Chapter 7

The Jugurthine War: The Marian Campaigns (107–105 BC)

As Marius comes to dominate the period that follows, it is clear that we need to see what type of man he was and so we need to examine his background prior to his bid for a consulship of 107 BC. Plutarch provides us with a biography of Marius and a number of other references can be found to his early activities. Evans also provides an excellent summary of his early career.²⁵⁴ Nevertheless, there are a number of elements of his background that remain unclear.

Background and Early Career

Marius famously did not hail from the Roman nobility, but came from an Italian background.²⁵⁵ He was born c.157 BC in the region of Arpinium (as later did Cicero). Plutarch chose to portray Marius as coming from a humble background, but there is much to argue against this. His parents are only named as Marius and Fulcinia, both of whom may have been related to Senatorial aristocracy.²⁵⁶ Thus it is likely that Marius grew up as Italian nobility, albeit crucially with Roman citizenship, which allowed him entry into Roman politics. Throughout the Republic, but especially in the later centuries (such as the second century BC), it was common for Italian nobles to join the Roman aristocracy, bringing fresh blood, becoming so-called novi homines (new men).²⁵⁷ In this respect, Marius appears to have followed the standard pattern for this: military service, followed by junior political office sponsored by a powerful Roman patron.

Marius undertook his military service in Spain, during the Numantine War (see chapter one), though the exact dates are a matter of conjecture. According to Plutarch, he eventually came to the notice of Scipio Aemilianus, who apparently noted his qualities.²⁵⁸Whether it was a coincidence or a dramatic contrast that both Marius and Jugurtha came to Scipio’s attention we will never know. It is perhaps ironic that both men fought for Rome in the same war and would have at least met, though thankfully we are spared any such dramatic stories of this meeting in our surviving sources.

Such distinguished military service would have given Marius the chance to enter Roman politics, albeit at a low level. Here the sources present us with an issue, as Marius appears to disappear for much of the 120s BC. Evans argues that he spent the time between the end of the Numantine War and his first datable political office (the tribunate of 119 BC) engaged in building up the funds and contacts necessary to pursue a political career.²⁵⁹ The chronology of his earliest attempts at office is hopelessly confused. Sallust speaks of a military tribunate that he was easily elected to, following his exploits in Spain, so this would place it in the early 120s (c.130/129).²⁶⁰ Valerius Maximus also tells us that he failed in gaining elected office back in Arpinium, so this could account for some of the intervening years.²⁶¹ Valerius tells us that Marius, once back in Rome, then stood for the Quaestorship, which according to an inscription from a monument in Rome he succeed in obtaining.²⁶² All this came against the backdrop of the Gracchan tribunates (see chapter one).

His first datable office was as a tribune in 119 BC, though we are told that he only succeeded at being elected at the second attempt.²⁶³ Plutarch adds that at this point he was being sponsored by the Caecilii Metelli, Rome’s leading political family (see appendix four).²⁶⁴ His tribunate is noted for two main actions: for proposing a law and opposing another. He proposed a law on what seems to be an obscure voting technicality, the width of the passages of the voting pens in judicial cases, through which the citizens of Rome passed. Cicero considers it to have been a sensible move aimed at reducing the potential for the corruption of voters and lets it pass without much comment.²⁶⁵ In Plutarch, however, the law is a deliberate populist measure, in the vein of the Gracchi, aimed at reducing the influence of the nobility.²⁶⁶

Certainly Marius’ law was opposed by many in the Senate and the two consuls, one of whom was a Metellus and thus from the family that sponsored him.²⁶⁷ The Senate voted against the law, purely as an expression of their opinion, as they had no formal veto on legislation. When Marius appeared before them he apparently threatened both consuls with imprisonment unless the Senate’s vote was reversed.²⁶⁸ When he received the support of his nine tribunician colleagues, the consuls and the Senate backed down. This would have given Marius a certain notoriety with the people, but cannot have impressed his sponsors. Perhaps in an attempt to redeem himself he successfully opposed one of his colleague’s proposals for the distribution of grain to the people.²⁶⁹

Thus, on one occasion he had threatened to imprison the consuls over a law which technically favoured the people, though would have been obscure to many, whilst on the other he blocked what would have been a popular grain distribution law. Although we have no other information to assess these actions on, it does show a certain opportunism. What is clear is that, in the short term, there was little electoral advantage as he is reported to have failed to be elected to either the Curule or Plebeian Aedileships (though these were highly competitive positions, given the low number of places).²⁷⁰

However, Marius was able to bounce back in 116 when he secured election to the Praetorship for 115 at the first attempt, albeit in last place. A prosecution for bribery soon followed his election, though he mange to secure acquittal.²⁷¹Such prosecutions were the norm, especially in tight elections and against the lowest ranking successful candidate. To a novus homo such as Marius, a Praetorship was a major achievement and ranked him as a rising star. Whilst it may be a coincidence that his election coincided with that of a Metellus as consul and another as censor (see Appendix IV), it appears that he had again been sponsored by the Metelli, having patched up any rift caused by his actions in 119 BC. An uneventful Praetorship was followed by an equally uneventful governorship of Hispania Ulterior (Farther Spain), where all he could claim was to have relieved the province of banditry.²⁷² Nevertheless, it would have opened up opportunities for business contacts in the region and a certain level of profit.²⁷³

The period of 113–109 presents us with another gap in his life.²⁷⁴ The most obvious next step for an ex-Praetor back from his province would have been a campaign for the consulship, probably in 112 or 111 BC, but our sources are silent on this. We do know that his political connections improved via a marriage to a Roman noblewoman named Iulia, who hailed from the Iulii Caesares, tying him into one of the oldest yet obscure patrician families.²⁷⁵ A consequence of this marriage is that Marius became uncle to the future C. Iulius Caesar. With the marriage somewhere in the region of 113–110, it has been argued that he campaigned for the consulship in this period, now with additional backers, though this remains conjecture.²⁷⁶

In any event, by 109 BC, his career had stalled at the Praetorship and he accepted the offer by Q. Caecilius Metellus to join him in Numidia as a legate in 109 BC. Nonetheless, we must not overlook his achievements to date. From provincial aristocracy to Roman Praetor was a great achievement. He had close ties with the Metelli, Rome’s leading family and was married into the old aristocracy. The Marii were now present in Roman politics and under normal circumstances his son could look forward to taking the family to the heights of the consulship. As events turned out, however, Marius was not finished and soon developed other ideas.

Marius and the consulship of 107 BC

One key question that faces us is whether Marius had this plan in mind from the beginning of his legateship or whether he developed it when in Africa. Given his position in 109 BC, having reached the praetorship, but stalled in a bid for the consulate, and in his late forties, the best he could have hoped for was more military success and greater wealth. Despite his being in Africa throughout 109 and some of 108, it is clear that he appreciated how things had changed in Rome in the period after 110 BC. The disaster at Suthul led to the creation of the Mamilian Commission and a witchunt against prominent Senators.²⁷⁷ Not only were failed commanders being prosecuted, but a number of prominent anti-Gracchans also fell under its scope as well. As Farney points out, this did not merely create the atmosphere for running on an anti-Senatorial ticket, but also the opportunity, given that several men who may have expected to run for the consulship had now been removed from the picture,²⁷⁸ though we are not informed who Marius did actually run against, aside from his eventual colleague, L. Cassius Longinus.

