Ancient History & Civilisation

Plato, Phaedo 62c9 to 67e6 and 69e6 to 75c5

Introduction, Commentary Notes and Vocabulary by Rob Colborn

AS: 62c9 to 67e6

A Level: 69e6 to 75c5

Introduction

Philosophy in action

The Phaedo offers a portrait of a man in the last three or four hours of his life and ends with his execution. The man, Socrates, does not choose to enjoy a final meal, spend time consoling his family or seek any distraction from what is ahead. Instead, he chooses to engage in philosophical argument with his friends, explaining why he is not afraid of death, but is sure in his hope of a better life beyond the present one. This is no lecture: although the others feel sorry for their friend in his plight, they do not shrink from challenging his arguments. What we have in the Phaedo is, rather, a live discussion. Arguments are put forth, picked apart, rejected and refined and progress is made. We watch a man work hard to justify as best he can the cheerful approach he is taking to his own death, ready to accept that the efforts may end in failure. As readers, we cannot help but join the conversation, find our own faults with the arguments and work through the same problems ourselves.

Whichever of the prescriptions you read, you will find in it a mix of moving drama, extraordinary prose and satisfyingly tough philosophy in action. All of it makes for provocative reading: do not expect to agree with it all, or any of it, but expect the challenge of exploring the arguments to be no less rewarding for it.

Socrates, Plato and Plato’s Socrates

How real a picture the Phaedo gives of the actual historical Socrates cannot be known. It is not until the Roman era that writers start taking a serious interest in the lives of philosophers and writing biographies of them. By then Socrates had been dead for some centuries, and the stories told about him had attained a generous coating of myth. Even the detailed portraits offered by his contemporaries Plato and Xenophon, who both knew him personally, and the satirical sketch of the comic playwright Aristophanes in The Clouds, differ wildly from each other. Few nowadays would see the Phaedo’s main aim as providing a historical document of the real Socrates’ final hours; but that such a view held sway well into the twentieth century attests to the convincingly lifelike portrayal of Socrates in this work.

We can indeed enjoy the Phaedo’s Socrates, on his own terms, for the wonderfully lively and compelling character he is. But any reading of the Phaedo is made the richer for an understanding of what the real Socrates was like, and how he comes across in Plato’s other works. What follows is an outline of the man as he emerges from the evidence. I offer directions to more detailed accounts in the ‘Further reading’ section of this introduction, and after that a timeline including the most important known dates of his life.

The historical Socrates

Socrates was an old man, aged about 70, when he died in 399 BC, which puts his year of birth around 469. He lived through several enormous political changes in his native Athens. During his boyhood, the threat of Persia waned and Athens grew into the leading imperial power of the Mediterranean. Later came three decades of conflict with Sparta and an eventual defeat in the Peloponnesian War (431–404).

When Sparta insisted on the establishment of an oligarchy in Athens in 404, most of the leading democrats went into exile. Socrates, however, chose to stay in Athens, reflecting what he saw as an apolitical stance. This can have earned him little favour in the eyes of the democrats, who returned to eject the oligarchy (the so-called Thirty Tyrants) and reinstate democracy the following year. During these years of political unease, Socrates’ friendship with members of the Thirty must have added to the suspicion that he was against democracy, stoking the hostility that led the people of Athens to convict Socrates and sentence him to death in 399.

In fact, the little we do hear about Socrates’ political activity shows him standing up against the oligarchs and defending proper democratic procedure. During the Thirty’s murderous purges of dissenters, Socrates was ordered to arrest a democratic general, Leon of Salamis, for execution, but refused to let them bloody his hands. Fortunately for Socrates, the rule of the Thirty was overthrown before they could punish him for his dissent. In 406, Socrates stood in the way of another miscarriage of justice, this time against the angry citizen body, who were clamouring for a joint and summary execution of Athens’ general, blaming them for not recovering the bodies of those lost at sea in the Battle of Arginusae. Socrates’ unsuccessful attempt to prevent an illegal joint trial must have earned him some enemies, who saw his defence of due legal process as an act of defiance against the people’s will.

When Socrates is taken to court in 399, however, neither of the two charges against him is overtly political. In one of his earliest surviving works, Plato records the charges as follows (Apology 24b):

(i) of not believing in (οὐ νομίζοντα) the same gods the state believes in, but in other novel ‘divinities’ (δαιμόνια); and

(ii) of corrupting (διαφθείροντα) the young men of Athens.

That work, the Apology, is Plato’s reconstruction of Socrates’ speech in his own defence (ἀπολογία in Greek) against the two charges and a perfect introduction to Socrates’ personality. A brief survey of his responses to the charges will fill in many of the remaining gaps in our picture of the historical Socrates.

In answer to the first, Socrates insists that his prosecutors confused his thoughts on the gods with those of another celebrity intellectual, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (Apology 26c–e). Anaxagoras had, some decades earlier, been kicked out of Athens for his supposedly irreligious views, which offered naturalistic explanations for many supposedly divine phenomena (considering the Sun and Moon, for instance, to be not gods but bits of rock). Why, then, was Socrates supposed to share these beliefs? As Plato has him explain, the blame lay with Aristophanes’ comic parody of the new wave of intellectuals – philosophers and so-called sophists – who had flocked to Athens in the mid fifth century. In his play The Clouds, Aristophanes applies the name ‘Socrates’ to a character who is really a mashup of various types of intellectual. ‘Socrates’ runs an expensive educational establishment called the Φροντιστήριον (‘Thinkstitute’), where he conducts various absurd experiments. More insidiously, Aristophanes has his ‘Socrates’ offer naturalistic explanations for the way the world works, denying the gods their traditional role in the natural order. That he chose the name ‘Socrates’ for his character is understandable: the real man was a famous eccentric, a celebrity his audience were bound to recognize more readily than Anaxagoras, who had died some years before the staging of The Clouds in 423. Still, The Clouds, which saw a second wave of popularity after Aristophanes redrafted it around 420–417, is probably the greatest exposure most Athenians had had to Socrates. Many will have seen him conversing with friends and fans in Athens’ main public spaces, but few will have stopped to hear whether he was, in fact, spreading irreligious teachings. Such people were surely predisposed to find him guilty of not believing in their gods.

Whether Socrates was guilty of believing in other novel divinities (δαιμόνια καίνα) is left rather more unclear. As Plato has him admit in the Apology, he had sometimes received a sign from a tutelary δαιμόνιον, telling him not to follow a certain course of action (40a–c). This unorthodox belief is unlikely to have warranted a trial on its own, for the Athenians were relatively accepting of differences in religious opinion, so long as people joined in with the rites and sacrifices expected of them – practices on which Socrates was outspokenly keen. His belief in a personal δαιμόνιον, however, one that granted him powers of divination, was bound to provoke envy from some and fuel the suspicions of others.

The second charge, that of ‘corrupting’ or ‘spoiling’ the youth (διαφθείροντα τοὺς νέους), is directed more at Socrates’ self-conduct than at his beliefs. Socrates would spend much of his free time in conversation with friends and strangers alike, many of whom were young Athenian men, drawn to the older Socrates by his colourful persona and quick sense of humour. It was surely entertaining to observe him winding up pompous intellectuals with his ‘irony’ (εἰρωνεία), or feigning of naivety and ignorance. Just as attractive, presumably, was the opportunity of meeting his many famous friends, including the controversial aristocrat Alcibiades. To judge from the earlier works of Plato, conversation with Socrates would be an electrifying thing to observe, but could be a crushing experience for those involved: he would engage his interlocutors in a process of ἔλεγχος (‘cross-examination’), asking their opinion on a philosophical question such as the nature of justice, and gradually leading them, through a series of questions, to the realization that the belief they had once been so confident in was really false. This he saw as a great service, ridding people of misconceptions that were surely harmful. For, in the famous words of the Apology, ‘the unexamined life is not worth living for a human’ (38a). Yet the state of perplexity in which he would leave his interlocutors, called ἀπορία (literally ‘not being able to see a way out of a problem’), is not one that many of us would find pleasant. The negative reaction that the ἔλεγχος would provoke is exemplified nowhere better than in the Apology: we see Socrates engage his prosecutor Meletus in this very kind of conversation and subject him to public embarrassment, a daring and perhaps arrogant strategy that makes it rather easier to see why the opinion of his jurors was so ready to turn against him.

The Socratic Method

For Socrates, engaging in philosophy meant having conversations, working towards a better understanding of a topic by arguing the matter out loud. While giving one’s opinion on a question is generally quite easy, constructive debate of this kind takes practice and skill; and for this reason Plato has Socrates call it ἡ διαλεκτική (i.e. τεχνή), or the skill of dialectic, an adjective formed from the verb διαλέγομαι ‘I converse with’. If philosophy for Socrates is a kind of conversation, it is no surprise that he never wrote any philosophical works – or anything, for that matter, until his incarceration. Socrates also placed great emphasis on his own ignorance. When the Delphic oracle proclaims that there is nobody wiser than Socrates, he takes it upon himself to prove it wrong. After engaging various apparently wise people in conversation (and making plenty of enemies in the process), Socrates comes to realize the one thing that makes him a little bit wiser than others: he knows the limits of his own ignorance (Apology 21d: ‘whatever I do not know, I do not even suppose I know’). For this reason, Socrates refused to be called a teacher – he did not pass on wisdom to others as one might imagine a teacher doing, but simply helped others to see that they did not know quite as much as they thought they did.

It was not Socrates’ teachings, then, that landed him in trouble, but his modus operandi. For the method of ἔλεγχος could not only be annoying for those whose ignorance it revealed but could also be seen as a danger to the moral fabric of society, as people began to question their core values and the fundamentals of their world view. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the ἔλεγχος also became a craze among the young (Apology 23c), driven by the twin aims of philosophical zeal and a desire to annoy their elders. These imitators, few of whom can have become very adept at the ἔλεγχος, only helped to spread the moral panic. For all who saw shared Athenian values as the glue of society, it must really have seemed that Socrates was a damaging influence on the youth.

If Socrates’ interests were more in line with the other intellectuals of his day, focusing on natural sciences, rhetoric, literature and so on, the panic would surely have been less. But for Socrates, what mattered most were moral questions and the well-being of one’s ‘soul’, to use his term (Apology 30b: on the term ‘soul’ and what this means for Socrates in the Phaedo, see further below). This is the real aim of philosophy. We can get closer to it only through self-examination and the pursuit of ‘wisdom’ – that is, the knowledge of what virtue, justice and other such morally significant values really are.

Ordinarily, those sentenced to death by an Athenian jury would not have to wait long for their punishment. According to the Phaedo, however, Socrates’ trial happened to coincide with a period of enforced ritual purity in Athenian religion, during which no executions could take place. Socrates had, then, to spend an extended stint in Athens’ small state prison, near the Agora. Prisoners were free to receive visitors (as we see Socrates doing in the Phaedo) and for those who were sentenced to death, it seems generally to have been possible to leave, on the understanding that they would then go into exile. That Socrates chooses instead to take the hemlock and end his life is yet another example of his adherence to Athenian law, unswerving to the very end.

Plato and his ‘Socrates’

If the historical Socrates is hard to make out behind the evidence, Plato is almost impossible. Aside from the late biographical tradition, our other main source, a set of autobiographical letters attributed to Plato are of spurious (or at least dubious) authenticity. Plato turns up only once in his own works, and even then it is only a cameo appearance at the trial of Socrates. He never appears as a participant in any of his dialogues – not even the Phaedo, where his absence during Socrates’ last hours is attributed to illness (Phaedo 59b; one explanation for his absence, real or otherwise, is offered in the overview later in this introduction). It is from his works, however, that we can deduce the most about Plato’s intellectual development and his relationship with Socrates.

Born sometime in the 420s BC, Plato was a good forty years younger than Socrates. While the late biographical tradition calls him either the student or the follower of the older man, the picture that emerges from the Seventh Letter (of dubious authenticity but earlier date) is more of a family friend. Indeed, Plato’s uncle and great uncle Charmides and Critias, two of the Thirty Tyrants, were close friends of Socrates and figure prominently in the dialogues. Whether as one of the young men who flocked to Socrates, or simply through his family connections, Plato is bound to have seen much of Socrates during his youth. It is clear from his writings that he knew the man and his quirks well, and could give a faithful portrayal of his philosophical habits. That they were intimate friends is clear from the opening of the Phaedo, where the eponymous Phaedo, listing those present at the death of Socrates, feels he must give a reason for the absence of Plato (59b). Above all, however, the sensitivity and pathos with which Plato describes his friend’s death, years after the event, reveal his genuine and lasting affection for the man.

Plato’s intellectual debt to Socrates is clearest in his earlier works. Their detailed reconstructions of the ἔλεγχος show that Plato has mastered that technique far better than the young copycats described in the Apology. The debt is clearest, though, in the dialogue form that most of Plato’s works take. Like Socrates, Plato seems to see conversation – dialectic – as the true means of philosophy and tries to capture (or recreate) the process of philosophy in action by writing conversations rather than treatises. A clear effort is made to make the discussions as plausible and immersive as possible: while the other great master of Attic prose, Thucydides, has all his characters deliver speeches in basically the same fashion, Plato takes every opportunity to bring his interlocutors to life by careful characterization in their spoken style and through a rich use of conversational idiom. He takes clear care, too, to find the ideal setting for each conversation, so that the characters’ surroundings, company and recent experiences can offer them interesting and apposite prompts. He is, in short, a master dramatist.

Plato is not unaware of the shortcomings of written dialogues in contrast with live conversation, issues he explores in his dialogue the Phaedrus. As we read, we may have our own thoughts and questions to contribute to the conversation, but the text is ‘mute’ and cannot reply (Phaedrus 275e). Still, reading a written dialogue has all the benefits of witnessing the dialectic of others, letting us watch the participants explore and develop their arguments in real time and pause as often as we need to appraise them in our own time.

Plato does not tell us the order in which he composed his works. Carefully analysing the evolutions in his style (a practice called stylometry), scholars have striven to arrange his surviving works into a rough chronology. While many details remain disputed, most agree on a loose grouping into three periods: early, middle and late. The grouping reveals that Plato did not deal with the events in Socrates’ life in chronological order: in fact, the Apology is among his earliest writing, and he went on to produce several more works after the Phaedo, in which Socrates dies.

We can, however, trace an evolution in the ideas and practices of his Socrates over time. In the earliest dialogues, Socrates spends most of his time engaged in his method of ἔλεγχος (‘cross-examination’) and leaves his interlocutors in a state of ἀπορία. We would still expect no less from the historical Socrates. Over time, however, Socrates spends less and less time picking apart other’s beliefs and grows more inclined to put forward views of his own. His range of interests grows beyond the moral and into metaphysics; in the late Timaeus he even strays into cosmology, despite claiming elsewhere to have abandoned natural science in his youth (Phaedo 96a). It seems, then, that Plato is using Socrates more and more as a vehicle for his own philosophical explorations and feeling a dwindling obligation to keep his portrait true to the Socrates of history. In his early works, Plato was not yet using Socrates as a mouthpiece for his own views – for, of course, the Socrates of those dialogues does not put any forth. But from the middle period on, this is increasingly his role.

Stylometry places the Phaedo firmly in Plato’s middle period, rather later than the Apology (perhaps by some decades) and a little before his best-known work, the Republic. Plato had recognized that he could only tell the story of Socrates’ final hours only once and saved this dramatic setting for a time when he wished to devote a dialogue to the topics of death and the afterlife. While the Phaedo may paint a fairly accurate picture of the events of that evening, many of the ideas put forward by Socrates during his final conversations must be Plato’s own. There are the usual giveaways one would expect in a middle-period work: its ideas are (i) absent from the earlier dialogues, (ii) stray beyond the historical Socrates’ areas of interest and (iii) lack the tentativeness with which he presented ideas for discussion.

At the heart of the Phaedo lie two of Plato’s most important contributions to philosophy, the Theory of Forms and the model of the human soul. In the Phaedo both appear in an early stage of development and go on to be critiqued and refined much in Plato’s later dialogues, but are no less vital to this work’s main arguments for the immortality of the soul. On account of their crucial role in the Phaedo and in Platonism at large, both deserve a little more exploration here, before we look at the Phaedo as a whole.

The Theory of Forms

Perhaps the most famous of all his contributions to metaphysics, the so-called Theory of Forms (εἴδη) or Ideas (ἰδέαι) is subject to constant refinement in Plato’s later works, but all its iterations have the following outline in common.

The things we see in the world around us cannot be said really to be (or exist) in the strict sense of the word, since they are always in some state of change: as Plato puts it, they are ‘becoming’ (γίγνονται) rather than being. The things that really exist, by contrast, are unchanging and eternal. To this category belong the Forms, non-physical exemplars or patterns in nature (παραδείγματα) of the things we see in the world around us, and that we are reminded of when we see those things. In some dialogues we hear about forms of objects, such as tables and chairs: there is, outside our world, a Form of Table to which all the tables in our world conform. And if we know that Form, we will be able to say whether any given object is or is not a table. In the early-to-middle dialogue the Cratylus, Socrates says that when a craftsman begins to make a weaver’s shuttle, it is precisely the Form of Shuttle that he brings to mind. It is knowing this Form well, then, that allows him to perform his craft.

Elsewhere, we hear of forms corresponding to what we might call properties, such as a Form of Largeness, which all large things in our world resemble in some way. We know an object we see to be large because we know the Form of Largeness and see that the object resembles that form. Likewise, we know that something is small because we see that it resembles the Form of Smallness. Things in the world, however, are often both large and small at the same time: a cat is large in relation to a mouse, but small compared with a cow. The Forms, by contrast, are entirely free of this so-called ‘compresence of opposites’. The Form of Largeness is understood to be itself large and nothing but large, regardless of any point of comparison: that is, the Form of Largeness exemplifies itself. This is understandable, since for Plato, to know the Form of Largeness and to know what ‘large’ is are one and the same thing. It does, however, provide some problems. For instance, the Form of Largeness surely cannot be large in the way that a blue whale is large, since forms are non-physical entities. The resultant problem for the theory is explored in the later dialogue the Parmenides (the famous ‘Third Man Argument’ of 132a–b).

The Theory of Forms allows Plato to make headway on many different problems of philosophy. It gives us a way of explaining how we know what largeness is, even though we have never had anything pointed out to us that is exclusively large, and not also small when set in comparison with something even larger. It allows us to explain, too, how you and I both know what tables are, even though our personal experiences of tables may have been very different. Lastly, the Forms offer a handy, if simplistic, account of causation: for Plato, the Form of Hot is what ultimately causes my lunch to be hot, even if I might prefer to name the microwave as a more specific cause.

In the Phaedo, Plato is not yet using the words εἶδος (‘form’), ἰδέα (‘idea’, a synonym) or παραδείγμα as technical terms, the discussions of properties in the abstract, such as ‘the just itself’ (i.e. that which is just and only just), reveal that he is talking about the same thing. In the commentary, I have avoided the term ‘form’ all the same, to avoid anachronism. For, given Plato’s readiness to challenge and overhaul his own ideas, we must take care not to read any later thoughts about the forms back into the Phaedo.

Plato on the soul

Readers familiar with Homer will know that in the worlds of the Iliad and Odyssey, a certain part of a person lives on in Hades, the underworld, after their death. Homer calls this thing a ψυχή, which we translate as ‘soul’. It is ghostlike and insubstantial, but still has the identifiable shape of the person it belonged to. In Greek, the word ψυχή has two other familiar senses, ‘life’ (i.e. that which distinguishes living things from dead) and ‘mind’, the seat of the intellect and emotions (hence our modern derivation, ‘psychology’). Any speaker of Greek would agree that a living person has ψυχή, even though they might disagree on the question of what exactly it is. We therefore cannot dismiss that question just because the corresponding English term ‘soul’ is no longer much used outside religious circles. We will find it to be a harder one to answer than meets the eye.

In the Phaedo, the interlocutors approach the question in an open-minded way, using the Homeric associations of the term ψυχή only as a springboard for discussion. The term allows the interlocutors to suggest a simple definition of death: the separation of the ψυχή from the body. This does the job, since death is the point beyond which the body no longer shows any signs of life, feeling or cognition. Nor does the definition assume that the ψυχή is an actual thing in its own right: for later on, the interlocutors are happy to consider the possibility that the soul is something more like the tuning of a lyre, which cannot exist apart from the instrument. It is, in short, perfectly possible for Greeks to use the term ψυχή without committing themselves to the belief that it is anything more than a property of living things. In this respect, it is very different to our own term ‘soul’. Henceforth and in the commentary, I use the term ‘soul’ as a translation for ψυχή, since that is the convention in Platonic scholarship. Readers must try not to let their own associations with word colour their reading, and know that this is generally less awkward than using the Greek term instead.

While it is hard to imagine Socrates’ final conversations involving anything like the Theory of Forms (he would surely have seen that kind of metaphysical enquiry as lying outside the remit of his knowledge and his interests), it is easier to see him speculating what, if anything, would happen to his soul after death. Indeed, if Plato’s Apology does accurately represent Socrates’ defence speech, he may already have indulged in some such speculation at his trial. At the end of the Apology, Socrates presents the court with two possibilities: either being dead is a kind of sleep, and a dead person feels nothing more after death, or, as many think, the soul passes from this world to another place (40c–d). For him, both outcomes are attractive, for we all enjoy a good night’s sleep; and if he should end up in the company of those who died before him, he can look forward to meeting and performing the ἔλεγχος on Odysseus, Sisyphus and countless other famous people (41b–c).

By contrast, the Socrates of the Phaedo is far more confident in his opinions on the soul. He is unshakeable in his faith that it will outlast his body and end up in the company of other good men and, indeed, gods. This is quite a way away from the non-committal Socrates of the Apology, but we might expect as much from a middle-period dialogue, as Plato begins to explore the nature of the soul himself through the medium of his interlocutors.

Several key ideas emerge from the Phaedo. The soul is indestructible and cannot die, a view the interlocutors feel to be conclusively proven at the end of the dialogue. It has much in common with the Forms, and is even said to be ‘akin’ to them: the soul, like the Forms, is incorporeal and invisible, and can only be grasped by the mind. Like the Forms it is also a true cause, not of largeness or tables but of life. It must, they agree, also be incomposite, that is, not divisible into parts.

Why do people behave the way they do, and not simply pursue wisdom? In the Phaedo, it is suggested that an average person’s soul is not entirely rational or irrational, but somewhere in the middle. The irrationality is the result of the soul’s contamination with the body, whose needs and desires it must service while the two are joined together. Anyone wishing to come closer to being rational must bow as little as possible to the body’s demands. But to be fully free of its contamination only becomes possible when one dies, and then only after a life devoted to purifying the soul of its influence. Anyone who achieves this goal, suggests Socrates, can look forward to joining the gods and enjoying the pursuit of wisdom in the company of other truly philosophical souls. Others will find themselves reincarnated as animals, the species matching the nature of their souls (the greedy and merciless, for instance, may become wolves). The theory thus offers a side benefit of explaining the characteristics of different animals.

Plato offers a radically different picture of the soul in later dialogues. In the Republic and the Phaedrus, the soul is seen as having three parts that must be reconciled. Book 4 of the Republic offers the clearest description: the first part (the smallest) is the seat of rational thought, one the seat of the emotions and one responsible for the appetites of the body. A soul can be called ‘just’ only if it allows the rational part to rule the others (Republic 4.439d–e). In the Phaedrus, Socrates offers the allegory of a charioteer, who representing the rational part of the soul. His chariot is led by two horses: on the right is a white one of noble stock, representing the higher-minded side of emotional impulse (such as moral outrage), and on the left a far wilder dark horse, representing the less noble urges. The charioteer’s job is to keep both horses running in the same direction, towards wisdom (Phaedrus 253c–254e). The appeal of a tripartite model for the soul is that it can explain why a person might behave rationally at one moment and impetuously or lustfully at another. It also explains why many people have a tendency towards one or other kind of drive: they are allowing the part of the soul responsible to rule the others.

Plato, of course, does not explain the move from the Phaedo’s idea of the soul to the tripartite models of the Republic and Phaedrus – we must puzzle out his reasons for ourselves. One way in which the tripartite models improve on the Phaedo’s is in their accounting for emotions. It is easy enough to see how irrational appetites might arise from the body’s contamination of the soul, since these are usually associated with the needs of the body. When hunger distracts me from my work, it is easy to blame the body. But when I feel anger at an unjust act against a stranger, it is difficult to see on the Phaedo’s model where that comes from: it is not a purely rational response, so impossible for a totally pure soul, but what needs of the body could it be seen to meet? The tripartite models recognize, too, that not all irrational drives are to the detriment of the soul, at least while it is paired with a body. What is damaging is an imbalance of power away from the rational element.

The Phaedo: an overview

The dramatic setting for the Phaedo is in the city of Phlius, not quite 20 miles west of Corinth in the Peloponnese. There we see the eponymous Phaedo recounting to his friend Echecrates the final hours and execution of Socrates, at which Phaedo had been present. Although most of the dialogue is taken up with Phaedo’s account, he pauses on occasion to reflect with Echecrates on what is happening in his story (88c–89b, 102a–b). The conversations between Phaedo and Echecrates are, however, much more than a framing device. By having Phaedo relay the final hours of Socrates at second hand, Plato is able to provide bits of narrative description that would otherwise have been impossible: for Plato, like all ancient dramatists, never includes stage directions. Phaedo’s most important is to describe the events that follow Socrates’ last conversations, as he takes the hemlock and meets his end.

His other job is to explain why Plato is not telling the events in his own voice. As Phaedo tells Echecrates, Plato was absent on Socrates’ final evening because he was ill (59b). Do we believe him? Was it in fact the historical Phaedo who told Plato everything that happened in the prison that night? These things cannot be known. But we can be sure that Plato wants us to reflect on the impossibility of Phaedo remembering the whole evening’s conversation. Phaedo has only one lapse of memory in the whole dialogue, forgetting which of the company raised a certain objection (103a). What the person said, however, is relayed verbatim. With this one unlikely lapse, I suspect Plato wishes to flag up the artificiality of the dialogue, and remind us that, despite centring on the real Socrates’ preoccupation with the well-being of the soul, the conversations of the Phaedo are ultimately Plato’s fiction.

Plato weaves various themes into the framing conversation and those relayed by Phaedo. These two elements of the work are united, first of all, by the common theme of religious purification. Socrates, we learn, had to wait for his execution because his trial fell at a time when, by Athenian religion, any execution would make the city unclean (see below). True or not, this foreshadows Socrates’ belief that the main task of philosophers during their lifetime is the κάθαρσις, or cleansing, of their souls from the toxic influences of the body (see 64e6 and 69c–d, with commentary). A second recurrent theme is the religiosity of Socrates. One of the charges of which his jury had convicted him was not recognizing the same gods as Athens (see p. 74 above), and in the Phaedo Plato often seems to be trying to vindicate Socrates of this charge. On several occasions he shows a special devotion to Apollo, composing a hymn to him (60d) and likening himself the swan, who sings its death-song to that god (84c). It is surely no coincidence that the god in whose honour Athens is keeping itself ritually clean at the time of his trial is also Apollo (58b–c). Finally, Socrates’ last words are to ask Crito to pay a cockerel he owes to Asclepius, god of healing and son of Apollo (118a). Plato, perhaps still smarting from the unjust condemnation of his friend, ends the Phaedo with this reminder of how wrong the accusers were.

