Justinian replaced Belisarius with his most trusted court advisor, the septuagenarian eunuch Narses, a man with less than two years of actual military service. Narses would attempt to wrestle Italy away from the Ostrogoths, once and for all. A generation before, under the rule of Theodoric the Great (r. 493–526), the Ostrogoths had created a strong Germanic king-dom, one that subscribed to a heretical version of Christianity called Arianism. A year after Theodoric’s death, Justinian was raised to the Byzantine throne, succeeding his uncle Justin I (r. 518–527). For the next quarter of a century, he pursued his reconquest of the Mediterranean, paying special attention to Italy. The Byzantine emperor was convinced that he was divinely ordained to bring the wayward region back into the fold of Orthodoxy while imposing Greek hegemony on the peninsula.
For twenty years the armies of Byzantium fought the Goths throughout Italy, burning towns and cities and pillaging the countryside. But the composition of the Byzantine expeditionary force changed as time went on as mercenaries began to fill the ranks, replacing the numeri and bucellarii. By the summer of 552 Narses led an army of over 20,000 men, but only the core were Byzantine, the rest being barbarian foederati made up of Lombard, Hunnic, Armenian, Persian and Arab mercenaries. Keeping a large treasury in reserve to pay his troops if the pillaging dried up, Narses moved his multinational army from Ravenna toward the forces of the new Ostrogothic king, Totila, in central Italy. Hearing that Totila was advancing toward him, Narses made camp near modern Scheggia on the crest of a pass over the Apennines and waited.
Totila left Rome and marched to the village of Taginae (near modern Gubbio), only 13 miles from where Narses was camped. Because the Goths possessed such a small standing army, Totila was forced to pull his garrisons from nearby cities to swell his ranks, in the end creating a host somewhat smaller than the invading army. At Taginae, Narses dispatched a Greek herald to Totila demanding his surrender. In response, the Ostrogothic king broke camp the next morning and advanced to within two bowshots (perhaps 300 yards) of the Byzantine army.
Both commanders desired battle, forming their armies across a narrow, level valley. In typical Germanic fashion when cavalry was present in great numbers, Totila arrayed his horsemen some distance in front of his infantry, with the intent of relying on repeated cavalry charges to break the enemy lines (Gothic infantry rarely reached the front lines except to dispatch the enemy or assist in the pursuit). Narses arrayed his troops in a concave formation, placing his 8,000 foederati as heavy infantry in battle squares, then dismounting some of his Byzantine horse to strengthen his phalanxes. He then put some 8,000 light infantry archers on his flanks (4,000 on each side), protected by pointed stakes or perhaps on a ridge inaccessible from below. On the left and right, behind the archers, he located his 1,000 heavy cavalry cataphracts, armoured lancers also equipped with bows. His concave array created, in effect, a dangerous killing zone for any enemy trying to attack the Byzantine centre.
Anxious to protect his vulnerable left flank, Narses dispatched fifty archers to occupy a small, detached hill on the left side of his line, where they took up position (Map 1.4(a)). When Totila tried to take the hill with a contingent of heavy cavalry, the fifty held their ground again and again, beating back the Gothic cavalry’s numerous charges with missile fire. With the hill secured, Narses dispatched another 1,000 horsemen to the extreme left of his left wing just beyond the contested hill. This cavalry force would act as a reserve, and, according to Procopius in his Gothic War, ‘at the moment when the enemy infantry began action [the Byzantine cavalry would] get behind them immediately … and place them between two forces’.
As the morning wore on, Narses left the initiative to Totila, but the Gothic king refused to attack until the arrival of 2,000 cavalry reinforcements (Map 1.4(b)). As he waited, he entertained the troops on both sides with his outstanding equestrian skills, parading between the lines in his golden armour. Once the reinforcements arrived, Totila changed into the armour of a private soldier and joined the ranks of the Gothic cavalry.
