11
Giulia Bonasio
In the Eudemian Ethics (EE) and in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle distinguishes between the virtues of character and the virtues of thinking. These virtues are explored in long-standing debates. Interpreters disagree on their respective roles in a happy life and on their relation among each other. One component of Aristotle’s theory, however, has so far found less attention, at least as far as the EE is concerned: the notion of complete virtue. Aristotle’s definition of happiness refers to complete virtue. Thus, we must be clear about complete virtue if we are to understand how Aristotle conceives of happiness. In this chapter, I argue that in the EE, complete virtue is the super excellence of kalokagathia, the virtue of the best person as Aristotle conceives of her in the EE, rather than some other virtue that Aristotle holds in high regard.
In EE II, Aristotle says that happiness is activity according to complete virtue (ἀρετὴ τελεία).1 In NE I, he says that happiness is activity according to the best and most complete (ἀρίστη καὶ τελειοτάτη) virtue.2 The expression ἀρετὴ τελεία can be read in many ways.3 It can be translated “complete virtue,” “perfect virtue,” or “final virtue.” I argue below that “complete virtue” best captures Aristotle’s view in the EE. Scholars predominantly focus on ἀρετὴ τελεία in the NE.4 Two exceptions are Cooper and Kenny, who examine also the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness in the EE.5 Cooper offers a formal characterization of ἀρετὴ τελεία as it occurs in the definition of happiness in EE II, 1219a39, namely that it is human excellence as a whole.6 Kenny offers a substantive identification: ἀρετὴ τελεία, he argues, is the virtue of kalokagathia.7 Kenny’s view is, in fact, a specification of Cooper’s proposal insofar as he argues that kalokagathia is the virtue which is virtue as a whole. By focusing on wholeness, I submit, Cooper showcases kalokagathia’s most theoretically challenging feature, which connects the EE with Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics. My chapter goes beyond Kenny’s (and Cooper’s) work because I explore a different route to arrive at the conclusion that kalokagathia is the complete virtue mentioned in the EE’s definition of happiness. What is more, I base my argument on the premise that Aristotle understands complete and whole – τέλειον and ὅλον – in the sense that these expressions have in the Physics and in the Metaphysics.
In what follows, I develop a set of criteria for virtue’s completeness, based on the EE and relevant passages from the Physics and the Metaphysics. By reference to the long-standing discussion about inclusive versus dominant readings, I set up the Inclusion Criterion: virtue is complete only if it includes the character virtues and the virtues of thinking. By reference to wholeness as defined in the Physics and in the Metaphysics, I defend the Wholeness Criterion: complete virtue must be a whole. Insofar as Aristotle argues that what is complete and whole must have a limit, I propose the Limit Criterion: complete virtue must have a limit.
In Section 11.1, I introduce the definition of happiness in the EE, where virtue is not only said to be complete, but also whole. In Section 11.2, I explain and defend the premise of my argument, that we need to refer to the Physics and to the Metaphysics in order to understand what Aristotle means by complete, whole, one, and limit. In Section 11.3, I offer an argument by elimination for the identification of complete virtue and kalokagathia; four other contenders – megalopsychia, dikaiosunê, phronêsis, and sophia – are ultimately not good fits for Aristotle’s notion of complete virtue. I show that kalokagathia is one virtue that includes all the virtues qua parts. Kalokagathia has all its parts connected so that they form a whole, and it has a limit. For these reasons, it is the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness. This proposal has larger implications for our reading of the EE: it supports the hypothesis that kalokagathia is a core concept of Aristotle’s EE, one that is not simply used in ways that reference traditional notions, but rather, one that is theoretically innovative. What is more, it shows that we need to have all the virtues in order to be happy.
11.1 The Definition of Happiness
The much-debated question of which activities – those of theorizing, practical wisdom, the virtues of character, to name the main contenders – make up a happy life matters for present purposes.8 If happiness consists only in theoretical activity, sophia is a good candidate for complete virtue. In that case, we would need to specify in which sense sophia is complete. If happiness consists both in theoretical and practical activities, complete virtue must be a virtue that includes virtues of character and virtues of practical and theoretical thinking. Two readings, both of which have been formulated in a number of ways, are now “classic” approaches: the so-called dominant and the inclusive reading.9 According to the former, happiness consists in contemplation. According to the latter, the best life includes both contemplation and the exercise of the virtues of character and phronêsis.
With regard to the EE, the inclusive reading has been considered more plausible.10 Scholars argue that in the EE, the life of the happy agent combines contemplation and the activities of practical wisdom and the character virtues.11 Notably, this proposal is not presented in comparative terms. Aristotle does not rank kinds of happiness and he does not discuss a virtue that is most complete. Rather, he simply talks about “complete virtue” and of happiness.
With regard to the NE, among defenders of the dominant reading, some scholars argue that the best and most complete virtue is sophia, others that it is nous.12 There are also what we may call hybrid views: some scholars argue that the best and most complete virtue is a combination of sophia and phronêsis.13 Scholars who support the inclusive reading argue that the best and most complete virtue is a virtue that includes virtues of thinking and of character.14 In NE 1097a25–29, Aristotle says that an end is most complete if it is chosen always as an end and never as a means for something else. Happiness is most complete because it is chosen for its own sake and for nothing else.15 It is, thereby, the ultimate or chief end, the end for the sake of which other ends are pursued. As many scholars argue, this is how completeness or finality is explained if it is happiness – an activity – that is most complete.16 But what does it mean that a virtue is complete? Let us consider two options: (i) A virtue is complete if it is by itself final, namely insofar as it is the virtue of the activity that most of all is self-sufficient and chosen for its own sake. (ii) A virtue is complete if it does not lack any parts.17 In this sense, a virtue is complete if it is a whole with all its parts. My hypothesis is that we can distinguish completeness-qua-finality and completeness-qua-unity-of-virtue. I submit that the former characterizes complete virtue in the NE, while the latter applies to complete virtue in the EE.
