Part I
Chapter 1
Introduction
Slightly to the north-east of Athens, over the massif of Mt Penteli (ancient Pentelikon) lies what was once a broad and clear plain. Today it is dotted with olive and cypress trees and all the marks of the encroaching Athenian suburbs, from the stone walls of agricultural plots to the red-tiled roofs of houses and businesses. In the north, a massive artificial water course used for the rowing competitions of the 2004 Olympics scores the plain’s surface. Yet near the small village of Vrana, on the foothills of Penteli which form the plain’s western border, the outline of the flat expanse is still clearly visible, stretching eastwards to a bay of the sea enclosed by a narrow peninsula the ancients called Kynosoura, the ‘dog’s tail’. In the centre of the open area, a mound of earth rises several metres, signalling the spot where 192 Athenians were buried in 490 BCE. The plain is that of Marathon, and these particular Athenian dead were revered through many centuries as hoi Marathonomachoi: the Marathon-warriors. On this very ground the newly minted Athenian democracy – the first government of its kind in world history – was stoutly defended by the Athenians and a small band of their allies from Plataea. The Persian enemy suffered much more dearly than the Greek defenders, losing at least 6,400 men, according to Herodotus, and were forced back aboard their ships and eventually back to Asia. Twenty-five centuries later, the plain of Marathon still bears many marks of democracy’s first battle, and a close look at the site’s topography and archaeological remains allows us to approach a plausible reconstruction of the battle’s events.
Directions to the Site
From the centre of Athens, preferably from the Panathenaic Stadium which marks the end of the modern Marathon course, visitors can reach the battle site along the classic Marathon route via Leof. Vas. Sofias, which turns into Mesogeion before becoming Marathonos as it runs between Mounts Hymmetos and Penteli. Keep following the signs for Marathonas. Just past the seaside town of Nea Makri, follow the signs to the right for the Soros, or tumulus of the Athenians. There are several landmarks on the Marathon plain that take some driving to visit. Further down the main road, follow the signs to the left for the Marathon museum at Vrana. The ‘Tomb of the Plataeans’ is at the museum too, and behind the museum you can ascend on foot along the tractor path to get a good view of the plain. Back on the main road, still further north in the plain, follow the signs for Schoinia/Trophy, turning eventually on Galazias to see the trophy next to a small church. Go back to the main road to Schoinia to get to the beach where the Persians landed.
Historical Outline of the Battle
A Persian fleet commanded by Datis and Artaphernes, the generals of Darius, King of Kings, arrived at Marathon in the late summer of 490. Their mission was straightforward: punish the Athenians and install an exiled Athenian, Hippias, as a Persian puppet. Hippias, the son of the famous Athenian tyrant Pisistratus, had been expelled from Athens in 510, whereupon he fled to Persia. Once Athens was free of Hippias, the politician Cleisthenes, in a bid to gain the support of the masses, introduced a set of sweeping political reforms that created the world’s first democracy. Strange as it may seem to us, steeped in a long Western tradition of venerating the democratic heroes of Marathon, the Persians had every right to be angry atAthens. Following Cleisthenes’ reforms, Athens found itself beset by several enemies – including the Spartans – and they sent to the world’s leading power, the Persian Empire, for help. In their desperation, the Athenian envoys offered the Persian satrap in Sardis – the local Persian capital in what is now Turkey – earth and water as the traditional tokens of submission. As far as Persia was concerned, therefore, Athens was now under its suzerainty. In 499 BCE, the Ionian Greeks, living along the Aegean coast of Turkey, revolted against Persian rule. In spite of their previous arrangement with Persia, the Athenians sent twenty ships to aid the rebels. The crews of these ships helped the Ionians set Sardis ablaze. Herodotus tells us that the Persian King Darius was so outraged that he had a servant remind him daily: ‘Sire, remember the Athenians.’ The Ionian Revolt ended in failure in 494, whereupon Darius set his sights firmly on Athens. Before landing at Marathon, the Persians destroyed the city of Eretria on the island of Euboea, lying just across from Athenian territory. The Eretrians had also helped the Ionians in their revolt, and were thus duly chastened. Now it was Athens’ turn.
