Chapter 20
Introduction
Perched beneath a hill just north of modern Preveza, Nikopolis, the ‘victory city’, overlooks the narrow strait between the Ionian Sea and the Ambracian Gulf. The ancient theatre and stadium are now crumbling ruins but still highlight the grandeur and scale of the Roman city, and the long stretches of fortification walls spreading across the plain attest to the city’s continued importance even into the Byzantine period. It was in this city that Paul wrote his ‘Letter to Titus’ and that Epictetus, the stoic philosopher, established one of his philosophical schools. And it was on this hill in 31 BCE that Octavian set up his camp for his final confrontation against Marc Antony and his Egyptian wife and ally, Cleopatra. The always tenuous alliance between the two charismatic Roman leaders had erupted into civil war, and the two armies, along with their substantial fleets, finally met near the promontory of Actium, a narrow sliver of land controlling the strait to the Ionian Sea. By all accounts, the battle was somewhat anticlimactic; after a day of heavy fighting between the fleets, with both armies watching from the shore, Cleopatra fled with her ships and Antony soon followed. Those ships that lingered were soon captured or destroyed, and the soldiers of Antony, dumbfounded by what they had seen, surrendered and gave their allegiance to Octavian. Octavian commemorated this victory by establishing the city of Nikopolis in 28 BCE. At the very spot where his tent once stood, he erected a monument on which he proudly displayed the bronze rams that he had captured from Antony’s defeated fleet, dedicating them to Mars and Neptune. Despite the ignominious withdrawal of Antony and Cleopatra, the Battle of Actium would mark the last great resistance to Octavian’s rise to sole rule of the Roman world and the establishment of the Roman Principate. So important was this battle that Octavian, now called Augustus, would forever commemorate his victory in his own words in his list of accomplishments, the Res Gestae:
All Italy, of its own free will, swore allegiance to me and demanded that I be its leader in the war in which I was victorious at Actium. (Augustus, Res Gestae Divi Augusti 25.2)
Directions to the Site
The battle can best be understood by exploring the respective locations of the camps of Antony and Octavian, from which the waters of Actium and the battle site itself can be viewed from a distance. Octavian famously dedicated the city of Nikopolis as a commemoration of his victory at Actium. From Preveza, the ancient city can easily be reached by driving less than 10km north along the Philippiada-Preveza road. The site is well marked and the Roman theatre, odeum and stadium, as well as the Byzantine walls, are notable landmarks and worth a visit. Travelling further up the hill past the stadium and theatre, visitors will arrive at the monument set up by Octavian to commemorate the battle. This monument marks the very location of Octavian’s tent, and the sea can be viewed from the hillside (though the monument is typically closed to visitors). The best view of the strait and the site of the battle can be achieved from the coast near Preveza, however. From the city, travel west along the coast to the remains of the Pantokratoras Fort. This fort was built in 1807 by Ali Pasha and guards the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf. From its walls, both the strait and the sea are clearly visible. Octavian’s army would have been camped just to the west of this fort. Antony’s army was camped across the strait on the promontory of Actium, from which the battle takes its name. A tunnel now passes under the mouth of the gulf, but access to the promontory is limited because it is now the site of the modern airport.
Historical Outline of the Battle
In the aftermath of the Battle of of Philippi (42 BCE), Suetonius records that the duties of running the Roman state were divided between Antony and Octavian, the generals and triumvirs who had defeated the assassins of Caesar. Because the victory was largely credited to Antony (Octavian, after all, was ill for much of the engagement and had his camp sacked by the Republicans), he took control of the wealthy East, while Octavian was sent back to Italy for the thankless task of settling the veterans of the campaign onto municipal land. Whatever spirit of cooperation that may have been present during the campaign against Brutus and Cassius soon began to fade as the two leaders settled into their respective spheres of influence. In order to settle the tens of thousands of veterans who were promised land as part of their military service, Octavian had to confiscate property from as many as forty cities in Italy. This, naturally, soon led to discontent and eventually open and hostile resistance against Octavian. This uprising was led by the consul of the year, Lucius Antonius, the brother of Antony, who was joined by Antony’s wife, Fulvia. The two were soon defeated in Perusia (modern Perugia) and both were pardoned by Octavian, but the relationship between the two triumvirs had clearly become strained.
