1943: More Lessons are Learnt

The year 1943 started well for the Allies with the Germans in retreat in North Africa and the Russians also forcing them back and inflicting heavy casualties. Churchill and Roosevelt met at Casablanca on 14 January and held discussions to plan the next stages of the war. Stalin did not attend but General Charles de Gaulle for the Free French was present. Among the subjects for debate was the air war against Germany and the bombing of strategic targets. At the start of the war the RAF had been reluctant to bomb factories in Germany, even though they were producing tanks and artillery, on the grounds that they were privately owned. Three years on and attitudes had changed. The Germans had bombed cities and armaments centres in Birmingham and Coventry, and although the attacks had temporarily disrupted production, the bombing never halted the factories and they remained centralised. The RAF had mounted the first so-called 1,000-bomber raid against Cologne on the night of 30–31 May 1942. With American bombers such as the B–17 and B–24 of the USAAF now arriving in Britain in ever greater numbers, the weight of aircraft sent against targets in Germany was huge. The bombing offensive was discussed and it was decided that it would be continued in order to achieve ‘the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened’. It was decided that the RAF would bomb by night and the USAAF would bomb by day, thereby allowing the defence measures no respite. The bombing campaign on its own did not halt production, but it had the effect of making the Germans decentralise, which slowed production and reduced output as parts had to be transported for assembly. America was unaffected by bombing and Canada too could carry on as normal.

Daylight bombing raid over Berlin by 8th USAAF to disrupt factory production.

The War in the Air

The RAF had already demonstrated the power they could unleash in bombing raids but in July 1943 the combined weight of the RAF and USAAF showed that they were unstoppable. On 24 July the first air raid in a series of attacks known as the Operation Gomorrah sorties was flown against the city of Hamburg, which was an industrial and military centre. U-boat pens, oil refineries and armaments factories made it an important target to attack in order to cripple the German ability to produce materiel for the war effort. For a total of eight days and seven nights the combined Allied air forces flew thousands of sorties and dropped tens of thousands of tons of bombs. Thousands of people were killed in the attacks and whole housing districts were destroyed. The bombing also destroyed 183 out of 524 large factories, 4,118 smaller factories out of 9,068 and a further 580 premises producing ammunition, vehicles and weapons. After the war German officials stated that had the Allies conducted further such raids, the country would have been forced out of the war. The Allies were unable to maintain such a weight of attack but continued air raids did force the Germans to decentralise their production centres. Even so, in early 1943 the Germans were producing 760 tanks a month but by the end of the year they were building 1,229, despite decentralisation. The bombing campaign against Germany would cost the RAF 10,123 aircraft lost between September 1939 and May 1945. The USAAF lost 5,548 bombers between 1942 and 1945, and between them the two air forces dropped an estimated 1,576,921 tons of bombs on targets in Germany and occupied countries.

The War at Sea

At sea the losses of supplies due to ships being sunk even in convoy had a telling effect on the armies. The Allies were able to reduce greatly Rommel’s mobility by using submarines to sink his fuel tankers. The German U-boats were a problem and they claimed many victims. Churchill remarked: ‘The only thing that ever terrified me during the war was the U-boat peril.’ He was right to be concerned, as the figures showed. Between 1941 and 1942 U-boats and surface raiders sank 1,459 vessels, amounting to 7,619,000 tons of shipping. To put the losses into context, Britain received 55 million tons of imported food before the outbreak of the war but by 1940 the U-boats had reduced this level to 12 million tons. A whole campaign was fought at sea in order to defeat the U-boat and eventually the Allies won it with technology and tactics. During the whole of 1942 1,664 ships were sunk and Britain was on the verge of being starved if such losses were maintained, while fuel supplies were also becoming critical. In March 1943 a total of 108 vessels were sunk, but aircraft with extended range provided air cover and helped keep the U-boats at bay. In May the same year fifty supply ships were sunk but the use of specialist weapons, improved tactics and technology such as ASDIC and radar allowed the Allies to sink forty-one U-boats. They would continue to menace supply routes but their ability to range at will, largely unmolested, had been stopped. The build-up for the invasion of Europe continued and the numbers of tanks, trucks and other specialist vehicles, along with the troops and other supplies, arrived in British ports such as Liverpool and New Haven, from where they were taken to storage depots or transit camps. England was becoming one vast military camp. One joke doing the rounds at the time was that it was only the barrage balloons, used in air defences, that prevented the island from sinking under the weight of all the materiel arriving. Where to keep it all was another problem and remote country lanes in the south-west of England were used as temporary vehicle parks. The overhanging trees provided natural camouflage to screen them from any prying German reconnaissance aircraft.

The American Forces

After the Torch Landings the Americans realised that the fighting in the North African desert was unlike anything they could have prepared for and they came to understand what a vast and unforgiving area the battleground was, covering as it did many thousands of square miles. The British, Italians and Germans had learnt many lessons and now it was the turn of the Americans. For example, there were few roads maintained to a level that allowed travel apart from the main arterial highways that connected the larger towns. Minor routes were unreliable as they could often be blown away during violent sandstorms and to traverse the area with military forces a form of navigation known as ‘dead-reckoning’ was used, and without any landmarks it was like navigating at sea. Accuracy was all-important and the slightest margin of error could lead to the destination being missed. Without doubt the most experienced units operating in the region were the reconnaissance patrols. The Germans sent out their patrols, which covered vast areas, but it was the British that excelled in the role and created specialist units, the most famous of which was the LRDG. They were an irregular force and used a range of vehicles, such as Canadian-built CMP F30 trucks, Chevrolet and even captured German and Italian vehicles. The CMP, standing for Canadian Military Pattern, and the F30, standing for the weight (30cwt or 1.5 tons), it was a 4x2 truck with a payload of over 1 ton. It was fitted with a 239 C1 Ford/Mercury petrol engine, which gave an operational range of 6 miles to the gallon so that the twin fuel tanks, with a combined capacity of 24.5 gallons, allowed distances of up to 150 miles to be covered. Canada built around 400,000 CMP trucks out of a total of 815,729 built during the war. In fact, Canada on its own built more trucks than Germany for the same period. There were other specialist units raised such as the Special Air Service, which was formed by David Stirling of the Scots Guards, and the group known unofficially as ‘Popski’s 400,000 CMP Private Army’ under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Peniakoff. These also used a variety of vehicles including the American-built Willys Jeep. They also used whatever weapons they had, including captured enemy types, which helped extend their ability to operate for extended periods.

Vehicles of the Specialist Units

Vehicle Name	Type	Manufacturer	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
CMP F30	4x2 truck	Ford	1940 onwards	Various machine guns	1.5 tons
Willys Jeep	Jeep	Willys MA, Ford GP, Willys MB, Ford GPW	1941 onwards	Various according to role	1.4 tons	65mph

Heading the American forces was an officer by the name of Dwight David Eisenhower who had never held a combat command. He was a relatively unknown factor but soon the whole world would recognise him and know him by his more familiar nickname of ‘Ike’. Eisenhower had graduated from West Point in 1915 and during the First World War held various training posts and proved himself to be a very capable and skilled organiser. He was refused service overseas and one of the positions he held was to train tank crews. He had been promoted to the rank of brigadier general in October 1941 and his administrative capabilities were widely recognised. His first post when America entered the war in December 1941 was to be appointed deputy chief in charge of Pacific defences. In May 1942 he arrived in England with Lieutenant General Henry Arnold, but earlier Eisenhower had been assigned to the General Staff in Washington, where among his many duties, he was responsible for drawing up plans for the defeat of Germany and Japan. In June 1942 he was appointed commanding general European theatre of operations. Five months later he was appointed Supreme Commander Allied (Expeditionary) Force of the North African theatre of operations for the Torch Landings, during which period he strengthened his command skills. Further promotions and changes in his appointment came during 1943 and by the end of the year President Roosevelt appointed him Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

The Pacific Theatre

The Pacific theatre could not be ignored but it did require an entirely different approach due to the vast distances involved. Following their massive defeats at Singapore and the Philippines the Allies knew they could not continue to fall back in the face of the Japanese onslaught the way the Russians had in the wake of Germany’s attack. The British retreated back to the borders of India, covering around 1,000 miles in over five months, fighting all the way and losing over 10,000 men killed and wounded, and having to abandon much equipment including trucks, artillery and armoured vehicles. The Japanese kept up their pursuit until July 1942 when unconventional British long-range forces began to slow them down by striking at their supply lines with various units that were organised into a force called the ‘Chindits’, created by Brigadier Orde Wingate.