Herodotus says that the Persians landed at Marathon because it was the area of Attica closest to Euboea and it had the ground most suitable for Persia’s cavalry. There was another compelling reason too, namely that Marathon was Hippias’ ancestral home and he likely planned to secure some local support in his bid to reclaim the rule of Athens. Ancient sources tell us that the Persians had upward of 200,000 soldiers, a wildly exaggerated number. Modern estimates range widely, but it is reasonable to guess that the Persians had around 25,000 infantry soldiers and perhaps 1,000 cavalry.
Marathon Map 1: The Persian route to Marathon. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
The Athenians, on the other hand, seem to have had 9,000-10,000 full hoplites, those citizens wealthy enough to supply their own armour and weapons. Upon hearing of the Persian landing in their territory, the Athenians were naturally struck with fear. One Athenian, however, stood among the assembly to champion a stout resistance to the invader. This leader, who carried the day, was a general named Miltiades, newly returned from decades abroad in the Chersonese – today’s Gallipoli peninsula in European Turkey – where he had gained familiarity with Persian troops. As a sign of Athens’ desperation, Miltiades proposed a decree freeing any slaves who fought in the battle. The decree apparently passed, since Pausanias tells us that at Marathon slaves fought alongside their masters for the first time. Having decided to fight, the Athenians sent the famous runner Pheidippides to Sparta, some 200km away, to ask for help. The hoplites and an unknown number of their slaves then marched out to Marathon and camped in a defensible location across from the Persians. The location of the Greek camp, and consequently the location of the battle itself, is debated by modern scholars. The Greeks were most likely in one of two locations: along the foothills of Penteli, near modern Vrana; or near the coast, along the foothills of Mt Agrieliki, guarding the longer but broader path to Athens. Once the Greeks were encamped, both sides commenced several days of waiting, neither one attacking the other.
Scholars dispute the reasons for this delay. Herodotus tells us that the Greek generals – there were ten in total – were divided as to whether or not they should engage the more numerous Persian host. These generals each held the command for one day in a ten-day rotation. Since Miltiades was the most vocal advocate of battle, and since he had convinced a majority of the generals to side with him, the Athenians postponed the attack until the day of Miltiades’ command arrived. Other possible explanations include that the Athenians were waiting to hear from the Spartans, or that the Athenians were watching for an opportune moment to attack, which perhaps came when the Persian cavalry was somehow out of the picture.
When Pheidippides returned from Sparta, he broke the disconcerting news that the Spartans would not be coming in a timely fashion since they were celebrating a religious festival. The Athenians, however, did welcome a small number of loyal allies from the tiny state of Plataea, just over the Attic border in Boeotia. The Plataeans sent around 1,000 troops, a very large number for their small town, to aid in the defence of Athens. Thus in all the Greeks marshalled no more than 11,000 regular troops and an unknown number of slaves – certainly less well-equipped and less accustomed to battle – against perhaps twice that number.
One of the most vexing questions concerning this battle is the role of the Persian cavalry. Herodotus tells us that the main reason for landing at Marathon was that this location offered ample room for the cavalry to manoeuvre. Since the Greeks had no real cavalry force to speak of, the Persian horse ought to have been decisive in the broad expanse of the plain. Herodotus, though, makes no mention of the cavalry in the battle itself. Perhaps the cavalry were indisposed, either being loaded onto ships to make a run at the city itself, or stuck in their camp behind the marsh that spread across the north-eastern section of the plain and unable to reach the field until the battle was largely decided. One late reference from a Byzantine source does say that the cavalry were apart for some reason, but this unsatisfactory source is the only one to make such a claim. In the end, we cannot know for certain exactly what role, if any, the Persian cavalry played.