In the aftermath of this Perusine War, Octavian asserted his authority in Gaul (previously under the influence of Antony) and granted Lepidus, the third member of the Second Triumvirate, power in Africa. In response to these actions, Antony decided to return to Italy and attempted to land at Brundisium, only to find that the port had been closed to him. Antony forcibly landed and soon began a number of skirmishes in southern Italy.Yet another civil war seemed imminent, but the soldiers of both Antony and Octavian, many of them veterans of the war against Brutus and Cassius, pushed for a diplomatic solution to the most recent crisis, rather than open hostilities. The so-called Treaty of Brundisium essentially re-established the political association of the Second Triumvirate, with Antony maintaining control in the East and Octavian retaining the West, now including Transalpine and Narbanese Gaul. Lepidus, who was not present at Brundisium, was granted only the province of Africa. By 36 BCE, Lepidus would no longer be a member of the triumvirate and Octavian would be in control of Africa as well. The spirit of reconciliation between Antony and Octavian was further bolstered by a marriage between Antony and Octavia, the sister of Octavian. Antony’s own wife, Fulvia, had died shortly before the meeting at Brundisium.
While Antony’s marriage to Octavia was a calculated political move aimed at strengthening the ties between Antony and Octavian, in the end it provided yet another source of contention between the two triumvirs. By 40 BCE, Antony had already begun his famous dalliance with the Ptolemaic queen, Cleopatra, who bore him twins before his marriage to Octavia. This relationship would forever be immortalized by Shakespeare, who was not the first to call into question the sincerity of Antony’s marriage to Octavia. The playwright puts this simple lament into the mouth of Antony: ‘I will to Egypt: And though I make this marriage for my peace, I’ the east my pleasure lies’ (Antony and Cleopatra 2.23.39-41). This very sentiment was voiced by both Plutarch and Appian, who suggest that Antony became so enamoured by the Egyptian queen that he neglected his duties, essentially becoming her slave. As Appian writes, ‘at once, Antony’s former diligence concerning all things suddenly began to diminish, and whatever Cleopatra ordered, this was done, regardless of divine or human laws’ (Civil Wars 5.1.9). In the years following the Treaty of Brundisium, Antony occupied himself with campaigns against the Parthian kingdom on the eastern border of Roman territory. By the year 37, he had sent his wife, who was pregnant, back to Italy and joined again with Cleopatra in Antioch. Tension immediately arose again as Antony was forced to withdraw his troops after a series of setbacks. Both Octavia and Cleopatra arranged for supplies to be sent to Antony and his armies, but he accepted only those offered by Cleopatra.
In 34, he further alienated himself from Octavian and the West. Following a victory in Armenia, Antony celebrated a triumph not in Rome, but in Alexandria, the capital city of Ptolemaic Egypt. During these celebrations, Antony granted his two children with Cleopatra, as well as Cleopatra’s child with Caesar, lands in the east, some of which were Roman territories. These so-called ‘Donations of Alexandria’ highlighted Antony’s close relationship with (and reliance upon) Cleopatra and gave Octavian and his supporters an opportunity to portray Antony not as a loyal Roman, but as an eastern and effeminate despot looking to transfer Roman power from Italy to Egypt. As the poet Horace would write of Antony after the Battle of Actium, ‘A Roman, alas – you, posterity, will deny it – having given up his power to a woman, raised a rampart and bore arms and, although a soldier, allowed himself to serve eunuchs’ (Epode 9). If any collegiality remained between Octavian and Antony at this point, it came to an official end in the following year when the Second Triumvirate was dissolved. Shortly thereafter, Antony’s supporters in Rome fled to join Antony in the East, and he and Cleopatra began to move troops and materiel to Greece in preparation for a final confrontation with Octavian. In 32 BCE, Antony finally divorced Octavia, severing the last tie he had with her brother. In retaliation, Octavian publicly read Antony’s will in the Senate, a particularly shocking event as the will had been left in the sacred care of the Vestal Virgins. In it, Antony recognized Caesarion, the son of Caesar and Cleopatra, as legitimate, immediately calling into question Octavian’s status as Caesar’s heir. In addition, he left provisions for his own children with Cleopatra and asked to be buried at the queen’s side when he died. Antony’s reputation as an eastern sympathizer was now solidified, and Octavian quickly moved to secure the loyalty of his allies in the west. In a revolutionary move, Octavian had his forces profess their loyalty to him as an individual, rather than to the Republic, and he formally declared war against Cleopatra in 31 BCE. This last move meant that Octavian could prosecute a war against Antony while avoiding the unsavoury label of a ‘civil war’.
