Chapter 9

The War in Spain (77–74 BC)

With the extinguishing of the renewed civil war in Italy, and the reinforcements that both sides received, the Spanish theatre of war became the sole conflict zone in the civil war during the period 77 to 74 BC. Despite it being the most important phase of the civil war in Spain, this period is noted for its uncertain chronology and confused narrative in the surviving sources, to such a point that we today are unsure even of how many battles were fought in the period. In terms of chronology, some modern commentators have advocated moving events forward by a year, based on Pompeius reaching Spain early in 77 BC and starting his campaign that same year, along with an earlier date for the death of Sertorius. The analysis below is based on Pompeius reaching Spain late in 77 BC, given his activities in Gaul and not actively campaigning until 76 BC, though the death of Sertorius can be moved forward a year from the traditional view.¹

1. The New Entrants to the War

Before analyzing the warfare of this period, it is necessary to review the two new commanders (and their forces) who entered the war and were to play such a crucial role in determining its outcome.

M. Perperna Vento

It is assumed that the Perperna who took command of the remnants of Lepidus’ army in 77 BC is the same man as the former coalition governor of Sicily in 82 BC, who defied Sulla (see Chapter 6). In our surviving sources, this identification is not explicit, and he is only described as an ex-praetor who had been proscribed.² Given the same name, the same office and the standing of the man in 77 BC, such an identification does seem likely and it makes Perperna an important and intriguing figure in this stage of the civil war. Between the fall of Sicily to Pompeius in 82 BC and his appearance in Lepidus’ army in 77 BC, we have no concrete idea of his whereabouts. Orosius does refer to Lepidus being in Liguria, but does not provide a timescale.³ This may have been when he was operating as part of Lepidus’ army in 78/77 BC, en route to Spain following Lepidus’ defeat, or where he spent the years 82–77 BC. Others have speculated that he spent the years with Sertorius, thus forming a concrete link between Sertorius and Lepidus, but there is no evidence to confirm this.

What we do know for certain is that by the end of 77 BC, Perperna was in command of the remnants of Lepidus’ army. Plutarch states that this force was fifty-three cohorts (500 in each), or just over 26,000 men, along with a considerable sum of money.⁴ It is not clear which other Lepidian survivors went with him, but L. Cornelius Cinna, the son of the coalition leader, is recorded as fleeing to Spain following the civil war of 78–77 BC.⁵ M. Marius, another relative, may well have been with him also (see Chapter 10).

Given that the senatorial forces had re-established control of Italy, whilst rebel forces were in the ascendancy in Spain, it is not surprising to see that Perperna took this force to Spain. However, as Plutarch states, it appears that Perperna did not intend to join Sertorius, but to fight his own war against the senatorial forces.⁶ All surviving accounts of Perperna focus on his birth and his apparent arrogance, with Velleius stating that he was ‘more distinguished for his birth than for his character’.⁷ Whilst Perperna was indeed a Patrician, the sources are coloured by his later actions (see Chapter 10). By 77 BC, both Perperna and Sertorius were former praetors, and whilst Sertorius was one of the key coalition commanders in 87 BC, he had been sent to Spain in 83 BC, in partial exile, whilst Perperna seems to have been close adherent of the younger Marius and part of the new generation of the coalition (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, Perperna had followed Lepidus in his attempt to seize control of Rome, whilst Sertorius remained in Spain. Therefore, it is no surprise that Perperna was at first reluctant to place himself, and his men, under Sertorius’ command.

However, once in Spain, he would have had to re-assess his position for two important reasons. Firstly, the situation in Spain had altered the balance between them, with Sertorius, as commander of a successful rebellion in the two provinces, controlling much of southern Spain. Secondly, Pompeius and his armies were approaching, and the two rebel armies would need to co-ordinate their actions to defeat him. Thus, reluctantly, Perperna led his forces to join Sertorius and placed himself under his overall command.

Cn. Pompeius ‘Magnus’

For Pompeius, the civil war in Spain was an excellent opportunity. His victorious campaigns in 83–81 BC had been followed by a lull in fighting in the Roman world, except Spain, and that campaign was under the command of the Sullan veteran Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius. What faced him now would have been over a decade’s wait until he could command forces again in his own right (as a praetor), and a near two-decade wait until his reached the minimum age for the consulship (42) and a leading command. The civil war in Italy in 78–77 BC gave him an excellent opportunity to take up arms again. His victories in Italy, combined with the disastrous showing of the senatorial forces in Spain, gave him the necessary circumstances to continue his military feats, whilst circumventing Sulla’s cursus honorum once more.⁸ Given the disastrous state of the war in Spain and the fact that a large fragment of Lepidus’ forces were moving to Spain also, the Senate would have been well aware of the need to reinforce their Spanish armies and preferably with a fresh commander, as Metellus was proving unable to defeat Sertorius (see below).

Lepidus’ attack on Rome would have made the Senate only too well aware of the potential threat from Spain and a repeat of the bloodshed of the 80s. Pompeius had a number of factors in his favour: he was a proven and battle-hardened commander, while the consuls of 76 had less battle experience and seemed to be reluctant to fight Sertorius. Furthermore, Pompeius had a large standing army in Italy and was demanding advancement, which, given his track record of refusing orders, his father’s own pedigree in this area, and his closeness to his former father-in-law and mentor Sulla, made him of more immediate danger than Sertorius himself. Thus, sending Pompeius to Spain would have been a win-win situation for the Senate. They got rid of one potential threat by sending him to defeat another potential threat. If he succeeded, then the Sertorian threat was ended; if he failed, then the threat that he posed was eliminated.

