Chapter 2
THE FRENCH ARMY
Of the three armies involved in the Waterloo campaign, the French Armeé du Nord was the most homogeneous – both nationally and at a practical level. Although some Poles and other nationalities formed a small portion of this force, it consisted almost entirely of Frenchmen. Many in the army were sickened by the dismal failure of Bourbon rule and confident that Napoleon’s military genius would bring them victory and restore French fortunes. Thousands of veterans who had been captured by the Allies and recently released bolstered the ranks. Many were still devoted to their Emperor and swiftly re-enlisted once they heard he had come back. Most recent conscripts had been sent to the armies guarding the frontiers and the majority of the soldiers in the Armée du Nord were veterans or volunteers. Consequently, morale was high and many were eager to do battle and avenge the recent humiliations suffered by France.
Nevertheless, while the French Army was well led overall, some of Napoleon’s new appointments were questionable. The unexpected death of Marshal Berthier, who died under suspicious circumstances, had deprived him of his best chief-of-staff. Marshal Soult made a poor substitute in this key role and many harboured doubts about his loyalty to Napoleon’s new regime. A better appointment for Soult would have been as commander of the army’s left wing instead of the fiery and intemperate Marshal Ney, whose inconsistent performance later caused problems. The newly promoted Marshal Grouchy received command of the right wing even though he had not held a post of such responsibility before. Although Joachim Murat was renowned for his ability as a cavalry general and would have been a better choice, Napoleon had rejected his services due to his treachery in 1813–14.
Napoleon had also appointed his brother, Prince Jérôme Bonaparte, to an important position instead of employing men like Suchet and Davout to influential posts for this vital campaign, who were great commanders in their own right. Political necessity lay at the root of such decisions. The Emperor needed to make a strong military comeback and was unwilling to share the glory with talented subordinates as they could potentially replace him, a fear shared by most dictators.
At around 128,000 men, the Armée du Nord possessed near parity in numbers when compared with each of the two opposing armies, but it would be outnumbered by them if they fought combined. Considering that Napoleon had been in power for a very short time, it was a remarkably well-equipped and cohesive force. Indeed, with 366 cannon it had more artillery than either of the opposing forces and the French superiority in cavalry, both in terms of quality and numbers, stood in its favour for a campaign of manoeuvre.
THE ANGLO-ALLIED ARMY
In direct contrast, Wellington’s Anglo-Allied Army was a truly international force. It contained a remarkable mixture of Dutch-Belgian, Nassau, Brunswick, Hanoverian and British troops. The Dutch-Belgian troops came from the newly formed Kingdom of the Netherlands, which had been in existence for less than a year. The British and King’s German Legion troops (German nationals within the British Army) were probably the most reliable soldiers. However, many Peninsula veterans, whose presence would have been welcome, were still travelling back over the Atlantic after the recent conflict in America. Many of the regiments that were available lacked experience in the field.
A large proportion of Germans also served in the ranks since, at this time, the monarchy hailed from the royal house of Hanover and this state enjoyed strong links with Britain as a consequence. Hanoverian soldiers had proved very willing to serve under British command in the Peninsula, particularly after their nation had fallen under the influence of a foreign power.
A British cartoon showing the potentially dire consequences of going to the wars for those who served in the ranks. (The Leisure Hour, 1875)
Yet the recently raised Hanoverian forces were largely conscript based and Wellington felt obliged to distribute veterans among them to stiffen their resolve. The Brunswicker and Nassauer soldiers were more experienced but Wellington hestitated to rely on his Dutch-Belgian contingent. Placed under the 23-year-old Prince of Orange, whose appointment owed more to political necessity than his military capability, many of these soldiers had recently fought under French command and their uniforms and tactics relied on French military doctrine. However, Wellington had been able to select some of his own staff and had some senior officers he knew he could rely upon, such as Generals Picton and Hill.
Although Britain’s army was small, it was professional, composed of volunteers and well trained in contrast to the largely conscript-based forces of many Continental armies. British infantry soldiers in particular were renowned for their defensive capability and speed of fire due to constant drilling. Unlike many armies, the British could afford to train their troops in regular live-firing exercises, which naturally led to their greater efficiency in musketry.
The army numbered roughly 106,000 men with 216 cannon but Wellington knew that it lacked national cohesion and, with so many of them having been recent allies or subjects of Napoleon, their loyalty to the Allied cause was suspect. Indeed, the fact that his troops spoke a mixture of at least four different national languages (not to mention local dialects) made internal communication problematic. With a general lack of campaigning experience in the army, Wellington privately referred to his command as: ‘an infamous army, very weak and ill-equipped, and [with] very inexperienced staff’. In the event, it would actually serve him very well.
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY
The Prussian Army had suffered a series of crushing defeats during the wars against France, but Napoleon’s aggressive foreign policy had provoked a resurgence of nationalism in the German states and consequently many were eager to fight against France. Half of this army consisted of twelve old regiments of regular infantry along with twelve reservist regiments, all of which contained experienced men who were reliable soldiers. However, the remaining 50 per cent of the army was mostly Landwehr (militia), and these were often poorly equipped, inexperienced soldiers who lacked discipline.
Some of the German states had been members of Napoleon’s Confederation of the Rhine and therefore many troops had divided loyalties. Even before the campaign actually began, Saxon and Silesian troops mutinied and Westphalian units were regarded with suspicion since Jérôme Bonaparte had recently been their king. Their subsequent lack of enthusiasm for the Allied cause was demonstrated by large-scale desertions after the Battle of Ligny.