The Americans had also been busy fighting a major naval battle in the Coral Sea and winning a costly victory in another naval battle at Midway between 4 and 7 June 1942, which broke the Japanese naval dominance in the Pacific. American planners decided to invade the Solomon Islands and in order to do so they would first have to capture the island of Guadalcanal, which lay to the east of the Solomon Islands. To defend the islands in the group made up of Tulagi, Florida Island and Guadalcanal the Japanese had deployed almost 4,000 men and 100 aircraft. The Americans assembled seventy-five warships and transports to carry the invasion force, which included 16,000 US marines for the assault. America had no combat experience of amphibious landings and this force had been assembled very hastily; the men had only sufficient ammunition for ten days and their supply levels had been reduced from three months to only two months. The first wave of marines landed at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942, by coincidence the day before the US troops landed in North Africa during Operation Torch. The fighting in the operation lasted until 7 February 1943 and cost the Americans 1,752 killed and 4,359 wounded. The logistic support for the operation had been confused but eventually it was resolved and much was learned from the experience. The landings had been supported by M3 Stuart light tanks. The Japanese had little to oppose the tanks directly, which literally crushed everything beneath them as they attacked the Japanese positions. Major General Alexander Vandegrift, commanding the 1st US Marines on Guadalcanal recorded how the ‘rear of the tanks looked like meatgrinders’ from the bodies they had driven over with their steel tracks. It was the first operation in the ‘island hopping’ campaign and every shell, vehicle, gallon of petrol and soldier had to be transported in readiness for each amphibious landing.

Chevrolet C60L transport truck with white star identification markings used for the Normandy campaign June 1944. It carries a bicycle for emergencies and there is a position on the cab roof for a machine gun.

Victory in North Africa

The reinforcements arriving in North Africa were only a fraction of what the Afrika Korps needed, but with the new Tiger tanks they could fight hard even with such reduced levels. The Tiger was formed into battalions comprising thirty vehicles and the Germans sent two battalions of Tiger I tanks to the North Africa theatre of operations between November 1942 and March 1943. This was an incredible move because the Germans were fighting a desperate war on the Russian front and they knew that it was only a question of time before an Anglo-American invasion of Europe was launched. Hitler may have rated the campaign in North Africa as a sideshow, but it was not going to be abandoned without a fight. Of all the varied tank types to be produced by Germany during the Second World War, the one design that stands out from all of them is the Tiger. The very name struck fear into Allied infantry and tank crews alike. The Russians had already encountered the Tiger and now the Western Allies were about to meet it for the first time in North Africa.

The forces making up the Operation Torch landings comprised the Western Task Force of 25,000 men commanded by Major General George S. Patton. The Central Task Force of 39,000 men was under the command of Major General Lloyd Fredendall and Major General Charles M. Ryder commanded the Eastern Task Force, comprising 23,000 British troops and 20,000 American. Using the coastal route they moved on Algiers, which quickly capitulated. In the east Montgomery had succeeded in pushing the Afrika Korps all the way back to the Tunisian border by late January 1943, but this allowed Rommel to join forces with von Arnim. The forces of the Torch Landings took up positions along the Dorsal Mountains, a vast natural barrier that could only be penetrated through a series of natural passes.

On 14 February forces under the command of Fredendall began to move forward but they were unwittingly stumbling into an elaborate trap. Under cover of a sandstorm, the Germans had moved armoured units forward, including Tiger tanks, through the Faid Pass. The 10th Panzer Division and 21st Panzer Division linked up to surround an American force of 2,500 men. The next day the Germans attacked, and with air support they destroyed forty-six tanks and only 300 Americans managed to escape. The rest of the American force fell back towards the Kasserine Pass through the Dorsal Mountains, which had to be held in order to prevent a large supply base at Tébessa from falling into German hands. Rommel wanted to pursue the retreating Americans, no doubt with a view to capturing supplies that he could have used, but von Arnim, who was technically superior to him and also had experience in fighting in Russia, was cautious and did not want to take the risk given their limited resources and shortage of supplies. The difference of opinion was only resolved when Field Marshal Albert Kesselring flew in from Rome to assess the situation and gave his support to Rommel’s plan. German tanks entered the Kasserine Pass on 19 February in pursuit of the Americans. The natural feature is barely 1 mile wide at its narrowest point and the Americans were able to make a stand and halt the German tanks. The next day the Germans renewed their attack using artillery and rocket artillery called Nebelwerfers, forcing the Americans to fall back again. The British gave support to their Allies and sent eleven tanks from the 2nd Lothian and Border Horse, but they were destroyed in the fighting.

The way appeared to be clear for the Germans to move into Algeria, advancing through Tébessa, with its prize of stocks of fuel and other supplies, and then through Thala. Rommel experienced a rare moment of caution and expected the Allies to mount a counter-attack and hesitated in making his move, choosing instead to assume a defensive stance. When no attack came he renewed his advance, but the Allies had taken the opportunity of the pause to strengthen their positions. The Americans held fast and defended Tébessa but the 10th Panzer Division with its Tiger tanks forced the British to fall back to Thala, where they established defences. The following day they received artillery support from the US 9th Division, which had covered the 600-mile distance from Oran in just four days. On 22 February the German advance was halted but the Allies preferred to hold their positions rather than putting in a counter-attack. The Germans began to withdraw from the Kasserine Pass and Rommel, realising the weight of reinforcements and supplies reaching the Americans, knew he did not stand a chance against their superior numbers and equipment, and did not mount an attack. Even so, it was another twenty-four hours before the Americans discovered that he had pulled off a masterstroke and completely melted away. The Americans had been unprepared for such a frightening initiation into war and the fighting had cost them 6,500 killed, wounded and captured. The British had lost 2,500 men and the whole effort had cost the Allies 183 tanks destroyed. The Germans and Italians had lost 2,000 killed, wounded and captured and thirty-four tanks destroyed.

Italian Armoured Vehicles

The range of armoured vehicles used by the Italian Army during the Second World War was not among the best designs fielded by any of the belligerent nations. There are many reasons for this and, apart from the Semovente, which is generally regarded as the best Italian armoured vehicle of the war, the remainder of the Italian designs were not well thought out. Italy had been engaged in military campaigns since 1935 when it invaded Ethiopia and in Spain from 1936, where Mussolini deployed more troops than Germany and fielded light tanks such as the M13/40, which were later sent into action during the disastrous Greek campaign of 1940. The inadequacies of these tanks were highlighted in these campaigns and the Italians realised, somewhat late, that better designs were required if they were to stand a chance on the battlefield. In 1941 the Italian Army finally developed and put into production a light tank design that did show some promise of being useful on the battlefield, but even so it was a classic case of too little too late.

Vehicle Name	Type	Manufacturer	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
M13/40	Light tank	FIAT	1940–41	47mm and 2x 8mm machine guns	14 tons	21mph
Carro Armato M14/41	Light tank	FIAT	1941–42	47mm-calibre gun and two Modello 38 8mm-calibre machine guns	13.7 tons	20mph
Semovente 90/53	Self-propelled gun	Semovente	1941	90mm gun	16.7 tons	22mph

The new tank was the M14/41, served by a crew of four and armed with a 47mm-calibre main armament gun with 104 rounds of ammunition carried; this placed it slightly better than the British 2-pounder 40mm-calibre gun fitted to many tanks such as the Matilda Mk II, but it was still lower than the 50mm guns fitted to the German Panzer III tanks. The M14/41 promised to be better than the earlier Italian tank designs, but in the later phases of campaigns in North Africa it fared no better when it encountered anti-tank guns or was engaged by British units using American-built tanks such as the Sherman. The Italian Centauro Armoured Division used M14/41 tanks in action at the Kasserine Pass in 1943 and lost many during the heavy fighting against the American forces.