It is also clear from both Sallust’s and Plutarch’s accounts that Marius had begun a long-term whispering campaign amongst elements of the Roman army and wider community in North Africa.²⁷⁹ When he started this is impossible to date, but it is most likely to have occurred after the Roman victory at Muthul River, when it was clear that a military victory in battle was not going to end the war. The elation that the Romans must have felt at defeating Jugurtha would have soon turned into disappointment as the war still dragged on. Sallust details two particular sections of the Roman community that were targeted by Marius: the soldiers and the traders, both of which groups would have been eager for the war to end.²⁸⁰ For the soldiers, a chance to return home, and for the business community, a chance to restore what had been a profitable area of trade. Furthermore, as we have already noted, Marius in particular played up to the Numidian prince Gauda, present in Metellus’ army, most likely offering him a clear chance to rule in place of Jugurtha.

It is interesting to note that once more Marius appears to have had a template for these actions in Scipio Aemilianus. Appian informs us that Scipio benefited from the soldiers serving at Carthage to send back word to their friends and relatives in Rome that he would make a better commander than the ones they were presently serving under.²⁸¹ As is often the case when dealing with Marius, the shadow of his old commander Scipio Aemilianus is present.

Thus, we can see that Marius, despite being in Africa, was able to use the winter break of 109/108 to get these elements to send back word to Rome that Metellus was merely more of the same and that someone fresh would be needed. However, there is one key issue here which we must not overlook. Harbouring a desire for one last run at the consulship is understandable enough, but that would not automatically bring with it command in Numidia. Metellus had already had his command in Numidia made proconsular and thus would run at the Senate’s discretion, which given the dominant Metellan position within the Senate, would be for as long as Metellus himself wanted. Under normal circumstances foreign affairs were a matter for the Senate and it alone, though Tiberius Gracchus had infamously infringed on this right with the kingdom of Pergamum in 133 BC. Thus for Marius to be considering gaining both a consulship and the Numidian command, he must have already formulated the radical step which would grant him both: getting the people to vote him the command.

To run for the consulship on such an anti-Senatorial ticket was a bold step in itself, especially against the leading Senatorial faction, but to then propose removing their power to allocate provincial commands, even on this one occasion, was truly either genius or insanity. Luckily for him, it worked.

It is clear that Metellus was all too aware of his subordinate’s ambitions and manoeuvring against him. It also seems clear that he did not give him much hope; even if Marius could gain a consulship, then his command would have been safe, assured by the Metellan faction in the Senate. Perhaps he considered that Marius would gain a command against the northern barbarians and fare no better than any previous commander. From Plutarch’s account it appears that the condemnation of Turpillius for his role in the mutiny at Vaga was the final straw in relations between Metellus and Marius (see Chapter 5).²⁸² Whatever the exact circumstances, Metellus reasoned that he was better off without Marius’ disruptions, which was a fair assumption at the time.

Once at Rome, Marius swung into action and ran for the consulship on a promise of ending the war, which, he argued, was being unnecessarily prolonged by either Senatorial incompetence, corruption or both. Given the atmosphere created by the Mamilian Commission and the growing threat from the north, it was a campaign which would have resonated well with the people of Rome. Furthermore, it seems that he had allies amongst the tribunes of 108, who agitated for his election, even accusing Metellus of treason at one point.²⁸³ In such a charged anti-Senatorial atmosphere, we must not forget that Marius himself had been serving senator for well over a decade at this point and probably had a number of allies there. Nevertheless, it is clear that he stressed his position as an outsider, from his Italian background to repulses at elections, which could be blamed on Roman noble jealousy. Clearly, though it must have paid to have kept his marriage alliance with the patrician Iulii as quiet as possible at this time.

An interesting question is how his friends, family and allies viewed this move. Although Sallust reports a particularly virulent anti-Senatorial speech made before an assembly of the people, we must exercise caution as it may be Sallust rather than Marius’ words.²⁸⁴ We can legitimately ask whether such a tactic, of playing to the people against your own supposed colleagues was that unique. Clearly, Tiberius Gracchus had led the way by seeming to side with the people against Senate, whilst maintaining a healthy number of allies within it. The Metelli, though powerful, were bound to have a number of opponents, who did not relish the prospect of another Metellan victory to add to their tally. Ultimately, though, the sources do not stretch this far.

It is clear though that Marius judged the public mood in Rome to perfection and was elected one of the consuls for 107 (the other being an L. Cassius Longinus). We do not know who was defeated or what Longinus’ attitude or connections in all of this were. Nevertheless, the first stage had been completed, and at fifty years of age, Marius had achieved his dream of becoming consul.

Marius as consul

We do not know what provinces had originally been assigned to Marius for 107 BC, but as Longinus gained Gaul, where he was killed fighting the Tigurini, it is likely that Marius was given Italy. We have little detail on the events that surrounded the re-assignment of the Numidian command, only that a tribune,

T. Manlius Mancinus, proposed a law (plebiscitum) to the assembly proposing that Marius be given command in Numidia and that there is no reference to any of the other nine tribunes opposing it. What the Senate made of it is unclear. Marius had run on a programme of ending the war in Numidia, yet we hear that the Senate snubbed this by re-affirming Metellus as commander shortly before it was put to a vote. Given the timing, it is probable that Marius only put it to a vote when snubbed by the Senate. Cicero presents the whole affair in a more ordered light.²⁸⁵

At a stroke Marius had utilized the theory of popular sovereignty that underpinned the unwritten Roman constitution (though usually buried very deep). The assemblies could vote on whatever they liked regardless of Senatorial prerogative. Marius now placed the military commands in the hands of the tribunes, a step far greater than either of the Gracchi in this respect, though one which had a forebear, if not direct precedent, in Scipio Aemilianus’ actions over the Numantine command in 134 BC (see Chapter 1). Nevertheless, such an outright move was an important and deadly precedent; one which sparked-off the First Civil War in 88 BC and was utilized with great skill by Pompey in later years. Yet, the whole incident is missing from Plutarch’s account.

What Marius did next was just as important, but far more contentious historically. Both Sallust and Plutarch agree that Marius determined to raise fresh forces in order to enlarge the army in Numidia and end the war with a surge. Sallust reports that he called for more troops from Rome’s allies and clients across the Mediterranean, corroborated by the fragments of Diodorus, which provide us with an excellent insight into this process. Diodorus add that he requested military aid from Nicomedes of Bithynia.²⁸⁶ Nicomedes initially refused on the grounds that large numbers of his people had been enslaved by the Roman tax collectors from Asia. This resulted in a decree banning the enslavement of any citizen of an allied state, which was to have its own consequences. Whilst Nicomedes’ excuse can rightly be treated as dubious, this incident does show that Rome had to bargain from a position of weakness for help from her allies.

As well as reinforcements from overseas, Sallust informs us that he recruited a number of men from Latium and initiated a programme of recruiting veterans back into the army.²⁸⁷ However, all of these methods of recruiting fresh forces are eclipsed, at least in the ancient sources, as well as a number of modern ones, by the report in both Sallust and Plutarch that Marius initiated the process of recruiting troops from the poorest classes of Roman society, those without land. This has become the most infamous of Marius’ military reforms, the alleged abolition of the land qualification for military service. This issue is paradoxically one of the most important in Roman history, whilst being of minimal impact in the short-term analysis of the war. For those reasons it will be analysed and discussed more fully in a later section on Marius’ military reforms (Chapter 11). For now we can content ourselves with the fact that Marius engaged in a number of recruiting methods designed to bolster his forces for the upcoming campaign surge.

One important aspect about the whole recruitment issue, as noted by Evans, is the speed with which this was to be accomplished.²⁸⁸ Whilst he was still recruiting his infantry reinforcements Marius sent a legate, A. Manlius, to Africa to prepare for his arrival and left Italy whilst another legate, L. Cornelius Sulla, was still recruiting the cavalry reinforcements. Clearly, he wished to make as early a start as possible in the campaign against Jugurtha, which is hardly surprising given that he was elected on a mandate of a swift end to the war. Furthermore, he had seen how much time had been lost from the 109 campaign during the handover between commanders, nor did he know how well Metellus would take the news of his being replaced by his deputy.

