Part II
Chapter 4
Introduction
Perhaps the most famous ancient Greek battle of all, in which 300 Spartans stood against the countless thousands of Xerxes’ army, the Battle of Thermopylae was technically a defeat for the Greeks. It also involved far more on the Greek side than the legendary 300 who fought in the face of certain death. However distorted this battle has become due to its surpassing renown in the centuries between then and now, there is no question that Thermopylae was a defining moment for the Spartans – and for the Greeks in general. And though Xerxes eventually took the vital Thermopylae pass, opening up central Greece to Persian invasion, the Spartans and their allies who fought Xerxes’ hordes demonstrated that Greek arms, especially the hoplite phalanx, were more than a match for Persian troops, a lesson all Greeks took to heart. The Spartans and their allies who died, including the Spartan King Leonidas, also demonstrated the true nature of courage, and that it was worth standing up to the Persians, even to the point of death. Thermopylae, then, is justly famous as a Greek moral victory, if not a tactical one.
Directions to the Site
The site of Thermopylae is about a two-hour drive north from Athens along the National Road. The city of Lamia, with hotels and other amenities, including a striking acropolis, is only 15km north of the site. The main tourist park for Thermopylae is along the old National Road, so you will need to turn off the modern highway at the signs for Thermopyles. The site itself is hard to miss, marked as it is by a set of conspicuous twentieth-century monuments, the most famous of which is a bronze representation of the Spartan King Leonidas. Across the old highway from the Leonidas statue is a path leading to the hillock where the 300 made their last stand. There is ample parking next to the modern monuments.
Historical Outline of the Battle
In early 480 BCE, Xerxes and his millions (or, more likely, around 150,000 soldiers) were on their way to Europe. Xerxes was bent on adding mainland Greece to the sprawling Persian Empire and exacting revenge on the Athenians for the humiliating defeat they inflicted on his father, Darius, at Marathon ten years earlier. When Xerxes gathered his forces at Sardis, his local capital in Lydia in what is now Turkey, more Greeks had joined the Persian forces than would stand against them. By the time he advanced on Athens and the other powers of central and southern Greece, even more Greeks would join the Persians. Those patriotic Greeks who were left, led officially by Sparta and in many ways morally by Athens, had to decide how to resist probably the largest invasion force the world had ever seen. Knowing that they would be massively outnumbered, the Greeks looked to their mountainous geography to provide a force multiplier, that is, a narrow pass in which few Greeks could hope to withstand many Persians.
On their rudimentary maps, the Greeks identified the Vale of Tempe – a narrow gorge running between Mt Olympus and Mt Ossa, forming the boundary between Macedonia and Thessaly – as the ideal place to make a stand. As they reasoned, Tempe afforded the Greeks a defensible location which, if held, would keep the lion’s share of mainland Greece out of Persian hands. Ten thousand Greeks accordingly made their way by ship north to the Vale of Tempe, with the polemarch Euainetos in command of the Spartans and the wily Themistocles in charge of the Athenians. But before the Persians arrived on the scene, or even crossed the Hellespont between Asia and Europe, it was discovered that there were alternate ways into Thessaly – in fact, the very ways taken by Xerxes in the event, according to Herodotus. In short, the Greek position could be turned and was vulnerable to encirclement. Alexander, the king of Macedonia, also dissuaded the Greeks by informing them of the staggering size of the Persian force about to enter Europe. Tempe would have to be abandoned, and Thessaly along with it. Quite understandably, the Thessalians and their famous horsemen saw no choice but to capitulate to Xerxes, and, as Herodotus says, ended up serving the Persians valiantly in the coming campaign.
