Into a New Era

Today logistics is defined as ‘the branch of military science relating to procuring, maintaining and transporting materiel, personnel and facilities’. Thus logistics covers everything an army needs to remain at a state of readiness at all times, but especially during time of war, when weapons, ammunition, supplies and vast amounts of petrol, oil and lubricants (POL) would be the very lifeblood for the trucks and tanks that allowed an army to operate. An army without fuel and oil was doomed, as the Germans would discover to their cost during the campaign in North Africa and again in Russia. In 1935, when Italy invaded Abyssinia, the trucks and tanks rolled on against an ill-prepared resistance force. Sanctions against Italy were put in place but there was no embargo on oil and as a result Italy was able to maintain its conquest of the country. Had the Italian forces been denied the vital oil, the army’s trucks and tanks would not have operated and the aircraft could not have flown operationally for longer than reserves would have allowed.

During the Second World War supplies of petrol were vital and armies often operated at distances away from depots where their vehicles could be provisioned. One answer was to carry as much petrol as possible in containers on the vehicles. The British Army used flimsy tin cans with either ‘crimped’ or soldered seams that split easily during the rigours of transportation. These held 4 gallons of petrol and General Sir Claude Auchinleck believed that the design fault in these tins led to the loss of at least 30 per cent of the petrol during the journey from base to the vehicle it was to provision. During the campaign in North Africa the British Army captured stocks of German-produced fuel cans made from pressed steel and sealed with welded seams. The design was far superior to anything in use and so impressed the Allies that they copied it, with more than 50 million being produced by the end of the war. The Germans had always been nicknamed ‘Jerry’ by the British Army and it was only natural they applied the term to these fuel cans, which became known as ‘jerrycans’. It has been expressed that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, and if that is indeed the case then this was a prime example of that.

Hitler and German Rearmament

When Adolf Hitler came to power as Chancellor of Germany with his Nazi Party in January 1933 he had to bide his time before he could make his first overt move militarily. In fact, he had to wait until March 1935 to be provided with an excuse to dismiss the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and begin openly to set about increasing the size and strength of Germany’s armed forces with a rearmament programme. Even before this denouncement, the first new armoured cars for the German Army, in the shape of the Kfz13 armed with machine guns, were unveiled in 1934 along with the first new tank design, the Panzerkampfwagen I. These were armed with nothing more serious than two machine guns and gave no cause for concern. Even when the next designs of German tank, known as the Panzerkampfwagen II and abbreviated to PzKw, appeared in 1936 armed with 2cm cannon in a turret with machine guns, the British and French did not seem unduly alarmed. The Germans called their tanks panzers and referred to them and their armoured cars along with other specialist vehicles by the prefix SdKfz, which stood for Sonderkraftfahrzeug (special motorised vehicle) followed by a unique number indicating the type of vehicle. This identification also extended to include the half-track range of vehicles, even down to the small motorcycle-style Kettenkrad, which was designated SdKfz 2. Even trucks, light cars such as the Kubelwagen and motorcycles all had designation numbers and lettering to identify them, right up to the largest projects. Various models would be referred to as Ausführung, abbreviated to Ausf., which literally meant ‘model’ or ‘mark’. Thus, we have, for example, the Panzerkampfwagen I referred to as SdKfz 101 Ausf. B, meaning model B of the tank.

The PzKw I and PzKw II had the nomenclatures of SdKfz 101 and SdKfz 121 respectively, which denoted their special status as armoured vehicles. Both of them would continue to serve in the German Army until 1943, by which time more than 1,400 PzKw I tanks would have been built, along with other variants including supply vehicles and SPGs, and some 3,600 PzKw II would have been built and produced in six different models and all variants. While the PzKw II was not the most powerful tank fielded by the German Army in the Second World War, it was far more advanced than a number of designs in service with other armies at the time, such as the British Army’s A11 Matilda I infantry tank. The Panzer II was a natural continuation from the design of the Panzer I, which had been introduced in 1934, but it was better armed and had a faster road speed. Despite its lack of power, the Panzer II’s design was versatile enough to permit several variants to be developed from the basic design, including SPG, recovery vehicle and bridge-laying vehicle.

Even before Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933 the German Army was already readying itself for a rearmament programme that would replace or introduce into service all those forms of weaponry forbidden under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, including anti-tank guns and tanks. Some work on tank design had already been undertaken in secret using factories and facilities in Sweden as early as 1932, but it would not be until 1934 that the designs of the first German tanks were revealed. The German Ordnance Department had laid out specifications for a tank that would have a battle-ready weight of around 10 tons because it was thought that anything heavier would wreck the bridges as the vehicles traversed them. At this time the PzKw I had already entered service and numbers of these vehicles together with their crews would gain invaluable experience during the Spanish Civil War between 1936 and 1939. At the time of the outbreak of this conflict the PzKw II was just entering service and would also be used in action in Spain. In fact, the Spanish Civil War was seen as a proving ground for the German Army, and for armoured vehicles and tank crews in particular. By 1939 the German armaments factories, such as MAN, had already built over 1,200 PzKw II tanks, which meant that in the invasion of Poland in September 1939 almost the total force was deployed for the campaign.

PzKw II Ausf. A

The first prototype PzKw II vehicles were sent to Spain where they gained their first combat experience; this identified the weaknesses in the design and led to improvements. Further field trials corrected minor flaws and improved on the design. For example, the armour protection was increased and changes were made to the suspension, which meant an increase in the weight of the vehicle of almost 2 tons. The power of the Maybach engine was increased by boring out the cylinders and the first production models were built in 1935 and entered service in 1936. This version was the Ausf. A (Model A), of which 100 vehicles were built, and it was this series that was the first to enter service with the German Army proper. The Ausf. A weighed 8.9 tons and was armed with a 2cm KwK30 L/55 cannon in a fully traversing turret with an MG34 machine gun of 7.92mm calibre mounted co-axially. There were slight variations in the design of the six main models of the Panzer II but some features remained unaltered. For example, the main armament remained the 2cm KwK30 L/55, the radio was always the FuG5 and the layout of the road wheels was also the same on all models. The Panzer II had five road wheels with four return rollers; the idler wheel was mounted at the front with the idler wheel at the rear.

PzKw II light tank c. 1939 armed with a 2cm gun and machine guns. Used in Poland and France.

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
PzKw II Ausf. A	MAN, Daimler-Benz, Henschel, Wegmann, Alkett, MIAG, FAMO	1937–40	2cm KwK30 L/55 cannon and an MG34 7.92mm-calibre machine gun.	8.9 tons	25mph

PzKw II Ausf. B & C

The Ausf. B version was produced from December 1937 and this type had improved engine power, new reduction gears and new tracks, but there was also an increase in the weight. The Ausf. C version of the Panzer II began to appear only six months later and this had improved armour protection which increased the weight of the tank to 9.3 tons. The additional armour was simply plates of some 20mm thickness bolted to the superstructure, and was as a result of lessons learned during the Polish campaign, when it was discovered that anti-tank rifles could penetrate the armour of the PzKw II. This increased the weight by more than 1,200lb from the original design and about 70 per cent of the Ausf. C vehicles were ready in this improved form in time for the campaign into France. The first three models of the Panzer II – Ausf. A through to Ausf. C – were 15.7ft long, 7.2ft wide and 6.5ft high, and were very compact vehicles ideal for reconnaissance and engaging light, unarmoured vehicles. The engine was a Maybach HL62TR six-cylinder, water-cooled inline petrol engine. This developed 130hp at 2,600rpm to produce speeds of 25mph on roads, dropping to around 12mph cross-country with a combat range of 120 miles. Armour protection was from 10mm in thickness to a maximum of 14.5mm, and the vehicles could ford water obstacles to a depth of 3ft, traverse spans of 5ft 8in and climb vertical obstacles of well over 1ft.

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
PzKw II Ausf. B	MAN, Daimler-Benz, Henschel, Wegmann, Alkett, MIAG, FAMO	1937–40	2cm KwK30 L/55 cannon and an MG34 7.92mm-calibre machine gun.	8.9 tons	25mph
PzKw II Ausf. C	MAN, Daimler-Benz, Henschel, Wegmann, Alkett, MIAG, FAMO	1938	2cm KwK30 L/55 cannon and an MG34 7.92mm-calibre machine gun.	9.3 tons	25mph

PzKw II Ausf. D and E

The next series of PzKw II tanks were the Ausf. D and Ausf. E, which were built between May 1938 and August 1939. In total only forty-three vehicles were built, and these were deployed with a single Panzerabteilung (panzer battalion) that saw service during the invasion of Poland. The Ausf. D and Ausf. E had thicker armour and were slightly larger than the previous three models, and consequently weighed 9.8 tons. The maximum armour on these vehicles was 30mm, fitted to the hull and superstructure. A Maybach HL62TRM engine was fitted that had seven forward gears and one reverse gear, and this permitted the vehicles a road speed of 34mph. The D and E models were 15ft 3in long, 7ft 6in wide and 6ft 9in high. These versions had a slightly different superstructure, hull and suspension from the original versions, but the turret remained unchanged and was operated by a three-man crew. The entire series of these models was withdrawn in March 1940 and converted to flame-thrower tanks. These were then given the designation of SdKfz 122 Panzerkampfwagen II Flamm Ausf. A and B. They would be used in service on the Eastern Front from June 1941 when Germany attacked Russia.

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
PzKw II Ausf. D	MAN	1938	2cm KwK30 L/55 cannon and an MG34 7.92mm-calibre machine gun.	9.8 tons	34mph
PzKw II Ausf. E	MAN	1939	2cm KwK30 L/55 cannon and an MG34 7.92mm-calibre machine gun.	9.8 tons	34mph

PzKw II Ausf. F

The final version of the PzKw II proper was the Ausf. F, which virtually reverted back to the original design, with only a few differences. The armour was between 10mm and 30mm maximum thickness and the weight returned to 9.5 tons, with the overall length just over 15ft 9in. The width was slightly greater at almost 7ft 6in and the height slightly increased to just over 7ft. The HL62TR Maybach engine produced road speeds of 25mph and combat range remained at 120 miles. In total some 524 versions of the Model F were built between March 1941 and December 1942 and it saw much service, mainly in a reconnaissance role.

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
PzKw II Ausf. F	FAMO	1938	2cm KwK30 L/55 cannon and an MG34 7.92mm-calibre machine gun.	9.5 tons	25mph

The Panzer (PzKw) II

The Panzer II carried 1,425 rounds for the MG34 machine gun and 180 rounds for the 2cm cannon. The ammunition fired by the main armament could be either high explosive or armour piercing, but penetration against armoured vehicles was limited. However, against light vehicles or unprotected ground targets the effect could be highly effective out to ranges of almost 2,000yd. Attempts at producing further versions of the Panzer II in other models amounted to little or nothing and the programmes were dropped. For example, only twelve vehicles of the Ausf. G were built between April 1941 and February 1942, but as far as can be ascertained they were never deployed in a combat role. Similarly, only four vehicles in the Ausf. H and Ausf. M versions were produced and none of these are believed to have seen actual combat service. Other versions were adapted for specific roles, such as the Ausf. J which was produced in very limited numbers and served in the bridge-laying role. Other variants of the Panzer II were developed into SPGs armed with a range of artillery such as captured Russian weapons of 76.2mm calibre and at least fifty-five were converted into amphibious roles in preparation for the invasion of Britain.

The PzKw II had originally been developed for a reconnaissance role, a function it performed remarkably well during all major campaigns. It was never intended to serve in many of the combat roles into which it would be pressed. Some of these roles, such as the self-propelled version Leichte Feldhaubitze 18/2 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II, armed with a 10.5cm le FH18M gun, would continue in service until the end of the war. This version was designated as the SdKfz 124 or Wespe self-propelled light field howitzer. This version shows how, despite being a small vehicle, the Panzer II and all its variants gave a good accounts of themselves and far exceeded all expectations. This version of the vehicle was developed by Alkett early in 1942 using the chassis of the PzKw II tank as frame on which a field gun could be mounted. The vehicle was increased in length to more than 15ft 9in and the engine was placed in front of the vehicle (unlike the tank designs of the day, which had the engines at the rear). An open-topped superstructure was built up on the hull that provided the crew with sufficient operating room around the gun, which was the standard field howitzer, the 10.5cm le FH18M, which increased the vehicle’s weight to 11 tons. The gun had a maximum range of 13,500yd and could traverse 17 degrees left and right of centre line and be elevated up to 42 degrees. The Wespe carried thirty-two rounds of ready-to-use ammunition and batteries of these SPGs were supported by munitions supply vehicles, also based on the PzKw II chassis, which carried an additional ninety rounds for re-supply. In total, some 676 Wespe and 139 munitions carriers were built between 1943 and 1944, and they were used by artillery regiments of armoured units serving in all theatres of operation. The Wespe remained in service until 1945 and was considered to be one of the best SPGs of the war.

British and French Armaments

The British and French believed their respective anti-tank gun capabilities could deal with the German vehicles and, besides, French tank designs such as the Renault AMC 35 light tank with its 47mm main gun were more than a match for such light vehicles. At the time the British Army had 136 infantry battalions, eighteen horsed cavalry regiments and only four battalions of tanks and two regiments of armoured cars. Tanks in service with the British Army included a number of older designs such as the Mk II medium tank armed with a 3-pounder gun in a turret, which had been in service since 1926. Another tank of similar vintage in service was the Vickers Mk VI light tank armed with a .303in-calibre machine gun, but later variants were armed with a .50in-calibre machine gun. This vehicle had started life during the 1920s when several types of light tanks and carriers were being considered for development for the British Army by Carden-Loyd. They were useful vehicles for the roles in which they were designed to operate, primarily reconnaissance duties, but the shape of the British Army was changing and so was the type of warfare in which they were to engage. In 1928 the Carden-Loyd company was acquired by engineering giant Vickers, and the design team wasted no time in scrapping all the designs that the company’s engineers considered to be of no value. There was one Carden-Loyd design that they did consider valuable, however, and that was in an advanced state of preparation at the time of acquisition. This vehicle design was the Mk I light tank and it entered service with the British Army in 1929, just one year after the takeover. It was to be the first tank of a series in its type that entered service with the army. The vehicle incorporated a fully traversing turret that had been developed by Vickers, and featured a Horstman-type spring-coil suspension along with several other modifications to the original design.

The Mk I Light Tank

The Mk I light tank was to prove so successful that in time it would serve as the foundation for the several other light tanks that Vickers turned out at a rapid rate. All versions bore a number of similarities such as forward-mounted engines, twin or single bogies and either one or more return rollers. The series was to culminate in 1936 with the Mk VI light tank, which was to run to improved ‘marks’, ending with the Mk VIC. In fact, this last design was to be the heaviest, fastest and best-armed tank in the range and would see service with the British Army until 1941. Although the Mk VI was lightly armoured compared to other tank designs of the period, it was widely deployed and saw service in France during 1940, in Egypt during 1941 and was also used on the island of Malta. In Egypt the British Army used these tanks in the role of mobile artillery observation posts. The vehicles in the range that had been intended for the Indian Army were diverted and ended up in Persia, modern-day Iran, when that country was occupied and taken over in a preventative move by the British, who made it a protectorate. The Mk VI light tank was also later used by the Australian, Canadian and South African armies.

Crews of British Vickers light tanks.

Vickers medium tank Mk II c. 1926.

The Mk I light tank of the 1929 period was not all that far removed from the Carden-Loyd Mk VIII light tank in appearance, in as much as it had leaf springs for suspension and a pronounced turret. Only a year later, the Mk IA made its appearance and featured proper coil springs and a turret slightly set off from the centre line. These two early versions were quickly followed in 1932 by the much-improved Mk II light tank, which was the first of its type to be fitted with a Rolls-Royce engine.

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Date Designed	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
Mk I light tank	Vickers	1929	.303in Vickers machine gun	4.8 tons	31mph

The .303in-calibre machine gun mounted in the turret of the Vickers light tank.

The riveted construction of the hull and turret can be seen clearly and the ‘slab-like’ design of the armour plate.

Vickers light tank design c. 1930s with Carden-Loyd suspension.

The Mk II light tank

The fully traversing turret of the Mk II was rectangular in shape and mounted a single Vickers .303in machine gun. The turret featured sloping sides and a mantlet fitted over the machine gun with an armoured sleeve around the exposed portion of the barrel. The vehicle was operated by a crew of two men who served in the roles of driver and commander/gunner. The driver’s position had a square hatch equipped with slits and glass vision blocks for use when driving closed down, which is to say with all hatches closed. The commander was provided with a square access hatch in the turret roof. A unique feature on the Mk II light tank, and not to be incorporated into any other design in the light tank range, was the two sets of twin bogies on either side, with a raised rear idler wheel. The Mk II was 11.7ft long, 6.2ft wide and 7.3ft high. It weighed 4,318kg and had armour protection from 4mm minimum to 12mm maximum. This particular version of the series was fitted with a six-cylinder Rolls-Royce water-cooled inline petrol engine, which developed 60hp to give it a maximum road speed of 30mph. The vehicle had the useful operational range of 240km, which allowed it to function in a reconnaissance role. The Mk IIA light tank from Vickers entered service with the British Army in 1933 and was essentially a slightly improved Mk II, retaining as it did the same level of armour protection, engine, range and speed. It still only mounted a single Vickers .303in machine gun in the turret, even though countries such as France and Japan were arming their tanks with larger calibre weapons.

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Date Designed	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
Mk II light tank	Vickers	1932	.303in Vickers machine gun	4.3 tons	30mph
Mk IIA light tank	Vickers	1933	.303in Vickers machine gun	4.3 tons	30mph

The Mk III and Mk IV Light Tank

The Mk II and Mk IIA were followed in 1934 by the Mk III and Mk IV. These had armour protection to a maximum thickness of 12mm and still featured a single .303in Vickers machine gun in the turret. The turret of the Mk III was narrower and had a lower profile than on previous versions of the light tank series, and was fitted with a front grille to protect the radiator. Very few Mk III light tanks were built, presumably due to the fact that Vickers was beginning to produce the Mk IV light tank. The Mk IV was a major leap forward in light tank design and featured many improvements over the previous marks. For example, the hull was built over the tracks to provide increased internal space for the crew, and the turret layout was changed to a design that was circular when looked at in ‘plan’ view. The Mk III and Mk IV light tanks still had two-man crews, but some Mk III vehicles were fitted with either a Vickers .30in-calibre medium machine gun or a Vickers .50in heavy machine gun, which would be mounted in the turret in place of the Vickers .303in machine gun.

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Date Designed	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
Mk III light tank	Vickers	1934	.303in or .50in Vickers machine gun	4.3 tons	30mph
Mk IV light tank	Vickers	1934	.303in Vickers machine gun	4.3 tons	30mph

The Mk V Light Tank

The Mk V light tank from Vickers appeared in 1935 and because of the increased space inside the vehicle it could carry a three-man crew, which distributed the work tasks more evenly. The length of the hull was increased and the track extended by adding a rear idler wheel. It was mounted in a unique way by attaching it to the single-wheeled bogie and springing it in the same way, which allowed it to double in purpose as a road wheel. The turret on the Mk V was larger than previous models to the point where it could be armed with both a Vickers .303in machine gun and a Vickers .50in-calibre heavy machine gun. To increase the ballistic protection of the vehicle the sides of the turret were sloped sharply. The commander of the vehicle was provided with a cylinder-shaped cupola. A smoke grenade discharger was fitted to the right-hand side of the turret and was fired by means of a Bowden cable. The driver’s hatch was made smaller on the Mk V but the front decking was extended. Nearly two dozen Mk V light tanks were built, some of which were used as experimental vehicles to proof trial features that were to become standard on the final mark of light tank.