The Campaigns of 107 and 106 BC.

When trying to assess the Marian campaigns of 107 and 106 BC, we are faced with two problems presented by our surviving sources. The first one is the apparent absence of any detail of the events between Jugurtha’s invasion of Numidia in late 108 BC and the arrival of Marius in late 107 BC. Furthermore, not only is there an absence of detail, but Sallust’s narrative picks up where it left off, giving us the impression that whilst events at Rome were taking place, events in Numidia were frozen until Sallust turns his attention to them once more. The second problem concerns the merging of the campaigns of 107 and 106 BC into one, sandwiched between two sieges at opposite ends of Numidia.

If we are to understand the events that occurred, then these two problems must be explored first. As 108 BC drew to a close, Jugurtha had invaded Numidia at the head of a ‘grand alliance’ of Mauri and Gaetulians and was threatening to undo the Roman achievements to date. Sallust then breaks off his campaign narrative for the election of Marius and the recruitment of his new army, which would have taken at least the first half of 107 BC. His narrative resumes, where he left off, yet screams the following question: What was Jugurtha doing in the months when Sallust is captivated by events in Rome? It is almost as if Jugurtha freezes where he is and waits patiently for the domestic situation in Rome to work itself out. This is always an issue in this period of Roman history, when our sources are far more concerned with domestic events than foreign affairs.

Upon his arrival in Africa, Marius formally took command of the Roman army there. As mentioned previously, he did so from P. Rutilius Rufus as Q. Caecilius Metellus apparently refused to meet with Marius, which is hardly surprising given the circumstances, Marius having usurped his command. Thus we apparently find the Roman army still in the province of Africa half way through 107 BC. Whilst it was normal for them to withdraw from Numidia during winter, it appears that their break continued throughout the early part of 107, whilst waiting for a change of commander, a situation exacerbated by the enmity between Metellus and Marius. Furthermore, this coincided with a renewed Jugurthan invasion of Numidia, which aside from an unknown number of garrisoned towns and cities was open to him. Once again, it appears that the Roman domestic political situation cost them crucial momentum in the war.

Therefore, it was almost as if the clock had been turned back and the war had to begin afresh. Yet although the situation in 107 may superficially resemble that of 111 and 109 BC there were significant differences. The primary one is that the Numidians had already been defeated in battle. Jugurtha himself may not have accepted this fact, but it is clear that the country and people as a whole had, hence Jugurtha’s reliance on an army of Gaetulians. Numidian armies had been easily defeated by Roman armies, and their cities occupied and in some cases laid waste. Nor was this a Roman war of conquest, but rather a war focussed primarily upon the figure of the king. The plotting amongst the Numidian nobles reveals that they saw Jugurtha as the key obstacle to peace in the kingdom. This was further exacerbated by the presence of a clear rival to Jugurtha on the Roman side, namely his half-brother Gauda. Here was a Numidian prince of the house of Masinissa, who was allied to the Romans and with the apparent full backing of the new Roman commander Marius.

Thus, the war against Numidia had effectively been won. For the rest of the war it was to be relegated to merely being the battleground for two invading armies, the Romans from the east and the Mauri and Gaetulians from the west. All that Jugurtha could call on was the support of a few garrisoned forts and handful of towns still loyal to him. Though as had already been seen, loyalty in a war such as this tended to be sold to the side with the nearest army. Without Numidian backing, Jugurtha was reliant on the Mauri and the Gaetulians, which contained considerable risks. The Mauri were led by their king Bocchus, who despite the marriage alliance had already shown himself to be reticent about bringing the wrath of Rome upon his own kingdom, and in short was unreliable at best. Although Jugurtha had personal command of the Gaetulians, at most they were a mercenary army and like all mercenary armies were reliant upon regular payment. Furthermore, they were operating in Jugurtha’s own country, which brought with it a host of issues concerning foraging and discipline. Finally, they had not been tested in battle against the Romans and there was no guarantee that they would fare any better than the previous Numidian armies.

As if the weaknesses of his own side were not bad enough, Jugurtha was faced by a greatly-increased Roman army. As is usual for this period, we are given no figures, but Marius raised a fresh army in Italy and combined it with Metellus’ army already in Africa. This gave him far greater manpower and far greater ability to conduct wider ranging campaigns in Numidia. The only downside for Marius was that he was light on cavalry, which was still being assembled in Italy by his deputy, L. Cornelius Sulla.

For Marius, his aims were twofold. Having been raised to power on his promise to end the war swiftly, he needed quick results. In short this meant the death or capture of Jugurtha. In a wider context he also had to consider the Roman position in North Africa and ensure that the war did not escalate into a full-blown war against the Mauri and Gaetulians, but was contained to Numidia. If it were not, not only would this weaken the Roman position, but it would undermine his need for a swift resolution. For Jugurtha, this escalation was his only hope. Negotiation was impossible, given that the only terms acceptable to Rome were his head. He had lost the support of the vast majority of the Numidians and was reliant on two other neighbouring powers for his survival. Nevertheless, he had already survived for four years and had seen off three Roman commanders. If the Romans could be ensnared in a long-drawn-out affair in North Africa then it was possible that events in Rome or in Gaul would ensure his survival, which at this point is all he could hope for.

In terms of strategy, despite the enlarged army, Marius had few other options than the ones that faced Metellus in the previous years: bring Jugurtha to battle and kill him, ensure that he had nowhere left to run and handed himself over, or induce others to hand him over. Given that he had high expectations to live up to, the military option was the preferred route. Therefore, it is no surprise that Marius’ strategy consisted of reducing the few strongholds and towns that were still doggedly pro-Jugurthan, either by siege or intimidation. This would further have the effect of reducing Jugurtha’s bases of operations and sources of money, both essential with a non-native army at his side. Furthermore, it would test the mettle of his allies.

Such a strategy is what ultimately Sallust provides us with details of, albeit in a particularly-unhelpful manner. The reported siege was at Capsa (modern Gafsa) in the southeast of Numidia. In military terms the attack is noted for the cunning manner in which it was staged, marching his troops at night to catch the town unawares, and the brutal manner in which the town was dealt. Marius’ forces attacked the townspeople just after dawn and caught them defenceless and with the city gates open. Despite their apparent offer of surrender, the male population was massacred and the women and children enslaved, with the town being burnt. Sallust notes that such an act was ‘contra ius belli’ or against the laws of war, but then goes onto highlight the startling effect this massacre had on the other remaining Jugurthan strongholds in the region.²⁸⁹ Thus we have a perfect example of early ‘shock and awe’ tactics, with the destruction of one town ensuring the compliance of the others.

The Sallustian narrative then switches to the other side of the country. By this point one of the few remaining Jugurthan strongholds was an unnamed fortress near the Muluccha River, which formed the border of Numidia and the kingdom of the Mauri.²⁹⁰ Once again we have a full description of the siege including a colourful story of how a Roman soldier, whilst out hunting snails to eat, discovered an unguarded approach to the mountain-top fortress.²⁹¹ The key problem we have is that there is no chronology in Sallust’s’ accounts, a problem exacerbated by the fact that these two sieges took place on opposite sides of the country. To reach the fortress at Muluccha, Marius would have had to cross the 800-mile length of Numidia, which is done in total silence in Sallust’s account.