Both Antony and Octavian made preparations for war during the winter of 31, with neither general making a major move until Octavian sailed for Corcyra (modern Corfu), hoping to take Antony’s fleet at Actium by surprise. The bulk of Antony’s fleet was stationed at Actium, a strategically important promontory that controlled the strait between the Ionian Sea and the Ambracian Gulf in western Greece. According to Cassius Dio, Octavian hoped to bring the battle to Greece, rather than fight on Italian soil. Nevertheless, Plutarch claims that Octavian offered Antony free access to the Italian coast so that the two could bring the conflict to an immediate close, rather than drag the Republic into another protracted civil war. Antony, we are told, responded with a challenge of hand-tohand combat with Octavian to determine the fate of Rome, and, when this was declined, he suggested that the their two armies meet on the plain of Pharsalus, thus imitating the epic final confrontation between Caesar and Pompey in 48. In the end, a winter storm prevented Octavian from landing at Corcyra and he was forced back to Italy.
When spring finally arrived, Antony made no move from his position at Actium. He was, in part, forced to await the return of many of his men from their winter quarters. Because his forces were pulled from many foreign nations, some had to travel quite a distance to muster. As a result of this, many of his men had undertaken little training in preparation for the impending war, and many were lost either to defection or illness. Malaria seems to have been a persistent threat, especially as the promontory of Actium is somewhat marshy and affords little drainage. As Cassius Dio reports, the area was better suited for a battle than for a camp. Octavian’s men, on the other hand, were well trained and prepared for the conflict. Velleius Paterculus in particular is careful to stress the strong contrast between the two armies. He characterizes Antony’s men as starving, dejected and deserting, while Octavian’s forces were spirited, robust and loyal. Such a characterization is almost certainly the product of Octavian’s own portrayal of his victory, but it is shared by nearly all subsequent authors, who present Antony, Cleopatra and their armies as weak, amoral and quintessentially un-Roman.
While Antony waited for his men to muster at Actium, Octavian tried once again to establish a naval base at Corcyra. This time he was able to take the harbour with no resistance from Antony’s men, who had already withdrawn to Actium. Octavian hoped that he could entice Antony’s forces to an open battle, but when they resisted, he moved his own forces to the peninsula on which he would later establish Nikopolis. From this elevated position, Octavian was able to look over the Ionian Sea, the Ambracian Gulf and the straits that connected the two. More importantly, he was also able to check the movements of Antony’s forces, both on land and at sea. As before, Octavian hoped to draw Antony into an immediate battle, especially since Antony had not yet mustered all of his forces. For his part, Antony moved part of his army north of the straits to a position near Octavian and set his cavalry loose around the Ambracian Gulf, thus hemming in Octavian on the peninsula. In response, Octavian sent troops into Greece and Macedonia to divert some of Antony’s forces, and Agrippa launched successful attacks against Leucas, Patras and Corinth, each an important port-of-call for Antony’s navy. Shortly after these losses, Antony’s cavalry was also defeated in a skirmish at Actium. This series of defeats led to a number of desertions amongst Antony’s supporters, most notably Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus. And while Ahenobarbus died before he could be of great service to Octavian, his actions inspired many more of Antony’s supporters to desert.
This situation was only worsened when one of Antony’s commanders, Sosius, attempted to surprise a small contingent of Octavian’s navy, which was anchored near the straits. While initially successful, Sosius was surprised by the arrival of Agrippa and the bulk of Octavian’s navy. Sosius’ forces were quickly overcome and the commander himself perished in the struggle. At this series of losses, Antony immediately withdrew from north of the straits and concentrated his men on the promontory of Actium. Because his supply lines had been severed by Agrippa’s campaigns around Greece, Antony’s provisions soon began to dwindle and he was forced to call a war council. What was decided at this council remains a point of contention in the study of the battle. According to Cassius Dio, Cleopatra persuaded Antony to withdraw to Egypt, leaving behind only enough troops to hold defensive positions in Greece. A number of troubling portents had caused Cleopatra to lose heart, and Antony in turn was affected by the reservations of his lover. Because a simple retreat would cause even more of their allies to defect to Octavian, the two determined to disguise their flight by pretending to prepare for battle. Accordingly, they would either be allowed to withdraw if Octavian did not engage, or, if battle was begun, they would be able to force their way through the lines and make their escape. In either case, Dio implies that Antony never had any hope or intention of defeating Octavian.
Actium Map 1. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Plutarch tells a slightly different tale. Because many of his ships were still undermanned, Antony, we are told, preferred to fight Octavian on land, likely in either Thrace or Macedonia. It was largely accepted that Octavian’s men were far more experienced at naval battle, and Antony was still recognized as the greatest living land-general in the Roman army, if not the world. A number of Antony’s commanders warned him that it would be a waste of his well-trained infantry to divide them up amongst the various ships in a naval engagement. Despite all of this, Cleopatra was able to persuade Antony to fight at sea. As Plutarch relates, she had already decided to flee during the engagement, rather than to contribute to the battle. In fact, in most of the sources for the battle, Cleopatra is identified as the first to flee, and Antony, because of his love for her, soon followed. Whether this was actually the case is difficult to determine. The negative characterization of Cleopatra is almost certainly the product of Octavian’s own portrayal of his victory, which aimed to highlight the differences between Romans and Easterners. Of more importance, though, are the discrepancies in our accounts of Antony’s war council and his plans for the battle.