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Date Designed	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
Mk V light tank	Vickers	1935	.303in and .50in Vickers machine guns	4.8 tons	35mph

The Mk VI Light Tank

From 1936 onwards the Mk VI, which was to prove to be the final light tank design from Vickers, began to appear. On its introduction into service with the British Army, before the outbreak of hostilities, it superseded all previous light tank designs. The Mk VI was the largest and heaviest model in the Vickers light tank series, with armour protection up to 14mm maximum thickness and a weight of 5.2 tons, which was nearly a quarter as much again as the Mk II light tank. The Mk VI was 12ft 11in in length, 6ft 9in wide and 7ft 4in high. Like the Mk V, this version was armed with both Vickers .303in- and .50in-calibre machine guns. As with the Mk IV, this version was fitted with a Meadows six-cylinder water-cooled inline petrol engine that developed 88hp. It could cross 5ft gaps, scale vertical obstacles more than 24in high and negotiate gradients of 60 per cent. The turret was slightly larger in order to accommodate a radio set for improved communications and the commander’s cupola was changed to be hexagonal shape in ‘plan’ view.

The Mk VIA light tank had the position of its return rollers altered and the Mk VIB had cupolas fitted that were cylindrical in ‘plan’ view. These were relatively minor modifications to the vehicle’s design. Some versions of the Mk VI light tank were equipped to carry .303in Bren guns mounted on special turret brackets for low-level air defence. The Mk VIC carried a BESA 15mm heavy machine gun and a co-axial 7.92mm BESA machine gun, which was a more powerful armament than had ever been imagined on previous marks. The commander’s cupola in this version was omitted, which did limit his view, but in its place two domed hatches for improved headroom were fitted. The driver’s position was better protected against the effects of ‘splashing’ caused by small arms fire by deflector plates that were fitted to his vision blocks.

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Date Designed	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
Mk VI light tank	Vickers	1936	.303in and .50in Vickers machine guns	4.8 tons	mph
Mk VIA light tank	Vickers	1936	.50in and .303in machine gun	4.8 tons	35mph
Mk VIB light tank	Vickers	1936	.50in and .303in machine gun	5.2 tons	35mph
Mk VIC light tank	Vickers	1936	BESA 15mm heavy machine gun and a co-axial 7.92mm BESA machine gun	5.2 tons	29mph

Post-Dunkirk Re-evaluation

Following the retreat from Dunkirk in 1940 it became all too apparent that the design of the Vickers series of tank was inadequate, both in weaponry hitting power and armoured defence, and those vehicles left in Britain were consigned to training roles. The turret of the light tank design was not large enough to accept a heavier gun, and the armour protection was not sufficient to sustain heavy battle damage. As the vehicles used in training roles wore out due to mechanical failure they were scrapped and replaced by more modern designs that were purpose built to function in the reconnaissance role of the more fluid battlefields of the Second World War. In 1939 the Polish Army had the light TK-3 Tankette with a single machine gun, which had been in service from 1932. Another armoured vehicle was the 7TP light tank; both were based on a British Carden-Loyd design. The 7TP was armed with a 37mm gun, and on paper it appeared that it could match some of the new German designs. In the overall assessment on the eve of the outbreak of war there did not appear to be any European country dominating the armour race and if there was, then it was surely France with designs such as the Char B1 heavy tank, Renault R35 light tank and Char Somua S-35 medium tank. Even in 1936, when the Germans unveiled the Neubaufahrzeug (NbFz) Panzerkampfwagen V (new construction vehicle or experimental medium tank) armed with a turret-mounted 7.5cm-calibre KwK L/24 gun with a 3.7cm co-axial gun and four machine guns in two further turrets, the alarms still failed to sound with the British and French. As it transpired this vehicle never entered service but it was a marvellous propaganda scoop for the Germans. However, three of these tanks and about 100 other types were deployed during the invasion on Norway in April 1940. Three Panzerkampfwagen V tanks, almost certainly the three experimental models that were built, were photographed in Oslo and thus proved their worth for propaganda purposes.

German SdKfz 10

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
SdKfz 10	Demag, Alderwerke, Bussing-NAG	1937	N/A	4.8 tons	40mph
SdKfz 10/1	Demag, Alderwerke, Bussing-NAG	1937	N/A	4.8 tons	40mph
SdKfz 10/2	Demag, Alderwerke, Bussing-NAG	1937	N/A	4.8 tons	40mph
SdKfz 10/3	Demag, Alderwerke, Bussing-NAG	1937	N/A	4.8 tons	40mph
SdKfz 10/4	Demag, Alderwerke, Bussing-NAG	1938	2cm-calibre FlaK 30 anti-aircraft gun	5.5 tons	40mph
SdKfz 10/5	Demag, Alderwerke, Bussing-NAG	1938	2cm-calibre FlaK 38 anti-aircraft gun	5.5 tons	40mph

The SdKfz 10 served in all theatres of fighting and was a versatile vehicle being configured to various roles.

The driver’s position of the SdKfz 10 Demag half-track showing standard steering wheel layout. The SdKfz 10 was used in a number of roles including artillery tractor, light anti-aircraft vehicle and troop carrier.

Throughout the 1930s the German Army continued to become ever more mechanised, leading to an increased demand for vehicles in all categories, including half-track vehicles that could be used for troop transport and as prime-mover tractors for towing artillery. One of the smallest and yet most versatile half-track vehicles to be developed was the SdKfz 10, which entered service in 1938 and remained in use throughout the war. It fitted all the roles asked of it, including towing artillery, carrying cargo and even serving as a mobile platform for mounting anti-aircraft guns. It was also used as a specialist chemical warfare decontamination system. Some sources state that 14,000 vehicles were built, but others give that number as more like 25,000. Whichever figure one chooses, what is certain about this vehicle is that it was built in five variants and served in all theatres of the war, including Europe, Russia and North Africa. It was standard practice for subcontractors to supply parts for vehicles and even actually to build the vehicles if it looked as though deliveries might not be met by the main contractor. Indeed, the SdKfz 10 was one such vehicle, and was built by several different manufacturers, including Adlerwerke (which turned out over 3,400 vehicles) and Bussing-NAG (which built 750 SdKfz 10 half-tracks). Another manufacturer of the series was Demag, with factories in Berlin and Düsseldorf, which had designed the vehicle and would build some 1,075 SdKfz 10s.

The range prototype was built in 1934 and, following further research and development along with field trials, the SdKfz 10 went into production in 1937, with Demag as one of the main manufacturers. The two variants of the vehicle, designated SdKfz 10/1 and 10/2, were configured for chemical decontamination roles. The SdKfz 10/3 was equipped with nozzles to spray poison chemicals, but in the event the few vehicles built for this purpose never operated in their intended role. The SdKfz 10/4 and SdKfz 10/5 were equipped with pedestal mounts to carry the 2cm-calibre FlaK 30 and FlaK 38 anti-aircraft guns respectively. These were used by the army and air force (Luftwaffe), and the army also made modifications in the field to adapt some vehicles for towing anti-tank guns. Already realising that the vehicles could be used in this way, some manufacturers strengthened them in order to cope with towing the larger, heavier guns, including the le FH18 howitzer of 105mm calibre.

The basic version of the SdKfz 10 Ausf. B when used to tow artillery such as the PaK38 50mm-calibre anti-tank gun, was known as a Zugkraftwagen 1T (prime-mover semi-tracked vehicle). These vehicles could also be used to tow ammunition trailers with which to re-supply the guns. In the basic role for gun crews, the vehicle was fitted out with seats to accommodate the driver, co-driver and six men in the rear. Overall the vehicle measured 15ft 7in long, approximately 6ft 4in wide and was 6ft 6in high when the collapsible canvas roof was erected. The vehicle weighed 4.8 tons and was capable of reaching speeds of up to 50mph on roads. Various design changes were made to the fuel tank capacity and by 1940 at least a new standard tank containing around 24 gallons of fuel was being fitted, which allowed the SdKfz 10 an operational road range of over 170 miles, reduced to around 100 miles when operating cross-country. The type of engine fitted and its rating depended on the manufacturer and the period of the production the vehicle was built during.

Typically a Maybach six-cylinder petrol engine HL42TRKM of 100hp was fitted but other models were fitted with a Maybach HL38TRKM engine. The tracked layout comprised of five sets of double road wheels with torsion bar suspension and the drive sprocket at the front. The front wheels were fitted with leaf springs. If the type of manoeuvre being executed was gradual turns, the front wheels were used for steering, but for sharper turns braking was applied to the tracks. The service life of the SdKfz 10 lasted the entire war and it was among the last vehicles remaining in use in May 1945, during which time it had shown itself to be a useful and dependable vehicle in whichever role it was used.

The Spanish Civil War to the Invasion of Czechoslovakia

When Italy and Germany sent troops, tanks and artillery to support the nationalist forces of General Franco during the Spanish Civil War in 1936, France and Britain did not appear unduly concerned. Although such military aid was criticised it was not condemned wholeheartedly, and Russia did send 700 tanks, mainly Christie and Vickers types, to support the republican cause opposing Franco. Despite warnings from people such as Winston Churchill, who could see through this and other moves, the British government did not act. Rearmament was a contentious point in Britain and the government of the day under Stanley Baldwin read the mood of the people and realised that it was not the right decision. Prime Minister Baldwin stated: ‘Supposing I had gone to the country and said that Germany was rearming and that we must rearm, does anybody think that this pacific democracy would have rallied to that cry at that moment? I cannot think of anything that would have made the loss of the election from my point of view more certain.’ At the time, Britain had a budget of £842,000 for the design, development and construction of tanks. Five years earlier the budget had been £357,000, but had actually decreased in 1932. It was only in 1937 that this budget was given a substantial increase, when it was granted £3,625,000 to develop tanks, by which time several European countries had entered into a rearmament programme. It may have been a case of too little too late, but rather too late than nothing at all. If war had not broken out in 1939, Britain’s rearmament programme would not have been completed until 1946. Churchill was not a prophet, but he was wise enough to see what was happening in Germany and predicted that: ‘in the end it is certain that a regime whose victories are in the main due to machines will collapse. Machines will one day beat machines.’ He would come to be proven correct when the might of the Allied armoured divisions smashed into the heart of Germany, whose once-powerful tanks lay either destroyed or abandoned through lack of fuel.

That image lay in the future, but in the meantime Germany was growing ever stronger militarily and German troops were gaining experience in the fighting in Spain: honing their weapons skills and developing tactics with tanks and vehicles under combat conditions. Russia sent tanks to support the republican forces, but other European countries, including Britain, did not send heavy military hardware. On 17 January 1936 Joseph Goebbels, the German Minister of Propaganda, addressed an audience and declared: ‘We can do without butter, but, despite all our love of peace, not without arms. One cannot shoot with butter, but with guns.’ Realising the growing threat posed by its neighbour, France began a rearmament programme in June 1936, knowing it had made the right decision when at the same time Herman Goering, the commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, reaffirmed Goebbels’ earlier statement by declaring: ‘Guns will make us powerful; butter will only make us fat.’ Hitler was very much centre stage and continuing his political manoeuvrings. He made much of his experiences as a soldier in the First World War and constantly reminded all around him of the fact. During a tour to observe military manoeuvres at Kummersdorf he saw the first German tanks engaged in field exercises. Turning to Heinz Guderian, who was escorting him, he said: ‘That’s what I need. That’s what I want to have.’ Hitler may not have been a tactical genius, but it did not require the skilled training of a military academy to realise that this would be a decisive weapon on the battlefield.

Even before his involvement with Spain, Hitler had already flexed his international political muscles when in 1935 he ordered his troops to enter the region of the Saar on the border between France and Germany. This was a French-administered zone, but when France and Britain did not react Hitler went one stage further, and the following year German troops entered the Rhineland, which had been a ‘demilitarised zone’. Still neither France nor Britain did anything to prevent the move. On 7 March 1938 German troops crossed into Austria in Anschluss to annex the country and create the ‘Greater German Reich’. This move gave Hitler more manufacturing capabilities for weaponry and vehicles. Further emboldened, Hitler occupied the Sudetenland border region between Czechoslovakia and Germany in September 1938. Britain, France and Italy agreed to the move and war was averted through negotiations, for the time being at least.

Hitler made his next move on 15 March 1939 when he ordered his troops to march in and take over the rest of Czechoslovakia, making it a Reich protectorate as part of Germany’s expansion plan and giving it the title Bohemia-Moravia. This gave Germany another 11,500 square miles of territory, but more importantly added factories such as the Škoda Works, which was already manufacturing tanks, vehicles and artillery. Czechoslovakia was now a nominal ally of Germany but would suffer as badly as any other occupied country during the war. Germany benefitted the most from the situation with the acquisition of the armaments manufacturers that were turning out weapons, the most important of which were the Škoda and CKD (Praga) factories, which were producing armoured vehicles and trucks, but especially tanks. Indeed, it would be Czechoslovakian tank designs, later to be designated the Panzerkampfwagen 35 (t) and Panzerkampfwagen 38 (t) that would form the backbone of the German armoured divisions from 1939 until 1941.These two designs were classed as light tanks and such was their versatility that they would later be adapted to serve in a variety of roles, including as ammunition carriers and SPGs. However, it was the Panzerkampfwagen 38 (t) that proved to be the most versatile of the two designs and in this tank design alone more than 1,600 were produced in eight different models and the basic chassis was used for thousands more vehicles operating as reconnaissance vehicles, SPGs, ammunition carriers and tank destroyers such as the highly successful SdKfz 138 Hetzer tank destroyer for example. In fact, it has been estimated that at one point early in the war the Panzerkampfwagen 35 (t) and 38 (t) formed almost a quarter of the German Army’s armoured forces.

The SdKfz 138 Hetzer tank destroyer developed on the 38 (t) chassis and used during the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944.

The Czechoslovakian-designed 38 (t) which formed the backbone of the early German armoured units and on which many SPG and other designs were based.

The Panzerkampfwagen 38 (t)

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
PzKw 38 (t): Ausf. A	Bohmisch-Mahrische Maschinenfabrik (BMM)	1939	3.7cm KwK38 (t) L/47.8 gun and 2x MG37 (t) 7.92mm-calibre MG37 (t)	9.4 tons	26mph
PzKw 38 (t): Ausf. B	Bohmisch-Mahrische Maschinenfabrik (BMM)	1940	3.7cm KwK38 (t) L/47.8 gun and 2x MG37 (t) 7.92mm-calibre MG37 (t)	9.5 tons	26mph
PzKw 38 (t): Ausf. C	Bohmisch-Mahrische Maschinenfabrik (BMM)	1940	3.7cm KwK38 (t) L/47.8 gun and 2x MG37 (t) 7.92mm-calibre MG37 (t)	9.5 tons	26mph
PzKw 38 (t): Ausf. D	Bohmisch-Mahrische Maschinenfabrik (BMM)	1940	3.7cm KwK38 (t) L/47.8 gun and 2x MG37 (t) 7.92mm-calibre MG37 (t)	9.5 tons	26mph
PzKw 38 (t): Ausf. E	Bohmisch-Mahrische Maschinenfabrik (BMM)	1940–41	3.7cm KwK38 (t) L/47.8 gun and 2x MG37 (t) 7.92mm-calibre MG37 (t)	9.9 tons	26mph
PzKw 38 (t): Ausf. F	Bohmisch-Mahrische Maschinenfabrik (BMM)	1941–41	3.7cm KwK38 (t) L/47.8 gun and 2x MG37 (t) 7.92mm-calibre MG37 (t)	9.9 tons	26mph
PzKw 38 (t): Ausf. G	Bohmisch-Mahrische Maschinenfabrik (BMM)	1941–42	3.7cm KwK38 (t) L/47.8 gun and 2x MG37 (t) 7.92mm-calibre MG37 (t)	9.9 tons	26mph
PzKw 38 (t): Ausf. S	Bohmisch-Mahrische Maschinenfabrik (BMM)	1941	3.7cm KwK38 (t) L/47.8 gun and 2x MG37 (t) 7.92mm-calibre MG37 (t)	9.5 tons	26mph

The origin of the tank that would become known as the Panzerkampfwagen 38 (t) was in 1937 when the company CKD (Praga) built a prototype design, known as the Vz38 in a series known as TNHPS, which came out as the overall winner against rival designs during field trials held in 1938. An order for 150 of the tanks was placed but the political situation at the time led to a cut back in filling orders and it was not until March 1939 that the first vehicle was ready. By then Germany was in control of Czechoslovakia and the first tanks went to the Wehrmacht as the Ausf. A version, and the original production company of CKD (Praga) was now known as Bohmisch-Mahrische Maschinenfabrik (BMM). In total only the original order of 150 Ausf. A vehicles were built, with production ceasing in November 1939. This meant that the first models were able to participate in the attack on Poland and later some were deployed to support the attacks against Norway and some were used to equip the 7th Armoured Division under General Rommel during blitzkrieg against France in May 1940.

The next three versions of the Panzerkampfwagen 38 (t) were designated as Ausf. B, C and D and a total of 325 of these were built between January and November 1940, making them the first models available to participate in the blitzkrieg against France and Belgium in 1940. They would later serve in Russia from 1941 onwards, as indeed would all other versions of the tank. Variants of the Panzerkampfwagen 38 (t) were also deployed to participate in fighting in all theatres of the war, including Greece, but none served in the North Africa theatre of operations. The most numerous versions of the tank to be built were the Ausf. E and F, with production running from November 1940 until October 1941, during which time some 525 were built. There were two more models, the Ausf. G and the Ausf. S, with a production run of 321 and 90 respectively and the output of all versions finally ended in June 1942 after which time variants such as SPGs were produced.

In all of the cases there was little to distinguish one version from another and all eight models of the Panzerkampfwagen 38 (t) actually shared a commonality in a great number of automotive parts, including the engine, which in all models was a water-cooled 125hp six-cylinder petrol Praga EPA which developed 2,200rpm to give a maximum road speed of 26mph, but this dropped to only 9mph when operating in cross-country. Sufficient fuel was carried to permit a combat range of 250km, which was better than the Panzer II. The gearbox was fitted with five forward gears and one for reverse to permit manoeuvrability in all terrains. In each of the eight models the tank was equipped with four large road wheels with the drive sprocket at the front, idler wheel at the rear and two return rollers. All versions were served by a crew of four comprising driver, gunner, loader and tank commander who kept in touch by means of radio. The armour protection on the tank varied according to the model and this affected the weight. For example, the original Ausf. A weighed 9.4 tons but the later Ausf. E, F and G models all weighed 9.85 tons. The overall dimensions varied slightly, with the Ausf. F measuring 15.1ft long, 6.8ft wide and 7.8ft high. Armour protection varied in thickness and ordinarily the Ausf. F would have been only 8mm on the top of the hull and 30mm on the side of the turret, which would have been the most vulnerable area. However, experience in early campaigns such as Poland showed the necessity to provide additional armour protection and in this case it was achieved by adding another armour plate of 25mm thickness over the existing hull armour to give 50mm protection. The overall structure was riveted, which gave it a ‘pimpled’ effect, unlike the welded designs of the later tanks.