At this point it would be helpful to turn to our supplementary sources for the war, notably Orosius and Plutarch’s life of Marius. However, here we are to be disappointed once more. Plutarch’s accounts of the Marian campaigns cuts from Marius arriving in Africa to the final capture of Jugurtha, completely missing out any details of the intervening campaigns or battles.²⁹² Orosius is little better, giving these campaigns just one sentence:

Marius gave an excellent example of this trait [his astuteness], when he outwitted the enemy and captured the city of Capsa, which, they say, was founded by the Phoenician Hercules and which now was filled with royal treasure.²⁹³

Thus we are forced to return to Sallust and try to make sense of the campaigns and their chronology. This subject has been argued over by many a historian and the consensus can be detailed as follows.²⁹⁴ Upon invading Numidia, Marius began a programme of giving his untrained troops combat experience by low-level attacks on Jugurthan strongholds and a number of skirmishes with Jugurtha’s Gaetulian forces (as detailed below), which will have taken place in late 107 BC. Either then or in early 106 BC he moved into the southeast of the country and destroyed the town of Capsa. This makes excellent strategic sense and would have secured the east of Numidia under Roman control. Throughout 106 he undertook a systematic march across Numidia, re-securing the country for Rome and storming any remaining Jugurthan towns or forts. By late 106, this process had taken Marius across the length of Numidia, until he reached the Muluccha River and the siege of the nearby fortress.²⁹⁵

With this issue dealt with, there are still two unanswered questions. Firstly, how successful a strategy was this for the Romans, and secondly, just what were Jugurtha and Bocchus doing all this time? Upon Marius’ invasion of Numidia (in late 107), Sallust explicitly states that Jugurtha and Bocchus were still together with their respective armies. Faced with the invading Roman force, we are told that the two monarchs separated and withdrew into the Numidian interior. Sallust ascribes this to a desire to avoid open combat and force Marius to divide his forces into two, thus weakening his overall position. Not only did Marius not apparently do this, but we hear no more of Bocchus or his army in Numidia.²⁹⁶ In fact, following the fall of the fortress at Muluccha, Bocchus and his forces are in fact back in his own kingdom without having fired a shot in anger.

It is clear from this that at some point soon after Marius’ invasion of Numidia, Bocchus and his forces retried back to his own kingdom, without either formally allying with Rome or breaking off his alliance with Jugurtha; clearly Bocchus was playing a waiting game. Although, on his own, Jugurtha’s defeat may have looked inevitable, aided by the full resources of the Mauri victory was still possible, at least in the short term. Bocchus clearly formed a third side to this war, playing both sides off against the other for maximum advantage. Jugurtha may have been a native African prince, but the Numidians had been the dominant power in North Africa. Thanks to this war, however, the tables had been turned and Numidia was now weaker than the Mauri. On the other hand, a Roman conquest of Numidia would put Bocchus’ own position in jeopardy. Thus we can understand Bocchus’ reluctance to commit to one side or another.

This left Jugurtha on his own in Numidia, with his Gaetulian army. Sallust does inform us of a number of small encounters between the Roman and Gaetulian forces in the initial stages of the Marian campaign:

He [Marius] made frequent attacks on Jugurtha and the Gaetulians, while they were plundering our allies [the Numidians], routing them and compelling the king’s own troops to throw away their arms not far from Cirta.²⁹⁷

Although only a brief passage, we learn two interesting facts. Firstly, Jugurtha’s Gaetulian army was living off the land, thus further alienating his own people. This was countered by the Romans defending the Numidians from the Gaetulians. Thus it was clear that Marius was winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the native population, but at the cost of tying up his own forces. If anything, it was Jugurtha and his army that were being seen as the invaders. Secondly, at some point in late 107 BC, Jugurtha and Marius clashed in the vicinity of Cirta, the old Numidian capital.²⁹⁸ Thanks to the gaps in Sallust’s narrative we are not even aware who held Cirta at this time, the two possibilities being that there was still a Roman garrison there, left by Metellus in 108 BC, or that it had been abandoned by the Romans under Metellus, when he withdrew back to Africa in late 108. Nevertheless, the clash (it is not described as a full-scale battle) left Jugurtha on the run and Cirta securely in Roman hands.

The mention of Cirta leads us back to the figure of Gauda, the Numidian prince in the Roman army, and ally of Marius. Although the issue of the government of Numidia is not touched on in the sources until the end of the war, it is tempting to speculate that Marius installed Gauda as a temporary monarch, based in the traditional Numidian capital of Cirta, to provide an alternative source of authority to Jugurtha and the semblance of a normal ruling authority. Thus the war would have become Numidia and Rome fighting together against Jugurtha, a renegade and deposed ruler, rather than Rome fighting Numidia. This may explain Marius’ early move to Cirta in 107, to install Gauda as a ‘legitimate’ ruler of Numidia, although this act would have ultimately needed to have been sanctioned by the Senate and People of Rome.

After these clashes between Jugurtha and Marius in 107 BC, Jugurtha then disappears from the narrative until the fall of the fortress at Muluccha. We can speculate that he could only look on impotently as his few remaining strongholds fell to the Romans, and he was reduced to skulking around the Numidian deserts living off the land with his foreign army. It was only with the fall of the fortress at Muluccha, that Jugurtha attempted a last throw of the dice and planned to defeat the Romans in battle. For this, it was clear that he needed the combined might of the Gaetulian and Mauri armies. Thus he turned to Bocchus once more and made him a more substantial offer (other than marriage ties and mutual threat from Rome). Jugurtha offered Bocchus one whole third of Numidia to be added to his kingdom, as an inducement to commit to his side.²⁹⁹ Such an act would have greatly enlarged Bocchus’ kingdom and made him the pre-eminent native power in North Africa.

This offer shows the desperate straights that Jugurtha had been reduced to, which in turn leads us back to our earlier question of how successful Marius’ strategy had been. Following the siege near Muluccha, as 106 BC drew to a close, two years had elapsed since Marius’ election as consul, promising a swift end to the war. Certainly much of the first year had been lost in waiting to take up his consulship, passing the necessary legislation and recruiting and blooding a new army, but on the face of it, was he proving to be any more successful than Metellus?

We hear little of events in Rome during this period. On the one hand, Marius’ supporters had secured a prolongation of his command, from consular to pro-consular and we hear of no attempts by the Senate to block this. On the other hand, there was the return of Metellus and the celebration of a triumph (in 106 BC) to mark his ‘victory’ in Numidia. As has been seen in the Northern Wars, such a triumph being celebrated whilst the war continued was normal practice, yet this one also resulted in Metellus being given the cognomen of Numidicus, thus becoming Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus. This was a clear provocation to Marius’ position and a sign that the Metelli, who were after all the dominant family/faction within the Senate, would not take Marius’ usurpation of the command lightly. Sallust reports Metellus’ return to Rome, but not his triumph, stating that he was hailed by the Senate and People (which is surprising, given that they had humiliatingly voted him out of his command in an unprecedented manner).³⁰⁰ In any event, a triumph would always have been enthusiastically welcomed by the people, whoever was celebrating it, giving them a public celebration and feast, marking a Roman military success, which would have been especially welcome given the losses in the north.

Ultimately though, despite the time it had taken, Marius’ strategy of reducing Jugurtha’s remaining strongholds and forcing him into a corner paid off, with the latter determining on a final military confrontation. Having taken the fortress at Muluccha, Marius determined to retire for the winter to the nearby Numidian coastal towns. Jugurtha was able to move his Gaetulian force to the border to meet up with Bocchus’ army entering Numidia from the west, a feat that was managed without alerting the Romans. This combined force then moved towards the Roman army, which was in the region of the city of Cirta.

What followed were two battles between these armies. However, unusually for this war, we have two separate and somewhat divergent accounts of these battles from two different sources, Sallust and Orosius. To appreciate the problem, we need to examine both of these accounts.

The First Battle of Cirta (Sallust)

Sallust presents us with a detailed account of the battle:

Then, at the very moment that the consul learned from his scouts of the presence of the enemy, they appeared, and before the army could be drawn up or the baggage piled, in fact before any signal or order could be given, the Mauri and Gaetulian cavalry fell upon the Romans, not in order or with any plan of battle, but in swarms, just as chance had brought them together.