Built by the motor manufacturing company FIAT, the full title of the new tank was Carro Armato M14/41, the designation ‘M’ standing for ‘medium’, ‘14’ being the weight of the vehicle in tonnes and ‘41’ the year of its introduction into service. Despite being termed a medium tank, the M14/41 was actually a ‘light’ tank and an improved version of the earlier M13/40, also a light tank. The improved version was fitted with a SPA 15-TM–41 eight-cylinder petrol engine developing 125hp to produce a top speed of 20mph. It weighed 13.7 tons and measured just over 16ft long, 7.2ft wide and 7.8ft high. Armour thickness varied from 6mm to 42mm, which was comparable to other tanks in service with Germany and Britain. It had an operational range of 125 miles, which was much less than many of its adversaries in North Africa. The M14/41 was constructed using a riveted design and looked old-fashioned when compared to other designs, which were constructed of welded hulls and cast turrets. It was fitted with vertical volute suspension with two sets of double-bogie wheels fitted on either side with the drive sprocket at the front, the idler wheel to the rear and three return rollers for the tracks. The main armament was a 47mm-calibre gun mounted in the turret that could traverse 360 degrees by hand and elevate to +25 degrees and depress to −15 degrees. The tank also carried two Modello 38 machine guns of 8mm calibre as secondary armament. One was mounted co-axially to the main gun with the second mounted in the hull, and over 3,000 rounds were carried.

The M14/41 may have been based on the M13/40 but the armour protection was much better than that design. It was produced from 1941 until 1942, during which time some 800 vehicles were built, but even despite its upgrades over earlier vehicles, the M14/41 could be considered obsolete even before it entered service. The flaws in its design became apparent when it was deployed in the North African theatre of operations. It had a ready tendency to catch fire easily when hit and many were destroyed in tank battles, with others being picked off by the anti-tank guns. When the Italian forces withdrew they abandoned many of their tanks, usually due to lack of fuel, and this included those M14/41 tanks not destroyed in the fighting. These were later recovered and refuelled and absorbed into use by the German Army, which designated them M14/41 736 (i). These were placed in service with Sturmgeschutz units and some went to the Panzerabteilung Adria. Those vehicles captured by the British Army were pressed into service for a short time but as there was no shortage of tanks they were soon abandoned. Some M14/41 tanks were deployed by the Italian Army to serve on the Eastern Front and these ended up being used by the Germans in this theatre of operations; there are photographs showing examples of the tank having been destroyed by Polish resistance fighters in Warsaw during the uprising in 1944. Although limited in service and with a less than impressive record in battle, the M14/41 later went on to be used as the chassis for the Semovente 90/53 heavy tank.

Eighty miles to the east, the Germans had established a defensive line of bunkers, tank traps and minefields known as the Mareth Line. In essence it was a stopgap measure from where they could launch an attack and that is just what Rommel intended to do, by attacking the British-held town of Medenine. Fortunately for the British, they had intercepted German radio messages and decoded them, giving warning of the impending attack, and were ready for it. So precise was the decoding that they knew the date of the attack, and when it came on 6 March the anti-tank guns were ready and waiting. The British had learned much in two years of desert fighting and allowed the German tanks to come within 400yd before opening fire and destroying fifty-two of the Germans’ ever-diminishing tank force. Rommel flew to Berlin on 9 March to request personally that Hitler allowed him to evacuate North Africa. The request was denied and Rommel remained in Germany while von Arnim took over command of Army Group Africa.

The British had improved their tactics to make the artillery more flexible in providing support and the Americans would come to learn from such experience. General Fredendall had not lived up to expectations, and Major General Ernest Harmon, commanding the US 2nd Armoured Division, reported his unflattering opinion of his fellow officer, stated to Eisenhower: ‘This is Rommel and tank warfare at its latest.’ He continued by adding that it was ‘way above poor Fredendall’s head’. On 6 March Fredenhall was replaced by General Patton, who took up command and arrived with more Sherman tanks. For three weeks he attacked the passes through the southern end of the Dorsal Mountains at El Guettar and Maknassy with little to show for the effort. However, it did have the effect of forcing the Germans to take tanks out of the defences making up the Mareth Line. This served to help Montgomery, who ordered the New Zealand 2nd Division, some 25,000 men under the command of Major General Bernard Freyberg, to attack south-west and then swing behind the Mareth Line. The division covered a distance of 200 miles following a route that had been plotted by the LRDG. Linking up with other elements of the British Eighth Army, they moved over the vast distances all the time heading northwards towards their goal of Tunis. The weather worsened and the rain turned the roads to a muddy quagmire that slowed the Allies’ progress. The Germans were still capable of turning to attack their pursuers and Montgomery was forced to keep changing his tactics to meet each situation. Through April the British continued to battle forwards even after they had linked up with the US II Corps on 7 April as they advanced north towards Tunis. By now the Germans were using up all their reserves and conducting a fighting withdrawal to take up defensive lines sweeping in a wide arc on the tip of Tunisia.

On 22 April British artillery joined American units to pound positions prior to an attack. General Omar Bradley, replacing Patton who was preparing for the next operation (the invasion of Sicily), ordered an attack by seventeen Sherman tanks to support an infantry attack against a feature known as ‘Hill 609’ from its height measured in metres. The Germans, literally with their backs to the sea, had only 175,000 men to oppose an Allied force of 380,000 men with 1,200 tanks, 1,500 pieces of artillery, 3,000 aircraft and unlimited supplies. The Germans had 400 aircraft, 130 tanks and ammunition supplies sufficient for three days if the 400 guns they had left were careful. A massive artillery barrage by 600 guns pounded the German positions on 6 May, which further weakened them. The next day the Americans were only 15 miles outside Bizerta and elements of the British 11th Hussars entered Tunis. Disparate fighting continued during which engagements the tanks of the 10th Panzer Division ran out of fuel. By 12 April the Germans and Italians had expended everything and Lieutenant General Hans Cramer sent a message to notify Berlin that ‘Munitions expended, weapons and war equipment destroyed’. On 13 May General Alexander sent a signal to Churchill to report that the campaign in Tunisia was finished and the enemy had surrendered. North Africa was clear and the Allies could now concentrate on enemy forces in Europe from France to Italy.

The losses sustained by the Germans at Stalingrad and the surrender of their forces in North Africa were huge by any standards. They had lost thousands of trucks, tanks, artillery, millions of tons of war materiel and, most importantly, manpower. However, despite these losses the German Army still had some 10.3 million men under arms in the field in mid-1943, including allies and volunteers from occupied territories. There were millions of forced labourers producing vehicles, weapons and uniforms, and according to General Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel these people were ‘working for Germany’, which implies that they were doing it of their own free will, when it was anything but the case. This workforce allowed the German armaments industry to increase productivity to supply the army by 80 per cent, which was made all the more remarkable when one considers the disruption to factory output caused by round-the-clock bombing by the RAF and USAAF.

Focus on Europe and Russia

The main fighting in North Africa was over and the onus was now put on the occupying forces in France to begin preparing defences to counter an Allied invasion of Europe, which Hitler and his generals knew must surely come. In Russia the fighting never stopped for a day and there was always movement and engagement somewhere across the vast expanse of territory; the German Army stripped men and equipment from France to redeploy in the east. Russian partisan groups attacked motorised convoys, blew up railway tracks and generally disrupted the rear areas through which passed the logistics to support the army. The railways were being used to transport tanks, ammunition, artillery and troops to the front, and these extended routes were particularly vulnerable. For example, in January 1943 some 397 attacks were recorded against railway targets, which resulted in damage to 112 locomotives and bridges. Some of the bridges were significantly important such as the one spanning 330yd over the Desna River on the Bryansk-Gomel railway line. To repair such damage required specialist engineers and equipment along with building material including replacement tracks, sleepers and points. In February the German General Directorate of Railways (East) reported 500 attacks, which rose to 1,045 incidents in May. By June there were 1,092 attacks against the railway, increasing to an alarming 1,460 incidents in July 1943. In the rear of the Army Group Centre, Russian partisans destroyed forty-four bridges, 298 locomotives and 1,223 wagons and carriages so that movement by rail was widely disrupted. A soldier reported that: ‘With us trains move for one day and three days have to be spent repairing the track since the partisans blow everything up.’ He continued by recounting how on one occasion a collision had been caused between a supply train and a troop train, which caused chaos on the over-burdened railway system.