The Prussian Army was, however, an effective force with good-quality infantry and efficient artillery. The cavalry arm was enthusiastic and eager to fight but lacked experience when compared with their French counterparts. Nonetheless, they were well mounted and equipped for the most part. The Prussians fielded approximately 128,000 infantry and 312 cannon. Blücher knew that he could rely upon his regular cavalry and infantry but also knew that his Landwehr were an unknown commodity and hoped that they would be able to withstand the rigours of the approaching campaign.
The 1815 campaign.
A Prussian hussar, 1815.
NAPOLEONIC WARFARE: THE THREE ARMS
The infantry was the backbone of most armies during this period. The limited range and inherent inaccuracy of the smoothbore musket, their primary weapon, meant that they were usually deployed in closely packed linear formations in order to ensure a heavy volume of fire was directed at the enemy. This compensated for the weapon’s shortcomings to a degree but, even when fired en masse, musketry was largely ineffective beyond 150yd (137m).
At close quarters, the infantry used bayonets (an edged weapon mounted on the muzzles of muskets or rifles), swords and occasionally the butts of their muskets. Nonetheless, prolonged instances of hand-to-hand fighting were rare in the open field with one side usually fleeing before a serious clash occured. When attacked by cavalry, infantry would form squares (or more accurately rectangles), the kneeling front ranks presenting a row of bayonets, the threat of which usually caused horses to veer away rather than ride into such an intimidating obstacle. The rear ranks (squares were usually three or four men deep) would fire over the heads of the kneeling men at their attackers. While these formations were not invulnerable to cavalry attack, it was rare for infantry squares to be broken by cavalry alone.
While cavalry were considered an elite by most armies, their battlefield role was diminishing due to the increased accuracy and lethality of artillery and firearms. A horse and rider made a large combined target and artillery fire, along with massed musketry at close range, could wreak bloody havoc upon a cavalry squadron. Nonetheless, a well-timed cavalry charge could be very effective under the right circumstances, especially when combined with the effect of other arms. Cavalry also excelled in the roles of reconnaissance, covering an army on the march and was particularly effective in pursuing a beaten enemy.
Artillery had become the biggest killer on the battlefield by 1815. Cannon enjoyed the longest range of any weapon of this period and could fire a variety of projectiles. Roundshot (solid cannon balls) was the main form of ammunition used, capable of striking down numerous targets if the ground was hard enough to allow them to bounce along the ground, cutting down everything in their path until their momentum was spent. Shells of various kinds were also available and were designed to explode on the ground or above targets, showering metal fragments over a wide area. Canister (commonly known by the naval term of ‘grapeshot’) was used at close range against cavalry or infantry. This entailed the firing of a shower of small projectiles, which could strike numerous targets, spreading out rapidly from a gun’s muzzle in a similar fashion to the spread of pellets when fired from a shotgun. Linear infantry formations were vulnerable to artillery, especially when fired upon from the flank, allowing numerous men to be hit as they stood so close to each other. The effects of firing artillery upon dense formations like attack columns or infantry squares could be devastating.
NAPOLEON INVADES BELGIUM
The Allied armies had spread out over this wide area of Belgium due to the necessity to feed and accommodate the troops, which relied upon billeting soldiers in towns and villages as garrisons could not cater for the vast number of men alone. The Allied commanders also wished to cover as much of the Belgian frontier with France as possible, suspecting that Napoleon might attempt a pre-emptive strike against them. Consequently the border was closely monitored as they wished to receive an early warning in the event of incursions.
Wellington’s deployment was partly influenced by a concern he shared with most British commanders who fought on the Continent – the risk of being cut off from the sea. This would sever his supply lines and prevent a withdrawal back to Britain. Consequently, he deployed his troops between Brussels, Mons, Ypres and Ghent with his lines of communication leading back towards Ostend and the Channel ports. The Prussians occupied a large area between Wavre, Charleroi, Dinant and Liège. This would hinder a swift concentration of the two armies and their lines of communication extended back towards the Rhine in the opposite direction to those of the Anglo-Allied Army.
Napoleon was well aware of this and intended to strike at a point between the two armies, hoping to force them apart. If the French were successful in this, he then meant to prevent them combining against him by blocking one army with a portion of his force while inflicting a major defeat on the other with his main army. This was known as the ‘strategy of the central position’, a manoeuvre he had previously used with great success in campaigns like those in Italy in 1796. He outlined this concept in succinct fashion to Marshal Ney:
For this campaign I have adopted the following general principle – to divide my army into two wings and a reserve. The Guard will form the Reserve, and I shall bring it into action on either wing just as the actual circumstances may dictate. Also, according to circumstances, I shall draw troops from one wing to strengthen my reserve.
Marshal Michel Ney who tried to seize the vital crossroads at Quatre Bras from the Allies. (François Gérard)
By thrusting his army into a central position between them, Napoleon predicted that they would instinctively retreat along their own supply lines. This would drive them even further apart and he would then detach a portion of his force to pursue one of the armies while he turned upon the other and defeated it in detail.
The plan relied upon achieving surprise and required careful co-ordination and timing. A less sophisticated army than Napoleon’s could never hope to achieve success in this kind of operation. The French Army was organized so that each corps theoretically formed a miniature army in itself, strong enough to fight an independent action against a superior foe for some time until reinforced. Each had its own staff, cavalry, infantry, artillery and supply train and Napoleon believed a well-led force of 25,000–30,000 men was easily capable of performing such tasks. Nevertheless, he was attempting a bold strategy and, since it relied on adapting to events as they developed, it could go badly wrong if he failed to keep his enemies apart.
CROSSING THE FRONTIER
Since achieving surprise was vital for Napoleon’s strategy, he dispersed the Armée du Nord along a 200-mile (321km) long front, aiming to conceal his intent. He closed the borders to all civilian traffic on 6 June as he began concentrating his forces, to prevent news from reaching the enemy. At 2.30am on 15 June, French troops began to march toward the frontier. He directed the main attack towards the town of Charleroi, which lay at the point where the boundary between the two opposing armies’ positions began, subsequently running northwards from Charleroi to Brussels. He planned to march his army along this line, effectively driving a wedge between the Allies. Napoleon also ordered two simultaneous feints (false attacks) hoping to deceive the enemy into believing he was invading at Mons or Namur.