Our men were all bewildered by the unseen danger, but nevertheless did not forget their valour. Some took arms, while others kept off the enemy from their comrades who were arming; a part mounted their horses and charged the foe. The combat was more like an attack of brigands than a battle. Without standards and in disorder, horse and foot massed together, some gave ground, others slew their opponents; many who were bravely fighting against the enemy were surrounded from the rear. Valour and arms were no sufficient protection against a foe who were superior in numbers and attacked on every side. At last the Romans, both the raw recruits and the veterans, who as such were skilled in warfare, if the nature of the ground brought any of them together, formed a circle, thus protecting themselves on every side and presenting an orderly front to the attacks of the enemy.

In so dangerous a crisis Marius was neither frightened nor less confident than before, but with the bodyguard of his cavalry, which he had formed of the bravest soldiers, rather than of his friends, went from place to place, now aiding those of his men who were in difficulty, now charging the enemy where they were pressing on in greatest numbers. He directed the soldiers by gestures, since in the general confusion his orders could not be heard. The day was now ending, yet the barbarians did not at all ease their efforts but thinking that the darkness would favour them, as the kings had declared, they attacked with greater vigour.

Then Marius, adapting his tactics to the situation and wishing to provide a place of refuge for his men, took possession of two neighbouring hills, one of which was too small for a camp, but had a large spring of water, while the other was better adapted to his purpose because it was the most part high and steep and required little fortification. He ordered Sulla to pass the night with the cavalry beside the spring, while he gradually rallied his scattered forces and the enemy were in no less disorder, and then led them all at the quick march to the hill. Thus the kings were compelled by the strength of the position to cease the battle. However, they did not allow their men to go far away, but encompassed both hills with their huge army, they camped in loose order.

Marius, who was especially heartened by the enemy’s lack of discipline, ordered the utmost possible silence to be kept and not even the customary signals to be sounded to mark the night watches. Then, as daylight was drawing near and the enemy having at length become exhausted just beginning to sleep, he [Marius] suddenly ordered the watch and at the same time the horn-blowers of the cohorts of the cavalry and of the legions to sound the signal together, and the soldiers to raise a shout and burst forth from the gates of the camps. The Mauri and Gaetulians, being suddenly awakened by this strange and terrible sound, were incapable of feeling or of arming themselves, or indeed taking any action at all. Their enemy was upon them and no help was at hand. The shouting and din, the confusion and the terror had made them frantic with fear. In the end they were completely routed. Most of their arms and standards were taken, and more were killed than in any previous battle; for they were too tired and too much dazed by the surprise to make good their escape.³⁰¹

The First Battle of Cirta (Orosius)

Orosius on the other hand presents us with the following account, which is longer than the rest of his account of the whole war:

Greatly strengthened by the cavalry contingents of the latter [Bocchus], he [Jugurtha] harassed the Marian army by frequent raids. Finally at Cirta, an ancient city, the capital of Masinissa, he encountered the Romans, who were preparing an assault upon that city. He drew up his forces in battle array with a cavalry force numbering 60,000. No battle was ever more turbulent or more harrowing to a Roman soldier. A cloud of dust, raised by the galloping and snorting of the horses as they circled about in attack, veiled the heavens, shut out the daylight, and brought on darkness. So great a shower of missiles poured down upon the Romans that no part of the body was safe. Moreover, the density of the atmosphere prevented them from seeing any distance ahead, while their great numbers, as they crowded together, made manoeuvres for defending themselves difficult to execute.

III. The First Battle of Cirta (105 BC), Stage 1

IV. The First Battle of Cirta, Stage 2

The Mauri and Numidian [Gaetulian] cavalry did not have to exert themselves much to carry out a well-timed javelin attack designed to break up the ranks of their opponents who were occupying a favourable position. They kept on discharging their darts blindly in the confident assurance that the missiles must of necessity strike their mark. Driven into one space, the Roman infantrymen pressed closely together against one another.

Night afforded the Romans a temporary relief from their perilous situation, but the next day the same conditions of war and of danger prevailed. It was useless for a soldier to rush against the enemy with drawn sword, for he would be driven back by darts hurled from a distance. The infantrymen could not flee, since the cavalry, which had completely hemmed them in, could swiftly overtake them. When the third day came and there was no help from any source, the dread appearance of death presented itself on all sides. Finally, the consul Marius offered a means of escape by undertaking a brave and desperate move. His entire army in battle formation rushed forth simultaneously from valley and open plain and offered battle everywhere at the same time. The enemy, again circling around them, not only cut to pieces the flanks of the line, but also kept overwhelming the centre with darts that reached their mark, though hurled from a distance. Furthermore, the heat of the sun, unbearable thirst, and the presence of death all around them exhausted the disorganized Romans and reduced them to a state of complete despair.

At this point a storm of wind and rain was sent from the heavens against the Africans. This kind of assistance, which was well known to the Romans, brought unexpected deliverance. The sudden downpour cooled the thirsty and heated Romans and gave them a drink, but so far as the Numidians were concerned, it made the shafts of their darts slippery, which they were accustomed to hurl with their hands without ammenta [a leather thong tied to the shaft to assist the thrower]. Thus their darts became useless. The shields too, which they usually carried and which were made from stretched and toughened elephant hide, though easy to handle and offering adequate protection, were of such a nature that they absorbed the rain like a sponge. This added weight rendering them unmanageable and quite useless in affording protection, since they could not be manipulated with ease. When the Mauri and Numidians (Gaetulians) had thus been unexpectedly thrown into confusion and rendered helpless, Bocchus and Jugurtha took flight.³⁰²

The Key Differences and Similarities

Thus, we can see that the two accounts contain some notable differences, indicating the use of different sources for the battle. The first clear difference concerns the location of the battle and the initial encounter. In Sallust, Marius is leading his army to their winter quarters at Cirta when he is attacked at dusk, in a classic Jugurthan ambush. In Orosius, Marius is laying siege to Cirta (or intending to) and the attack was preceded by a number of enemy raids upon the Roman army. It seems highly unlikely to say the least that Cirta was still in Jugurtha’s hands by late 106 BC, especially given that Marius had spent the preceding year reducing every remaining Jugurthan fortress in Numidia and that we are told he was in the vicinity of Cirta in late 107 BC. It is this last point that may help to throw some light on Orosius’ account. We know from Sallust that Marius and Jugurtha were in the vicinity of Cirta in late 107 BC and that there were indeed skirmishes between the two sides. Thus, it is entirely possible that Orosius or his source have condensed these two separate events into one account. If this is what has happened, and at this stage we can only speculate, then it actually throws light on Sallust’s account of the campaign of late 107, as it seems that the Romans were forced to lay siege to Cirta, which must have fallen into Jugurthan hands, when Metellus evacuated Numidia in late 106 BC. Thus Cirta fell to Marius in late 107 BC and remained in Roman hands throughout 106 BC.

Both Sallust and Orosius do agree that the battle was initially a disaster for the Romans. If they were indeed attacked by 60,000 Mauri and Gaetulian cavalry and it was indeed at dusk in an ambush, then we can see the Roman plight. Aside from Orosius’ literary flourish of the skies turning dark with arrows (highly reminiscent of the Battle of Thermopylae), the next major difference was the length of the encounter. In Sallust the battle starts at dusk and ends at dawn the next day. In Orosius, we are given no start time, but the battle dragged on for three days. Orosius makes no mention of the hills that Marius defended in Sallust’s account, but if the Romans did take up a defensive position then the battle could have dragged on, as Orosius suggest, with Jugurtha’s army unable to get to grips with the Romans at close quarters and the Romans unable to break out.

