the words to express the emotional shock when the French fired on the advancing Swiss with artillery and hand-held guns: ‘thus the enemy engaged and let off all their guns of all calibres and all their hand-held firearms. That was such a thing that one might have thought that the skies had opened with every fury and the heaven and earth were breaking apart under the enemy fire.’ The psychological effects of artillery and arquebus fire helped break up the battle square even faster then casualties alone. By the sixteenth century it was such a common problem that the Swiss prescribed the death penalty for any infantryman who left the battle square under fire.
Although heavy cavalry lancers continued to have a place in early modern military doctrine, the gunpowder revolution also had an impact on European cavalry. The Spanish brought to Italy light cavalry genitors, horsemen who traded in their javelins for bulky crossbows and arquebuses. Ultimately unsuccessful on the battlefield, genitors were used for strategic reconnaissance, screening and disrupting enemy communications. During this period of tactical experimentation, the Germans developed a new kind of cavalry armoured in a breastplate and high, heavy leather boots, and armed with three wheel-lock pistols. This new mercenary light cavalry, called Schwarzreiters or ‘black riders’ because of their black armour and accoutrements, attacked enemy formations using the revolving tactics of the caracole.
To execute the caracole, these reiters, as they were soon called, trotted toward their enemy in a line of small, dense columns, each several ranks deep and with intervals of about two horses’ width between files. In a tactic reminiscent of the Parthian shot, the reiters fired their three muzzle-loading pistols, then swung 180 degrees and filed to the rear to reload. Usually the caracole tactic was employed before a general advance as a means of disrupting enemy cavalry and infantry formations (see Figure 7.1). But the time and awkwardness of reloading while mounted meant the caracole was a very difficult manoeuvre to carry out effectively, and, like light cavalry from the classical and medieval period, it was easily disrupted by an enemy heavy cavalry countercharge.