Prussian outposts were quickly pushed back and the French were fortunate to seize bridges across the River Sambre before the Prussians could destroy them. General Ziethen, commanding the Prussian I Corps, soon realized that this was a serious attack and withdrew in the direction of Ligny. Although warning of the invasion was quickly dispatched, the news took time to reach Blücher. In Brussels, Wellington heard vague rumours of an attack but only received a reliable report late that afternoon. Consequently, the Anglo-Allied Army lost valuable hours, which could have been spent in preparation.
With news of the invasion confirmed, Wellington ordered his army to concentrate in the region between Enghien, Braine and Mons, guessing that the French intended to sever his links to the coastline and acting exactly as Napoleon had predicted. Meanwhile, Blücher, true to his reckless hussar reputation, ignored the supposed threat to Namur and chose to concentrate his army behind Ziethen’s I Corps, an area dangerously close to the point of the French incursion.
Despite some logistical difficulties, the French advanced rapidly into Belgium with the two wings of the army pressing forward in search of the enemy. Napoleon calculated that it would take the Allies at least 12 hours to concentrate their forces and if he could catch one of them in the process of doing so, he might gain a decisive victory. Grouchy with III Corps and the main Cavalry Corps forged ahead on the right and began to encounter resistance. Napoleon had predicted that they would encounter the Anglo-Allied Army first but was delighted to hear of the Prussian’s forward concentration. Accordingly, he began to march his main body to reinforce his right wing.
Picton’s Division on the march. (W B Wollen)
On the French left wing, Marshal Ney advanced along the main Charleroi–Brussels road aiming to seize a strategically important crossroads at Quatre Bras. His main force consisted of I and II Corps along with a cavalry detachment from the Imperial Guard. Possession of Quatre Bras would allow the French to use an important lateral road running through Quatre Bras towards Sombreffe. It would enable them to communicate between their left and right wings more effectively and, potentially, sever Allied communications at this point. If the Anglo-Allied Army continued to retreat, possession of the crossroads also left Blücher’s forward position dangerously exposed to a flank attack.
Yet here Ney encountered resistance. Although he had received orders to the contrary, Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar recognized the strategic significance of the crossroads and decided to hold his position there. With two corps, Ney enjoyed massive superiority in numbers but Saxe-Weimar bluffed him into thinking that Quatre Bras was held in greater strength than was actually the case. Ney halted his advance and sent cavalry forward to probe the position but, although there was only a single brigade of Nassauer troops present under Perponcher, he hesitated to attack. Having fought the British before, he was aware of Wellington’s ability to mask troops from sight and feared that the high corn and woodlands in the area concealed further Allied soldiers. He decided to halt, ordering his men to bivouac at 8.00pm that evening, and rode to Charleroi to confer with Napoleon.
NAPOLEONIC WARFARE: THE MUSKET
The smoothbore, single-shot musket was the main infantry weapon used by all the armies of the Waterloo campaign. It was a heavy, muzzle-loading gun fired by means of the flintlock mechanism. To load, an infantryman bit the end off a paper cartridge and took the musket ball it contained into his mouth. He then poured a pinch of gunpowder from the cartridge into the priming pan before pushing the rest of the cartridge down the barrel using an iron ramrod. He then spat the musket ball into the barrel and rammed that down before replacing the ramrod (stored in hoops under the barrel) and pulling the flintlock to the fully cocked position. When the trigger was pulled, the flint (held in the jaws of the cocking lever) struck against a metal plate (called the frizzen) showering sparks into the pan. This ignited the charge and fired the musket.
It was an imprecise weapon as far as accuracy was concerned and unlikely to hit a man at much over 100yd (91m). Colonel George Hanger wrote on the subject in 1804 and claimed:
A soldier’s musket, if not exceedingly ill-bored (as many are), will strike the figure of a man at 80 yards; it may even at a hundred; but a soldier must be very unfortunate indeed who shall be wounded by a common musket at 150 yards, provided his antagonist aims at him; and as to firing at a man at 200 yards with a common musket, you may as well fire at the moon and have the same hope of hitting your object.
The weapon’s inherent inaccuracy dictated the need for closely packed linear infantry formations so that they could be fired simultaneously in volleys, producing a heavy volume of fire. Naturally, this was most effective when fighting a similarly dense formation of men, who made a large target. This increased the chances of hitting someone but muskets were also prone to misfiring, especially in wet conditions.
A man hit by a musket ball could expect a severe wound. Compared with more modern bullets that often penetrate the human body entirely, a musket ball usually stayed within the victim if it struck in the torso, using up its remaining kinetic energy on its unfortunate target. This soft-lead projectile usually deformed upon impact and being of large calibre, was capable of inflicting horrific wounds (British muskets fired a 0.76in ball, while the French fired 0.70in calibre projectile).
Although it was possible to load when lying prone, muskets were best loaded when standing upright due to their length and the fact that the gun was loaded from the muzzle rather than the breech (most modern weapons are loaded from the breech). It was a long, elegant-looking weapon and its length was useful in a melee, where infantrymen thrust this weapon forward in a manner akin to using a spear. Muskets were equipped with detachable bayonets (a stabbing weapon similar to a knife), which were attached over the weapon’s muzzle for use in hand-to-hand combat. Muskets were heavy and this, along with the complex loading process (the description of this given previously has been simplified), dictated the need for regular drilling among the infantry.