There were, however, two dangers in this strategy. First, by sending him as an additional commander to Metellus and with equal standing (both had proconsular commands), there was the real danger that the two would not co-operate. This would not have been helped by the generational difference between the men; Metellus was a senior and experienced ex-consul who had been Sulla’s deputy, while Pompeius was a young and arrogant commander who had been Sulla’s son-in-law, and had demonstrated little appetite to conform to the Roman norms on age and respect. The second danger was farther away, and it lay in Pompeius succeeding in defeating Sertorius and returning to Italy even more powerful.

2. The Transalpine War 77–76 BC

Shortly after receiving the command, Pompeius had re-equipped his army and crossed the Alps, where it seems he fought a war against the Gallic tribes. Details of this war are limited, as the surviving narrative sources are too eager to comment on his fighting in Spain. Nevertheless, we do have some fragments that attest to the war and its scope, firstly, from a letter of Pompeius himself, preserved by Sallust:

I admit that I entered upon this war with more zeal than discretion; for within forty days of the time when I received from you the empty title of commander I had raised and equipped an army and driven the enemy, who were already at the throat of Italy, from the Alps into Spain … and over those mountains I had opened for you another and more convenient route than Hannibal had taken. I recovered Gaul…⁹

Cicero provides two references to the war, one a passing reference to a Transalpine War preceding the Sertorian conflict.¹⁰ The other being: ‘Gaul is my witness, through which a road into Spain was laid open to our legions by the destruction of the Gauls.’¹¹ We also have reference to Pompeius’ action in Caesar’s work on the civil wars:

Pompeius and Caesar, both patrons of our state [Massilia], one of whom has officially granted us the lands of the Volcae Arecomici and of the Helvii; the other, after conquering the Salluvii by force, has assigned them to us and increased our revenues.¹²

Thus it appears that the civil wars in Spain and Italy had stirred up the native tribes of the region into revolt, possibly attacking Rome’s ally Massilia, of whom Pompeius became a patron. This would have been aided by the removal of all Roman forces from Transalpine Gaul to fight in Spain (see previous chapter). Given that Pompeius provided Massilia with lands from the Vulcae and Helvii, we can assume that they were the principal tribal opponents. Whether they were in support of Sertorius or simply rebelling against Roman domination by raiding Transalpine Gaul we will never know. All we do know is that these tribes were defeated and had to cede land to Rome’s ally. Not only had Pompeius blooded his troops, but he had secured senatorial control of the strategic land corridor between Spain and Italy, thus ensuring that he could receive further reinforcements if necessary and taking the boundary of senatorial control back to the Pyrenees.¹³

3. The Early Clashes (76 BC)

With the Gallic tribes defeated, Pompeius crossed the Pyrenees into Spain in the spring of 76 BC. Orosius states that Pompeius had an army of 30,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, whilst Sertorius commanded 60,000 infantry and 8,000 cavalry.¹⁴ We cannot be sure whether these figures include the armies of Metellus and Perperna. Sertorius, however, had not been idle and had been using the time to reinforce his position. Fortunately, we have a substantial surviving fragment of Livy, excerpts of which provide us with some details of this period (late 77, early 76 BC), and are worth quoting at some length:

Contrebia was reduced after forty-four days, with a large loss of soldiers. Sertorius left L. Insteius in the town with a strong garrison, and led his own force to the River Ebro. There he constructed winter quarters by the town called Camp Aelia, and remained there with his forces. By day he held conference in the town of the cities allied with him. He issued an order that throughout the province arms should be manufactured according to the capabilities of the various peoples.

He distributed the new weapons to his men through their centurions, equipped his cavalry also with new arms, distributed clothing which had been previously prepared and issued pay.

He called together embassies from all the tribes and cities and presented his thanks for the supplies they had provided for his infantry, which had been demanded. He laid before them his achievements in defending his allies and in storming the cities of his enemies, and encouraged them to continue the war after a brief explanation of the advantages of the provinces of Spain if his side had the upper hand.

As spring opened he sent M. Perperna with 20,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry to the tribes of the Ilercaones to defend the coast of that region; he gave Perperna instructions as to the route he was to use in coming to the rescue of allied cities which Pompeius would attack, as well as those routes from which he was to attack Pompeius’ own column in ambush.

At the same time, he also sent dispatches to Herennius, who was in the same region, as well as to L. Hirtuleius in the other province, instructing them how he wanted the war to be managed, especially that Hirtuleius was to protect the allied cities in such a way as not to meet Metellus in battle, since he was no match for Metellus, either in personal prestige or in military power. Sertorius said that he had no intention of meeting Pompeius head on, nor did he believe that Pompeius would offer battle.

Sertorius with his own force decided to march against the Berones and Autricones, who had, as he had learned, frequently begged aid from Pompeius during the winter.

With these thoughts in mind, Sertorius led his army up to the Ebro River through friendly territory, in a peaceful and harmless fashion. He then advanced into the territory of the Bursaones, Cascantium and Graccuris, ravaging everything and trampling the crops, and arrived at Calguris Nasica, a town of his allies.¹⁵

Thus Sertorius’ strategy with regard to the armies of Metellus and Pompeius was clear: keep Metellus pinned down by Hirtuleius, without giving battle, and avoid battle with Pompeius, whilst protecting his allies and reducing those still loyal to Rome, who could provide aid to the invading senatorial forces. It also shows us that he took great care with the orders issued to his legates, who had explicit instructions on how to conduct the war. Furthermore, we can also see the care he took to re-equip and re-provision his army in anticipation, and made sure that all of his allies were behind him.

Regrettably, this fragment of Livy ends after recording Sertorius’ advance into tribal areas still loyal to Rome, giving us a stark reminder of the details of history that have been lost to us, through the losses of works such as those of Livy. For the rest of the year’s campaigning, we must fall back on briefer narrative works and compressed biographies.