The Greeks reconvened at the Isthmus of Corinth to settle on a new plan of action. Though Tempe was a debacle, there was another narrow pass that for many reasons offered better prospects for keeping the Persians at bay. The pass of Thermopylae, literally the ‘hot gates’ because of its famous hot springs, skirted the coast from west to east long the Malian Gulf, guarding the routes south into Boeotia and Attica. Thermopylae was both narrower than Tempe and closer to home for most of the patriotic Greeks. It also offered another key advantage over Tempe for anyone seeking to prevent the Persian invasion of central and southern Greece. Just as the land route past Thermopylae was at points very confined, right off the coast a narrow strait ran between the mainland and the promontory of Artemisium on the large island of Euboea, promising the Greek navy a force multiplier similar to that for the Greek land forces (see the chapter on Artemisium in this book). Since Xerxes’ invasion was amphibious – his army was accompanied and supplied by a naval force of unprecedented size – the Persians would need to be stopped on both land and sea. Thermopylae was therefore the best hope the Greeks had to defend themselves, worthy of an all-out effort, despite the arguments of some modern scholars who question whether the pass was all that important.
Thermopylae Map 1: The Persian route to Thermopylae. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
In popular culture, the Greek force sent to Thermopylae is legendary, if perplexing. The Spartans, bravest and most skilled of Greek soldiers and guarantors of Greek liberty, sent a mere 300 hoplites under the command of Leonidas, one of the Spartan kings. Why so few? First of all, the 300 Spartans who made their famous last stand against the Persians – inspiring soldiers for countless generations – were only the nucleus of a much larger force. This larger army amounted to at least 3,100 Peloponnesians, and perhaps as many as 4,000 according to a dedicatory epigram of Simonides quoted by Herodotus. These Peloponnesians were reinforced by 700 hoplites from tiny Thespiae in Boeotia and 400 from Thebes. Herodotus says that these Thebans were included by Leonidas merely to test their loyalty, since the Thebans were suspected of wanting to ‘Medize’, that is, to join the Persians. Most scholars, beginning with Plutarch in antiquity, think that this charge was no more than anti-Theban bias on the part of Herodotus, arrived at with the benefit of hindsight (the Thebans really did Medize eventually, and fought along with the Persians at Plataea in 479). To these troops were added around 1,000 Opuntian Locrians (though Pausanias says there were 6,000 of these troops) and 1,000 Phocians from the areas nearer Thermopylae, and perhaps 1,000 Malians. Thus, the true size of Leonidas’ army was likely greater than 8,000. Given that many states, especially Athens, needed to use large numbers of their men in the fleet sent to guard the way by sea at Artemisium, this figure is not totally out of keeping with the 10,000 that had been sent to Tempe.
Still, the Spartans should have been able to spare more than 300. Herodotus says they were hampered by the religious festival of the Karneia, sacred to Apollo, and were prohibited from sending out their full army under pain of religious pollution. The rest of Greece was also occupied by the festival of the Olympic Games, in antiquity as much a religious rite as an athletic competition, which might partly explain why more Greeks did not go to Thermopylae. Perhaps Leonidas’ army was meant only as an advance force, to hold the Persians at bay until more Greeks could come, unencumbered by religious scruples. Then again, maybe Leonidas and his men were only meant to delay the Persians as long as possible, to allow the rest of Greece to prepare for the Persians in whatever way they could. Yet none of these explanations really satisfies, given how crucial it was to hold the pass. Beyond Thermopylae, there was nowhere to stop the Persians until the Isthmus of Corinth, leaving Thebes and Athens, among other major cities, completely exposed to the invaders. The legend of Thermopylae would have us believe that Leonidas and the Spartans were on a suicide mission (as indeed is stated by Diodorus), aiming to inflict as many bloody casualties on Xerxes as possible while selling their lives dearly. The 300, after all, were supposedly chosen because they all had at least one living son, ostensibly to carry on the family after the inevitable death of the father. This explanation, however, reeks more of myth than of history, and does not reflect the general military behaviour of the Spartans, who were, in fact, rather reluctant to risk their precious hoplites in battle outside of the Peloponnese. Just as likely, the qualification of having a son was a means to prevent the Spartan soldiers from acting too recklessly, or of ensuring that all the soldiers were old enough to have valuable military experience.
Upon arriving at Thermopylae, probably in August of 480, and adding to their ranks such locals who were willing and able to help, the Greeks began to rebuild the crumbling remains of the Phocian Wall, built long before to prevent invasion and located at what is now called the ‘Middle Gate’, one of three narrow points along the Thermopylae pass. The Greeks soon learned the disturbing fact that there was a mountain path, called Anopaia, which an army could take to encircle the Greek position. Thus, the same danger posed by the position at Tempe threatened the Greeks at Thermopylae. The best Leonidas and his army could hope for was that the Persians would not learn of the path, since it was quite rugged and relatively hidden. Leonidas did what he could: he posted the 1,000 Phocians, who volunteered themselves for the task, to guard the Anopaia path and provide at least some resistance in case the Persians did hear of the route.