The Russians were laying minefields at the rate of 2,400 anti-tank mines and 2,700 anti-personnel mines per mile and it has been calculated that they dug more than 3,100 miles of anti-tank ditches as defences against the German tanks. Using a workforce of 200,000 civilians the Russians also laid new railway tracks, such as the 50-mile stretch between Stary Oskol and Rzhava, built 250 new bridges and constructed 1,800 miles of new roads to ferry supplies to the front. All the while the Russians were building up their reserves and making good the deficiencies that had beset them in 1941 and 1942. Marshal Georgi Zhukov, who had defended Moscow and rescued Stalingrad, was created Deputy Supreme Commander and in 1943 he began to formulate plans that would crush the German Army in the east. Tank armies, artillery and troops were all being assembled so that when the time was right he could strike in overwhelming force. Operations were still being conducted to hold down the Germans and on 2 February the Russians, fresh from their success at Stalingrad, launched an offensive and penetrated the German lines.

Praying Mantis machine-gun carrier based on the Universal carrier. Never entered service.

By 1942 the Germans had sustained losses of 1.9 million men killed, wounded or captured. By January 1943 they were down to fewer than 500 operational combat tanks and were under strength by almost 500,000 men. They were receiving replacement vehicles, and supplies were getting through, but they were losing a lot to partisan activity. The Germans had captured the city of Kharkov in early March and as the fighting continued in the latest offensive the Russians headed towards the city with the intention of recapturing it. This was entering a phase known as the Third Battle of Kharkov and between January and April the Russians poured in 500,000 troops in the Veronezh-Kharkov Offensive. They had already managed to capture the city of Rostov on 14 February but despite their best efforts Kharkov could not be taken. The fighting saw each side committing the usual tank types such as Tiger I and T–34 engaging in combat along with SPGs, including the StuG. III, anti-tank guns and half-tracks such as the SdKfz 7, which towed the deadly 88mm anti-tank gun. By the end of the fighting the action had cost the Russians 80,000 killed, wounded and captured, but they had fought hard and inflicted 56 per cent losses on the SS Panzer Corps committed to the battle. Even so, by 14 March the Germans still had the city of Kharkov and were determined to hold it. General Erich von Manstein claimed that he had destroyed 1,140 tanks and 3,000 pieces of artillery. These figures are questionable and probably greatly exaggerated and have been questioned by historians since then. After the battle the Russians held the line with a bulge, known as a salient, projecting forward of their own lines into the German front line. This was over 160 miles in width and the position was totally unacceptable to Hitler, who wanted to eliminate it. The Russians had pushed the Germans back some 300 miles in places, which extended their supply route and shortened the Germans’ supply lines. For the Russians this was not a problem because they were in their own country with friendly local populace. The journalist Alexander Werth covering the war in Russia for The Sunday Times newspaper reported on the Russian morale in the aftermath of Stalingrad, and saw ‘Horses, horses and still more horses blowing steam and with ice around their nostrils were wading through the deep snow, pulling guns and gun-carriages and large covered wagons; and hundreds of lorries with their headlights full on …’ The German supply lines remained a mess and were being attacked by partisans in the rear and the regular army in the front.

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
PzKw V SdKfz 171 Ausf. D also known as ‘Panther’	MAN, Daimler-Benz, MNH and Henschel	1943	7.5cm KwK42 L/70 and 2x MG34 7.92mm machine guns	43 tons	26mph

Effective paint schemes camouflaged the Panther even at close range. Even for its great size the Panther could take up ambush positions in woods. Recreated scene loading shells into a Panther tank showing how the vehicle would have been re-armed (right).

The Panther and the bicycle stand in stark contrast to show how the fortunes of the German Army changed towards the end of the war when fuel was not available to power the tanks and it was a man on a bicycle. With armour protection up to 120mm thickness, the Panther had little to fear on the battlefield. The Panther or SdKfz 171 with its 75mm gun could destroy most tanks at ranges of 1,000yd.

In mid-April the Germans began formulating plans to deal with the Russian salient and this was to be known as Operation Citadel. Hitler would commit more than 2,700 tanks to the coming battle, which represented around 63 per cent of the German Army’s armoured forces in Russia, including the new PzKw V or ‘Panther’. In 1941 the range at which German tank crews engaged Russian tanks was around 500yd and Russian tank crews engaged targets at 400yd. By 1943 each side had improved their tank gunnery due to more powerful guns on tanks and the range had increased to over 1,000yd for both sides. The Russians too were putting new vehicles into the field for the first time in preparation for the battle they knew was coming because their spy network, known as the ‘Lucy Ring’, was keeping them informed of German intentions. Among the new vehicles was the SU–122, which weighed 30 tons and mounted a 122mm-calibre gun on the T–34 chassis. The SU–152 was the KV–1 chassis on to which was mounted a 152mm ML–20S gun nicknamed the ‘Zverobody’ (beast killer) and could destroy the heavyweight German tanks such as the Tiger, Panther and Ferdinand. The 44-ton SU–152 carried twenty rounds of ammunition for its main gun and was served by a crew of five. It had a top speed of 27mph and measured 29ft 4in long, 10ft 8in wide and 8ft high. Russian troops were reckless in their methods of tank hunting and infantrymen would often approach tanks to place demolition charges or mines directly on the vehicle, always with devastating effect. The tactic was suicidal but it achieved results.

Russian SU Tank Series

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
SU–122	UZTM	1942	122mm M–30S gun	30 tons	34mph
SU–152	Chelyabinskiy Kirovskiy Zavod	1943	152mm ML–20S gun and DShK 12.7mm machine gun	44.8 tons	27mph

The Tiger Tank

By now the Western Allies and the Russians had engaged the formidable Tiger tank in battle and they had needed to rethink their tactics concerning tank fighting. The first Tiger I tanks had entered service with the 1st Platoon of the 502nd Schwere (heavy) Panzerabteilung and went into action in the Leningrad area in Russia. Ever since Germany began its rearmament programme in earnest in the mid-1930s, the military had been considering a number of designs for heavy tanks. In 1937 one of the suggestions proposed the idea that a version of the 88mm anti-tank gun be mounted on a heavy hull and chassis to produce an undisputed tank capable of destroying any challengers before they came close enough to open fire with any effect. The whole heavy tank programme kept changing direction and the requirements governing the final design of the tank kept being changed for no apparent reason. This led to delays, wasted materials and occupied factory space. Finally in 1942 a step in the right direction came when the armaments manufacturing company Henschel was awarded the contract to produce the design of a heavy tank on which all quarters agreed was the right one. The project was given the specification VK 4501, and when it appeared it was like nothing else ever deployed before on the battlefield. It was given the official designation of SdKfz 181, but the name Tiger became the identifying title to friend and foe alike.

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
Panzerkampfwagen VI (Tiger I)	Henschel	1942	KwK36 L/56 88mm gun and 2x MG34 machine guns	55 tons	23mph

The Tiger I or Panzerkampfwagen VI was undoubtedly a remarkable fighting machine and yet it was a basic tank design except for the armour thickness, which made it virtually proof against all but the most powerful ammunition. It was the armour protection that varied from only 25mm in less vulnerable areas, such as the engine deck, to 100mm in thickness over the frontal portion of the hull and turret and the gun mantlet where it was 110mm in thickness, which almost guaranteed its survival on the battlefield. The best an Allied anti-tank gunner could hope for was to disable the Tiger by hitting the track or the vulnerable engine area at the rear of the tank. It was the size and sheer weight that made the Tiger intimidating and made it stand apart from other tanks. It was used in all theatres of war from 1942 onwards and yet, despite its almost ubiquitous presence, only 1,357 vehicles were actually produced. This relatively low production number was due to the fact that it was a complicated design, with each vehicle requiring some 300,000 hours’ assembly time. It would be the audacious manner in which it was handled by commanders that could turn the course of a battle. For example, during the Normandy campaign on 13 June 1944 Michael Wittmann, joined by other Tiger tanks, surprised elements of the British 7th Armoured Division and left in their wake twenty-five tanks destroyed along with a further twenty-eight other armoured vehicles destroyed in an action lasting only minutes. It was originally intended that thirty Tiger I tanks would form special battalions and come under command of either army or corps headquarters and, indeed, this was often the case, but some regiments such as SS units had their own battalions formed with Tiger tanks.

The Tiger I weighed 55 tons and was a very powerful weapon platform to carry a powerful weapon in the shape of a KwK36 L/56 88mm gun and two MG34 machine guns. The machine guns were mounted one in the hull and the other was co-axially mounted next to the main armament. The Tiger could carry up to ninety-two rounds of ammunition for the 88mm gun and these could pierce 4in of armour at ranges up of over 500yd. A standard complement of five men formed the crew operating in the usual roles of driver, gunner, loader, commander and radio operator, which could make a formidable team. It was powered by a Maybach HL230P45 V–12 water-cooled inline petrol engine that developed 700bhp at 3,000rpm, giving it a road speed of over 23mph, cross-country speeds of around 12.5mph and an operational road range of 62 miles.