Marathon Map 2: The Athenian routes to Marathon. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
After several days of inaction and stalemate, when Miltiades was firmly in command of the army, the time came for the Greeks to attack. Either because of a clever plan or out of necessity, the Greeks arranged their battle line in an unusual way: both wings were at full strength, probably eight hoplites deep, while the centre of the line was thinned, likely to four men or so. Whatever the actual numbers were, the Persians significantly outnumbered the Athenians and Plataeans. A sure way for a hoplite phalanx to lose an ancient battle was to be outflanked by the enemy and thus struck in the sides and rear, where a phalanx is most vulnerable and unable to rely on a cohesive formation of spears and shields. The thinning of the Greek centre had the immediate effect of making the Greek line match the width of the Persian force. The thinner centre and stronger wings also proved decisive as the battle progressed. With the Plataeans holding the left wing and the titular head of the Athenian army, and the polemarch, Callimachus, taking his customary position on the right, Miltiades led the Greeks against the enemy.
More than a kilometre and a half stretched between the Greek and Persian forces, and Herodotus says that the Greeks covered the full distance at a run. Most students of the battle today doubt whether fully armed soldiers could run such a distance in the sweltering heat of a Greek summer and still have energy enough to fight. Whatever the case may be, the Greeks did advance boldly, and ran all-out for at least the final distance in order to crash headlong into the enemy before the Persian archers had time to inflict too many casualties. The Persians for their part were astonished to see the Greeks, outnumbered as they were and lacking in any cavalry or archer support of their own, rushing towards them. Across a front roughly a mile wide, the two armies clashed and the mountains echoed the clanging of iron and bronze and the splintering of wood.
At this point Herodotus tells us simply that the battle lasted a long time, and that the Greeks fought in a way worthy of renown. His account then becomes rather difficult to interpret. What is clear is that the Persian centre, held by Asia’s best troops, fought its way successfully through the unusually thin Greek centre, but that the full-strength Greek wings were victorious against the opposing Persian wings. The Persian centre then chased inland after the fleeing troops of the broken Greek centre. Somehow, the two Greek wings, after allowing those in the defeated Persian wings to flee in the direction of the ships, joined together and turned their attention to the Persians chasing the Greeks into the interior. Despite most textbook recreations of the battle, Herodotus’ account does not allow for a ‘double envelopment’ wherein the Persian centre was drawn deep into the Greek lines while the Greek wings closed in as part of a grand pincer movement to hit the Persians in the flanks. Instead, a large number of Persians actually broke through the Greek lines and went some distance inland, while the two Greek wings, hundreds of metres apart, came together to form a new unified line, did an about-face and then marched back to engage the Persian centre.
Marathon Map 3: The battle based on a Greek camp at Mt. Agrieliki. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Marathon Map 4: The battle based on a Greek camp at Vrana. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
The amalgamated Greek wings made short work of the erstwhile victorious Persian contingents. The entire Greek force then pursued the retreating Persians all the way to the sea, cutting down great numbers and calling for fire to set the ships ablaze. Whether the Persian centre, having the worst of it, was somehow able to break through the Greeks in their bid to escape, or whether they ran eastward towards the sea and then around the eastern flank of the Greek force, or whether the Persian centre was wiped out and the Greeks turned to pursue only those fleeing soldiers that remained from the unsuccessful Persian wings, we cannot tell. The later traveller Pausanias, writing during Roman times, says that most of the Persians who perished in the battle did so while struggling through the marshes and swamps that lay between the battlefield and the beach where the ships were waiting. Exhausted from the hard-fought battle, caught in the mud and mire, and crushed in the throng of thousands of their fellow soldiers fleeing in a panic, the Persians found themselves defenceless against the pursuing Greeks. The Greeks, on the other hand, drew great energy from the spectacular victory that was unfolding in front of their eyes, and slaughtered the Persians all the more enthusiastically. Many stories naturally arose surrounding so great a rout of a seemingly invincible enemy. One of these tells of an Athenian, named Cynegirus, so eager to catch the fleeing Persians that he had his arm hacked off as he laid hold of a Persian ship. Cynegirus, heroically dying from his wounds, was none other than the brother of the great tragedian Aeschylus. For his part, when he died decades later, Aeschylus had inscribed on his own tomb only that he had fought at Marathon. No mention was made of the plays that made an indelible mark on the Western literary tradition.