A key part of the Phaedo’s drama is a tug of war between Socrates, keen to show his friends that he has every reason to look forward to death, and his friends, who cannot fight the very human urge to console the condemned man. The friends keep getting this wrong. For instance, shortly before Socrates takes the hemlock, Crito asks how he wants to be buried. Socrates chides his friend for confusing Socrates with his dead body, adding that they would be lucky to catch him (115c). Simmias, earlier on, admits he is hesitant to find fault with Socrates’ argument and upset him at this difficult time, forgetting that Socrates is in fact in a good mood (84c–85b). It is indeed often hard to tell how persuaded Socrates’ friends are by his arguments, and tempting at times to see them as going along with him out of pity or respect. We are left wondering how much Phaedo himself has bought into them: for despite his the traces of good cheer in his voice at the beginning of the dialogue (58e–59a), Plato has him end with such an emotionally charged description of Socrates’ death. And in the scene’s final detail (‘Crito closed his mouth and eyes’, 118a), is Phaedo not committing the same error that Crito had made earlier? These are all welcome provocations to us, as the readers, to chew over the arguments and see how much of them we ourselves are convinced by.

A word, finally, is needed on the convention for referring to parts of the text – for many readers will have noticed that the section numbering of the Phaedo begins not at 1 but 57. For centuries Platonists have followed the page numbering used by the Swiss scholar H. Stephanus in his 1578 edition of Plato’s complete works. In the reference ‘Phaedo 57a1’, the first number refers to the page of Stephanus’ edition while the letter tells you the section of that page (each is divided into five sections, a–e). The second number, on the other hand, refers to the line as it is printed in John Burnet’s Oxford Classical Texts edition. The same line numbering has been followed by most scholars since Burnet, a convention followed in this book.

The main characters

Phaedo of Elis appears only here in all of Plato. In fact, the only other sources to mention him are the third-century AD biographer of philosophers, Diogenes Laertius and Aulus Gellius a century before that. Some of what Diogenes says has a ring of falsehood to it, sounding like a fantasy based on the Phaedo – for instance, that he was taken as a prisoner of war by the Athenians, sold into sex-slavery and then ransomed by Crito and Alcibiades at Socrates’ request (Diogenes Laertius 2.105). He seems to have been a philosopher of at least some importance, however, for he is derided along with various other thinkers in a fragment by the satirist Timon of Phlius (fr. 28: ‘I don’t care … for Phaedo, whoever he is’).

Echecrates of Phlius is another figure about whom little information survives. It is clear from the Phaedo that he is a philosopher with Pythagorean leanings, a detail corroborated by Aristoxenus in the generation after Plato. By having a known Pythagorean as one of his interlocutors, Plato sets an appropriate tone for a discussion of the ethics of suicide and of reincarnation, topics that loom large in Pythagorean doctrine.

Simmias and Cebes are two Thebans who, according to Plato’s Crito (45b), have come to Athens with money to help Socrates escape from prison. While some scholars assume them to be Pythagoreans, this is far from clear: all we hear in the Phaedo is that they had once listened to Philolaus, a famous Pythagorean, on his visit to Thebes (61d), though they cannot remember what he had to say on the ethics of suicide. What emerges from the dialogue is that they are both well-informed philosophers, the former very ready to agree and the latter a little more sceptical.

Crito is a wealthy Athenian friend of Socrates, from his home deme (district) of Alopeke and of about the same age (Apology 33e). Roughly the same age as Socrates, Crito turns up in various Socratic works of Xenophon and Plato, including the eponymous dialogue cited above. Despite the claims of Diogenes Laertius, Crito does not come across as a philosopher but a successful farmer who married into an aristocratic family and remained lifelong friends with Socrates. In the Phaedo, he is shown to be a practically minded man, concerned more with taking care of Socrates than with the philosophical discussions.

57a–59c: Opening conversation

Echecrates, learning that Phaedo was present on Socrates’ final evening, asks Phaedo to describe his final conversations – for Phaedo is the first person to come to Phlius from Athens since then. Echecrates had heard, however, about the delay between trial and execution. Phaedo explains that on the day before the trial, the ship sent yearly to Delos, to commemorate the safe return of Theseus from Crete, had been crowned and sent on its way, in accordance with an ancient vow made by the Athenians to Apollo. No executions could be performed until the ship had returned to Athens. Phaedo describes his feelings that evening, ‘a mixture of pleasure and pain combined’ (59a), but not pity. He lists the various people present, mentioning Plato’s absence on grounds of illness. According to Phaedo, Socrates’ friends had been in the habit of visiting him every day and spending the day in philosophical discussion. On that day that had come especially early, as they had heard that the ship was back from Delos.

60a–61b: Socrates introduced

Phaedo describes how, on entering, they found Socrates’ wife Xanthippe with their little son, bidding him an impassioned farewell. Socrates merely asks for her to be taken home. He reflects on how pleasure and pain rarely visit a person together, but one tends to follow the other. Socrates tells Cebes how he had been instructed in a dream to ‘make art and practise it’. Previously he had taken this to mean that he should perform philosophy, a very high art form. While in prison, however, he had interpreted it as an instruction to write poetry, so had written a hymn to Apollo and set some of Aesop’s fables to verse.

61b–63a: A philosopher should look forward to death, though suicide is wrong

Socrates gives Cebes a message to pass on to his poet and philosopher friend Euenus: he is setting off today, and if he has any sense, Euenus will follow him as soon as possible, since true philosophers will look forward to death. Cebes is shocked, but Socrates reassures him that he is not advising him to take his own life. He asks Simmias and Cebes if they had ever heard the Pythagorean Philolaus give his reasons why suicide is wrong during his stay in Thebes. (Given the Pythagoreans’ belief in reincarnation, their opinions on the matter are surely of interest.) They do not recall what Philolaus said. They agree on the view, based loosely on that of the mystery religions (62b), that humans are the possessions of the gods and they look after us. In that case it would be wrong to die before the gods wish it and make it unavoidable – as they now have to Socrates.

63b–69e: Socrates defends the view that a philosopher should look forward to death

Cebes is keen to hear how Socrates can reconcile this belief, that we should not wish to leave the stewardship of the gods, with his evident keenness to die. Socrates takes this as an invitation to give another defence speech (ἀπολογία), and hopes that this time he can do a better job of persuading the jury – that is, his friends – than he did at his actual trial. Before he begins his defence, Crito relays the advice of the executioner that Socrates should not get too animated, otherwise he will need extra doses of the poison. (Prisoners who chose to be executed by hemlock had to pay for it themselves, and it did not come cheap.) Socrates explains that that would be fine by him.

He opens his defence with the provocative claim that philosophers do nothing but ‘practise dying and being dead’ (64a). He gets Simmias to agree that death can be defined as the separation of the soul from the body, and that philosophers are not much bothered with the concerns of the body (such as food, clothes and sex) and care more for the soul. They agree that philosophers have most success in achieving their aims when the body is allowed to distract them as little as possible, either with its needs or with perceptions from the sense-organs. They agree that we only come to know the things that have real existence (i.e. the Forms, though they are not called that here) through thinking alone, and that our sense-organs are of no help in that endeavour. In fact, they are unreliable and only hold us back. Philosophers, then, should strive to separate themselves as far as they can from the body – something that can only be achieved fully when they die. That being the case, they are bound to look forward to death rather than resent it and will spend their lives getting their souls ready for that moment.

Philosophers are therefore very different from ordinary people, who tend to prioritize the concerns of the body ahead of the pursuit of wisdom (which for Plato amounts to knowing the things that really exist). They differ, too, in that for them, the virtues of courage and moderation are genuine products of wisdom: they do not fear death or give in to the body’s temptations simply because they know that ridding themselves of the body is in their interests. Normal people, on the other hand, only have an inferior kind of courage, motivated by a fear of something worse, and an inferior kind of moderation, holding off from some pleasures so they can pursue others. Socrates has striven throughout his life to belong to the group of true philosophers and will soon find out whether his efforts have been successful. On that note he ends his defence speech.

69e–78b: The ‘Cyclical Argument’ for immortality and the argument from the Theory of Recollection

As Cebes points out, everything Socrates has said assumes that the soul is not destroyed at death but will live on, which goes against what most people think (70a). Socrates will need to show not just that the soul survives death but that it retains its intelligence, contrary to the Homeric view (see commentary on 70a5). The first two arguments for immortality address each of these two concerns in turn.

As a starting point, Socrates cites the ancient idea of reincarnation that the souls of the dead become the souls of the living, just as the living become the dead. He then leads Cebes through the following argument in favour of that view: all things that are larger must previously have been smaller, and vice versa. This is the case for all such opposites. Between any such pair, there are two ‘processes of becoming’ – for example, becoming bigger and becoming smaller – going in both directions. The opposite states of sleeping and being awake have between them processes we call falling asleep and waking up. Likewise, being dead and being alive must also have two processes between them: dying and, balancing that, coming back to life. If these did not balance each other out, then the world would run out of souls. Since that plainly has not happened, the living must be coming back to life after being dead, and vice versa. Compelled by the argument’s logic, Cebes accepts its conclusion. We, however, might ask why all pairs of opposites should conform to this pattern. Being young and being old, for instance, are opposites of a similar sort, but we would not so willingly say that there are two balanced processes of becoming between them, only growing old. Socrates, it seems, has had to pull the wool over Cebes’ eyes here. Luckily for them both, Socrates will offer strong arguments later on.

Cebes is reminded of a theory of Socrates’ that may be of relevance to their present enquiries. According to this theory, all of what we call learning is really recollection of things we had come to know in a previous state of existence. This argument, which had first appeared in Plato’s Meno, runs as follows. Socrates meets a slave boy, who does not know how to work out the area of a square. By a series of well-chosen (or, we might say, leading) questions, he leads the slave boy to solve the problem and arrive at a rule for other squares. The slave boy has not had any of this told to him directly, but has been led to reveal it himself through Socrates’ questions. For Socrates, this shows that he really had the knowledge in him all along, and is not learning it but simply recollecting it (see Meno 81a–86b).

This alone is not enough, however, to show that the soul remains intelligent when parted from its body and answer that part of Cebes’ question. Socrates therefore gives a fuller version of the theory, running roughly as follows. It is possible to be reminded of one thing by the sight or sound of another thing. For instance, I might be reminded by a guitarist just by seeing her guitar, even if she herself is not there. The same is true of the things that have real existence (i.e. the Forms, though again they are not named as such here). If I see two Lego bricks of the same size and shape, they remind me of equality (i.e. the Form of Equal). I have never seen equality itself, or perceived it by any other sense. So I must have known about it beforehand; otherwise I could not be said to be reminded of it. If I did not come to know it through the senses, it must have happened before I was born. Our souls, therefore, must have existed (and possessed intelligence) before we were born.

As Simmias points out, this only shows that our souls existed before birth, not after death. Socrates suggests that the argument could work in tandem with the one before it (the Cyclical Argument) to prove that the soul is immortal.

78b–80c: The ‘Affinity (or Kinship) Argument’ for immortality

Unsatisfied, perhaps, with the previous arguments – the first of which had indeed involved some sleight of hand – Socrates offers a new one. He observes that a distinction can be made between the things in the world we perceive with our senses and the set of things that really exist (the Forms), which we can grasp only with our minds. The former is subject to constant change; the things in it die or break apart and are themselves made up of parts. By contrast, the things that really exist are unchanging, undying and incomposite. The soul, he observes, is surely akin to the latter, since it is invisible; the body, on the other hand, clearly belongs to the first group, since it is visible and dies. If the soul belongs to the latter group, it must also be undying – presuming, at least, that it has been suitably prepared by a life spent in philosophy.

80c–84b: Reincarnation

Socrates offers a hypothesis on what will happen to the souls after death. He thinks it likely that the purified souls of philosophers will ascend to the realm of the gods. Everyone else’s will drift about like the shades of the dead in Homer until they are reincarnated as animals in accordance with their natures: the greedy and bloodthirsty will become wolves or birds of prey, while more orderly (but not philosophical) souls will be ants or bees.

84c–85b: Socrates’ swan song

Simmias and Cebes are reluctant to voice their concerns with what Socrates has just said. Socrates picks up on this, and they admit that they did not want to upset him in his time of difficulty. Socrates reminds them that he is in good spirits: he is like the swan, a fellow devotee of Apollo that sings its most beautiful song just before it dies, and is likewise filled with prophecy and joy as he approaches his own death.

85b–95a: Simmias and Cebes offer their opinions; Socrates refutes them

What if, asks Simmias, the soul is really like the harmonious tuning of a lyre – invisible and akin the divine (Harmonia, whose name means harmony or tuning, is a goddess)? Why should it not be destroyed along with the body, then, just as the destruction of the musical instrument means the destruction of its tuning too?

Cebes, too, gives an objection of his own: what if the soul is like a weaver, who makes himself a new cloak every time the previous one is worn out? He will keep replacing his cloaks while he lives, but will one day die, and his final cloak after a time will disintegrate. Perhaps it is the same for the soul: it will produce a new body for itself every time the last one dies, but this process might be finite, with the soul one day dying itself. If that is the case, we should be afraid that the death we are about to die is our last.

Echecrates, who has been listening silently to Phaedo up to this point, now interrupts him, and the two briefly discuss how difficult these objections must have been for Socrates to fend off. Returning to his narrative, Phaedo tells how Socrates warned those present not to become haters of arguments (‘misologues’). For just as people come to be misanthropes after just a few bad experiences with other people, so it would be easy to slip into misology just because a few arguments in which you had placed your hopes later turn out to be unsound.

Taking on Simmias’ objection first, Socrates explains that the soul cannot be a harmony. For wickedness is a form of disharmony, and if all souls are harmonious then they must all be free of wickedness, which is false. What is more, it is clear that some parts of the soul (the purely rational) are in opposition to others (those contaminated with the desires of the body). Since opposition is a form of disharmony, the soul cannot be a harmony.

The response to Cebes’ objection will come in the form of the Final Argument (see below).

95a–102a: Socrates describes his intellectual development

Socrates explains how he came to scorn the natural science so beloved by Anaxagoras and other early philosophers. He had hoped to find in them a true explanation of the causes of things, but found that their accounts of causation were never any good. In time, he came to see that the true causes of things were the Forms: something is beautiful precisely because the (Form of) Beautiful makes them beautiful (100d). An appeal to the Forms is, he says, the safest answer on questions of causation.

102a–107b: The ‘Final Argument’ for the immortality of the soul

Simmias, Cebes and all those in Socrates’ company agree with his method of explaining causation, and this in turn prompts Echecrates and Phaedo to voice their agreement too. Using this method, Socrates now turns to his final argument, which boils down to the observation that the soul is ultimately the cause of life (and so rather like a Form of Life). It runs as follows. For any pair of opposites A and B, A cannot become B without ceasing to be A. This is true of opposite properties (e.g. ‘hot’ and ‘cold’), and something similar is true, too, of things that have those opposed properties (e.g. fire and snow): snow cannot become hot without ceasing to be snow. The soul can be said always to bring life with it, since everything that is alive has a soul. Therefore, a soul cannot have the property ‘dead’ without ceasing to be a soul. Since that which cannot become dead cannot be destroyed, the soul must be indestructible – that is, immortal.

We might well object to the claim that what cannot become dead cannot be destroyed. Objects that were not alive to begin with, such as the book you are holding, seem an obvious counterexample. Simmias suspects that some objections to the argument will come to him later, but Socrates reassures him that the argument will be able to withstand them once they have clarified its hypotheses.

107c–115a: Socrates’ myth of the afterlife and the true earth

Since the soul is immortal, there must be a whole story to be discovered as to where it goes when it dies, where it dwells between its incarnations and how this fits in with our wider understanding of the way the world works. Socrates accordingly offers a possible account (μῦθος) of all this, describing the journey of the souls to Hades, the topography of the underworld and the rewards and punishments of the good philosophers and the bad non-philosophers. Socrates points out that what matters are not whether the details of the myth are literally true, but that we are happy to accept that something along such lines is true. The tale, then, can serve as a charm against the fear of death, which will spur us on in our quest to become good philosophers in our present lives.

115b–118a: The final scene

To summarize this moving episode would risk lessening its effect. All serious students should read and appreciate it on its own terms. They will find in it much to reflect upon.

Further reading

The Apology is an ideal starting point for further exploration of Plato. It is a wonderful work of prose in its own right, but also paints in colourful but faithful detail the character of Socrates, which is so important to Plato’s works of all periods. The Meno is a sensible second port of call, a transitional work between the early and middle periods, in which we can watch Socrates apply the ἔλεγχος in discussion on his home turf of ethics, and witness an earlier argument for the Theory of Recollection. Thereafter, readers are advised just to follow their noses and try works on topics that interest them. Detailed summaries of numerous dialogues can be found on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (plato.stanford.edu) and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (iep.utm.edu).

For an accessible but in-depth introduction to each of the dialogues, the best starting point is Peter Adamson’s recent book Classical Philosophy (Oxford 2014). The book offers wide-ranging coverage of Ancient Greek Philosophy from its very beginnings and an excellent discussion of the evidence problems for Socrates – all vital background for the study of Plato. The book’s contents are based almost to the letter on Adamson’s series of podcasts, all of which are free to download at historyofphilosophy.net.

Those wishing to delve deeper into the Phaedo have a wealth of resources to assist their journey. Among the translations, Hugh Tredennick’s wonderfully clear and idiomatic translation is the most widely available, in his Penguin Classics edition The Last Days of Socrates, which also includes his translation of the Apology. David Gallop offers another very modern and readable translation in his Plato: Phaedo (Oxford 1975), accompanied by a detailed philosophical commentary. Lastly, Reginald Hackforth’s translation (Cambridge 1955) is recommended for its helpful division of the work into more manageable segments of a few pages, each with a summary and piece of lucid philosophical analysis. Many will find this the most accessible point of entry, even if the English is at times rather dated.

Among the texts and commentaries on the Greek, John Burnet’s 1911 edition deserves a special mention, as his Greek text (printed also in the Oxford Classical Texts series) has been the foundation for all subsequent editions of the text, including the one printed in this book. I would encourage any reader of the Phaedo to peruse at least the introduction to Burnet’s edition, where he defends courageously the view that the Phaedo is an accurate account of Socrates’ final conversations. The view is presently out of fashion, but Burnet puts it as well as it can be put. The commentary that I have found most helpful in preparing my own, however, is C.J. Rowe’s in the Cambridge ‘green-and-yellow’ series (Cambridge 1993). Though demanding in its detail, Rowe’s commentary is a great help on both linguistic and philosophical points for those wishing to read beyond the prescriptions.

Lastly, David Bostock’s Plato’s Phaedo offers a fantastic philosophical exploration of the whole dialogue, in very accessible English, as well as a fine discussion of the historical Socrates. The ideas are as tricky as ever, and the content is no easy read as Bostock plays rival interpretations offagainst each other. But anyone who wants to dig deeper into the arguments in the prescription they have read, or those of any part of the Phaedo, should enjoy taking on Bostock.

Timeline

c. 469	birth of Socrates
431	beginning of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta
428/7	birth of Plato (according to the biographer Diogenes Laertius)
423	first staging of Aristophanes’ Clouds
420–417	Aristophanes redrafts the Clouds
406	Battle of Arginusae and the execution of the Athenian generals
404	end of the Peloponnesian War and overthrow of the democracy
403	restoration of the democracy
399	trial and execution of Socrates
c. 398	Bostock’s suggested date for the Apology
c. 388	Plato visits Sicily and stays with Dionysius I of Syracuse
c. 384	Bostock’s suggested date for the Phaedo
348/7	death of Plato (according to Diogenes)

Rough chronology of Plato’s works

Few of Plato’s works can be assigned a date with any confidence. They are therefore listed separately here, in the conventional groupings of early, middle and late. Within each group, the ordering given below (taken from Bostock, p. 2) is rather less certain than the groupings themselves.

Early

Apology

Crito

Ion

Hippias minor

Euthyphro

Lysis

Laches

Charmides

Hippias major

Meno

Euthydemus

Protagoras

Gorgias

Early or middle

Cratylus

Middle

Phaedo

Symposium

Republic

Phaedrus

Middle or late

Timaeus

Critias

Late

Parmenides

Theaetetus

Sophist

Statesman

Philebus

Laws

Text

ἀλλ᾽ εἰκός, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, τοῦτό γε φαίνεται. ὃ μέντοι	62c9
νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, τὸ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν
ἀποθνῄσ κειν, ἔοικεν τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀτόπῳ, εἴπερ ὃ	62d
νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν εὐλόγως ἔχει, τὸ θεόν τε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιμελούμενον ἡμῶν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐκείνου κτήματα εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας
ἀπιόντας, ἐν ᾗ ἐπιστατοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἵπερ ἄριστοί εἰσιν τῶν	5
ὄντων ἐπιστάται, θεοί, οὐκ ἔχει λόγον· οὐ γάρ που αὐτός γε αὑτοῦ οἴεται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ἐλεύθερος γενόμενος. ἀλλ᾽ ἀνόητος μὲν ἄνθρωπος τάχ᾽ ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον
εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν λογίζοιτο ὅτι οὐ δεῖ ἀπό	62e
γε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μάλιστα παραμένειν, διὸ ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι· ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων ἐπιθυμοῖ που ἂν ἀεὶ εἶναι παρὰ τῷ αὑτοῦ βελτίονι. καίτοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες,
τοὐναντίον εἶναι εἰκὸς ἢ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο· τοὺς μὲν γὰρ	5
φρονίμους ἀγανακτεῖν ἀποθνῄσκοντας πρέπει, τοὺς δὲ ἄφρονας χαίρειν. ἀκούσας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης ἡσθῆναί τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ
Kέβητος πραγματείᾳ, καὶ ἐπιβλέψας εἰς ἡμᾶς, ἀεί τοι,	63a
ἔφη, ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ, καὶ οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὅτι ἄν τις εἴπῃ. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας, ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γέ μοι
δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης· τί γὰρ ἂν βουλόμενοι	5
ἄνδρες σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεσπότας ἀμείνους αὑτῶν φεύγοιεν καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀπαλλάττοιντο αὐτῶν; καί μοι δοκεῖ Κέβης εἰς σὲ τείνειν τὸν λόγον, ὅτι οὕτω ῥᾳδίως φέρεις καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀπολείπων καὶ ἄρχοντας ἀγαθούς, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς, θεούς.
δίκαια, ἔφη, λέγετε· οἶμαι γὰρ ὑμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι χρή με	63b
πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας. φέρε δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, πειραθῶ πιθανώτερον πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπολογήσασθαι
ἢ πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε	5
καὶ Κέβης, εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾤμην ἥξειν πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ θεοὺς ἄλλους σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθούς, ἔπειτα καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκότας ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, ἠδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν τῷ θανάτῳ· νῦν δὲ εὖ ἴστε ὅτι παρ᾽
ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς – καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν	63c
πάνυ διισχυρισαίμην – ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθοὺς ἥξειν, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων διισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα οὐχ ὁμοίως
ἀγανακτῶ, ἀλλ᾽ εὔελπίς εἰμι εἶναί τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι καί,	5
ὥσπερ γε καὶ πάλαι λέγεται, πολὺ ἄμεινον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἢ τοῖς κακοῖς. τί οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὦ Σώκρατες; αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, ἢ κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοίης;
κοινὸν γὰρ δὴ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καὶ ἡμῖν εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, καὶ	63d
ἅμα σοι ἡ ἀπολογία ἔσται, ἐὰν ἅπερ λέγεις ἡμᾶς πείσῃς. ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι, ἔφη. πρῶτον δὲ Κρίτωνα τόνδε σκεψώμεθα τί ἐστιν ὃ βούλεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν.
τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων, ἄλλο γε ἢ πάλαι	5
μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων σοι δώσειν τὸ φάρμακον ὅτι χρή σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι; φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν
τῷ φαρμάκῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνίοτε ἀναγκάζεσθαι καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς	63e
πίνειν τούς τι τοιοῦτον ποιοῦντας. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἔα, ἔφη, χαίρειν αὐτόν· ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρασκευαζέτω ὡς καὶ δὶς δώσων, ἐὰν δὲ δέῃ,
καὶ τρίς.	5
ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν μέν τι ᾔδη, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλά μοι πάλαι πράγματα παρέχει. ἔα αὐτόν, ἔφη. ἀλλ᾽ ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὥς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ
ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μέλλων	10
ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὔελπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ	64a
ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ. πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχοι, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.
κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι
φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ	5
ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἄτοπον δήπου ἂν εἴη προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἥκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν ὃ πάλαι προυθυμοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον.
καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας, νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,	10
οὐ πάνυ γέ με νυνδὴ γελασείοντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι. οἶμαι	64b
γὰρ ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρῆσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας – καὶ συμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ – ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες
θανατῶσι, καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσιν	5
τοῦτο πάσχειν. καὶ ἀληθῆ γ᾽ ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλήν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι. λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ᾗ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ᾗ ἄξιοί εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἵου θανάτου οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι.
εἴπωμεν γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις·	64c
ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας. ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος
ἀπαλλαγήν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς	5
ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἶναι; ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ᾖ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο; οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἔφη.
σκέψαι δή, ὠγαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκῇ ἅπερ ἐμοί·	10
ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν.	64d
φαίνεταί σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν;
ἥκιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.	5
τί δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; οὐδαμῶς. τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας; δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἷον ἱματίων διαφερόντων
κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς	10
τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμάζειν,
καθ᾽ ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν;	64e
ἀτιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς
φιλόσοφος. οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία
οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται	5
ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι; ἔμοιγε. ἆρ᾽ οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ
φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ	65a
σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; φαίνεται. καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ᾧ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἳ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις. τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πότερον
ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὔ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει	10
κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ; οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἆρα ἔχει	65b
ἀλήθειάν τινα ὄψις τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὔτ᾽ ἀκούομεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν; καίτοι εἰ αὗται τῶν περὶ τὸ
σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ	5
αἵ γε ἄλλαι· πᾶσαι γάρ που τούτων φαυλότεραί εἰσιν. ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. πότε οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἅπτεται; ὅταν
μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι	10
τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ.
ἀληθῆ λέγεις.	65c
ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεταί τι τῶν ὄντων; ναί.
λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων	5
μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀλγηδὼν μηδέ τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν γίγνηται ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ᾽ ἁπτομένη ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος.
ἔστι ταῦτα.	10
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα
ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ᾽	65d
αὑτὴν γίγνεσθαι; φαίνεται. τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὦ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον
αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν;	5
φαμὲν μέντοι νὴ Δία. καὶ αὖ καλόν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν; πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; ἤδη οὖν πώποτέ τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες;
οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.	10
ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν; λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑνὶ λόγῳ ἁπάντων τῆς οὐσίας ὃ
τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν· ἆρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ	65e
ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὧδε ἔχει· ὃς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσηται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἕκαστον;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	5
ἆρ᾽ οὖν ἐκεῖνος ἂν τοῦτο ποιήσειεν καθαρώτατα ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ᾽ ἕκαστον, μήτε τιν᾽ ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι μήτε τινὰ ἄλλην
αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτῇ	66a
καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων, ἀπαλλαγεὶς ὅτι μάλιστα ὀφθαλμῶν τε καὶ ὤτων καὶ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν σύμπαντος
τοῦ σώματος, ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐῶντος	5
τὴν ψυχὴν κτήσασθαι ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ φρόνησιν ὅταν κοινωνῇ; ἆρ᾽ οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν, ὦ Σιμμία, εἴπερ τις καὶ ἄλλος ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος; ὑπερφυῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ
Σώκρατες.	10
οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἐκ πάντων τούτων παρίστασθαι	66b
δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις, ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτα ἄττα λέγειν, ὅτι ‘κινδυνεύει τοι ὥσπερ ἀτραπός τις ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς μετὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῇ σκέψει,
ὅτι, ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ᾖ ἡμῶν ἡ	5
ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές. μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν
τροφήν· ἔτι δέ, ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν, ἐμποδίζουσιν	66c
ἡμῶν τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θήραν. ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς, ὥστε τὸ λεγόμενον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι ὑπ᾽
αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν. καὶ	5
γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίγνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα
ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου	66d
θεραπείᾳ· καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα. τὸ δ᾽ ἔσχατον πάντων ὅτι, ἐάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ
σκοπεῖν τι, ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν αὖ πανταχοῦ παραπῖπτον	5
θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει, ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν τἀληθές. ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι,
ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ	66e
πράγματα· καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καί φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὔ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷόν τε
μετὰ τοῦ σώματος μηδὲν καθαρῶς γνῶναι, δυοῖν θάτερον,	5
ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἔστιν κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτήσασιν· τότε
γὰρ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος,	67a
πρότερον δ᾽ οὔ. καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν, οὕτως, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγγυτάτω ἐσόμεθα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ὅτι μάλιστα μηδὲν ὁμιλῶμεν τῷ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη,
μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως, ἀλλὰ καθαρεύωμεν	5
ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς· καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς μετὰ τοιούτων τε ἐσόμεθα καὶ γνωσόμεθα δι᾽ ἡμῶν
αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές·	67b
μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ’. τοιαῦτα οἶμαι, ὦ Σιμμία, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους λέγειν τε καὶ δοξάζειν πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς. ἢ οὐ
δοκεῖ σοι οὕτως;	5
παντός γε μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
οὐκοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ οἷ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι, ἐκεῖ ἱκανῶς, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, κτήσασθαι τοῦτο οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ πολλὴ
πραγματεία ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ γέγονεν, ὥστε ἥ γε	10
ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη μετὰ ἀγαθῆς ἐλπίδος	67c
γίγνεται καὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνδρὶ ὃς ἡγεῖταί οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν ὥσπερ κεκαθαρμένην. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
κάθαρσις δὲ εἶναι ἆρα οὐ τοῦτο συμβαίνει, ὅπερ πάλαι	5
ἐν τῷ λόγῳ λέγεται, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐθίσαι αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν πανταχόθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι, καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι καὶ ἐν τῷ
ἔπειτα μόνην καθ᾽ αὑτήν, ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ	67d
τοῦ σώματος; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε θάνατος ὀνομάζεται, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς
ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος;	5
παντάπασί γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. λύειν δέ γε αὐτήν, ὥς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς
ἀπὸ σώματος· ἢ οὔ;	10
φαίνεται. οὐκοῦν, ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον, γελοῖον ἂν εἴη ἄνδρα
παρασκευάζονθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ	67e
τεθνάναι οὕτω ζῆν, κἄπειθ᾽ ἥκοντος αὐτῷ τούτου ἀγανακτεῖν; γελοῖον· πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; τῷ ὄντι ἄρα, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες
ἀποθνῄσκειν μελετῶσι, καὶ τὸ τεθνάναι ἥκιστα αὐτοῖς	5
ἀνθρώπων φοβερόν.