11.2 What It Means for a Virtue to Be Complete
In EE II, Aristotle defines happiness as follows:
(T1) Happiness, then, is the activity of the good soul. And since happiness is something complete (τέλεόν), and a life can be complete (τελέα) or incomplete (ἀτελής), and so too virtue (since it can be a whole (ὅλη) or a part (μόριον)), and the activity of what is incomplete (ἀτελῶν) is itself incomplete (ἀτελής), it follows that happiness would be the activity of a complete (τελείας) life in accordance with complete (τελείαν) virtue.18
The two expressions – τέλεος (complete) and ὅλος (whole) – are connected. Three things are called complete or whole in the passage:
· life can be complete or incomplete;
· activity can be complete or incomplete;
· virtue can be complete/whole or incomplete/a part.
What it means for a life to be “complete” is controversial.19 For present purposes, I assume that a “whole” life is either a complete lifespan including all life stages and ending with death, or it is a sufficiently long lifespan to permit development of excellent activities.20 With regard to activity, Aristotle says that the activity of what is incomplete is itself incomplete. But what does it mean for an activity to be of something incomplete (ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀτελῶν ἐνέργεια)? In Metaphysics 1048b11–14, Aristotle says that activity is activity of a δύναμις – an ability.21 For example, we may say that there is an activity of the ability of seeing which is seeing. The activity of seeing can be exercised according to virtue (κατ’ἀρετὴν) – with good sight – or without virtue – with poor sight. According to Metaphysics 1048b20–35, activities like seeing are always complete. Roughly, this means that the activity of seeing is, at any moment in which it is exercised, complete. However, in T1, Aristotle seems to speak of activities in a general sense that admits activities to be incomplete. For present purposes, I should set aside the discussion of incomplete activities. An activity can be performed according to virtue or not. And this virtue can be complete or incomplete. Hence, there are four combinations: activity of something complete according to complete virtue, activity of something complete according to incomplete virtue, activity of something incomplete according to complete virtue, activity of something incomplete according to incomplete virtue. In the case of happiness, this activity is complete insofar as it is activity of something complete – the ability to do virtuous actions and to contemplate. What is more, this activity is according to complete virtue.
While in the case of life and of activity, Aristotle speaks of being τελέα and ἀτελής, virtue is said to be τελεία and ἀτελής since it can be ὅλη and μόριον. In T1, two lines before the definition of happiness, Aristotle mentions a virtue which is a whole (ὅλη). This virtue which is a whole is different from the virtue which is only a part (μόριον). But why is virtue said to be τελέα/ἀτελής since it is ὅλη/μόριον, while life and activity are said to be τελέα/ἀτελής with no further specification? My hypothesis is that with this difference, Aristotle stresses a dimension of the virtue he aims to characterize: this virtue must not only be complete, but also a whole. In the EE, Aristotle does not specify what τέλειον and ὅλον mean. In Metaphysics 1021b12–34, Aristotle defines τέλειον as (i) that which has all its parts; (ii) that which cannot be surpassed in respect to excellence and whose proper excellence does not lack any part; (iii) that which has attained its end. He says that virtue is τελείωσις – completion or perfection.22 In the Physics, Aristotle clarifies not only what is complete, but also what is a whole:
(T2) That of which there is nothing left out (ἔξω), it is complete (τέλειον) or whole (ὅλον). For we define a whole precisely as that from which nothing is absent, for example, a “whole man or a whole chest.” And as with particular wholes, so it is in the main sense (κυρίως) [GB: that is, for the whole that is not a part of something else]: the whole is that of which there is nothing left out; whereas that from which something, no matter what, is missing and left outside is not “all” (ἀπῇ). And “whole” and “complete,” if not altogether the same, are close in their nature (σύνεγγυς τὴν φύσιν), and nothing is complete (τέλειον) unless it has an end (τέλος); but an end is a limit (πέρας).23
Aristotle says that something is whole or complete when nothing is left out. Something is complete if it has an end and this end is a limit. Limit translates the Greek πέρας.24 For present purposes, it is sufficient to invoke the definition of limit that Aristotle provides in Metaphysics 1022a4–10. Aristotle says that the limit is
(a) The furthest part of each thing, and the first point outside which no part of a thing can be found, and the first point within which all parts are contained. (b) Any form (εἶδος) of magnitude or of something possessing magnitude. (c) The end of each thing. […] (d) The substance (οὐσία) or essence of each thing.25
As (a) suggests, there is continuity among the parts contained within the limit. That is, the parts are connected and identifiable as parts of the same whole insofar as there is a limit that divides what is part of the whole and what is not.