It was in a Tiger tank such as this that Michael Wittmann earned his reputation in France and finally met his end. The Tiger I was first encounterd on the battlefield by the Russians who had to develop more powerful weapons to deal with it.

Today there are only a handful of examples of the Tiger I tank surviving in museums around the world with a few more believed to be in private hands. They are all in various states of repair or running conditions. The French Tank Museum at Saumur has an example and the vehicle held by the Aberdeen Proving Ground in the United States is understood at present to be undergoing an extensive restoration project. There is an example by the roadside just outside the French village of Vimoutier, having been recovered and put on display. This example is missing many components, is far from being anywhere near complete and is certainly not roadworthy, but even so its sheer size remains very impressive. The museums at Kubinka in Russia and Koblenz in Germany each have an example of the giant 65-ton Sturmmorser variant of the Tiger. There are tantalising rumours of other examples of Tigers, but only two others are known to be definitely in private hands and in the course of restoration projects.

The Tiger tank was feared and respected by all the Allies who met it on the battlefield. The 88mm was the powerful punch of the Tiger and it could penetrate more than 4in of armour at ranges of almost 500yd. Whether moving or static the Tiger is always impressive.

Unarguably one of the best-preserved surviving examples of a complete Tiger I is that held by the Bovington Tank Museum in Dorset, England, where it forms part of the permanent display. This exhibit is known as Bovington Tank Museum Accession Number 2351. The full provenance of this particular vehicle is well known, as is its production and service record. According to the files of Henschel, the company that built the Tiger I, the chassis records for the production run of the Tiger tank numbered from 250001 to 251357. The Fahrgestell or chassis number for the Tiger at Bovington is 250112, from which record one can place it as being one of the earliest vehicles to come off the assembly lines at Kassel. In fact, it is believed that the vehicle may have been completed around February 1943. The turret that houses the 88mm KwK36 L/56 main armament was built by Wegmann A.G., also based in Kassel. It is understood that the Bovington Tiger arrived in Tunisia sometime between early March and April 1943. It was given the unit numbering ‘131’, which indicates that it served with No. 3 Platoon of No. 1 Company of the 504th Schwere Heeres Panzerabteilung (army heavy tank battalion).

The Bovington Museum Tiger went into action on 21 April 1943 at Medjez-el-Bab where it encountered Churchill tanks of No. 4 Troop, A Squadron of the 48th Royal Tank Regiment. It was a fierce engagement and one of the Churchill tanks, probably a Mk III armed with a 6-pounder gun, made a chance hit on the Tiger and disabled it. With no other choice, the crew evacuated the vehicle, which was abandoned on the battlefield. The British Army consolidated the area and the ‘knocked out’ Tiger was recovered from the battlefield by 104 Army Tank Workshops and the 25th Tank Brigade Workshops of the REME. It was removed back to Tunis on 24 May 1943, having been in the theatre of operations for barely two months. On 2 June Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden inspected the captured tank and on 18 June King George VI visited the area and took a keen interest in the Tiger. It was then decided to take the tank back to Britain as an exhibit, where it was displayed briefly at Horse Guards Parade in London. The damage inflicted to Tiger 131 on the battlefield was great because it was able to manoeuvre under its own automotive power at La Goulette Harbour as it was being prepared for transportation. After it had been displayed the tank was closely examined and taken apart for in-depth analysis and study into enemy tank technology. Six years after the end of the war the Tiger I was officially handed over to the Bovington Tank Museum in September 1951, where today it remains one of the ‘star’ attractions with visitors from all over the world.

The Battle of Kursk

The German attack against the Kursk salient was finally timed to begin at 5.30 a.m. on 5 July. Hitler had given his authority for the attack on 1 July and the days in the countdown to the commencement of the attack were used to bring in more armour to counter the build-up of Russian armoured forces that the Germans had learnt of. What their intelligence forces could not tell them, however, was the extent of the weight of the Russian forces facing them. The Lucy spy ring had got most of the details concerning the planned German attack correct except for the time at which it was due to start, which the agents had reported as being 3.30 a.m., two hours earlier than actually planned. The Russians decided to act first and unleashed a massive pre-emptive artillery barrage, which began at 2.20 a.m. with 3,000 guns firing half the ammunition supply allocated for the entire battle. The Germans endured this for just over an hour and then launched a series of infantry attacks beginning at 3.30 a.m. The Russians had prepared a series of eight defensive lines up to 100 miles deep and these were divided into three defensive areas. The Germans were unable to clear the minefields for the following tanks to move through but the Russians had laid the mines in such a fashion that they left pathways through the minefields that effectively channelled the German tanks into the firing line of the anti-tank guns. These positions were known as PaK Fronts from the German tactic of placing anti-tank guns, Panzer Abwehr Kanone or PaK, to engage tanks with intense firepower. Now it was being used against them. They had hoped to penetrate the defences in a day but Russian resistance slowed them down to a crawl. What developed over the next three weeks has gone down in history as the largest tank battle ever fought.

Hitler realised that he had to try to eliminate either the Western Allies or the Russians if his armies were to stand any chance of winning the war. The Americans and British were still flushed with their success in North Africa and growing stronger for the next phase of their operations, while in the east the Russians were being held for the time being at least. He also realised that the Americans and British were planning an invasion of Europe but he knew that would mean an amphibious assault, which would take time and careful planning. The Russians, on the other hand, were a more pressing question because they could simply batter their way forward and drive across Europe, bringing all their supplies with them. This made him decide to attack Kursk and pinch out the bothersome salient that posed a threat to the stability of his Eastern Front.

The Germans moved troops, trucks and tanks and artillery into a concentrated area in a build-up for the operation. In the north Colonel General Walther Model had the Ninth Army, XX and XXIII Corps along with the XLVI, XLVII and XLI Panzer Corps with air support. In the south Field Marshal Eric von Manstein had the 4th Panzer Army under Colonel General Hoth along with II SS and XLVIII Panzer Corps. (Army corps are always identified with Roman numerals in unit histories, such as the British XXX Corps, and this applied to all armies.) Other armoured units took the number of AFVs deployed to 2,700, but Colonel General Heinz Guderian, by now appointed to the position of inspector general of armoured forces, was concerned about the capability of some of these vehicles, in particular the Panther, armed with a 75mm-calibre main gun but untried and unproven in battle. The Ninth Army had over 100 Tiger I tanks with the 88mm gun and sixty-six versions of the Tiger known as the Brummbar, which mounted a 150mm gun; these were also serving in battle for the first time as SPGs. The Germans had 900,000 troops, 10,000 pieces of artillery and air support from 2,500 aircraft. Between the two Russian field commanders, General Konstantin Rokosovski, commanding the Central Front in the north, and General Nikolai Vatutin, commanding the Veronezh Front in the south, they had a total of 1,357,000 troops, 22,000 pieces of artillery, including rocket batteries known as Katyushas (’Little Kates’ but known to the Germans as ‘Stalin’s Organs’), 3,306 tanks and air support of 2,650 aircraft. In total, the strength of forces deployed by Zhukov represented almost 40 per cent of the entire force available for the defence of Russia. While the German Army was still struggling to maintain its strength and supply lines the Russians held a reserve force of 500,000 troops and supplies, which could be transported along secure routes. The perimeter of the Russian salient extended over 360 miles and with the elaborate defences created Zhukov hoped to blunt the powerful blitzkrieg tactics that usually skirted around strongpoints of defence. Here, before Kursk, he was hoping that by allowing the Germans to wear themselves out by trying to blast through these defences he would then be able to counter-attack.

Mounted on horseback Cossack cavalry troops could scout fast and relatively quietly.