Light infantry employed the best marksmen and most agile infantrymen within a regiment and they often fought in more dispersed formations. Skirmishing before a main body of infantry, they would target officers and NCOs once they had overcome their counterparts and were capable of severely damaging the effectiveness of an enemy unit. However, their relatively light volume of fire could not inflict as much damage as a massed unit, the disciplined but less accurate fire of which could be devastating at close range. Rifles were used on Napoleonic battlefields, especially for skirmishing, and these enjoyed far better accuracy up to 200yd (182m) or more as the rifling in their barrels spun the projectile, resulting in greater stability during flight. However, they were slower to load and the large volume of smoke created by the gunpowder of the time limited their effectiveness as battlefields regularly became obscured unless a breeze struck up. In 1815, the use of rifles was largely confined to elite units.
THE ALLIED RESPONSE
By late afternoon, Wellington had received more intelligence about the French invasion but, nonetheless, decided to attend the Duchess of Richmond’s Ball that evening, hoping to reassure observers and calm tensions in the capital. Having quietly given orders for officers to join their commands as soon as was decently possible, Wellington remained at the party and outwardly maintained an air of detached, aristocratic coolness. Yet appearances were deceptive and he anxiously awaited precise intelligence so that he could enter the field with confidence. By 9.00pm he could stand it no longer and retired to a back room to confer with his officers.
At the outset of the campaign, Wellington had anticipated that Napoleon would adopt a defensive strategy similar to that he had fought in 1814, which would have been the safest option for the French. He was aware that the enemy might seize the initiative but had predicted an offensive move by Napoleon beginning in the region of Mons, allowing a more direct march against Brussels. Therefore, he was surprised by this major attack further south at Charleroi and at the speed with which it had been mounted. With grudging respect, he conceded: ‘Napoleon has humbugged me, by God! He has gained twenty-four hours march on me.’ Still convinced that his lines of communication were threatened, he only altered his army’s point of concentration in the early hours of 16 June when he heard that Quatre Bras still remained in Allied hands and that the Prussians meant to stand at Ligny. Picton’s Reserve Division set off at 4.00am and Wellington and his staff left Brussels at approximately 8.00am that day.
Battle of Quatre Bras around 3.00pm.
THE BATTLE OF LIGNY
Blücher managed to assemble approximately 84,000 men and 224 guns from his army and took up positions around the village of Ligny. He stationed his army along a series of ridges to the north of Ligny brook and strongly garrisoned ten villages and hamlets along the 7-mile (11km) front to bolster his defence. He anticipated being attacked before the rest of his army could reach this point of concentration.
Wellington arrived at Quatre Bras at around 10.00am and, discovering that the enemy was remarkably quiet there, rode south-east to confer with the Prussians. He arrived at around 1.00pm and, observing their dispositions, commented that the infantry lay dangerously exposed to French artillery fire on the forward slopes of the ridges they occupied. Conferring with Blücher and his staff, he suggested moving them back to where the rising ground would shield them from sight and offer better protection but General Gniesenau sharply retorted: ‘Our troops like to see the enemy.’ Wellington promised to send reinforcements, as long as his army did not come under serious attack, and returned to Quatre Bras. As he rode away, he commented to an aide that if the Prussians fought in their current positions they would be ‘damnably mauled’.
Napoleon had now brought up the Imperial Guard, his reserve corps and the bulk of the cavalry in support of his right wing. He intended to assault the Prussian position with Gérard’s and Vandamme’s Corps and, while they were thus occupied, d’Erlon’s I Corps would assail the Prussian right flank (although the use of this corps relied upon close co-operation with Ney’s command). If all went well he would then send in the Imperial Guard to inflict a coup de grâce. He anticipated that the Prussians would retreat in the direction of Namur, taking them further away from the Anglo-Allied Army.
Napoleon’s plan envisaged using a sizeable portion of Ney’s forces, but he failed to dispatch new orders to him before 2.00pm, and these did not arrive until around 4.00pm. He also hoped that Ney would attack the Anglo-Allied Army and drive it away from the Prussians towards Brussels. At the very least, he hoped that Wellington would be placed under sufficient pressure to prevent him assisting his ally. Despite this rapid change in strategic emphasis, the Emperor confidently remarked: ‘If Ney carries out his orders thoroughly, not a gun of the Prussian Army will get away.’
The French attack at Ligny began at 2.30pm and the Prussians suffered severely during the preceding cannonade as Wellington had predicted. Fierce fighting ensued in the villages and, though French progress was initially slow, the Prussians sustained heavy losses and were soon obliged to commit their reserves. Napoleon was debating whether to send in the Guard when an unidentified army corps was seen advancing towards the French left from their rear. The attack was postponed while cavalry was dispatched to identify this new force, which turned out to be d’Erlon’s I Corps.
Somehow, d’Erlon had taken the wrong road and subsequently arrived too far to the west. The presence of this corps was welcome but d’Erlon now received new orders from Ney, heavily engaged at Quatre Bras. One of Napoleon’s aides had given instructions directly to d’Erlon without consulting him and Ney was furious. If he was to carry out Napoleon’s initial orders, he needed this corps badly and ordered d’Erlon to return. Receiving a bewildering series of conflicting instructions, d’Erlon marched back and forth, ultimately failing to fight at either location. Due to this confusion, the French were denied the use of 20,000 men, whose presence may well have proved decisive on either battlefield.
Seething at the valuable time squandered by this farcical interlude, Napoleon finally committed the Imperial Guard to the struggle at 7.30pm. The Prussian defence had already weakened and their line crumbled as infantry began to flee to the rear in full retreat. Wishing to avert a catastrophe, Blücher ordered a counterattack and personally led thirty-two squadrons in a cavalry charge. His horse was killed underneath him, pinioning him to the ground, and he was ridden over in the ensuing melee. Nonetheless, this attack allowed the infantry to disengage from the fighting and enabled them to make an orderly retreat. Prussian cavalry only retired from the field at around 9.00pm.