Scholars have long debated what Antony’s true intentions in the battle were. Some hold that Dio is correct and that Antony never hoped to defeat Octavian. Rather, he simply planned to use the battle as a cover for his flight to Egypt. While this conclusion rings of propaganda by the victors, the move would make some strategic sense. Egypt provided substantial resources to Antony’s war efforts, not only in ships and manpower, but also in grain and gold. A withdrawal to Egypt would allow Antony to regroup and attempt a later engagement on better terms. Such a tactical withdrawal was not without risks, though. Many of Antony’s supporters would have certainly seen the move as a sign of cowardice and immediately defected to Octavian, and retreat under the guise of battle would have risked both ships and men. In addition, Antony would have essentially been abandoning his land army in Greece, where they would be harassed continuously by Octavian. Other scholars look to Plutarch’s account and contend that Antony always intended to fight and, if possible, defeat Octavian. His mistake was the choice to fight at sea rather than on land. It was not uncommon for a general to be forced to make such a decision in antiquity, and even if Antony was better skilled on land than at sea, he would have been well versed in naval tactics. Why he would have chosen to put all of his hope in the fleet, though, remains uncertain. Antony’s infantry, according to Plutarch, outnumbered Octavian’s by 20,000, and Antony was, after all, apparently interested in a second Pharsalus. Here, Cleopatra once again enters the discussion. We are told that she preferred a sea battle and that Antony was persuaded by her plan. This may once again seem like later propaganda, but the plan is not without merit. Cleopatra had many of her resources invested in ships and seamen, and should the battle not go in their favour, her best chance of escape was to sail back to Alexandria and the presumed safety of Egypt. By pushing for a naval engagement, then, Cleopatra was ensuring either that Octavian would be defeated or that her withdrawal would be secured.
In either case, the final engagement occurred on 2 September 31 BCE. It is not always the case that we have such a specific date for an ancient battle, but Cassius Dio is careful to record the precise day because it was upon his victory at Actium that Octavian gained sole power in Rome. The importance of this date and this event were recognized even in antiquity, and the battle’s significance should not be underestimated. Despite his specificity in recording the date of the battle, however, Dio gives no indication of the relative numbers of the opposing forces. Plutarch, for his part, records that Antony had 500 ships in his fleet and an army of 100,000 foot-soldiers and 12,000 horsemen. Both Orosius and Florus, though, state that Antony’s fleet at Actium was considerably smaller, with Orosius listing its strength at 170 ships and Florus at around 200. The discrepancies in these numbers are yet another cause of confusion in our understanding of this battle. Plutarch reports that Octavian had a fleet of 250 ships at his disposal and land forces consisting of 80,000 infantrymen and 12,000 cavalrymen. These numbers are supported by Orosius, who lists Octavian’s strength at 230 warships. Florus seems to be mistaken in his understanding of Octavian’s naval strength, as he alone asserts that Octavian had nearly 400 ships at Actium. While it is largely agreed that Octavian’s fleet consisted of roughly 250 warships, the size of Antony’s naval force remains a point of some contention and has a significant impact on our understanding not only of the battle itself, but of Antony’s actions in the engagement. If Plutarch is correct, then Antony outnumbered Octavian by nearly two-to-one, so his decision to fight at sea rather than on land seems tactically sound. In addition, if Antony had such a great tactical advantage over Octavian, it is difficult to imagine that he would have determined simply to flee, rather than try his luck in a naval engagement. Orosius and Florus, on the other hand, both suggest that Octavian actually outnumbered Antony by as many as eighty warships, so Antony’s decision to fight at sea becomes more questionable while his plan to flee is more reasonable.