T2 specifies that τέλειον and ὅλον are not the same, but they are close in their nature. As Aristotle says at 228b13: τέλειον and ὅλον are close in their nature insofar as they are attributes of what is one.26 In the Metaphysics, Aristotle explains the relative notion of oneness:
(T3) Most things, then, are said to be “one” because they produce, or possess, or are affected by, or are related to, some other one thing; but some are called “one” in a primary sense, and one of these is substance. It is one either in continuity or in form or in definition (ἢ συνεχείᾳ ἢ εἴδει ἢ λόγῳ); for we reckon as more than one thing which are not continuous, or whose form is not one, or whose definition is not one. Again, in one sense we call anything whatever “one” if it is quantitative and continuous; and in another sense we say that it is not “one” unless it is a whole (ὅλον) of some kind, i.e. unless it is one in form (τὸ εἶδος ἔχῃ ἕν) (e.g., if we saw the parts of a shoe put together anyhow, we should not say that they were one – except in virtue of their continuity (συνέχειαν); but only if they were so put together as to be a shoe, and to possess already some one form). Hence the circumference of a circle is of all lines the most truly one, because it is whole and complete (ὅλη καὶ τέλειός).27
The passage is fraught with interpretative difficulties that I cannot discuss in this chapter. Aristotle addresses the way in which we call substances “one.” He considers three options: something can be one in terms of continuity, or form, or definition. For present purposes, we are interested in the most ambitious notion of oneness, according to which something is one only if it is a whole, and that is, unless it is one in form. Aristotle uses two examples to illustrate the point. First, consider a shoe: the components of the shoe could be put together in such a way as to be continuous; that would provide the item with the weak oneness of continuity. But the item would not yet be a shoe. For that the components must be put together so that their continuity has the form of a shoe, and thereby the oneness of being a whole. Second, the circumference is said to be whole and complete. It is whole because there is continuity among the different parts that form the circumference: namely, it is a circumference and not a bunch of disconnected points. The circumference is complete insofar as it has a limit – πέρας (as established by what Aristotle says in T2).
In light of all this, virtue is complete when (i) it has all its parts connected in a way that they form a whole; (ii) it has a limit that defines what belongs to the whole; (iii) it is one virtue that has other virtues as genuine parts rather than as a mere bundle that fails to be composed in the way that wholeness requires. Since we are talking about a virtue that has other virtues as parts, it seems plausible to say that the virtues that are parts are connected if they interact and co-function.28
11.3 What Is the Complete Virtue of the EE’s Definition of Happiness?
Prima facie, megalopsychia, dikaiosunê, phronêsis, sophia, and kalokagathia are candidates for the role of complete virtue as it appears in the EE’s definition of happiness.29 Each of these virtues meets some important criteria: megalopsychia is called the strongest and greatest state and it occurs together with some virtues; dikaiosunê is, albeit with qualification, called complete virtue; phronêsis occurs with the character virtues; sophia includes already two virtues – intelligence (nous) and knowledge (epistêmê); and kalokagathia is called complete and whole. When Aristotle ascribes any of these virtues to a person, it is clear that he intends it as high praise. Each virtue is a comprehensive accomplishment, which pertains to important domains of life. Nevertheless, only kalokagathia meets the stringent criteria (Inclusion, Wholeness, and Limit) for complete virtue.
Megalopsychia and dikaiosunê are the least promising candidates. They fail to meet what, earlier, I called the Inclusion Criterion. Namely, scholars agree in ascribing an inclusive position to the EE, and that this ascription seems well founded. That is, happiness as it is understood in the EE includes both activities according to the character virtues and according to the virtues of practical and theoretical thinking. In line with this reading, complete virtue should include both the virtues of character and the virtues of thinking. Megalopsychia and dikaiosunê, however, are virtues of character that do not include the virtues of thinking.
In the EE, the discussion of megalopsychia differs in some respect from the more widely studied discussion of this virtue in the NE.30 In EE II, 1221a10, Aristotle includes megalopsychia in the list of character virtues, describing it as the mean between conceitedness and weak-heartedness.31 That is, megalopsychia is unequivocally characterized as a character virtue. This is sufficient reason against the identification of complete virtue and megalopsychia; but it is not the only reason.
In EE III, 1232a33–34, Aristotle says that greatness of soul, as we may translate megalopsychia, is the greatest and strongest (κράτιστη) state.32 At first sight, this claim seems to speak in favour of the identification of megalopsychia with the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness. Aristotle says:
(T4) Moreover greatness of soul even seems to follow (ἀκολουθεῖν) all the virtues. After all, correctly judging what is great and small among good things is praiseworthy; and the great goods are thought to be those pursued by the possessor of the strongest state regarding such matters, the strongest state being greatness of soul. What virtue in each sphere does is judge the greater and the lesser correctly; as the wise person and as virtue would bid. Hence all of the virtues will accompany (ἕπεσθαι) greatness of soul, or it will accompany all of them.33
Megalopsychia follows (ἀκολουθεῖν) all the virtues and all the virtues accompany (ἕπεσθαι) it. Aristotle does not specify whether he is talking about all the character virtues or all the virtues including the virtues of practical and of theoretical thinking. However, the passage occurs in EE III, which is a book dedicated to the virtues of character. Hence, we may suppose that Aristotle is talking about the virtues of character: these are the virtues that accompany megalopsychia. The verb ἀκολουθεῖν – to follow – signals that megalopsychia occurs with the other virtues, but it does not say that it includes the virtues. In addition, there is no indication that megalopsychia includes the virtues of thinking.34 Megalopsychia occurs with practical wisdom – even though it does not include it – insofar as there cannot be virtues of character in the proper sense without practical wisdom (according to the theory of mutual entailment).35 In T4, Aristotle says explicitly that the megalopsychos and the phronimos (the wise person) are able to judge the greater and the smaller correctly. The megalopsychos has practical wisdom, but nothing is said regarding the virtues of theoretical thinking.36
The megalopsychos is characterized by the capacity to judge correctly what has value in life. In T4, Aristotle says that the megalopsychos is the measure of great goods insofar as this agent pursues great goods. The megalopsychos does not care about life or wealth.37 This agent cares only about honour. Gauthier argues that there are important differences between the discussion of megalopsychia in the NE and in the EE: in the NE, megalopsychia is characterized by self-sufficiency, while in the EE, it is characterized by honour.38 In agreement with Gauthier, I think that honour has a special role in the discussion of megalopsychia in the EE. This relation with honour is an important element that disqualifies megalopsychia from the role of complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness.