It seems that Pompeius passed across the Pyrenees unopposed and pressed into Spain. Although Livy tells us that Sertorius sent Perperna to cover the coastal roads, we hear of no clashes between the two.¹⁶ With Sertorius seeking to avoid a full-scale battle with Pompeius, it seems that Pompeius continued to advance into Spain, most likely via the eastern seaboard. Plutarch tells us that this advance caused a number of cities to either change allegiance from Sertorius to Pompeius, or at least waiver in their loyalty.¹⁷ One such city was Lauro, the location of which is unclear, although most commentators place it on the coastal plain to the north of Valencia. It seems that Sertorius decided to take action and stop these defections by making an example of the city. In turn, Pompeius could hardly allow a defecting city to be destroyed, and so he hastened to break the siege, leading to the first clash of the war between Pompeius and Sertorius.

Battle of Lauro

Both Plutarch and Frontinus provide good accounts of the clash, which are worth quoting at length, given the paucity of our source normally:

For Sertorius was besieging that city, and Pompeius came to its assistance with all his forces. Now there was a hill which was thought to afford a good command of the city, and this hill Sertorius strove to seize in advance, while Pompeius sought to prevent him. But Sertorius got there first, whereupon Pompeius, taking position with his army, was delighted with the way things had turned out, believing that Sertorius was caught between the city and his adversary’s forces; he also sent a messenger to the people of Lauro bidding them be of good cheer and take seats along their walls for the spectacle of Sertorius undergoing siege. When Sertorius heard of this, he gave a laugh, and said that to Sulla’s pupil (for thus he was wont to style Pompeius in jest) he himself would give a lesson, namely, that a general must look behind him rather than in front of him. As he said this, he pointed out to his beleaguered troops, 6,000 men-at-arms, whom he had left behind at their former camp, from which he had sallied forth to seize the hill; these, in case Pompeius moved against the occupants of the hill, were to fall upon his rear. Pompeius also became aware of this all too late, and did not venture to attack Sertorius for fear of being surrounded, but he was ashamed to go away and leave the people of the city in their peril, and so was compelled to sit there quietly and see them ruined; for the barbarians gave up all hope and surrendered to Sertorius. Sertorius spared their lives and let them all go, but he burned down their city, not because he was angry or cruel, for he appears to have given way to passion less than any other general, but to put to shame and confusion the admirers of Pompeius, in order that it might be said among the Barbarians that though he was near at hand and all but warming himself at the flames of an allied city, he did not come to its relief.¹⁸

However, for Pompeius, the situation worsened when a foraging party fell into an ambush:

When Sertorius was encamped next to Pompeius near the town of Lauro in Spain, there were only two tracts from which forage could be gathered, one nearby, the other farther off. Sertorius gave orders that the one nearby should be continually raided by light-armed troops, but that remoter one should not be visited by any troops. Thus, he finally convinced his adversaries that the more distant tract was safer. When, on one occasion, Pompeius’ troops had gone to this region, Sertorius ordered Octavius Graecinus, with ten cohorts armed after the Roman fashion, and ten cohorts of light-armed Spaniards along with Tarquitius Priscus and 2,000 cavalry, set forth to lay an ambush against the foragers. These men executed their instructions with energy; for after examining the ground, they hid the above-mentioned forces by night in a neighbouring wood, posting the light-armed Spaniards in front, as best suited to stealthy warfare, the shield-bearing soldiers a little further back, and the cavalry in the rear, in order that the plan might not be betrayed by the neighing of the horses. Then they ordered all to repose in silence till the third hour of the following day.

When Pompeius’ men, entertaining no suspicion and loaded down with forage, thought of returning, and those who had been on guard, lured on by the situation, were slipping away to forage, suddenly the Spaniards, darting out with the swiftness characteristic of their race, poured forth upon the stragglers, inflicted many wounds upon them, and put them to rout, to their great amazement. Then, before resistance to this first assault could be organized, the shield-bearing troops, bursting forth from the forest, overthrew and routed the Romans who were returning to the ranks, while the cavalry, dispatched after those in flight, followed them all the way back to the camp, cutting them to pieces. Provision was also made that no one should escape. For 250 reserve horsemen, sent ahead for the purpose, found it a simple matter to race forward by short cuts, and then to turn back and meet those who had first fled, before they reached Pompeius’ camp.

On learning of this, Pompeius sent out a legion under Decimus Laelius to reinforce his men, whereupon the cavalry of the enemy, withdrawing to the right flank, pretended to give way, and then, passing round the legion, assaulted it from the rear, while those who had followed up the foragers attacked it from the front also. Thus the legion with its commander was crushed between the two lines of the enemy. When Pompeius led out his entire army to help the legion, Sertorius exhibited his forces drawn up on the hillside, and thus baulked Pompeius’ purpose. Thus, in addition to inflicting a twofold disaster, as a result of the same strategy, Sertorius forced Pompeius to be the helpless witness of the destruction of his own troops. This was the first battle between Sertorius and Pompeius. According to Livy, 10,000 men were lost in Pompeius’ army, along with the entire transport.¹⁹

There are brief notes in Appian, Sallust and Obsequens that also record the defeat:

Directly Pompeius arrived in Spain, Sertorius cut to pieces a whole legion of his army, which had been sent out foraging, together with its animals and servants.²⁰

Laelius, the father of this Laelius, was killed by the soldiers of Hirtuleius. As Sallust says, a great number of military standards were seized along with the body of Laelius.²¹

Laelius lost his life among the foragers in Spain, in the campaign against Sertorius.²²