Scholars have struggled for decades to account for such a great discrepancy in the ancient sources. Some suggest that Antony’s fleet was in fact 500 strong when he started his campaign in Greece. However, it must have been diminished when Agrippa took Leucas, Patras and Corinth, not to mention the ships lost in Sosius’ abortive sortie at Actium. In addition, Cassius Dio and Plutarch both mention that Antony was forced to burn a number of his ships before the final battle, since he did not have enough rowers to fully man them all. Combined, then, Antony’s fleet may have been diminished by as many as 300 ships before the final engagement with Octavian. There is no ancient source that mentions how many ships Antony lost before 2 September, so not all scholars are convinced by the theory that Plutarch is referring to Antony’s initial strength while Orosius and Florus are reporting the number of ships he had at his disposal in the final battle. As such, other scholars contend that Orosius and Florus have simply misunderstood their own source material. They argue that Antony did in fact have roughly 500 ships at Actium, but that one portion of his battle-line, most likely the right wing, consisted of 170-200 ships. Over time, this figure became confused with the total strength of Antony’s fleet, so Orosius and Florus record it as such. More recently, it has been suggested that Plutarch is simply mistaken in his account, and that Octavian likely had around 250 ships, a number agreed upon by most ancient sources, and Antony had between 170-230 ships, a number that aligns better with the possibility of his flight and his tactics during the battle itself. As is always the case, ancient historians are notoriously unreliable when it comes to specific numbers, but it seems as though Octavian had at least a slight numerical advantage over Antony when the two met at Actium.
As Antony’s supplies continued to dwindle, men continued to defect and disease continued to spread through his camp, it became clear that a direct engagement with Octavian could no longer be avoided. As mentioned above, there are conflicting reports of Antony’s aims in this engagement – victory or flight – but in either case, both generals moved their fleets into position for battle. Antony’s fleet, while outnumbered, consisted of much larger ships than that of Octavian’s. Cassius Dio, Plutarch, Florus and Orosius all report that Antony possessed many large ships, some with as many as eight or ten banks of oars or rowers. Plutarch is disparaging of these ships, calling them flashy rather than functional, and Dio is careful to mention that their size made them slow and difficult to manoeuvre. The advantage, however, was that these ships were difficult to ram, could hold many archers, slingers and infantry, and could support various towers and turrets for assaulting enemy ships. And so, with his fleet of large vessels, Antony formed his battle line just in front of the narrows between the gulf and the sea. In this way, his ships could remain in support of one another and prevent Octavian’s smaller, faster vessels from moving through holes in their line and surrounding them. Dio records that Antony himself, along with his lieutenant, Publicola, led the right wing, while Coelius was on the left. Antony, then, opposed Agrippa, while Octavian led his right wing against Coelius.
Actium Map 2: The first phase of the battle. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Antony at first refused to engage, preferring to control the straits and to let the narrows work in his favour. Nevertheless, he was soon forced to leave his secure position and enter the battle. Cassius Dio claims that Octavian formed a crescent-shaped line in the hopes of encircling Antony’s fleet and breaking through his line. Because this required a strengthening of the right and left wings, it left the centre of Octavian’s line vulnerable. Antony then chose to attempt his breakthrough and flight at this point. Plutarch, though, suggests that Antony’s left wing was enticed to fight by a favourable wind, rather than awaiting any order from their commander. In response, Octavian withdrew his own line, drawing Antony’s ships further and further into open water and causing gaps between the larger, slower ships. This was advantageous to Octavian’s smaller ships, which could then surround and swarm Antony’s vessels, breaking their oars and punching holes in their hulls. For their part, Antony’s men attempted to draw Octavian’s ships nearer so they could be caught with grappling hooks and assailed with arrows and stones. As Plutarch writes, the battle resembled a fight on land, since neither side relied on ramming for victory, but rather fought as though either attacking or defending a fortified city. Cassius Dio echoes this sentiment, noting that Octavian’s fleet fought like the cavalry, rushing in to cause quick damage and then withdrawing before they could be captured, while Antony’s fleet resembled the heavy infantry, strong and effective at close quarters but unable to pursue the smaller ships. Octavian’s ships continued to swarm and pester the larger vessels of Antony, while Antony’s own men showered Octavian’s rowers and marines with arrows and stones.