After eating a small lunch, Totila finally ordered the cavalry to charge the Byzantine centre, ignoring the Greek archers on both sides. But the foederati heavy infantry, buttressed with dismounted heavy cavalry, held. The halted Gothic cavalry then received a rain of arrows from the 8,000 Byzantine archers on the flanks, horses and riders killed alike by the hundreds (Map 1.4(c)). To aggravate the situation, the attacking cavalry soon found themselves pressed between the Byzantine defenders and their own approaching infantry. As the coup de grâce, Narses ordered his heavy cavalry reserve from behind the hill to attack the flank of the approaching Gothic infantry, rolling up their line and driving them from the field (Map 1.4(d)). Surrounded and facing certain annihilation, the Gothic cavalry fled the battlefield, cutting their way through their own infantry. King Totila was mortally wounded leaving the battlefield, and died in a peasant’s hut nearby. Some 6,000 Ostrogoths perished in the battle, and those that were captured were massacred.
The battle of Taginae illustrated the power of a combined-arms tactical system working in concert against attacking shock cavalry and infantry. Unable to penetrate the defending Byzantine phalanxes, the Gothic cavalry found itself at the mercy of the Greek archers. Moreover, the failure (or perhaps inability) of the Ostrogoths to attack and scatter the Byzantine bowmen on the wings, either by cavalry charge or infantry attack, gave the Byzantines the ability to attack with missiles and wear down the Gothic cavalry. But the Ostrogoths’ mistake of leaving the light infantry archers unmolested was not unique in western military history. French heavy cavalry lancers would make the same mistake 800 years later against English longbowmen at the battle of Crécy. Finally, Narses’ order to use his cavalry reserve to attack the Gothic infantry at a propitious time shows a sophisticated grasp of tactics and a keen understanding of the tactical tendencies of his enemy.
After the battle of Taginae, Narses pursued the remaining Goths to Rome then farther south to Naples, killing their new king and continuing his campaign of extermination. Finally, a truce was called at Monte Lettere, and the few surviving Goths were allowed to leave Italy and settle in any other barbarian kingdom they wanted.
Having taken Italy from the Ostrogoths, Narses next faced a force of perhaps 15,000 Franks raiding from the north in 554. Blocking the Franks’ route of escape, Narses met the raiders at Casilinum near Capua in south central Italy with an army of 18,000 men. Here, as at Taginae two years before, Narses dismounted some of his own heavy cavalry to strengthen his heavy infantry, placing them in three lines. On his flanks he placed the majority of his heavy cavalry cataphracts. The Frankish army faced by Narses was similar to Germanic armies faced by the Romans centuries earlier.
Map 1.4. The Battle of Taginae, 552. (a) Phase I: As Totila arrives on the field and deploys his forces (1), Narses dispatches a small contingent of archers to a detached hill to support the Byzantine left flank (2). A contingent of Gothic cavalry attempts to seize the hill (3) but is rebuffed by the archers firing down from the heights (4). Narses dispatches a reserve force of cavalry to the threatened area (5) and stands fast. The initiative passes to Totila, but the Gothic commander decides to await the arrival of additional cavalry forces (6) before attempting a general assault. (b) Phase II: His reinforcements having arrived, Totila launches an attack against the squares of Byzantine heavy infantry and dismounted cavalry in the centre (1). Unmolested by the Gothic horsemen, Narses’ archers begin to loose volleys of arrows into the enemy’s tightly packed ranks (2) as the Ostrogoth infantry approach the fight (3). (c) Phase III: The Byzantine archers continue to shower the killing zone with arrows (1). This unrelenting fire inflicts hundreds of casualties, and the situation grows worse as the Gothic infantry attempt to press ahead (2). Confronted by resolute Byzantine defenders to their front and crowded from behind by their own foot soldiers, the Ostrogoths’ mounted element begin to rapidly lose cohesion (3). (d) Phase IV: Narses launches his cavalry reserve against the Ostrogoth infantry’s right flank (1), which begins to roll up as the foot soldiers panic and begin to flee (2). The Byzantine archery continues to exact a heavy toll on the Gothic horse, which stampede through their own infantry (3) as they join the rout. King Totila is mortally wounded in the final action, dying in a nearby hut.