Orosius’ account is the more detailed for the Mauri/Gaetulian tactics and this fits in well with previous Jugurthan tactics and his analysis of their strengths and Roman weaknesses. Once again Jugurtha chose to utilize weapons of distance and speed, cavalry and javelins, to avoid engaging the Romans at close quarters. On this occasion, if he did have them surrounded and pinned down in a defensive position, then, unlike the Battle of Muthul River, the Romans would find it difficult to charge forwards and engage the enemy.

The biggest difference between the two accounts comes with the ending of the battle. In Sallust we are presented with a clear-cut example of Roman discipline and barbarian indiscipline, with the highly-improbable account of the Mauri and Gaetulians completely losing all sense of discipline, not to mention common sense, and celebrating when the Romans were trapped in a defensive position and then falling prey to a dawn counterattack, which any half-decent commander could have anticipated. In Orosius, it is chance, or divine intervention, which saves the Roman army, when a ferocious downpour soaks the Mauri/Gaetulian weapons and renders then unable to engage with the Romans. Furthermore, in Sallust the armies of Jugurtha and Bocchus are completely defeated and in Orosius they retreat and regroup, with the Romans skulking off in a hasty withdrawal (though retreat might be a more apt description). Given that Jugurtha and Bocchus were apparently able to mount a second attack just a few days later, withdrawal rather than defeat seems the most likely outcome.

In both accounts though, it is Marius who engineers this Roman breakout. The only difference being that in Sallust he is aided by the Mauri and Gaetulian indiscipline and in Orosius by the elements. In both accounts Marius is the saviour of the Roman army, though we must question how they got into such a mess in the first place. On both occasions, however, Marius is greatly assisted by what look suspiciously like standard Roman prejudices: barbarian indiscipline and divine favour. The question of which account is more accurate is an impossible one to answer, as we cannot even be sure that either is an accurate description. It is entirely possible that both may have been in circulation at the time and both contain many fabulous elements to turn them into good stories for public consumption.

What is clear is that the result was inconclusive, with both sides withdrawing and regrouping for a further encounter. On this occasion, although we have another two accounts, Orosius has clearly exhausted himself and relegated the final battle to just a sentence, whilst Sallust again gives us a highly dramatized account.

The Second Battle of Cirta (Sallust)

With his opponents scattered, Marius continued the army’s march towards their winter quarters, rather than following up the victory. This is not as strange as it first seems. Although the enemy had been defeated, it is clear from later events that they had not been destroyed as Sallust claims. Furthermore, this battle had been a close run thing and had shown the vulnerability of Marius’ army. Thus, regrouping over winter would have been a priority, as opposed to chasing down Jugurtha. Sallust goes into great detail about the precautions Marius’ army now took on their march, to prevent a repeat of the ambush they had suffered, by marching in battle formation. This clearly indicates that the enemy was still a viable threat and that Marius was in effect attempting to retreat from hostile territory. Marius’ fears were confirmed as the Mauri and Gaetulians attacked on the fourth day of the march, having obviously regrouped under their commanders.

Once again, Jugurtha apparently demonstrated his superb tactical abilities when he drew up his combined armies into four separate forces, planning on attacking the Romans from all sides. On this occasion Marius’ scouts were apparently able to warn him of this ambush and he drew his army up in square formation to meet this threat. Once again Sallust details the battle:

Meanwhile, Sulla, whom the enemy had reached first, after encouraging his men, attacked the Mauri with a part of his force, charging by squadrons and in close order as possible; the rest of his troops held their ground, protecting themselves from the javelins which were hurled at long range, and slaying all who succeeded in reaching them. While the cavalry were thus engaged, Bocchus, with his infantry being brought up by his son Volux, who had been delayed on the way and had not taken part in the previous battle, charged the Roman rear.

Marius at the time was busy at the front of the battle, since Jugurtha was their with the greater part of his forces. Then Jugurtha, on learning of the arrival of Bocchus, made his way secretly with a few men to meet up with him. When he reached them, he cried out in Latin, which he had leaned to speak when at Numantia, that our [Roman] men were fighting in vain, since he had a short time before killed Marius with his own hand.³⁰³ With these words he displayed a sword smeared with blood, which he made so during the battle by killing a Roman infantryman. When our men heard this they were shocked, rather by the horror of the deed than because they believed the report, while at the same time the barbarians were encouraged and charged upon the stunned Romans with greater vigour.

Our men were just at the point of flight when Sulla, who had routed his opponents, returned and fell upon the flank of the Mauri. Bocchus at once gave way. As for Jugurtha, while he was trying to hold his men and secure the victory which he had all but won, was surrounded by the [Roman] cavalry, but though all, on his right and left were slain, he broke through alone, escaping amid a shower of weapons.

Marius in the meantime, after putting the cavalry to flight, was hastening to the aid of his men, of whose imminent defeat he had now heard. Finally, the enemy were routed in all parts of the battlefield.

Then there was a fearful sight in the open plains; of pursuit, slaughter or capture. Horses and men were thrown to the ground, many of them wounded, without the strength to escape or the will to remain still, struggled to get up, only to collapse immediately. As far as the eye could see, the battlefield was strewn with weapons, armour and corpses, with patches of bloodied earth showing between them.³⁰⁴

V. The Second Battle of Cirta (105 BC), Stage 1

VI. The Second Battle of Cirta (105 BC), Stage 2

VII. The Second Battle of Cirta (105 BC), Stage 3

The Second Battle of Cirta (Orosius)

In comparison, Orosius presents only a brief description of the battle:

Later, however, these same kings (Jugurtha and Bocchus) threw 90,000 soldiers into a final struggle. When the Romans conquered them, their forces it is said, were slaughtered almost to the last man.³⁰⁵

The Second Battle of Cirta – Analysis

Both authors agree that for Jugurtha and Bocchus this attack was the last throw of the dice. They committed their full forces, cavalry and foot, in an all-out attempt to defeat the Romans, with Orosius again providing a figure for Jugurtha’s forces, of 90,000. Overlooking the more dramatic elements, such as Jugurtha’s bluff in Latin we can see the following. Whilst we have no figure for the Roman army, it is clear that they were outnumbered. Such a figure for the Jugurthan forces is a high one, but he was utilizing the manpower of two nations and his forces would have included a huge number of poorly-armed men as well as fully-equipped soldiers.

There were several differences between the first battle and the second. In the first battle Jugurtha utilized his two strengths, surprise and distance, whilst in the second he had neither, just sheer weight of numbers. In addition, he attacked from all sides hoping to break the Roman army down. In such a case, had they lost heart and broken they would have been slaughtered. However, it is clear that the Roman army maintained its discipline and held firm, again showing their superior close-quarter fighting ability. Whilst they held firm, the tide of the battle was turned by the victory of the Roman cavalry under Sulla, who, after driving off the Mauri cavalry (at least in his sector) then returned to the fray to support the infantry and catch the Mauri from behind. With Bocchus and Jugurtha fleeing, their armies’ discipline broke and the battle turned into a rout and a slaughter.

What is clear from these accounts is that, surprisingly perhaps, these battles could have gone either way, showing just how the situation had been altered by the addition of the Mauri and Gaetulian forces. This allowed Jugurtha to field armies, probably twice the size of the Roman one. Once again, Jugurtha showed his awareness of his troops’ inferior quality and always attempted to overcome this by using elements such as surprise and distance. The first battle, despite Sallust’s positive presentation, looks for all intents and purposes to have been a stalemate, with the Romans only just being able to extricate themselves from what could have been a massacre. Thus, even after six years of warfare, Jugurtha was still able to engineer a position which could have resulted in military victory. Had he done so then, given events in the north, this could have turned the tide of the whole war in his favour. Here we can clearly see the quality of his military abilities. His ultimate failure once again rested in the poor quality of his soldiers, when face-to-face with the Roman legion. Ultimately, we can see a case of a great commander saddled with inferior troops.