By all accounts, the battle was evenly matched and the outcome was far from certain. Nevertheless, it was at this point, when both fleets were fully engaged, that Cleopatra fled with her contingent of sixty Egyptian ships. This auxiliary force had been left in reserve, presumably to reinforce the battle line where needed, but they never entered the battle. The ancient sources are far from sympathetic in their portrayal of Cleopatra, accusing her of fleeing because she, as a woman, could not bear the uncertainty of the fight at hand. The historians all agree that Cleopatra was the first to flee and that her flight brought the battle to a premature close. The withdrawal of her ships immediately threw Antony’s line into disarray, and the general himself, seeing the queen withdraw, followed at once with a contingent of his own ships. As Plutarch remarks, Antony was no longer a general, but only a lover. Despite the flight of their general, Antony’s men continued to fight, and Octavian was forced to resort to the burning of ships before they at last surrendered. A small contingent of Octavian’s fleet attempted to pursue Antony and Cleopatra, but they were unable to overtake the lovers, who had stowed their sails in case they were forced to withdraw. Typically, before a naval battle, the sails and rigging were removed from the ship to decrease the weight and so increase the speed of the vessel – in a pursuit with a favourable wind, a ship under sail was far swifter than a vessel propelled by oars. The outcome of the battle, then, became somewhat lopsided. Plutarch records that Octavian captured 300 ships (a seemingly high number) and that Antony lost around 5,000 men. Orosius’ numbers are even more dramatic, with Antony losing nearly 12,000 men while another 6,000 were captured. Despite the unreliability of these numbers, it is clear that Antony’s fleet was utterly defeated, and his land forces, who had watched the engagement from the shore, soon surrendered to Octavian and swore their allegiance to him. The civil war had essentially come to a close and Octavian emerged as the sole ruler in Rome.
The immense significance of this battle immediately became a cause of celebration amongst the poets and authors of Rome, many of whom were under the direct patronage of Octavian himself. Horace, for example, equates Octavian’s victory to the achievements of Scipio Africanus, who gained eternal recognition for his defeat of the Carthaginians in the Second Punic War (218-201 BCE). Vergil includes a scene of Octavian’s victory at the centre of the shield of Aeneas, the founding hero of the Roman race. In this way, he suggests that the Battle of Actium marked the culmination of Rome’s ascension to greatness and dominance. For his part, Octavian dedicated ten captured ships to Apollo – one from each class in An tony’s fleet, ranging from a small vessel with only a single bank of oars to one of Antony’s ten-banked behemoths. He likewise founded Nikopolis at the site of his own camp and established celebratory games called the Actia, which were to be held every four years in commemoration of his victory. It was clearly his intention to ensure that all of posterity would remember and celebrate not only his defeat of Cleopatra and Antony, but also the beginning of his reign in Rome and the establishment of the Principate.
The Battle Site Today
The straits and narrows near which the Battle of Actium was fought can best be observed from the modern town of Preveza. The city’s marina is easily accessible from the city centre and allows for views to the opposing Actium Peninsula to the south-east (N38° 57.564"; E020° 45.470"). It was on that peninsula that Antony established his camp, and it is clear to see why the point was strategically important. Here, the straits to the Ambracian Gulf are at their most narrow, and so access to the gulf and points inland could be easily defended by a well-positioned fleet. Unfortunately, the Actium Peninsula is no longer accessible, as it is now the location of the local airport, but the view from the marina nicely highlights the importance of Antony’s position.
Actium Map 3: The second phase of the battle. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
To gain a better view of the battle site itself, visitors should travel west along the coast to the Pantokratoras Fort, which was built early in the nineteenth century (N38° 57.715"; E020° 44.294"). This well-preserved fort was constructed by the Ottoman governor Ali Pasha, and its location once again highlights the strategic importance of Actium and its surroundings. The fort guards the entrance to the straits and overlooks the location of the Battle of Actium itself, which would have taken place in the waters to the south and west. The shoreline here served as the anchor for Antony’s right flank, and his battle line would have stretched to the south, eventually reaching the opposing shore not far from modern Leukada. Antony’s strategy relied on his ability to draw Octavian’s ships into this narrow position, which provided protection on the flanks for Antony’s larger, slower vessels. Such a narrow position also restricted the movement of Octavian’s smaller but swifter ships, and so would have prevented them from swarming Antony’s vessels. As mentioned above, though, Antony’s vessels were drawn out of this defensive position into the open sea to the west, and the battle quickly turned against them.
In recent years, archaeologists have attempted underwater surveys to locate the precise site of the battle. In particular, they hoped to find one of the massive bronze rams that would have been carried by any number of the ships used in the engagement. Preserved components of ancient warships remain especially elusive, as many of these ships had positive buoyancy, and so did not sink when swamped or flooded. Even so, ship rams are occasionally discovered underwater – most famously that found near Athlit in Israel. While no ship’s ram has been found at Actium, archaeologists have discovered a number of what they believe to be stone catapult balls, which would have been launched from the ships during the engagement. These objects lie in the sediment deep beneath the surface of the Ionian Sea, and so excavation and retrieval has proven difficult; nevertheless, with the development of new technologies and with additional archaeological surveys, it is possible that we will someday know exactly where the final battle took place.
Fig. 20.1: View of the battle area from the Pantokratoras Fort. Authors’ photo.