Thus Pompeius had been doubly defeated; first by being humiliated in his very public failure to relive the siege of Lauro, and second by losing a legion to an ambush and again being unable to save them. Not only was Pompeius visibly humbled, but the destruction of Lauro sent a message to all the other cities that had, or had considered, defecting; namely, that Pompeius could not protect them if they did. Plutarch tells us that as a consequence there were no more defections, at least this year.²³

Whilst Pompeius was suffering reverses in northern Spain, to the south Metellus’ fortunes were changing. Whilst again we have few details, it appears that Hirtuleius had disregarded Sertorius’ order not to engage Metellus, and the two sides gave battle near the city of Italica Baetica (located just north of modern Seville).²⁴

Battle of Italica Baetica

There is also talk of a battle of Segovia, apparently fought between these two men the next year as well. As will be discussed below, it can be argued that there was only one battle between Hirtuleius and Metellus, fought here at Italica. This battle was thus a decisive encounter for control of southern Spain. Regrettably, we have little detail on the battle itself, with only notices in Frontinus and a brief excerpt in Orosius:

Hirtuleius engaged in battle with Metellus near the city of Italica Baetica and lost 20,000 soldiers. After his defeat he fled with a few followers to Lusitania.’²⁵

When Metellus Pius was waging war against Hirtuleius in Spain, and the latter had drawn up his troops immediately after daybreak and marched them against Metellus’ entrenchments, Metellus held his own forces in camp till noon, as the weather at that time of year was extremely hot. Then, when the enemy were overcome by the heat, he easily defeated them, since his own men were fresh and their strength unimpaired.²⁶

Metellus, in the battle in which he vanquished Hirtuleius in Spain, had discovered that the battalions of Hirtuleius which were deemed strongest were posted in the centre. Accordingly he drew back the centre of his own troops, to avoid encountering the enemy at that part of the line, until by an enveloping movement of his wings he could surround their centre from all sides.²⁷

Aside from these, we only have a brief note in the Periochae of Livy stating that Hirtuleius was defeated.²⁸ This absence of detail is especially frustrating given the magnitude of the defeat and the fact that this was the first victory for the senatorial forces in the war, and an important one at that. With Hirtuleius’ army destroyed, large stretches of southern Spain were now free of Sertorian forces, with the remaining ones concentrated in central Spain with Sertorius. Furthermore, the loss of 20,000 men would balance out the losses which the senatorial forces had suffered over the previous years. This major victory would also overshadow Pompeius’ losses in the north and give the senatorial campaign a much needed boost.

It also seems to have turned on its head the direction of the war. In the previous years’ campaigns, Metellus had seemingly been reduced to roaming southern Spain, unable to force the rebels into battle and being steadily ground down. Hirtuleius, by contrast, had won a string of victories. We must therefore assume that our surviving sources have played up the desperate situation that Metellus faced, in order to portray Pompeius in a better light. There is no mention of the battle in either of the two biographies by Plutarch (Pompeius and Sertorius), or in any of the shorter narrative accounts, Appian, Florus or Paterculus.

With the onset of winter Pompeius appears to have withdrawn back towards the Pyrenees. Appian states that Metellus also wintered by the Pyrenees, but this seems highly unlikely, given that he ended the year campaigning in southern Spain, and when the next year’s campaign reopened, we again find him in the same region.²⁹ We are told that Sertorius and Perperna wintered in Lusitania, in the heartland of the rebel territory, where the defeated Hirtuleius had fled.³⁰

As can be seen from the above, the entrance of Pompeius into the war, which must have been accompanied by much expectation on both sides, failed miserably. In fact, it was Metellus who scored the first victory of the campaign for the senatorial forces, with Pompeius being humiliated at Lauro and given a bloody nose in the battle which followed. However, the greatest victory of the year fell to Metellus when he destroyed the army of Hirtuleius, which overall meant that it was a year where the senatorial force came out ever so slightly on top.

4. Full-scale Warfare (75 BC)

If 76 BC was a year where Pompeius, Sertorius and Perperna were reluctant to commit themselves to battle, but rather followed feeling-out strategies, then 75 BC was the year that all sides appeared to commit to full-scale warfare, with three major battles culminating in the Battle of Segontia, the largest of the war. The sources present us with a number of key battles between the various armies, but each account differs from the others in terms of details, making the task of creating a coherent narrative of events notoriously difficult for this year (see below).

Non-Battle of Segovia

The key problem lies in the fact that a number of the surviving sources seem to depict elements of two battles between Hirtuleius and Metellus, traditionally assigned as the Battles of Italica Baetica in late 76 BC and Segovia in 74 BC. However, as Konrad points out, no one source states that there were actually two battles between the two men; we only assume this by combining the various scattered references across the sources.³¹ Frontinus provides two separate references to the tactics used by Metellus against Hirtuleius, both different stratagems (see above), lending weight to the two-battle theory (one for Italica and one for Segovia). However, these could easily be Frontinus reporting either two different stratagems from one battle or two different accounts of the one battle from two different sources.

Another issue concerns the deaths of Hirtuleius and his brother. Orosius states that they clearly survive the first battle (Italica), while other sources depict their deaths in a subsequent encounter.³² In Orosius, this encounter comes not only after the Battle of Lauro (76 BC) but Sucro as well (see below). Florus has only one battle, which he names as Segovia, but provides no details.³³ The disputed location of Segovia adds to the confusion, as it can be placed at a great distance from Italica.

Konrad’s conclusion is that there was only one battle between Metellus and Hirtuleius, and that was Italica in late 76 BC.³⁴ With Hirtuleius’ army crushed, he was unable to raise a fresh army and return to the field to fight the same man once again, which makes logical sense. Hirtuleius then joined up with either Sertorius or Perperna and served on their command staff, dying in battle at Segontia. To this author’s mind, such an explanation seems far more logical than trying to create a two-battle scenario between the same men either side of the winter break in campaigning, especially given the complete nature of Hirtuleius’ defeat at Italica. Thus, for Metellus, the year 75 BC opened with him moving from his winter quarters to link up with Pompeius to the east.