(T5) Greatness of soul is the best disposition concerning the choice and the use of honour and the other honourable goods, and it is with regard to this and not to what is useful that we grant this disposition. At the same time the most praiseworthy disposition is the mean. Clearly, then, greatness of soul too would be a mean.39
Megalopsychia is defined as the best disposition in relation to the choice and use of honour. The same expressions “choice and use” appear in EE VIII where Aristotle talks about natural goods.40 As Aristotle says in EE VIII, 1248b28, honour is a natural good. While another plausible candidate for the role of complete virtue – kalokagathia – allows us to choose and use all the natural goods in a way that promotes contemplation, megalopsychia is the virtue of choosing and using honour and honourable goods. However, there is no mention of contemplation as the final purpose of this choice and use of honour and honourable goods. This is a further argument that speaks against the identification of megalopsychia with the virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness: megalopsychia does not have any explicit relation to contemplation.
In EE II, 1221a4, dikaion (the just) is listed among the character virtues. It is the mean between profit and loss. Justice does not satisfy the Inclusion Criterion: in Aristotle’s reinterpreted Thrasymachean formulation, justice is the “good of the other.” It includes all the virtues, but merely in a qualified sense, namely insofar as virtuous action relates to others. In NE V = EE IV, Aristotle calls dikaiosunê (justice) complete virtue.41 He says explicitly that justice is a whole (ὃλον).42 That is, though justice does not meet the Inclusion Criterion, it has a kind of completeness.
(T6) This form of justice is complete virtue, not however simpliciter but in relation to other people. That is why justice is often thought to be the strongest virtue, and “neither Evening star nor Morning star is so wondrous.” And we affirm the old saying: “Justice contains within it all of virtue together.” It is complete virtue to the highest degree because it is the use of complete virtue. And it is complete because one who possesses it has the capability to use virtue not just on one’s own behalf but in relation to others.43
Justice is said to be, as megalopsychia, the strongest of the virtues.44 Aristotle quotes Theognis who says that justice is all virtues together. Aristotle does not agree with Theognis. Instead he develops his own proposal, according to which justice is specifically concerned with our relation to others. Justice contains all the virtues, and is the use – χρῆσις – of complete virtue, insofar as the agent relates not only to herself but also to others. This makes justice complete in a qualified sense and not simpliciter (ἀπλῶς).45
Let us move to more plausible candidates: phronêsis, sophia, and kalokagathia. Aristotle says that phronêsis (practical wisdom) always functions in conjunction with the character virtues.46 For this reason, scholars speak of a unity of the virtues that includes practical wisdom and the character virtues. Practical wisdom and the character virtues entail each other: one cannot have one without the other. However, Aristotle does not say that practical wisdom includes all the virtues. It does not include the virtues of theoretical thinking. Aristotle says that phronêsis prescribes (ἐπιτάττει) for the sake of theoretical wisdom.47 That is, practical wisdom “serves” or “prepares the ground” for theoretical wisdom: sophia. Practical wisdom cannot be the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness in the EE insofar as it does not include sophia – and this is clear insofar as it prescribes for its sake. What is more, it does not include any of the other virtues of theoretical thinking.48
One of the most promising candidates for the role of complete virtue is sophia (theoretical wisdom). Sophia already includes two virtues: espistêmê and nous. Yet, one passage clearly excludes sophia. In EE = NE, 1144a1–6, Aristotle says that sophia is part of complete virtue.