On the content of the intervening passage (67e6–69e5), see p. 136 of the commentary.

εἰπόντος δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους ταῦτα, ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Κέβης	69e6
ἔφη· ὦ Σώκρατες, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι,
τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις	70a
μή, ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος, οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ᾖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται ᾗ ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀποθνῄσκῃ, εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος, καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα
ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχηται διαπτομένη	5
καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ. ἐπεί, εἴπερ εἴη που αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν συνηθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη τούτων τῶν κακῶν ὧν σὺ νυνδὴ διῆλθες, πολλὴ ἂν εἴη ἐλπὶς καὶ καλή, ὦ
Σώκρατες, ὡς ἀληθῆ ἐστιν ἃ σὺ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ	70b
ἴσως οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως, ὡς ἔστι τε ψυχὴ ἀποθανόντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καί τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρόνησιν.
ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὦ Κέβης· ἀλλὰ τί δὴ	5
ποιῶμεν; ἢ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν, εἴτε εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν εἴτε μή; ἐγὼ γοῦν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι ἥντινα δόξαν ἔχεις περὶ αὐτῶν.
οὔκουν γ᾽ ἂν οἶμαι, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σωκράτης, εἰπεῖν τινα νῦν	10
ἀκούσαντα, οὐδ᾽ εἰ κωμῳδοποιὸς εἴη, ὡς ἀδολεσχῶ καὶ οὐ	70c
περὶ προσηκόντων τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμαι. εἰ οὖν δοκεῖ, χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι. σκεψώμεθα δὲ αὐτὸ τῇδέ πῃ, εἴτ᾽ ἄρα ἐν Ἅιδου εἰσὶν αἱ
ψυχαὶ τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἴτε καὶ οὔ. παλαιὸς	5
μὲν οὖν ἔστι τις λόγος οὗ μεμνήμεθα, ὡς εἰσὶν ἐνθένδε ἀφικόμεναι ἐκεῖ, καὶ πάλιν γε δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται καὶ γίγνονται ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· καὶ εἰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, πάλιν γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν ἀποθανόντων τοὺς ζῶντας, ἄλλο τι ἢ εἶεν
ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που πάλιν ἐγίγνοντο μὴ	70d
οὖσαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ὄντι φανερὸν γίγνοιτο ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν γίγνονται οἱ ζῶντες ἢ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο, ἄλλου ἄν
του δέοι λόγου.	5
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. μὴ τοίνυν κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾷον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζῴων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ συλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν περὶ πάντων
ἴδωμεν ἆρ᾽ οὑτωσὶ γίγνεται πάντα, οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν	70e
ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὂν τοιοῦτόν τι, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον που καὶ δίκαιον ἀδίκῳ, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως ἔχει. τοῦτο οὖν σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα ἀναγκαῖον
ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι	5
ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτῷ ἐναντίου. οἷον ὅταν μεῖζόν τι γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη που ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι; ναί.
οὐκοῦν κἂν ἔλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον	10
ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται;	71a
ἔστιν οὕτω, ἔφη. καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυροτέρου γε τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θᾶττον;
πάνυ γε.	5
τί δέ; ἄν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἂν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ἱκανῶς οὖν, ἔφη, ἔχομεν τοῦτο, ὅτι πάντα οὕτω γίγνεται,
ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα;	10
πάνυ γε. τί δ᾽ αὖ; ἔστι τι καὶ τοιόνδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων δυοῖν ὄντοιν δύο γενέσεις,
ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἀπὸ δ᾽ αὖ τοῦ ἑτέρου	71b
πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον· μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν;
ναί, ἔφη.	5
οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω, κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐνιαχοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ γοῦν πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον, γίγνεσθαί τε αὐτὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσίν τε εἶναι
ἑκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα;	10
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.
τί οὖν; ἔφη, τῷ ζῆν ἐστί τι ἐναντίον, ὥσπερ τῷ	71c
ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τί;
τὸ τεθνάναι, ἔφη.	5
οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀλλήλων τε γίγνεται ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἐναντία ἐστιν, καὶ αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὄντοιν; πῶς γὰρ οὔ; τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἑτέραν συζυγίαν ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον ἐγώ
σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις· σὺ	10
δέ μοι τὴν ἑτέραν. λέγω δὲ τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι γίγνεσθαι καὶ
ἐκ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ τὰς γενέσεις αὐτοῖν	71d
τὴν μὲν καταδαρθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δ᾽ ἀνεγείρεσθαι. ἱκανῶς σοι, ἔφη, ἢ οὔ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
λέγε δή μοι καὶ σύ, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου.	5
οὐκ ἐναντίον μὲν φῂς τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι; ἔγωγε. γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων; ναί.
ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνόμενον;	10
τὸ τεθνηκός, ἔφη. τί δέ, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος; ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν. ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἄρα, ὦ Κέβης, τὰ ζῶντά τε καὶ οἱ
ζῶντες γίγνονται;	15
φαίνεται, ἔφη.	71e
εἰσὶν ἄρα, ἔφη, αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐν Ἅιδου. ἔοικεν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖν γενεσέοιν τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα ἥ γ᾽ ἑτέρα
σαφὴς οὖσα τυγχάνει; τὸ γὰρ ἀποθνῄσκειν σαφὲς δήπου,	5
ἢ οὔ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. πῶς οὖν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ποιήσομεν; οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις; ἢ ἀνάγκη
ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν ἐναντίαν τινὰ γένεσιν;	10
πάντως που, ἔφη. τίνα ταύτην; τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι. οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι, ἐκ τῶν
τεθνεώτων ἂν εἴη γένεσις εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας αὕτη, τὸ	72a
ἀναβιώσκεσθαι; πάνυ γε. ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν
τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας ἐκ τῶν	5
ζώντων, τούτου δὲ ὄντος ἱκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς εἶναί που, ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι. δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων
ἀναγκαῖον οὕτως ἔχειν.	10
ἰδὲ τοίνυν οὕτως, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὅτι οὐδ᾽ ἀδίκως ὡμολογήκαμεν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀεὶ ἀνταποδιδοίη τὰ
ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνόμενα, ὡσπερεὶ κύκλῳ περιιόντα, ἀλλ᾽	72b
εὐθεῖά τις εἴη ἡ γένεσις ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου μόνον εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἕτερον μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη
καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι καὶ παύσαιτο γιγνόμενα;	5
πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. οὐδὲν χαλεπόν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ἐννοῆσαι ὃ λέγω· ἀλλ᾽ οἷον εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν μὲν εἴη, τὸ δ᾽ ἀνεγείρεσθαι μὴ ἀνταποδιδοίη γιγνόμενον ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδοντος, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τελευτῶντα πάντ᾽
<ἂν> λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειεν καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἂν	72c
φαίνοιτο διὰ τὸ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ταὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ πεπονθέναι, καθεύδειν. κἂν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μή, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη, ‘ὁμοῦ πάντα
χρήματα’. ὡσαύτως δέ, ὦ φίλε Κέβης, καὶ εἰ ἀποθνῄσκοι	5
μὲν πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι, μένοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα καὶ μὴ πάλιν ἀναβιώσκοιτο, ἆρ᾽ οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα πάντα
τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν; εἰ γὰρ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ	72d
ζῶντα γίγνοιτο, τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνῄσκοι, τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι; οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλά μοι
δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν.	5
ἔστιν γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Κέβης, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐξαπατώμενοι ὁμολογοῦμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοὺς ζῶντας γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν τεθνεώτων ψυχὰς
εἶναι καὶ ταῖς μέν γε ἀγαθαῖς ἄμεινον εἶναι, ταῖς δὲ κακαῖς	72e
κάκιον. καὶ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης ὑπολαβών, καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ ἀληθής ἐστιν, ὃν σὺ εἴωθας
θαμὰ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἀνάμνησις	5
τυγχάνει οὖσα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς ἐν προτέρῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ μεμαθηκέναι ἃ νῦν ἀναμιμνῃσκόμεθα. τοῦτο δὲ
ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ	73a
ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι· ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ ἀθάνατον ἡ ψυχή τι ἔοικεν εἶναι. ἀλλά, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας ὑπολαβών, ποῖαι τούτων
αἱ ἀποδείξεις; ὑπόμνησόν με· οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα ἐν τῷ παρόντι	5
μέμνημαι. ἑνὶ μὲν λόγῳ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, καλλίστῳ, ὅτι ἐρωτώμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ, αὐτοὶ λέγουσιν πάντα ᾗ ἔχει – καίτοι εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα καὶ
ὀρθὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἂν οἷοί τ᾽ ἦσαν τοῦτο ποιῆσαι – ἔπειτα	10
ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων,	73b
ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει. εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ γε, ἔφη, πείθῃ, ὦ Σιμμία, ὁ Σωκράτης, σκέψαι ἂν τῇδέ πῄ σοι σκοπουμένῳ συνδόξῃ. ἀπιστεῖς γὰρ
δὴ πῶς ἡ καλουμένη μάθησις ἀνάμνησίς ἐστιν;	5
ἀπιστῶ μέν σοι ἔγωγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὃς ὁ Σιμμίας, οὔ, αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος, ἀναμνησθῆναι. καὶ σχεδόν γε ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν ἤδη μέμνημαι καὶ πείθομαι· οὐδὲν μεντἂν ἧττον ἀκούοιμι νῦν πῇ σὺ
ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν.	10
τῇδ᾽ ἔγωγε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. ὁμολογοῦμεν γὰρ δήπου, εἴ τίς τι	73c
ἀναμνησθήσεται, δεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦτο πρότερόν ποτε ἐπίστασθαι. πάνυ γ᾽, ἔφη. ἆρ᾽ οὖν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγίγνηται
τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι; λέγω δὲ τίνα	5
τρόπον; τόνδε. ἐάν τίς τι ἕτερον ἢ ἰδὼν ἢ ἀκούσας ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο γνῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ οὗ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλη, ἆρα οὐχὶ τοῦτο δικαίως λέγομεν ὅτι ἀνεμνήσθη, οὗ τὴν ἔννοιαν
ἔλαβεν;	73d
πῶς λέγεις; οἷον τὰ τοιάδε· ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
οὐκοῦν οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ ἐρασταί, ὅταν ἴδωσιν λύραν ἢ ἱμάτιον	5
ἢ ἄλλο τι οἷς τὰ παιδικὰ αὐτῶν εἴωθε χρῆσθαι, πάσχουσι τοῦτο· ἔγνωσάν τε τὴν λύραν καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδὸς οὗ ἦν ἡ λύρα; τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις· ὥσπερ γε καὶ Σιμμίαν τις ἰδὼν πολλάκις Κέβητος ἀνεμνήσθη,
καὶ ἄλλα που μυρία τοιαῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη.	10
μυρία μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησίς τίς ἐστι; μάλιστα	73e
μέντοι ὅταν τις τοῦτο πάθῃ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν ἤδη ἐπελέληστο; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
τί δέ; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς· ἔστιν ἵππον γεγραμμένον ἰδόντα καὶ	5
λύραν γεγραμμένην ἀνθρώπου ἀναμνησθῆναι, καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον Κέβητος ἀναμνησθῆναι; πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ Σιμμίαν ἰδόντα γεγραμμένον αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου
ἀναμνησθῆναι;	10
ἔστι μέντοι, ἔφη.	74a
ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ᾽ ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων; συμβαίνει.
ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμιμνῄσκηταί τίς τι, ἆρ᾽	5
οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὗ ἀνεμνήσθη; ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. σκόπει δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι
εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο	10
τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον· φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν;
φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε.	74b
ἦ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν; πάνυ γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς. πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν
νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἄττα ἰδόντες	5
ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἕτερον ὂν τούτων; ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῇδε. ἆρ᾽ οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ᾽ οὔ;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	10
τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης	74c
ἀνισότης; οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες. οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ
τὸ ἴσον.	5
οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ᾽, ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἑτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας;
ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.	10
οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου; πάνυ γε. διαφέρει δέ γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐδέν· ἕως ἂν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ
ταύτης τῆς ὄψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς, εἴτε ὅμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον,	74d
ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. τί δέ; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς· ἦ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς
ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις; ἆρα φαίνεται	5
ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὃ ἔστιν, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν; καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ. οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι
βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων,	10
ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι ἴσον οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ᾽	74e
ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μέν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν;
ἀνάγκη.	5
τί οὖν; τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἢ οὒ περί τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον; παντάπασί γε. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ
χρόνου ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν ὅτι	75a
ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως. ἔστι ταῦτα.
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ	5
ἐννενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἅψασθαι ἢ ἔκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων· ταὐτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω. ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρός γε ὃ βούλεται
δηλῶσαι ὁ λόγος.	10
ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι ὅτι
πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὃ	75b
ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεέστερά ἐστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν; οὕτως. πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τἆλλα
αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ	5
τοῦ ἴσου ὅτι ἔστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ᾽ εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα. ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὦ Σώκρατες.
οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἑωρῶμέν τε καὶ ἠκούομεν καὶ τὰς	10
ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἴχομεν; πάνυ γε.
ἔδει δέ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τούτων τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπιστήμην	75c
εἰληφέναι; ναί. πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν
εἰληφέναι.	5

Commentary Notes

62c9–63b1 – a true philosopher will look forward to death

Cebes and Simmias are surprised at Socrates’ suggestion that a philosopher should be content to die. They had just been discussing how it would be wrong to kill oneself, because we mortals are the property of the gods, and they are good masters. If dying would mean leaving the care of such masters, Cebes wonders, how can a wise person look forward to death?

62c9

ἀλλ’ εἰκός … τοῦτό γε φαίνεται: ‘this, at least, seems plausible’. Socrates has just concluded that it is wrong to kill oneself, and one must wait until the gods make death unavoidable, as it is now for him (c7–8). Frequently in prose dialogue, ἀλλά does not introduce an objection but shows that the speaker (Cebes here) concurs with an opinion just voiced.

62c10–d1

τὸ τοὺς φιλοσοφους ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἐθέλειν ἀποθνῄσκειν: ‘that philosophers would readily be willing to die’. As an alternative to an indirect statement with ὅτι, Plato often uses τό with an acc. + inf. The phrase here is in apposition to the relative clause ὃ … νυνδὴ ἔλεγες ‘what you were saying just now’.

ἔοικεν τοῦτο … ἀτοπῳ: ‘this seems strange’. ἔοικα ‘I resemble’ has a dative object (hence ἀτόπῳ, which is delayed for emphasis).

62d2

εὐλογως ἔχει: ‘is reasonable, makes sense’. ἔχω + adverb is equivalent to εἰμί + adjective.

62d2–3

‘That it is a god who looks after us and that we are his possessions’. Cebes is repeating the reasons previously discussed why suicide is wrong. ἐπιμελέομαι ‘I take care of’ takes a genitive object, in this case, ἡμῶν. Note the chiastic arrangement of the sentence.

62d3–5

τὸ … μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν … ἐκ ταύτης τῆς θεραπείας ἀπιοντας: a long articular infinitive (gerund) and the subject of ἔχει below: ‘not to be displeased on leaving this care is not reasonable’ (i.e. the care given to the living by the god).

τοὺς φρονιμωτάτους: ‘those who are very wise’. In Plato, φρόνιμος and σόφος are equivalent.

62d5–6

οἵπερ ἄριστοί εἰσιν τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστάται: ‘who are the very best overseers of all’ (lit. ‘of the ones that are’). -περ, added to the relative or to εἰ ‘if’, emphasizes more precisely the thing or condition in question (so οἵπερ = ‘the very ones who’).

θεοί is in apposition to the relative clause.

62d6–7

οὐ γάρ που αὐτος … αὑτοῦ οἴεται ἄμεινον ἐπιμελήσεσθαι: ‘I don’t suppose each thinks he will take better care of himself.’ The subject has shifted from plural to singular.

που as a particle serves to temper the assertiveness of a sentence and hence is best translated with ‘I suppose’ or the like. αὑτοῦ is a contraction of ἑαυτοῦ, the gen. obj. of the fut. ἐπιμελήσεσθαι.

62d8–e1

ἀνόητος … ἄνθρωπος: ‘a foolish individual’. ἄνθρωπος often conveys a touch of contempt.

τάχ᾽ ἄν ‘perhaps’ is followed by two potential optatives here, οἰηθείη and λογίζοιτο (with ἄν repeated), ‘could think’, ‘could reason’.

φευκτέον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσποτου: ‘that he must run away from his master’, an acc. + inf. in apposition to ταῦτα. Plato here uses the neuter impersonal use of the gerundive φευκτέος ‘needing to be fled’ (from φεύγω) and leaves out the dat. of agent.

62e1–2

οὐ δεῖ … ἀπὸ … τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φεύγειν: ‘he must not run away from the good (master)’. οὐ δεῖ means ‘it is necessary that … not’ (compare οὐ φημί ‘I deny’).

ὅτι μάλιστα: ‘as much as possible’. Like ὡς, ὅτι with superlative means ‘as X as possible’.

62e3

ἀλογίστως ἂν φεύγοι: ‘it would be irrational to flee’.

ὁ δὲ νοῦν ἔχων: ‘anyone with sense’.

62e4

παρὰ τῷ αὑτοῦ βελτίονι: ‘with one better than himself’.

62e5

τοὐναντίον … ἢ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο: ‘the opposite (τὸ ἐναντίον) to what was just now being said’. As in its usual sense (‘than’), ἤ here articulates a contrast.

62e5–7

πρέπει = ‘it is fitting for … to …’, with accusative of the person and infinitive. Here imagined attitudes of the wise and foolish towards dying are contrasted clearly, (i) with μέν and δέ and (ii) their positions at the sentence’s start and end, framing the participle they share (ἀποθνῄσκοντας, ‘when they are dying’).

62e7–63a1

ὁ Σωκράτης ἡσθῆναί τέ μοι ἔδοξε: this brief observation from the narrator (Phaedo) is one of a handful of reminders that the conversation is being relayed to us at second hand.

63a1–2

ἀεί τοι … Κέβης λογους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ: ‘See how Cebes is always examining some argument or other’. The main job of the particle τοι is to bring to the listener’s attention something important that the speaker thinks has gone unnoticed. It is accordingly common in philosophical dialogues.

ὁ Κέβης: One way Plato distinguishes direct speech from the narrative is in his use of the article before names, omitting it in the former and using it in the latter. For this reason many scholars join Burnet in bracketing the article here, despite most manuscripts having one.

63a2–3

οὐ πάνυ εὐθέως ἐθέλει πείθεσθαι ὅτι ἄν τις εἴπῃ: ‘he is not at all keen to believe straightaway whatever someone is saying’. The ὅτι-clause is indefinite (hence ἄν + subjunctive).

63a4–5

ἀλλὰ μήν νῦν γέ: ‘And indeed, on this occasion at least’ (i.e. ‘for once’).

μοι δοκεῖ τι καὶ αὐτῷ λέγειν Κέβης: ‘Cebes seems – even to me – to be onto something.’ Simmias feigns surprise at his friend’s good point, lending a touch of humour. μοι καὶ αὐτῷ, to me myself also, with the intensive pronoun.

63a5–7

τί … ἂν βουλομενοι … φεύγοιεν: ‘Why would they willingly flee’.

σοφοὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς: ‘truly wise’. (The ὡς is best left untranslated.)

ἀμείνους αὑτῶν: ‘better than themselves’. ἀμείνους is m. acc. pl., an alternative contract form of ἀμείνονες/ἀμείνονας. αὑτῶν = ἑαυτῶν.

ἀπαλλάττοιντο: reflexive middle, ‘rid themselves’. ἀπαλλάττω and its cognate ἀπαλλαγή ‘deliverance, escape’ are key terms in the following discussion and like their English meanings have connotations of an improvement in condition. The optative is potential, supply ἄν from earlier.

63a7–8

δοκεῖ εἰς … σὲ τείνειν τὸν λογον: ‘he seems to be aiming his argument at you’: for as Cebes and Simmias have spotted, Socrates himself is facing death, and the prospect of leaving the care of the gods, in good cheer. The metaphor of aiming, as of a bow and arrow (which one must draw (τείνω) to shoot), is poignantly witty: Cebes is challenging Socrates’ acceptance of death by placing him, as it were, in his crosshairs.

63a8–9

οὕτω ῥᾳδίως φέρεις … ἀπολείπων: ‘you are taking your departure so lightly’.

63b1–67e6 – Socrates’ ‘second apology’

Socrates now defends himself against the charge of inconsistency that Cebes and Simmias have levelled against him. He presents his belief that a better existence and the care of other gods await a good man after death. Socrates argues at length that for a true philosopher, the whole of life is a preparation for this better existence, and that the goals of philosophy can really be attained only then. Recalling his famous defence speech (recorded in Plato’s Apology) before the Athenian jury that condemned him to death, Socrates promises to deliver this defence of his views in the form of a second defence speech (ἀπολογία), this time with his friends as the jury.

63b1

δίκαια … λέγετε: ‘what you’re saying is just’ – a pun, as he is about to call upon his friends to serve as a jury (63b4–5).

63b1–2

Socrates infers that Cebes and Simmias are asking him to answer their questions as a defendant in a court of law (ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ). Socrates is really putting this idea in their mouths; but the interlocutors are happy to run with it and join in the pretence of a second trial.

πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι: ‘to defend myself against these (charges)’.

63b3

πάνυ μὲν οὖν: ‘yes indeed’, or the like. The phrase is a common response of agreement in Platonic dialogue.

63b4–5

Socrates promises to try to defend himself more convincingly than he did in his actual trial, which ended with his death sentence. The irony is that he is now speaking in defence of his own willingness to die.

φέρε δή: ‘come on, then’. The phrase usually introduces some sort of exhortation.

ἦ δ᾽ ὅς: ‘he said’, a common idiom for marking direct speech in a dialogue. 3rd sg. impf. ἠμί and demonstrative ὅς to change speakers.

πειραθῶ: ‘let me try’, a hortative subjunctive.

63b5–9

Socrates expects that on death, he will find himself in the care of other wise and good gods, and of people ‘better than those here’ (ἀμείνους τῶν ἐνθάδε, b8). This is a direct enough response to his friends’ questions and starkly unsentimental at the prospect of their separation.

εἰ μὲν μὴ ᾤμην ἥξειν … ἠδίκουν ἄν: one long present closed conditional. This first μὲν is answered by the δὲ at b9.

πρῶτον μὲν is answered not by any δέ but by ἔπειτα καὶ: ‘first into the company of other wise and good gods, and then …’.

θεοὺς ἄλλους: Socrates leaves their identity vague, but we may presume them to be the chthonic gods (those of the underworld).