In eastern Spain, it seems that the previous year’s reticence vanished also. It seems probable that Sertorius, plagued by the continuing threat of defections and weakened by the loss of Hirtuleius the previous year, had determined to defeat the senatorial forces in open battle. Whilst in 76 BC we have testimony of Sertorius deliberately avoiding battle, 75 BC saw major clashes between the two sides.

Battle of the River Turia

Pompeius advanced along Spain’s eastern seaboard towards the city of Valentia (modern Valencia), where he encountered the army of Perperna and Herennius (another of Sertorius’ legates), seemingly dispatched to block his attack on the city. The two armies clashed by the River Turia.³⁵Again, we have few details of the battle, merely the outcome, which was a resounding victory for Pompeius, defeating both rebel commanders, killing Herennius along with 10,000 of his soldiers.³⁶

However, near Valentia he conquered Herennius and Perperna, men of military experience among the exiles with Sertorius, and generals under him, and slew more than 10,000 of their men.³⁷

Following this victory, he appears to have attacked and destroyed the city of Valentia, as described by Pompeius’ own words (as reported by Sallust): ‘the destruction of the enemy general C. Herennius together with his army and the city of Valentia.’³⁸ Following the defeat, Perperna seems to have retreated southwards, towards the River Sucro.

Battle of the River Sucro

With the defeat of Perperna and Herennius, combined with the impending arrival of Metellus, it was at this point that Sertorius committed himself to battle, attempting to defeat Pompeius before the two men could combine forces. To this end, he marched to join Perperna at Sucro. In fact, Plutarch reports that Pompeius had a similar desire to give battle before Metellus could arrive; in this case out of a desire not to share any glory of the decisive victory with him. The two sides met at the River Sucro late in the day, and Plutarch provides two accounts, each with additional details, whilst Orosius has a short passage on it:

By the River Sucro, though it was now late in the day, they joined battle, both fearing the arrival of Metellus; the one wished to fight alone, the other wished to have only one antagonist. Well, then, the struggle had a doubtful issue, for one wing on each side was victorious; but of the generals, Sertorius bore away the more honour, for he put to flight the enemy in front of his position. But Pompeius, who was on horseback, was attacked by a tall man who fought on foot; when they came to close quarters and were at grips, the strokes of their swords fell upon each other’s hands, but not with like result, for Pompeius was merely wounded, whereas he lopped off the hand of his opponent. When more foes rushed upon him together, his troops being now routed, he made his escape, contrary to all expectation, by abandoning to the enemy his horse, which had golden head-gear and ornamented trappings of great value. They fought with one another over the division of these spoils, and so were left behind in the pursuit.³⁹

When the fighting was at close quarters, it happened that Sertorius was not himself engaged with Pompeius at first, but with Afranius, who commanded Pompeius’ left, while Sertorius himself was stationed on the right. Hearing, however, that those of his men who were engaged with Pompeius were yielding before his onset and being worsted, he put his right wing in command of other generals, and hastened himself to the help of the wing that was suffering defeat. Those of his men who were already in retreat he rallied, those who were still keeping their ranks he encouraged, then charged anew upon Pompeius, who was pursuing, and put his men to a great rout, in which Pompeius also came near being killed, was actually wounded, and had a marvellous escape. For the Libyans with Sertorius, after getting Pompeius’ horse, which had golden decorations and was covered with costly trappings, were so busy distributing the booty and quarrelling with one another over it, that they neglected the pursuit. Afranius, however, as soon as Sertorius had gone off to the other wing with aid and succour, routed his opponents and drove them headlong into their camp; and dashing in with the fugitives, it being now dark, he began to plunder, knowing nothing of Pompeius’ flight and having no power to keep his soldiers from their pillaging. But meanwhile, Sertorius came back from his victory on the other wing, and falling upon the straggling and confused soldiers of Afranius, slew great numbers of them.⁴⁰

Sertorius then met Pompeius in battle and killed 10,000 of his soldiers. When Pompeius was conquering on the opposite wing, Sertorius suffered losses in almost the exact proportion to the former’s gains.⁴¹

Thus, although both sides were victorious on a wing and suffered similar losses, it is clear that it was Pompeius who had to flee the battlefield with his men routed. The battle ended with the fall of night, which seems to have saved Pompeius’ army from annihilation. The battle did not recommence the next day due to the arrival of Metellus’ army, which forced Sertorius to withdraw rather than get caught between two opposing armies. Sertorius ordered his army to scatter and retreated inland to the Spanish highlands, leaving the senatorial forces with control of Spain’s eastern seaboard. Whilst, on the face of it, the Battle of Sucro had been a stalemate, if not a defeat for Pompeius on the first day, ultimately, thanks to the arrival of Metellus, the senatorial forces had driven Sertorius back inland. Sertorius had once again bested Pompeius, but weight of numbers now appeared to be a factor against him. The armies of his subordinates Perperna and Herennius had been destroyed, with Herennius killed. Despite his personal standing, and undefeated status, the war appeared to be turning against him.

Pompeius thrust along the eastern seaboard, and Konrad argues that the attack on New Carthage by one of his legates (and brother-in-law), C. Memmius, dates to this period.⁴²

The conflict is known only from a passing reference in Cicero. Regrettably, our narrative for the campaign then leaps forward to the next battle. We must assume that Pompeius and Metellus spent the intervening period securing control of Spain’s eastern seaboard whilst tracking down Sertorius and his forces.