Blücher is unhorsed and ridden over at Ligny. (Scribner’s Magazine, 1888)
The Prussians had suffered a clear defeat. Opinions vary about the number of casualties they suffered but 16,000 is a generally accepted figure, along with the loss of 21 cannon. In contrast, the French lost between 11,000 and 12,000 men. Sergeant Hippolyte de Mauduit of the French 1st Grenadiers walked over the field of battle on 17 June and, although an experienced soldier who had witnessed terrible sights before, was appalled by the scale of the slaughter. Although both sides lost large numbers of men fighting in the villages, Prussian infantry standing exposed to direct artillery fire on the slopes to the north of Ligny brook suffered in particular:
A vast number of corpses, of men and horses, were scattered here and there, horribly mutilated by shells and cannon-balls. This scene was of a different sort to that of the valley where almost all of the dead had at least preserved a human form, for canister, musket-balls and the bayonet were practically the only instruments of destruction used there. Here, in contrast, it was limbs and scattered body parts, detached heads, torn out entrails and disembowelled horses. Further away, on the plateau not far from our regiment, whole ranks were lying on the ground.
The fact that they had been forced to remain there during most of the engagement without being able to fire a shot in return made this carnage even more frightful. Furthermore, had they been ordered to sit or lie down, they would have suffered fewer casualties instead of presenting such a fine target to the French gunners.
Although Napoleon was victorious at Ligny, he did not order an immediate pursuit, allowing the Prussians time to regroup and fall back in good order. Why the usually pro-active Napoleon failed to act at this point is baffling. There are many reasons put forward for the Emperor’s lethargy, some historians claiming that he felt unable to move before receiving definite news about Ney’s battle to the north, while others cite his supposed ill-health as the cause. Regardless of why this was so, the Emperor wasted considerable time walking over and examining the battlefield and denied Grouchy permission to mount a pursuit for a considerable period of time.
THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS
Originally, Ney had expected to be reinforced, believing that the main French attack would be mounted in his sector against the Anglo-Allied Army. Nonetheless, his early inactivity on the morning of 16 June is difficult to account for and the delay would cost the French dearly. He only ordered Reille’s Corps into position at 11.00am and essentially wasted 6 hours of daylight at a point when the crossroads were thinly held by Allied troops. Reille attacked at 2.00pm but still faced only a small defensive force as, even with the addition of Bylandt’s Brigade, Perponcher had only 8,000 men and 16 guns to defend the area against at least 25,000 French infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 60 guns.
Yet Reille agreed with his commander that Wellington meant to fight a ‘Spanish battle’ and proceeded with caution, fearing that far more Allied troops than they could see lay concealed somewhere before them. Nevertheless, the farmhouses of Gemioncourt, Piraumont and Pierrepoint fell to French assault and, when Wellington returned at 3.00pm, fierce fighting raged in Bossu Wood on the right of the Anglo-Allied position. The French committed one and a half divisions to take the wood but the Nassauer troops there defended it tenaciously.
Battle of Ligny at 2.30pm.
Battle of Quatre Bras around 9.00pm.
Gemioncourt Farm, which was defended by battalions of the 27th Jäger and 5th National Militia regiments.
Allied and French cavalry clashed extensively at Quatre Bras and many former friends now fought each other. General Renard later wrote:
At that time several of our brave soldiers underwent a trying ordeal. They were facing comrades with whom they had braved the same dangers a few months before. The latter were calling our soldiers by their names urging them to rejoin their flag. After that fruitless plea they started to fight. Captain Delenne faced Devielle, his brother-in-arms in France. Captain Van Remoortere was stabbed by the sabre of one of his former non-commissioned officers. Staff sergeant Beauce was engaged in a sword fight with the staff sergeant of one of his former companies.
Dutch and Belgian cavalry charged repeatedly at their counterparts, hoping to delay the French advance on the crossroads, and the fighting was intense. One Belgian veteran of the 5th Light Dragoons, fighting against his former emperor, recalled: ‘I have fought [in] all the great wars of France. I have served in the Light Cavalry of the Imperial Guard and have made a lot of charges, but I have never seen any in which we were entangled for so long with the enemy.’ At one point when the Belgian dragoons retired to regroup, they were fired upon by British infantry since their uniforms bore a close similarity to those of the 6th French Chasseurs and they suffered accordingly.
The Prince of Orange had just ordered a counter-attack as his commander-in-chief returned but the cavalry he had committed were swiftly repulsed and six cannon were lost in the action. However, Allied reinforcements were now arriving and the presence of Picton’s Division and further cavalry raised Allied numbers to 17,000. By 4.00pm, the Duke of Brunswick had arrived with a further 4,000 men and Wellington now enjoyed a near parity in numbers to Ney’s command.
At this point, the confusion arose about d’Erlon’s Corps, whose commitment at this time might have overwhelmed Wellington’s defence. As he tried to countermand d’Erlon’s orders, Ney desperately ordered a major cavalry attack on the crossroads at around 5.00pm. General Kellerman, leading a brigade of cuirassiers, now assailed the Allied centre in an unexpected move that initially proved very effective.
Brunswick troops had been heavily engaged for some hours and had taken severe losses. As the Leib Battalion struggled to fall back under heavy fire, they became disordered and the Duke of Brunswick was shot as he tried to rally them. Their 3rd Line Battalion was placed towards the rear of the Brunswick positions and had only suffered light casualties so far, but the overall pressure had had a shattering effect on morale, Ensign Anton Kubel recording:
suddenly the terrible news arrivevd that the Duke was badly wounded and had died shortly thereafter. Moreover, several of our battalions were almost annihilated … at that moment the French cuirassiers advanced on us through a village, and in our numbness and anger we would have been killed to the last man had our artillery not just arrived and thrown the enemy back.