ἀνθρώπους τετελευτηκοτας: ‘people who are now dead’ may best capture the sense of the perfect participle here (from τελευτάω, ‘I die’). Τhe Greek perfect is used when the author wishes to highlight the state that someone (or something) is now in, as a result of a past event. At the end of the Apology, Socrates had already described his excitement at the prospect of meeting and discussing famous dead Greeks, including Homer, Hesiod and various mythical mortals (Apology 41a6).

ἠδίκουν ἂν οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν: ‘I would be unjust in that I am not aggrieved’. The negative οὐκ affirms that he is not in fact aggrieved (as against μή, which lends a conditional force to a participle). ἠδίκουν continues the imagery of the courtroom.

63b9–c4

Plato’s Socrates is not in the habit of giving his opinions dogmatically, preferring to lead others to see the flaws in their own. Here, however, he must defend his own attitude towards death, something he cannot do without voicing some opinion. There is a touch of ironic, self-referential humour in his use of assertive language (εὖ ἴστε ὅτι, twice) amid his general tentativeness (ἐλπίζω) on whether he will gain the company of good masters and of other good men after death. Of the two, he feels more sure of getting the former, but does not say why.

παρ᾽ ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς: ‘I hope I shall arrive in the company of good men.’

καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἂν πάνυ διισχυρισαίμην: ‘and I would not assert this first thing (τοῦτο μὲν) with full certainty’. The clause is balanced against the final clause of the sentence (διισχυρισαίμην ἂν καὶ τοῦτο), with τοῦτο μὲν in the first answered by καὶ τοῦτο at the sentence’s end. The contrast is illustrated further by the chiastic word order across the two clauses.

ὅτι μέντοι … ἥξειν: the syntax requires a finite verb, and we should assume an ellipsis of a second ἐλπίζω (‘however, that I will come’).

εἴπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων: ‘if (I will affirm) anything on such matters’, i.e. on what he can expect after death.

63c4–5

ὥστε … εὔελπίς εἰμι: the indicative after ὥστε is more rhetorically forceful than an infinitive, stressing the reality of the result.

εἶναί τι τοῖς τετελευτηκόσι: an indirect statement, ‘that there is something (i.e., in store) for those who have died’ – that is, some sort of afterlife.

63c6–7

ὥσπερ … πάλαι λέγεται: ‘as has long been said’. The present tense here stresses that it is still now being said. Socrates is hopeful that the afterlife will be ‘better for the good than the bad’. Belief in reward and punishment in the afterlife was not a question all Greek agreed upon, but mythology furnishes enough examples of it for Socrates’ claim here to hold good.

63c8–d3

Simmias jovially presses Socrates to explain his beliefs about the afterlife, saying that if he can persuade them, the explanation will serve as his real defence speech (σοι ἡ ἀπολογία ἔσται, d1).

63c8–9

τί οὖν … ὦ Σώκρατες: the British idiom ‘Hang on’ may best capture the sense of Simmias’ question. The ‘what then’ is inferential and is often used with impatient questions.

αὐτὸς ἔχων τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην: ‘keeping this thought to yourself’.

ἐν νῷ ἔχεις: ‘have in mind’, i.e. ‘intend’.

ἢ κἂν ἡμῖν μεταδοίης: a potential optative, with ἄν, used to make a polite request (‘or might you share it with us too?’). κἄν is a crasis of καί and ἄν. μεταδοίης is the 2sg. aor. opt. act. of μεταδίδωμι, ‘I share’. Note the chiastic contrast between holding back and sharing.

63d1

κοινὸν … καὶ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸν: ‘something we too could benefit from having in common’.

63d3

ἀλλὰ πειράσομαι: ‘indeed I shall try’. For ἀλλὰ see 62c9 n.

63d3–e8

Socrates pauses his ἀπολογία to hear his friend Crito, who has a message from the executioner: if Socrates allows himself to get too animated, it will reduce the efficacy of the poison and he will need to take further doses. This brief episode lets us see that Plato’s Socrates is no hypocrite: he really does not fear death, dismissing the warning in a carefree and cheerful manner. It is a moving scene. There is especial poignancy in the revelation that Crito had been waiting for some time, torn between his keenness to spare his friend considerable pain and his reluctance to interrupt the discussion.

63d3

Κρίτωνα τόνδε: ‘Crito here’.

63d4

ὃ βούλεσθαί … δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰπεῖν: ‘that he has for a long while seemed to want to say’. On πάλαι with a present verb, see c6–7 n. The adverb need not mean ‘in times of yore’ but is also used of the relatively recent past.

63d5

τί δέ … ἄλλο γε ἢ: properly a question (‘What else but that …?’), but better rendered as ‘simply that …’. Here it expresses some surprised and precedes a follow-up question.

63d6–7

χρή σοι φράζειν ὡς ἐλάχιστα διαλέγεσθαι: ‘you should converse as little as possible’. In contrast with δεῖ, χρή is used to express a moral obligation. This is, then, kindly advice from the executioner.

63d7–9

φησὶ γὰρ θερμαίνεσθαι … μᾶλλον διαλεγομένους: ‘he says that people who talk rather a lot grow warm’. φησὶ here introduces a run of indirect statements, lasting until 63e2.

δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον προσφέρειν τῷ φαρμάκῳ: ‘and that one must not add anything of this kind to the drug’. For to do so would interfere with its function. τοιοῦτον here must refer to any such complicating behaviour. προσφέρω ‘I add’ takes a dative, after the fashion of uncompounded πρός + dat. ‘in addition to’.

63e1–2

Crito continues to report the executioner’s speech with accusative + infinitive.

εἰ δὲ μή: i.e. if this advice is not heeded, ‘otherwise’.

63e3–4

ἔα … χαίρειν αὐτον: ‘never mind about him’, literally ‘let him say goodbye’. χαίρειν ἐάω and χαίρειν λέγω, both ‘I say goodbye to’, are used of banishing thoughts from one’s mind. The choice of expression lends some black humour, however, as Socrates knows they will see the executioner again soon enough.

τὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρασκευαζέτω: ‘let him sort out his own equipment’. παρασκευαζέτω is a 3sg. active imperative.

ὡς … δώσων: ὡς with future participle, expressing purpose.

63e6

σχεδὸν μέν τι ᾔδη: ‘I should have known’ (lit. ‘I almost knew something’). The μέν here has no corresponding δέ, though one might take ἀλλά in the next sentence as serving the same purpose.

63e6–7

πάλαι πράγματα παρέχει: ‘he has been bothering me for some time’.

63e8

ἔα αὐτον: not ‘let him’, but an abbreviation of ἔα αὐτον χαίρειν (see 63e3–4 n.).

63e8–9

ἀλλ’ … δὴ: ‘but now’. The particle δὴ serves not just to emphasize the preceding word, but often marks a transition to a new topic. Socrates now resumes his prior discussion where he left off.

ὑμῖν … τοῖς δικασταῖς: in apposition, ‘to you as my jurors’.

βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λογον ἀποδοῦναι: ‘I want now to give the account that is due’. ἀποδίδωμι is used of giving or returning something owed.

ὥς here introduces the topic of the λόγος, rather than the λόγος itself – that a man who has spent his life engaged in philosophy can expect to win great rewards when he dies.

63e9–10

φαίνεται εἰκότως … θαρρεῖν: ‘seems to have good reason to be confident’. θαρρέω has no single-word equivalent in English, but is used as an opposite to φοβέομαι.

ἀνὴρ … διατρίψας τὸν βίον: ‘a man who has spent his life’. διατρίβω ‘I rub’ is used metaphorically to mean ‘I spend time’.

τῷ ὄντι: ‘in reality’, an adverbial idiom common in Plato’s early and middle works.

63e10–64a1

μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι: μέλλω + fut. inf. means ‘I am about to’, ‘I intend to’ or less often, ‘I hesitate to’. Only the first of these senses really works here; but in working this out, the reader is forced to reflect on the attitude of the person described.

εὔελπις εἶναι: the phrase (again at 64a1) lends opportunity for variety alongside ἐλπίζειν, but also the added connotations of the adjective εὔελπις, which means both ‘helpful’ and ‘cheerful’.

οἴσεσθαι: fut. inf. from φέρω, which in the middle has the sense ‘I win’.

64a2

ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ: an indefinite, reflecting our uncertainty about when any person is going to die. As the indefinite often also suggests a repeated event (‘whenever he dies’) the phrase acts as a forward reference to the doctrine of reincarnation that Socrates will later espouse (77a–d).

πῶς ἂν … οὕτως ἔχοι: ‘how this might be the case’, an indirect question with potential optative (ἂν … ἔχοι). On οὕτως ἔχειν see 62d2 n.

64a4–6

Socrates introduces the idea that those who practise philosophy are really ‘in the business of dying and being dead’. What exactly this means and why Socrates thinks it are the focus of the rest of his ἀπολογία.

κινδυνεύουσι … λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι: ‘it may be that other people are unaware that they …’. It is often better to render λανθάνω ‘I escape the notice of (acc.)’ with the subject and object reversed (‘[acc.] does not notice’). The negation of its perfect ‘[acc.] has not noticed/is unaware’ is often used as a substitute for οἶδα. κινδυνεύουσι ‘they run the risk of’ (i.e. ‘it is possible that they’) is an ironic understatement here: there is surely no chance that anyone, Socrates excepted, has ever thought (let alone noticed) that philosophers are mostly concerned with dying and being dead.

ὅσοι: usually best rendered with ‘all those who’.

τοὺς ἄλλους: ‘the other people’, i.e. ‘everyone else’.

οὐδὲν ἄλλο … ἢ: ‘nothing other than’, i.e. ‘exclusively’.

ἐπιτηδεύουσιν: this verb means ‘practise’ not in the sense of developing a skill but as in applying it (as in ‘I practise medicine’), i.e. making it one’s business.

ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι: both infinitives are objects of ἐπιτηδεύουσιν. Philosophers are busying themselves with the process of dying (present infinitive) and the condition of being dead (perfect infinitive). As Socrates will explain, true philosophers want to get as close as possible to this state, so they may be best prepared for it when it comes.

64a7–9

If this is really the business of philosophers, they will surely not be aggrieved when the time comes to die.

64a7

δήπου: ‘surely’. Though originally the particle expressed some doubt (as a compound of που ‘I suppose’), Socrates uses it with a touch of irony to state strong claims.

64a8

ἥκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ: genitive absolute, ‘but when it has finally (δή) come’ (i.e. death).

64a10

ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας: Simmias’ laughter creates a dramatic change in the tone. It is a hint that Socrates’ good mood may be proving infectious.

64b1

οὐ πάνυ γε … γελασείοντα: ‘though not at all in the mood for laughing’. Verbs ending in -σείω belong to a class called desideratives, which express actions their subject wants to do.

64b2

ἂν: belongs with δοκεῖν, in an indirect statement after οἶμαι: ‘I think most people (τοὺς πολλοὺς) … would think’. δοκέω here is in its personal sense, ‘I think’.

64b2–3

εὖ πάνυ εἰρῆσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας: another indirect statement, dependent on δοκεῖν: ‘that this is spot on about those who do philosophy’. εἰρῆσθαι is an impersonal perfect passive from λέγω and is followed by ὅτι at b4, after a parenthesis.

64b3–4

συμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ: ‘people where we come from (παρ᾽ ἡμῖν) would very much agree’: another indirect statement dependent on οἶμαι (b1). It is this joke that has made Simmias laugh: he and Cebes are from Thebes, whose citizens were stereotyped as disinclined to intellectual activity and rather slow-witted. Thebans, he quips, would readily see philosophers as having a deathwish – something for which Socrates offers a good precedent. Besides, philosophers (as Socrates presents them) have no interest in any of the pleasures typically associated with a good life. In making their lives hardly lives at all, they are, in that sense too, closer to being dead.

ἀνθρώπους: the noun often has a faintly derogatory sense, as (presumably) here. Compare the similar English use of ‘individual’ and ‘person’.

64b4

οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες: those who do philosophy, i.e. philosophers. By using the participle rather than the noun φιλόσοφος, Plato keeps our attention on what they do, and not just what they are labelled as being. Plato will vary this expression several times in the Phaedo.

θανατῶσι: θανατάω can mean either ‘I wish to die’ or simply ‘I am going to die’.

64b5–6

σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν: ‘they are well aware’. On λανθάνω rendered thus, see 64a4–6 n. Simmias is merely relaying what he thinks the Thebans would say, and not implying that he feels the same way (as ‘are aware’ might imply). σφεῖς (acc. σφᾶς, gen. σφῶν, dat. σφίσι) is a 3 pl. pronoun common in prose and verse of most kinds.

ἄξιοί εἰσιν τοῦτο πάσχειν: ‘they deserve to suffer this’. The joke is presumably that philosophers are a nuisance to those who do not share their inclinations (such as the stereotypical Theban philistine).

64b7–8

πλήν γε τοῦ σφᾶς … μὴ λεληθέναι: ‘except, that is, the bit about them being aware’.

64b8–9

The imaginary Thebans, Socrates says, do not know in what way philosophers are ready for death, how it is they deserve death or the sort of death they deserve. He himself will directly address only the first of these questions before he dies.

ᾗ: adverbial, ‘in what way’.

οἵου θανάτου: ‘of what sort of death [they are worthy]’.

64c1

εἴπωμεν … πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς: εἴπωμεν is a hortative subjunctive, ‘let us speak amongst ourselves’.

χαίρειν εἰποντες: see 63e3–4 n.

64c2–9

Having dismissed the imaginary Thebans, Socrates feels ready to the more serious philosophical business of his ἀπολογία. He and Simmias begin by defining death as the total separation of the soul from the body, and vice versa. What exactly Socrates means by ‘the soul’ is left open for now: this will be addressed at 69e–70b.

64c2

ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι: ‘do we think there is such a thing as death?’ It is Socrates’ standard practice to get his interlocutors to agree on some fundamental points at the beginning of a discussion.

64c4–5

ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ: ‘surely it (i.e. death) is nothing other than’. ἆρα μή introduces a yes/no question that assumes the answer ‘no’. Socrates will give Simmias only one option to assent to.

τὴν … ἀπαλλαγήν: see 63a5–7 n.

καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι: ‘and that the state of having died is this’. Socrates continues to speak in acc. + inf. indirect statements, following ἡγούμεθά (c2). The perfect infinitive emphasizes that he is asking about the state of being dead (or having died), rather than the event (aorist) or the process (present).

64c5–8

In the form of an inviting question, Socrates suggests that to be dead equates to the body coming to be ‘by itself, separated from the soul’ and the soul being ‘by itself, separated from the body’. The two requirements really entail each other; giving both merely serves to drive the point home that the two must become utterly separate.

ἀπαλλαγὲν … ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν: both aor. past. participles from ἀπαλλάττω (on which see, 63a5–7 n.).

αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ: ‘by itself on its own’. αὑτό = ἑαυτό, i.e. the very thing in its essense and ‘unmixed’ (this will be important later). Key philosophical vocabulary. Plato often combines an intensive (αὐτός) and reflexive (ἑαυτοῦ) to denote separation. The phrase is already pleonastic, as αὐτός alone often means ‘by oneself’. But along with χωρὶς ‘separately’ and ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν ‘separated from the soul’, the phrase is even more emphatically pleonastic.

64c8

ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ᾖ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο: ‘death can’t be anything other than this, can it?’ ἆρα μή expects the answer ‘no’, while the subjunctive ᾖ after μή adds a note of caution to the assertion.

64c10

σκέψαι δή: ‘consider this, then’: an object must be supplied for the imperative.

ὠγαθέ: an affectionate crasis of ὦ and the vocative ἀγαθέ.

ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκῇ ἅπερ ἐμοί: ‘in case, after all (ἄρα), you too will share my view’. This is not an indirect question (which would require εἰ with indicative) nor an open condition, but a distinct use of εἰ/ἐάν used to present the motive for the action in the main clause (‘in case’, ‘in the hope that’): Smyth § 2354.

ἅπερ ἐμοί: we must assume the previous verb again (συνδοκῇ) in ellipsis. On ἅπερ, see 62d5–6 n.

64d1

μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν: ‘I think we will gain knowledge about the things we are looking into’. μᾶλλον modifies εἴσεσθαι (future infinitive of οἶδα). The case of the relative ὧν should strictly be accusative, given its role in its clause as the direct object of σκοποῦμεν, but with no antecedent for the preposition περί to govern, it is dragged by the preposition περί into the genitive case, a common phenomenon called the attraction of the relative.

64d2

φιλοσοφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι: εἰμί + gen. means ‘belong to’, or better here, ‘be characteristic of’.

64d2–3

ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ: ‘to busy themselves with’, the perfect infinitive (of σπουδάζω) implying established and lasting behaviour. This infinitive phrase is the subject of the sentence.

τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε: ‘the so-called pleasures, such as the following’. τοιοσδε (‘such as this’), like ὅδε (‘this’) and ὧδε (‘thus’), tends to point ahead to what it refers. καλουμένας suggests that they are not ‘true’ pleasures (at least not to a philosopher).

64d2–3

οἷον σιτίων καὶ ποτῶν: ‘for example, [the pleasures] of food and drink’. Plato often uses adverbial οἷον to introduce a set of one or more examples.

64d5

ἥκιστα: like the Latin minime, this superlative adverb can simply mean ‘no’, as here. It may surprise us that Simmias is so ready to join Socrates in denying the true philosopher any share in bodily pleasures. It is easy to see that philosophers should not overindulge in these, but why they should not enjoy them even in moderation is never explained.

64d6

τί δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων: ‘what about those (the pleasures) of sex?’.

64d7

οὐδαμῶς: ‘no way’. From now on, Phaedo will only sometimes include a phrase meaning ‘he said’, leaving it to us to deduce when one speaker takes over from another. With Simmias rarely saying more than brief phrases of assent in this passage, this poses little difficulty to the reader.

64d8

τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας: ‘the other attendances to bodily needs’.

64d9

ἐντίμους: ‘of value’, f. acc. pl. agreeing with θεραπείας. Being a compound, ἔντιμος is a two-termination adjective (its m. and f. endings are the same).

ὁ τοιοῦτος: ‘someone of this sort’, i.e. a philosopher.

64d9–10

οἷον ἱματίων διαφεροντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων: ‘for example, the owning of fancy clothes and shoes’. The base meaning of διαφέρω is ‘I differ’, but it has the extended sense ‘I excel’ (compare the English ‘distinguished’). A philosopher need not go naked or unshod, but will take no pleasure in owning finery. The sentence’s main verb (δοκεῖ) is delayed until d11.

64d11

πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμάζειν: πότερον … ἢ articulate a direct question with two alternatives (‘do you think he values them or holds them in no regard?’) ἀτιμάζω implies rather stronger disapproval than just οὐ τιμάω.

64e1

καθ᾽ ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν: ‘insofar as there is not a great necessity to take part in them’, i.e. beyond what is absolutely necessary. ἐστι is omitted as obvious. αὐτῶν refers back to the θεραπείας of d8.

μετέχειν : Key philosophical vocabulary. Plato often uses this verb to describe the relationship between an object and a form. For example, the number three is odd because three participates in or shares in (μετέχει) the form oddness. The nature of the participation of objects with forms is a subject of scholarly debate.

64e2

ἀτιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ: it may surprise us that Simmias is so ready to join Socrates in denying the true philosopher any share in things that bring the body pleasure beyond what is necessary for survival. It is easy to see that philosophers should not overindulge in these, but why they should not enjoy them even in moderation is never explained.

64e4–6

Socrates now casts the philosopher as one who concerns himself as much as possible with the soul and as little as possible with the body.

64e4

οὐκοῦν … δοκεῖ σοι: ‘don’t you think …?’ οὐκοῦν, accentuated thus, introduces a question inviting the answer ‘yes’.

ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία: ‘the business of someone like this’. πραγματεία here has a different sense from that at 63a1 (diligent effort).

64e5

καθ᾽ ὅσον δύναται: ‘as much as it can’.

64e6

ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι: ‘to stand apart from it (the body), and to have turned himself to face the soul’. This is the first of many occasions in the dialogue in which mental activity is expressed through markedly physical metaphors. The incongruity presses the reader to think through the distinction between the mental and the bodily. Both ἀφεστάναι (intransitive, from ἀφίστημι) and τετράφθαι (reflexive middle, from τρέπω) are perfect infinitives with present force.

64e8–65a2

ἆρ᾽ … δῆλος ἐστιν ὁ φιλοσοφος ἀπολύων: ‘is it clear that the philosopher frees’. δῆλός ἐστι is typically followed by a dependent participle. ἀπολύω is rich in appropriate connotations, meaning not just ‘set free’ but ‘acquit’ (of a legal charge), ‘ransom’ (both active and middle) and ‘pay off’ (of a debt of mortgage).

ὅτι μάλιστα: ‘as much as possible’, as often when ὅτι is followed by a superlative see 62e1–2 n.

διαφεροντως: here ‘to a greater degree than’, though originally ‘differently from’ (see 64d9–10 n.), followed by a genitive of separation.

65a3

φαίνεται: ‘evidently’, assuming ἀπολύων (a1) as its complement. While φαίνομαι with the infinitive means ‘I appear’ (and may or may not be), with a participle the verb has the stronger sense ‘I am clearly’.

65a4–7

Socrates presumes, not without plausibility, that the ascetic life of his true philosopher would not strike most people as much of a life.

δοκεῖ γέ που … τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις … οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν: ‘I suppose at least most people think it is not worth it to be alive.’

65a5

ᾧ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων: ‘[someone] for whom there is nothing pleasurable in such things’. It is common in Greek for the antecedent of a relative clause to be left out. (It is this that creates the need for attraction of the relative: see 64d1 n.)

μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν: the subject now changes to the referent of ᾧ, ‘and does not partake of them’.

65a6

ἀλλ᾽ ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι: we must supply δοκεῖ again, this time with ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων (‘the one who thinks nothing of’) as its subject. ἐγγύς τι τείνειν ‘to skirt rather close to’ is an ironically dynamic metaphor drawn from the domain of horse- and chariot-racing. τοῦ τεθνάναι is genitive after ἐγγύς. The perfect infinitive again serves to pinpoint a state (being dead), rather than the event or process of dying. Hackforth’s translation ‘to have one foot in the grave’ captures the sense well.

65a7

τῶν ἡδονῶν αἳ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν: i.e. those which are had by means of the body: διά with the genitive can mean ‘through’ in the sense of instrument or manner, as well as of time or space.

65a9–c1

Socrates advances an idea that will be central to his following argument, that the bodily senses are of no help in our acquisition of knowledge, but without exception hinder it. That Simmias needs no persuading on the matter may shock us. This is not because the senses were generally held in so little regard at the time. Rather, Plato must be keen to have Socrates plough on through his main argument with as little interruption as is necessary.

65a9

φρονήσεως: a synonym of σοφία (‘wisdom, learning’) in Plato, and hence the prime goal of all philosophical endeavour.

65a10

ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα: ‘the body is in the way’, i.e. a hindrance. Taken literally, ἐμπόδιος (‘at one’s feet’) is neatly paradoxical – for how can one’s body lie at one’s feet when the feet are part of it? In processing the phrase, the reader is prompted to reflect further on the relationship between body and soul.

65a10–b1

ἐάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ: ‘if someone should bring it (i.e. the body) along with them as a companion in their search [for wisdom]’. The description makes sense only if we identify our true selves as being our souls alone, and not body and soul together. Socrates is encouraging us to take precisely this perspective, a vital step if we are to sympathize with the arguments ahead.

οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω: ‘I mean something along the following lines.’ οἶον is adverbial and τὸ τοιόνδε the direct object of λέγω.

65b2–3

τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν: ‘are the poets too not always going on about such things (τὰ τοιαῦτα)’? The ungenerous verb θρυλέω ‘babble’ is ironic here, as their opinion chimes with Socrates’ own.

65b3–4

οὔτ᾽ ἀκούομεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν: one surviving line of the comic playwright and philosopher Epicharmus comes close to the sentiment: νοῦς ὁρῇ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τἆλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά (‘the mind sees and the mind hears; all other [organs] are deaf and blind’, Diels-Kranz 23 B 2). Plato often has Socrates quote lines of poetry directly, and it may be that these words are a rough paraphrase of a specific line (the iambic/trochaic character of, e.g. οὐδὲν οὔθ᾽ ὁρῶμεν may hint at the metre).

65b4–5

αὗται τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων: ‘these of the body’s senses’, i.e. sight and sound. περί here has the same sense as διά at a7.

65b5

σχολῇ: ‘hardly’ (lit. ‘with leisure’).

65b9

τῆς ἀληθείας ἅπτεται: ‘takes hold of’ or ‘grasps’ the truth. Unlike the comparable English ‘grasp’, which is a dead metaphor (i.e. one so common that it is hardly treated as one in conversation), the Greek ἅπτομαι makes for a more striking bodily metaphor for mental activity. Like many middle verbs of grasping (e.g. λαμβάνομαι), ἅπτομαι takes a genitive.

65b9–10

ὅταν … ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν: ‘whenever it (the soul) tries to examine something’. The indefinite construction adds an important emphasis: there is never any situation in which the bodily senses grant us access to knowledge.

65b11

ἐξαπατᾶται: ‘is deceived, seduced’. The metaphor adds a touch of the sinister, underscoring the harmful influence of the body on the soul.

65c1

We may again feel surprise at Simmias’ readiness to deny the senses any role in apprehending truth, and simply must not want to interrupt Socrates’ flow. (See 65a9–c1 n.)

65c2

ἆρ᾽ … οὐκ: in contrast to ἆρα μή, ἆρα οὐκ introduces a direct question expecting the answer ‘yes’.

ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι: ‘in the activity of reasoning’. λογίζομαι and its noun λογισμός are used both of mathematical calculation and of other forms of pure thinking.

εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι: ‘if anywhere else at all’. On -περ see 62d5–6. που here is not the particle (‘I suppose’) but the indefinite correlative (‘somewhere’) of the question-word ποῦ; (‘where?’).

65c2–3

κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεταί τι τῶν ὄντων: ‘a part of reality comes to be manifest to it (the soul)’. In Plato, τὰ ὄντα – literally ‘the things that are (or exist)’ – and its singular τὸ ὄν serve to mean ‘reality’ and ‘the truth’ (compare τῷ ὄντι: see 63e9–10 n.). Note the κατά- used for emphasis.

65c5–9

One might then assume that the soul does its best pure thinking (λογίζεται κάλλιστα) when the body presents no distracting sense or sensation, and the soul can be as separate from it as possible.

65c6

παραλυπῇ: ‘troubles it besides’. The verb expresses a grievance or distraction on top of some other issue – here, presumably, the effort of thinking.

65c6–7

μηδέ τις ἡδονή: ‘and not even any pleasure’. μηδέ/οὐδέ, which like καί can have a further adverbial force (‘not even’), here highlights pleasure as a surprising final component in the list of distractions. On reflection, however, Socrates’ audience will recall that he had begun his argument by showing how little philosophers will care for most sources of bodily pleasure (64d2–3).

65c7–8

ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα: ‘saying goodbye to the body’. Socrates has used similar phrases shortly before (63e3: see n.) of dismissing his executioner and the imagined worldly Thebans (64c1); the echo here helps us see the link between leaving his earthly state and engaging purely in philosophy.