Battle of Segontia⁴³

Again, we have few details of the circumstances building up to the battle, and the various sources give accounts that do not fit well together, and even the location is disputed. Plutarch actually places the battle near Saguntum, Appian Seguntia.⁴⁴ Modern commentators prefer to place the battle at the city of Segontia, though this in itself is problematic, as we can identify at least five of them in ancient Spain, none of which can be conclusively proven as the battle site. Konrad argues that it was fought near the River Duero and that Segontia should be identified with Langa de Duero.⁴⁵

Whatever the location, it was the site of the greatest battle of the civil war in Spain to date, with the armies of Sertorius and Perperna clashing with those of Pompeius and Metellus for the first and last time. The circumstances that led up to the battle are unclear, but given his previous desire to avoid a set-piece battle, it seems that Sertorius had now changed tactics and was determined to end the war with one major encounter rather than continue to suffer lesser defeats, such as those suffered at Italica and Turia. There are various accounts of the battle:⁴⁶

Not long afterward, Sertorius fought a great battle near Seguntia, lasting from noon till night. Sertorius fought on horseback and vanquished Pompeius, killing nearly 6,000 of his men and losing about half that number himself. Metellus at the same time destroyed about 5,000 of Perperna’s army. The day after this battle, Sertorius, with a large reinforcement of barbarians, attacked the camp of Metellus unexpectedly towards evening, with the intention of besieging it with a trench, but Pompeius hastened up and caused Sertorius to desist from his bold enterprise.⁴⁷

Quintus Metellus defeated Sertorius and Perperna with their two armies, but Pompeius, who was eager to be part of the victory, fought with dubious results.⁴⁸

Both sides fought splendidly. Memmius, the most capable of Pompeius’ generals, fell in the thickest of the battle, and Sertorius was carrying all before him, and, with great slaughter of the enemy who still held together, was forcing his way towards Metellus himself. Then Metellus, who was holding his ground with a vigour that belied his years, and fighting gloriously, was struck by a spear. All the Romans who saw or heard of this were seized with shame at the thought of deserting their commander, and at the same time were filled with rage against the enemy. So, after they had covered Metellus with their shields and carried him out of danger, they stoutly drove the Iberians back.⁴⁹

It has been argued that additional casualties included the Hirtuleii brothers on Sertorius’ side and Memmius (Pompeius’ brother-in-law), by ascribing the statement of Orosius concerning casualties to this battle (see above).⁵⁰

Thus it seems that Sertorius was again victorious when he faced Pompeius in battle, but that the tide was again turned by Metellus, who defeated Perperna and forced Sertorius to disengage once more, or be defeated. Sertorius once again retreated back into the Spanish interior, this time with Metellus and Pompeius in pursuit. Sertorius retreated to the town of Clunia, where he successfully fought off the armies of Metellus and Pompeius, with repeated attacks on their camps and fortifications. The year ended with both senatorial commanders forced to withdraw, Metellus to Gaul, Pompeius to northern Spain, amongst loyal tribes.⁵¹

Thus the year ended with Sertorius suffering setbacks in battle, but still undefeated. It can be seen that this year represents a turning point in the civil war in Spain, with Sertorius out-matched by the combined armies of Pompeius and Metellus. On two occasions, at the battles of Sucro and Segontia, Sertorius was militarily successful himself (against Pompeius), but had to retire in the face of two separate Roman armies. Furthermore, his lieutenants had now all been defeated, with Hirtuleius and Herennius killed, and the remnants of Perperna’s force integrated into his own.

Despite these setbacks, neither Metellus nor Pompeius were able to strike the final blow, as Sertorius’ army had the ability to melt away into the Spanish interior and conduct a guerrilla campaign, to disrupt the senatorial armies, both of which retired for the winter, with Sertorius still in charge of the Spanish interior. A lack of supplies also seems to have been a serious issue for both senatorial armies for several reasons. Firstly, we must consider the devastation that Spain had suffered during these years of fighting, which was now reaching a peak, with a number of battles and sieges of key cities. Pompeius himself wrote the following (or at least that is what Sallust reports): ‘That part of Nearer Spain which is not in enemy hands has been laid waste, either by us or by Sertorius, to the point of extermination, except for the coastal towns, to the stage where it is actually an expense and a burden to us.’⁵²

Whilst we must allow for both possible Pompeian and Sallustian embellishments, Spain would have been devastated by this continued fighting. Furthermore, Sertorius had re-adopted his guerrilla tactics and was especially adept at the ambushing of foraging parties. All of this added up to Spain being a poor source of supplies for the armies of Pompeius and Metellus. Added to this devastation in Spain, it seemed that Gaul too was also suffering. Again, Sallust reports what purports to be Pompeius’ words: ‘Last year Gaul provided Metellus’ army with pay and provisions; now, because of a failure of the crops, it can hardly support itself.’⁵³

Thus it seems that Gaul, on the edge of famine, was unable to support the senatorial armies. This meant that supplies had to come from the rest of Rome’s empire. However, it seems that the key sea routes were blocked or at least severely compromised by the activities of the Cilician pirates. We have little direct reference to their activities in the west, but Plutarch does refer to Sertorius cutting off the supplies of Pompeius and Metellus, including ‘their maritime supplies by besetting the coast with piratical craft’.⁵⁴

As we shall see below, the Senate took steps to clear the supply routes to the west. However, in the short term, this meant that whilst the two senatorial armies were victorious on the battlefield, it seems that they were losing the logistical war. A measure of the senatorial commanders’ frustration can be seen by the reports that Metellus offered up a huge reward, of money and land, along with a free pardon to any exile, who assassinated Sertorius. At this point of the war, we have no reports of anyone attempting to claim the reward.