From the early sixth century to the beginning of the eighth century, the Franks and surrounding Germanic kingdoms fought similarly. Infantry was by far the most prevalent weapon system, with Germanic infantry fighting in unarticulated battle-square formations or columns. Most Frankish soldiers were armoured in leather or, at best, mail, and carried a round or oval shield. Although Germanic nobility would most certainly be armed with either the single-edged scramasax or a double-edged long sword, the primary weapon of all Germanic infantry, including the Franks, was the spear. Medieval sources identify a unique Frankish spear called an angon, which was not only special in its design but also in its use in warfare. Agathias describes the weapon as a unique barb-headed spear of moderate length that could be used ‘if necessary for throwing like a javelin, and also in hand-to-hand combat’.
Besides the spear, Frankish infantry also employed a francisc (sometimes francisca) or throwing axe which, according to Procopius, ‘at a given signal and at first encounter, was thrown at the enemy’. The Frankish infantry’s ability to use the spear and axe for either missile or shock combat created a fusion of light and heavy infantry not unlike the fusion seen in the classical period with the Roman legionary. The difference here was in the nature of battlefield articulation. The Roman legionary was a professional soldier who fought in a linear formation capable of great tactical flexibility, while the Franks in the early medieval period were a militia who continued to attack in unarticulated formations, with missile troops screening the battle square or firing overhead from the rear.
In the sixth century, the Franks did employ a small number of heavy cavalry lancers. The Gauls had a long tradition of fielding lancers, with the Romans often employing Gallic heavy cavalry as auxiliaries. But these lancers, devoid of stabilizing stirrups, were not the masters of the medieval battlefield yet. Diffusion of the stirrup from central Asia to medieval France would not take place until the mid-eighth century, with widespread use by the Franks only in the ninth century.
Except for the use of the francisc from horseback, light cavalry was almost non-existent in early Germanic warfare. When horses were employed, it was usually for reconnaissance or as mounted infantry. The tradition of light cavalry in medieval western civilization comes almost exclusively from contact with nomads from the Eurasian steppes, with the Magyars (Hungarians) perhaps the most famous example of Christianized light cavalry horse archers. Still, heavily forested western Europe proved less than ideal for light cavalry, a weapon system which requires a great deal of real estate and fodder to be successful. Also, mounted archery was a skill that took years in the saddle to perfect, a pastime more suited to Turkish and Mongol steppe warriors than Germanic agriculturalists west of the Alps.
At Casilinum the Frankish raiders formed up their battle squares opposite the Byzantines, then charged the Greek centre (Map 1.5(a)). The ferocious attack of the Germanic warriors broke the first two lines of Byzantine infantry, despite the presence of dismounted heavy cavalry. As the Franks engaged the third and final line, Narses ordered forward his cataphracts on the flanks (Map 1.5(b)). Threatened by this double flanking manoeuvre, the Franks halted their charge and formed into a defensive square against the heavily armoured Greek heavy infantry (Map 1.5(c)). But the cataphracts did not charge the Frankish battle square; instead, they employed their bows to shower the Franks with arrows. Unwilling to break formation for fear of being run down by those cataphracts with lances and swords, the Frankish square slowly withdrew to the rear. In their retreat, the Frankish formation lost cohesion, and the Greek heavy cavalry charged, completely outflanking and breaking up the square (Map 1.5(d)). A horrible carnage ensued. Agathias tells us that the Byzantines lost only eighty men. For the Franks, only five men survived.
The battles of Taginae and Casilinum demonstrated the versatility of the combined-arms Byzantine army. At Taginae, Narses used heavy infantry to stop the Gothic cavalry, then used his preponderance of light infantry archers to wear down the Germanic horsemen. At Casilinum, Narses used his heavy infantry to resist Frankish heavy infantry, bringing his hybrid heavy cavalry to bear, first to shower the infantry square with arrows, then to scatter and run down enemy infantry when the formation broke. The composition of the Byzantine army and its reliance on a fusion of heavy cavalry and light infantry as the predominant tactical system gave the Eastern Roman Empire the flexibility to meet the many different fighting styles of its enemies.
Narses’ victory at Casilinum was absolute, and Italy emerged out of two decades of Byzantine occupation ruined by war, famine and plague. The largest cities, such as Milan, Rome and Naples, were nearly depopulated, and the countryside’s agricultural economy was devastated. Eastern Roman rule would only last another fourteen years before the final wave of Germanic invaders, the Lombards, occupied the northern two-thirds of the peninsula, ending forever Justinian’s dream of Greek rule over Italy.