Xerxes timed his own march to Thermopylae to coincide with the arrival of his navy near Artemisium. The first thing he did when he arrived near the city of Trachis, in the plain just west of the pass, was to send a scout to assess what sort of resistance the Persians could expect. Xerxes was perplexed by the scout’s report that the Spartans were spending their time primping and combing their famously long hair. What sort of men were these Spartans? To get an answer, Xerxes sent for Demaratus, an exiled former Spartan king who accompanied Xerxes to Greece and served as an advisor concerning Greek, and especially Spartan, matters. Aside from telling the Great King that the Spartans were the world’s best infantrymen and would never bow to a foreign power, Demaratus explained that they were combing their hair because they planned to die in the coming battle, and they wanted to leave a beautiful corpse after dying a noble death. Bemused, Xerxes reckoned that his huge army would make short work of the Spartans and the rest of the Greek defenders nonetheless.
Despite Demaratus’ lofty praise of the Spartans, Herodotus tells us that the general Greek reaction to seeing Xerxes’ army for the first time was to fall into utter despair. Most of the Greeks apparently wanted to abandon their posts, and Leonidas is said to have sent to the Greek cities – it is unclear which ones were meant – for more soldiers. In the end, the Greek defenders, at the prompting of the locals who faced the destruction of their homes, opted to stay and make what use they could of the narrow pass and the rebuilt defensive wall. In case the Persians were contemptuous of the Greeks’ resolve – the Persians did wait three or four days to attack the Greeks, ostensibly to give them a chance to run away – Plutarch records a most memorable saying from the Spartan King Leonidas upon being asked to lay down his arms: ‘molōn labe’, or ‘come and get them!’
Eventually, Xerxes ordered a general attack of his Median and Cissian troops against the Greeks defending the pass. We do not know for sure how many soldiers were in the Persian army – surely not the two to three million that Herodotus says – but Xerxes’ force probably consisted of somewhere around 150,000 soldiers, outnumbering the Greeks by at least fifteen-to-one and perhaps even twenty-toone. But as Xerxes would learn once again at the Battle of Salamis a month or so later, all the numbers in the world are made ineffective by the right, or in his case the wrong, terrain. At Thermopylae, the confined space rendered Xerxes’ numerical advantage next to meaningless. Aside from well-chosen geography, the Greek defenders had another ace up their sleeve: the hoplite phalanx. Though many scholars have long seen the phalanx as largely ritualistic, the type of infantry formation used by free citizens trying to demonstrate the superiority of their aretē, or excellence, to that of their neighbours, hoplites could also be deadly and effective troops. Persian soldiers tended to be less heavily armed, wielding little more than wicker shields for defence, whereas the double-grip hoplite shield and the long and sturdy thrusting spear of the Greeks were designed for a stout defence and shock-based attack. Herodotus explicitly says that the Persians’ shorter spears put them at a considerable disadvantage. Once the Persian attack commenced, Thermopylae became a masterclass in the effectiveness of the hoplite phalanx against other troop types, a lesson that would be repeated time and again over the next century and a half.
More than presenting the wall of shields and hedge of spears that defined the phalanx, at Thermopylae the Spartans demonstrated the value of their life-long devotion to military training. When their sturdier spears and heavier shields were not killing enough of the Persians, the Spartan hoplites repeatedly feigned retreat to lure the Persian soldiers after them. Once the hapless Persian infantrymen were well out of any formation, the Spartans would abruptly turn about to skewer their pursing opponents. The citizen-soldiers of Sparta’s allied states were probably unable to duplicate these tactics, though they might have honed their own hoplite skills considerably after watching the Spartans in action. Witnessing the battle unfold, Xerxes concluded that he needed to send his best troops against the formidable Greek warriors. He therefore ordered his Immortals to advance under their commander, Hydarnes. The Immortals, the elite guard of the king, were so named because whenever one fell, another would take his place, making it seem as though the 10,000 soldiers in the unit could not be killed. Unfortunately for Xerxes, the Immortals fared little better than the Medes and Cissians. Herodotus says that Xerxes leapt to his feet three times in terror for his army as he watched his troops being slaughtered. The great historian also adds, rather triumphantly, that though Xerxes had many men in his army, he had few soldiers.