The British 69th Foot were in line when charged by the cavalry and did not have time to form a square to repel them. They suffered terribly, losing one of their colours as they fell back in considerable disorder. The British 42nd was also badly mauled during the attack and the 33rd was thrown into confusion as the French heavy cavalry swept forward, their charge reaching as far as the crossroads itself. Wellington and his aides were forced to take refuge in a square formed by the 92nd Highlanders during this onslaught but French progress was halted by cannon fire from a King’s German Legion (KGL) battery as the French horse began to reform. Well-directed musketry from the 30th and 73rd Regiments, combined with this cannonade, subsequently repulsed Kellerman’s assault.
The battle escalated steadily throughout the afternoon as the Anglo-Allied Army received welcome reinforcements. By 6.30pm, its strength had risen to 36,000 men and 70 guns and Wellington counter-attacked. The French were gradually forced to withdraw, relinquishing most of the territorial gains they had seized that day. The battle ended at around 9.00pm as the light began to fade and d’Erlon’s I Corps returned too late to affect the outcome. The Allies had suffered 4,800 casualties compared to around 4,000 French. Tactically Quatre Bras was a stalemate but, by denying the French use of the crossroads and steadfastly maintaining his position, Wellington had upset Napoleon’s strategic plan.
Ney’s performance at Quatre Bras had been distinctly unimpressive. Historians like Chandler and Roberts believe that he was suffering from combat fatigue after years of campaigning, which might explain his inertia at the outset. He was a veteran of seventy battles during a long period of incessant warfare and the disastrous retreat from Russia in 1812 had taxed his strength and resolve, so this could well be true. Whatever the cause of Ney’s cautious approach, Napoleon was furious at his failure to press Wellington into retreat and feared that the Allies had gained a chance to recover from their initial surprise.
THE ALLIES’ RETREAT
Although Wellington had weathered the French assaults, news of the Prussian retreat compelled him to withdraw or risk being outflanked and possibly enveloped by superior French numbers. Once he received confirmation of the direction of the Prussians’ march, he began to pull his army back, sending the wounded and baggage north. He slowly began to thin out the number of troops on the front line and, when the French failed to attack on the morning of 17 June, Wellington ordered his main body to retreat. He intended to retire to a preselected position along the ridge of Mont St Jean, close to the village of Waterloo. He had ridden over this ground extensively the preceding year and noted its defensive potential. Knowing the direction in which the Prussians were retreating, he also felt that it was close enough to allow them to combine forces. Picton’s Division had already paused at Mont St Jean on their march to Quatre Bras, confirming that Wellington had considered fighting there all along.
Built in 1990, this striking modern memorial records the efforts of the Dutch cavalry regiments who fought to defend the crossroads.
General Augustus von Gneisenau was Blücher’s chief-of-staff and had served under him since 1813. Gneisenau provided competent, professional soldiering to back up his chief’s more instinctive style of command. He distrusted the British and felt that Wellington had let them down at Ligny by failing to send the support he had pledged (not realizing how heavily engaged the Anglo-Allied Army had been at Quatre Bras). During Blücher’s absence when he lay incapacitated after the cavalry charge, he considered falling back on the army’s supply lines towards Namur. However, he knew that his commander was determined to support Wellington and ordered a retreat north towards Wavre, which permitted them the option of taking either route. Blücher agreed when he returned from the battlefield, the 71-year-old having sustained remarkably little injury despite his ordeal.
In truth, the decision to retreat northwards was more Gneisenau’s than Blücher’s. The ageing Field Marshal relied heavily upon his chief-of-staff’s judgement as his grasp of strategic concepts was limited and he was honest enough to admit it. This choice, made hurriedly while under the stress of battle, would have a marked effect on the outcome of the campaign. This important strategic manoeuvre had been debated under very trying circumstances and Wellington later described the decision as ‘the decisive moment of the century’.
Battle of Ligny at 8.30pm.
On the morning of 17 June, Napoleon was finally galvanized into action when he realized that he had an excellent chance to outflank the Anglo-Allied Army. He had expected Ney to resume his attack that morning but knew something must be amiss as he could not hear massed gunfire to the north. Belatedly, he ordered Grouchy to take a mixed force of around 33,000 men (almost a third of his army) and follow the Prussians at around 1.00pm. The Emperor believed that Blücher would retreat on Namur and ordered Grouchy to press his withdrawal and block any Prussian attempts to unite with Wellington. Meanwhile, he hoped Ney would occupy the Anglo-Allied Army while he brought up his Imperial Guard and reserve against their left flank. Riding with his staff to investigate, Napoleon reached Quatre Bras and was astounded to learn that Ney had been inactive all morning. He furiously ordered a full-scale attack but the bulk of the enemy army was already retiring northwards and, although a pursuit was immediately mounted, it was too late.
Captain Mercer of the Royal Artillery recalled that the retreat was carried out as quietly as possible and was surprised at how long it took for the French to realize something was wrong. As part of the rearguard, he manoeuvred his battery in cooperation with the cavalry, trying to support their charges or cover their withdrawal. As they observed the French advance, Mercer was ordered to fire upon them:
‘They are just running up the hill,’ said Lord Uxbridge. ‘Let them get well up before you fire. Do you think you can retire quick enough afterwards?’
‘I am sure of it, my lord.’
‘Very well, then, keep a good look-out, and point your guns well.’