Operation Citadel (Zitadelle in German) was forced to begin early due to the opening Russian artillery barrage, with infantry forces leading the way to open up routes for the tanks to follow. The action throughout the day was long and hard, and achieved a penetration of 4 miles deep, 7 miles at its furthest. The two German commanders were still separated and there was a long way to go before the blitzkrieg pincers could meet and surround the Russians. The Panther tanks were not proving as battleworthy as was hoped and the tactic of Panzerkeil (armoured wedge) designed to destroy the Russian anti-tank guns was not as successful as had been hoped either. Fighting continued with the Russians withdrawing, which encouraged the Germans to move deeper forward, but it was a subtle and well-planned trap. Between 6 and 11 July it looked as though Hitler’s doubts about the operation were unfounded and it appeared that they may have succeeded even if the cost had been high. Then, on 12 July just outside the village of Prokhovka, a force of 800 Russian tanks, mainly T–34s, attacked the German armoured units, including SS panzer divisions, amounting to 450 tanks. This was the Russian counter-attack, Operation Kutuzov, which had been initiated by the code word ‘Steel’. By the time darkness fell there were more than 350 German tanks burning on the battlefield and around 10,000 men had been killed. Further losses to the German tanks had been caused by the minefields and a figure has been suggested that for every tank lost to Russian tanks or anti-tank guns two more were destroyed by mines. Russian losses are believed to have been comparable to German losses but they had more vehicles to replace those destroyed and a massive reserve of manpower to draw from. In view of this action, on 13 July Hitler ordered his commanders to break off Operation Citadel. Fighting continued over the next two days as the Germans withdrew back to the original positions they had held before the battle started.

The Russian success forced the Germans to begin a massive withdrawal across a frontage of 400 miles wide, retreating over 200 miles in some places before establishing new defensive lines along the Dnieper River from August onwards. The whole Battle of Kursk and fighting retreat cost the German Army over 200,000 killed, wounded and captured. Around 720 tanks and SPGs had been lost and the figure for the amount of artillery lost is not precise, but it is known that during the engagement at Kursk they lost some 500 guns. The Germans now implemented an action called Verbrannte Erde (Scorched Earth), which described the policy to the letter. Two years earlier the Russians had used the tactic to deny resources to the Germans and it was being repeated to try to slow down the pursuit by the Russians. In their wake they left a trail of destruction as the Germans herded up 350,000 cattle and killed 13,000 more. They transported over 250,000 tons of grain and destroyed a further 1 million tons. Factories, bridges, railways and anything else considered to be of use to the advancing Russians was destroyed and young Russian men of military age were rounded up to be taken for forced labour in the west. In this year of reversals on the battlefield for the German Army the factories were able to produce 14,400 pieces of artillery and 11,800 tanks and other AFVs, which was a great increase over the previous year when just over 5,000 armoured vehicles had been built. In 1944 this figure increased, despite Allied bombing, to produce 17,843 armoured vehicles of all types and 56,000 pieces of artillery. The one thing the German Army did find difficult to maintain was the level of trained and experienced crews to operate these tanks on the battlefield.

The Russians had lost over 863,000 men killed, wounded and captured in the fighting and more than 6,000 tanks and other fighting vehicles had been destroyed, along with 5,244 pieces of artillery. But now they were in a position to absorb these losses and even make good the deficiencies with replacements from factories geared up for production that were no longer being threatened by enemy action. At the start of the Battle of Kursk the Russians had over 5.5 million trained and armed men under arms and their tank force stood at around 10,000 of all types, but mainly the superb T–34. Factories were now producing tanks at a rate of 2,000 per month and, with the Americans still sending aid, Russia was in the ascendancy. In their pursuit of Manstein’s 750,000 men the Russians recaptured the towns of Belgorod and Orel on the same day, 5 August. The city of Kharkov, which both sides had fought so hard for, was recaptured on 23 August and a month later, hundreds of miles to the north, the city of Smolensk was liberated on 25 September. Four days earlier the Russians had established a small bridgehead across the Dnieper River at Kanev, thereby keeping up the pressure on Manstein. By December the Russians had entered the Crimea and cut off the entire German Seventeenth Army of 65,000 men with all their equipment, weapons and vehicles.

Allied Invasion of Europe

The Western Allies were also making plans and their planners used the time after the Italo-German surrender in North Africa to consolidate their forces in readiness for the next move. One thing about which they were certain was the fact they had to get back into mainland Europe, but the question was, how was this to be achieved? It had already been decided at the Arcadia Conference between Churchill and Roosevelt in Washington that Germany would be treated as the priority enemy to be beaten at all costs. The Allied Conference at Casablanca reaffirmed this decision and Churchill took the opportunity to use the meeting to convince the Americans that a start to invade Europe should be made through Italy, which he described as ‘the soft under belly’. In the event, the invasion of Europe by the back door would prove to be a ‘tough old gut’.

The first step would be to make initial landings on the island of Sicily at the southern end of Italy, and from there the Allies could ‘springboard’ into mainland Europe. The operation would receive air cover from the RAF flying from Malta, and the Royal Navy and US Navy had dominance of the Mediterranean, ensuring the safety of the campaign. Code-named Operation Husky, the Allies had done a thorough job of amassing intelligence concerning the enemy dispositions on the island and even conceived an elaborate deception plan to fool the Germans into believing that they planned to attack through Greece. When everything was in place, the invasion fleet set sail. It had taken the Allies six months to build up the invasion force of 2,590 vessels required to transport and support the force of 180,000 troops along with 14,000 vehicles, 600 tanks and 1,800 pieces of artillery. The British troops were the most battle experienced, having seen action in the North African campaign, but most of the vehicles and supplies were provided by America. All the supplies, fuel, ammunition, food and medical stores were loaded aboard the ships to make this the largest amphibious landing of the war to date. The Allies knew that facing them on Sicily there were 315,000 Italian troops along with 50,000 German troops and a further 40,000 German troops in reserve. In terms of manpower the Allies were outnumbered but in terms of equipment, tanks and artillery they were superior, and they had massive air support. Italy had already lost over 200,000 men killed, wounded or captured during the North African campaign and on the Eastern Front there were 217,000 Italian troops fighting alongside the Germans and other troops such as Romanians. In addition there were another 580,000 Italian troops fighting in Yugoslavia and engaged in conducting anti-partisan operations in the Balkans. This coming battle would be a testing time for Italy as Germany’s ally.

Arming shells for the 5.5in field gun probably in Italy

The island of Sicily measures 9,927 square miles and the mountainous terrain in the interior is made up largely of volcanic rock, as the island is dominated by the active Mount Etna volcano, which rises to a height of more than 10,900ft. The Allies planned to land on two separate beachheads, together having a combined frontage of 40 miles. The American Seventh Army under Patton made its first landings under cover of darkness at around 2.45 a.m. at Licata where the Italian defenders soon surrendered. The Italian defenders at Gela, further east along the coast, were supported by Germans of the Herman Goering Division with Tiger tanks. The warships in the bay provided covering fire and the ships’ guns’ targets included the tanks. Along the south-west corner of the island the British Eighth Army under Montgomery included Canadian troops going into battle for the first time, like many of the American troops. Although separate landings had been achieved the operation was designed to be mutually supportive. On the ground, however, each commander had his own ideas. Timings for the landings were crucial for the ships in the armada because they had to rendezvous precisely after some had sailed directly from ports in America, others from Scotland and more from ports in North Africa and Malta. The planned airborne landings by glider and parachute went badly wrong but the amphibious landings assaulted inland with the Americans fanning out to the west of the island whilst the British and Canadians battled their way northwards up the east side of the island.

The American ranger units showed themselves to be remarkably adept at anti-tank tactics almost from the moment they landed. On 11 July units of the 1st and 4th Rangers found themselves being attacked by the Italian Gruppo Mobile E using thirty-two captured French tanks at Gela. During close-quarter fighting the rangers destroyed three of these tanks and made the others withdraw. Some seventeen Tiger tanks of the Herman Goering Division were sent in to attack the rangers who managed to get some abandoned Italian anti-tank guns into action. It was these tanks that the warships fired on, and between the navy and the rangers they managed to destroy a number and force the remainder to withdraw. During the course of three days of such fighting, sixteen Tiger tanks were destroyed. The Americans then made a rapid advance inland and by 18 July had reached a point about a third of the way across the island. By 22 July they had captured the town of Palermo on the north coast and forces farther east were moving along the coast road to capture San Stefano on the same day. The British were having a hard time of it as the Germans mounted stiff resistance and fought fierce rearguard actions. In fact, by 20 July the British had only reached the town of Enna in the centre of the island. Patton was able to hurry ahead as Italian resistance collapsed and he captured the port town of Messina, from where he could look across the Strait of Messina to the Italian mainland. The Germans instigated an evacuation plan and between 11 and 17 August they managed to get 40,000 German and 60,000 Italian troops across the water to Italy.