Following the battle, as the famous story goes, Pheidippides ran all the way back to Athens, upwards of 26 miles or 40km of course, to announce the Greek victory before falling dead from exhaustion. The defeated Persians aboard their ships, still plenty strong in numbers, decided to sail around Cape Sounion and try their hand at taking the city itself, perhaps with the help of pro-Persian or pro-Hippias elements from within Athens. Early the next day, the entire Greek army at Marathon marched back to Athens on the double and marshalled along the sea in defence of the city before the Persian ships arrived. When the Persians did arrive they were greeted by the sight of the Athenian and Plataean armies marshalled and ready to contest the ships’ landing. Thinking better of facing off against the very same soldiers who had crushed them the day before, the Persians turned their ships around and retreated back across the Aegean.
All told, the Athenians lost 192 dead while the Persians lost 6,400. Though the numbers for ancient battles are notoriously exaggerated, these casualty figures are relatively credible. Most of the Athenians who died were from the centre of the line where the Persians had broken through, whereas once the Persians had lost cohesion and order, they would have fallen thick and fast to the hoplites’ bronze. A combination of guts, battle formation and the superiority of heavy-armed hoplites against light-armed Persian soldiers in hand-to-hand combat all made for this most spectacular and shocking victory. The new democracy, established a mere two decades before the battle, held out against the attack of the Persians and the machinations of Hippias.
The Battle Site Today
Upon arriving at the battle site by following the classic Marathon route, the modern visitor should begin the tour proper with a visit to the Soros (N38° 07.061"; E023° 58.720"). Today a useful three-dimensional battle map has been situated next to the Soros, which does a fine job of orientating the visitor to the topographical surroundings. Almost 3km west of the Soros is Vrana, the village at the outlet of the shorter route to Marathon, nestled in a cleft of Mt Penteli and enclosed on three sides by sections of the mountain. The three ridges of Penteli that surround Vrana are Mt Kotroni to the north, Mt Aphorismos directly behind Vrana to the west and Mt Agrieliki to the south. The standard route to Marathon, and the main road to the city in ancient and modern times, enters the plain next to the eastern slopes of Agrieliki, a little under 2km south of the Soros. The plain extends 3-4km north-east from the Soros before reaching what was a large marsh in antiquity, now home to the watercourse for the 2004 Olympics, and a long beach, called Schoinia, stretching the better part of 3km and today backed by a forest of pine (N38° 08.571"; E24° 02.425"). At the eastern edge of the beach, the Kynosoura peninsula extends southwards, partially enclosing the Bay of Marathon, and is the hilly land seen over the bay to the east.
Visitors can walk around the entire Soros while taking in the plain, and contemplate the sacrifice of the 192 Athenians whose cremated remains were buried on this spot in 490 BCE. Those who fought at Marathon were considered so extraordinarily valorous that they were buried on the battlefield itself, an honour virtually without parallel in the history of ancient Athens. Most scholars assume that this particular spot was chosen because it was where the majority of the Athenian dead were slain. Thus, the Soros probably marks the very centre of the Athenian line, the part that was bested by the Persians. If this hypothesis is correct – and there are a few sceptics – the Soros becomes essential for reconstructing the course of the battle. Here the two great armies met, stretching for a mile either in a northwest-south-east orientation perpendicular to the coast or more parallel to the coast along a north-south axis, depending largely on where one situates the Greek camp.