The Ausf. F version of the Panzerkampfwagen 38 (t) was armed with a 3.7cm KwK38 (t) L/47.8 gun as a main armament mounted in a turret with full 360-degree traverse. The lower case suffix letter ‘t’ within brackets identifies Czechoslovakia as the country of origin of the weapon and tank. The KwK stands for Kampfwagenkanone and the 3.7cm calibre in this case had a barrel length of 47.8 calibres, to give around 5ft 6in in length. The main gun, for which ninety rounds were carried in the tank, did not have a muzzle brake and fired armour-piercing shells weighing 1.8lb at a muzzle velocity of 2,469ft per second, which could penetrate 41mm of homogeneous armour set at 30 degrees at a range of 100yd but falling to 35mm penetration at 500yd. The main gun could elevate to +25 degrees and depress to −10 degrees with manual operation for the turret traverse. Two MG37 (t) machine guns of 7.92mm calibre, both of Czechoslovakian origin, were also carried, with one mounted co-axially in the turret and the other fitted in the hull and for which 2,400 rounds of ammunition was carried. They had limited traverse and elevation capability, but were useful for self-defence and for providing fire support for advancing infantry. The armament and optical sighting units carried on the tank remained the same for the entire fleet throughout the war.

The Panzerkampfwagen 38 (t) did not only serve with the German armoured divisions, but was also used to equip the armoured units of its allies, including the forces of Hungary and Romania, where they were deployed on the Eastern Front in Russia. The tank was compact enough to be transported by railway at the rate of two tanks per flat car. One of the earliest proper tanks to equip the German armoured divisions, the Panzerkampfwagen 38 (t) was still in service in late 1944, by which time those still in service were declared obsolete. Its war record was second to none and despite being out-gunned by Allied tanks, its longevity in battle, during which it was deployed in some heavy fighting, is a testament to its usefulness.

Italian Advances and the German Invasion of Poland

The German Army used resources such as these from Czechoslovakia and other occupied countries to increase their capacity to wage war. Meanwhile, Italy had not been idle, and although committed to providing military aid to Franco in Spain, since October 1935 Italian troops had been engaged in a ruthless war, including the use of poison gas, to suppress Ethiopia in East Africa. Finally, on 9 May 1936, the Italians declared the war to be at an end, and annexed Ethiopia. Mussolini made his next major military move on 7 April 1939, when he sent 100,000 troops into Albania, which was also annexed to Italy. The invasion was a one-sided affair with Italian troops supported by air cover and a fleet of vehicles. Several weeks later, on 22 May 1939, Italy and Germany entered into an agreement called the Pact of Steel, which made them allies in the event of war. At the time, Italy’s armaments output in weapons and vehicles, including tanks, was very limited and the country was not prepared for full-scale war – a fact that Mussolini made Hitler aware of during a meeting in August. It was one thing to subdue an ill-prepared country like Ethiopia or Albania, but a war against a well-equipped European army such as that of France was something entirely different. Hitler then made his next demand: the reunification of East Prussia with Germany proper. The problem with this was that the two areas were separated by the Danzig Corridor, which was Polish territory. On 1 September German troops crossed the border and although Britain and France had pledged their support to Poland in the event of war there was little they could do but issue an ultimatum calling for the withdrawal of troops. Germany ignored the demands and two days later, on 3 September, France and Britain declared war on Germany.

At the time the British Army was short of vehicles and to make up for the shortfall it pressed into service some 26,000 civilian vehicles, including 5,000 private cars, 7,000 motorcycles and 14,000 trucks. This took the total number of soft-skinned vehicles up to 55,000 and by the end of the war there were 1.25 million soft-skinned vehicles in service. One company producing cars for the civilian market was the Rootes Group, which had factories in Birmingham and Coventry in the Midlands where they built a series of vehicles under the Hillman marque known as the Hillman Minx. Over the years several versions were built and it was a popular car for civilian use in the pre-war period. The RAF was one of the military users of the 4×2[??045] Hillman 10, known as such from the horsepower of the four-cylinder (22kW) 1,185cc side-valve petrol engine, which allowed road speeds of up to around 65mph. The vehicle had a pressed-steel body with a wheelbase length of 12ft 7in, and it was perfectly suited to liaison duties around air bases or for travelling between air bases. Hillman had been producing vehicles since before the war and the Minx design was built from 1932 and 1938; in 1939 the company moved into building more vehicles for the military and the ‘Tilly’ design was ideal for home-service use. The actual numbers used in this role has not been accurately tabulated but the fact they were used for the duration of the war says something for the design’s usefulness. Tilly cars were built by other companies such as Austin and Morris, and the Humber ‘Snipe’ was sometimes used for converting into ‘Beaverette’ armoured cars for use by Home Guard units.

Hillman Minx 10 as used by the Royal Air Force for liaison duties between air bases.

The Polish Army fought as gallantly as any army could but under the circumstances it was no match for the German Army, which outnumbered them and was supported with modern tanks and aircraft that smashed anything the Poles sent against them. The Polish Army fought stubbornly and bravely but by 27 September the Polish capital of Warsaw had surrendered. The Polish Army had comprised thirty infantry divisions, twelve cavalry divisions and ten reserve divisions. Poland had almost 900 tanks, mostly small, light ‘tankette’ designs except for ninety-five larger 7TPjw tanks equipped with 47mm guns, but these and the armoured cars could do little against sixty German divisions with thousands of tanks and vehicles. These tanks would later be pressed into service with the German Army. The Germans suffered 40,000 casualties killed, wounded and missing, and lost 217 tanks destroyed or damaged. Following the conclusion of the Polish campaign the Allies faced the Germans in the west and entered into a period of inactivity that lasted several months, during which time they simply sat in trenches and bunkers staring at one another along the Franco-German border. The American senator William Borah referred to it as the ‘Phoney War’, a term adopted by the British. Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, called it the ‘twilight war’ and claimed that Hitler had ‘missed the bus’. The French called the period drôle de guerre (funny or peculiar war) and the Germans knew it as Sitzkreig (sitting war). Whatever one chose to call it, everybody knew that it all rested on the Germans, and if they chose to play a waiting game the Allies would have no option but to go along with it. Some small localised manoeuvring on the part of the French did take place, but it was no more than a show and the troops returned to their positions. Because they did nothing positive, the consequences of their indecision would lead to catastrophe for the Dutch, French and Belgian armies. The British Army would be luckier, but only just.

When Germany began its rearmament programme in the mid-1930s almost everything an army otherwise took for granted had either to be replaced completely or introduced from scratch. This was the case with armoured cars, required by the German Army, which needed their vehicles to operate in the variety of roles that would be demanded of them in the new tactics that were being devised. Those earlier vehicles, such as the Ehrhardt E-V/4 armoured cars, had served in the 1920s and were now obsolete, while others like the Kfz13 were severely limited in capability, though their speed and operational range was acceptable. In 1934 the German Army High Command issued a contract to the Leipzig-based company of Bussing-NAG to develop a new armoured car with four axles and full 8x8 all-wheel drive. From time of request through to production of the first prototypes and the first vehicles entering service took only three years, and in 1937 the Schwerer Panzerspähwagen (Heavy Armoured Reconnaissance Vehicle) or SdKfz 232 was ready in time to take part in the first phases of Germany’s expansionist operations, including the Polish campaign where it served in the reconnaissance role, which it reprised in France the following year.

The Schwerer Panzerspähwagen (SdKfz)

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
SdKfz 231	Bussing-NAG, Daimler-Benz, Magirus	1932–37	2cm KwK30 cannon or 2cm KwK38 cannon and 7.92mm MG34 machine gun	5.4 tons	44mph
SdKfz 232	Deutsche Werke, Schichau	1936–42	2cm KwK30 cannon or 2cm KwK38 cannon and 7.92mm MG34 machine gun	8.3 tons	53mph
SdKfz 233	Schichau	1942–43	7.5cm StuK 37 L/24 and 7.92mm MG42 machine gun	8.7 tons	50mph
SdKfz 234	Bussing-NAG	1944–45	2cm KwK38 L/55 and 7.92mm MG42 machine gun	11.5 tons	50mph

The vehicle that was produced had a very advanced design with an impressive cross-country capability, which surpassed anything else then in service anywhere. A rear-mounted Bussing-NAG L8V-GS eight-cylinder water-cooled petrol engine developing 150hp at 3,000rpm produced speeds of up to 53mph on roads and carried sufficient fuel to give an operational range of around 170 miles. The ability to cope with naturally occurring obstacles on the battlefields, such as fallen trees and ditches, is always desirable in armoured car designs and while some had limited capability, the SdKfz 232 was better than most, and was able to span gaps of over 4ft, negotiate gradients of up to 30 degrees and vertical obstacles of over 1.5ft were no barrier to this vehicle, which weighed 8.3 tons. The SdKfz 232 measured 19ft 2in long, 7ft 3in wide and 9ft 6in high to the top of the turret, which had a full 360-degree traverse capability and mounted a main armament of either a KwK30 or KwK38 2cm cannon for which 180 rounds of ammunition were carried. The gun could be elevated to +26 degrees and depressed to −10 degrees, allowing it to engage a wide range of targets, from vehicles to low-flying aircraft. It was not the only eight-wheeled vehicle in the German Army’s arsenal but it was the first, and it served through the entire period of the war, with some still being used in 1945. This was an incredible achievement for a vehicle that ceased production in 1943 with a total of around 1,235, a figure that includes other specialised variants that were being built, and it is a testimony to its utilitarian design. It was replaced by the SdKfz 234 ‘Puma’, but those examples of the SdKfz 232 that were still in service continued to be used in their original role.

It was a complex vehicle with a highly advanced chassis design and, apart from some improvements to the hull and minor changes to the automotive design, it remained the same vehicle throughout the war. Armour protection was between 8mm and 15mm, set at varying angles to help deflect projectiles. However, this level of protection was not considered sufficient and an upgrading programme was begun to retrofit additional armour to the vehicle. This took the form of an angled plate fitted to the front across the bow and forming spaced armour across the glacis plate. This was called a Pakschutz and looked rather like the blade of a snowplough. As the term implies, it was meant to provide protection against anti-tank guns. This was only a temporary measure and the first Pakschutz may have been fitted to the SdKfz 231 in early 1940. Typically of the troops, they soon found that they could store extra kit and supplies in the space between the Pakschutz and the glacis plate of the vehicle. The device was fitted until after May 1942, after which armour protection was increased to a maximum level of 30mm thickness instead, resulting in almost 1 ton being added to the weight of the vehicle. The SdKfz 231 was served by a crew of four who could also rely on a secondary armament comprising of a co-axial mounted MG34 machine gun, for which 2,100 rounds were carried, for self-defence and fire support in an emergency. The vehicle and its later derivatives, such as the SdKfz 232 which was built from May 1942, were formed into heavy platoons serving with the Panzerspähwagen squadrons on the heavy Aufklärungs (reconnaissance) detachments. The vehicles served in all theatres of the war, from Western Europe to Russia and North Africa, which means that modellers have a wide choice of settings, colour schemes and even variants in which to depict the SdKfz 231, from armoured car to radio vehicle with its frame aerial and even the special add-on armour Pakschutz device.

Allied Equipment and Preparations for War

In 1939 the French Army was one of the largest in Europe and had a tank force larger than any other European country, as well as a fleet of trucks to support it. When war was declared Winston Churchill was appointed to the post of First Sea Lord and stated, ‘Thank God for the French Army’. The French had a standing army of 900,000 men with a further 5 million trained reservists with a tank force of 3,500 vehicles comprising 2,700 light tanks, 500 medium and 300 heavy tanks along with a strong artillery force for support. By comparison Britain had an armoured force of 600 light and medium tanks. The German Army by contrast had some 3,400 light and medium tanks that had been built up from nothing, and these were available for an attack in the west. France relied on the Maginot Line to protect its eastern border against attack by Germany. The Maginot Line was an impressive series of defences stretching 87 miles, and was heavily armed and armoured. However, it stopped 250 miles short of the Channel coast; serving the guns of this series of subterranean fortresses was a force of 250,000 men.

Searchlights were mounted on trucks to give mobility to these large and heavy pieces of equipment.

When war was declared the French Army mobilised and Britain prepared to send the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to take up positions close to the Franco-German border. At the time there proved to be a shortfall of light vehicles in service and the British Army was obliged to press into service some 26,000 civilian vehicles, including 5,000 private cars, 7,000 motorcycles and 14,000 trucks. This emergency move took the total number of soft-skinned vehicles up to 55,000 and by the end of the war the army had 1.25 million utility vehicles in service. The BEF numbered just four divisions in 1939 but by May 1940 it had increased its strength to ten divisions. Initially some 24,000 vehicles, including tanks, trucks and supplies, were moved into operational areas and defensive positions were prepared. The tank forces included 229 vehicles of which 171 were light tanks armed with only machine guns. One type of truck used at the time was the Retriever, dating from the early 1930s and built by Leyland, which was fitted with a 6-litre, four-cylinder overhead cam petrol engine of a design built by Leyland. The engine was rated at 73bhp at 1,150rpm and, although the trucks were in widespread use, the fleet had actually been declared obsolete. The coming of war was a reprieve and the trucks were kept in use for the duration and served to transport supplies. The Retriever was also fitted out to serve in the role of field workshop and breakdown recovery vehicles; some were equipped to serve as searchlight pontoon trucks. A Leyland Retriever was fitted into use as a field caravan for Field Marshal Montgomery when on campaign and was spacious enough for his maps and for meetings.

The Leyland Retriever was a 1930s design but it was used throughout the war as a field workshop and other roles. The driver’s controls were very basic for such a large vehicle. The Retriever was spacious and Montgomery used one as his tactical vehicle on campaign.

Range of vehicles in use by the British Army in the 1930s showing from left to right: 5-ton Leyland heavy tender; Morris six-wheel ambulance and Leyland wireless tender with its support truck.

View showing the height of this Leyland truck from the 1930s which is over 6ft.

All the lessons concerning the tactics the German Army would come to use in combat were there for the Allies to read, but works such as Infanterie Greift (Infantry Attack) and Achtung-Panzer! (Attention-Armour!), written respectively by Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian, both of whom had been officers in the First World War, went largely overlooked. In Guderian’s book, for example, were listed all the elements for modern armoured warfare, combined operations and support, and the blueprint for the new form of warfare that would become known as blitzkrieg (lightning war). The Germans almost certainly did not invent the expression and it is believed that the term may have been coined by a journalist reporting on the Polish campaign in 1939. Heinz Guderian would later state that: ‘our [Germany’s] enemies coined the word Blitzkrieg.’ This was a first-hand opinion and one cannot argue with those who were there and knew the real story. The Allies had seen a demonstration of the German Army’s new blitzkrieg tactics during the Polish campaign but nothing could prepare them for it, and they could not formulate a strategy to counter it in the time given. A handful of British officers had taken notice before the outbreak of war, one of whom was Captain Basil Liddell Hart, whose own writings on tank warfare had influenced a number of German officers such as Heinz Guderian, who presented a signed photograph of himself to Hart inscribed: ‘To Captain B.L. Hart from one of his disciples in tank affairs.’ Another of Hart’s devotees was General Hasso von Manteuffell, and he too presented Hart with a personal photograph addressed to ‘the creator of modern tank strategy’. One could hardly fail to notice the poignancy in the sentiments appended to the photographs.

Pre-war exercise moving searchlight on trucks c. 1937.

Russia and the Russo-Finnish War

While the eyes of the world were focused on Germany and Poland, Russia had meanwhile been consolidating its territorial gains in Poland, which it had invaded on 17 September. Two months later Russia turned its attention towards Finland, its northern neighbour, which it attacked in November. The assault by 1 million men supported by 1,500 tanks and 3,000 aircraft looked set to crush the Finnish Army. The Russo-Finnish War is often overlooked in the wider history of the Second World War, but it was far from being a sideshow. The Russians had an estimated 24,000 tanks from which force they brought up more reserves such as the massive KV–1 tank. More importantly, they had supplies in abundance. The Finns turned out to be a tougher opponent than the Russians had thought and the fighting lasted until March 1940, by which time the Finnish armed forces had inflicted some 200,000 losses and destroyed 1,600 tanks. The Red Army had killed 25,000 Finns and Russia gained all the territorial demands it made. Finland would return to fight against Russia once again as Germany’s ally on 26 June 1941. This was referred to as the Continuation War. The Finns would fight for more than three years but by 20 September 1944 they sought peace negotiations with Russia and then, in an about-turn, took up arms against its former ally, Germany, on 1 October 1944. During the time they fought as Germany’s ally, Finnish volunteers were formed into the Nordost Battalion of the Waffen-SS and the SS Wiking Division, both units that required armoured support and trucks for supply and transport. In the post-war period the country had to pay huge reparation costs to Russia, which also made further territorial claims against Finland until the last payment was settled. The Finns also uniquely used reindeer as transport animals which, being indigenous to the region, were better suited to the harsh conditions, unlike horses which suffered terribly from the cold.

Sweden and the Norwegian Campaign

The Norwegian campaign was begun by Germany on 9 April 1940 when they launched a combined naval and airborne strike force from Denmark. The British and French sent troops and warships to assist the Norwegians and the fighting was fierce. The type of warfare prevented the use of tanks, and motorised transport was severely limited. The Norwegians possessed no tanks, and all their artillery was horse-drawn. In view of events in France and Belgium the Allies withdrew their troops, and on 9 June, exactly two months to the day since the German invasion, the Norwegians surrendered. Lying inland to the east was Sweden, which was historically neutral and reaffirmed this status, which was honoured by the Allies and Germany. Even so, Sweden felt obliged to maintain a state of ‘armed neutrality’, the same as the position adopted by Switzerland. Sweden found itself in a unique position in that it continued to trade with both sides throughout the war but favoured the Allies. Because of its position, Sweden maintained border guard posts along its frontier with German-occupied Norway to the west and Finland to the east, which were later increased when Finland allied itself with Germany against Russia in June 1941. The size of the Swedish Army was nominal and there were a few armoured vehicles, such as the M39/40 armoured car, which had entered service in 1939 and was armed with a 20mm cannon and 8mm machine gun. Other vehicles included the Stridsvagn m/40 light tank based on a German design, and the Stridsvagn m/41, which was based on a Czechoslovakian design. There was also an SPG variant known as the Stormartillerivagn m/43, which was armed with a 105mm gun.