On 17 August, after thirty-eight days of very difficult fighting, the Sicilian campaign was over and the Allies had either killed or captured 130,000, including 30,000 Germans. The British had suffered 9,000 casualties and the American 7th Army had sustained 7,000 casualties. At the peak of the campaign the Allies had 467,000 men to support the operation. The way ahead was now clear to cross the Strait of Messina, which at its narrowest point is only 2 miles across, but with heavy concentrations of artillery to defend the crossing points it would have been suicidal to cross here, for the time being at least. Instead plans were laid for more ambitious landings at Salerno on the Italian coast. The Sicilian campaign had been supported by a new type of vehicle called DUKW (termed ‘Duck’ by the troops) which was an amphibious design.

US Amphibious Vehicles

Most fighting countries developed amphibious vehicles for lesser roles on the battlefield but the US Army saw these as having a wider role and for that reason requested a heavier design, comparable to a standard truck. What they got was exactly that: an amphibious version of the GMC Jimmy (also known as the ‘deuce-and-a-half’ from its weight of 2.5 tons) which was designed and built for the army by GMC. The acronym came from the code letters to designate the vehicle with D standing for the year 1942, when the first request for an initial order of 2,000 such vehicles was posted. The letter U designated it as amphibious. The letters K and W denoted all-wheel drive and dual rear axles respectively. The DUKW was essentially a six-wheeled CCKW 353 truck fitted with a boat-like hull to make it amphibious along with a rudder and propeller, which was powered by the GMC 270 six-cylinder main engine, rated at 104hp. The vehicle was thus able to propel itself under its own power to a speed of 6mph when afloat and drive directly on to land where it was capable of reaching speeds of over 45mph. The first operational use of the DUKW came in March 1943 when it was used to support the landing in New Caledonia, and by the end of the war some 21,147 had been built by the Yellow Truck and Coach Manufacturing Division of GMC, based in Pontiac, Michigan.

The driver’s position on the DUKW which had additional controls for use in the water.

The boat-like shape to the hull helped the vehicle in the water but it had a low freeboard and it could not operate in ‘choppy’ water.

The DUKW could drive directly out of the water onto dry land to deliver its load inland. It was essentially an amphibious version of the Jimmy and provided a vital service in supplying the troops; it was fitted with a winch for towing or helping to recover vehicles.

Vehicle Name	Manufacturer	Production Date	Armament	Weight	Max. Speed
Jimmy (DUKW)	GMC	1943 onwards	.50in-calibre machine gun (some vehicles only)	8.7 tons	6mph (water) 45mph (land)

The DUKW weighed 8.7 tons and measured 31ft long, almost 8ft 3in wide and 7ft 1in to the top of the hull. It had an operational road range of 400 miles but when operating in water this dropped to 50 miles. It had a large rear cargo area that could take loads of up to 2.5 tons or twenty-five fully equipped troops but in an emergency more troops could be carried. The amphibious capability of the DUKW meant it could be loaded at sea from a supply ship and on reaching land it could drive straight to the delivery point. During Operation Husky the landings were supported by 1,000 DUKWs, with some 230 being used by the British Army. The DUKW could be fitted with a canvas screen to cover the rear area but when erected it hampered the loading and unloading so it is rarely seen in wartime photographs. During the Burma campaign in the Far East DUKWs were used as ferries to cross the massive Irrawaddy River and in seventy-two hours they transported 6,000 men and 200 vehicles across the great waterway. During the Normandy Landings in June 1944 some 2,000 DUKWs carried around 40 per cent of all supplies ashore on D-Day itself. Those used by the British Army ferried 10,000 tons of stores ashore each day and it is estimated that they were responsible for carrying some 18 million tons of supplies ashore over a three-month period in support of the landings. The basic DUKW was not armed but at least one in four was equipped with a .50in-calibre machine gun for self-defence, but some vehicles were used as platforms for other weapons including trials with 105mm howitzers and 4.5in rocket launchers.

The Development of the Jeep

Another vehicle that had made an appearance by this time was a design called the Willys Jeep, the story of which began in 1940 when the war in Europe was spreading out across the globe and threatening to drag in other nations. Despite its official non-involvement stance there were some in America who realised that it was only a question of time before an incident occurred that would force this great industrialised nation to take action. It was realised that reliable, sturdy vehicles would be required in great numbers to suit a variety of roles for the military and in 1940 the US Ordnance Technical Committee produced a specification for a new military vehicle that had to meet a certain level of criteria for what was termed a ‘utility car’. The specifications called for the new vehicle to be four-wheel drive, light with an upper weight limit set at 1,300lb and capable of carrying a payload of 600lb.

The request for the new vehicle was sent out to an incredible 175 specialist engineering and automobile companies. However, the request set a delivery date with a lead-time of almost eleven weeks in which each company could submit their models for consideration; this meant that in the end only two manufacturers actually responded and even then only one managed to meet the deadline. The two companies that showed an interest in competing for the contract were the American Bantam Car Company and Willys-Overland Motors. The Bantam prototype design, known as the Bantam Reconnaissance Command, was delivered in September 1940 and was put through a series of trials at Fort Holabird. These field tests showed that the vehicle had potential but lacked power and was not nearly rugged enough to withstand the rigours of use and abuse on the battlefield. At Willys-Overland Motors, the chief engineer, Barney Roos, believed the specifications laid down were not realistic and any design would be too constrained by them, especially when it came to the question of the overall weight of the finished vehicle. Roos began working to design a vehicle that he felt was more suited to the needs of the US Army and decided to ignore the weight limits. He worked closely with the engineers from the US Army Quartermaster Corps and between them produced a vehicle ready for testing in November 1940. Early trials showed it to be successful in every instance and it looked promising.

Jeep with 75mm howitzer and ammunition trailer, as used by British airborne forces at Arnhem.

Driver’s position on the Jeep which allowed it to cope with all terrain and conditions.

Jeeps were flown into the Arnhem area during Operation Market Garden where they were used as radio vehicles, medical service and liaison vehicles. The British used thousands of Jeeps which they armed with weapons such as Vickers ‘K’ machine guns.

Meanwhile, the Ordnance Technical Committee had made some concessions regarding the new ‘utility car’, including the weight limit, which was now raised to an upper limit of 2,160lb. Invitations for a new design with the amended specifications were sent to the companies of Ford, Willys-Overland and Bantam asking for their vehicles. In the end the Ford and Bantam designs were found to be inadequate, while the Willys design exceeded the new weight limit by some 120lb, but was more mechanically powerful, giving over 50 per cent more engine capability than the other designs. Again it looked promising for the Willys design, but the weight factor remained a problem. Roos returned to examine the vehicle and stripped out all unnecessary items to bring it to just within the set limits. The hard work paid dividends and the new ‘utility car’ was accepted into service in 1941, in time for America entering the war following Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor that December. An initial order for some 16,000 vehicles was placed and these were referred to as model MA. However, as production proceeded, so small modifications were made, such as fitting a larger-capacity fuel tank. These changes were reflected in a new nomenclature and these vehicles became the Willys Model MB with production commencing in December 1941. The Ford Motor Company was also contracted to build the vehicle to the Willys design and these were called Truck, Command and Reconnaissance, 0.25-ton, 4x4 Ford Model GPW.

The Jeep was used in all theatres of operations by all services including airborne forces.

The LRDG used Jeeps and equipped them with German weapons and Americans as seen here during a display.

The new vehicle soon acquired the term ‘Jeep’, a nickname that all reference sources agree was a contraction of the initials ‘GP’ which denoted the vehicle as being general purpose. Whether the story is simply apocryphal does not matter much, because the name stuck and is still used today. The Jeep proved itself to be invaluable in all roles from cargo carrier to medical support, capable of towing a trailer load of 1,000lb and carrying loads of 800lb on the vehicle itself. It was versatile enough to serve as a weapons platform on to which heavy machine guns could be mounted and even recoilless rifles for anti-vehicle roles and destroying bunkers. The Jeep’s application to the army was obvious and proved useful to infantry, artillery and medical services, along with the marines and air force. It was also versatile enough to be used by airborne forces and the British LRDG and Special Air Service, who fitted them with a range of machine-gun configurations including twin Vickers ‘K’ guns, Bren guns, .30in-calibre and .50in-calibre machine guns. Jeeps were also capable of being directly driven ashore from landing craft during amphibious assaults such as North Africa, Salerno, D-Day and in the Far East during the landings at New Guinea.