According to the ancient sources, the Greeks camped near a certain shrine to Heracles. Many sites have been suggested for the shrine’s ancient location, though no physical remains have been identified. The first good candidate for the shrine to Heracles and the Greek camp is on the eastern slopes of Agrieliki just north of Nea Makri, where the mountain comes closest to the sea and marks the narrowest point between the plain and the broad main road to the city. Situated here, the Greeks could have used Agrieliki to cover their left flank and the smaller marsh, which we are told existed in antiquity near the sea in this area, to protect their right. This location is close to the Soros – in fact, the very distance Herodotus says the Greeks covered at a run – and has the added advantage of blocking the main access to Athens. The second location is behind Vrana, on the slopes of Aphorismos and Kotroni. This mountainous terrain would have provided an ideal defensive location, essentially unassailable from the flank or rear. Militating against this location is the greater distance from the Soros and thus the site of the battle itself, and also the danger to Athens presented by leaving the main coastal road to the city unguarded. The Persians were almost certainly camped at the north-eastern edge of the plain near Schoinia, where their ships were beached. The Persian cavalry at Marathon were probably camped in a different location, one near the ancient Makaria spring mentioned by Pausanias. This spring was probably located near the northern end of the modern rowing course, with the cavalry camp located in the plain north of the course, in modern Kato Souli.
Fig. 1.1: The Soros. Authors’ photo.
Tradition unanimously holds that the Greeks advanced against the Persians. The Persians were apparently already in the field, tempting the outnumbered Greeks to fight against long odds. Once again, based on the location of the Greek camp, the Persians were either lined up perpendicular to the coast, facing south-west, or parallel to the coast, facing inland to the west. As the battle progressed, and the Greek centre gave way, the Persian centre broke through and pursed some Greeks inland. While this information might make it seem as though the Persians charged directly inland - that is, towards Vrana - this is not necessarily the case. The region of Attica south of the battle site along the main road is still today called the Mesogeion, the ancient and modern Greek word for ‘inland’, and a good stretch of Route 54 is even called Leof. Mesogeion, or Inland Boulevard. Thus, it is perfectly plausible that the Persians broke through while facing south-west, and then pursued the Greeks south along the main road. Once the Greek wings had gotten the better of the Persian wings, the defeated Persians turned to flee while the Greek wings came together into a new unit and attacked the Persian centre. After the Persian centre had been defeated, a general rout ensued in which all the Persians retreated in a disordered panic to their ships beached at Schoinia.
In the north-eastern part of the plain, the route to Schoinia was very narrow in antiquity owing to the large marsh in the area. Here thousands of Persians became stuck in a terrible bottleneck, easy prey for the victorious Greeks. In the location of the ancient marsh, 3½km or so north-east of the Soros, an Ionic column capital was found within the structure of a medieval tower. This capital, the original now in the Marathon museum, has been identified as part of the permanent victory trophy set up by the Greeks in the decades after the battle. Most consider its location to mark the spot where the greatest number of Persians were slain, that is, in the marsh. A reconstructed model of the trophy – consisting of a tall column topped by the capital – has been erected in situ, today next to the small Panagia Mesosporitissa church (N38° 08.448"; E024° 00.012"). The trophy can best be reached by following Route 83 to the northern edge of the plain, turning east along Leof. Soulio for about 2½km, and then turning south-east onto Galazias Aktis. The church and trophy are on the right about a kilometre down this road. The Schoinia beach, where the Persian ships were located, can be reached by continuing along Galazias Aktis.
The last major landmark of the battle is at the plain’s western edge, in Vrana adjacent to the museum. Here a smaller burial mound, containing the mostly inhumed (rather than cremated) remains of nine men and one boy, has been identified as the ‘Mound of the Plataeans’ mentioned by Pausanias (N38° 07.401"; E023° 56.924"). This identification is rather controversial. First of all, the inhumation burials contrast with the cremated remains found in the Soros. Secondly, the mound is nearly 3km from the Soros, too far to have been the Plataeans’ position in the Greek line. Early travellers to Marathon saw another mound, now lost, closer to the Soros, which may have been the true Mound of the Plataeans. Or perhaps the burial in Vrana is the real final resting spot of the Athenians’ stalwart allies in 490. In any case, this mound appears less useful than the Soros for reconstructing the course of the battle.
Fig. 1.2: Reconstructed trophy. Authors’ photo..