(T7) These states [GB: that is, theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom] must be choiceworthy in their own right, since each is certainly the virtue of its own part of the soul, even if neither of them accomplishes anything. Next, they do indeed accomplish things, not in the way that medical knowledge brings about health but in the way that health does. That is how theoretical wisdom (sophia) causes happiness, since theoretical wisdom is a part of the whole virtue and by being possessed and by being active it makes a person happy.49
Here, Aristotle introduces a distinction between two ways in which something can be productive of something, or in other words, accomplish something. His comparandum is health. Medicine brings about health in one way; in another way, health brings about health. If someone is sick, medicine can produce health. If someone is healthy, however, then it is in the nature of being healthy that health sustains itself. In that sense, health brings about health. This is the very sense, according to T7, in which theoretical and practical wisdom are productive. They are ways of being active which sustain themselves. And hence it is not just true to say that they bring about themselves; insofar as one can engage in excellent activities such as contemplation and activities that display practical wisdom, they bring about happiness. At the conclusion of this line of thought, Aristotle makes the claim that interests us here: sophia is part of complete virtue.50 This shows that sophia is not the complete virtue mentioned in the EE’s definition of happiness. Insofar as EE = NE 1144a1–6 occurs in one of the so-called common books, it may also raise a problem for the interpretation of complete virtue in the NE. That is, if sophia is said to be part of complete virtue, how can it be the most complete virtue of the NE? The answer to this question is not clear. One way to solve the problem is to view the common books – or at least this passage – as part of the philosophical argument in the EE. Another way to read the passage is that sophia is τέλειον in the sense of finality rather than completeness.51
Kalokagathia is the virtue of being-beautiful-and-good – as I translate it – and it is discussed in detail in EE VIII 3. 52 In 1248b14–16, Aristotle compares this virtue to a whole (ὃλον):
(T8) We have spoken earlier about each virtue qua part (κατὰ μέρος μὲν οὖν περὶ ἑκάστης ἀρετῆς εἴρηται πρότερον); but since we have separately distinguished the capacity of each of them, we have to discuss the virtue composed by them, which we actually call being-beautiful-and-good. Now it is evident that whoever truly has this appellation must have the individual virtues (τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἀρετάς). For it cannot be otherwise in other cases, either. For no one is healthy in his body as a whole (ὅλον), yet not in any part (μέρος) of it; rather, all parts, or most parts and the most important ones, should be in the same state as the whole (ὅλῳ).53
Aristotle uses the same term – ὃλον – to describe the virtue according to which happiness is complete activity in T1 and to describe kalokagathia. In T8, he says that kalokagathia is composed by the virtues. Elsewhere, I proposed an argument that shows that it is composed of all the virtues discussed so far in the treatises.54 Insofar as kalokagathia is composed by all the virtues of character and by all the virtues of thinking, it meets the Inclusion Criterion. In EE VIII 3, Aristotle says that kalokagathia is complete virtue:
(T9) Goods are beautiful when the aim in acting and choosing them is beautiful. That is why the natural goods are beautiful for the beautiful-and-good person. For the just is beautiful and this in the sense of what accords with worth; this person is worthy of these things. What suits him is also beautiful, and these things (wealth, high-born status and power) are suitable for him. Consequently for the beautiful-and-good person the same things are both advantageous and beautiful. But for most people there is a discrepancy here. Things which are simple goods are not good for them too, but they are good for the good person; but for the beautiful-and-good person they are also beautiful, since he performs many beautiful actions on their own account. But he who thinks that he ought to possess the virtues for the sake of external goods performs beautiful actions only incidentally. Hence being beautiful-and-good is complete virtue.55
The last sentence of the passage sums up several reasons for the claim that kalokagathia is complete virtue. All these reasons are connected to the beautiful. First of all, Aristotle says that the so-called natural goods are not only good for the agents who possess kalokagathia, but they are also beautiful. Second, the beautiful is the ultimate motivation for their actions and choices. Third, the agent who possesses kalokagathia is worthy (ἄξιος) of things beautiful such as the just, the suitable, wealth, high-born status, and power. Fourth, things that are advantageous (συμφέροντα) are also beautiful for this agent. For the many, there is a discrepancy between what is advantageous and what is beautiful. Finally, beautiful actions are done for their sake and not for the sake of acquiring external goods. The virtue of kalokagathia allows the agents who possess it to have a special relation with the beautiful. This is due to the very nature of kalokagathia, as the name of this virtue suggests. What matters for present purposes is that Aristotle discusses the relation to the beautiful as evidence that kalokagathia is complete virtue. As part of the definition of τέλειον that Aristotle offers in Metaphysics 1021b12–34, Aristotle says that what is τέλειον cannot be surpassed in respect to excellence. As T9 shows, kalokagathia cannot be surpassed in respect to excellence. That is, for the agent who has kalokagathia things are not only good, but they are also beautiful. And the beautiful is the final aim of all of the agent’s actions and choices. Insofar as all the virtues that compose kalokagathia co-function in order to attain one common end – the beautiful – there is continuity among the parts that constitute the whole of kalokagathia. This meets the definition of being one and whole given in Metaphysics 1016b7–18. In light of this and of what is said in T8 in relation to being composed by all the virtues, kalokagathia meets the Wholeness Criterion.
In EE VIII, 1249b13, Aristotle mentions explicitly τὸ θεωρητικόν – the theoretical capacity. This seems to be the ἀρχή – principle – to which we need to subordinate. In EE VIII, 1249b17, Aristotle says that the choice and the acquisition of natural goods should promote the θεοῦ θεωρίαν – the contemplation of the divine. And this is the most beautiful limit (ὅρος κάλλιστος). This ὅρος has to do with kalokagathia: in EE VIII, 1249b24, Aristotle seems to suggest that this is the ὅρος of kalokagathia.56 As he argues, we need: (i) to perceive the irrational part of the soul as little as possible,57 and (ii) to be able to choose and acquire natural goods in a way that promotes contemplation. The choice and acquisition of natural goods is the most beautiful limit because it promotes the most beautiful activity, namely contemplation.58 Insofar as the limit is a limit of kalokagathia, it is this virtue that allows us to choose and acquire natural goods so that they promote contemplation. This provides further support in favour of the idea that kalokagathia meets the Inclusion Criterion: that is, if the final aim of this virtue is theoretical contemplation, the virtues of theoretical thinking must be included in kalokagathia in addition to the virtues of character and practical wisdom (which are necessary in order for the aim of our actions to be beautiful).