While archaeological evidence from the battle site itself remains scant at best, the nearby ancient city of Nikopolis offers one of the few examples of a securely identified monument marking a known position from an ancient battle. Nikopolis, the ‘Victory City’, was established by Octavian to commemorate his victory at Actium. Cassius Dio, Strabo and Suetonius all mention the foundation of this city, but Dio’s account is of particular importance. In it, he mentions that Octavian established an open-air sanctuary to Apollo in which he constructed a monument designed to receive the bronze rams taken from captured ships. This monument, he notes, was erected on the very spot where Octavian had set up his tent during the campaign at Actium. Remarkably, this monument has been discovered and excavated by archaeologists and can still be viewed by visitors (N39° 01.664"; E020° 44.186"), though the site is now typically locked and so the monument can only be viewed through a fence, unless specific permission is requested from the Ministry of Culture. Even so, the sanctuary is well worth a visit and can be reached by driving into the modern town of Nikopolis and following the signs for the archaeological site. The monument is located just north of the city and requires a short drive down a gravel road, but it is well worth the time. From the hill, visitors can look down into the straits and the Ionian Sea, and it is clear why Octavian chose this spot for his camp.
The monument itself is fairly well preserved, though it now undulates dramatically, no doubt the result of seismic activity in the area. And while none of the bronze ship rams that once adorned it survive, a series of oddly shaped cuttings in the stones were designed to receive the captured rams. These cuttings attest to the dramatic scale of the ships in Antony’s fleet, and in few places can a visitor feel so closely connected to an ancient battle – one stands on the very spot where Octavian had his tent and viewed the vestiges of the fleet of Antony and Cleopatra. An inscription, which once stretched across the facade of the monument, is preserved in Latin and, though fragmentary, commemorates Octavian’s victory:
Imperator Caesar [Octavian], son of the divine Julius, following the victory in the war which waged on behalf of the Republic in this region when he was consul for the fifth time and commander-in-chief for the seventh time, after peace had been secured on land and sea, consecrated to Neptune and Mars the camp from which he set forth to attack the enemy, which is now ornamented with naval spoils. (Murray and Petsas, 1989, p.86)
The surviving blocks of this inscription have been set up in front of the remnants of the dedication and give a sense of the monumentality of Octavian’s commemoration of his victory.
Two final sites are worth a visit while at Nikopolis, especially given their relation to the Battle of Actium. As travellers leave the Actium monument and pass through the modern town of Nikopolis, the remains of the Roman theatre and stadium lie just to the south of the village. Neither building is particularly well preserved, and both are often closed to the public given their damaged state; nevertheless, these buildings were constructed for the sake of the Actia, the games set up by Octavian to further commemorate his victory over Antony and Cleopatra. While not directly connected to the battle itself, it is here that travellers can again fully appreciate the importance that this victory held for Octavian, especially since the Battle of Actium marked the beginning of his sole rule in Rome and the establishment of the Principate and the Roman imperial period.
Fig. 20.2: Octavian’s victory monument at Nikopolis, showing the cuttings where the ships’ prows would have been mounted. Authors’ photo.
Further Reading
Ancient Sources:
–Plutarch, Life of Antony 58-68
Writing in the first and second centuries CE, Plutarch provides a detailed account of the Battle of Actium. He draws a contrast between the types of ships commanded by each general, and highlights the superior training and preparation of Octavian’s men, though, because of Plutarch’s customary moralizing, it is difficult to know how reliable such claims are. Plutarch largely blames Cleopatra for Antony’s flight in the battle, ascribing it to her questionable morals.
–Cassius Dio, Roman History 50.1-51.1
Writing in the second and third centuries CE, Dio offers a lengthy and detailed description not only of the engagement itself, but also of the lead-up to the battle. Like Plutarch, he is at times moralizing about the influence Cleopatra had on Antony as well as the difference in character between Antony and Octavian. Of particular significance, Dio records that Antony never intended to fight Octavian, but rather simply to flee, disguising his flight as preparation for the battle.
–Velleius Paterculus 2.84-86
An early account, written in the first century CE, highlighting the contrast between the armies of Octavian and Antony. Velleius offers few specific details of the battle, but does list the names of the commanders on each side. As with most accounts, he also blames Cleopatra for the flight and eventual defeat of Antony.
–Orosius 6.19.6-12
Writing more than 400 years after the battle, Orosius’ account contains a remarkable amount of detail, including the relative strengths of each army and the number of casualties suffered by Antony. The number of ships in Antony’s navy, as recorded by Orosius, differs from that of Plutarch, and he suggests that the battle actually continued through the night into the next morning, an assertion largely dismissed by scholars.