Initially, the opposing sets of cavalry skirmished in a series of running fights, while the artillery of both sides fired in their support. The light rain soon swelled to a downpour, limiting visibility and slowing the progress of both sides along the muddy roads. Dragging heavy guns back through these conditions, Mercer was nearly captured as his troop tried to negotiate the narrow lanes through a village during the retreat. With the fields and roads churned into a sodden morass after the passage of thousands of men, horses, wagons and guns, the pursuit eventually slowed to a crawl. Few casualties were suffered by either side during brief cavalry skirmishes and artillery exchanges during the retreat. Wellington had successfully eluded the French by executing a model withdrawal.
Historian David Chandler later wrote that, because of Ney’s inaction and Napoleon’s vague orders: ‘the Duke was provided with several invaluable hours’ start in what would soon become a critical race for Mont-St. Jean’. The onset of rain and the effective rearguard action mounted by Lord Uxbridge allowed Wellington a crucial breathing space in which to choose his own ground to fight upon. Realizing that he had missed a chance to envelop his enemy, and that Wellington had disengaged without serious loss, Napoleon supposedly muttered: ‘France has been ruined.’
Unbeknown to the French, Grouchy initially set off in the wrong direction, misled by large numbers of Prussian stragglers and deserters fleeing in the direction of Namur. Napoleon’s failure to order a swift follow-up action at Ligny allowed the Prussians a crucial period of respite and their army fell back on Wavre virtually unmolested, regrouping around IV Corps, which had not yet seen serious action.
Although the campaign had begun well for the French, errors made on the 16/17 June enabled the Allies to fall back and choose their own ground. Napoleon had formerly written: ‘Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less concerned about the latter than the former; space we can recover, but time, never . . ’. Unfavourable circumstances, the intransigence of subordinates and the Emperor’s own lethargy had seen the French violate these principles. Napoleon would pay a heavy price for these failures.
Viewpoints
THE BATTLEFIELD OF LIGNY
As the site of Napoleon’s last victory, Ligny has received more attention from the French than the related battlefield of Quatre Bras. Therefore, during the 1960s, the Royal Commission for Monuments and Places of Interest and the Society of the Legion of Honour took steps to preserve important locations and commemorate the battle.
In 1965, the two organizations ensured that the farmhouses of En-Haut and En-Bas were officially protected as both had witnessed intense fighting on 16 June. En-Haut has a particularly Continental look, typical of the period, and is located in the centre of Ligny. It was fiercely defended by the Prussians and seems to be very solidly constructed with an imposing roofed entrance and hardly any external windows, at least upon its outward facing side. A plaque in French records ‘Farm of En-Haut defended by Blücher’s Prussians this farmhouse was captured on 16 June 1815 by the Imperial Guard helping two divisions of General Gérard’s 4th Army Corps – Napoleon entered it on the evening of that glorious day.’
The farm of En Haut – a formidable defensive structure that changed hands several times during the battle.
A memorial erected on the bicentenary of Napoleon’s birth to commemorate his final victory at Ligny.
The farm of En-Bas, also located in Ligny, burnt down on 16 June during the intense street fighting but traces of its original construction remain in its outer shell. A plaque, surmounted by an Imperial eagle, reminds us that the farm withstood repeated French assaults but changed hands numerous times during the struggle. It is now a parish hall.
On the bicentenary of Napoleon’s birth, the Society of the Legion of Honour constructed a memorial on the edge of the old village. This is in the form of a wall surmounted with a plaque and the barrel of a large artillery piece has been placed before them. The plaque proclaims: ‘The Legion of Honour in homage to the civilian and military work of Napoleon 1769–1969’. The brass gun barrel, which is now greened with age, was donated by the Musée de la Porte de Hal and is a heavy calibre weapon. It was cast in Douai on 14 September 1811, weighs 11,904lb (5,400kg) and is 14ft (4.20m) long. Emblazoned with the Imperial ‘N’ for Napoleon, the artillery named this gun, calling it ‘Le Formidable’.
Ligny also boasts a military museum devoted to the battlefield on the Rue Pont-Piraux near the centre of the town. It is called the Centre Général Gérard and is currently open only at weekends. It contains maps, models and artefacts picked up from the battlefield and is well worth a look. A plaque on the museum wall remembers a French officer, killed during the battle. It reads: ‘In memory of General J. Le Capitain, born at Lapentry in 1765, killed in Ligny on 16 June 1815’.
ST ARMAND, SOMBREFFE AND FLEURUS
The Prussian defensive line extended through several villages in addition to Ligny. At the farm of La Haye in St Armand there is a plaque recording the fall of General Jean-Baptiste Girard, who was mortally wounded nearby. The General was taken back to Paris and on 21 June Napoleon made him Duke of Ligny in honour of his exploits there, one of the last dukedoms he created during the final days his regime. However, Girard died on 27 June and enjoyed the title for only a few days.
Nearby at Sombreffe, the Prussians commandeered the village presbytery so that Blücher could use it as his headquarters just before the battle. The village also saw some fighting and one cannon ball remains lodged in the cemetery wall, while another penetrated the presbytery itself and is still embedded in the wall of an internal corridor.
In 1936, the Franco-Belgian Committee constructed an unusual memorial that commemorates three separate battles fought in the area, including Ligny. It stands along the road from Gembloux and its French inscription translates: ‘To the three French victories of Fleurus: Luxemburg 1690 – Jourdan 1794 – Napoleon 1815’. There was little or no fighting within Fleurus itself but behind the monument is an old windmill that Napoleon used as an observation post. It is now a private residence and the mill’s upper section and sails are gone but a plaque on its wall records how Napoleon stood at the summit and watched from here. This was probably only during the early stages of the battle but, considering that it was a high building for the area at that time, he probably enjoyed a good view of the action. In contrast, Blücher watched the initial stages of the battle from a point near Byre along the Namur–Nivelles road, although the exact location is unknown.