The first day of battle ended with many Persians dead, including the so-called Immortals, but few Greeks. The second day proceeded in much the same way. It began to look as though the relatively small force the Greeks had sent to Thermopylae was large enough after all. The heavily armed hoplite phalanx, anchored by 300 of Greece’s best and most highly trained soldiers, combined with a well-chosen defensive position, seemed to be enough to keep Xerxes’ invasion at bay. If enough Persians died on land, and if the Greeks at sea were able at least to keep the Persian navy engaged at Artemisium, maybe the Great King would reconsider the need to occupy all of mainland Greece. For all of the scholarly debate over whether or not the Spartans were on a suicide mission, or why the Greeks sent so small a force to defend a crucial pass, the fact that Thermopylae might have been a success is usually overlooked. The Persians, however, never really preferred conquest by means of brute military force. Instead, they often opted to buy their way to power and influence, and to rule through client kings and tyrants. It would be Persian gold rather than Persian arms that carried the day at Thermopylae. That gold found its way to a local Greek named Ephialtes, who had an important piece of information for the Persian king.
Ephialtes knew of the Anopaia path, a small mountain track that ran inland from near the Persians’ camp and through Mt Kallidromos before returning to the coast behind the Greeks’ position. In other words, the pass at Thermopylae could be turned, and the advantage of the confined terrain nullified. Xerxes was delighted at Ephialtes’ information, and the traitorous Greek was rewarded handsomely for betraying the defenders. Ephialtes did not enjoy his new wealth for long: Herodotus says that he died in shady circumstances not long after the war, after living in exile with a price on his head. Herodotus is careful to mention by name this betrayer who has enjoyed a historical reputation on a par with Judas Iscariot and Brutus. Xerxes sent Hydarnes and the Immortals – we do not know whether the entire force or only a portion went – with Ephialites to traverse the path by night, with the goal of surrounding the Greeks on the third day of the battle. Along the Anopaia path, the Immortals encountered the Phocians who had been assigned to guard the route. The Phocians, it seems, had not posted lookouts, since they only became aware of the Persians’ presence when they heard the rustling of leaves under the soldiers’ feet. After a brief skirmish between the two startled forces, the Phocians withdrew to higher ground, determined to fight to the death against the Persians. Hydarnes and the Immortals, however, simply ignored the Phocians, noble as these Greeks might have been, and continued along the path, nothing now preventing them from surrounding Leonidas and his soldiers.
Thermopylae Map 2: The battle and the pass around the Greeks. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Leonidas learned of the Immortals’ deadly mission from several sources, according to the ancient accounts. The Greek seer, Megistias, first declared that the Greeks would face death at dawn. Megistias was later remembered as a hero since he saw more clearly than anyone the impossibility of the defenders’ position, yet opted to stay anyway and die along with the Spartans. Some deserters from the Persian side also told Leonidas that his position would soon be turned. One of these deserters, at least according to Diodorus, was one of Xerxes’ Greek allies, a man from the city of Cyme in what is now Turkey. Since Diodorus’ source was Ephorus of Cyme, this account might betray some local propaganda to the effect that the people of Cyme never really supported Xerxes fully. Since it would have been pointless for all of the Greeks to die, Leonidas sent the majority home. Thermopylae would fall. Leonidas and what was left of his 300 after two days of hard fighting opted to stay, as did the Thespians. The Thebans also stayed, but only because Leonidas did not trust them – or so Herodotus tells us. Did Leonidas stay as the ultimate demonstration of Spartan heroism and the Spartan adherence to their own laws? One of Sparta’s most touted military laws was never to yield one’s place to the enemy. Facing death against the Persians, therefore, would prove the loyalty of Leonidas and his men to this Spartan tradition. The real reason for Leonidas’ decision might be a tad more prosaic. The majority of the Greek defenders, retreating to fight another day on behalf of Greece and their own cities, needed a strong rearguard to avoid being wiped out by the Persian light troops and cavalry. Leonidas, then, stayed behind not in suicidal obedience to the law, but to give the others a chance to escape. Yet facing certain death, these last few defenders are still rightly considered heroic.