In the immediate aftermath of Germany’s attack on Poland, the whole of Europe braced itself for the war into which every country must surely follow, and which would thereby engulf the continent. Several countries had a history of neutrality, including Switzerland and Sweden, but even these nations realised that they too had to be prepared, with their armies equipped, should the fighting spill over their borders. When Germany invaded Denmark in April and also attacked Norway, it took the fighting to the borders of neutral Sweden, which then found itself surrounded by occupied countries. Fearing the worst, it placed its armed forces in a state of preparedness in case of attack. Swedish troops manned frontier posts on the border between Sweden and Norway and patrols were conducted to ensure that there was no breech of protocol. Sweden had only a small army in 1940, but despite its limited size in manpower it was equipped with artillery along with a small number of armoured vehicles, such as the m/39–40 armoured car and the Stridsvagn m/40 light tank. Sweden had the necessary research and design engineering resources required to produce armoured vehicles, but the m39/40 armoured car design was really little more than a truck chassis on to which armoured plate had been fitted for protection. The Stridsvagn m/40 light tank was actually designed by German engineers and its appearance showed this German influence. Indeed, Germany and Sweden had a history of cooperation in weapon design that went back to the end of the First World War, when German technicians moved to Sweden to continue development of weapons that Germany was forbidden to possess under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. One of these development programmes produced the 88mm anti-tank gun so feared by Allied tank crews.

An m/43 Stormartillerivagn as used by the Swedish Army. It is armed with a 105mm gun in a ball mounting, and shows the rivetted design of construction.

Just before the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 the Swedish company Jungner had acquired the rights to build a limited production run of some fifty Czech-designed AN-IV-S tanks, which entered service with the Swedish Army as the Stridsvagn m/37. These were useful vehicles with a good road speed that led to a further order being placed with the Czech manufacturer. This was to be for the TNHP tank, but when war broke out hostilities prevented the delivery being made. However, as an alternative arrangement Sweden was granted the right to build the vehicle under licence from Germany, which by then controlled the Czech armaments industry. In fact Germany was using the TNHP 38-ton design for its own purposes and developed a number of fighting vehicles on the chassis, one of which would later be the Hetzer self-propelled tank destroyer. The Swedish company Scania-Vabis was given the contract to build a total of 238 vehicles in two versions between 1942 and 1944.

The first variant based on the versatile TNHP chassis was the basic Stridsvagn m/41 light tank, which was armed with a 37mm-calibre main gun mounted in a fully traversing turret. A small number of the Czech-designed vehicles were also used to produce a second rather unusual but fascinating SPG version, which only ever saw service with the Swedish Army. According to some sources only around thirty-six of these SPG versions were ever built by Scania-Vabis, and these were known as the Stormartillerivagn (SAV) m/43. Using the chassis and hull, a superstructure of riveted design was built up using armour plate up to 25mm thick. This gave the vehicle a box-like appearance not dissimilar to the German Marder III SPG, which was also based on the LT–38 chassis, but was armed with the lighter 75mm anti-tank gun. Fitted into the front of the hull of the Swedish vehicle was a large ball-type mounting that permitted a 105mm-calibre field gun to be installed. Originally, the SAV m/43 was to have been armed with a gun of 75mm calibre, but it was decided that the more powerful gun would be better suited to the needs of the Swedish Army in terms of providing fire support and counter-battery fire. The ball mounting gave limited traverse and the gun could fire out to ranges of some 10,000yd depending on the elevation of the barrel.

The SAV m/43 was fitted with a rear-mounted Scania-Vabis six-cylinder water-cooled petrol engine that delivered 140hp to give road speeds of over 25mph. It weighed 11.8 tons and records show that one of the first units to be equipped with the SPG was an artillery regiment stationed in Kristinehamn. In the event of Sweden going to war the m/43 would have been used in batteries of six vehicles to provide artillery support for infantry or counter-battery fire. The vehicle was fitted with four road wheels either side with the drive sprocket at the front and the idler wheel at the rear with two return rollers, as used on the German Army’s Marder III. The SAV m/43 SPG was served by a crew of four and had an operational range of about 125 miles. The vehicle was just over 6ft 6in high with an overall length of 15ft and a width of almost 7ft.

Sweden’s state of neutrality was recognised internationally and it had not been involved in a war since 1814. Even so, it was still capable of producing weapons and one of the country’s leading armaments manufacturers was Bofors, which produced some exceptional designs, such as the 40mm anti-aircraft gun. These weapons were exported and used by armies around the world, including Britain and America. The Germans had their own comparable weapon in the form of the FlaK 18, 36 and 37 guns, which fired 3.7cm shells, but even they used captured examples of Bofors guns. The Germans had exploited Sweden’s position of neutrality by sending engineers to the country to work for Bofors, and used the loophole for their own military gain. In fact, the relationship between Germany and Sweden led to the latter redressing its military imbalance and beginning a rearmament programme. Sweden also built tanks such as the m/21 and although only ten were built, the design set the foundations on which a number of tank designs would be laid over the coming years. Sweden purchased a number of tanks from Britain and France, including Renault NC27 light tanks from which they took certain features to provide ideas, reducing the amount of time and expenditure spent on development and leading to several useful tanks designs, each of which incorporated improvements.

One of the resulting designs was the m/38 tank, which was built exclusively for service with the Swedish Army. This vehicle was the culmination of several years of development and gave the country a weapon platform that would help it guard its neutrality. Although a sound design, the m/38 was quickly followed by the m/39, which was armed with a 37mm-calibre gun mounted in a fully traversing turret. This was actually a very advanced design for a country with no historic enemies. In fact, the calibre of the gun mounted on the m/39 tank was larger than the machine gun on the German Panzer I and the 2cm-calibre cannon mounted on the Panzer II, both of which were in service with the German Army at the time.

Recreated Swedish intantryman c. 1939 carrying his rifle in the position for riding his bicycle.

The Stridsvagn m/40 light tank was in service with the Swedish Army during the war even though Sweden was neutral.

Notable Swedish Military Vehicles

Vehicle Name	Type	Manufacturer	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
m39/40	Armoured car	Landsverk	1939	20mm cannon and 8mm machine gun	7.6 tons	44mph
Stridsvagn m/37	Light tank	Junger	1938	2x 8mm machine guns	4.5 tons	38mph
Stridsvagn m/40	Light tank	Landsverk	1940	37mm gun and 2x 8mm machine guns	9.4 tons	30mph
Stridsvagn m/41	Light tank	Scania-Vabis	1942	37mm-calibre gun and 2x 8mm machine guns	10.3 tons	26mph
Stridsvagn m/42	Heavy tank	Landsverk	1942	75mm-calibre guns and 4x 8mm machine guns	22.2 tons	26mph
Stormartillerivagn (SAV) m/43	Light tank	Landsverk	1944	105mm field gun	11.8 tons	25mph
m/37	Light tank	Junger	1938	2x 8mm machine guns	4.4 tons	37mph
m/38	Tank	Landsverk	1939	37mm gun and 2x 8mm machine guns	8.5 tons	28mph
m/39	Tank	Landsverk	1938	37mm gun and 2x 8mm machine guns	8.7 tons	26mph
Stridsvagn m/40L	Tank	Landsverk	1940	37mm gun and 2x 8mm machine guns	9.3 tons	25mph
Stridsvagn m/40K	Tank	Landsverk	1943	37mm gun and 2x 8mm machine guns	10.7 tons	28mph

By 1940 the indigenous Swedish tank design reached its pinnacle with the prototype for a new project known as the Stridsvagn m/40, which was fitted with an engine rated at 142hp and again more powerful than the engine fitted to either the Panzer I or Panzer II tanks. The first production models of this new tank, termed the m/40L, would be improved on in a later version. This was known as the m/40K and would be fitted with better armour protection that increased the combat weight to 10.7 tons; it was powered by an engine rated at 160hp. The m/40L version of the new light tank was built in relatively small numbers and by 1945 there were only 180 in service with the Swedish Army. These were in service with light tank companies, and in 1941 their typical strength included three platoons, each equipped with four m/37 light tanks and one m/40L tank. Sweden was never involved in any action during the Second World War, but its armed forces nevertheless had to be maintained. The number of troops serving with the armoured units numbered around 6,500 and included seventy-six heavy tanks of the Stridsvagn m/42 type armed with 75mm calibre guns.

The m/40L was 16ft long, 6ft 10in wide and just over 6ft 6in high to the top of the turret. The maximum armour thickness was 24mm and its combat weight was 9.3 tons. A water-cooled Scania-Vabis petrol engine of six cylinders and rated at 140hp produced a road speed of 25mph and fuel capacity was sufficient for over 120 miles. Four road wheels were fitted either side with two return rollers, a drive sprocket at the front and an idler wheel at the rear of the layout. This permitted the m/40L to negotiate vertical obstacles of 2ft, cross open spans of over 5ft and cope with gradients of up to 60 per cent.

The m/40L was served by a crew of three men and included quite a formidable armament mounted in a turret capable of a full 360-degree traverse. A 37mm main armament was complemented by two 8mm machine guns that were mounted co-axially. This layout would have been useful in providing close fire support to infantry units and for engaging lightly armoured vehicles. While not in the same category as later German tanks such as the Panzer III and Panzer IV, in this tank the influences that led to its development can be seen, and it served the purposes of the Swedish Army quite adequately. However, had the country been invaded it is doubtful whether the lightly armoured vehicle would have stood up in battle against German guns. In the end, the country was not involved in the fighting and the m/40 series and later tanks such as the m/41 and m/42 were never put to the test in battle.

The End of the Phoney War

Finally, after eight months, the wait was over, and the German Army attacked along the Dutch border and at points along the Belgian and French border on 10 May 1940. That same day the British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, resigned from office and Winston Churchill was invited to form a government. Churchill was made of sterner stuff than Chamberlain and his appeasement policies, and would prove tireless in his efforts to win the war. The weight of the attack was overwhelming, as 136 divisions of infantry and ten armoured or panzer divisions, supported by artillery, aircraft and engineering units, moved as a cohesive force to swamp the Allies. One of the leading vehicles was the SdKfz 247, built in very low numbers but produced in two distinct models that were important for reconnaissance missions. Designated the Schwere Geländegängige Gepanzerte Personenkraftwagen (heavy cross-country armoured passenger car), the first ten vehicles were 6x4 design and termed Ausf. A. They were built by Daimler-Benz, based on the Krupp L2H143 chassis in 1937, and were intended as an armoured staff car for commanders of reconnaissance units. This version was powered by a Krupp M305 57PS engine, giving road speeds of up to 43mph. It weighed 5.2 tons and had an operational range of 217 miles.

The Schwere Geländegängige Gepanzerte Personenkraftwagen (SdKfz)

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
SdKfz 247	Daimler-Benz	1941–42	N/A	4.5 tons	50mph

Following the campaigns against Poland in 1939 and the blitzkrieg against France and the Low Countries, the German Army sought an improved version of the SdKfz vehicle. In the seven-month period between July 1941 and January 1942 a further fifty-eight vehicles of a similar design were built by Daimler-Benz and designated the Ausf. B. Such low production rates were hardly a drain on resources but the fact remains that the role for such a vehicle on the battlefield was thought to be on a small scale. In combat it was intended that the commander of each Aufklärung (reconnaissance unit) of either a panzer or motorised division should be equipped with such a vehicle. The Ausf. B version of the SdKfz 247 was markedly different from the Ausf. A version as it was a 4x4 vehicle based on the chassis of a heavy passenger car. The maximum thickness of the armoured body was 8mm and it weighed 4.5 tons, which was much lighter than the earlier version due to the third set of wheels being removed. The shape was changed and it measured 16.4ft long, 6.5ft wide and 5.9ft high. It was powered by a front-mounted, air-cooled, eight-cylinder Horch 3.5-litre petrol engine with five forward and one reverse gear, which gave road speeds of up to 50mph. It had an operational distance of 250 miles, which was very good for the role that it was intended to operate in. It appears from all reference sources that it was never equipped with any form of armament, not even for self-defence, apart from the personal weapons carried by the six-man crew. The SdKfz 247 remained in service until 1945, with some vehicles eventually being fitted with additional armour at the front to protect the engine. Some sources state that no radio equipment was fitted but this is contradicted by the fact that wartime photographs show examples of the Ausf. B with a ‘star-shaped’ antenna and it is unlikely that this feature would be fitted without a radio. However, despite all efforts at this time, the radio type that was fitted is still unknown. The vehicle was open-topped, which exposed the crew not only to the elements but also to shell splinters from overhead explosions. To protect the crew against inclement weather a canvas cover could be pulled overhead.

Motorcycles

Among the first vehicles to cross the borders, scouting ahead of the armoured columns to make sure the roads were clear and to report on the conditions of bridges over rivers, were fast-moving motorcycles. Throughout the war these machines would become one of the most versatile vehicles to be used by all belligerent nations. Every army used motorcycles and they were deployed to all theatres of fighting, from the desert wastes of North Africa all across Europe and the frozen steppes of Russia. The American company Harley-Davidson built some 90,000 machines for the American armed forces during the war and a further 30,000 for Russia under the terms of Lend-Lease. In 1942 Harley-Davidson also copied the German BMW R71 motorcycle to produce the XA model, but only 1,000 of these were produced because they proved too expensive to build. Throughout the rearmament period of the 1930s the German Army came to realise the usefulness the motorcycle would have as a military vehicle and how it would fit in with the new blitzkrieg tactics that were being devised, and a series of machines were developed accordingly. One of the leading manufacturers of motorcycles was Bayerische Motoren Werke (BMW), which would produce some of the most popular and enduring machines to become workhorses on the battlefield, serving as they did in the reconnaissance role, or as medical services, liaison and general communications vehicles.

Recreated SdKfz 247 radio vehicle equipped with ‘star’ aeriel. Built in small numbers, the vehicle served well in its role. Here the SdKfz 247 radio vehicle looks very convincing at a re-enactment event and shows style of construction.

Before the war the Munich-based BMW firm produced a range of motorcycles such as the R12, which was used by the German Army between 1935 and 1941, and the R61, which was also produced as a combination vehicle with sidecar. But it was the Schweres Kraftrad 750cc mit Seitenwagen, better known as the R75, with its Boxer OHV two-cylinder, 26hp, petrol-driven engine and sidecar that would become the most popular machine and prove its versatility in many campaigns, including Poland in 1939, France in 1940 and Russia in 1941. It was used in Greece and Italy and saw service in many other occupied nations. By the end of the war in 1945, more than 16,000 R75s had been built by BMW. The design and layout of the conventional motorcycle precludes it from being armed, but the fitting of a sidecar to the right-hand side meant that a machine gun could be mounted and operated by the passenger in this unit. In the case of the R75 the weapon was invariably the MG34 with extra ammunition carried inside the sidecar unit. Additional equipment such as tools, tents and food could be strapped to the rear of the sidecar combination unit to allow the riders to operate with a certain degree of autonomy for days at a time when operating in the reconnaissance role. Typically the rifle brigade of a panzer division would include a motorcycle battalion comprising two motorcycle companies, a machine-gun company and a mixed company. The armoured reconnaissance battalion of a panzer division would also include a motorcycle company.

Motorcycles of the German Army

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production Date	Features	Armament	Engine	Max. Speed
R12	BMW	1935–41	N/A	N/A	BMW 750cc	57mph
R61	BMW	1938–41	Sidecar and trailer	7.92mm MG34 machine gun	BMW 750cc	57mph
R75	BMW	1939 onwards	Sidecar	7.92mm MG34 machine gun	Boxer 750cc OHV two-cylinder, 26hp petrol	56mph
KS750	Zündapp	1940	Sidecar	7.92mm MG34 machine gun	751cc petrol	50mph

The German Army also used light cars such as the Kubelwagen and the amphibious-capable Schwimmwagen in the same roles as the motorcycle, but they lacked the advantage of the motorcycle, which could traverse bridges that had been rendered unusable for larger or heavier vehicles. For example, it was motorcycle riders that located the small, narrow bridge across the River Meuse just north of Sedan that allowed the first German troops to cross after all bridges had been destroyed by the French Army on 12 May 1940. With both sides of the river secured, the engineers could construct a bridge across the river to allow heavier vehicles to cross. Long before the bridge was finished the motorcycle units were moving ahead and scouting the ground before the tanks.

Almost from the very beginning of its rearmament programme in 1933, the German Army recognised the potential of the motorcycle. Indeed, as early as 1931 General Heinz Guderian, in command of a transport battalion, had conducted military exercises using motorcycles to represent tanks supplemented with obsolete armoured cars in order to formulate armoured warfare tactics that would later allow the panzer divisions to charge across Europe. His dictum would become ‘Klotzern, nicht kleckern’ (Smash, don’t tap).

Riders of motorcycles remained vulnerable to rifle fire and during the campaigns of 1939 and 1940 they suffered heavy casualties. But it was the ability of the riders to push their motorcycles across obstacles and maintain the impression of a continued advance that favoured German tactics. The machine-gunner in the sidecar could fire at targets and provide support for infantry as they advanced. Even when the main roads were clogged with the debris of war, the motorcycles of the panzer divisions could still fan out and reconnoitre ahead of the main columns.

A replica example of a Germany army DKW motorcycle as used during the war.

BMW R75 motorcycle combination with two PzKw IV tanks in the rear, probably somewhere on the Eastern Front.

BMW R75 motorcycle combination.

Collection of various types of German Army motorcycles used during the war, including the light trailers for carrying extra supplies.

German Army BMW equipped as a medical support unit.

Replica BMW motorcycle combination loaded with three crew to depict how a reconnaissance unit would have operated.

Replica German Army motorcycle armed with MG42 as it would have been during the war.

Replica German Army motorcycle combination in action during a battle re-enactment scenario to show how it would have been used for real.

The BMW R75 motorcycle combination weighed 0.7 tons and had an overall length of 7ft 10in. The air-cooled 750cc engine gave it a maximum speed of 57mph and the fuel tank had a capacity to allow a range of operations of more than 200 miles, which was more than sufficient when deployed in the reconnaissance role. The vehicle was operated by the rider and a passenger was carried in the sidecar, but an additional man, such as a radio operator, could also be carried in order to relay information back to the main unit. The crew would be armed with personal weapons, either rifles or MP40 sub-machine guns, so that between them they could defend themselves. The motorcycle combination proved a robust machine able to transporting enormous loads far beyond what it was understood to be capable of. For example, wartime photographs exist that show a motorcycle combination, presumably in France, transporting five men sitting on the machine, which is also towing a PaK35/36 anti-tank gun of 3.7cm calibre – a remarkable feat of endurance. Such a move would not have been standard operational procedure, but it does show what could be achieved in an emergency.

The R75 was fitted with a four-speed gearbox and included a reverse gear, which was good for getting out of the muddy quagmire on the Russian front. The layout was conventional with hydraulic brakes on the drive wheels and mechanical braking for the front wheel with telescopic front forks for suspension. An unusual feature about the R75 was the fact that the wheel of the sidecar was also driven by the engine, which proved invaluable in the deep mud of the Eastern Front in Russia. When operating with medical units, the R75 could both carry supplies forward and assist with the evacuation of the wounded in the sidecar, making the combination one of the most understated machines of the whole Second World War.

Other motorcycles that were also available to the German Army included the Zündapp KS750, which, like the BMW R75, could be equipped with a sidecar combination for use in liaison and reconnaissance roles. The Zündapp KS750 had an air-cooled 751cc petrol engine that drove the rear wheel and also that of the sidecar when it was fitted. This model also proved its worth in the same range of duties as other motorcycles and was deployed to all theatres of war where the German Army fought. Because of their small size and manoeuvrability combined with their speed, it could be said that motorcycles were the prying eyes of the attacking force.