Metellus appears to have wintered in Gaul, adding to the burden of an overstretched province, whilst Pompeius seems to have wintered in Celtiberia, apparently continuing to reduce the local towns and cities. It was during the winter of 75/74 BC that he sent his infamous letter to the Senate, preserved by Sallust, demanding fresh troops, monies and supplies. In addition to summing up the desperate situation of his own army and the regions of Spain and Gaul (as seen above), his letter included the following statements:

Thus the situation of my army and that of the enemy is the same; for neither is being paid and either, if victorious, can march into Italy. I draw your attention to this state of affairs and ask you to take notice of it and not to force me to solve my difficulties by abandoning the interest of the state for my own.⁵⁵

I myself have exhausted not only my means, but even my credit. You are our last resort; unless you come to our aid, my army, against my wishes, but as I have already warned you, will cross into Italy and bring with it the whole Spanish War.⁵⁶

Whilst the debate will forever rage over the accuracy of the wording in Sallust, we must assume that the content and tone were the ones of Pompeius’ letter to the Senate. If that is the case then it is an extraordinary document, in which a senatorial commander threatens to abandon the war and let Sertorius invade Italy, or be ‘forced’, by his own army to invade Italy and bring the civil war with it. Once again, we see the Pompeian tactic of claiming that his army was making demands rather than him. This tactic was used in both 80 and 77 BC when his army refused orders to disband, leaving him apparently powerless to defy them. As Sallust reports, the threats worked, and the consuls dispatched fresh monies, supplies and legions to Pompeius to continue the war in Spain.⁵⁷

5. A Year of Sieges (74 BC)

Following the flurry of military activity in 75 BC, with a number of important battles, the war in 74 BC, by contrast, appears to have been one of siege and counter-siege. Sertorius returned to his strategy of avoiding set-piece battles and grinding the two senatorial armies down with his guerrilla tactics, whilst Metellus and Pompeius, perhaps slowed down by the lack of men and supplies, at least in the beginning of the year, seemed unable to fully campaign. As we would expect, the few surviving sources retain no sense of chronology for the year’s campaigns. Both Metellus and Pompeius set about attacking the towns and cities which were loyal to Sertorius, whilst being harried by Sertorius in return. Sertorius and Perperna again appear to have wintered in Lusitania in the heartland of the rebellion.⁵⁸

Metellus is recorded as making further progress against Sertorius in this year, aided by an increasing tide of defections from Sertorius. The losses of the previous year, whilst not actual defeats in battle, must have dented his aura of invincibility and indicated that he was unlikely to be victorious in the war, to the point of being able to drive Pompeius and Metellus out of Spain and invade Italy. Furthermore, Pompeius’ letter to the Senate (see above) points out that the Sertorian forces were suffering from a lack of supplies also, due to the devastation caused by the continued fighting in Spain. Appian records the following:

At this time, many of the soldiers of Sertorius deserted to Metellus, at which Sertorius was so angered that he visited savage and barbarous punishments upon many of his men and became unpopular as a consequence.⁵⁹

Whilst Metellus was making apparent headway against Sertorius, both by desertions and sieges, Pompeius by contrast appeared to be continuing in his difficulties. We do not know at what point his reinforcements from Italy arrived; all we do know is that he suffered reversers at the sieges of Palentia and Calagurris, as reported in Appian:

While Pompeius was laying siege to Palentia and undermining the walls with wooden supports, Sertorius suddenly appeared on the scene and raised the siege. Pompeius hastily set fire to the timbers and retreated to Metellus. Sertorius rebuilt the part of the wall which had fallen and then attacked his enemies, who were encamped around the castle of Calagurris and killed 3,000 of them. And so this year went by in Spain.⁶⁰

The Periochae of Livy has the following: ‘in every aspect of war and the art of soldiery, he [Sertorius] was their equal… and having made them to break off the siege of Calagurris, he forced them to retreat in different regions, Metellus to Hispania Ulterior, Pompeius to Gaul.⁶¹

Perperna, however, appears to have been active in the field also, attacking towns loyal to Metellus and Pompeius, yet seems to have avoided the main areas of conflict in Spain. A fragment of Sallust, which is commonly dated to this year, records him capturing the town of Cales in northwest Spain, though again this is impossible to date with any certainty.⁶²

Thus it seems that again Sertorius was victorious against Pompeius’ forces, but lost ground to Metellus. The senatorial forces again appeared to be slowly gaining the upper hand by reducing the towns and cities loyal to Sertorius, securing fresh supplies and reinforcements, whilst encouraging defections amongst Sertorius’ men. Yet as the year drew to a close, Sertorius remained at large, Spain remained largely out of senatorial control, and Pompeius and Metellus appeared to be no nearer to clinching a decisive victory in the war.

Whilst the year 74 BC saw stalemate in Spain, two new wars beset Rome this year, both of which had an impact on the civil war being fought in Spain, namely, the Third Mithridatic War and another major campaign against the Cilician pirates. Whilst the full details of these wars falls beyond the scope of this present work (see Appendix I), both contained elements that affected the fighting in Spain.

6. The Piracy Campaign (74 BC onwards)

The removal of the great naval powers of the region, notably Rhodes, combined with Roman indifference to naval issues, had allowed piracy in the Mediterranean to flourish, and one particular hotbed was centred on the lawless regions of Cilicia, in southeast Asia Minor. On occasions the Senate tuned its attentions to the piracy problem, most notably in 102 BC, with the appointment of M. Antonius (grandfather of the triumvir) to a command to combat the piracy problem in the eastern Mediterranean. Whilst he seems to have made some inroads into the problem, for a generation at least, the chaos of this period had led to a resurgence of piratical activity, disrupting trade across the whole Mediterranean. In the western Mediterranean, Sertorius allied with Cilician pirates as early as 81–80 BC, whilst by 74 BC the pirates seem to have totally disrupted the naval routes between Italy and Spain, though whether this was through alliance with Sertorius or not is unknown.