–Florus 2.21.5
Active in the first and second centuries CE, Florus offers a brief account of the battle that is particularly critical of both Antony and Cleopatra, and so heavily moralizing and potentially propagandistic. Florus is yet another source to offer numbers for the relative strengths of the fleets of Octavian and Antony.
–Propertius 2.15, 2.16, 2.34, 3.11, 4.6
Propertius’ poetry, written during the Augustan Age, offers little to help our understanding of the battle itself, but it does illustrate the carefully crafted image set forth by Octavian/Augustus in the years after the battle. The passing references to Actium are almost universally critical of Cleopatra, while extensively praising Octavian. Interestingly, there is little mention of Antony. This is in line with Augustus’ own Res Gesstae, which stresses his war against a foreign enemy, rather than a fellow Roman.
Modern Sources:
Books
–Murray, W.M., and Petsas, P.M., Octavian’s Campsite Memorial for the Actian War (Philadelphia, 1989).
A thorough treatment of the excavation of the Actium memorial set up by Octavian and mentioned in numerous ancient sources. In addition to the discussion of the remains of the monument, the work also explores the warships used in the battle and outlines the scholarly debate about Antony’s strategy and the relative strength of the opposing forces.
Articles
–Kromayer, J., ‘Kleine Forschungen zur Geschichte des zweiten Triumvirats, VII. Der Feldzug von Actium und der sogenannte Verath der Cleopatra’, Hermes 34 (1899), pp.1-54.
Although in German, Kromayer’s thorough treatment of the battle is essential for the scholarly debate that it inspired. Kromayer, based in particular on the works of Dio and Plutarch, argued that Antony never intended to fight at Actium, but rather preferred to withdraw with his fleet and fight at a later date.
–Ferrabino, A., ‘La battaglia d’Azio’, Rivista de Filologia e di Istruzione Classica 52 (1924), pp.433-72.
Ferrabino was one of the first scholars to challenge Kromayer’s interpretation of the battle. Preferring to use the more contemporary works of the poets, particularly Horace, rather than the later accounts of Dio and Plutarch, Ferrabino contended that Antony did in fact intend to fight, but that the failure of one of his generals was responsible for Antony’s eventual defeat.
–Tarn, W.M., ‘The Battle of Actium’, Journal of Roman Studies 21 (1931), pp.173-99.
By far the most extensive and thorough challenge of Kromayer’s reconstruction of the battle, Tarn, like Ferrabino, uses sources more contemporary with the battle itself to suggest that Antony did in fact intend to engage with Octavian at Actium. The conclusions of Kromayer and Tarn have long shaped our understanding of the battle, with scholars largely falling into one of the two camps.
–Kromayer, J., ‘Zur Shlacht von Actium’, in J. Kromayer and G. Veith, Antike Schlachtfelder: Bausteine zur einer antiken Kriegsgeschichte, Vol. 4, Part 4, (Berlin, 1931), pp.662-71.
Kromayer’s first defence of his reconstruction of the Battle of Actium. In particular, this article addresses the arguments of Ferrabino.
–Kromayer, J., ‘Actium: ein epilog’, Hermes 68 (1933), pp.361-83.
A second defence of his reconstruction of the Battle of Actium; this article responds more directly with the arguments presented by Tarn.
–Richardson, G.W., ‘Actium’, Journal of Roman Studies 27 (1937), pp.153-64.
A defence of Tarn’s stance on the battle, Richardson’s article nicely outlines the debate between Kromayer and Tarn. Although aligned with Tarn, this article provides a third voice in the debate about the battle and Antony’s strategy.
–Tarn, W.M., ‘Actium: A Note’, Journal of Roman Studies 28 (1938), pp.165-68.
Another response by Tarn in reaction to Kromayer’s continued defence of his own theory.
–Zachos, K.L., ‘The Tropaeum of the Sea-battle of Actium at Nikopolis: Interim Report’, Journal of Roman Archaeology 16 (2002), pp.65-92.
While not concerned with the battle itself, this article updates the archaeological work of Murray and Petsas, focusing particularly on the Actium monument and including new reconstructions of the monument and the inscription commemorating the battle. For visitors to the site of Nikopolis, this source will be of particular use.
–Lange, C.H., ‘The Battle of Actium: A Reconsideration’, Classical Quarterly 61.2 (2011), pp.608-23.
A re-examination of the battle and the Kromayer-Tarn debate. Lange offers a middle-ground, contending that Antony did in fact intend to fight, and that he could have been successful; nevertheless, he suggests that Cleopatra’s flight was the catalyst for Antony’s eventual defeat. This article focuses in particular on the size of the opposing navies and tries to account for the discrepancies in our ancient sources.