So, how do men fight when they know they will die anyway? In the case of the Spartans, Greece’s pre-eminent warriors, the answer is like men possessed. Now that Leonidas and his remaining soldiers needed only to give their compatriots time to retreat, the 300 and their allies began the third day of the battle by abandoning the narrowest part of the pass, near the Middle Gate and Phocian Wall where they had made their stand for the previous two days, to advance into the broader part of the plain, closer to the Persian camp. Xerxes did not wait for Hydarnes and the Immortals to complete their circuit before unleashing his army against the remaining Greeks. Heedless of their own safety, the Greeks took the fight to the Persians and slaughtered many more of the Great King’s men. Leonidas himself fell in this part of the struggle, and his closest companions fought like mad men to maintain possession of their king’s body. In this passage, Herodotus closely mirrors the struggle over the body of Patroclus, Achilles’ friend, in one of the most riveting scenes of Homer’s Iliad. Quite literally, the Spartans and their allies were now engaged in an epic struggle in the pass of Thermopylae.
Thermopylae Map 3: The final stand. Satellite image courtesy of the USGS.
Once Leonidas had died, and once Hydarnes and the Immortals appeared to the rear of the Greek position, having descended to a spot on the coast close to the East Gate of the pass, those Greek defenders who were still alive withdrew to the Middle Gate and behind the wall, and took up a position on a small hill. Even now they sold their lives dearly. Herodotus says that after their spears and swords were broken – the result of killing so many Persians over the past three days – the Spartans and Thespians fought with their bare hands and even their teeth. For their part, the Thebans had by now deserted to the Persian lines, holding out their hands in surrender. It was in a hail of arrows and other missile weapons that the last of the Spartans and Thespians died, demonstrating that to the very end the Persians were afraid to approach within a spear-length of the Greek defenders. As one more comment on the Spartans’ stiff upper lip, Herodotus says that before the battle someone related to the Spartans that the Persian arrows would fly so thick that they would blot out the sun. One of the Spartans, a man named Dienekes, who might have died in this final shower of arrows, replied that the Spartans would happily fight in the shade.
Diodorus and Plutarch mention a last-ditch effort on the part of the Greeks not found in Herodotus. According to these later sources, once it was clear that the pass would fall, the Greeks organized a raid against the Persian camp, even against Xerxes’ command tent itself. Few believe this story, especially since it is not mentioned by Herodotus, who otherwise gives a rich and full account of the battle. However, the story is not as far-fetched as it might seem. Given that the Greek defenders were otherwise heedless of their lives, advancing into the broader part of the plain and fighting even with their hands and teeth, is it really so difficult to believe that some of them invaded the Persian camp in a desperate last ditch attempt to knock out the Persian leadership? Modern cinematic and literary accounts of the battle, romanticized to be sure, are enamoured of this story, and it fits well generally with the Thermopylae legend, if not with history. Even if the raid happened, however, it was unsuccessful and did not alter the outcome of the battle.
Thermopylae fell to the Persians at last. Central and southern Greece now lay open to the invading army. Once news of the defeat reached the Greek navy at Artemisium, the Greek ships withdrew to the isthmus, allowing the Persian navy to sail along with the land forces. Thus, Thermopylae was a defeat for the Greeks. The pass had not been held, either by land or by sea, and there were precious few other places in Greece where the Persian numbers could be nullified. Within a few days, Athens would be in flames, its temples destroyed and Marathon avenged. Yet still, among the bodies of his own soldiers and those of his enemies at Thermopylae, Xerxes was not a happy man. Kept at bay for three days and humiliated, Xerxes made sure to find the body of Leonidas, which the Persian king ordered to be desecrated and the head displayed on a pike. As shocking as this treatment of their king’s body must have been, compounding the loss of their king himself, the Spartans took Thermopylae in their stride. Herodotus recounts an oracle from Delphi to the effect that the Spartans were doomed unless they lost a king. This king had now been lost, opening up the possibility that the Spartans – and the other Greeks – could pull out of this situation after all. Most scholars dismiss this oracle as little more than a fabrication after the event. Nevertheless, the legend of Thermopylae began to spread almost immediately after the battle. Thermopylae’s most valuable lesson was that Greek hoplites were terrifyingly effective against even overwhelming numbers of Persian soldiers. At Plataea in 479, the Greeks, anchored by the Spartan phalanx, turned their tactical superiority into a strategic and decisive victory.