For Marius, however, these battles reveal both positive and negative aspects of his command. On the positive side, his policy had finally paid off and he had forced Jugurtha to give battle, allowing him the chance of defeating the pan-African alliance and clearly demonstrating Rome’s military superiority to the races of North Africa. The Battles of Cirta clearly established Rome’s military dominance of North Africa, which was not to be challenged for over a century. The battles also revealed Marius’ steady leadership abilities, cool head and clear thinking in battle, marshalling his forces to utilize their strength: close-quarter superiority.

On the negative side, on both occasions he allowed Jugurtha to choose his ground and time of attack, disastrously so in the first battle. On the first occasion it appears that Jugurtha was able to catch the Romans completely unawares, though we must always exercise caution when Sallust is decrying Marius’ military abilities. On the second occasion, the Roman scouts alerted the army in time and allowed Marius the time to prepare his army and blunt Jugurtha’s tactics.

Overall we have to consider whether these Roman victories were a result of the finest quality of general being victorious or the finest quality of army. Had Jugurtha been in command of Roman forces, we must suspect that the outcome would be quite different. Ultimately, however, this once again reveals the underlying strength of the Roman system, which allowed it to defeat individual generals of quality, men such as Hannibal, Mithridates or Jugurtha. As for Marius, these battles reveal that, although initially placed on the back foot in terms of pre-battle planning, his clear strengths came to the fore in the midst of battle, which ultimately brought about victory.

The Abduction of Jugurtha and the End of the War in Africa

Despite the closeness of these two battles, the end result was clear: a complete military victory for the Romans. Yet, once again, this did not mean that the war itself was over. By the end of 106, the Romans had defeated the armies of three entire nations – the Numidians, the Mauri and the Gaetulians – yet while Jugurtha lived and was free, the war would not end. Marius was now faced with the same problem that had beguiled Metellus in 108 BC, namely how to turn victory on the battlefield into an end to the war.

Whilst Jugurtha would never surrender to the Romans, the focus shifted to Bocchus, who had gambled and lost heavily. Allying with Jugurtha against the Romans had always been a risk, but the lure of enlarging his kingdom at Numidia’s expense had been too tempting to resist. Now, however, with his army destroyed at the Second Battle of Cirta, his kingdom was the next logical target for Roman anger. It was at this point that Bocchus sought to recover by diplomacy what had been lost by force and just four days after the battle of Cirta, he sent word to Marius to open negotiations. What followed was a protracted series of negotiations between Bocchus and Marius, with the former offering friendship and allegiance to Rome, in much the same position that Jugurtha had once been. What Bocchus ultimately had to offer was of paramount interest to Marius and Rome, namely Jugurtha himself.

As a precursor to any deal, Bocchus received Marius’ permission to send a three-man delegation to the Senate to express his forgiveness for taking up arms against them, and naturally blaming Jugurtha. Sallust records the Senate’s reply to the petition:

The Senate and People of Rome do not forget either service or injuries. However, since Bocchus repents, they forgive his offence; he shall have a treaty of friendship when he has earned it.³⁰⁶

Thus for Bocchus, the situation was clear. Not only could he avert Roman invasion, but could get himself into Roman favour; the price was Jugurtha. To negotiate the deal, Marius sent his deputy, L. Cornelius Sulla, to Bocchus’ court. Sallust reports that Sulla’s column was intercepted en route by Volux, Bocchus’ son, with a warning that Jugurtha was attempting to intercept him.³⁰⁷ Forewarned, Sulla was apparently able to evade the ambush. It is clear that Jugurtha must have been aware of Bocchus’ manoeuvrings, which were only logical, though we must always be aware of the possibility that the whole incident was staged by Bocchus to publicly demonstrate his new loyalty to Rome. Even if Jugurtha had been preparing an ambush, it is entirely possible that the news was leaked by Bocchus.

Sallust gives these events his usual dramatic flourish and states that, even at this stage, Bocchus was vacillating between Jugurtha and Rome.³⁰⁸ This is highly unlikely given the relative power of the two sides; Bocchus would have been clearly aware that his future and that of his kingdom depended on the delivery of Jugurtha and, in short, it was a case of Jugurtha or him. That did not mean that he could not protract the situation for his maximum benefit, with an eye on the post-war settlement of the region.

Jugurtha, meanwhile, was apparently being kept appraised of the situation by his representative at Bocchus’ court, a man named Asper. According to Sallust, Jugurtha was negotiating with Bocchus to kidnap Sulla and use him as a hostage to negotiate a peace treaty with Rome.³⁰⁹ This interpretation relies heavily upon the figure that Sulla became, not the man he was in 105 BC, a deputy commander from an ancient but obscure Roman family. Neither Marius nor the Senate would have concluded a peace treaty with Jugurtha under any circumstance, never mind the holding of such a minor hostage. Again according to Sallust, Bocchus agreed to Jugurtha’s plan and arranged to meet with him and hand Sulla over to him. When Jugurtha and his party arrived, the inevitable happened, and Bocchus’ men attacked and overpowered them, murdering all but Jugurtha, who was handed over to Sulla, and then to Marius and ultimately Rome.³¹⁰

What we have to ask ourselves is why Jugurtha walked into such a trap. He knew about Bocchus’ negotiations with the Senate and must have realized that Bocchus’ only way out would be to betray him. Given Bocchus’ patchy record of allegiance in the past few years, he could hardly have expected loyalty from the man. Sallust’s notion of taking Sulla ransom is possible, but Jugurtha would have realized that such a minor hostage was of limited use to him. Ultimately, we have to admit that we will never know what enticements Bocchus used to get Jugurtha to attend that meeting. In the end, it perhaps came down to the fact that Jugurtha had finally run out of options.

Jugurtha was conveyed to Rome and paraded in Marius’ triumph on the 1 January 104 BC. According to Orosius, he was accompanied by his two sons, a detail omitted by Sallust. For his final fate, Plutarch has the following:

But we are told that when he [Jugurtha] had been led in triumph he lost his reason; and that when, after the triumph, he was cast into prison, where some tore the tunic from his body, and others were so eager to snatch away his golden earring that they tore off with it the lobe of his ear, and when he had been thrust down naked into the dungeon pit, in utter bewilderment and with a grin on his lips he said ‘Hercules! How cold this Roman bath is!’ But the wretch, after struggling with hunger for six days and up to the last moment clinging to the desire for life, paid the penalty which his crimes deserved.³¹¹

Orosius, meanwhile, states that he died a more prosaic death, executed in his cell by strangulation.³¹² In any event, it was an ignominious end for a man who had successfully challenged Roman might for so long.

Africa after the War

Following Jugurtha’s capture, Marius’ post-war settlement was a conservative one. Bocchus was confirmed as king of the Mauri and an ally of the Roman People. In addition, he received the western third of Numidia, which had been promised him by Jugurtha, and which reduced the power of Numidia. The rest of Numidia was kept as one kingdom and Gauda, Jugurtha’s half-brother, was confirmed as the new king. The Gaetulians were made independent from Numidia also.³¹³

Numidia soon turned back to a prosperous trading nation, but became entangled in Rome’s First and Second Civil Wars. As a result of backing the Pompeians against Caesar in 46 BC, Juba I, the king of Numidia, committed suicide and Numidia was partitioned, with the eastern part being added to the province of Africa and the western part remaining independent under a nonnative king. Juba’s son, Juba II, briefly ruled the reduced Numidian Kingdom between 29–27 BC as a client of Octavian, but was given the kingdom of the Mauri to rule and married off to Cleopatra Selene, daughter of M. Antonius and Cleopatra VII. Their son Ptolemy became king, but was murdered by the Emperor Caius (Caligula) in AD 40 and the kingdom annexed and divided into two new Roman provinces (of Mauretania).