Thus in 74 BC, tiring of the problem in both the west and the east, the Senate appointed another M. Antonius (the son of the commander of the 102 BC expedition and father of the triumvir) to another extraordinary naval command, tasked with clearing the Mediterranean of the pirate threat. Whilst the spur for this command is usually ascribed as the outbreak of the Third Mithradatic War (see below), Antonius spent the first year of his campaign clearing pirates from the western Mediterranean, around the coasts of Liguria, Spain and Sicily, and thus aided the Senate in securing the supply routes to its commanders in Spain, especially Pompeius, again easing the conditions of warfare for the senatorial commanders.⁶³ A fragment of Sallust preserves a narrative of an engagement Antonius fought with Ligurian tribes allied to the pirates, who then considered finding shelter with Sertorius:

When, on the summons of the Terentuni, the Ligurian detachments had withdrawn into the Alps, the question was raised about sailing on to join Sertorius. Since it seemed a good idea to Antonius and the others to hasten their voyage towards Spain, they reached the territory of the Aresinarii after four days with their whole force of warships.⁶⁴

7. The Civil War Spreads East

Whilst the additional naval support provided by Antonius in his war against the pirates of the Mediterranean looked like a further tightening of the noose around Sertorius in Spain, events in the east allowed for a massive (albeit temporary) escalation of the civil war. At some point in 75/74 BC period, King Nicomedes IV of Bithynia (see Map 9) died and bequeathed his kingdom to the Roman people.⁶⁵ As his kingdom lay between the Roman province of Asia and the Pontic Kingdom of Mithridates VI, the Senate, not wanting Mithridates to seize the leaderless kingdom, eagerly accepted the bequest and declared Bithynia a Roman province. Unsurprisingly, Mithridates VI did not take kindly to the Romans annexing a prize he had long sought and bringing their empire to his own borders, and thus declared war on Rome, sparking the Third Mithridatic War. Whilst the full details of this war fall outside of the scope of this work, there was one crucial element that tied this war to the civil war raging in Spain. At some point in either 75 or 74 BC, Mithridates sent envoys to Spain to conduct a treaty of alliance with Sertorius and his government in exile.⁶⁶ As Appian reports, the driving force behind this alliance seems to have come from two former coalition commanders, who had served under Flaccus and then Fimbria in Asia Minor (see Chapter 5), and had taken shelter with the court of Mithridates:

Two members of his [Sertorius’] faction, Lucius Magius and Lucius Fannius, proposed to Mithridates to ally himself with Sertorius, holding out the hope that he would acquire a large part of the province of Asia and of the neighbouring nations. Mithridates fell in with this suggestion and sent ambassadors to Sertorius. The latter introduced them to his Senate and felicitated himself that his fame had extended to Pontus, and that he could now besiege the Roman power in both the Orient and the Occident. So he made a treaty with Mithridates to give him Asia, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappodocia, and Galatia, and sent Marcus Marius⁶⁷ to him as a general and the two Luciuses, Magius and Fannius, as counsellors.⁶⁸

Plutarch reports a variation on the terms of the treaty:

So Mithridates sent envoys to Iberia carrying letters and oral propositions to Sertorius, the purport of which was that Mithridates for his part promised to furnish money and ships for the war, but demanded that Sertorius confirm him in the possession of the whole of Asia, which he had yielded to the Romans by virtue of the treaties made with Sulla. Sertorius assembled a council, which he called a Senate, and here the rest urged him to accept the king’s proposals and be well content with them; for they were asked to grant a name and an empty title to what was not in their possession, and would receive therefore that of which they stood most in need. Sertorius, however, would not consent to this. He said he had no objection to Mithridates taking Bithynia and Cappodocia, countries used to kings and of no concern whatever to the Romans; but a province which Mithridates had taken away and held when it belonged in the justest manner to the Romans, from which he had been driven by Fimbria in war, and which he had renounced by treaty with Sulla, this province Sertorius said he would not suffer to become the king’s again; for the Roman state must be increased by his exercise of power, and he must not exercise power at the expense of the state.⁶⁹

Orosius also records the alliance: ‘Fannius and Magius fled from the army of Fimbria and joined Mithridates. On their advice the latter made a treaty with Sertorius through the offices of ambassadors whom he had sent to Spain.⁷⁰

Thus in Plutarch’s version, Sertorius agreed to cede to Mithridates Bithynia and Cappodocia, but not Asia. Given that its revenue was crucial to the Roman state, this is hardly surprising. Despite this, it seems that a treaty was concluded and Sertorius and his Senate agreed that Cappodocia and Bithynia were to be ceded to Mithridates.⁷¹ Plutarch details the practical terms of the treaty: ‘Sertorius sending him [Mithridates] a general and soldiers, while Sertorius was to receive from Mithridates 3,000 talents and forty ships.’

For Plutarch and Orosius, it is the two coalition commanders L. Fannius and L. Magius, who were the driving forces behind this alliance, linking Mithridates’ struggle to their own and fanning the flames of the civil war in Asia once more, leaving Rome to fight on two fronts. Appian has a variation on their role, placing them both as firm followers of Sertorius, seemingly making him the driving force for this alliance, and seems to believe that they were in Spain with him prior to being sent to serve under Mithridates. Given that they fled to Mithridates whilst in the east, it seems that both men stayed there in the intervening period, as part of the wider Roman exile community in the Pontic court (see Chapter 11). How much prior contact the two had with Sertorius is unknown.⁷² Thus, by 74 BC, a second front of the civil war had been opened, in Asia Minor. As part of the alliance, Sertorius sent a general to fight alongside Mithridates, and the other Roman exiles in Pontus: his name was M. Marius.