The idea of a ὅρος of kalokagathia reinforces the hypothesis that kalokagathia is the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness. In T2, in the Physics, Aristotle says that something is complete when it has an end and the end is a limit – πέρας. Πέρας and ὅρος are two different expressions, but they are closely connected and for present purposes, they can be treated as synonyms.59 As Aristotle states, kalokagathia has a ὅρος. This is enough to show that kalokagathia meets the Limit Criterion. Insofar as it satisfies the Inclusion, Wholeness, and Limit Criteria, kalokagathia is the most plausible candidate for being the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness.
11.4 Conclusion
I investigated the complete virtue mentioned in the Eudemian definition of happiness. I focused on three criteria: complete virtue is one virtue that includes all the virtues qua parts, all its parts are connected so that they form a whole, and it has a limit. I analyzed the explanations of τέλειον, ὄλον, oneness, and limit that Aristotle offers in the Physics and in the Metaphysics. In light of these explanations, I examined some possible candidates for the role of complete virtue in the Eudemian Ethics. First, I examined megalopsychia and dikaiosunê, which qua virtues of character must be ruled out, though they have some relevant features. Next, I turned to two virtues of thinking: phronêsis and sophia. Even though these two virtues occur with other virtues, they fail to meet the Inclusion, Wholeness, and Limit Criteria. Finally, I brought evidence in favour of kalokagathia. I argued that kalokagathia is the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness insofar as it meets all the criteria. This proposal has upshots for our reading of the EE insofar as it elucidates what virtue we should have in order to lead a happy life. What is more, it shows that with regard to complete virtue and to happiness the EE differs in important respects from the NE.60
Notes
1. II, 1219a39, ἡ εὐδαιμονία ζωῆς τελείας ἐνέργεια κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τελείαν (all translations of the in this chapter are by Inwood and Woolf modified by the author). EE Eudaimonia is translated “happiness” for lack of a better term: I use this translation for the sake of clarity insofar as it is ingrained in the literature on the topic.
2. I, 1098a17. Aristotle specifies in I, 1098a17 that complete virtue is here to be understood as the best and the most complete. In I, 1100a4, b10, 1101a15, 1102a5–6, Aristotle speaks of complete virtue: in all these occurrences, complete virtue has to be understood as specified in 1098a17. That is, it is the best and the most complete virtue.NE
3. Cooper, 1986, p. 100; Kenny, 1992, p. 16; Irwin, 2012; P. Destrée argues that in the Metaphysics, teleios is connected to agathos, see Destrée, 2003, p. 56.
4. Some of the major contributions to the discussion on happiness and its definition in the two treatises are: Donini, 2014; Donini, 1994, pp. 98-110; Kenny, 2016 (first edition: 1978); Kenny, 1992; Rowe, 1971; White, 1992.
5. In his commentary on the EE, Woods says that in the EE definition of happiness, complete virtue is kalokagathia. But he does not offer an argument to support this claim. Woods, 1992, p. 90.
6. Cooper, 1986, p. 100.
7. Kenny, 1992, p. 19.
8. The debate is vast. I only summarize some contributions relevant for present purposes.
9. The distinction between a dominant and an inclusive reading is first proposed by Hardie 1968. Defenders of the inclusive reading argue that the most complete virtue includes all the virtues. A. Long summarizes the debate in Long, 2011. See also Destrée, Zingano, 2014; Reeve, 2012; Lännström, 2006; Lear, 2004; Kraut, 1989; Ackrill, 1974.
10. Even though there are not many studies on the EE, comparatively speaking to the NE, the discussion of happiness is one of the most investigated topic: see Kenny, 1992 and Cooper, 1986. Lear, Cooper, Kenny et al. think that in the EE, happiness includes activity according to the character virtues and contemplation. According to Cooper, 1986, the EE proposes an inclusive view of happiness. According to Rowe, 1971, there is an incongruity between happiness in NE I 7, X 7 and EE II 1. As Rowe says, in the NE, happiness is “the actuality of the virtue of the superior part of the soul” and in the EE, it is the whole of virtue. Rowe says that in the NE, happiness seems to be mostly theoretical while in the EE, it is practical and theoretical. Buddensiek goes beyond the dominant/inclusive debate: he argues that happiness is a whole and many things are necessary to achieve it, but theoretical activity is the most important one, see Buddensiek, 1999, p. 20.
11. Cooper and Kenny argue that in the EE, happiness is activity according to all the parts of the soul.
12. Among others, Cooper, Kraut, Kenny, and Donini argue that the best virtue is sophia. In antiquity, the first to defend this interpretation is Aspasius. Labarrière argues that the best virtue is nous. See Cooper, 1986; Kraut, 1989; Kenny, 1992; Donini, 1994, pp. 98–110; Bodeüs, Labarrière, Lefebvre, 2003. With regard to the NE, Cooper argues that happiness must be in accordance with the best and most complete virtue, but it is not the activity of a single virtue (Cooper 1987).
13. In antiquity, Eustrate argues that the best virtue is phronêsis. Natali argues that the best virtue is a combination of phronêsis and sophia. See Natali, 1989.
14. See Ackrill, 1974; Destrée, 2003.
15. Cf. NE 1097b1 and 1176b31.
16. See Kenny 1992, p. 5 and 18; Cooper 1986, p. 100; Irwin, 2012.
17. Cooper and Irwin argue that in the case of complete virtue, being complete means that the virtue includes all the other virtues.