The French memorial at Fleurus with the windmill Napoleon used as an observation platform behind it.
Napoleon spent the night of 16/17 June at the Chateau de la Paix, which ironically translates as ‘Castle of Peace’. The chateau now acts as Fleurus town hall and houses some local authority departments. A plaque in its gardens informs the public about its former royal resident. It is rarely possible to gain entry to this structure but it is well worth photographing from outside; it is located on the Chemin de Mons in central Fleurus.
THE FARMHOUSES OF GEMIONCOURT, PIRAUMONT AND GRAND PIERREPOINT
The farm of Gemioncourt stands around 1,093yd (1,000m) south of the main crossroads and its possession was fiercely contested during the battle. It is a large, high-walled and sturdily built farmhouse of red brick with adjoining barns and outhouses. In 1815, it was surrounded by hedged orchards and must have presented a formidable challenge to the French infantry when they tried to assault the structure. The 27th Jäger and 5th National Militia defended Gemioncourt and made their enemies pay a heavy price for its capture. It fell to the Gautier Brigade, of Foy’s Division, at around 3.00pm that day. In 1988, the Association for the Conservation of Napoleonic Memorials placed a plaque on the farm’s gatehouse. Written in French, it translates: ‘In memory of the Soldiers of the Grande Armée who fell before these walls on 16 June 1815’.
Gemioncourt farm was well constructed and a difficult strongpoint for the French to take.
Situated in open ground on the east side of the road from Charleroi, Gemioncourt is easy to find but the farms of Grand-Pierrepoint and Piraumont are situated some way from the main road. Piraumont lies to the west of Gemioncourt and, though it initially fell to the French, it was recaptured in the early evening by a combined force of British, Brunswick and Hanoverian light infantry.
The farm of Grand Pierrepoint is now a clubhouse for a large golf course that is signposted from the main road (Chaussée de Charleroi). It is reached by a narrow country lane, which runs through open fields with no hedgerows. Although the old farm has been massively extended in modern times, parts of the old structure can still be seen, and these probably date back to 1815. Initially defended by a company of the Oranien-Nassau regiment, the farm was utilized as a strong point as it lay to the fore of the Anglo-Allied right flank.
All three farms played a role in delaying the French advance and the tenacious Dutch-Belgian defence bought Wellington valuable time to reinforce Quatre Bras, which greatly affected Allied strategy during the 1815 campaign. Visitors should note that these houses are occupied and due consideration for the owners should be shown if they approach these structures to take photographs.
THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK’S MEMORIAL
The Duke of Brunswick’s (Duke von Braunschweig-Lüneburg) memorial lies between Gemioncourt and the Quatre Bras crossroads, standing on the eastern side of the main road. It is a fine, imposing monument with a sturdy plinth 29½ft (9m) high surmounted by a 9.8ft (3m) high statue of a Belgian lion. The lion is made of brass and its right paw rests upon a shield displaying Brunswick’s coat of arms.
On the side of the pedestal facing the road is a medallion bearing the Duke’s bust surrounded by a laurel wreath and underneath is an inscription in German, which translates: ‘Frederick-William, Duke of Brunswick and Lüneburg, fell near this place while fighting at the head of his troops, on 16 June 1815’. On the opposite side, a similar inscription records: ‘In memory of the hero and his warriors who fell with him for Germany – The grateful homeland. MDCCCMXXXX’.
A musket ball shattered his right wrist and then lodged deep in the Duke’s abdomen as he struggled to rally his men who were falling back. Officers and men carried him to a nearby farm but he expired before medical help could reach him. His body does not rest here but was taken back to Brussels for embalming and later returned to Brunswick for burial. He was 44 at the time of his death.
THE CROSSROADS OF QUATRE BRAS
The crossroads at Quatre Bras mark the centre of the Allied position. Each side suffered around 5,000 casualties during this terrible struggle and several monuments are located here, commemorating the Allies valiant defence. On the right of the Allied position, the large Bois de Bossu no longer exists so this part of the battlefield has changed considerably since 1815. Nonetheless, the land before the Chaussée de Namur (the road running east from the crossroads) is largely open farmland, dotted with small woods, just as it was during the battle. Looking towards the French position, visitors can gain an insight into the problems facing General Picton as he deployed his Division along the line of the road. There is no reverse slope to shield the infantry from the worst effects of cannon fire and the land is perfect cavalry country. Desperate to lead his men and stay in command, Picton managed to conceal the fact that he had been wounded during this battle and went on to fight at Waterloo.
The monument constructed to commemorate the Duke of Brunswick, who fell at or near this spot, probably shot by a French sharpshooter.
Several modern buildings stand at the crossroads itself, and the name Quatre Bras translates as ‘four arms’ or ‘four ways’. Until recently one of these carried a simple plaque dedicated to the Netherlands forces and their allies but this has disappeared. The building in question will either be demolished or extensively modified, but one day the plaque will hopefully be recovered and restored to its rightful place.
The oldest of the monuments to the west of the crossroads (erected in 1926), dedicated to the Belgian soldiers who fought here.
Three large monuments are placed along the Chaussée de Nivelles (the road running west from Quatre Bras crossroads). The closest of these to the crossroads is a modern monument to the British and Hanoverian forces that fought here. It is a plain but imposing construction and lists all the divisions, brigades and regiments concerned. A striking monument stands across the road with a very modern appearance dedicated to the Dutch cavalry and built in 1990. Constructed in the stylized shape of a sword, it bears inscriptions in Dutch and French and lists the regiments known to have been present during the battle. The oldest of these monuments is tomb shaped and was built in 1926. Dedicated to the Belgian soldiers who fought here, its inscription reads: ‘In memory of the Belgian soldiers killed at the Battle of Quatre Bras for the defence of the flag and the honour of arms’.