The Jeep was used by Allied commanders such as Montgomery and Patton, and even Rommel ordered that captured vehicles be pressed into service. In the ambulance role the Jeep could carry up to three stretcher cases. For airborne operations where they were carried into battle by gliders, Jeeps were often stripped down to reduce weight and as such were able to be flown straight into battle during campaigns such as Normandy and Arnhem. The Jeep was used for a range of experimental trials including a half-track version and long wheelbase. The American 82nd Airborne Division are known to have modified some of their Jeeps by fitting armour plates for improved protection when in battle.

Looking like a hybrid between the DUKW and the Jeep, the GPA was an amphibious Jeep, but it was never popular.

The GPA could tow a trailer because the propeller was recessed into the hull and did not interfere with the tow-bar hook. The driver’s position had controls for land and water propulsion but its role was limited (above). The exhaust had to vent out over the engine cover at the front (left).

Under the terms of the Lend-Lease Act, which came into effect on 11 March 1941, America supplied Britain with thousands of vehicles, including many Jeeps. Russia too benefitted from a similar plan and in 1943 alone received over 210,000 vehicles, not including tanks, but including Jeeps. The vehicle was used to tow 6-pounder anti-tank guns, 75mm howitzers and a range of other artillery of ammunition trailers and gun crews. The thousands of shipped Jeeps were transported in versions known as either ‘Partly Knocked Down’ or ‘Completely Knocked Down’ and had to be assembled on delivery. In Britain the vehicles were assembled for use at locations all across the country and after D-Day Jeeps were even assembled in hastily prepared barns on recently liberated farms. The basic MB version weighed 3,254lb (1.5 tons) and measured 11ft long and 5ft 2in wide. It was powered by a four-cylinder side-valve engine, which gave a top speed of over 60mph and an operational range of 300 miles. Depending on the role, a typical Jeep could carry four men plus the driver along with personal equipment and heavy machine gun. Although Jeeps look essentially alike, there were actually four different types, not counting those converted to amphibious roles. By the end of the war over 639,000 Jeeps had been built, a figure almost forty times greater than the original production order of 16,000. Many more companies were involved in the production of the Jeep and there were a number of experiments conducted using the Jeep as the basis for this work. One such trial produced the GPA or amphibious design, which looked like a scaled-down version of the DUKW. Sometimes known as the ‘Seep’ (Sea-going Jeep) it was never a popular vehicle, being difficult to handle in the water and prone to being swamped. Around 12,778 were built, measuring just over 15ft long, 5ft 4in wide and 3ft 9in high. It weighed 3,665lb (1.6 tons) and was powered by a four-cylinder 154 cid 54hp engine to give road speeds of up to 50mph, while the propeller allowed it 5.5mph in the water.

Even before the campaign in Sicily had been concluded, events were unfolding in Italy that would have a profound effect on the Allies. On 24–25 July the Fascist Grand Council voted a massive no confidence in Mussolini as a wartime leader. In the evening of 25 July Mussolini had an audience with King Victor Emmanuel of Italy and was replaced by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, thereby ending twenty-one years of Fascist dictatorship. Mussolini was led away under armed escort, effectively military arrest, to be held first in Podgora Barracks before more permanent arrangements could be made. Italy now found itself in an almost impossible position: some troops deserted, others remained fighting alongside their German allies and some wanted to join the Anglo-American forces to fight the Germans. The Allies mounted a two-pronged attack on Italy, with the British launching Operation Baytown on 3 September by crossing the Strait of Messina. Naval bombardment and air support meant that the Eighth Army under Montgomery landed virtually unopposed at Reggio di Calabria and then moved inland along two axes of advance up the peninsular, with the left flank heading for Pizzo and the right flank heading for Catanzaro. By 9 September the right flank had reached the outskirts of Taranto where the harbour town was captured by an airborne assault by the British 1st Airborne Division and the Royal Navy during Operation Slapstick. That day a fleet of 450 vessels carrying 69,000 American troops with 20,000 vehicles, commanded by General Mark Clark, landed at Salerno. This was Operation Avalanche and men of the Fifth Army were hoping that things were going to be easy, after all Italy had capitulated six days earlier. General Clark was one of them and he hoped to be in Naples by 14 September. Salerno was not the best landing place and Clark had refused air cover or naval bombardment to support his landings, hoping he would achieve total surprise by landing under cover of darkness.

The Germans were well prepared, and firing from defensive positions, they took a terrible toll on the men coming ashore. The German Luftwaffe sank Allied transport vessels using radio-controlled bombs, and the troops faced a tough fight. At one point Clark seriously considered evacuating the beachhead. During one period of fighting the Americans fired 10,000 artillery shells and held the line. At last the Allies managed to link up at Auletta on 20 September, but it would be another two weeks before they finally broke out of the beachhead in force. On 10 October, a full month after the landings at Salerno, the position was secure and 200,000 troops had been landed, along with 35,000 tanks and other vehicles and 15,000 tons of supplies. The Germans made a fighting withdrawal northwards, first behind the Barbara Line of defensive positions before establishing themselves on the formidable Gothic Line, which stretched across the breadth of Italy barring the Allies’ advance. One Allied soldier remembered advancing towards these positions in November: ‘We piled into trucks and drove through the rain … Dozens of 105mm howitzers and 155mm Long Toms and other breeds of howitzers were all round, firing day and night.’ On the east coast of Italy the British Eighth Army penetrated the left flank of the Gothic Line and captured the town of Ortona on 27 December. In the west things were much different and the seemingly impossible task of capturing Monte Cassino, from where the Germans could direct artillery fire, lay ahead. Even so, the Allies had come a long way but they had achieved a great deal. Italy was ineffectual as Germany’s ally, they were back in Europe and troops were being siphoned away from France and Russia along with their equipment and weapons.

The War in the Pacific

On the other side of the world the war in the Pacific was being defined by naval engagements supported with aircraft and conducted over vast distances of the ocean. The larger land masses of Burma and the Malay Peninsula did allow for mechanised strategy but the density of the jungles and the remoteness of the islands precluded armoured battles approaching anywhere near the scale of those in Russia and Europe. That is not to say that tank actions were not engaged in but it was only by armoured vehicles deployed in support of amphibious landings. Each island taken had to be consolidated and airfields established and built from where aircraft could operate to support operations. The strategy had been developed so that American forces would advance stage by stage in an inexorable move towards the Japanese homeland. In May 1943 the Allies had agreed to expand the war in the Pacific and build up forces in readiness to invade the Gilbert Islands, many of which were tiny fragments such as Betio, which measures only 2.5 miles long by 0.5 miles wide, or Tarawa, which covers only 14 square miles. Supporting these operations across the islands was to prove costly to both sides because everything had to be taken to them in turn in order to cope with any eventuality. For the Japanese, once the garrison was established they were at the mercy of re-supply convoys and if these were intercepted they did not receive food, fuel or other vital stores. The Americans left nothing to chance and each amphibious assault carried everything and each landing taught vital lessons required for subsequent operations. Each amphibious landing required logistical build-up and the actual assaults went in only after massive naval and aerial bombardment. Even so, the US marines found themselves confronted by fanatical troops. For example after a naval bombardment lasting 2.5 hours and dropping 3,000 tons of bombs on Betio, the US 2nd Marine Division found themselves fighting 500 Japanese supported by tanks dug into defensive positions and artillery. For the actual assault on Tarawa the US marines used 27,000 troops with a further 7,600 held in readiness for garrison duties and supported with 6,000 vehicles. The tanks were unable to land in support of the initial assault because of the coral reef surrounding the island but those landed later dealt with points of resistance and Japanese tanks. Once the island had been secured bulldozers and earth-moving equipment was landed to prepare airfields, from where American aircraft could fly support missions to cover the next assault. It was a slow, grinding process, but it was rolling the Japanese back. The fighting on Tarawa had cost the Americans 3,000 killed and wounded, while the Japanese force of 4,700 troops fought so desperately that only 100 were taken alive.

Bulldozers were essential in the construction of airfields.

Bulldozers and graders were used on the Pacific islands to create airfields and also in Europe.