18. II, 1219a35–39.EE
19. Irwin, 2012; Horn, 2013.
20. For a discussion of this, see Woods, 1992, p. 91.
21. See Kosman, 1994, p. 201.
22. 1021b21.Metaphysics
23. 207a9–15. Translation by GB.Physics
24. LSJ reports “limit” as a possible translation of peras, as well as “end” and “boundary.”
25. 1022a4–10, trans. by H. Tredennick.Metaphysics
26. Radice argues that the two terms are hendiadys. Cf. Aristotele, Fisica, trad. by R. Radice, Milano: Bompiani, 2011.
27. 1016b7–18, tr. by Tredennick with changes by GB.Metaphysics
28. I argue in favour of this in Bonasio, 2020.
29. Décarie discusses complete virtue: he considers as candidates justice, sophia, and kalokagathia. See Décarie, 1975, pp. 60–76.
30. 1124a1. In the , Aristotle points out that NE megalopsychia is the adornment (kosmos) of the virtues. Scholars debate on how to understand this claim: they suggest that either megalopsychia is not a virtue at all, or it includes all the virtues and somehow it perfects them. Curzer argues that Aristotle’s notion of megalopsychia is an attempt to reconcile the Homeric virtue of grandeur with his new virtue of moderation. See Curzer, 2012.
31. In his edition (under preparation) of the EE, Rowe proposes to put the third column of the list of virtues in round brackets to signal that there is something suspect about the text. That is, right after the list, Aristotle refers to this list as a list of pathê. However, the third column is a list of virtues and not of pathê. The disposition of the items in columns is not Aristotelian. Even if the third column, where megalopsychia occurs, was not Aristotelian, megalopsychia is discussed in book III, which is about the virtues of character. Hence, it is undoubtedly a virtue of character.
32. III, 1232a34.EE
33. III, 1232a31–37.EE
34. Stover, 2003; Pakaluk, 2004, pp. 265–268; Crisp, 2006.
35. III, 1234a24–29; V, 1144b17.EE
36. Aristotle distinguishes a particular form of megalopsychia and a more general form of megalopsychia. In his discussion of this virtue, he focuses on the particular form. The more general form of this virtue could be a better candidate for the role of the complete virtue mentioned in the definition of happiness. However, Aristotle does not offer any discussion of this general form. Insofar as this general form is a virtue of character, it could be excluded. Cf. EE III, 1232b23–25. Cooper argues that this distinction between a general and a particular form is introduced to solve the tension between megalopsychia as the virtue of doing great deeds and the virtue of acting moderately. See Cooper, 1986, p. 196.
37. III, 1232b10.EE
38. Gauthier, 1951; Rees, 1971. See also Schmidt, 1967. See NE 1124a4. In the NE, Aristotle says that megalopsychia cannot occur without kalokagathia. This is the only occurrence of kalokagathia in the NE. For this reason, it is even more difficult to understand what Aristotle means by saying that megalopsychia cannot occur without kalokagathia. If kalokagathia is conceived in the same way as in the EE, it means that megalopsychia cannot occur without all the virtues of character and all the virtues of practical and theoretical thinking. However, this must remain speculative as there is no evidence regarding how Aristotle conceives of kalokagathia in the NE (in 1179b10, Aristotle mentions kalokagathia, but he does not elucidates what he understands with this virtue except perhaps that if one possesses it, she is a lover of the beautiful – philokalon).
39. III, 1233a4–9.EE
40. VIII, 1249b17.EE
41. EE = NE 1129b26.
42. EE = NE 1130a16.
43. EE = NE 1129b27–33.
44. EE = NE 1129b27–28.
45. EE = NE 1129b27–30.
46. EE = NE 1144a30; 1144b15.
47. EE = NE 1145a7; VIII, 1249b15. In VIII, Aristotle says that practical wisdom prescribes for the sake of the divine. What it means is obscure: one possible interpretation is that practical wisdom prescribes for the theoretical capacity (mentioned a few lines before the passage). The divine is the highest object of this capacity.
48. See Cooper 1986, p. 121. In addition, in MM 1184a34, Aristotle says that practical wisdom is not complete because when one acquires this virtue, one still wants and needs other things. In MM 1198b12–18, practical wisdom is called the steward of sophia.
49. V, 1144a1–6.EE
50. Aristotle compares theoretical wisdom to health. See Burnet, 1900, p. 283; Joachim, 1951, pp. 216–217; Reeve, 1992, p. 95.
51. Cooper argues that sophia is most final (teleion) insofar as the activity of contemplation does not need other goods. See Cooper, 1986, p. 118.
52. VIII, 1248b8–1249b25.EE
53. VIII 3, 1248b8–16.EE
54. Bonasio, 2020. Kenny, 1992, Buddensiek, 1999, Monan, 1986, and Gastaldi, 2003 argue that kalokagathia includes the virtues of thinking. Verdenius and Moraux and Harlfinger argue that it does not include the virtues of thinking. On kalokagathia as complete virtue, see Kenny, 1992, p. 94. Arius Didymus describes kalokagathia as aretê teleia.
55. VIII 3, 1249a6–16. I accept Spengel’s emendation at 1249a13.EE
56. See Peterson, 1988, pp. 233–250. Irwin suggests to me an alternative reading according to which horos is a definition.
57. The “irrational” part translates the term ἀλόγου. An alternative reading of the manuscripts (defended by Rowe) is ἄλλου – namely, “the other part” of the soul.