65c8–9

μή κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ᾽ ἁπτομένη: ‘not having it (the body) as its partner and not fastening itself to it’. Taken at face value, the second participle already suggests that the philosopher’s soul should ideally be no longer even connected with the body – a state which Simmias and Socrates had already agreed on to be death (64c4–9).

65c9

ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος: ‘reaches out after reality’, another metaphor, an action of the body used to describe the activity of the soul.

65c10

ἔστι ταῦτα: ‘this is true’. Plato often uses εἶναι in a so-called ‘veridical’ sense (‘to be true’), as well as the existential (‘to be real’). Many arguments in his works hinge on the intersection of these senses.

65d3

φαίνεται: the strength of Simmias’ assent is ambiguous: whether his reply means ‘so it seems’ or ‘obviously’ would depend on whether an infinitive or participle is assumed to depend upon it (see 65a3 n.).

65d4–e5

Socrates and Simmias agree that certain things exist that we do not know through the senses, and for which only reasoning is of any use. It is to this category that the main interests of the philosophers belong, such as justice, beauty and goodness. Although Greek has its own abstract nouns for such things, Plato avoids them here, to encourage us to reflect with more care on the aspects of reality he wishes to pinpoint. This produces Greek that is difficult to translate, but that a thoughtful modern reader should still find easy enough to follow. On the passage’s relation to Plato’s later Theory of Forms, see introduction, pp. 79–80.

65d4–5

τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε: ‘what, then, about things such as the following?’

φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν: ‘do we say there exists something that is itself right, or is there no such thing?’ In other words, is there something that is right and nothing else – i.e. rightness (or justice) itself?

65d6

φαμὲν μέντοι νὴ Δία: ‘indeed we do, by Zeus’. The particle μέντοι often adds emphasis to a word repeated as the answer to a yes/no question, as here. By now the reader is used to Simmias’ ready assent even on questions which to them may raise an eyebrow. Here, however, we should note that the claim Socrates is suggesting sounds especially convincing to a speaker of Greek, who is more used than us to using adjectives in lieu of nouns (e.g. τὸ δίκαιον).

65d7

καὶ αὖ καλόν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν: ‘and again, [is there] something [that is in itself] beautiful, and [something that is in itself] good?’ The Greek is elliptical, but the sense is clear.

65d9

ἤδη οὖν πώποτέ τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες: ‘well now, have you ever seen any of these with your eyes?’ Socrates’ pleonasm makes it clear that ὁράω is meant literally: he is asking Simmias why he is ready to assent to there being such things as the beautiful and the good even though he has never actually seen them.

65d11–12

ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει … ἐφήψω αὐτῶν: ‘have you laid hold of them (i.e. such things) using any other sense?’ ἐφήψω is 2sg. aor. mid. of ἐφαπτομαι, which expresses a slightly more forceful action than the uncompounded verb.

65d12–e4

Socrates now asks if the same is not true of such things as size, health, strength and everything else that counts as ‘real’. We might think we understand something like size based on sensory information; but Socrates is talking not about big and small things but about size itself, divorced from the objects that exemplify it. For Socrates, the only things that deserve to be called ‘real’ are such things as size itself, health itself and so on: on this outlook, see introduction, pp. 79–80.

65d12

λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι: ‘I’m talking about everything – about size, for example’. μέγεθος is strictly speaking ‘bigness’, the property of things that are big (in English we would say that small things have size, but they do not μέγεθος). As its accent reveals, πέρι is postpositional, governing μεγέθους (contrast the prepositional form περί, with accent on the second syllable). Though postpositional, the following string of genitives (ὑγιείας … ἁπάντων) also depend on πέρι.

65d13

τῶν ἄλλων ἑνὶ λόγῳ ἁπάντων τῆς οὐσίας: ‘in short, [about] the reality of every single other thing’. ἑνὶ λόγῳ does not quite match the English idiom ‘in a word’ (λόγος generally is not used of a single word), but really means ‘in one short utterance’. ἅπας is a somewhat more emphatic form of πᾶς ‘all, every’. Plato’s first readers might expect οὐσία to mean ‘property’ (its more usual sense) rather than ‘reality’, as here. But, as an abstract noun derived from a participle stem of εἰμί, it must have appealed to Plato as a fitting synonym for τὰ ὄντα.

65d13–e1

ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν: ‘what each thing is’. The clause is added, presumably, to clarify Plato’s more philosophically technical use of οὐσία (see previous n.).

As the LSJ points out, τυγχάνω often ‘cannot be translated at all’, especially with a participle of εἰμί. In such instances, τυγχάνω seems nonetheless to stress that the action of the participle really happens or happened (‘I actually am’).

65e1–2

αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται: ‘the full truth of them is beheld’ (Hackforth). θεωρέω is used variously of spectators at events, of people contemplating and of people theorizing. In all cases the verb communicates some lasting effort.

ἢ ὧδε ἔχει: ‘or is it as follows’. On the construction, see 62d2 n. Since the first option (that we learn about such things through the body’s senses) is plainly wrong in Socrates’ eyes, we know that what follows will be his real opinion.

65e2–3

ὃς ἂν ἡμῶν παρασκευάσηται: ‘whichever of us has prepared himself’. The verb is a reflexive middle.

μάλιστα … καὶ ἀκριβέστατα αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι: the adverbs modify the infinitive, and not παρασκευάσηται: ‘to think especially and most precisely of each thing by itself’ (αὐτό). διανοηθῆναι is passive in form but middle in meaning (‘to think of, have in mind’). It will be worthwhile to note the various superlatives used in this passage.

65e4

περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ: ‘(each thing) he is investigating about’. On the attraction of the relative, see 64d1 n.

οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἕκαστον: ‘this person would come closest to knowing each thing’: for Socrates will go on to claim that we must be utterly rid of the body, i.e. dead, to actually get there.

ἴοι is 3sg. pres. opt. act. of εἶμι ‘I shall go’, a metaphor more strikingly physical in the Greek than in the English, where it is commonplace. γνῶναι is the aor. act. infinitive ( ‘to have come to know’ = to know). The repetition of ἕκαστον stresses that the person would come close to gaining knowledge of specific things, rather than being more generally knowledgeable.

65e6

καθαρώτατα: ‘most purely’. The adverb, rich in religious connotations of ritual cleansing, may strike the first-time reader as a surprising choice here, with no precedent so far in the dialogue. However, the idea of purity, and in particular the importance of the soul’s purity from the body, will loom large over the following discussion (69c–d: see introduction, pp. 80–82).

65e6–7

ὅστις ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἴοι ἐφ᾽ ἕκαστον: ‘whoever approaches each thing as far as possible through thought alone’ (αὐτῇ, ‘(by) itself’). ὅστις introduces an indefinite construction with optative (ἴοι) and no ἄν, as the main verb (ποιήσειεν), though optative too, is still in a historic tense. διανοίᾳ is dat. of means.

65e–66a1

μήτε τιν᾽ ὄψιν παρατιθέμενος: ‘neither serving oneself a side helping of sight’ may capture the whimsical sense of παρατίθεμαι, a verb whose principal use is of food.

ἐν τῷ διανοεῖσθαι: ‘while he has [it] in mind’, with ἐν here expressing either time or condition.

μήτε ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἐφέλκων μηδεμίαν: ‘nor dragging along behind him any other sense’. The metaphor captures perfectly the impediment that Socrates sees the body’s senses to be.

μετὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ: ‘along with his reasoning’.

65a2–3

ἀλλ᾽ ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων: the indefinite construction after ὅστις (65e6) continues: ‘but attempts to hunt each of the things that exist’. ἐπιχειρέω and θηρεύω are more ironically physical metaphors for striving after incorporeal things: the former is really ‘I try my hand (χείρ) at’ and the latter used of hunting wild beasts (θῆρες).

εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος: ‘using undiluted thought’. χράομαι ‘I use’ is followed by a dative. εἰλικρινής originally is ‘pure’ as in ‘unmixed’, without the religious connotations of καθαρός.

65a3–5

ἀπαλλαγεὶς … ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν σύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος: ‘having been set free from … almost the entire body’. ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ‘so to speak’ is used to discourage the reader from taking a statement too literally (e.g. οὐδεὶς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν = ‘almost nobody’). Here the phrase reminds us that Socrates is talking about philosophers who are still alive – since being fully set free from the body would mean being dead (64c4–9).

65a5–6

ὡς ταράττοντος καὶ οὐκ ἐῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν: ὡς here is causal, and both participles haveτὴν ψυχὴν as object: ‘since [the body] confuses and does not allow the soul …’.

65a7–8

ἆρ᾽ οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν … εἴπερ τις ἄλλος ὁ τευξόμενος τοῦ ὄντος: ‘surely this is the man who will hit upon what is real, if anyone [will]’. With a genitive object, τυγχάνω means ‘I light upon’, ‘meet’ or ‘obtain’, all of which work here. τευξόμενος is its future participle (always middle). On τοῦ ὄντος, see 65c2–3 n.

66b1–67b4 – the testimony of the True Philosophers

Socrates now summarizes all he has said about the obstacles humans face in obtaining knowledge during their lifetime. He does this in the voice of some imaginary true philosophers, who describe in first person their plight as they labour under their cruel master, the body. It is a colourful and forceful piece of rhetoric which aside from its role as summary serves two purposes: it will be the strongest piece of evidence in Socrates’ ἀπολογία for why any good philosopher, himself included, can expect to be much better off when he is dead and free of the body. In this respect his True Philosophers recall the witnesses that litigants at trial in Athens would invoke in support of their cases. The philosophers also offer Socrates a mouthpiece through which he may speak with uncharacteristic assertiveness: for while his preferred method is to explore arguments by questioning others (the elenchus: see introduction, p. 76), his fictional philosophers are free to speak as they wish.

66b1–2

ἀνάγκη … τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις: ‘it is necessary for those who are genuinely philosophers’. The original sense of γνήσιος, an adjective cognate with γένος, is ‘born within wedlock, legitimate’. Note Plato’s variation of phrase for those who ‘truly’ philosophize.

ἐκ πάντων τούτων: ‘from [i.e. based on] all this, it is necessary …’.

παρίστασθαι δόξαν τοιάνδε τινὰ: ‘to bring forward some opinion such as the following’. παρίσταμαι (transitive middle) is used in a legal context to mean ‘bring forward’, of witnesses and of other evidence.

66b2–3

ὥστε καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοιαῦτα ἄττα λέγειν: ‘so that they say some such things, to each other too’. ἄττα is an alternate for τινά. The vagueness of τοιάνδε τινὰ (b2) and τοιαῦτα ἄττα (b3) makes it clear that the direct speech that follows is a product of Socrates’ imagination.

66b3–5

κινδυνεύει … ἐκφέρειν ἡμᾶς … ὅτι: the subject of this complex clause is ὅτι ‘that’. It is therefore simplest to reverse passive and active in our translation thus: ‘it seems likely that, as if by some path, we are being led by the opinion that …’.

ὥσπερ ἀτραπός τις: the point of the simile is presumably that the opinion they are about to give follows directly from what comes before. That the path of the simile is ‘leading us out’ (ἐκφέρειν) calls to mind the state of perplexity or ἀπορία (lit. ‘having no way out’) that Socrates’ conversations often leave people in. In contrast to having no way, the True Philosophers follow a clear path.

66b5

συμπεφυρμένη ᾖ: perfect passive subjunctive of συμφυράω ‘I mix (or knead) up with’. This state of the soul is opposite to its being εἰλικρινής or καθαρός. In this particular metaphor it is striking that the soul almost takes on a physical existence.

τοιούτου κακοῦ: ‘such a base thing’, i.e. the body.

66b6

οὐ μή ποτε κτησώμεθα: ‘we will never acquire’. οὐ μή with an aorist subjunctive expresses an especially forceful denial.

66b7

φαμὲν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές: Socrates is plainly relishing the opportunity to speak forthrightly, or at least to create as strong a contrast as possible with his usual manner.

66b7–8

μυρίας … ἀσχολίας: ‘countless jobs to do’. An ἀσχολία is any distraction from σχολή, leisure time within which one may pursue philosophy. Note the continued exaggeration; μυρίας is in effect here another superlative.

66b8–c1

διὰ τὴν ἀναγκαίαν τροφήν: Socrates had told us that a philosopher will scorn bodily attendances beyond those that are absolutely necessary: every living person must eat, drink and sleep, for instance. The suggestion here, however, is that even these basic requirements get in the way of philosophy.

66c1

ἄν τινες νόσοι προσπέσωσιν: ‘if ever some diseases befall us’, protasis of an indefinite present condition (ἄν here is a contraction of ἔαν).

ἐμποδίζουσιν ἡμῶν … τὴν θήραν: ‘they get in the way of our hunt’. Socrates has used both metaphors in his own speech: see 65a10 and 66a2–3 nn.

66c2–4

ἐρώτων … καὶ φλυαρίας ἐμπίμπλησιν ἡμᾶς πολλῆς: ‘it [the body] fills us with desires … and a great deal of foolishness’. πίμπλημι and its compounds are followed by an accusative (the thing filled) and a genitive (that with which it is filled). ἔρωτες need not be, but are generally, sexual desires – hence the inclusion of ἐπιθυμίαι (appetites more generally) in the list too. ἡμᾶς here must refer to the philosophers’ souls only.

εἰδώλων παντοδαπῶν: ‘all sorts of images’, or ‘fantasies’. Given Socrates’ hostility even to the sense of sight, these are presumably recollections of things we have seen that distract us from our pure reasoning.

66c4–5

ὥστε … οὐδὲ φρονῆσαι ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται οὐδέποτε οὐδέν: ‘so that it is not even (οὐδέ) possible for us to think about anything ever’. The multiple negatives drive home the point. The indicative after ὥστε, too, emphasizes the reality of the result. Emphatic positioning of οὐδέποτε οὐδέν.

τὸ λεγόμενον: ‘as is said’, an accusative of respect. The words do not match up with any known saying, and it may just be a humorous fancy of Socrates’ to pretend that philosophers were going around saying that they can never ever get any thinking done.

ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι: emphatic, ‘really truly’.

66c5–7

The grammatical subject he is the phrase οὐδὲν ἄλλο … ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τουτοῦ ἐπιθυμίαι (‘nothing other than the body and its desires’).

στάσεις: conflicts between factions, generally within city-states, i.e. civil strife. Readers familiar with the Republic may be reminded here of the analogy in that work between the city-state and its rulers and the body and the soul.

66c7–d2

The luxury of speaking through the True Philosophers lets Socrates advance some potentially controversial claims without challenge: that all wars come from a desire for money, and that we need money for the care of our bodies.

66d1–2

δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ: ‘being slaves to the care of this thing’, an image Plato has been saving for this rhetorically climactic point.

66d2

ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι: ‘we have no time for philosophy’. πέρι is postpositional (see 65d12 n.).

66d3

τὸ δ᾽ ἔσχατον πάντων: ‘and the worst thing of all [is]’.

66d3–4

ἐάν τις ἡμῖν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ: ‘if we do ever get some rest from it’, protasis of a present indefinite conditional. καί is adverbial, emphasizing σχολή γένηται (‘if we do ever get some rest …’).

66d4–5

καὶ τραπώμεθα πρὸς τὸ σκοπεῖν τι: ‘and apply ourselves to the examination of something’. τραπώμεθα is an intransitive middle aorist subjunctive from τρέπω, ‘I turn’.

66d5–6

αὖ πανταχοῦ παραπῖπτον: ‘turning up afresh at every point’. παραπίπτω is literally ‘fall in one’s way’ and by extension ‘turn up unexpected’. Either is strikingly paradoxical when used of one’s own body. (τὸ σῶμα) παραπῖπτον: (the body) getting in the way …; nom. sg. neut. part. modifies σῶμα.

θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει: the body bothers presents our souls with various distractions. In classical Greek a θόρυβος is generally a loud noise or din – an example of a distraction to which most readers will relate. ταραχή can be ‘disorder’ either of the body (especially of the bowels) or of the mind. Take note of the arrangement of the καὶ … καὶ …

66d7

καθορᾶν τἀληθές: the metaphor of sight has an ironic ring, given Socrates’ recent discrediting of all the body’s senses.

66d7–8

ἡμῖν δέδεικται: ‘it has been shown’ (i.e. is clear) ‘to us’. δέδεικται is a perfect passive from δείκνυμι.

66d8

εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι: ‘if we intend ever to know anything purely’, i.e. to know it as a thing itself distinct from others, the kind of knowledge discussed at 65d4–66a8. μέλλω is as usual followed by a future infinitive (εἴσεσθαι = fut. inf. of οἶδα). ποτε as an enclitic (i.e. unaccented) means ‘ever’. καθαρῶς will be used several times in this passage, in different forms.

66e1

ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον: two impersonal uses of gerundives from ἀπαλλάσσω and θεάομαι. The former is followed by a genitive of separation αὐτοῦ (‘from it’). The dative αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ expresses the agent of θεατέον (i.e. ‘the soul [by] itself must contemplate’).

66e2

ἡμῖν ἔσται: possessive dative, ‘we will have’.

66e2–3

οὗ … φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι: ‘of which we claim to be lovers’. Like the English, the Greek ἐραστής often implies a specifically sexual desire. The connotation adds a touch of irony: for the True Philosophers, of course, scorn such desires of the body.

ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν: indefinite because the speakers do not know when they will die.

66e4

ζῶσιν δὲ οὔ: the dat. pl. follows on from ἡμῖν ἔσται (e2): ‘we will not have it while we live’.

66e4–5

εἰ γὰρ μὴ οἷον τε … μηδὲν καθαρῶς γνῶναι: ‘For if it is possible to know nothing purely …’. The verb is impersonal, with ἐστι omitted after τε.

66e5

δυοῖν θάτερον: ‘one or other of two things [is true]’. θάτερον = τὸ ἕτερον, by a crasis of the article with an earlier form of the adjective, ἅτερος (hence its vowel). δυοῖν is the genitive/dative form of δύο, a word that is naturally dual. Note particularly the exclusive options which Socrates presents; since people will be unlikely to accept the first option, then they must agree to the second.

66e6

ἔστιν κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι: ‘nowhere is it possible to get hold of knowledge’. Much like ἔξεστι, the uncompounded ἔστι with a dative and infinitive may mean ‘it is possible for (dat.) to (inf.)’. τὸ εἰδέναι is really ‘the state of knowing’, an articular infinitive of οἶδα.

ἢ οὐδαμοῦ … ἢ τελευτήσασιν: ‘[it is possible] either nowhere or for those who have died’, i.e. only the dead stand a chance of actually knowing anything.

67a2–6

According to the True Philosophers, during life we can still come as close as possible to knowing something, by freeing and cleansing ourselves of the body. Philosophers, whose goal is actual knowledge and not a near miss, may not be satisfied merely by coming close. But, Socrates will suggest, this cleansing and freeing is all just practice for being dead, when we can really learn (c5–10).

67a2

ἐν ᾧ ἂν ζῶμεν: ‘while we are alive’, indefinite because one does not know the length of one’s life while it is happening.

67a3

ἐγγυτάτω: an alternative superlative of the adverb ἐγγύς. But, as it modifies ἔσομεθα here, we must take it adjectivally (‘we will be nearest’).

67a4

ὅτι μὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη: ‘except when entirely necessary’, a slightly stronger version of καθ᾽ ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη at 64e1.

67a5

μηδὲ ἀναπιμπλώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως: ‘and do not infect ourselves with its nature’. This medical sense of ἀναπίμπλημι (really ‘I fill up’) seems appropriate here, given the True Philosophers’ attitude towards the body. On the genitive, see 66c2–4 n. φύσις can mean ‘nature’ in the sense of something’s character, temperament or (of animals) instincts. All of these make good sense here.

67a6

ἕως ἂν ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς: ‘until the god himself sets us free’, i.e. allows us to die. There is no reason to see ὁ θεὸς as suggesting that the True Philosophers are monotheists; it makes better sense to take the singular as meaning ‘the god responsible’ (so Rowe). Plato often has his characters switch seamlessly between plural and singular when speaking of gods.

67a6–b2

The Philosophers expect to be in like-minded company after death – that is, the company of others who too have become pure. For, they explain, ‘it is not right for someone who is impure to lay hold of what is pure’. On this note the speech of the Philosophers ends.

67a6–7

οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττομενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης: ‘being thus pure as we escape the thoughtlessness of the body’. Note the present tense of the participle. The μέν here has no corresponding δέ, but looks forward to b2, where the opposite situation (that of being impure) is presented.

67a7–8

ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς: ‘as seems likely’, the first trace of uncertainty in a hitherto assertive speech.

67a8–b1

γνωσομεθα δι᾽ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν πᾶν τὸ εἰλικρινές: ‘we will know the whole pure thing through our own selves’, that is, through our souls, without the intermediary of any sense or teacher.

67b1

τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἴσως τὸ ἀληθές: the Philosophers’ strongest admission of uncertainty yet, but with good reason: they of course cannot know if what they have advanced is true until they are dead. The job of ἴσως (really ‘we suppose’ here) is to mark that the view presented is just the opinion of the speaker.

67b2

μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι: ‘for [someone] impure to grasp hold of [something] pure’. Note the juxtaposition.

μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ᾖ: ‘it is not right’. μὴ οὐ … ᾖ is really a negative fear-clause with the verb omitted. It is an idiom Plato uses often to make a modest assertion.

67b6

παντός γε μᾶλλον: ‘yes, more than anything’. The particle γε confirms that Simmias is answering in the affirmative.

67b7–e6 – why philosophers are really practising for death

In the True Philosophers’ arguments Socrates finds much cause for hope, for himself and for anyone else who believes they have purified their thoughts. Socrates now offers definitions of purification and of death. Finding them both to involve roughly the same thing, the separation and freeing of the soul from the body, he concludes that what philosophers are really doing is practising dying and being dead.

67b8–9

πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ οἷ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι … ἱκανῶς … κτήσασθαι: ‘(there is) much hope for someone who has arrived where I am travelling, that he will adequately possess’. ἐλπὶς here introduces an indirect statement (‘hope that …’). An aorist infinitive is common in indirect statements of hope, instead of a future infinitive. οἷ is the relative (subordinating) form of ποῖ; ‘to where?’ Socrates may be speaking generally about the experience of a certain type of people when they die, it is striking that he still has his own death very much in mind.

67b9–10

τοῦτο οὗ ἕνεκα ἡ πολλὴ πραγματεία ἡμῖν … γέγονεν: ‘the thing that has been our main occupation’.

67b10

ἐν τῷ παρελθοντι βίῳ: ‘in the life we have lived’. παρέρχομαι is a common verb for time’s passage. παρελθοντι is aorist, and elicits some pathos, that his life is now over.

67b10–c2

ὥστε … γίγνεται: an indicative in a result clause emphasizes the reality of the result and thus Socrates’ hopeful attitude.

ἥ … ἀποδημία ἡ νῦν μοι προστεταγμένη: ‘the journey abroad that has been prescribed for me now’. ἀποδημία, really meaning a stretch of time away from one’s δῆμος, is a poignant euphemism for death, not least given Socrates’ reluctance to leave Athens to avoid execution. However, just as speaking of ‘time away’ in English implies a return, ἀποδημία may hint already at the doctrine of reincarnation that Socrates later advances (77a–d).

67c2–3

ὃς ἡγεῖταί οἱ παρεσκευάσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν: ‘who thinks that his mind has been prepared’. οἱ = αὐτῷ, a dative of possession (‘his’). παρεσκευάσθαι is a perfect passive infinitive of παρασκευάζω.

ὥσπερ κεκαθαρμένην: ‘as if it has been purified’. As Socrates will go on to explain, it is only on its way to being purified: that will require the full separation of soul from body (c5–7).

67c5

κάθαρσις … εἶναι ἆρα οὐ τοῦτο συμβαίνει: ‘it then follows (συμβαίνει), doesn’t it, that purification is this?’ Philosophical authors often use συμβαίνω to express that a conclusion logically follows from something already said.

67c5–6

ὅπερ πάλαι ἐν τῷ λογῳ λέγεται: Socrates is not claiming that he has already discussed κάθαρσις explicitly (he has not), but that κάθαρσις is something he and Simmias have already discussed: the separation, as far as possible, of the soul from the body (c6–7).

67c6–9

τὸ χωρίζειν … καὶ ἐθίσαι: a single articular infinitive phrase. The infinitives that follow all depend on ἐθίσαι.

67c7–8

κάθαρσις involves ‘the accustoming of the soul to gather together and assemble (συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι) itself on its own out of every part of the body (πανταχοθεν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος)’. Socrates here offers slightly more illumination on the nature of the soul: for most humans, we conclude, it is spread throughout the body and the philosopher must strive to concentrate it in such a way that there are no bits of body amid the soul. As ἐθίσαι suggests, this is a matter of habit for the soul and must come with practice.

συναγείρεσθαί τε καὶ ἁθροίζεσθαι: synonyms, the pleonasm drawing our focus onto this new detail, that the soul must gather itself together out of every part of the body. Plato, often when speaking metaphorically, will often use several synonyms to help convey his meaning.

67c8–d1

καὶ οἰκεῖν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν … μονην καθ᾽ αὑτήν: ‘and to live as much as it can … on its own’. What is important is the continued effort the soul must make to do without the body: this is all part of ‘practising dying and being dead’ (e1–2).

καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν παροντι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔπειτα: ‘at the present time and in future’: it is to be a lasting effort.

67d1–2

ἐκλυομένην … ἐκ τοῦ σώματος: ‘being freed from the body’. The present participle, which could also be read as middle (‘freeing itself’), stresses the ongoing process of freeing, which must continue until the individual dies. The analogy of prison-chains (δεσμῶν) is particularly poignant in Socrates’ current circumstances.

67d4

λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς: emphatic near-synonyms, but with λύσις adding the optimistic connotation of an escape to something better (echoing 67d1).

67d7–8

μάλιστα καὶ μονοι: this freeing of the soul is something true philosophers desire especially keenly (μάλιστα), and they alone (μόνοι). For everyone else, this sounds like no life at all (65a6).

67d8–9

τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσοφων: ‘and this is the very thing the philosophers practise’. μελέτημα and its cognate verb μελετάω (e5) refer to the practising of some activity with the aim of improving one’s proficiency in it: contrast ἐπιτηδεύουσι at 64a6 (see n.).

67d11

φαίνεται: a less enthusiastic response from Simmias; but perhaps the preceding points had already made it abundantly clear that this λύσις καὶ χωρισμός will take repeated and sustained effort (practice).

67d12

ὅπερ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἔλεγον: Socrates had indeed made the same point at 64a6–9, in similar terms.

67d12–e2

γελοῖον ἂν εἴη: introduces an acc. + inf. indirect statement (ἄνδρα … ἀγανακτεῖν), but most simply translated, ‘It would be ridiculous if …’.

ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω ὄντα τοῦ τεθνάναι: ‘being as close as possible to being dead’, that is, with his soul as separate as possible from the body. All degrees of ἐγγύς are followed by a genitive.