The German Motor Industry

As early as 1934, Lieutenant Colonel Nehring wrote that in his opinion the German motor industry should be supported by the army as a whole. In other words, he believed that the German Army should become the main client of the country’s motor industry, which would greatly benefit the industry and allow for expansion. Between 1933 and 1935 German military spending more than doubled from 5 million RM (Reichsmarks) to 11 million RM, and the German motor industry consolidated its position by becoming wholly autonomous. By 1937 German Ford vehicles were manufactured using only materials from Germany. After the Anschluss and the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938, Germany had a massive industrial power base at its disposal for the production of motor vehicles and armoured vehicles, including tanks. But it was a very mishmash organisation with much duplication and was wasteful with resources. In 1938 General Major von Schell proposed a new streamlining plan for the motor industry called the Schell Plan. Among the many changes suggested was a proposal to reduce the number of motorcycle designs from 150 different models to only thirty. It may have been due to being denied armoured vehicles, including personnel carriers, that prompted the German Army to place such emphasis on the motorcycle and experiment with them to move large units of troops. These trials began in the mid–1930s and culminated with a series of field exercises, one of which involved putting an entire battalion of infantry of a panzer division’s rifle brigade on motorcycles for speed of movement. This planning allowed the German Army to have large numbers of motorcycles in service and available for the invasion of Poland in September 1939, for the blitzkrieg westwards into France, Holland and Belgium in May 1940 and again for the invasion of Russia in June 1941. In every area of occupation the motorcycle could be seen responding to all manner of situations, and among them was the Zündapp.

The Zündapp

Zündapp produced some 18,000 machines during the war, some of which were standard motorcycles, while others were a combination, fitted with sidecar units and used right up to the final collapse of the German Army in May 1945.

The Zündapp motorcycle with sidecar was a useful and versatile vehicle in its role on the battlefield, which included the evacuation of wounded. Its unladen weight was less than 900lb and fully laden for combat it could weigh up to 1,800lb, which would amount to three men and their kit. In an emergency and over short distances the motorcycle could transport greater loads and, as with the BMW R75, there are photographs showing Zündapp motorcycles carrying loads that are evidently far in excess of what they were intended for. In combat, improvisation is a motivating factor and machines were operated beyond their capacity out of necessity. The ground clearance of these motorcycles was only 6in and, while it was set rather low, it was comparable to other motorcycles of the day. When the machine became bogged down in the glutinous mud on the Russian front the light weight and rear-wheel drive allowed it to be pushed out. The Zündapp motorcycle was rather a compact machine measuring less than 5ft 6in in overall width with sidecar and just over 7ft 9in in length. The machine had a good turn of speed and could reach speeds of around 50mph.

As with other motorcycle combinations, it only carried an MG34 7.92mm-calibre light machine gun armament for self-defence. It was usually fitted with a ‘saddle drum’ magazine because the ammunition belt could become snagged and prevent firing. As with the BMW R75 machine, extra ammunition would be carried in the sidecar unit; with a spare wheel on the rear of the unit and the crew’s kit securely fastened, it was possible for such a combination unit to operate far ahead of the main unit in order to reconnoitre in front and bring back information regarding the enemy’s movements. By using such versatile machines the German Army was able to maintain a stream of vital information through to the General Staff, which could then plan the next operational phase of an attack. In medical support and communications the motorcycle in all armies would prove essential at all levels on the battlefield.

The German Attack

The first victim of the German attack in 1940 was the tiny Dutch Army of 114,000 men, which surrendered on 14 May after the city of Rotterdam was bombed. In the five days of fighting, the Dutch Army sustained 9,779 casualties and its few armoured cars, such as the M39 Panserwagen had been no match for the German tanks or anti-tank guns. Those vehicles that were not destroyed in the fighting were taken into service by the German Army and the M39, for example, would be categorised as the Pz SpWg L202 (h). They were eventually used for internal security duties; the letter ‘h’ denoted Holland. The intensity of the German attack, which was spearheaded by columns of tanks with armoured cars and fast-moving motorcycle units scouting ahead, was more powerful than anything that they could have prepared against. Hitler later wrote an assessment of the Dutch Army, stating: ‘They [the Dutch] put up a stronger resistance than we expected. Many of their units fought very bravely. But they had neither appropriate training nor experience of war. For this reason they were usually overcome by German forces which were often numerically very inferior.’ For all his faults as a commander, including the fact that he never attended military college, Hitler gave credit where credit was due in his opinion. The Netherlands had been neutral in the First World War and the country believed that it could maintain this stance again, but circumstances dictated otherwise and the army was neither prepared nor equipped.

The rapidity with which the Germans advanced was startling. The XIX Corps, commanded by Guderian, covered a distance of 151 miles from the point of its initial attack to the Channel coast in eight days. This gave it an average advance rate of 19 miles per day, with the best performance being 56 miles in one day. The speed of the advance led to Guderian being nicknamed ‘Der schnelle Heinz’ (Fast Heinz). Fuel consumption was a problem for the tanks with an armoured division requiring 1,000 gallons for every mile on roads and as much as double that figure when operating cross-country. German tanks were fuelled by petrol, which meant that in an emergency they could, in theory at least, refuel from commercial garages. Trucks carried fuel for the tanks and motorcycles in jerrycans, and tankers carrying fuel in bulk followed behind with the supply column. Much later, Guderian spoke about the campaign in France and commented that the commander of the 2nd Panzer Division believed his units were running out of fuel, stating: ‘After regulating the fuel stocks in the hands of the troops it proved possible to continue the advance. One must always distrust the report of troop commanders [who say] “We have no fuel”. Generally they have. But if they become tired, they have no fuel. This is a common experience of war with forward troops. During the campaign in France there was no lack of fuel; good staff work can avoid this calamity.’ Regarding the same issue in later campaigns, he went on to state: ‘Later in the war we often had a real scarcity of fuel because of the destruction of our industry. But in 1940 it was only a question of transport and easy to solve.’

This was Guderian changing his mind with hindsight because he knew it could be, and indeed was, vastly different, as he had witnessed first-hand during pre-war manoeuvres in 1938 when he was commanding a panzer division during the Anschluss between Germany and Austria. His tanks covered a distance of 400 miles in two days, which was an extreme test. On average there was a 30 per cent mechanical breakdown rate among the tanks and he noted at the time the ‘inefficiency of maintenance facilities, particularly for the tanks’. He was also concerned about fuel supplies. The exercise taught the German Army many things about specialist recovery and support vehicles, supplies of fuel and maintenance problems. The 1939 Polish campaign and the attack against France, Belgium and Holland produced higher levels of mechanical failure among tank units, which reported on average a 50 per cent failure rate. This was only to be expected, as the stresses of combat are far greater than in peacetime manoeuvres. The mechanical failure could even be high among lorries, and pre-war exercises had shown that the army could lose up to 10,000 vehicles a year through breakdowns alone. If the tanks were to be kept supplied then more supply lorries and specialist recovery vehicles had to be made available to the panzer divisions.

The other exponent in modern warfare involved in the 1940 campaign in France was General Erwin Rommel, commanding 7th Panzer Division, who covered a distance of 110 miles in the same time, with a daily average of 13.75 miles’ advance per day; the unit was nicknamed the ‘Ghost Division’. The entire column of an armoured division, including troops, supporting artillery and horses, could stretch along 70 miles of roadway and in some extreme cases would move at an average speed of 2.5mph, causing massive tailbacks and bottleneck jams at junctions. The tanks could move cross-country but the supply trucks were restricted to roads, which did not always run parallel to the axis of advance; they had to keep up as best they could. These supply trucks also needed to be fuelled in order to remain operational. The German Army had six standardised units (called Kolonne or ‘columns’) to transport supplies. The first was the Fahrkolonne, which was a horse-drawn unit with the capacity of transporting 29.5 tons. The second type was the Leichte Fahrkolonne, which was identical to the Fahrkollone but could only transport 16.7 tons. The Leichte Kraftwagen Kolonne was a motorised column capable of transporting 29.5 tons. The Schweres Kraftwagen Kolonne was the heavyweight unit capable of transporting 59 tons of supplies, including food, ammunition and medical supplies. The Leichte Kraftwagen Kolonne für Betriebstoff was the motor transport column responsible for fuel and had the capacity to move 5,500 gallons. Lastly, there was the Schweres Kraftwagen Kolonne für Betriebstoff, which had the capacity to transport 11,000 gallons of fuel. These transport columns would move the supplies as close as possible to wherever they were required in order to minimise handling.

Rommel and Guderian had given written warnings of what could be expected in future wars and now they were proving it in practice on the battlefield. The size of armoured divisions would vary during the war but it would always remain autonomous and this was the same in all armies.

Development of the British Army’s A11 Matilda Mk I

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
A11 Matilda Mk I	Vickers	1938	.303in machine gun or .50in-calibre machine gun	10 tons	8mph

Despite all the published material available and the actual demonstration of blitzkrieg tactics in Poland, the British and French still maintained their belief in their tactics for armoured warfare, which held that tanks should operate in support of the infantry. Indeed, many of the tank designs had the term ‘infantry’ as part of their designation. The British A11 Matilda Mk I ‘infantry tank’, for example, was deployed to France with the BEF in 1940 and the A12 Matilda Mk II was also classed as an infantry tank. The development of the A11 or Matilda Mk I can be traced back to the mid–1930s when the British Army sent General Sir Hugh Elles to Vickers with a view to ordering a new design of tank. The design was to be of a type referred to as an infantry tank, which meant that it had to have adequate armour protection, be armed only with a single machine gun and have a much reduced speed so as not to outpace the infantry, because it would be these troops that the tank would be supporting during an assault. These design stipulations were fine on paper and Vickers could certainly have produced a vehicle to meet these requirements; however, to add insult to injury, the British Army wanted the resulting vehicle to come in at a price of no more than £6,000 per tank, which was asking a great deal and would mean many compromises.

At the time, the usual practice when the army required a new tank was to send an experienced officer of senior rank to negotiate with the armaments manufacturer and to discuss the needs of the army. The officer concerned would outline what would be required of the vehicle and the armaments manufacturer would then produce a blueprint for consideration; any modifications would be highlighted and changes were made accordingly. That was the most sensible course of action because the company that was to produce the tank knew its own capabilities and what could be achieved. In this case there was a restraint on budget, and a manufacturer does not want to work at a loss. The British Army was adamant that they wanted to follow the trend in tank design in other countries such as France, where companies like Renault were producing light tanks of very good design. Field trials and military manoeuvres with tanks showed that vehicles operated with a crew of only two men were greatly limited in what they could achieve and that such designs were not that further advanced from the light tanks used during the First World War.

At the time of the request by the British Army one of the leading tank designers in the country, Sir John Carden, was working for Vickers, and so the responsibility fell to him to create this new tank. He, more than perhaps anyone else, realised that the army was asking for a grossly underarmed vehicle, and should have known better. The A11, or Matilda Mk I infantry tank as it was known, lacked a large-calibre main gun armament and was to be armed instead with a single machine gun of either .30in calibre or .50in calibre, mounted in a turret with a full 360-degree traversing capability. There were later plans to arm the tank with a larger gun but the turret proved too small to accommodate one. Sir John Carden was left with no other choice but to opt for a vehicle design that had a turret operated by a single man. To produce a vehicle that was no more than a mobile machine-gun post would not provide a battle-winning weapon, especially as the German Army was known to be arming more powerful anti-tank guns with increased hitting power, and ever-heavier projectiles were entering into service. Carden also had to be mindful of the reduced speed requirement, which he must have known would further risk the vehicle’s survival on the battlefield.

Armed with only a single .303in-calibre machine gun, there was little the Matilda Mk I could do against heavier, more powerful German tanks in 1940.

The Matilda Mk I gave a good account of itself during the 1940 campaign in France but they were all destroyed or abandoned in the retreat to Dunkirk.

The Matilda Mk I was an old-fashioned design but it was compact; however, its road speed of 8mph was very slow.

The Matilda Mk I was operated by two men who served as driver and commander machine-gunner.

The British Army General Staff had asked for, and expected to receive, the vehicle they had in mind. Finally, in April 1937, the first production order was placed and the following year the 1st Army Tank Brigade took the first Matilda Mk I infantry tanks into service. At the time, Germany was rearming with advanced designs such as the Panzer II and armoured cars such as the SdKfz 231, SdKfz 222 and SdKfz 232, but the British Army stuck with the Matilda Mk I even though it appeared to have been outclassed already. It weighed in at just over 10 tons and was protected by armour between 10mm and 60mm in thickness. Overall the new tank was 15ft 11in long, 7ft 6in wide and 6ft 1½in high. A petrol-driven eight-cylinder Ford engine developing 70bhp at 3,500rpm produced a road speed of 8mph. It had an operational combat range of 80 miles, could negotiate 2ft-high vertical obstacles and span gaps of 7ft. It was outclassed in speed, range and hitting power by the Panzer II and the wheeled armoured cars it would soon be pitted against in battle.

The Development of the German Army’s SdKfz Armoured Car

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
SdKfz 221	Weserhütte	1935–40	7.92mm MG34 machine gun and later a 2.8cm sPZB41	4 tons	56mph
SdKfz 222	Bussing-NAG, Weserhütte, Schichau, MNH	1936–43	KwK30 or KwK38 L/55 2cm cannon and a 7.92mm MG34 machine gun	4.2–4.7 tons	53mph
SdKfz 223	Built by Auto Union and assembled by Schichau and Maschinenfabrik Niedersachsen	1935–44	MG34 machine gun	4.4 tons	50mph

The SdKfz 222 was one of the first of the series of new vehicles. It had a building programme that lasted from 1936 to 1943, during which time some 989 vehicles were produced. The first models of this new armoured car entered service with the German Army proper in 1938, and during its service life the range was deployed in all the major campaigns and used in the blitzkrieg tactics into Poland in 1939, France 1940 and Russia in 1941. In all, the design was produced in several versions with the entire production range being built by four main manufacturers, including Bussing-NAG. Although production stopped in 1943, those surviving SdKfz 222 vehicles continued to be used until 1945. The SdKfz 222, in keeping with other light reconnaissance vehicles, was developed to replace the earlier Kfz13 and 14 vehicles, which had only been lightly armed with a single machine gun and equipped with a radio. The SdKfz 222 was a more specialised vehicle with improved armour and heavier armament and, as such, equipped the Panzerspähwagen squadrons (armoured scout car units) of the Aufklärungs (reconnaissance) battalions. At the time only France had any credible vehicles that could be considered comparable to the new German vehicles, such as the Panhard AMD 178, which was armed with a 25mm cannon and a 7.5mm-calibre machine gun.

Recreated SdKfz 222 armoured car showing faceted construction with armour plate, and 2cm cannon in the turret during a battle re-enactment. The design of this vehicle was built in very small numbers.

The SdKfz 222 was a compact design, 17ft 9in long, 6ft 5in wide and exactly 6ft 7in high to the top of the turret, which gave it a low silhouette. It weighed 4.2 tons, which increased to 4.7 tons when fully loaded. A three-man crew served the vehicle, which went ahead of the armoured columns in order to gather information. It was equipped with a short-range FuG Spr Ger ‘a’ radio set, which allowed details of the enemy’s movement to be sent back to the heavier vehicles. The armament was sufficient to provide local self-defence and comprised a KwK30 or KwK38 L/55 2cm cannon for which some 220 rounds of ammunition were carried pre-loaded in magazines, and a 7.92mm-calibre MG34 machine gun for which 2,000 rounds of ammunition was carried. The weapons were mounted co-axially in a two-man turret that had a most unusual design in that it was decagon-shaped in plan view (meaning ten-sided). It was capable of a full 360-degree traverse to provide all-round covering fire, but being hand operated it was rather slow to bring on to a target; a well-trained crew and in battle conditions speed was all important. The main armament could be elevated to +87 degrees, which was an extremely high angle but meant that it could fire at low-flying aircraft; it could also be depressed to –4 degrees in order to engage all ground targets. In combat, the SdKfz 222 served well in the North African desert and across Europe, but in Russia the harsh extremes of the cold reduced its operational capability, leading to it being replaced by other vehicles functioning in the reconnaissance role.

Recreated SdKfz 223 amroured car in action during a battle re-enactment (top). SdKfz 223 with frame-type aerial and armed with an MG34 machine gun (above).

Recreated SdKfz 13 scout car and liaison vehicle armed with a single machine gun.

During its production run the vehicle was fitted with two different types of engine, but the speed remained around 50mph and the combat range of 187 miles was unaffected as the standard gearbox layout of five forward and one reverse was common to all types. The first SdKfz 222 vehicles were fitted with the Horch 3.5-litre engine, but those built after May 1942 had improvements to their design, which included the Horch 3.8-litre engine. At around this time the armour thickness protecting the front of the hull was also improved to 30mm, but the rest of the armour covering was unaltered. The turret was open-topped, which exposed the crew to the elements, but more importantly to the effect of shell splinters and hand grenades, which could be thrown into the interior at short range. To counter this threat a wire-mesh screen was fitted that could be folded back to allow the crew to operate the weapons and provide access and exit to the vehicle. The SdKfz 222 had good ground clearance and the armour was well sloped to deflect light projectiles; set into either side of the body were doors for driver access and for loading ammunition. Stowage boxes were carried externally on the left-hand side and a spare tyre was carried on the right-hand side.

A variant of the SdKfz 222 was the SdKfz 223, but perhaps as few as only 500 or so of these were built between 1935 and 1944, which amounted to an average of fifty vehicles per year. This may not have been a great burden on the armaments industry, but it may have been inconvenient to produce such small numbers when the workforce could have concentrated on other more important designs instead. The SdKfz 223 was not an original design but rather an adaptation of the SdKfz 221 armoured car, designed as a small, fast vehicle for carrying signals equipment and providing long-range communications using the Funkgerät 10 (radio equipment) and the Funksprechgerät ‘a’ (radio-telephone equipment). Production began in 1935, the same year as the SdKfz 221, with both vehicles designed by Wesserhutte Eisenwerk of Bad Oeynhausen. The chassis were built by Auto Union in Zwickau and assembled by Schichau of Elbing and Maschinenfabrik Niedersachsen in Hanover. The vehicle was fitted with a collapsible frame aerial, sometimes referred to as a ‘bed-frame antenna’ due to its similarity to that item. This could be folded flat over the rear of the vehicle when not in use, such as during routine maintenance or when parked in rest areas. The SdKfz 223 served with the Panzerspähwagen squadrons of light panzer and with motorised infantry divisions, providing communications for the armoured cars operating well in advance of the main column. Because it was never intended to engage directly in fighting it was only armed with a single MG34 machine gun with just over 1,000 rounds of ammunition for self-defence purposes. The weapon was fitted into a low-profile turret that was set further back than on the SdKfz 221 in order to provide space for all the radio equipment. The turret had a full 360-degree traverse capability using hand wheels for all-round defence.