Finally, the museum is well worth a visit (€3 entrance fee at the time of writing, which includes the Soros site as well), containing the original ancient column capital from the victory trophy, as well as pottery excavated from the Soros, left in 490 by pious and grateful Athenians as burial offerings for the glorious Athenian dead, who were worshipped as heroes by their compatriots. Before leaving the site, the visitor is encouraged to take in a view of the entire battlefield by ascending one of the roads behind the museum that climbs up the slopes of Penteli.
Further Reading
Ancient Sources
–Herodotus 6.102-120.
While too vague and too short, Herodotus’ description of the battle is the best we have from antiquity. He certainly visited the site and, writing in the 430s BCE, would have spoken with the children of veterans of the battle, and possibly even some very old veterans themselves.
–Pausanias 1.15.3; 1.32.3-7.
This traveller writing during the Roman Empire records many details of the battle omitted by other surviving sources, particularly concerning questions of topography and the situation of monuments from the battle.
–Cornelius Nepos, Life of Miltiades 4-5.
This first-century BCE Roman chronicler of the lives of famous generals had access to many sources that no longer survive. While he must be used with caution, he does include some details concerning the terrain and the Persian cavalry that might shed further light on the course of events.
–The Suda Lexicon, under the entry ‘choris hippeis’, or ‘the horses are apart’.
This Byzantine encyclopedia provides the only surviving claim that the Persian cavalry did not actually engage the Greeks at Marathon. Most scholars now doubt the accuracy of this much later source.
Modern Sources
Books
–Billows, R.A., Marathon: The Battle That Changed Western Civilization (New York: Overlook, 2010).
A recent and accessible book written for a popular audience, it usefully situates the battle within the broader historical context.
–Burn, A.R., Persia and the Greeks (London: Duckworth, 1984).
Now superseded by more recent works, this nevertheless remains a classic study.
–Green, P., The Greco-Persian Wars (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
A good general account of the Persian Wars written in lively and engrossing prose.
–Krentz, P., The Battle of Marathon (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).
The best and most up-to-date scholarly treatment of the battle now available.
–Lazenby, J.F., The Defence of Greece (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1993).
An excellent account of the Persian Wars as a whole, with special emphasis on tactical and strategic considerations.
Articles
–Doenges, N.A., ‘The Campaign and Battle of Marathon’, Historia 47 (1998), pp.1-17.
A useful survey and synthesis of early scholarly treatments of the battle and surrounding campaign.
–Evans, J.A.S., ‘Herodotus and the Battle of Marathon’, Historia 42 (1993), pp.279-307.
An article attempting to clarify and expand upon Herodotus’ problematic account of the battle.
–Hammond, N.G.L., ‘The Campaign and Battle of Marathon’, Journal of Hellenic Studies 88 (1968), pp.13-57.
A comprehensive and groundbreaking study by a scholar with unmatched familiarity with Greece’s terrain and history.
–Pritchett, W.K., ‘Marathon’, University of California Classical Archaeology 4 (1959), pp.137-90.
An account of the physical battlefield written by a pioneer in Greek topographical studies.
–Schrimpton, G., ‘The Persian Cavalry at Marathon’, Phoenix 34 (1980), pp.20-37.
An article addressing the vexing question of the Persian cavalry’s conspicuous absence from all ancient accounts of the battle.
–van der Veer, J.A.G., ‘The Battle of Marathon: A Topographical Survey’, Mnemosyne 35 (1982), pp.290-321.
A concise treatment of the archaeological and topographical markers around the plain of Marathon that can aid in the battle’s reconstruction.
–Vanderpool, E., ‘A Monument to the Battle of Marathon’, Hesperia 35 (1966), pp.93-106.
The publication of the discovery of the Greek trophy at Marathon, including its implications for reconstruction of the battle’s key events.
–Vanderpool, E., ‘The Deme of Marathon and the Herakleion’, American Journal of Archaeology 70 (1966), pp.319-23.
An examination of the question of the location of the Greek camp, and by extension that of the Persians, prior to the battle.