κἄπειθ᾽ ἥκοντος … τούτου: ‘and then, when this has come’ (i.e. death). κἄπειτα is a crasis of καί and ἔπειτα.

67e3

πῶς δ᾽ οὔ: ‘how could it not be?’

67e7–69e5 – Socrates ends his ἀπολογία

Socrates draws his defence speech to a close (see 63b1–67e6 n.), having proved to his satisfaction that he is right to welcome his approaching death in good cheer. Death, he says, allows philosophers finally to get what they have worked towards all their lives: escape from the distractions and confusions of their bodies, which hamper their pursuit of wisdom in this life. On this view, philosophers will see death as the release they have prepared for all their lives. Anyone who dreads death cannot be a philosopher but must be a ‘lover of the body’, since they must place a higher value on it than on wisdom.

For Socrates, wisdom is worth pursuing beyond all else: without it, all other supposed virtues ring hollow. He argues that bravery (say) – or what passes for bravery among most people – is really a product of fear. The philosopher, however, can be truly brave: he knows death is not to be feared but welcomed.

69e6–70c3 – Cebes’ question: How can we know that the soul can survive death?

Cebes applauds Socrates’ speech, but wonders why his friend is so sure that a person’s soul is not immediately annihilated at the moment of death, as many think.

69e6–7

ὑπολαβὼν … ἔφη: ‘he said in reply’. ὑπολαμβάνω ‘I reply’ is really a metaphor (‘I take up [role of person speaking]’), hence the aorist participle here.

69e7–70a1

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα … τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς: Cebes uses a μέν/δέ contrast to isolate the part needing further discussion in what Socrates has said. τὰ μὲν ἄλλα (‘most of what you say’ – lit. ‘everything else’) tells us to expect an exception: τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς (‘the stuff about the soul, on the other hand’).

ἔμοιγε: ‘to me, at least’, setting up a contrast with τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (70a1).

δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι: ‘seems to be well put’, i.e. convincing. δοκεῖ here is not impersonal, but has τὰ ἄλλα as its subject. The infinitive is present, reflecting the lasting importance of what Socrates has said.

70a1–2

πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει … μή … οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ᾖ: ‘causes much doubt that it [the soul] will not exist anywhere anymore’. μή here introduces a series of fear-clauses, with verbs in the subjunctive as usual (ᾖ, διαφθείρηταί, ἀπολλύηται, οἴχηται). The word prompting the fear-construction is ἀπιστίαν, which should thus be taken as connoting some worry on top of the disbelief. ᾖ (3sg. pres. subj.) is an example of the ‘existential’ use of εἰμί (‘I exist, am real’) common in philosophical texts.

ἐπειδὰν ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος: an indefinite temporal clause (here ἐπειδάν + subjunctive), because one’s time of death is unknown (‘when’). It need not imply belief in reincarnation (‘whenever’), the possibility of which is currently being called into question.

70a3

διαφθείρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολλύηται: present subjunctives, after μή (see a1–2 n.). The words are synonyms, the pleonasm for emphasis.

ἡμέρᾳ … ᾗ ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀποθνῄσκῃ: ‘the day … on which the person dies’, again indefinite (see a1–2n.) with ἄν + subjunctive.

70a3–4

ἐκβαίνουσα … διασκεδασθεῖσα … διαπτομένη: the three participles, in asyndeton, describe the soul’s departure and dissolution. διασκεδασθεῖσα is an aorist passive participle from διασκεδάννυμι ‘I scatter abroad’. διαπτομένη is an aorist middle participle from διαπέτομαι ‘I fly off’.

οἴχηται: subjunctive after μή (see a1–2 n.). οἴχομαι ‘I have gone’ is present with perfect sense. There is some wordplay here: for like the English ‘departed’, the verb has the secondary meaning ‘I have died’.

70a5

ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς: echoes a Homeric simile of the soul to smoke (Iliad 23.100). In the same passage, the souls of the dead are said to be mere images lacking any real intelligence (Iliad 23.103–104: compare b3–4 below).

70a6

οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ: closely echoes a2, but with an adverbial οὐδέν (‘not at all’) for further emphasis.

70a6–8

εἴπερ εἴη που … πολλὴ ἂν εἴη ἐλπὶς: ‘if indeed it were to be anywhere … there would be a great hope’. The future remote conditional suggests some scepticism on Cebes’ part. που is not ‘I suppose’ but the indefinite correlative of ποῦ; ‘where?’. -περ (‘indeed’ here) is added to εἰ or a relative to pinpoint more precisely the condition or thing in question (e.g. ἅπερ ‘the very things which’; compare ὥσπερ ‘just as’).

αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν: ‘on its own, by itself’. On this recurrent phrase, see 64c5–8 n.

συνηθροισμένη καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένη: perfect middle participles of συναθροίζω ‘I gather’ and ἀπαλλάττω ‘I release’.

70a8

ὧν σὺ νυνδὴ διῆλθες: ‘[the evils] which you have just now described’. In Plato διέρχομαι, ‘I go through’ is generally a metaphor for recounting or describing in sequence.

καλή: the hope would be ‘fine’ as in well justified (much like καλῶς at 69a7).

70b1

ἀληθῆ ἐστιν: ‘they are true’, with neuter pl. subject taking a singular verb as usual.

70b2

οὐκ ὀλίγης παραμυθίας δεῖται καὶ πίστεως: ‘much reassurance and proof is needed’. δεῖται ‘there is a need of’ is impersonal and followed by the genitive.

70b2–3

ὡς ἔστι τε ψυχὴ: existential ἔστι (see 70a1–2 n.), ‘that the soul exists’. Plato often omits the article before ψυχή, with no change to the meaning.

ἀποθανοντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: better taken as a genitive absolute than a possessive genitive: Socrates and his friends do not speak of someone who has died as still being an ἄνθρωπος (as the latter would imply).

70b3–4

τινα δύναμιν ἔχει καὶ φρονησιν: the hopes Socrates had expressed of a better future after death (62c9–69e5) hinge on the soul having ‘some power and intelligence’ after death. Cebes is cutting to the chase.

70b5–6

τί δὴ ποιῶμεν: a deliberative subjunctive: ‘what are we to do, then?’

70b6

βούλει διαμυθολογῶμεν: ‘do you want us to talk through [whether X or Y]’. Occasionally a deliberative subjunctive occurs after βούλομαι in a direct question; the result is really a combination of two (‘do you want …?’ and ‘shall we talk through …?’ As a 2nd sg. middle-passive ending, -ει is far commoner in later classical Greek than -ῃ.

70b6–7

εἴτε … εἴτε: ‘whether … or’ in indirect questions (much like πότερον … ἤ).

εἰκὸς οὕτως ἔχειν: ‘[it is] likely that this is the case’. εἰκός (generally with ἔστι omitted as understood) introduces an acc. + inf. indirect statement. ἔχω + adverb is equivalent to εἰμί + adjective.

70b8–9

ἐγὼ γοῦν … ἡδέως ἂν ἀκούσαιμι: ‘Well I for one would be pleased to hear’. The potential optative with ἄν is used for polite requests: it is really the apodosis of a future remote conditional, with the protasis (‘if you should be so kind’, or the like), omitted as obvious. γοῦν is a crasis of γε and οὖν and roughly equivalent to γε.

ἥντινα δοξαν ἔχεις: an indirect question – hence ἥντινα, the indirect question form of τίνα (f. acc. sg.).

70b10

οὔκουν γ᾽ ἂν οἶμαι … εἰπεῖν τινα: ‘I don’t think anyone would say’. ἄν here belongs with εἰπεῖν in the indirect statement.

70c1

οὐδ᾽ εἰ κωμῳδοποιὸς εἴη: ‘not even if he were a comedy-writer’. Aristophanes, in his comedy the Clouds, grossly misrepresents Socrates and his practices for humorous effect, and has the character Strepsiades call him and his followers ἀδόλεσχοι (‘nonsense-talkers’, Clouds 1485). Another comic playwright, Eupolis, has him called ἀδόλεσχης (a cognate meaning the same). Elsewhere Plato has Socrates plausibly imply that the Clouds had a great part in turning the Athenian public against him (Apology 19b–c), giving the joke here a sinister edge.

ἀδολεσχῶ: ‘I talk rubbish’, a verb formed from ἀδόλεσχος/ἀδόλεσχης (see previous n.) and so a direct nod to the comedians.

70c1–2

οὐ περὶ προσηκοντων: Socrates cannot be accused of talking ‘about things that don’t concern’ him, as is soon to die and keen to know the fate of his soul. προσήκει is commonly impersonal (‘it concerns’).

70c2–3

εἰ … δοκεῖ: ‘if you agree’, with the pronoun understood.

χρὴ διασκοπεῖσθαι: ‘we ought to look into it thoroughly’, with a middle infinitive, as they would be doing so for their own benefit.

70c4–72e1 – the first argument for the soul’s immortality: The cycle of opposites

For any two pairs of opposite conditions such as ‘bigger’ and ‘smaller’, or ‘awake’ and ‘asleep’, the one must come from the other. For something can only be bigger if it was hitherto smaller. In any such pair, there are two processes of ‘coming to be’, one going in each direction (e.g. from bigger to smaller, and from smaller to bigger). Socrates argues that the same must be true of the opposites ‘living’ and ‘dead’: if there is a process one way (from being alive to being dead – i.e. dying), there must be one going the other – coming back to life.

Readers who find the argument frustrating or plainly erroneous must remember that it is just a first approach to the challenge of proving the soul’s immortality. Later in the dialogue, Socrates and his friends will try other avenues and find them more profitable. This argument and its successor, the argument from recollection (72e3–77a5), must also be read and appraised as a pair: for as Socrates says himself, only together do they serve as a proof for the soul’s immortality (77c–e).

70c4

σκεψώμεθα: hortative subjunctive, ‘let us examine’. As with an imperative, the aorist is for aspect: they are to examine the matter once, now, rather than as a general principle of behaviour (present).

αὐτὸ: i.e. the matter at hand.

τῇδέ πῃ: ‘in some way (πῃ) such as the following (τῇδέ)’. πῃ is the indefinite correlative of the question-word πῇ; ‘in what way?’. Like τῇδε here, demonstratives in -δε generally point ahead to what is coming next.

70c4–5

εἴτ᾽ ἄρα … εἴτε καὶ: ‘whether … or …’, an indirect question following σκεψώμεθα. After εἴτε, ἄρα (not to be confused with the closed question-marker ἆρα) and καί are really untranslatable, but serve to mark the question as a genuinely open one with no bias either way.

ἐν Ἅιδου: ‘in [the house] of Hades’. Socrates does not mean literally the Hades of classical myth, but is using the name as a shorthand for the dwelling place of dead souls, wherever and whatever that may be. He will put forth his own take on the myths of the afterlife and the underworld at the end of the Phaedo (107c–115a).

τελευτησάντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων: genitive absolute again, rather than possessive (see b2–3 n.).

70c5–6

παλαιὸς … ἔστι τις λογος: the ‘ancient legend’ (or ‘hypothesis’) in question is that of reincarnation (παλιγγενεσία). In Plato’s Meno (81a–c) the doctrine is credited to various priests, priestesses and ‘inspired poets’. Such a tale is told, for instance, by the lyric poet Pindar (Olympian 2.56–80).

οὗ μεμνήμεθα: ‘which we recall’. μέμνημαι ‘I remember’ is a reflexive middle perfect of μιμνήσκω ‘I remind’, with present sense. It takes a genitive object.

ὡς: ‘that’, introducing the παλαιὸς λόγος.

70c6–7

εἰσὶν … ἐκεῖ: existential, ‘they exist there’.

70c7–8

πάλιν … γίγνονται: ‘they are born again’. Based on πάλιν γίγνεσθαι at c8–9, it seems best to take πάλιν with γίγνονται here too. γίγνομαι can mean ‘I am born’ as well as ‘become’ (compare its cognate γένος).

ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων: ‘from the dead’. τεθνεώς is a perfect participle from (ἀπο)θνῄσκω ‘I die’.

70c8–9

πάλιν γίγνεσθαι … τοὺς ζῶντας: ‘that the living are born again’, an acc. + inf. indirect statement after οὕτως ἔχει.

70c9–d1

ἄλλο τι ἢ: ‘[would] anything else [be the case] than [that]’; i.e. ‘surely …?’

εἶεν ἂν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν ἐκεῖ: ‘our souls would exist there’, a remote-conditional apodosis, despite the open-conditional protasis εἰ τοῦθ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει. This is because a second, counterfactual protasis is implied (‘and if we were dead’).

70d1–2

μὴ οὖσαι: ‘if they did not exist’. When negated with μή and not οὐ, participles take on a conditional force.

70d2

τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι: ‘this [is] sufficient evidence of [the fact] that these things are true’. As an alternative to an indirect statement with ὅτι, Plato often uses τό with an acc. + inf. εἶναι here is in a ‘veridical’ sense (‘to be true’), a use common in Plato alongside the existential (‘to be real’).

70d2–3

τῷ ὄντι: ‘in reality’, an adverbial idiom common in Plato’s early and middle works. Plato regularly uses τὸ ὄν in other cases, as well as the plural τά ὄντα, to mean ‘reality’ and ‘the truth’.

70d3

οὐδαμοθεν ἄλλοθεν … ἢ: ‘from nowhere else than’.

70d4–5

The form of the sentence is a present open conditional, with a present indicative in the protasis (εἰ-clause) but with a potential optative with ἄν in the apodosis (main clause). In conditionals of this type, the potential optative serves to suggest that the speaker is making an inference (Smyth § 2300e): ‘if X, then I presume Y’.

εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο: ἔστι is veridical (‘is true’).

ἄλλου ἄν του δέοι λογου: ‘we would need another argument’. The impersonal δεῖ with a genitive means ‘there is need of’. του here is not the article (τοῦ) but an alternative to τινός.

70d6

πάνυ μὲν οὖν: ‘yes indeed’, or the like. The phrase is a common response of agreement in Platonic dialogue.

70d7

κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπων: ‘in relation to human beings’.

ἦ δ᾽ ὅς: ‘he said’, a common phrase for marking direct speech in a dialogue.

70d9

συλλήβδην: an adverb formed from συλλαμβάνω (‘I take together’), meaning either ‘collectively’ or ‘in short’. Either sense works here.

ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν: ‘all those things that have generation’. The relative ὅσαπερ is neuter to match its most recent antecedent φυτῶν (‘plants’). On the addition of -περ, see 70a5 n. The noun γένεσις is awkward to translate, and its sense may best be captured by ‘coming into being’.

70e1

ἴδωμεν ἆρ᾽: hortative subjunctive (‘let’s see’), with ἇρα introducing an indirect yes/no question (‘whether …’) instead of the far commoner εἰ.

οὑτωσὶ γίγνεται πάντα: ‘everything comes into being in this very way’. The suffix -ι on οὑτως can be added to all demonstratives for emphasis.

70e1–2

οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία: ‘opposites [coming into being] from nowhere but from their opposites’.

ὅσοις τυγχάνει ὂν τοιοῦτον τι: ‘all those that happen to have something like that’. ὅσοις here is possessive dative. The clause clarifies that what Socrates will say will pertain to any two things that are opposite to each other.

οἷον: ‘[as,] for example’. The adverbial οἷον (‘for example’) is a common Platonic idiom.

70e2–3

τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἐναντίον που: ‘the beautiful, I suppose, [is] opposite to the ugly’. Alternatively, καλός and αἰσχρός can be taken in their other opposite senses, ‘honourable’ and ‘shameful’.

70e4

τοῦτο … σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα: see 70e1 n.

70e4–5

ἀναγκαῖον … αὐτὸ γίγνεσθαι: ‘[it is] necessary for it to come into being’.

ὅσοις ἔστι τι ἐναντίον: another dative of possession with ἔστι.

70e6

ὅταν μεῖζον τι γίγνηται: indefinite, ‘whenever something becomes bigger’.

70e7

ἀνάγκη: as with ἀναγκαῖον (e4), ἔστι must be supplied.

ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος προτερον: something must become bigger (μεῖζον) ‘from [itself] being formerly smaller’. It is still the same ‘something’, just a different size.

70e10–71a

Socrates is keen to show, by this example, that the process of becoming between opposites goes both ways.

70e10

οὐκοῦν introduces a question inviting the answer ‘yes’ and can therefore often be translated just as ‘surely’. It has a secondary role, however, which is to mark that the sentence as a logical consequence of what has come before. In such cases, it is better to translate οὐκοῦν as ‘therefore’ and treat the question as a statement.

κἂν ἔλαττον γίγνηται: κἂν is a crasis of καὶ εἄν ‘if, too’, introducing a future open condition.

71a2

ἔστιν οὕτω: ‘that’s right’.

71a3–4

To avoid unnecessary repetition, the verb (presumably γίγνεται) is omitted as understood.

καὶ μὴν: ‘and then’, marking the speaker’s keenness to get on to what he has to say next. The particle γε here works with it in tandem, focusing attention further on that example.

71a6

θᾶττον: neuter singular comparative of ταχύς.

71a8

πῶς γὰρ οὔ: ‘how could it not be?’

71a9

ἱκανῶς … ἔχομεν τοῦτο: ‘we are satisfied with this’ (lit. ‘have it sufficiently’).

71a9

πράγματα means ‘things’ of either an abstract or concrete nature.

71a12–b4

Socrates gets Cebes to agree that for any pair of opposites A and B, there are two processes of becoming (γενέσεις) between them, which allow something that is A to become B and vice versa.

71a12

τί δ᾽ αὖ: ‘what about this, next?’

71a12–b1

ἔστι τι καὶ τοιονδε ἐν αὐτοῖς, οἷον … δύο γενέσεις: is there also something like this in them [i.e. opposites]: something such as two processes of coming into being?’.

μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων: the processes are ‘between both of all opposites’.

δυοῖν ὄντοιν: genitive, agreeing with ἀμφοτέρων (‘[between] both, being two’). δυοῖν and ὄντοιν are in the dual number, for which -οιν is the genitive/dative ending in the second- and third declensions.

71b2–3

μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ: μεταξύ (‘between’) takes the genitive and here governs the words preceding it: ‘between a greater thing and a smaller one [there is] growth and decay’.

71b3–4

καλοῦμεν … τὸ μὲν αὐξάνεσθαι τὸ δὲ φθίνειν: ‘we call the one thing (τὸ μὲν) “growing” and the other (τὸ δὲ) “decaying”’. With αὔξησις and φθίσις both being feminine, we might expect the articles to be the same. Instead, they have taken on the neuter gender of the infinitives. The articular infinitive in the present tense is a clear and convenient way of denoting processes, and one Socrates will take much advantage of in the ensuing lines.

71b6–9

οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι … καὶ πάντα οὕτω: ‘And therefore there is also separating and combining … and all such things’. The entire sentence is punctuated as a question owing to the initial οὐκοῦν (on which see, 70e10 n.).

71b7–8

κἂν εἰ μὴ χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνομασιν ἐνιαχοῦ: ‘even if we don’t use their names in some cases’. That is, the same is true for pairs of opposites for which our language lacks terms. κἄν here is a crasis of καὶ and ἄν (not ἐἄν as at 70e10), even though ἄν properly belongs within the protasis (εἰ-clause).

71b8–9

ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ γοῦν: ‘still, in actual fact’. This phrase introduces the apodosis to κἂν εἰ in the previous line, and so ἀλλά must be left untranslated. The adverbial ἔργῳ is often found alongside the contrasting λόγῳ ‘in word’ (i.e. allegedly).

πανταχοῦ οὕτως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον: ‘it is necessary that they (i.e. pairs of opposites) are like this everywhere’.

γίγνεσθαί τε αὐτὰ … γένεσίν τε εἶναι: these two acc. + inf. phrases follow on from οὕτως: ‘[they are like this everywhere]: they come into being from each other …’.

71b10

ἑκατέρου εἰς ἄλληλα: ‘from each of the two into the other’. The reciprocal pronoun ἄλληλα (‘each other’) is naturally plural despite the sense requiring a singular.

71c1–2

Socrates leads Cebes to agree on the pivotal point for his argument: that living and being dead are pairs of the kind just described.

τί οὖν: ‘what about this, then?’

ζῆν: present infinitive of ζάω ‘I live’.

τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι: ‘being awake’. ἐγρηγορέναι is the intransitive perfect infinitive of ἐγείρω ‘I awaken’ and is accordingly used with the present sense ‘to be awake’. The articular infinitive in the perfect tense offers a convenient way to form nouns denoting states or conditions.

71c5

τεθνάναι is the perfect infinitive of (ἀπο) θνῄσκω and so means ‘to have died’ or ‘to be dead’. The latter sense is better here, as Cebes is naming the opposite state to being alive.

71c6

εἴπερ: ‘if indeed’: see 70a6–8 n.

71c7

αἱ γενέσεις εἰσὶν αὐτοῖν μεταξὺ δύο δυοῖν ὄντοιν: ‘there are two processes of becoming between the two [states]’. δύο agrees with γενέσις, and the duals αὐτοῖν … δυοῖν ὄντοιν are genitive after μεταξὺ. The hyperbaton here mirrors the interrelation of the two.

71c9–d5

Socrates returns in more depth to the examples of being awake and sleeping, and invites Cebes to give him in turn an analogous account of life and death.

71c9

συζυγίαν: ‘pair’. The original sense of the word is of animals joined together with a yoke, such as horses or oxen.

ὧν νυνδὴ ἔλεγον ἐγώ: ‘of the ones which I was saying just now’. The case of the relative pronoun here is determined not by its role in the clause; instead it takes on the case the antecedent would have had if there had been one (a phenomenon called the attraction of the relative).

71c9–10

ἐγώ σοι, ἔφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης: ‘“I shall tell you” said Socrates’. The interleaved word-order (ABAB) is a pattern of which Plato is fond.

καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὰς γενέσεις: expands on τὴν συζυγίαν: ‘[I shall name for you] both [the pair] itself and its processes’.

71c11

λέγω here has as its objects both simple noun phrases (τὸ μὲν καθεύδειν, τὸ δὲ ἐγρηγορέναι) and indirect statements (ἐκ τοῦ καθεύδειν τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι γίγνεσθαι …) and must be translated in different ways for each. I suggest ‘I am talking about’ for the former and ‘I say that’ for the latter.

71d2

τὴν μὲν καταδαρθάνειν εἶναι, τὴν δ᾽ ἀνεγείρεσθαι: ‘the one [process] is falling asleep, the other waking up’. The acc. sg. γένεσιν is assumed, hence the feminine article. Again, the use of present infinitives makes clear that he is talking of processes and not events (aorist) or states (perfect).

71d2–3

ἱκανῶς σοι: ‘is that enough for you?’, assuming ἔχει (see 70b6–7 n.).

71c5

λέγε δή μοι καὶ σύ: the particle δή is common after imperatives, where it conveys some added sense of exhortation such as ‘come, now’ in English. καί here is adverbial (‘you too’).

71d8–9

γίγνεσθαι δὲ ἐξ ἀλλήλων: ‘and [do you say that] they come into being from each other?’ That Cebes is so ready to agree (ναί) may shock us: for our experience can bear witness to only one of the processes, that between living and being dead. He is compelled to do so, however, by a premise he has already agreed on, that between pairs of opposites there are processes of becoming in both directions.

71d10

ἐξ … τοῦ ζῶντος τί τὸ γιγνομενον: ‘what is the thing that comes into being from that which is living?’ Socrates moves from articular infinitives (which express processes and states) to articles with participles, which allow him to talk about the things that exemplify the states and processes (‘that which is X-ing’).

71d11

τὸ τεθνηκος: ‘that which is dead’. Plato uses two different perfect active participles of (ἀπο)θνῄσκω in the passage, τεθνηκώς and τεθνεώς.

71d13

ἀναγκαῖον … ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν: ‘it is necessary to agree that it is that which is living’. Rowe detects a trace of reluctance in Cebes’ agreement here and in his next few replies (φαίνεται and ἔοικεν), in contrast to the more confident πάνυ μὲν οὖν and πῶς γὰρ οὔ of before. Cebes, it seems, is now beginning to question the premises he had been led to agree with.

71d14–15

τὰ ζῶντά τε καὶ οἱ ζῶντες: i.e. non-human living things (φυτόν and ζῷον are both neuter) and humans (οἱ ζῶντες), the main focus of the argument. Both groups together comprise the broader category τὸ ζῶν ‘that which is alive’.

71e1

φαίνεται: while this can mean ‘clearly’ (assuming a dependent participle), it is better to take it as ‘it seems’ (assuming a dependent infinitive) here, given Cebes’ less confident responses at d13 and e3.

71e2

ἐν Ἅιδου: see 70c4–5 n.

71e4

τοῖν γενεσέοιν τοῖν περὶ ταῦτα: ‘of the two processes of becoming concerning these things’, i.e. concerning that which is alive and that which is dead. τοῖν γενεσέοιν is genitive dual.

71e5

σαφὴς οὖσα τυγχάνει: ‘is actually visible’. Especially with a participle of εἰμί, τυγχάνω is often used to stress the reality of the action of the participle (‘I really am’). σαφής here means clear as in ‘visible, obvious’ – our experience confirms that dying (τὸ ἀποθνῄσκειν) is real.

δήπου: ‘surely, presumably’. Though originally the particle expressed some doubt (as a compound of που ‘I suppose’), Socrates uses it with a touch of irony to state strong claims.

71e8–10

Picking up, perhaps, on the doubt in Cebes’ voice, Socrates loads his next questions with persuasive emotional appeal.

οὐκ ἀνταποδώσομεν: ‘shall we not grant, as is due …?’, i.e. as is required for maintaining balance. Though ἀνταποδίδωμι is used more often later in the Phaedo of arriving at a balance, its primary sense is of repaying a debt. The verb hints, then, at a moral obligation to posit a second process alongside dying.

ταύτῃ χωλὴ ἔσται ἡ φύσις: ‘will we make Nature lame in this respect?’ The future ἔσται ‘will be’, instead of present ἔστι, implies that it is in their power to decide the matter, and that to answer ‘yes’ would be an act of cruelty. ταύτῃ is adverbial, a demonstrative correlative to ᾗ ‘in which way, how’ (73a8) and πῃ (70c4).

φύσις: on top of the senses listed in 67a5 n., φύσις can mean Nature in the sense of the entirely of creation.

71e11

πάντως που: Cebes’ response betrays further traces of doubt.

71e12

τίνα ταύτην: accusative, as if continuing the acc. + inf. construction after ἀνάγκη (e9).

71e13

τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι: ‘coming back to life’. The word may well be Plato’s own coinage. Since they are talking about a process of coming to be from τὸ τεθνηκος, which can just as readily mean ‘that which has died’, as ‘that which is dead’, it makes sense that Cebes calls that process not just ‘coming to life’ but ‘coming back to life’.

71e14–72a2

On the form of this conditional, see 70d4–5 n.

εἴπερ ἔστι τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι: ἔστι is existential.

ἂν εἴη γένεσις … αὕτη, τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι: ‘it – coming back to life – would be this process of becoming’. This second τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι is really redundant, simply clarifying what is understood as the subject of εἴη.

ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων … εἰς τοὺς ζῶντας: ‘from the dead into the living’, i.e. dead people (hence the masculine participles) into living ones.

72a4

ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν: ἡμῖν is a dative of relation: ‘as far as we’re concerned, then (ἄρα), it is agreed’. What follows is an acc. + inf. indirect statement.

καὶ ταύτῃ: ‘in this way, too’. Both words are adverbial (see 71e8–10 n.).

72a5

γεγονέναι: ‘have come into being’, perfect infinitive of γίγνομαι.

72a6

τούτου δὲ ὄντος: ‘with this being the case’ (taking ὄντος as veridical).

που: ‘I suppose’ in a6, but ‘somewhere’ in a7.

72a7–8

ἀναγκαῖον: ‘[it is] necessary’, introducing an acc. + inf. indirect statement.

ὅθεν δὴ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι: δή marks out ὅθεν as picking up που (a7): ‘the place, that is, from which they come back into being’, i.e. are born again.

72a9–10

Cebes recognizes that the conclusion follows from the premises they agreed on, but voices no discernible enthusiasm at the revelation.

ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων: ‘from the things we have agreed upon’. The participle is a perfect passive.

72a11–d3

Socrates argues that without a corresponding process in the other direction, the process from living to being dead could not go on for long. For within a finite universe, the stock of souls from which new life could arise would eventually be exhausted.

72a11–12

οὐδ᾽ ἀδίκως ὡμολογήκαμεν: ‘we are not wrong to have agreed, either’. Like καί, οὐδέ/μηδέ can play an adverbial role (‘not even’, ‘not … either’). The perfect ὡμολογήκαμεν picks up on Cebes’ ὡμολογημένων and invites us to read these as words of encouragement to Cebes, who may well be doubting their conclusion (see 71d13 n.).

72a12–b1

εἰ … μὴ ἀεὶ ἀνταποδιδοίη τὰ ἕτερα τοῖς ἑτέροις γιγνομενα: ‘if one lot’ (i.e. either the dead or the living) ‘did not always achieve a balance with the others when coming into being’. ἀποδίδωμι is here used in its intransitive sense, ‘I correspond with, achieve balance’. Its subject here is τὰ ἕτερα ‘the one group’ (in both singular and plural, ἕτερος is used to contrast between two things or groups). The future remote form of the conditional lends some persuasive power to Socrates’ words, warranted or not: for in this pair of opposites there really is only one process of coming to be – from being alive to being dead.

ὡσπερεὶ κύκλῳ περιιοντα: ‘just as if [they are] going around in a cycle’. The simile’s intended point of reference is probably not a circle as in the shape (also κύκλος) but a recurrent cycle of events such as the orbit of the heavenly bodies or the cycle of the seasons (both also called κύκλοι). Though ὡσπερεί is properly a compound of ὥσπερ and εἰ, it can be followed by a participle or noun just as readily as a full clause.

72b2

εὐθεῖά τις εἴη ἡ γένεσις: ‘the process of coming to be were a straight one’, that is, in a single direction.

ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου μονον εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ: both are neuter in keeping with τὸ τεθνεώς and τὸ ζῶν, to which they refer.

72b3

καὶ μὴ ἀνακάμπτοι πάλιν … μηδὲ καμπὴν ποιοῖτο: ‘and does not bend back round again, nor makes a turn back’. The pleonasm draws our full attention to the metaphor, of a runner, horse or chariot rounding the turning-post (καμπή) of a racecourse.

72b4

οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι: Socrates packages the apodosis of the conditional as a question: ‘do you realise that …?’ To render οἶσθα here as ‘know’ does not capture the spirit in which the question is put and something more like the above is needed.

πάντα τελευτῶντα τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα ἂν σχοίη: ‘everything would end up having the same form’. Plato has frequently used τελευτάω to mean ‘I die’ so far in the Phaedo. Here its participle must mean rather ‘being at the end’ (i.e. ‘finally’) but the connotations from its other sense make for a good pun. σχοίη is a 3sg. aor. opt. act. of ἔχω. Some wordplay is surely intended with σχῆμα, a cognate, as with πάθος and πάθοι (see next n.).

72b5

τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἂν πάθοι: ‘would come to be in the same state’. πάσχω, like Latin patior, need not imply suffering, but can simply mean ‘I have something happen to me’, ‘I am come to be in a certain state’. πάθος is used accordingly to refer to that state.

παύσαιτο γιγνομενα: παύομαι with a participle means ‘I cease from X-ing’.

72b7–c2

Socrates takes the example of ‘going to sleep’ and ‘waking up’ to show that such processes must all be bidirectional. For if there was no ‘waking up’, we would all be permanently asleep.

72b7

οὐδὲν χαλεπον … ἐννοῆσαι: ‘[it is] not at all difficult to get your head around’. οὐδέν is adverbial.

οἷον: ‘for example’.

72b7–8

εἰ τὸ καταδαρθάνειν … εἴη: although Cebes and Socrates have already agreed that there is such a thing as going to sleep (71d2–4), the optative εἴη is still needed here, as the protasis, as a whole, is future remote.

72b8

ἀνταποδιδοίη: ‘achieve a balance’, the intransitive sense again of ἀποδίδωμι (see 72a12–b1 n.).

72b9

οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι: again a question (‘do you realise …?’) as at 72b4.

τελευτῶντα: ‘in the end’ (see 72b4 n.).

72b9–c1

πάντ᾽ <ἂν>: the manuscripts transmit πάντα, but we should join Bekker in emending the text to include ἄν, a requisite for the apodosis of a future remote conditional. With another ἄν shortly after, it is easy to imagine a scribe omitting the first (a so-called ‘haplography’), perhaps assuming the word to have been accidentally repeated by an earlier copyist (a ‘dittography’).

<ἂν> λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειεν: ‘[in the end everything] would show up Endymion as nothing special’. The mythological shepherd Endymion, lover of the moon-goddess Selene, is famous for sleeping eternally. (Zeus had put him in this state as a double-edged favour to Selene, so he would never grow old.) Without that one claim to fame, Endymion would be λῆρος (‘rubbish’). ἀποδείξειεν is 3sg. aor. act. opt. of ἀποδείκνυμι ‘I show X to be Y’.

72c1–2

οὐδαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο: ‘he would be nowhere to be seen’, i.e. would not stand out at all. The idiom (οὐδαμοῦ φαίνομαι) was used commonly in the context of horse racing, where it meant to finish in a low position. Connotations of the racecourse are humorously inapposite in a discussion of the inert Endymion.

διὰ τὸ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ταὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ πεπονθέναι: ‘because all the other things would have undergone the same thing as him too’. On the articular construction, see 70d2 n. τἆλλα and ταὐτὸν are, respectively, τὰ ἄλλα and τὸ αὐτόν with crasis. πεπονθέναι is the perf. act. inf. of πάσχω.

72c3

καθεύδειν: in apposition to, and explaining, ταὐτὸν.

72c3–5

As a second example, Socrates points out that matter, if it only ever combined and never separated, would eventually end up in one big lump. This he calls ‘all things in the same place’ (ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα), a phrase borrowed from Anaxagoras. There is a poignant touch to the mention of this philosopher-scientist, a generation older than Socrates: in Plato’s Apology, Socrates had ascribed the charge of impiety against him to rumours that he shared some of Anaxagoras’ more impious views (‘that the sun is stone and the moon is earth’, rather than gods: Apology 26d).

κἂν εἰ: see 71b7–8 n.

ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγορου γεγονὸς εἴη: ‘soon, what Anaxagoras describes would have become a reality’.

ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα: ‘all things in the same place’. For Anaxagoras, this is the original indiscriminate state of the universe’s matter, before it took shape to form the world as we know it.

72c5

ὡσαύτως: ‘in the same way’, the adverbial equivalent of ὁ αὐτός.

καὶ εἰ: ‘if, too’, not ‘even if’.

72c6

πάντα ὅσα τοῦ ζῆν μεταλάβοι: ‘everything that has got a share of life’. Though we would expect an indicative verb here, μεταλάβοι has been assimilated into the optative to match ἀποθνῄσκοι (c5). The meaning is unaffected.

ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀποθάνοι: likewise, what would normally be an indefinite clause with the subjunctive (ἐπειδὰν δὲ ἀποθάνῃ) has also been assimilated into the optative.

72c6

μένοι ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι τὰ τεθνεῶτα: ‘dead things would stay in this form’, i.e. being dead.

72c8

ἆρ᾽ οὐ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη: both the verb (εἴη) and the required ἄν are omitted as obvious: ‘wouldn’t it be greatly necessary [that]’.

72d1

τεθνάναι καὶ μηδὲν ζῆν: ‘be (i.e. remain) dead and not one of them live’.

72d1–2

εἰ … ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὰ ζῶντα γίγνοιτο: ‘if living things come into being from something else’, that is, than the dead. ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων means literally ‘from the rest of things’ and therefore ‘any other source’.

τὰ δὲ ζῶντα θνῄσκοι: ‘but the living things die’, which in the scenario means they cannot be the source of new living things.

72d2–3

τίς μηχανὴ μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα καταναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι: ‘what contrivance could prevent everything being used up on dying?’ After a negated verb of preventing, Greek uses μή οὐ and an infinitive to express what is being prevented. Here the verb is omitted, and the added negative οὐχί (a variant of οὐ) justified by the negative answer expected by this rhetorical question. καταναλωθῆναι is the aorist passive infinitive of καταναλίσκω, ‘I use up, spend lavishly’. In Greek one spends money εἴς τι (on something), hence εἰς τὸ τεθνάναι.

72d4

οὐδὲ μία μοι δοκεῖ: ‘I don’t think there can be one at all’ (i.e. contrivance). οὐδὲ μία is a more emphatic form of the feminine οὐδεμία. The difference in pronunciation between the two is revealed by the accented or unaccented ε.

72d6–7

ἔστιν … παντὸς μᾶλλον οὕτω: ‘it is like this more than anything’.

αὐτὰ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν: ὁμολογέω can be used with a direct object (‘I agree on’).

72d8

ἔστι τῷ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι: ‘coming back to life really does exist’. The καί is the first in a run of three, linking three units in polysyndeton.

72e1–2

καὶ ταῖς … κάκιον: Burnet is surely right to bracket these words, which bear no relation to the argument just presented. A very similar phrase occurs at 63c6, where it is much more suited to the context. It is likely an interpolation from a Christian-era copyist who felt that Socrates has not said enough on the different fates of the good and the bad in the afterlife.

72e3–77a5 – the second argument for immortality: The theory of recollection

Cebes reminds everyone of Socrates’ theory of recollection, according to which everything we learn during life we are really just remembering. For how else could people be brought, by questioning alone, to say true things on issues they had previously been ignorant of? (For more on the theory, see Introduction, pp. 79–80.) Socrates and his friends discuss the theory and conclude that it would be impossible unless our souls existed before birth.

72e3

καὶ μὴν … γε: see 71a3–4 n. Here, the phrase communicates Cebes’ enthusiasm to share the connection he has spotted between the cycle of opposites and the theory of recollection.

ὑπολαβών: see 69e6–7 n.

72e4

εἰ ἀληθής ἐστιν: i.e. if its conclusions are right.

72e4–5

εἴωθας θαμὰ λέγειν: ‘you are often saying’. εἵωθα ‘I am accustomed to’ is a perfect with present sense. Socrates does in fact discuss his theory of recollection in two other Platonic dialogues, the Phaedrus and, more famously, the Meno (see introduction, pp. 86–87).

οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ: ‘nothing other than’.

72e6

τυγχάνει οὖσα: see 71e5 n.

κατὰ τοῦτον: i.e. τὸν λόγον.

72e6–7

ἀνάγκη που ἡμᾶς … μεμαθηκέναι: ‘I suppose we must have learned’.

ἃ νῦν ἀναμιμνῃσκομεθα: ‘which we now recall’. ἀναμιμνῄσκομαι is always strictly passive (‘I am reminded’), but can also be middle in meaning – that is, not imply some other agent (‘I recall’). It is used thus throughout this part of the Phaedo.

73a1

εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ: ‘if our soul did not exist (ἦν) somewhere (που)’, a present closed conditional.

73a2

ταύτῃ: ‘in this way’ (see 71e8–10 n.).

ἀθάνατον … τι: ‘something immortal’. As Cebes has put it so far, recollection hardly requires the soul to be immortal, but just to have existed and acquired knowledge before birth.

73a4–5

ποῖαι τούτων αἱ ἀποδείξεις: ‘what are the proofs of this like?’ ποῖαι ‘what sort?’ requests a rough gist.

73a5–6

ὑπομνησον: 2sg. aor. act. imperative of ὑπομιμνῄσκω ‘I remind’.

οὐ γὰρ σφοδρα … μέμνημαι: ‘I don’t remember [it] too well’. Simmias’ lapse of memory permits not just a joke but also an opportunity to review briefly the argument for recollection, as presented in the Meno.

ἐν τῷ παροντι: ‘at present’.

73a7

ἑνὶ μὲν λογῳ … καλλίστῳ: [it is proved] ‘by one outstanding argument’.

ἐρωτώμενοι: passive, ‘being asked questions’.

73a8

ἐάν τις καλῶς ἐρωτᾷ: ‘if someone is asking them properly’. Not all questions can lead to recollection (what we would call discovery), only those that guide the person towards the right answer.

73a8–9

πάντα ᾗ ἔχει: ‘everything as it is’, i.e. they can say things that are true that they previously could not. ᾗ is a relative used adverbially (‘in which way’: see 71e8–10 n.), and so ἔχω alongside it means ‘I am’.

73a9

εἰ μὴ ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῖς ἐπιστήμη ἐνοῦσα: ‘if there wasn’t really knowledge in them’. On τυχγάνω in this sense, see 71e5 n.

73b1

ἐάν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγῃ: we must infer an αὐτοῦς as the object.

73b2

σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ: ‘it proves very clearly’. As present κατηγορεῖ shows, the conditional is not a future, but a generalizing present: the ἐάν + subjunctive of the protasis are indefinite (‘if ever …’).

73b3

εἰ δὲ μὴ ταύτῃ … πείθῃ: the verb is a 2sg. present passive, not middle. ταύτῃ is adverbial ‘in this way’.

73b4

σκέψαι ἂν … σοι … συνδοξῃ: ‘consider if you agree’. σκέψαι is 2sg. aor. mid. imperative of σκέπτομαι, and ἄν here = ἐάν.

τῇδέ πῄ: see 70c4 n.

73b5

καλουμένη: i.e. ‘so-called’.

73b6

ἀπιστῶ … ἔγωγε … οὔ: the verb is promoted to mark Simmias’ words as a direct response to Socrates’ (ἀπιστεῖς, b4) and the negative held back for emphasis. ἔγωγε ‘I at least’ hints that Socrates must go into more detail if others are to share Simmias’ faith in the theory.

73b6–7

αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο … δέομαι παθεῖν … ἀναμνησθῆναι: ‘I need to experience this very thing, [namely] to be reminded’ (or ‘recall’). On the sense of πάσχω, see 72b5 n.

περὶ οὗ ὁ λογος: ἔστι must be assumed.

73b8

ἐξ ὧν Κέβης ἐπεχείρησε λέγειν: the relative is attracted into the genitive after ἐξ (see 71c9 n.). In saying that Cebes has only ‘tried’ ἐπεχείρησε to state the case, Simmias may intend a dig at his friend, who had felt his summary of recollection had proved the immortality of the soul (73a2 n.).

73b9

πείθομαι: again passive, not middle.

οὐδὲν μεντἂν ἧττον ἀκούοιμι: a potential optative with ἄν can express a polite request (μεντἄν is a crasis of μέντοι and ἄν). οὐδὲν ἧττον is adverbial here and means ‘nonetheless’ (lit. ‘nothing less’).

πῇ: ‘how’ – accented, and hence a question-word here.

73b10

ἐπεχείρησας λέγειν: ‘you put your hand to stating it’. The verb is aorist because Socrates has already tackled the question in his own mind at this point, not to mention previous conversations (72e4–5). ἐπιχειρέω is in a slightly different sense here (‘undertake, set to work at’) to at b8 (‘try, attempt’).

73c1–2

ὁμολογοῦμεν … δεῖν αὐτὸν: the verb introduces an indirect statement: ‘we agree … that he must’.

εἴ τίς τι ἀναμνησθήσεται: a future indicative in a conditional’s protasis stresses that the consequences described in the main clause (ὁμολογοῦμεν …) are unavoidable if the condition is met. It is a rhetorically powerful choice here.

προτερον ποτε: ‘at some earlier time’.

73c4–d11

Socrates and Simmias agree that it is possible to be reminded of something or someone by the perception of something else entirely: someone spotting Simmias, for instance, might thus be prompted to remember Cebes too.

73c4

τοδε ὁμολογοῦμεν: τόδε is the direct object (‘we agree on this’) and stands in apposition to the indirect statement that follows ὁμολογοῦμεν.

παραγίγνηται: ‘comes to [someone]’.

73c5–6

λέγω δὲ τίνα τροπον; τονδε: Socrates asks himself ‘in what way do I mean?’, and answers, ‘The following [way]’. τίνα τροπον and τονδε are adverbial accusatives.

73c6–7

τι ἕτερον: ‘some one thing’, with ἕτερον corresponding with ἕτερον again at c8 (‘another thing’).

τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβὼν: ‘having perceived it some other way’ (lit. ‘having taken some other perception’).

73c7–8

μὴ μονον ἐκεῖνο γνῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕτερον ἐννοήσῃ: ‘not only recognises that thing, but also thinks of another’. ἐκείνο refers back to τι ἕτερον at c6. γνῷ is 3sg. root aor. subj. of γιγνώσκω.

οὗ μὴ ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλη: ‘of which [there is] not the same knowledge but another’. Socrates is envisaging two things where someone can know the one but not the other. For example, someone might know Simmias but have never met Cebes. Odd and even, however, would not count, since nobody can understand what one is without understanding the other.

73c8–9

ἆρα οὐχὶ … δικαίως λέγομεν: ‘are we not right to say’. ἆρα οὐχὶ introduces a closed question expecting the answer ‘yes’ (οὐχί is a variant of οὐ).

τοῦτο: looks forward to the ὅτι-clause, so is better left untranslated.

73d2

πῶς λέγεις: ‘how do you mean?’

73d3

ἄλλη που ἐπιστήμη ἀνθρώπου καὶ λύρας: ‘the knowledge of a person is, I suppose, different from the knowledge of his lyre’.

73d4

οἱ ἐρασταί: ‘lovers’. The article shows that Socrates is speaking of lovers in general.

73d6

τὰ παιδικὰ: the n. pl. of the adjective παιδικός ‘of a child’ is used as a noun to refer to a lover’s ‘beloved’ or ‘darling’. (For Athenians, this is usually a young male, hence the word’s origin.) Here it is best taken as a true plural (‘boyfriends’), to match οἱ ἐρασταί (d4).

πάσχουσι: ‘they experience’.

73d7

ἔγνωσάν … ἔλαβον: the aorist tense is used to mark that these are commonly occurring actions, or general truths, that may well be familiar from one’s experience (the so-called gnomic aorist).

ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ: ‘in the process of thinking’, i.e. about the object.

73d7–8

ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδὸς: ‘grasped the mental image (εἶδος) of the boy’.

οὗ ἦν ἡ λύρα: ‘to whom the lyre belongs’. ἦν should be translated as present: it is only imperfect in keeping with the (gnomic) aorists ἔγνωσάν and ἔλαβον.

73d10

ἄλλα … μυρία τοιαῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη: a potential optative phrase, ‘there would be countless other such examples’.

73d11

μυρία μέντοι νὴ Δία: ‘countless indeed, by Zeus’. μέντοι here does not have its usual adversative sense (as at e2), but instead marks a strong agreement. (Compare the English ‘but of course!’)

73e1

οὐκοῦν … τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀνάμνησίς τίς ἐστι: ‘is this sort of thing a case of recollection, then?’

73e1–2

μάλιστα μέντοι ὅταν: ‘however, [isn’t recollection] more especially when …’. Socrates is pointing out that what they have been discussing is not ἀνάμνησις in the most usual sense of the word, which is more often the remembering of something one has forgotten.

τοῦτο πάθῃ: i.e. recollects.

73e2–3

ὑπὸ χρονου καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν: ‘through time and inattention’.

ἐπελέληστο: 3sg. pluperfect of ἐπιλανθάνομαι ‘I forget’. The verb can take a genitive or (as here) accusative object.

73e5

τί δέ: ‘what about this?’, heralding a forward move in the discussion (as at 71a12).

ἔστιν: ‘is it possible?’ Uncompounded ἔστι functions in this sense much like ἔξεστιν, but is followed by an accusative (rather than a dative) and infinitive.

ἵππον γεγραμμένον: i.e. a drawing or painting of a horse.

ἰδοντα: ‘someone having seen’.

73e9–10

ἔστιν in the sense ‘it is possible’ (e5) must be supplied again here.

73e9

αὐτοῦ Σιμμίου: ‘the actual Simmias’, as opposed to an image of him.

74a1

ἔστι μέντοι: see 73e1–2 and e5 nn.

74a2

ἆρ᾽ … οὐ κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα συμβαίνει: ‘does it not follow (συμβαίνει) from all this?’ Philosophical authors often use συμβαίνω to express that a conclusion logically follows from something already said. It is typically followed by an acc. + inf. indirect statement.

74a2–3

εἶναι μὲν ἀφ᾽ ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων: recollection ‘exists from things that are alike, but it also exists from things that are unalike’. We are reminded of A by an image of A (i.e. something ‘alike’) but can also be reminded of A by something different altogether (B).

74a6

τοδε προσπάσχειν: ‘to experience the following thing as well’. προς with a dative means ‘in addition to’, and this is the sense of prefix here. τόδε looks forward to the infinitive ἐννοεῖν, which stands in apposition to it (‘[namely,] having in mind’).

74a9

σκοπει: 2sg. pres. act. imperative of σκοπέω.

74a9–12

φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον … αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον: ‘we say, I suppose, that there is something that is equal’, that is, not examples of things in the world that might be called equal (like two identical copies of this book), but ‘the equal itself’. In his wording, Plato invites us to recall the earlier discussion of abstract things that exist and that we know, but not through the senses (65d4–e5: see n.). These are what Plato will go on to call Forms (see introduction, pp. 79–80).

οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ … οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν: the examples make it clear that Socrates is not talking about equality between objects we perceive in the world.

παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερον τι: ‘but something else over and above all these’.

74a12

φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν: φῶμέν, 1pl. pres. subjunctive of φημί, is deliberative (‘should we say that it is something [i.e. exists] or nothing?’), which accounts also for μηδέν instead of οὐδέν.

74b1

φῶμέν: in typical Greek fashion, Simmias says ‘yes’ by repeating the verb of the question. Here the ‘yes’ is further reinforced by μέντοι νὴ Δί(α) (on which see, 73d11 n.).

θαυμαστῶς γε: a further expression of approval, showing that Simmias’ enthusiasm has grown since his otherwise similar approbation at 73d11. We cannot translate the words literally (‘marvellously indeed’) and still capture this sense: something like ‘without a doubt’ comes closer.

74b2

ἦ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν: ‘and do we know what it, by itself, is?’ Given Plato’s tendency to omit the antecedent of a relative clause, we should treat αὐτό here as emphatic, in the sense (‘by itself’), as used in the earlier discussion of abstract ‘things by themselves’ (64d4–e5; see 64c5 n.). ἦ is not ‘or’ (ἤ, as at c6), but a particle, used as here to mark a yes/no question or to introduce a confident statement.

74b3

Having already agreed at 65d that similar abstract ‘things by themselves’ exists, Simmias is understandably ready to go along with Socrates again here. See also 65d6 n.

74b4

ποθεν λαβοντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην: ‘having got the knowledge of it from where?’ There is no main verb because ἐπιστάμεθα (b2) is assumed again as obvious.

74b4–6

This complex sentence must be broken down into its components before sense can be made of it. These are as follows.

ἆρ᾽ οὐκ … ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοήσαμεν: the main clause, ‘do we not come to have that thing (i.e. τὸ ἴσον) in mind from these’. τούτων (‘these’) refer to the equal-looking objects we see in the world (see next n. but one). ἐνενοήσαμεν is a gnomic aorist (see 73d7 n.).

ἐξ ὧν … ἐλέγομεν: the case of the relative has been attracted into the genitive by ἐξ, even though its role in its clause should demand an accusative (‘attraction of the relative’).

ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἄττα ἰδοντες ἴσα: ‘when we see equal pieces of wood or equal blocks of stone or some other equal things’. (ἄττα here is a variant of τινά.) Such things may be ‘equal’ insofar as they look identical and/or have the same weight, value, size, purpose, and so on. Materials such as pieces of wood and blocks of stone (λίθοι) offer a good example, since, as common building materials these are usually cut to precise measurements, so as to differ as little as possible from each other.

ἕτερον ὂν τούτων: ‘since it (ἐκεινό) is different from these things’, i.e. equal pieces of wood and blocks of stones, etc.

74b7

τῇδε: see 70c4 n.

74b7–9

The interpretation of this sentence is hotly disputed among Platonic scholars. The two main options are presented below, and readers must choose which they prefer. More in-depth discussion can be found in all the works in the ‘Further reading’ section of the introduction (pp. 89–90).

ἐνίοτε: ‘sometimes’ must modify φαίνεται, not ὄντα.

ταὐτὰ ὄντα: ‘though being the same’, i.e. as each other. They are not the actual same piece of wood or stone, but just resemble each other in every other way. ταὐτά is a crasis of τὰ αὐτά. Although they agree with both a neuter (ξύλα) and a masculine (λίθοι), these words are neuter because that is the gender of the more recent of the two.

τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται τῷ δ᾽ οὔ: the pieces of wood or stone ‘seem equal to X (τῷ μὲν) but not to Y (τῷ δ᾽)’. The reader must decide whether X and Y refer to:

(a) observers, one who sees the objects as equal and one who doesn’t; or

(b) other things, one that looks equal to the objects and one that doesn’t.

Both have the same consequence: that unlike ‘the equal itself’, things in the world are not purely equal. On (a), people disagree on whether objects are equal because they only remind us of ‘the equal itself’, and people’s recollections are triggered by different things. On (b), the issue is that objects can be simultaneously both equal and unequal: one can be equal to another, but unequal to a third. This is not true of ‘the equal itself’, which, Socrates says, cannot ever be unequal to anything (c1–6).

74c1–2

τί δέ: see 73e5 n.

αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη: interpretation is again controversial, but Simmias’ immediate confident response (‘never!’, c3) suggests reading the question in the following way, as a no-brainer: ‘did the things that are equal in themselves (αὐτὰ) at times seem unequal to you?’ Socrates is asking whether Simmias has ever perceived something that is equal in and of itself as being also unequal. At this stage he is leaving open the question of how many things really belong to that category, but it will soon become clear that it is only one, ‘the equal itself’.

ἔστιν ὅτε: ‘sometimes’, an adverbial phrase offering an alternative to ἐνίοτε (b8).

ἢ ἡ ἰσοτης ἀνισοτης: ‘or has equality [sometimes seemed to you to be] inequality?’ The detail further encourages reading the whole question as a no-brainer.