The armoured 8mm-thick hull was well sloped and multi-faceted to give many angles with which to deflect light projectiles. The vehicle was based on the HOCH 801 heavy car chassis and was powered by a rear-mounted Horch 3.5-litre petrol engine of 90hp, which gave it a road speed of up to 50mph (25mph cross-country) with an operational range of 187 miles. The SdKfz 223 weighed 4.4 tons and was the same size as the SdKfz 222. A crew of three operated the vehicle, with the driver given good visibility through four armoured vision slits that could be opened. The turret was open-topped but a hinged wire-mesh screen was fitted to prevent hand grenades from being thrown into the vehicle. The SdKfz 223 underwent a series of modifications during its service life but these did not alter its appearance. The changes included the thickness of the frontal armour being increased to 30mm, the introduction of a new chassis, and the addition of hydraulic brakes and a more powerful Horch 3.8-litre engine, which increased the speed slightly to 53mph. It served right until the end of the war and, although not a fighting vehicle in the true sense of the term, its role within the panzer divisions as a reconnaissance and communications vehicle was undeniably important to the blitzkrieg tactics of all the major campaigns.

The German Army Attack

When war broke out in September 1939 the BEF, of which the 1st Army Tank Brigade was part, was deployed to France along with its complement of 139 Matilda Mk I tanks. They took up positions and maintained a presence by passing time engaged in exercises. Apart from conducting reconnaissance patrols there was little to do in the way of operational activity. This inactivity was shattered when the German Army attacked in May 1940, overwhelming virtually everything in its path with the speed and ferocity of the armoured thrusts of their tanks. In the fighting retreat towards Dunkirk the 1st Army Tank Brigade lost all 139 Matilda tanks either through fighting or abandonment because they were unable to cope with the mechanical strain placed on them. The crews did put up a valiant effort in conducting a fighting withdrawal, but the German armour and anti-tank guns were just too powerful and ripped into the flimsy design of the Matilda. It has been estimated that up to 75 per cent of British tank losses were due to mechanical failure.

The armour of the Matilda Mk I provided protection against the lighter anti-tank guns such as the 3.7cm-calibre PaK35/36, nicknamed the ‘Doorknocker’ by the German troops because it was ineffective. Against the heavier-calibre anti-tank guns such as the PaK18 and 36, of 88mm calibre, there was little if any chance of survival. The main weakness of the tank lay in the almost skeletal appearance of the chassis and the exposed track, suspension and drive mechanism. In order to meet the constraints placed on him, Carden had been forced to employ components that were already in use on other tanks. For example, the chassis was ten years out of date, being based on the style fitted to the Vickers 6-ton tank, which had entered service in 1928. The engine was underpowered and had to be modified to drive the rear sprocket wheel through a basic transmission. It may have been pared down to the bare essentials but when put to the test in battle the Matilda did not go down without a fight.

When captured examples were examined by the Germans, they must have wondered what possessed the country that had developed the tank to pit such an obsolescent design against more modern models. The two-man crew in the cramped interior, the basic radio set and lack of offensive capability against vehicles meant that the Matilda was limited in its role on the battlefield. The British Army had to abandon its tanks in France but a number of Matilda Mk I tanks had been left in Britain and were used for maintenance training. The actual service life of this tank had only been two years, but during that brief period its deficiencies had become clear in battle tests, but from these deficiencies, lessons were learnt.

The British Army’s A12 Matilda Mk II

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
A12 Matilda Mk II	Vulcan (latterly sub-contracted to the North British Locomotive Works, the LMS Railway Works, Harland & Wolff and Fowler, Ruston and Hornsby)	1938 onwards	2-pounder gun and .303in-calibre Vickers machine gun (later a 7.92mm-calibre BESA machine gun)	26.5 tons	15mph

Fortunately for the British Army, it had the larger, more powerful A12 Matilda Mk II, which fared much better during the Dunkirk campaign. This had started life in the early 1930s when the British Army found itself desperately lacking in tanks with good armour protection and an armament with hitting power. The Matilda A11 infantry tank was entering its prototype stage, but even at that early point in its development there were already debates going on concerning the possibility of increasing the fighting capacity of the tank. This meant that there would have to be a major rethink concerning the new tank design and other future designs of infantry tanks.

One suggestion put forward was to equip the A11 Matilda tank with a two-man turret and arm it with a 2-pounder gun. The idea was simple and sounded good but the problem was that the tank was in service and crews had already been trained on it. The suggestion offered the simplest solution to the problem, but unfortunately those who proposed it had failed to take the narrow limitations of the A11’s hull into account and the idea was scrapped. Another problem with the suggestion was the additional weight, which would have placed even greater strain on an already overworked engine. What was needed was an entirely new tank design. The request was put forward and the design department at Woolwich Arsenal was entrusted with producing the design for the new tank. The plans drawn up included strengthened suspension and twin commercial diesel engines, which had originally been suggested for the A7 tank of 1932. Thick armour would be provided in the form of a cast turret and bow plate. Unfortunately the heavy industry in Britain in the mid–1930s was limited in its capacity to produce large castings. This shortcoming was due to the fact that there was no demand for the large castings required by the new design because most British tanks were built using welding and riveting techniques. This was not the case in other countries such as France and America, where advanced casting techniques and welding processes were used to produce machinery and tanks.

In November 1936 the contract to produce the new tank was awarded to the Warrington-based foundry Vulcan, which produced a wooden model of the vehicle in April the following year. By 1938 the company had built a pilot model using mild steel to be used in feasibility trials. The project had experienced some delays, one of which was caused by problems concerning the delivery of the Wilson gearbox. Trials with the pilot model were finally completed in 1938, but even before the trials had commenced the British Army had placed an initial order for sixty-five new tanks. On completion, an order for a further 100 vehicles was placed. It was fortunate for all concerned that the trials went well, otherwise there would have been a great many questions to answer. In fact, only main mechanical changes were suggested, and given the overall complexity of designing a new tank, they were relatively minor. Nevertheless, changes were ordered to the suspension and the engine cooling. The new tank was designated the A12 and was detailed as an infantry tank. It was 18ft 5in long, 8ft 6in wide and 8ft 3in high, with a weight of 26.5 tons. It was one of a series of heavier new tanks entering service with the British Army and followed in the same direction as many armies that were being re-equipped at the time. It was intended to support the infantry and a British Army General Staff policy document of the time stated: ‘If tanks are to survive at infantry pace while supporting men on foot, they must [be able to] resist the fire of current anti-tank guns, and yet retain the ability to destroy hostile men and weapons, including enemy tanks.’

The Matilda Mk I and Mk II served together in France in 1940, the Mk II having entered service in 1939 and later seeing service in North Africa. It was used as a flail tank to clear minefields and used as experiments to develop other systems for specialist units. The size difference and armament of the two Matildas was incredible. The 2-pounder gun on the Matilda Mk II was limited but in North Africa it took its toll on Italian vehicles.

By 1938 talk of war was everywhere despite reassurances from politicians and the talks that defused the Munich Crisis. All across Europe, countries began to rearm. Britain was one of them and realised, rather late in the day, that more tanks were needed. An additional order for the new A12 was placed with Vulcan foundry, but the company realised that it could not meet the increased demand alone. Therefore, other companies were sub-contracted including the North British Locomotive Works; the LMS Railway Works; Harland & Wolff, the Belfast-based shipbuilders in Northern Ireland; and the engineering concern of Fowler, Ruston and Hornsby. Vulcan remained the prime contractor, however, and undertook much of the important casting process. The A12 tank was far from being an easy machine to put into mass production, because the size of the castings and other features had low tolerances and allowed little margin for error. The side skirts over the tracks, for example, were cast as a single unit. However, in a move to ease manufacturing processes, the number of mud chutes was reduced from six to five. The precise time limit required to produce all the components of the A12 is difficult to compute, but it has been calculated that it took some 2,000 man hours to assemble all the components on the production line.

In September 1939, when Britain declared war against Germany, there were only two of the new A12 tanks in service. Just six months later, in early 1940, the number of A12 tanks in service allowed for one battalion of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment to be equipped with the vehicle as were other units. The A12 gave a good account of itself in action during the retreat towards Dunkirk and fighting rearguard actions against German armoured units with superior numbers. A number of the new tanks were involved in mounting a counter-attack against German forces in the Arras region and while it was well intentioned, it did little to prevent the inevitable overrunning of France. At the same time as these events in Europe several units of the British Army in Egypt were being re-equipped with the new tank, which would be used in the early campaigns against the Italians. After the retreat from Dunkirk, the A11 Matilda was declared obsolete and withdrawn from front-line service. This led to the troops referring to the A12 as the Matilda Mk II, which was the title it remained known by until the end of the war. There are those believe that the nickname was referring to ‘Waltzing Matilda’, a popular tune of the time, but actually the name came from a cartoon duck called ‘Matilda’ who waddled.

During the early campaign in Libya in 1940–41, the Matilda proved itself to be virtually impervious to the Italian anti-tank guns, which were mainly of light calibre. Italian tanks such as the Carro Armato L6 and Carro Armato M13, sometimes called ‘tin coffins’, offered little danger to the Matilda Mk II with its armour protection of between 14mm and 80mm. The Matilda’s armour was actually thicker than that on the German Army’s PzKw IV Ausf. E, which was fitted with armour up to 60mm maximum. This one-sidedness would only last until mid–1941, however, by which time the newly formed German Afrika Korps entered the theatre with their powerful 88mm anti-tank guns. With this weapon they could engage the Matilda Mk II tanks at ranges in excess of 1,000yd, which was far beyond the range of the 2-pounder gun. From this point on, the crews began to lose faith in the Matilda’s survivability on the battlefield.

A series of trials were conducted into the possibility of increasing the size of the main armament from a 2-pounder gun up to a 6-pounder gun of 57mm calibre. It proved a failure because the turret of the Matilda Mk II was already far too cramped and small to accommodate the larger breech mechanism and the three men required to operate the gun. This inability to upgrade the size of the main armament was one of the deciding factors that eventually led to the production of the Matilda Mk II being suspended. The last time the Matilda was committed to battle as a front-line tank to engage enemy tanks in direct action was during the First Battle of El Alamein in July 1942. The design of the A12 Matilda Mk II was typical of the period, divided into the three hull compartments (driving compartment, fighting compartment and engine compartment) with a four-man crew. The first version of the Matilda Mk II was armed with a .303in-calibre Vickers machine gun but later models were armed with 7.92mm-calibre BESA machine guns. There was no provision for a bow-mounted machine gun as on other tanks such as the A9 Cruiser or Crusader tank. The turret was heavily armoured and fitted with hydraulic power for traversing through 360 degrees, and it was capable of absorbing most anti-tank fire and surviving. Indeed, the Matilda Mk II was the first British tank design to incorporate hydraulic power for turret traversing. The machine-gun armament was changed for the close support version of the Matilda Mk II, which carried a main armament of a 3in-calibre howitzer and a BESA 7.92mm-calibre machine gun, but the configuration meant that internal space was even less. The commander’s position was equipped with a circular cupola, but while it provided all-round vision it was limited in aspect. In fact, this was one of the few poorly designed points of the tank.

A total of sixty-seven rounds was carried for the 2-pounder gun, along with 4,000 rounds of machine-gun ammunition. Two AEC six-cylinder inline diesel engines were coupled together to produce some 174bhp and these were connected to a Wilson epicyclic gearbox and a rear drive sprocket. The suspension was derived from the A7 tank design and was known as either the ‘scissors’ or ‘Japanese’ type, which had been used on the Vickers Medium C tank and some French designs during the 1920s and early 1930s. This system comprised of bogies linked together and operating against horizontally mounted compression springs. This layout meant that there were four pairs of rollers with two link units and two springs to each suspension point. The entire unit was supported by a single vertical bracket mounted on the side of the hull. There was one such complete unit mounted on either side of the hull with a four-roller unit and large idler wheel at the front. The track was supported at the top by a series of return rollers. The system sounded complicated and indeed it was, but it worked extremely well. However, the tank was severely limited in its top speed: only 15mph on roads and 8mph for cross-country. It had an operational range of 160 miles and could ford water obstacles of up to 3ft deep, scale vertical obstacles of 2ft and cross gaps such as trenches and ditches up to 7ft wide.

Some later versions of the Matilda Mk II tanks were fitted with a pair of Leyland six-cylinder inline diesel engines, which produced 190bhp at a power-to-weight ratio of 7.17hp/ton. This version was built in greater numbers than those models powered by AEC engines. Another version, known as the Mk V Matilda II was fitted with an air servo on top of the gearbox to simplify gear changing. But apart from these relatively basic modifications the Matilda Mk II would remain unchanged throughout the entire course of its service life. By the time of the First Battle of El Alamein in July 1942, the Matilda Mk II had earned a reputation that resulted in it being christened the ‘queen of the battlefield’. But by 1942 it was being joined by American-built tanks such as the Grant and M3 ‘Honey’, which were beginning to enter the North African theatre of operations in increasing numbers. In view of this it would be fair to say that despite the Matilda Mk II’s magnificent operational success rate, its service days were numbered. As more American-built tanks came into service the question arose of what to do with the surplus Matildas, most of which were still serviceable. Many were still in excellent running order and the army was loath to write off so many otherwise sound tanks. For the time being, at least, no one could see how else they could be usefully employed on the desert battlefield.

As it transpired, a solution to the problem was not far off. The thick armour and battlefield survivability of the Matilda Mk II made the design ideal for development for use in some highly specialised roles such as flail tank mine clearance, an application for which at least twenty-four tanks were used at El Alamein. These were known as Mk I ‘Scorpions’ and were specialised tanks that would prove themselves invaluable in clearing minefields as the Allies continued their drive to Tunis. The Scorpions comprised an external compartment that was mounted on the right-hand side of the Matilda Mk II and housed a Ford truck engine and the operator for the equipment. The truck engine rotated a drum through the means of an extension shaft, which was mounted on a girder arm. The drum was fitted with a series of heavy chains that rotated at up to 70rpm, whipping the chains to beat the ground and detonating anti-tank and anti-personnel mines as it moved forward. A later variant on this mine-clearing flail device required the removal of the turret with its 2-pounder gun. This version was fitted with two motors that were mounted externally in special housings to the rear of the vehicle’s hull and were used to power the flail drum. The motors rotated the chain drum at a rate of up to 80rpm and allowed the tank to move forward at the grand speed of 2mph. While this may not sound fast, it was a great deal faster, safer and more efficient than sapper units using mine detectors moving forward on foot. The invention of the flail device is generally accredited to being devised by an engineering officer from South Africa by the name of Major Du Toit.

The Matilda Mk II was also developed to serve in other specialised roles, including being fitted with a large heavy roller to clear minefields using pressure, while others were used to place demolition charges to clear obstacles such as concrete anti-tank walls or field positions such as bunkers. Even more specialist roles included laying bridges, moving earth with ‘dozer-type’ blades, flame-throwing and dropping fascines (large bundles of tightly bound wooden stakes) to fill the gap in ditches. There were other unconventional roles devised for the Matilda Mk II, and there existed a radio-controlled version although its purpose was never entirely clear and the project was dropped. One can only surmise that it may have been an attempt to emulate the German Schwerer Ladungsträger SdKfz 301 demolition vehicle, and intended to deliver an explosive charge against obstacles such as the defences of the Siegfried Line on the German border.

The CDL Experiment

One of the more unusual of the Matilda’s uses was the Canal Defence Light (CDL) experiment, which was intended to illuminate the battlefield at night, allow river crossings to be made and prevent the enemy from responding by blinding them with intense beams of light. The CDL system was the code name for a device that was used in limited numbers to support the crossings of the Rhine and Elbe rivers in Germany. The system had been under development for some time and the Matilda was seen as an ideal platform on which to mount the lights. The CDL comprised of an arc lamp of extremely high intensity, the beam of which was projected at the target through a vertical slit in front of a special turret using a series of reflectors. When used, the CDL system was designed to ‘dazzle’ enemy gunners in much the same manner as the flashgun of a camera can temporarily blind people and disorientate their vision. In the case of the CDL, the dazzle effect could be multiplied by the operator opening and closing the shutter in rapid sequence, creating a flickering effect. In the end the CDL was fitted to Grant tanks, a design which better lent itself to the installation of the CDL equipment, and these were deployed with the 79th Armoured Division.

The Matilda Mk II was also supplied to the Australian Army, which used them in the Pacific theatre of operations against the Japanese. The Australian Army developed them into flame-throwing tanks known as ‘Matilda Frogs’, and used them to burn out enemy emplacements. They also used the earth-moving version to improve tracks through jungle terrain in order that wheeled vehicles could traverse the route. A number of Matilda Mk II tanks were also supplied to the Russian Army, which despite liking the heavy armour, did not consider the 2-pounder gun to be of any use against the more powerfully armoured German tanks. Indeed, the 2-pounder was a stumbling block, because despite the best efforts it could not fire a high-explosive shell. In the early days of the war the 2-pounder gun, with its calibre of 40mm, could penetrate the lighter armoured vehicles, but as the war progressed and heavier tanks appeared it was left behind in the gun/armour race.

In the final months of the war the Matilda was replaced even in its specialist roles by the more commonly available Sherman tank, which could be adapted to almost every role, including being used as a platform for launching rockets. Following continuous use throughout the war years, the remaining Matilda Mk II tanks were mechanically worn out and it was deemed too costly to start a rebuilding programme. A small number of battleworthy Matilda Mk II tanks were still in service at the end of the war, although not in the role of gun tanks, making it the only British tank to see service throughout the entire duration of the Second World War and be used against all belligerents in all theatres of operations.

Tactics

Other countries were also building new tank designs in their rearmament programmes; France, for example, began developing the Renault R35 light tank in 1936 for the specific role of supporting the infantry. The official French view for the role of tanks on the battlefield was that they were a ‘subdivision of the infantry’ in order to ‘make it easier for the infantry to proceed’. The Japanese Type 95 Ha-Go light tank was also developed for infantry support roles, and they never thought they would encounter large numbers of tanks in opposition on the battlefield. The British and French had numerical superiority in tanks but this advantage was lost by committing them to battle in groups often called ‘penny packets’ because they were so small in numbers. In such weak forces they did not pose a serious threat to the Germans with either their anti-tank guns or the tanks themselves. Of these new designs only the Matilda Mk II would prove itself capable of withstanding anti-tank fire, except against the 88mm gun, which had started service life as an anti-aircraft gun but had been used in the anti-tank role since the Spanish Civil War.

The Germans, on the other hand, developed tactics that sent large numbers of tanks into battle to overwhelm defences and outnumber tank forces opposing them. Guderian was adamant that the tank had to be used as a concentrated force in order to maximise the best use of it as a mobile weapon of protected firepower. The tank crews were taught to halt and fire, which gave better accuracy, while the French and British method of firing on the move was less accurate. The German tactic did leave them vulnerable to anti-tank fire, but the Allies were limited in 1940 in the calibre of their anti-tank guns, which in the British Army was only a 2-pounder, a variant of which was fitted to many of the British tank designs. Blitzkrieg tactics were basic principles applied on a large scale and it was perhaps this that the Allies could not understand and fully come to terms with. The blitzkrieg tactic was broken down into phases or elements and was essentially an expression of combined operations using land and air forces working in close cooperation. The first phase involved deciding on the axis or line of advance to be taken by the advancing units of infantry and armour which had already been reconnoitred by advance vehicles such as armoured cars and motorcycles, which scouted ahead and reported back. Under cover of artillery bombardment and ground-attack aircraft, the infantry followed the armoured advance moving forward to make contact with the enemy. While the defending enemy was still reeling from the shock of the artillery and aerial assault, the armoured units attacked in heavy numbers and pushed their way through the defences. Having pushed through the enemy positions, the armoured units then moved out and circled around any points of resistance that were left for the follow-on infantry units to deal with. These armoured thrusts cut lines of communication and supply routes. In the fourth and last phase, the armoured thrusts continued to advance with air support from ground-attack aircraft, leaving isolated pockets of resistance to be dealt with by the infantry. British officers such as General Wavell and General O’Connor learnt from these tactics and in turn adopted them, which allowed them to defeat the Italians in North Africa. The Americans would also learn these tactics in time and even the Russians developed ‘tank armies’ to overwhelm the Germans at engagements such as the Battle of Kursk in 1943.