58. Buddensiek argues for a similar interpretation, see Buddensiek, 2014.
59. LSJ reports that horos can be translated as standard, limit, and measure. Ancient commentators stress the connection between peras and horos. Simplicius in his Commentary of De Anima 407a18, mentions horos and peras in nearby passages: he calls peras the limit of the line and horos the limit of the whole structure which is also its form. In the same passage, he talks about holon – the whole – of which peras is the limit. (Cf. Simplicius, Commentary on the Soul, tr. by Urmson, footnote 207 and 187, pp. 73–74.) Of course, Aristotle may understand peras and horos in De Anima in a way that is not consistent with how he understands them in the EE. Steel argues that horos is that by which the essence of something is constituted and determined. He says that it is used interchangeably with eidos. Steel lists both horos and peras as possible translations of boundary (Simplicius, On Aristotle on the Soul, 3.6–13, tr. by Steel).
60. I would like to thank Giulio di Basilio for organising the conference in Dublin where this project started and for editing this volume. Special thanks to Katja Vogt and Terry Irwin for helpful comments. All remaining mistakes are mine.
References
1. Ackrill, J., ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia‘, Proceedings of the British Academy 60, 1974, pp. 339–359.
2. Bodeüs, R., Labbarière, J.-L., and Lefebvre, D., Aristote: Bonheur et vertus. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2003.
3. Bonasio, G., ‘Kalokagathia and the Unity of the Virtues in the EE’, Apeiron, 53(1), 2020, pp. 27–57.
4. Buddensiek, F., Die Theorie des Glücks in Aristoteles’ Eudemischer Ethik. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999.
5. ———, ‘Contemplation and Service of the God’, in Destrée, P. and Zingano, M. (eds.), Theoria, Studies on the Status and Meaning of Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ethics. Louvain: Peeters, 2014.
6. Burnet, J., The Ethics of Aristotle. London: Methuen 1900.
7. Cooper, J., Reason and the Human Good. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986.
8. ———, ‘Contemplation and Happiness: A Reconsideration’, Synthese, 72(2), 1987, pp. 187–216.
9. Crisp, R., ‘Aristotle on Greatness of Soul’, in Kraut, R. (ed.), Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.
10. Curzer, H. J., Aristotle and the Virtues. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
11. Décarie, V., ‘Vertu totale, vertu parfaite et kalokagathia dans l’Éthique à Eudème’, in Madison, G. B. (ed.), Sens et Existence. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1975, pp. 60–76.
12. Destrée, P., ‘Bonheur et completude’, in Aristote, bonheur et vertus. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2003.
13. Destrée, P. and Zingano, M. (eds.), Theoria, Studies on the Status and Meaning of Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ethics. Leuven: Peeters, 2014.
14. Donini, P., ‘Due libri su eudaimonia in Aristotele’, Phronesis 39, 1994, pp. 98–110.
15. ———, Abitudine e saggezza. Alessandria: Edizioni dell’Orso, 2014.
16. Gastaldi, S., Bios Hairetotatos. Generi di vita e felicità in Aristotele. Napoli: Bibliopolis, 2003.
17. Gauthier, R. A., Magnanimité. Paris: Vrin, 1951.
18. Hardie, W. F. R., Aristotle’s Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.
19. Horn, C., ‘Eine Schwalbe macht noch keinen Frühling’, in Mesch, W. (ed.), Glück, Tugend, Zeit. Stuttgart: Zeit, 2013, pp. 21–40.
20. Irwin, T., ‘Conceptions of Happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics’, in Shields, C. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
21. Joachim, H. H., Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, A Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951.
22. Kenny, A., Aristotle on the Perfect Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
23. ———, The Aristotelian Ethics (1st ed. 1978). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2016.
24. Kosman, A., ‘The Activity of Being in Aristotle’s Metaphysics’, in Scaltsas, T., Charles, D., and Gill, M. L. (eds.), Unity, Identity and Explanation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
25. Kraut, R., Aristotle on the Human Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
26. Natali, C., La saggezza di Aristotele. Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1989.
27. Lännström, A., Loving the Fine: Virtue and Happiness in Aristotle’s Ethics. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006.
28. Lear, G., Happy Lives and the Human Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
29. Long, A. A., ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia, Nous and Divinity’, in Miller, J. (ed.), Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: a Critical Guide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
30. Monan, J. D., Moral Knowledge and its Methodology in Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
31. Pakaluk, M., ‘The Meaning of Aristotelian Magnanimity’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 26, 2004, pp. 265–268.
32. Peterson, S., ‘Horos in Aristotle’s NE’, Phronesis, 33, 3, 1988, pp. 233–250.
33. Rees, D. A., ‘Magnanimity in the EE and EN’, in Moraux, P. and Harlfinger, D. (eds.), Undersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik . Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1971, pp. 231–245.
34. Reeve, C. D. C., Practices of Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
35. ———, Action, Contemplation and Happiness. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2012.
36. Rowe, C. J., ‘The Eudemian and the Nicomachean Ethics’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, 1971.
37. Schmidt, E. A., ‘Ehre und Tugend. Zur Megalopsychia der aristotelischen Ethik’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 49, 1967, pp. 149–168.
38. Stover, P., ‘Moral Virtue and Megalopsychia’, Ancient Philosophy 23, 2003, pp. 351-359.
39. White, S. A., Sovereign Virtue. Aristotle on the Relation between Happiness and Prosperity. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.
40. Woods, M., Aristotle Eudemian Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.