The Battle Site Today
The topography of the Battle of Thermopylae is very difficult to visualize today, since silting from the Spercheios River has moved the coastline several kilometres to the east, leaving a broad and marshy plain where there was once only sea. The route of the old national highway, along which are the modern monuments to the battle, marks the ancient coastline, more or less. When imagining the action, picture a battle raging in the narrow space between the slopes of Mt Kallidromos to the south and the old highway/ancient coastline of the Malian Gulf to the north, with the Persians coming from Trachis to the west, and the Greeks making a stand to block Xerxes’ army from forcing its way east and then south into central and southern Greece. In antiquity, about 5km stretched between the passes of Thermopylae, now called the West Gate, Middle Gate and East Gate respectively.
A tour of the site naturally begins at the impressive modern monuments (N38° 47.801"; E022° 32.188"). The monument to the Spartans was built by the Greek government in 1955, with funds raised by Greek ex-patriots living in the United States. The central figure of Leonidas stands atop a base which reads ‘??ΛΩ? Λ???’ (molōn labe), which is the pithy two-word response given by the Spartans to the request to lay down their arms: ‘Come and get them!’ Behind Leonidas is a wall showing imagined scenes of Spartan military exploits, along with figures of the personified Taygetos mountain range and Eurotas River in Sparta’s home territory of Laconia. Next to the Spartan memorial is a winged figure erected by the Greeks in 1997 to commemorate the often-forgotten 700 soldiers of Thespiae who also fought to the death against the Persians at Thermopylae.
Across the old highway from the modern memorials, a path leads up to the summit of an unimposing hillock, which is almost certainly the Kolonos hill where the 300 – and their Thespian allies – made their final stand once the Persian flanking force under Hydarnes arrived via the mountain path of Anopaia (N38° 47.751"; E022° 32.225"). From here one can look north-east towards the strait between Euboea and the mainland where the Greek navy fought the Persians in the Battle of Artemisium. Many arrowheads excavated from the hill are now on display in the National Archaeological Museum in Athens, a sobering reminder of the hellish assault unleashed on these last few defenders. On a modern stone plaque – also from 1955 – at the summit of the hill is inscribed the famous epigram to the 300 Spartans by Simonides of Chios, quoted in Herodotus: ‘Stranger, go tell the Spartans that here we lie, obedient to their laws.’
Fig. 4.1: The modern monument to Thermopylae. Authors’ photo.
Before Hydarnes and the Persian Immortals arrived and completely surrounded the Greek defenders, Leonidas had sent away most of the allies, knowing that the Persian capture of Thermopylae was imminent. Since they knew that they would soon be dead, the Greeks ventured further into the broad part of the plain than they had before, probably toward where the modern hot-springs are located (N38° 47.606"; E022° 31.701"). Between the hillock of the last stand, which is close to the so-called ‘Middle Gate’ of the Thermopylae pass, and the modern hot-springs (called the Loutra Thermopilon) some 400 metres or so away, are several streams of hot water flowing toward the sea. The presence of these hot springs is what gave the place the name ‘Thermopylae’, meaning ‘hot gates’. Along with these streams can be seen the remains of the ‘Phocian Wall’ which the Greeks had reinforced prior to the Persians’ arrival in order to bolster the defensive position of the middle gate.
Fig. 4.2: Modern monument on hill of last stand, with epigram by Simonides inscribed. Authors’ photo.
Fig. 4.3: The pass at Thermopylae. Author’s photo.