The French and British put up stiff resistance against such tactics as best they could, but the Germans dominated the battlefield with their air superiority. The Italians developed a similar strategy called ‘guerra di rapido corso’, but it was nowhere near the level of German tactics in terms of strength of armour or coordinated airpower. Later in the war the Russians would develop similar tactics with far greater levels of manpower and overwhelming armoured units. The French Army had had tank tacticians such as General Jean-Baptiste Eugène Estienne, who was considered by many to be the ‘father of French armour’, and Colonel Romain, who unfortunately failed to convince the French Army of the power of armour en masse. He wrote that it was ‘up to the High Command to make them [tanks] operate in mass and, as much as possible, by surprise wherever it has been decided to make a decisive attack’. Colonel (later General) Charles de Gaulle espoused the strategy of forming armoured divisions but such theories were not fully understood by the old-fashioned minds from an earlier age. General Maxime Weygand was one of those who acknowledged that France had ‘gone to war with a 1918 army against a German army of 1939’. In other words France was twenty years out of date in armoured warfare. The French relied on artillery, which resulted in the Maginot Line; however, this was effectively by-passed except for a few assaults against some positions such as Markolsheim near Colmar which covered the River Rhine crossing.

Tank engagements occurred throughout the German attack into France and Belgium before the campaign finally ended at Dunkirk. The only real credible attempt to use armour to spearhead a counter-attack was mounted by two battalions of the Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) with seventy-four tanks and two battalions from the Durham Light Infantry on 21 May. They were supported by elements of the French 3rd Light Mechanised Division. Their line of attack took them directly towards positions held by 7th Panzer Division, commanded by Rommel, and the Matilda Mk II tank gave a good account of herself in battle. The attack went in so determinedly that Rommel believed that he was being assaulted by five divisions. Major Fernie instructed Warrant Officer 3 Armit of the 4th RTR to attack the German guns. The NCO drove towards the German positions and later recalled that: ‘The guns were not camouflaged, and their only cover was a fold in the ground. I got two of them before they realised I was into them – the range was about 200yd. The survivors turned on me and one hit the gun housing.’ The action was close-range and some of the Germans, including the feared SS, were seen to run. Armit continued: ‘I got my gun going and returned to the attack. They must have thought I was finished for I caught the guns limbering up, and revenge was sweet.’ The attack had been planned hastily and although it inflicted 700 casualties on the Germans and destroyed twenty tanks, the cost was high, and the RTR lost forty-six tanks. However, it did serve to make the Germans wary of their adversary and show more concern for their flanks

The Belgian Campaign

On 27 May 1940 Belgium surrendered, at the same time that the BEF and French troops were fighting a rearguard action to cover the withdrawal of the main armies to Dunkirk, from where they were being evacuated to England. The decision to withdraw the remains of the Anglo-French armies from Dunkirk was code-named ‘Operation Dynamo’ and lasted from 26 May to 4 June.

Belgium, like its Dutch neighbour, had taken a neutral stance, but all that changed when Germany attacked on 10 May 1940. The Belgian Army had a peacetime strength of 100,000 men, which increased to 550,000 on mobilisation. It had machine guns and was supported with mortars, anti-tank guns and some armoured cars. The troops fought to the best of their ability but after eighteen days they too were beaten; their few armoured vehicles were either destroyed or captured and 23,350 men were killed and wounded. Sensing that the Belgians were on the verge of collapse three days before the Belgian Army actually surrendered, Hitler wrote his assessment of the Belgian soldier: ‘The Belgian Soldier, too, has generally fought very bravely. His experience of war was considerably greater than the Dutch. At the beginning his tenacity was astonishing.’ He went on (it should be remembered at this point Belgium had not yet surrendered): ‘This is now decreasing visibly as the Belgian soldier realises that his basic function is to cover the British retreat.’ Hitler’s assessment recognised the Belgian fighting capability but his view of the role is incorrect, as the Allies were all fighting the same retreat and the average Belgian soldier would have been unaware of any strategy at higher level. The Germans quickly distributed propaganda leaflets and posters showing the British preventing French troops from evacuating at Dunkirk, but those who got away knew this to be untrue.

The Evacuation of Dunkirk

In total more than 338,000 troops were evacuated, a figure that included 113,000 French troops and troops of other nations, including some Belgian and Dutch troops, contrary to popular belief. The cost was massive in manpower and materiel (which had to be abandoned because there was no room on the ships and time ran out). One of the units to be brought out was the 1st Armoured Division, and from its return to the UK until August 1941 it was engaged in anti-invasion duties while it built up its strength. In August 1941 it was sent overseas to Egypt and the division was present for the Second Battle of El Alamein in October 1942. It took part in the later campaigns that liberated Tunis. The division had a strength of just under 15,000 men and 343 tanks along with other AFVs for reconnaissance duties, and included artillery and attached units such as signals and engineers. Among the brigades serving with the division were the 7th Motor Infantry Brigade and the 18th Lorried Infantry Brigade, both of which required vehicles of different sizes for transport and carrying supplies.

Captured Military Vehicles in the German Army

The French Army lost 90,000 killed and 200,000 wounded, with the remainder of the army capitulating when the French government signed an armistice on 21 June, seventeen days after Operation Dynamo had ended. During that period, despite being outnumbered in troops and tanks, the French Army had fought on, more stubbornly in some cases than at any point in the campaign before Dunkirk. The surrendering French troops were disarmed and taken into captivity and all the remaining trucks and armoured vehicles of the French Army, including tanks, were eventually taken into German service and given specific titles. For example, the Renault AMC 35 light tank became the PzKw AMC 738 (f) and the Panhard AMD 178 armoured car became the SdKfz 178 (f). The letter ‘f’ was used to denote French origin and the fleet of French armoured vehicles would be pressed into service as SPGs, flame-throwers and ammunition carriers. Some of the older tanks, such as the Renault FT–17 light tank, which the Germans termed the PzKw 18R 730 (f), had their turrets removed and incorporated into defensive positions as armoured machine-gun posts at points along the French coast. Some of these captured tanks were later taken to the Channel Islands, where their turrets were removed and used in the fortifications across the islands. The chassis were then used as towing vehicles or ammunition carriers for artillery units.

French military vehicles taken for service in the German Army

Vehicle Name	Type	German Army Designation	Armament	Max. Speed
Panhard AMD 178	Armoured car	SdKfz 178 (f) or Panzerspähwagen Panhard 178 (f)	25mm cannon and a Model 31 7.5mm-calibre machine gun	45mph
Renault AMC 35	Light tank	PzKw AMC 738 (f)	3.7cm KwK18 (f)	25mph
Renault FT–17	Light tank	PzKw 18R 730 (f)	8mm machine gun or converted to supply tractors	5mph
Renault UE (Chenillette)	Supply tractor	UE 630 (f)	Some fitted with 3.7cm PaK35/36 anti-tank guns and others equipped with machine guns or to fire rockets	18mph

The Panhard AMD 178

The prototype of the Panhard AMD 178 (Auto-Mitrailleuse Découverte) armoured car was ready for field trials in 1933. French Army observers watching the trials were suitably impressed by the vehicle’s performance that an order was placed for the army. By 1935 the first AMD 178 armoured cars were entering service to replace ageing vehicles. The vehicle was a fairly standard design along the lines of similar vehicles entering service with Britain and Germany at around the same time. It was of an all-riveted construction, including the hull and turret. It was 15ft 8½in long, 6ft 7¼in wide and 7ft 7in high. Into this compact space was fitted a crew of four men and an armament comprising a 25mm cannon, for which 150 rounds were carried, and a 7.5mm-calibre machine gun, for which 3,750 rounds were carried, along with other kit and provisions.

The regular driver sat facing forward with the gunner and commander serving in the turret, but the fourth member of the crew sat facing the rear, ready to act as the reverse driver in the event of an emergency getaway being required. The petrol engine was fitted to the rear and comprised of a four-cylinder Panhard SK water-cooled model developing 105bhp at 2,000rpm to give road speeds of up to 45mph and an operational range of some 187 miles. These capabilities, coupled with the ability to climb vertical obstacles of over 12in, made the AMD 178 quite a useful vehicle, weighing 8.5 tonnes. With armour thickness from 13mm to 18mm, it was sufficiently protected against most small arms ammunition.

The turret was hand operated and had a full 360-degree traverse capability, and the 25mm cannon could depress to –12 degrees and elevate to +14 degrees, allowing a wide range of ground targets to be engaged, including being able to bring fire to bear against defensive positions and upper storeys of buildings. The Model 31 7.5mm machine gun added to this firepower and could be used either for self-defence or to provide support fire to cover infantry advancing during an attack. An alternative armament layout comprised of two Model 31 machine guns mounted in the turret, while a third version of the AMD 178 was unarmed but instead equipped as a radio vehicle to serve in a reconnaissance role, scouting ahead of units. All three versions were used by the French Army but it was the 25mm cannon armed vehicle that was in service in the greatest numbers.

At the time of Germany’s attack against France in May 1940 there were around 360 AMD 178 armoured cars in service with the French Army and most of these were engaged in the fighting. When France capitulated in June 1940, the Germans readily seized on the captured French armoured vehicles, including the surviving AMD 178s, and pressed them into service. In German use these vehicles were given the designation Panzerspähwagen Panhard 178 (f), although some sources claim they were designated SdKfz 178 (f).

Whichever title one prefers, the fact remains that the Germans considered this to be a rather useful vehicle and made extensive use of it. For example, a number were sent to the Eastern Front in readiness for Operation Barbarossa, the attack against Russia in June 1941. Indeed, it is understood that more than 100 of the vehicles were lost during the fighting, which points to the fact that they were heavily committed in the reconnaissance role. Wartime photographs show the AMD 178 in use with the Germans with the road wheels removed and replaced with railway wheels for use on the rail network. Records indicate that some forty-three vehicles may have been configured to this role. The Germans also converted a number into specialised radio vehicles, with some being fitted with the distinctive ‘bed-frame’ aerial, which curved forward over the turret. In 1943 a number of AMD 178 vehicles were converted to carry a heavier armament by having their turrets removed and fitting a 5cm-calibre KwK L/42 gun in an open-topped turret.

The Renault UE Supply Tractor

Another example of how the Germans utilised captured enemy vehicles to the fullest can be seen in the UE Supply Tractor developed by Renault in 1931. At the time of the invasion of France in May 1940 there were more than 6,000 of these vehicles in service with the French Army. Known as Chenillette (small tracked vehicle), Renault referred to it as Tracteur Blindè (armoured tractor), and it was used to transport almost 800lb of supplies, such as ammunition, on the vehicle in a cargo bay at the rear or to take additional cargo using a trailer towed by the vehicle. The UE was served by a crew of two, who sat in the front and were separated by the front-mounted four-cylinder Renault 85 engine, which developed 38hp to reach road speeds of up to 18mph. The noise caused by the position of the engine meant that the men could not even talk to one another.

The Germans used the UE carriers they had captured to transport ammunition and other supplies. The armoured covers for the crew of the UE Carrier of the French Army (above left). The Germans converted some captured UE carriers into rocket-launching vehicles (above right).

The vehicle weighed 2.5 tons, measured 5ft 9in wide, 4ft 1in high to the top of the armoured hoods for the crew, and had an overall length of 9ft 2in. It was protected by armour of between 7mm and 9mm in thickness and lacked both radio and armament. It had an operational range on roads of more than 100 miles and over 60 miles cross-country. The tracked vehicle had a wheel arrangement comprising three sets of double bogies, with a drive sprocket to the front, idler wheel to the rear and two return rollers. The tracked trailer was fitted with a double pair of large road wheels on each side and could be loaded with almost 1 ton of stores. When France surrendered in June 1940 the German Army captured numbers of these little vehicles and set about modifying them to serve in a variety of roles.

The Germans referred to the captured stocks of UEs as Infanterie Schlepper (infantry tractor) and designated them UE 630 (f) to denote that they were captured French equipment. Research shows that the vehicle was developed into several roles, including as anti-tank gun platforms, rocket launchers and even as the basis for decoy tanks. The Germans did retain some in their original ammunition supply role, and kept the two armoured hoods known as calottes; the first use of them in this role was probably in 1941. The leaf-spring suspension was retained and the 300mm ground clearance also remained unaltered.

Some UEs were converted to carry a single MG34 machine gun; these were called Gepanzerte-MG Träger and were used for patrolling airfields, again from around 1941. This involved removing the left-hand calotte or armoured hood, leaving only the driver’s calotte, and this was replaced by a box-like superstructure for the machine to be mounted. A second version of machine-gun carrier saw the addition of a similar superstructure built at the rear of the vehicle over the internal cargo compartment and a traversing turret with an MG34 mounted. Considerable supplies of ammunition would also have been carried, making this a mobile machine-gun post able to deploy anywhere to provide fire support.

Some UEs had both calottes removed and were converted to tractors for light anti-tank guns such as the 3.7cm-calibre PaK35/36, with ammunition carried on the vehicle in the cargo compartment. The armoured hoods had visors that could be raised and lowered like giant medieval knights’ helmets and which provided some overhead protection. However, when lowered, the field of vision was severely restricted (probably no better than peering through slitted fingers) and the headroom was very limited. A self-propelled anti-tank gun version was developed which saw a 3.7cm-calibre PaK35/36 gun mounted to the rear of the vehicle, again utilising the space around the cargo compartment. The gun shield was left in place and ammunition was carried on board the vehicle, ready to use. This version was issued to Panzerjäger (tank-hunting) units from 1941 and, like the machine-gun versions, was intended as a light mobile vehicle. The gun had a limited amount of manual traverse, as it was restricted to 30 degrees either side and could be elevated to +25 degrees and depressed to –8 degrees. Some UEs were used to tow larger guns such as the 5cm and 7.5cm anti-tanks guns.

From around 1943 a number of UEs were converted to carry launcher units for four 28/32cm Wurfrahmen, fixed to fire forward over the vehicle’s length. This meant that the rockets fired in whichever direction the vehicle was facing and the crew had to vacate it before firing the rockets remotely by wire command. These vehicles were in service with Panzerpionier companies in France between 1943 and 1944. The launching frame was fitted to the rear of the vehicle and was elevated to give the desired range using a basic sight unit fitted to the front of the vehicle, and it could be folded away when not required. An alternative version of this role was to fit two rockets on either side of the vehicle in the same manner used on the larger SdKfZ 251 half-track. This would have given mobility to the rocket launcher but once fired it would have either had to withdraw to be reloaded or a supply vehicle, probably an Infanterie Schlepper UE 630 (f), would have had to come forward with extra rockets.

Another rather unusual role for the UE was to serve as a mobile base on which a dummy superstructure was built using canvas and wood to give the impression that it was a much larger tank. Wartime photographs show some very good results that include a turret and main armament along with false tracks. This version was called Panzerkampfwagen-Attrappe; it would have been unlikely to fool infantry for very long but aerial photographic reconnaissance might have fallen for the trick. It certainly is interesting to consider the small UE as a Trojan Horse. As a main front-line fighting vehicle, the UE would have been severely restricted and extremely vulnerable, and so its main duties with security units suited it much better. The rocket artillery version would have kept it back from anti-tank guns but even bazooka- or PIAT-armed infantry could have destroyed them. Rather than dismissing the small vehicle, the Germans saw in it something useful and developed some into support vehicles such as Schneeschleuder (snow ploughs), infantry carriers, radio and observation vehicles and even Fernmeldekabel-kraftwagen (cable-laying vehicles) for field telephones.

The Evacuation of Dunkirk

As with the Dutch and Belgian armies, Hitler wrote his assessment of the French Army, which he identified as containing some ‘marked differences’. Overall, he noted that in the French Army:

Very bad units rub elbows with excellent units. In the overview, the difference in quality between the active and reserve divisions is extraordinary. Many active units have fought desperately; most of the reserve divisions, however, are far less able to endure the shock which battle inflicts on the morale of troops. For the French, as with the Dutch and Belgians, there is also the fact that they know that they are fighting in vain for objectives which are not in line with their own interests. Their morale is very affected, as they say that throughout or wherever possible the British have looked after their own units and prefer to leave the critical sectors to their allies.

Again he was exhibiting some respect for some units of the French Army and, while not entirely dismissing them, knew that when an army recognises it is defeated it is impossible to motivate it. The French had lost 90,000 troops killed and 200,000 wounded in the campaign. The remainder of the French Army was taken prisoner and all war materiel, including ammunition, mortars, AFVs and artillery, would be absorbed into service by the German Army to supplement its existing stocks of equipment.

Hitler believed he understood the mood and characteristics of the British Army, of which he had direct experience from the First World War. He had only been a corporal in that war, however, and was now trying to use that knowledge to assess the British soldier, whom he considered to be: ‘Very brave and tenacious in defence, unskilful in attack, wretchedly commanded. Weapons and equipment are of the highest order, but overall organisation is bad.’ Some of his points were valid but his opinions were out of date and he was not taking into account the fact that a new generation of officers would emerge from the organised chaos of Dunkirk, such as Major General Bernard Montgomery and Alan Brooke (later to become Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke). Lord Gort, commanding the BEF, wrote of his experiences facing the blitzkrieg in his dispatches saying: ‘The speed with which the enemy exploited his penetration of the French Front, his willingness to accept risks to further his aim, and his exploitation of every success to the uttermost limits emphasised even more fully than in the campaigns of the past the advantage which accrues to the commander who knows how best to use time and make time his servant and not his master.’ His words were testimony to the nature of this new warfare and other commanders would learn from his first-hand witnessing of it.

The operation at Dunkirk had cost the British Army dearly, with more than 11,000 killed and a further 14,000 wounded, along with 41,338 taken prisoner or reported missing. In terms of vehicles, out of the 68,618 sent to France with the BEF, some 63,879 were destroyed or abandoned, including tanks and trucks along with 20,548 motorcycles. Some sources put the figure much higher at 75,000 vehicles and also state that the BEF lost around 11,000 machine guns of all types and 90,000 rifles. The artillery regiments had taken 2,794 guns of all calibres to France for anti-tank and anti-aircraft roles, of which 2,472 were either destroyed in the fighting or had to be abandoned because there was no room for these weapons on the evacuating ships. When Operation Dynamo was declared at an end the country was relieved that the British Army had been saved. However, Churchill was under no illusion, knowing that there was worse ahead, and reminded people that ‘wars are not won by evacuations’. The US radio journalist Ed Murrow was based in London working for the Columbia Broadcasting System transmitting to neutral America; he broadcast his opinions over the airwaves, and echoed those of Churchill when he stated that to call the Dunkirk withdrawal a victory: ‘there will be disagreement on that point.’ Churchill knew losses had to be made good and it would take time, which was a commodity in short supply. As the last remnants of the BEF returned to England, the army could only count 200 serviceable tanks. On 10 June Italy declared war on Britain, no doubt hoping to gain something from the campaign even in its closing stages. On 21 June thirty-two Italian divisions attacked but were halted by French mountain troops and suffered heavy losses. For the Italians, North Africa would become the main battleground against the British Army.