Considering he initially backed the wrong side, Bocchus came out of the war rather well. In 112 his kingdom was a minor one, dwarfed by the power and connections of Numidia, yet by 105 BC he was a staunch ally of Rome, with friends in high places and possessing an enlarged and more powerful kingdom. The Mauri continued to prosper as Roman allies, managing to avoid the entanglements that cost Numidia so dear during the Roman Civil Wars. Ironically, when Bocchus II died in the late 30s BC he willed his kingdom to Rome, but this merely saw a Numidian prince become king of the Mauri. As noted above, the kingdom of the Mauri was annexed by Rome in AD 44.

The Gaetulians too became caught up in the Roman Civil Wars, but they initially benefited from backing Caesar against the Numidians and supporters of Pompey. However, the expansion of the Roman Empire into Numidia saw the Gaetulians go to war with the Rome in c.AD 3–6, which saw them defeated and added to the Mauri kingdom. When that too was annexed, they finally passed into formal Roman control.

Conclusion – The Jugurthine War

What are we to make of this war? The Romans initially became embroiled in a domestic dispute of one of her allies on her southern-most border and got themselves bogged down in an unnecessary and distracting seven-year war. In military terms, they suffered one humiliating defeat and tied up valuable manpower and resources at a time when it was most needed elsewhere, for little apparent return.

Although Rome appeared to gain little as a result of the war, we must look beyond the formal notions of empire. Throughout their history the Romans had no black-and-white concept of a formal division between Roman and non-Roman territory. Although on a modern map, the only Roman possession was the province of Africa itself, the war had seen a massive extension of Roman power in the African continent, north of the Sahara. By 105 BC, not only had Numidia been defeated and humbled, but so had the Mauri and the Gaetulians, who seven years earlier had been completely absent from Roman consideration. Thus Roman might and domination now covered the whole of North Africa, from Libya to the Atlantic coast. Over the late Republic and early Empire this domination slowly turned into formal empire, a situation that remained until the Vandal invasions of the fifth century AD.

Although the Romans had once again emerged victorious and greatly strengthened their grip on North Africa, the domestic repercussions had been serious. Their failure to act decisively in the first place had seen the tribunes and assemblies intervene on the Senate’s prerogative of deciding Roman foreign policy, by forcing the declaration of war. The failure of the first two consular commanders had led to the Mamilian Commission being established and a witch-hunt being conducted by the assemblies against the Senatorial commanders. The perceived failure of Metellus had led to Marius, a relative outsider, not only being elected consul, but using the tribunate and the assemblies to trample over another Senatorial prerogative, that of choosing consular provinces. All the Senate could hope for would be that once the war was over, they could restore some measure of control over the domestic situation. However, events soon occurred that threw these hopes into disarray.

Three key Romans came out of this war with their reputations enhanced. The first was L. Caecilius Metellus ‘Numidicus’, who despite being replaced, had defeated Jugurtha militarily and had effectively put Numidia out of the war, forcing Jugurtha to rely on ultimately-untrustworthy allies. As well as having his military reputation enhanced, he registered his claim to having won the war by taking the cognomen Numidicus. He remained a key member of the most powerful faction in the Senate, the Metelli, who continued their domestic pre-eminence, with both censors of 102–101 being Metelli, one of whom was Numidicus himself (see Appendix IV). Furthermore, his treatment at the hands of Marius and the assembly would have enhanced his standing within the Senate. This being the case, Metellus could look forward to settling the score with Marius when he returned to Rome after the war.

The second man was L. Cornelius Sulla, who had acquired an excellent military reputation in battle and now could, and indeed did, claim to have ended the war by organizing the capture Jugurtha himself. Sulla famously had a ring made depicting the handover of Jugurtha to him (later depicted in coin by his son). In addition, during the 90s BC Bocchus paid for a group of statues depicting this scene on the Capitol.³¹⁴ Both were later to be bones of contention between Sulla and Marius, though this was not immediately clear. He had clearly established himself as a man to watch and a good prospect for returning his obscure patrician family to the consulship.

Finally, comes the figure of C. Marius himself. From being a loyal and aged deputy he had managed not only to become consul, but to overturn a key senatorial power, the right to decide consular commands. He had constructed an alliance of the people and the equestrian order to propel him to the pinnacle of the Roman political ladder and provide him with the power to alter the Roman system of recruitment. This gave him a prominent position to end the war in Africa and gain military glory for himself.

It has often been argued as to which of the three men had the greater influence in winning the war.³¹⁵ Of the three, the easiest to dismiss is Sulla, as, although he was the officer in charge at the handover of Jugurtha, the whole thing had been arranged by Bocchus and was the inevitable price of his peace with Rome. Sallust makes a great attempt to enlarge Sulla’s role in this process, no doubt encouraged by Sulla’s own memoirs and the reputation of the man he was to become.

This leaves us with Metellus and Marius. Metellus clearly did much to restore the Roman position in Numidia after the disasters of 110 BC. His competent generalship and use of the superior Roman military might at his disposal effectively led to the defeat of Numidia, but not of Jugurtha, thus deserving him the title of Numidicus. However, it was under his command that Jugurtha was able to escalate the war into a pan-African one, which so nearly cost Rome during the Battles of Cirta. Furthermore, it is apparent that when faced with the Mauri/Gaetulian invasion of Numidia in 106 BC, combined with the news of Marius’ usurpation of his command, he slackened the pace of the Roman military effort to a considerable extent. Nevertheless, he did give Marius a base on which to build.

Then we come to Marius’ own contribution. He arrived in 107 with the largest Roman army yet in the war and with the Numidians defeated. For the next year he conducted an uninspiring but competent campaign of reducing Jugurtha’s remaining powerbase and ultimately his options. However, he too could not prevent the reformation of Jugurtha’s ‘grand alliance’ with Bocchus, which so nearly led to disaster at the Battles of Cirta. Furthermore, despite his apparent calm leadership in battle, Sallust’s account at least leaves him facing a charge of incompetence for getting his army ambushed in such a manner. It is highly possible that neither of the accounts of the battles was intended to flatter Marius and the true picture, now lost, may have been far less fraught than depicted. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note how close Rome came to being defeated in the war, even as late as 106 BC. Had the Roman army been destroyed at Cirta, given the war in the north, it was unlikely that they could have mounted any serious opposition for several years, leaving North Africa in the hands of Jugurtha and Bocchus.

This brings us to the final figure to consider, that of Jugurtha himself. Here is a man of contradictions, clearly a superb general, albeit one encumbered with an inferior army for the majority of the war. Furthermore, his recklessness in the political field led to a war against Rome and one that neither side wanted, nor one that in normal circumstances he would have ever been able to win, given the disparity of resources. This recklessness, however, was tempered by the creation of the grand alliance of North African races, which was always a bold and risky move, albeit one that nearly paid off. In the end, he paid for this recklessness with his life, but forever earned himself a position as a tenacious enemy of Rome and one that brought about significant changes within the Roman political and military systems. These changes may have happened anyway, but Jugurtha proved to be a catalyst for them.

For Marius, the end of the war should have been his crowning glory, a return to Rome followed by a triumph, which would be the apex of his career, at the age of around 52. Once his command expired he would become a private citizen again and would have to face the domestic consequences of his actions in 107 BC. From the people this would be short lived-adulation, from the equestrian order, long-term support, and in the Senate, hostility from the established Roman families and especially the Metelli. However, events transpired elsewhere to make the Jugurthine War merely the launching pad to an even greater and unprecedented role in the Roman Republic. For Rome, 105 BC saw the ending of one crisis but the worsening of another.