The Anopaia path, the route taken by the Persian Immortals to surround the Greek defenders, has been the subject of much debate. According to Pritchett, the Persians most likely ascended Kallidromos from a point near the modern village of Iraklia, moving south into the mountain just to the east of the prominent Asopos gorge, continuing past Eleftherochori before turning east to traverse the Kallidromos plateau. Paul Wallace, who hiked Kallidromos at night to test what the Persians could do, argues that Hydarnes and his men started considerably further to the west, at Vardates, ascending westward past Dio Vouna, before turning south and east to traverse the mountain. Wallace’s route adds considerable distance to the Persians’ hike, and does not accord as well with Herodotus’ account. Once on Kallidromos, scholars agree that the path descends north past Drakospilia to arrive at the coast behind and to the east of the defenders, at the ancient ‘East Gate’. Today, as in antiquity, only rugged paths are found along the Anopaia route, so the going is difficult. It is clear why the Persians needed local guides to find their way along these mountain tracks.
Further Reading
Ancient Sources
–Herodotus 7.173-239
The prime source for the battle, Herodotus claims to have taken the trouble to learn the name of every single one of the 300. In addition to offering a fairly detailed account of the action and an unusually rich description of the topography, Herodotus’ literary powers rise to remarkable heights in this passage.
–Diodorus of Sicily 11.4-11
This first-century BCE universal historian offers a fuller account of Thermopylae than he does for most other battles. His account is similar to that of Herodotus, aside from a few extra details such as the sayings of Leonidas and a supposed Spartan raid on Xerxes’ tent, which few historians believe took place.
–Plutarch, Sayings of Spartans; On the Malice of Herodotus 31-32
This first- and second-century CE biographer compiled some of the Spartans’ most famous sayings, including several of Leonidas at Thermopylae. This splendid collection is a fine demonstration of Spartan élan. In his essay on Herodotus, Plutarch censures the historian for failing to mention a night raid undertaken by the Spartans against Xerxes’ tent, and for maligning the character of the Thebans.
–Pausanias 10.20-21
This second-century CE travel writer provides a description of Thermopylae in the context of the Gallic invasion of Greece in 279 BCE. He offers some discussion of the Greek numbers in 480.
Modern Sources
Books
–Cartledge, Paul, Thermopylae: The Battle that Changed the World (New York, 2006).
This expert on Sparta delivers an engaging account of the battle and its context, emphasizing the immense importance of Thermopylae for Greek culture – and for students and scholars seeking to understand the Greeks.
–Cawkwell, George, The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia (Oxford, 2005), Appendix 5.
A spirited defence of the importance – and indeed existence – of the Thermopylae pass against some modern scholars who doubt Herodotus’ account of its topography.
–Lazenby, J.F., The Defence of Greece: 490-479 BC (Warminster, 1993).
The best critical and scholarly study of the Persian Wars, this book offers a detailed account of Thermopylae, including the battle itself and the broader strategic considerations at play.
–Pritchett, W.K., Studies in Ancient Greek Topography Part IV (Passes) (Berkeley, 1982).
With his customary detail and focus on in-person exploration, Pritchett provides a full account of the battle’s topography, defending Herodotus from charges of writing an inaccurate and too-brief description. Pritchett also described the possible routes of the Persian army before and after the battle.
Articles
–Strauss, Barry, ‘Thermopylae. Death of a King, Birth of a Legend’, Military History Quarterly (fall, 2004), pp.17-25.
A leading military historian and expert storyteller explains the battle, the Spartans’ mentality and the triumph of the Greek way of war over the Persian.
–Stronk, Jan P., ‘Thermopylae 480 BC: Ancient Accounts of a Battle’, Talanta: Proceedings of the Dutch Archaeological and Historical Society 46-47 (2014-2015), pp.165-236.
An up-to-date and comprehensive examination and comparison of the ancient sources for the battle and its topography. This article also engages with most modern scholarship on the battle.
–Wallace, Paul W., ‘The Anopaia Path at Thermopylae’, American Journal of Archaeology 84 (1980), pp.15-23.
A detailed discussion of the route taken by the Immortals to outflank the Greek defensive position, based on an in-person, night-time walk.