British Army Vehicles taken for Service in the German Army

Vehicle Name	Type	German Army Designation	Armament	Max. Speed
Bren gun carrier	Tracked carrier	Gepanzert Maschinengewehr Träger Br 731 (e)	MG08 machine gun or SPG	31mph
A12 Matilda Mk II	Tank	Panzerkampfwagen Mk II 748 (e)	Either 2-pounder original guns or later 5cm KwK L/42 (Sf)	30mph

Vehicles littered the roads leading to Dunkirk and one of the enduring images of the beaches was the rows of lorries that had been ‘parked’ leading to the water, where they served as makeshift staging for the troops to clamber on to the rescue vessels. These losses would leave the army weakened in transport and the numbers of tanks lost in battle or abandoned along with other weapons did nothing to help matters either. As with vehicles captured from other armies, the German Army would benefit as it absorbed the vehicles abandoned by the British Army along with 500,000 tons of stores including ammunition. One vehicle that would be pressed into service was the Universal or Bren gun carrier, which the German Army termed the Gepanzert Maschinengewehr Träger Br 731 (e), which was modified for a range of duties. Some even found their way on to the Eastern Front after Germany attacked Russia in June 1941. The suffix letter (e) denoted the English origin of the vehicle and was also applied to captured examples of the Matilda Mk II tank, which the Germans termed Panzerkampfwagen Mk II 748 (e). Some were used to mount a range of weapons such as the 3.7cm anti-tank gun, machine guns and even the 88mm Raketenpanzerbüchse anti-tank rocket launchers in a manner similar to the French UE supply carrier.

The Bren Gun Carrier

The British Army used a range of carrier vehicles during the Second World War including the Oxford carrier and the Windsor carrier, which was built in Canada. Some were basic and changed very little during the conflict, while others were built in a variety of designs to suit different roles. One of the carrier vehicles to be used throughout the entire war was a most surprising design and became a veritable workhorse not only for the British Army but for several other Allied armies as well. This was the British-designed Universal carrier, more commonly referred to as the Bren gun carrier, which served not only as a troop and cargo carrier, but also as the test bed for an SPG platform, a flame-thrower carrier called the Wasp and many other experiments. The wartime production run of this utility vehicle exceeded more than 84,000 built in Canada, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and America, where 14,000 were produced for the US Army as the T–16 with certain modifications.

The Mk I carrier entered service in 1938 and featured in many of the pre-war propaganda newsreel films screened at cinemas across the country to show the British public how well equipped the country’s army was. It looked impressive as whole battalions of infantry charged around exercise areas carried into battle on the fleet of carriers. When the BEF was deployed to France in 1939 on the outbreak of war the carriers went with the infantry divisions so that when the Germans attacked in May 1940 and unleashed their blitzkrieg tactics the Bren gun carriers were there to provide extensive service. Among the many vehicles abandoned by the British Army during the retreat to Dunkirk were these Bren gun carriers.

Bren gun carrier in camouflage colours for North Africa. The smoke grenade discharger can be seen. The flimsy water container would be replaced by jerricans.

Bren gun carrier on the move loaded with fuel carried in jerricans.

Bren gun carrier with recreated South Wales Borderers Regiment. It carries a spare road wheel and length of track for repairs.

Carden-Loyd carrier on which the Universal or Bren gun carrier was based.

Universal or Bren gun carrier in 43rd Wessex Division with infantry section on board.

The carrier can be traced back to a series of developments based on designs produced by the vehicle development team of Carden-Loyd during the 1930s. The idea of a specialised carrier vehicle actually dated back to the early 1920s, when a range of carriers was built for the purpose of transporting ammunition for the artillery batteries. From this concept it was only natural that such a vehicle also be used to transport troops across the battlefield along with the light weapons used by infantry battalions such as Bren guns, mortars and .55in-calibre Boys anti-tank rifles. The actual term ‘Bren gun carrier’ was applied to only one specific model in a range more correctly termed the ‘Universal carrier’. However, the name was popular with the troops and it stuck, no matter what role the vehicle served in, even if it was towing 2-pounder anti-tank guns.

In essence the carrier was little more than an open-topped steel box mounted on tracks and powered by an eight-cylinder Ford V–8 engine. The engine was situated in the centre of the vehicle with rectangular spaces on either side of the cowling that allowed troops to be seated or cargo to be stored for transportation. The driver’s position was to the right and a seat to the left allowed for a Bren gun or Boys anti-tank rifle to be fitted and operated to provide fire support. The Ford engine was water-cooled and developed 85bhp at 2,800rpm to give top speeds of more than 31mph. The basic Bren gun carrier was 12ft 4in long, 6ft 11in wide and 5ft 3in high, producing a compact vehicle with a very low silhouette, yet capable of tackling a wide range of obstacles likely to be encountered on the battlefield. For example, it could negotiate vertical obstacles of more than 2ft high, span gaps of over 5ft, ford water barriers and traverse gradients up to 60 per cent. Unfortunately the open-topped design of the carrier meant that the crew and any infantry being transported were vulnerable to small arms fire and the elements. While it could be seen as a design flaw, the open top did mean that cargo and troops could be loaded and unloaded quicker than with an enclosed vehicle.

The basic Bren gun carrier weighed around 4 tons and was protected along the sides of the hull by armour up to 12mm thick. This left it vulnerable to even the lightest anti-tank weapons, but the vehicle was versatile enough to serve as a platform on which to mount a range of weapons apart from machine guns. For example, the Australians experimented by mounting a 2-pounder anti-tank gun on the Bren gun carrier, but this was not very successful and did not enter service. Heavier guns, including the 25-pounder field gun, were mounted on the carrier as a self-propelled vehicle with varying results, while as a flame-thrower vehicle called the Wasp, the vehicle was able to give support to infantry advancing against defensive positions. A 2in mortar was sometimes mounted to allow the crew to fire smoke grenades to screen their movement across open spaces when natural cover such as trees and hedgerows were absent. Due to its low height the carrier could normally use such features to its own advantage. In the 1940 campaign in France inexperience in battle led to a high casualty rate among carriers as they faced heavy artillery and mortar fire from the Germans.

The carrier’s running gear was based on a design by Vickers and Carden-Loyd and comprised three road wheels in a layout of a single road wheel and a further pair on a single bogie with a shaft connecting both sides together. The suspension used a Horstman-type coil spring to give a rather seesaw motion on the move, but nevertheless had good cross-country ability. The carrier was driven by means of a steering wheel and operators could be trained quickly and easily because of the similarity to driving a wheeled vehicle. Changing direction to follow the path of a normal road was achieved by ‘bowing’ the track, which could be done without the need to reduce speed. For sharper turns the driver used the vehicle’s brakes to stop one track and permit the other to move and thus turned the vehicle. It was a method used on other tracked vehicles and, provided it was done correctly, it was a perfectly adequate practice of steering.

The carrier served in all theatres of operations from the Far East to north-west Europe, including Italy, and even in the Middle East where the dry desert conditions tested the vehicle to its limit. In all cases the vehicle had an average combat range of over 155 miles, which was noteworthy and better than tanks. When towing anti-tank guns other carriers operating with the group transported ammunition and the crew. Carriers served throughout the entire war and after D-Day in 1944; as the Allied armies fought across Europe, increasing pressure was put on the operational role of the vehicles. In fact, by the end of the war it was carrying loads far in excess of what it had originally been intended to transport. This it did with apparent ease and without affecting its operational performance. So much so was the carrying ability and versatility that the carrier continued in service until the 1950s.

German Army Consolidation and Occupation of the Channel Islands

The Germans may have captured huge stocks of supplies, ammunition and vehicles, but the campaign in the west had cost them 27,074 killed, 111,034 wounded and a further 18,384 missing. It is relatively straightforward to account for troops killed, wounded and taken prisoner but the term ‘missing’ is rather more ambiguous. It is applied to those troops whose disappearance on the battlefield cannot otherwise be explained. If a man is shot he remains intact as a corpse, but if he is caught in the centre of an explosion caused by an artillery shell or mortar bomb there would be very little, if indeed anything, that would allow a positive identification to be made, and if several men were caught in such a blast together it would be impossible to separate individuals; thus ‘missing’ is applied in such cases. The 1939 campaign in Poland and the blitzkrieg in the west had cost the German Army dearly in manpower, vehicles and equipment, but they had gained enough resources to more than compensate for the losses in materiel. Fresh troops would soon be trained to replace those lost in the recent fighting and they could be used to consolidate territorial gains, which also included the British Channel Islands. Occupation forces established garrisons, with divisions being assigned to specific areas. For example the 319th Infantry Division would be raised in November 1940 and posted to the Channel Islands, along with other attached units, where they would remain until the islands were liberated in May 1945. Equipment, vehicles and even captured tanks were sent to the Channel Islands and Organisation Todt built thousands of defensive positions across the islands and dug miles of tunnels into the hillsides. The German propaganda ministry under Joseph Goebbels wasted no time and distributed to cinemas all across occupied Europe, including the Channel Islands, the newsreel film Sieg im Westen (Victory in the West). The film was screened to show how Germany won the campaign and defeated the Allies, leaving Britain to continue the fight alone.

The Krupp-built Protze truck showing tools and tow-bar arrangement. It was a useful all-purpose vehicle which served in all theatres of operations.

German Army Vehicles used for Channel Island Fortification

Vehicle Name	Type	Manufacturer	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
‘Protze’ L2H 143	Truck	Krupp	1937–41	Some equipped to carry 2cm FlaK 38 anti-aircraft gun in self-propelled role	2.5 tons	44mph
R200 (KfZ series)	Light standard cross-country vehicle	Stoewer	1936–43	KfZ4 model armed with light anti-aircraft gun	1.6 tons	60mph

Between July 1940 and May 1945 the Channel Islands would be fortified out of all proportion to their military value and absorbed vast quantities of steel and concrete which were needed to build these defences. Hundreds of pieces of artillery of all calibre, including weapons captured from the French, were moved to the islands, along with thousands of tons of ammunition. Aircraft were used to transport essential items and high-ranking officers to the islands while ships brought in the heavy equipment and troops along with vehicles. As the occupation progressed so the Germans consolidated their position by bringing further equipment to the islands, including more military vehicles such as light cars and even some captured French tanks, including twelve Char B1s, were moved to Jersey along with five flame-thrower variants of the same vehicle. Jersey also received eleven SPG variants of the R35 tank armed with captured 4.7cm Czechoslovakian guns and at least eight FT–17 tanks that dated back to the First World War. Many civilian vehicles were commandeered and captured stocks of French and British vehicles were also brought to the islands. Neighbouring Guernsey received similar deliveries of weaponry and vehicles.

Many standard German Army vehicles such as the Krupp-built 6x4, 60bhp, air-cooled ‘Protze’ L2H 143 truck arrived on the islands. It could carry a payload in excess of 1 ton and was also used to tow light anti-aircraft guns, or carry troops or ammunition. The vehicle was fitted with independent coil-spring suspension all round and was originally built as the L2H 43 between 1934 and 1936 with a 55bhp engine. The later L2H 143 was built between 1937 and 1941 and was used as a searchlight truck and communications vehicle. Artillery was the dominant factor in the defence of the islands and, apart from half-tracks as artillery tractors, no heavy vehicles were required in the long term. Light liaison vehicles and motorcycles were very useful on the small islands, which could be traversed in only a few hours along the narrow, winding country lanes. One thing the Germans had to get used to was the fact that the local civilian population drove vehicles, including horse-drawn carts, on the left-hand side, the same as on the British mainland, which led to the inevitable casualties, some fatal, on both sides. In June 1941, after one year of occupation, the Feldkommandantur issued an order that all drivers should drive on the right-hand side of the road. As the occupation progressed and the fuel situation worsened, particularly after the islands were cut off after the Allied landings at Normandy in June 1944, the Germans were the main vehicle users and they had full control of the traffic.

French FT-17 tank deployed on Guernsey by the Germans during the occupation.

Among the light vehicles to be brought over were Stoewer R200s for use in liaison roles during the occupation. These vehicles were produced in four versions and were built by Stoewer between 1936 and 1943. All versions had four-wheel drive and the basic model served through the war and was deployed to all theatres of fighting. The design was configured for four main roles and each was given a ‘KfZ’ or Kraftfahrzeug title to designate their role as a military motor vehicle. The KfZ1 was a four-seat personnel carrier for liaison duties, the KfZ2 was equipped with radios for signals, the KfZ3 served in the light survey role and the KfZ4 was armed with a light anti-aircraft gun which could also engage ground targets. The Stoewer was but one design in a whole series of vehicles known as Leichter Einheits Geländegängige (light standard cross-country vehicles), which were used by the German Army. Weighing only 1.6 tons, the KfZ2 or Funkkraftwagen (radio-carrying vehicle) was much lighter than the comparable m E Pkw KfZ15. The vehicle measured 12.6ft long, 5.5ft wide and 6.2ft high with the canvas collapsible roof erected. It was fitted with the Stoewer 2-litre ohv, four-cylinder, water-cooled engine with 1,997cc producing 50hp. The vehicle had a fuel capacity of 13 gallons, which allowed an operational range of more than 300 miles, and it could achieve speeds over 60mph.

Production ended in 1943 and the Volkswagen Type 82 Kubelwagen took over the roles of the vehicle, but those versions of the KfZ2 still in service were used right up until the end of the war. Other vehicle manufacturers such as Hanomag also produced the vehicle, and between 1937 and 1940 BMW built some 3,225 models. In 1940 a version known as the Type 40 was also built by these three manufacturers. This version had front-wheel steering only and was fitted with the Stoewer 2-litre AW2 engine, but that is a different vehicle. It had a ground clearance of only 8in and a turning radius of 39ft, but these features combined with its good operational range made it ideal for service on the small islands. The Kfz2 was fitted with only one door to the right-hand side at the passenger’s position. The left-hand side was fitted with two doors and seating was fitted to allow up to two passengers as well as the driver. The radio sets were fitted in the rear of the vehicle with the antenna mounted on the left-hand side at the rear. There was stowage capacity in the boot and tools such as shovels and pick axes were carried for use in an emergency to recover the vehicle if it became bogged down. The windscreen could be folded forward if required or erected to seal the vehicle off from inclement weather with the roof erected also.

The success of the Polish campaign and now the overrunning of Western Europe in ten weeks had strengthened the impression that the German Army wanted to project, which was that it was greatly motorised. The truth of the matter was something entirely different. German propaganda neither admitted nor denied the levels of motorisation in the army and left it largely up to their enemies to reach their own conclusions, which were wide of the mark. In September 1939 only sixteen of the German Army’s 103 divisions were motorised and even this level had only been reached by limiting the numbers of vehicles in service with other units. Typically an infantry division had around 950 vehicles but almost 5,400 horses, and the logistics to supply this disparity was worthy of First World War figures. The vehicle fleet required 20 tons of fuel each day while the horses needed over 50 tons of fodder to feed them even when not working. In 1938 the German Army had more than 100 different types of truck in service and even in 1939 there was still such a shortage of transportation that 16,000 civilian vehicles were commandeered. After the French Army had surrendered in 1940 the captured vehicles were distributed throughout eighty-eight infantry divisions so that by 1941 they were in service ready to be used in Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of Russia, in June that year. Another mode of transportation utilised by the military was the humble bicycle. All armies in the war used bicycles, including the Japanese, and in June 1944 images from D-Day show Allied troops going ashore with bicycles. During the course of the war the German Army would use as many as 3 million bicycles, including civilian cycles commandeered for units of the Volkssturm, the home-defence volunteer units.

The Stoewer could drive the narrow routes of the roads on Jersey and Guernsey to keep in touch with units around the island. The Stoewer R200 radio vehicle was useful for communications throughout the five years of German occupation on Jersey.

Top left: Re-enactor depicting a Luftwaffe officer serving in the infantry role with Panzerfaust anti-tank weapons and a bicycle of the period. Top right: Recreated German infantryman with bicycle of the period armed with Panzerfaust anti-tank launcher. Towards the end of the war Luftwaffe personnel served as infantry. Above: This recreated scene shows re-enactors with Panzerfaust anti-tank weapons and bicycles of the period.

German Army Communications Vehicles

The German Army realised how important it was to maintain communications at all levels and for that purpose they developed a range of vehicles for this role, such as the SdKfz 260 and SdKfz 261, both termed Kleine Panzerfunkwagen (small armoured radio cars), which entered service with the German Army in early 1941 and remained in use throughout the remainder of the war. Both vehicles were 4x4 drive and powered by a front-mounted engine of either a Horch 3.5 litre or 3.8 litre fitted with a gearbox to give five forward and one reverse speed. The vehicles could reach speeds of over 50mph on roads and had an operational range of over 186 miles, which meant that they could serve over a wide-ranging area and keep in contact with armoured units. Being specialist radio vehicles they were operated by four-man crews serving with signals units. Armour protection was very marginal, being between 5mm and 8mm with an open-topped roof that left the crew very vulnerable to even small arms fire when in combat. The armoured body was built up in a method called ‘faceting’, which meant that the armour plates were set at angles from 30 degrees to 35 degrees to help deflect some light projectiles. The vehicles were unarmed and only the personal weapons of the crew would have been available for self-defence. Each version weighed 4.2 tons and measured 15.8ft long, 6.5ft wide and 5.8ft high to present a very low profile. The two types of vehicles were produced in four series, with production lasting from November 1940 until April 1943, during which time only 493 are believed to have been built. When serving in inclement weather conditions canvas roof covers could be fitted, but these would have afforded little in the way of protection. Indeed, during the cold winter months in regions such as Norway and Russia where the vehicles served the crews must have suffered terrible privations.

Vehicle Name	Type	Communications Equipment	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
SdKfz 260	Small armoured radio car	Funktrupp ‘c’ comprising Funkgerät 7 and Funksprechtgerät ‘a’	1940–43	N/A	4.2 tons	53mph
SdKfz 261	Small armoured radio car	Funktrupp ‘d’ comprising Funkgerät 12 and Funksprechtgerät ‘a’	1940–43	N/A	4.2 tons	53mph

Externally there was little to tell the SdKfz 260 apart from the SdKfz 261 except that the former was fitted with a rod aerial for the medium-range radio equipment, while the latter vehicle featured a collapsible frame aerial for long-range radio equipment. It was the communications carried on board that set the vehicles apart. The SdKfz 260 was fitted with the Funktrupp (troop radio) ‘c’ which comprised Funkgerät 7 (radio equipment) and the Funksprechtgerät (radio telephone equipment) ‘a’. The SdKfz 261 was fitted with the Funktrupp ‘d’ which comprised the Funkgerät 12 and Funksprechtgerät ‘a’. Both vehicles were deployed to serve with signals units attached to the headquarters of regiments, brigades and divisions of armoured units and the armoured radio companies of Nachrichten (communications) battalions. The operational life of these vehicles may have been relatively short compared to other similar vehicles but they did deliver an important service wherever they were deployed.