74c3

οὐδεπώποτέ γε: ‘never yet!’

74c4–5

οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν: ‘[they] are not the same, then’. Note the crasis in ταὐτὸν.

αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον: see 74a9–12 n.

74c7–10

Socrates and Simmias agree that we have (re)gained our knowledge of the equal itself via the equal things (such as equal pieces of wood) that we have seen in the world (ἐκ τούτων … τῶν ἴσων).

ἑτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου: ‘though different from that [one] equal’, i.e. the equal itself. ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου is a genitive of separation (‘from’).

αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενοηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας: ‘you have come to have in mind and got hold of the knowledge of it’ (i.e. of the equal itself). ἐννενοηκάς and εἴληφας are 2sg. perfect actives of ἐννοέω and λαμβάνω, respectively. These two verbs were earlier used to express the key activities involved in recollection (73e4–9).

74c11

οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου: the words continue Socrates’ previous sentence, as a yes/no question: ‘it [i.e. the equal itself] being either similar or dissimilar to them?’ The point of the question is to pave the way for Socrates’ next remark, that it doesn’t matter whether what reminds us of the equal itself is similar or dissimilar to it (c13). For as they had agreed before, one can be reminded of something (e.g. Simmias) either by a likeness of it (a painting of Simmias) or something different entirely (Cebes).

74c13–15

διαφέρει … οὐδέν: ‘it makes no difference’.

ἕως ἂν: indefinite, ‘so long as’.

ἄλλο ἰδὼν … ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς: ‘seeing one thing, you come to think of another’.

ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὄψεως: i.e. as a result of seeing the first thing.

ἀναγκαῖον … αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι: ‘the process in question (αὐτὸ) must have been recollection’.

74d4–8

Socrates and Simmias return to the examples of equal pieces of wood (and the like) and conclude that they appear equal to us in a way that falls short of the equal itself.

74d4

ἦ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον: ‘do we experience something like this’, referring to what follows.

74d5

οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν: the relative is attracted into the dative to show it follows on from ἐν (d4).

74d5–6

ἆρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι: οὕτως looks forward to ὥσπερ. The verb is singular because the subject is neuter plural.

ὥσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὃ ἔστιν: ‘just as the [thing] which is [equal] itself’. The formulation is convoluted, but Plato’s readers are now familiar enough with the idea of ‘the X itself’ to recognize it here, even with the ‘X’ omitted.

74d6–7

ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου … ἢ οὐδέν: ‘do they fall short of that [i.e. the equal itself] in some way, or not at all?’ ἐνδέω ‘I fall short of’ is followed by a genitive. τι and οὐδέν are accusatives of respect (adverbial).

τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον: an articular infinitive phrase and dative of relation. Socrates asks whether they fall short ‘in being like (τοιοῦτον … οἷον) the equal’.

74d8

πολύ: adverbial.

74d9–75c5

Socrates enters the final stretch of his account of recollection. To understand it, we must recall that in his view, only certain things really exist: these exclude the objects we see in the world, but include ‘the just itself’, ‘the equal itself’, and so on – what he later calls the Forms (see introduction, pp. 79–80). Suppose I see an object (O) in the world, and it reminds me of one of the things that really exist (F); for when I see O, I notice that it resembles F but falls short of it in some way. That I am reminded of F means, by definition, that I already know F. Yet I have never perceived F through the senses (65d4–e5), only things that reminded me of F. I must, then, recall F from before I started perceiving things – that is, before I was born.

74d9

ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι: ‘whenever someone sees a thing and thinks to himself, …’. Despite the ὅτι, what follows must be treated as a direct statement, as the first person ὁρῶ (d10) reveals.

74d10

βούλεται μὲν … εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων: ‘aspires to be like some other real thing’ (lit. ‘of the things that exist’). βούλεται μὲν looks forward to ἐνδεῖ δὲ (74e1).

τοῦτο ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ: the subject of βούλεται: ‘this thing which I now see’.

74e1

οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο: it cannot be of the same sort as that thing’, that is, it is only a pale imitation of the thing that really exists.

74e1–2

ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν φαυλοτερον: ‘but is inferior to it’. After this the ὅτι-clause ends.

74e2–3

ἀναγκαῖον … τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα τυχεῖν προειδοτα: ‘the person thinking this must really have known from before’. On this sense of τυγχάνω, see 71e5n. προειδότα is the acc. sg. pres. act. participle of πρόοιδα ‘I know in advance’.

ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μέν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν: ‘that which he says it is similar to, but falls short of’. προσεοικέναι is the infinitive of προσέοικα ‘I resemble’ (+ dative), which like its uncompounded form is perfect in form but present in meaning. On ἔχω with an adverb, see 70b6–7.

74e6

τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπονθαμεν: ‘we have experienced the same thing’. πεπονθαμεν is a perfect from πάσχω.

74e9

προειδέναι: infinitive of πρόοιδα.

75a2

ὀρέγεται … πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον: ‘all these things were striving (lit. “reaching”) to be like the equal’. ὀρέγεται, like βούλεται (74d10), adds a touch of personification to the account of how objects in the world relate to the things-themselves (or Forms) they identify.

75a5–6

μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννενοηκέναι … ἀλλ᾽ ἢ: indirect statement in apposition to τόδε, ‘that we haven’t come to think of it from anywhere … except’.

75a6–7

ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἅψασθαι: ‘from seeing or touching it’, really two articular infinitives, but sharing one article.

75a7–8

ταὐτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω: ‘I count all these [as] the same’. That is, the same is true of all the senses, not just vision, which Socrates has been referring to most.

75a9–10

προς γε ὃ βούλεται δηλῶσαι ὁ λογος: ‘for what the argument seeks to show’.

75b1–2

ἐκείνου τε ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον: ‘strives for that thing which the equal is’. On τὸ ὃ ἔστιν (ἴσον), see 74d5–6n.

75b2

ἢ πῶς λέγομεν: better translated with a future: ‘or how shall we put it?’

75b4–5

πρὸ τοῦ … ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν: articular infinitive with dependent infinitives, ‘before we began to see and hear’.

καὶ τἆλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι: ‘and to perceive by the other [senses]’. τἆλλα is an accusative of respect.

75b5–6

τυχεῖν ἔδει … εἰληφοτας ἐπιστήμην: ‘we must really have got hold of knowledge’. εἰληφοτας is the acc. masc. pl. of the perf. act. participle of λαμβάνω.

ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὅτι ἔστιν: ‘knowledge of what the equal itself is’. It is common in Greek for what ought to be the subject of a subordinate clause to come ahead of it, with the case appropriately changed. This is called anticipation or prolepsis. ὅτι is the indirect-question form of τί; ‘what’, often printed as ὅ τι to distinguish it from other uses of ὅτι.

75b6–7

εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν: we would need to know what the equal itself is ‘if we were going to refer the equal things [we recognise] from our perceptions to it’.

τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα: i.e. the objects we perceive to be equal.

ἀνοίσειν: future infinitive of ἀναφέρω, ‘I bring back’ or, metaphorically, ‘I refer’.

75b7

ὅτι: causal (‘because’).

προθυμεῖται: ‘are eager’, another personifying metaphor for the way in which objects relate to the things-themselves (or Forms) they resemble.

75b8

ἔστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλοτερα: ‘but they are inferior to it’ (i.e. αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον, looking back to ἐκεῖνο just before). αὐτοῦ is a genitive of comparison.

75b9

προειρημένων: perfect passive participle of προλέγω ‘I say before’.

75b10

γενομενοι εὐθὺς ἑωρῶμέν: ‘we began to see straight away after we were born’. ἑώρων is the imperfect of ὁράω. On this sense of γίγνομαι, see 70c7–8 n.

75c2

εἰληφέναι: perfect active infinitive of λαμβάνω.

75c6–77c5: the end of the argument from recollection.

Socrates leads Simmias through the line of reasoning detailed below.

Just as we knew the equal itself before we were born, we must also possess ‘pieces of knowledge’ of all the other things we identify as having real existence: the good itself, the just itself and anything else we call ‘the X itself’. What we call learning, then, is really the recovery of pieces of knowledge that we had once had, but were made to forget at the moment at birth. For we certainly don’t have them as newborns. And it seems implausible, they agree, that we received the knowledge at birth and then immediately forgot it afterwards. We must, then, have got it before birth. If the objects of knowledge really exist (and Simmias happily concurs that they do), so too our souls must have existed and come to know them before birth.

Simmias refers Socrates back to Cebes’ original question (69e6–70c3), whether our souls outlast our bodies or are destroyed when we die. For until we have answered that, we cannot yet be sure of the soul’s immortality, just that it existed before birth. For Socrates’ response to the problem (which lies beyond the limit of the prescription), see introduction, pp. 80–82.

Vocabulary

An asterisk * denotes a word in OCR’s Defined Vocabulary List for AS.

* ἀγαθός -ή -όν	good, virtuous
ἀγανακτέω	be annoyed, aggrieved, angry
* ἄγω	lead
* ἀδικέω	wrong, act unjustly
* ἄδικος, -η, -ον	unjust, wrong
ἀδολεσχέω	talk nonsense
ἀδύνατος, -η, -ον	impossible
* ἀεί	always
ἀθάνατος, -ον	immortal
ἁθροίζω	gather
Ἅιδου	(the house) of Hades
* αἰσθάνομαι	perceive
αἴσθησις, -εως, ἡ	perception
* αἰσχρός, -ή, -όν	shameful
ἀκοή, -ῆς, ἡ	hearing
* ἀκούω	hear, listen
ἀκριβής, -ές	accurate
ἀλγηδών, -όνος, ἡ	pain
ἀλήθεια, -ας, ἡ	truth
* ἀληθής, -ές	true
* ἀλλά	but
ἄλλῃ	elsewhere; to another place
* ἄλληλους, -ας, -α	each other
ἄλλοθεν	from another place
ἄλλοθι	elsewhere
* ἄλλος, -η, -ο	other
ἀλογίστως	irrationally, without reason
* ἅμα	at once; (+ dat.) together with
* ἀμείνων, -ον (m./f. acc. pl. ἀμείνους)	better (comp. of ἀγαθός)
* ἀμφότερος, -α, -ον	both (of two)
* ἄν	(hypothetical or indefinite particle; or a contraction of ἐάν)
ἀναβιώσκομαι	come back to life
* ἀναγκάζω	compel
ἀναγκαῖος, -α, -ον	necessary
* ἀνάγκη, -ῆς, ἡ	necessity
ἀνακάμπτω	bend back; return
ἀναμιμνῄσκω	remind; (mid.) recall
ἀνάμνησις, -εως, ἡ	recollection
ἀναπίμπλημι	fill up, fill full
ἀνεγείρω	rouse, wake up
ἀνερευνάω	search out, investigate
* ἀνήρ, ἀνδρός, ὁ	man
ἀνθρώπινος, -η, -ον	human
* ἄνθρωπος, -ου, ὁ/ἡ	person, man, human
ἄνισος, -ον	unequal
ἀνισότης, -τητος, ἡ	inequality
ἀνόητος, -ον	foolish
ἀνοίσειν	fut. act. inf. of ἀναφέρω, ‘I refer’
ἀνόμοιος, -ον	unlike, dissimilar
ἀνταποδίδωμι	give back, repay; assign as a balance; make to correspond
* ἄξιος, -α, -ον	worthy, fit
ἀπαλλαγείς	aor. pass. part. of ἀπαλλάττω
ἀπαλλαγή, -ῆς, ἡ	release, relief, separation
ἀπαλλακτέον	one must release
ἀπαλλάττω	set free, release; (mid./pass.) escape, be released
* ἅπας, ἅπασα, ἅπαν	all, the whole, every
ἄπειμι	depart
ἀπιστέω	disbelieve, distrust
ἀπιστία, -ας, ἡ	disbelief, distrust
* ἀπό + gen.	from, away from
ἀπόδειξις, -εως, ἡ	demonstration, proof
ἀποδημία, -ας, ἡ	time abroad, journey, exile
ἀποδίδωμι	give back, pay what is due
* ἀποθνῄσκω, fut. ἀποθανοῦμαι, aor. ἀπέθανον, perf. τέθνηκα	die
ἀπολείπω	leave behind
ἀπόλλυμι	destroy, kill; (intr. mid.) die
* ἀπολογέομαι	speak in one’s own defence
ἀπολογία, -ας, ἡ	defence-speech
ἀπολύω	release, set free, undo
ἅπτω	fasten; (mid.) grasp
ἄρα	after all, then
* ἆρα	(introduces a yes/no question)
* ἄριστός, -ή, -όν	best, very good (superl. of ἀγαθός)
* ἀρχή, -ῆς, ἡ	beginning
* ἄρχομαι	begin
* ἄρχων, -οντος, ὁ	ruler
* ἀσθενής, -ές	weak
ἀσχολία, -ας, ἡ	lack of leisure
ἀτιμάζω	dishonour
ἄτοπος, -ον	strange
ἀτραπός, -οῦ, ὁ	path, shortcut
ἄττα	= τινά (see τις, τι)
* αὖ	again; moreover; in turn
αὐξάνομαι	grow, increase
αὔξησις, -εως, ἡ	growth, increase
αὑτὸ	contraction of ἑαυτό
* αὐτός, -ή, -ό	(emphatic adjective) -self; (pronoun in oblique cases) him, her, it, them
* ὁ αὐτός	the same
αὐτοῦ	just here, just there
ἀφεστάναι	intransitive perf. inf. of ἀφίσταμαι ‘stand apart’
* ἀφικνέομαι	arrive
ἀφροδίσια, -ων, τά	sexual pleasures
ἀφροσύνη, -ης, ἡ	foolishness
ἄφρων, -ον	foolish, senseless
βελτίων, -ον	better
* βίος, -ου, ὁ	life
* βούλομαι	wish, want
* βραδύς, -εῖα, -ύ	slow
* γάρ	for
* γε	at any rate
* γράφω	write
* γελάω	laugh
γελασείω	be inclined to laugh
γελοῖος, -α, -ον	ludicrous, funny
γένεσις, -εως, ἡ	coming into being, origin, becoming
* γίγνομαι	become, happen, come to be
γνησίως	genuinely
* γιγνώσκω	get to know, find out, realize
* γοῦν	at least, at any rate
* δέ	but, and
* δεῖ	it is necessary
* δείκνυμι	show
* δέομαι	be lacking, need; ask for
* δεσμός, -οῦ, ὁ	bond, chain
* δεσπότης, -οῦ, ὁ	master
* δεῦρο	here
* δή	indeed
* δῆλός, -ή, -όν	clear
* δηλόω	show, make clear
δήπου	I presume; perhaps; surely not?
* διά + acc.	on account of
* διά + gen.	through
διαγράμμα, -ατος, τό	(mathematical) diagram
διακρίνω	separate, distinguish
* διαλέγομαι	discuss, converse
διαμυθολογέω	converse, express in speech
διανοέω/διανοέομαι	have in mind, intend; think of
διανοία, -ας, ἡ	thought, intention, understanding
διαπέτομαι, aor. part. διαπτόμενος	fly away, vanish
διασκεδάννυμι	scatter
διασκοπέω	examine thoroughly
διατρίβω	spend time; wear away
διαφερόντως	to a greater degree
διαφέρω	excel; differ
* διαφθείρω	destroy
* δίδωμι, fut. δώσω	give
διέρχομαι, aor. διῆλθον	go through
διϊσχυρίζομαι	affirm strongly
* δίκαιος, -η, -ον	just
δικαστήριον -ου, τό	law-court
δικαστής, -οῦ, ὁ	juror
διὸ	for which reason (= δι’ ὅ)
δίς	twice
* δοκέω	think, have an opinion; intend; seem
* δόξα, -ας, ἡ	opinion, judgement; glory
δοξάζω	think, suppose
* δουλεύω	be a slave
* δύναμαι	be able
* δύναμις, -εως, ἡ	power
* δυνατός, -ή, -όν	able, capable
* δύο, gen./dat. δυοῖν	two
* ἐάν	if (future open conditional)
* ἑαυτόν -ήν -ό	himself, herself, itself (reflexive)
* ἐάω	allow; χαίρειν ἐάω = ‘say goodbye’
ἐγγίγνομαι	happen in, be born in, come to be in
* ἐγγύς (superl. adv. either ἐγγύτατα or ἐγγυτάτω)	near (+ gen.)
ἐγείρω	rouse, wake up
ἐγρηγορέναι	perf. intr. act. inf. of ἐγείρω ‘I wake up’
* ἐγώ	I
* ἔγωγε	I for one
* ἐθέλω	want
ἐθίζω	accustom
* εἰ	If
εἶδος, -ους, τό	appearance, form, shape
εἴδωλον, -ου, τό	image, phantom
εἶεν	well then
* εἰκός	(it is) likely, reasonable (strictly a participle of ἔοικα)
εἰκότως	reasonably
εἰλικρινέω	purify
εἰλικρινής, -ές	pure
* εἰμί	be
* εἶμι, pres. part. ἰών, inf. ἰέναι)	(will) go
εἴπερ	if, precisely if
* εἰρῆσθαι	perf. pass. inf. of λέγω
* εἰς (+ acc.)	into
* εἷς, μία, ἕν	one
* εἴτε	either, or
εἴωθα	be accustomed
* ἔκ (+ gen.)	out of
* ἕκαστος, -η, -ον	each
* ἑκάτερος, -α, -ον	each of two
ἐκβαίνω	go out
* ἐκεῖ	there
* ἐκεῖνος, -η, -ο	that
* ἐκεῖσε	to that place
ἐκλύω	release, free
ἐκπλήττω	shock, amaze, astound
ἐκφέρω	carry out
ἐλάττων, -ον	smaller, less
ἐλάχιστος, -η, -ον	least, very little
* ἐλεύθερος, -α, -ον	free
ἐλλείπω	leave in, leave behind, leave out
* ἐλπίζω	hope
ἐλπίς, -ίδος, ἡ	hope
ἐμπίμπλημι	fill up
ἐμποδίζω	get in the way, hinder
ἐμπόδιος, -α, -ον	in the way
* ἐν (+ dat.)	in
* ἐναντίος, -α, -ον	opposite
ἐνδεής, -ές	lacking
ἐνδέω	fall short, be lacking
ἔνειμι	be in
* ἕνεκα (+ gen.)	on account of
* ἐνθάδε	to here, to there
* ἐνθένδε	from here, from there
ἐνιαχοῦ	in some places, in some cases
ἐνίοτε	sometimes
* ἐννοέω	have in mind, think about, consider
ἔννοια, -ας, ἡ	thought, intent, notion
* ἐνταῦθα	here, there
ἔντιμος, -ον	honoured, valued
* ἐξ (+ gen.)	out of
* ἐξαπατᾶω	deceive
ἔοικα	seem, seem likely; resemble (+ dat.)
* ἐπεί	when, since
* ἐπειδάν	whenever (= ἐπειδή + ἄν)
* ἔπειτα	then
ἐπελέληστο	3sg. perf. mid./pass. of ἐπιλανθάνομαι ‘forget’
ἐπεχειρέω	put one’s hand to, try
* ἐπί (+ acc.)	to, towards, onto, for the sake of
* ἐπί (+ dat.)	on, at, for, for the sake of
ἐπιβλέπω	look upon
ἐπιθυμέω	desire, be eager
ἐπιθυμία, -ας, ἡ	desire
ἐπιλανθάνομαι	forget (+ gen.)
ἐπιμελέομαι	care for, take care of
ἐπισκοπέω	look upon, observe, inspect
* ἐπίσταμαι	know
ἐπιστατέω	be in charge of, take care of
ἐπιστάτης, -ου, ὁ	overseer, person in charge
ἐπιστήμη -ης, ἡ	knowledge
ἐπιτηδεύω	make something one’s business, take care to do, practise
* ἔπος -ους, τό	word
ἐραστής, -ου, ὁ	lover
* ἔργον, -ου, τό	deed, work, task
* ἐρωτάω	ask
* ἔσχατος, -η, -ον	last, final; worst
* ἑταῖρος, -ου, ὁ	friend, companion
* ἕτερος, -η, -ον	one, the other (of two)
* ἔτι	still
* εὖ	well
εὔελπις, -ι	in good hope
* εὐθύς, -εῖα, -ύ (adv. εὐθέως)	straight
εὐλόγως	reasonably
ἐφάπτομαι	grasp (+ gen.)
ἐφέλκω	drag to
* ἔχω	have
* ἔχω + adverb	be
* ἕως	while, until
* ζάω, inf. ζῆν	live
* ζητέω	seek
ζήτησις, -εως, ἡ	search
ζωή, -ῆς, ἡ	life
ζῷον, -ου, τό	animal, living thing
* ἤ	or; either … or
* ἤ	than
ἦ	(introduces question)
* ἦ δ’ ὁς	he said
* ἡγέομαι	lead, think
* ἡδέως	gladly
* ἤδη	already, now, furthermore
* ἥδομαι	be glad, take pleasure in
ἡδονή, -ῆς, ἡ	pleasure
* ἡδύς, -εῖα, -ύ	pleasant, sweet
* ἥκιστα	least, very little
* ἥκω	have come
* ἡμεῖς	we
* ἡμέρα, -ας, ἡ	day
* ἤν	imperfect from εἰμί; crasis of ἐάν
σσσων -ον	less, weaker, worse
θαμὰ	often
* θάνατος, -ου, ὁ	death
θανατάω	desire to die
* θαρρέω	take courage
θάτερον	= τὸ ἕτερον (crasis)
* θᾶττων, -ον	quicker (comparative of ταχύς)
θαυμαστῶς	wonderfully
θεατέον	one must see (θεάομαι)
θεμιτός, -ή, -όν	lawful, permitted
* θεός, -οῦ, ὁ	god
θεραπεία, -ας, ἡ	care
θερμαίνω	heat up
θεωρέω	consider, contemplate
θήρα, -ας, ἡ	hunt
θηρεύω	hunt
θνῄσκω, fut. Θανοῦμαι, aor. ἔθανον, perf. τέθνηκα	die
θόρυβος, -ου, ὁ	din
θρυλέω	babble, keep saying
* ἱκανός, -ή, -όν	sufficient
ἱμάτιον, - ου, τό	cloak
* ἵππος, -ου, ὁ	horse
* ἴσος, -η, -ον	equal, balanced
ἰσότης, -τητος, ἡ	equality
ἰσχύς, -ύος, ἡ	strength
* ἰσχυρός, -ά, -όν	strong
* ἴσως	perhaps; equally
καθαρεύω	be clean, pure
καθαρός, -ή, -όν	clean, pure
κάθαρσις, -εως, ἡ	cleansing, purification
* καθεύδω	sleep
καθοράω	observe, perceive; look down on
* καί	and, also, too, even
* καίτοι	and yet
* κακός, -ή, -όν	bad, evil
* καλέω	call
καλλωπισμός, -οῦ, ὁ	ornamentation, beautification
* καλός, -ή, -όν	fine, good, beautiful
καμπή, -ῆς, ἡ	bend, turn; turning post
* κἂν	crasis of (a) καί and ἔαν or (b) καί and ἄν
καπνός, -οῦ, ὁ	smoke
* κατά (+ acc.)	according to, in accordance with, along, down
κατά (+ gen.)	concerning; against
καταδαρθάνω	fall asleep
κατάδηλος, -η, -ον	visible, clear
καταναλίσκω, aor. pass. κατανηλώθην	use up, spend, lavish
καταντικρὺ	right opposite; τό καταντικρύ, ‘the very opposite’
* κατηγορέω	accuse, allege
* κινδυνεύω	run the risk, be likely to
* κοινός, -ή, -όν	common, shared, mutual
κοινωνέω	have in common; be in partnership
κοινωνία, -ας, ἡ	partnership, communion
κοινωνός, -οῦ, ὁ	companion, partner
* κτάομαι	obtain
* κτῆμα, -ατος, τά	possession, property
κτῆσις, -εως, ἡ	possession, acquisition
κύκλος, -ου, ὁ	circle
κωμῳδοποιός, -οῦ, ὁ	comedy-writer
* λαμβάνω	take, get
* λανθάνω, perf. λέληθα	escape one’s notice
* λέγω	say, speak, mention, tell
λῆρος, -ου, ὁ	rubbish, nonsense
* λίθος, -ου, ὁ	stone
λογίζομαι	calculate, reckon
λογισμός, -οῦ, ὁ	reckoning, calculation, reasoning
* λόγος, -ου, ὁ	speech, argument, story, something said
λύρα, -ας, ἡ	lyre
λύσις, -εως, ἡ	release, deliverance
* λύω	release, set free
μάθησις, -εως, ἡ	the act of learning
* μάλιστα	especially, very much
* μᾶλλον	more
* μανθάνω	I learn
* μάχη, -ης, ἡ	battle
* μέγας, μεγάλη, μέγα, superl. μεγίστος	large
μέγεθος, -ους, τό	largeness, size
μελετάω	practise
μελέτημα, -ατος, τό	practice
* μέλλω	intend, be about to; hesitate
* μέμνημαι	remember (perf. mid. of μιμνήσκω)
* μέν...δέ	on the one hand … on the other (articulates a contrast)
* μέντοι	however
* μένω	remain, stay
* μετά + acc.	after
* μετά + gen.	with
μεταδίδωμι	give part of, give a share of
μεταλαμβάνω	get a share of, partake of
μεταξύ + gen.	between
μετέχω	have a share in, partake of
* μή	not
μηδαμόθεν	from no place
* μηδέ	and not
* μηδείς, μηδεμία, μηδέν	nothing
μήν	truly, indeed
* μήτε	neither, nor
* μηχανή, -ῆς, ἡ	contrivance, device; way, means
μιμνήσκω	remind
* μόνος, -η, -ον	only, alone
μυρίοι, -αι, -α	countless; 10,000
* ναί	yes
νή (+ acc.)	by
* νόσος, -ου, ἡ	disease
* νοῦς, -οῦ, ὁ	mind
* νῦν	now
νυνδή	just now
ξύλον, -ου, τό	(piece of) wood
* ὅδε, ἥδε, τόδε	this, the following
* ὅθεν	whence, from where
* οἷ	to where
* οἶδα	know
* οἰκέω	live, dwell
οἶμαι	think
* οἷον	for example, such as
* οἷός τ’ εἰμι	be able
* οἵος, -α, -ον	of what sort
οἴχομαι	go, be gone; be dead
* ὄλιγος, -η, -ον	few, little
ὅλως	wholly
ὁμιλέω	be in company with; speak with
* ὅμοιος, -α, -ον	similar
ὁμοιότης, -τητος, ἡ	similarity
* ὁμολογέω	agree
ὁμοῦ	together, in the same place
* ὅμως	nevertheless
* ὄνομα, -ματος, τό	name
ὀνομάζω	call
* ὁράω	see
ὀρέγω	reach, stretch; (med.) reach for, grasp
* ὀρθός, -ή, -όν	upright, straight; correct
* ὅς, ἥ, ὅ	who, which (relative pronoun)
ὅσαπερ	all the very things which (= ὅσα + περ)
* ὅσος, ὅσα, ὅσον	as much as; (pl.) as many as, all those which
ὅσπερ, ἥπερ, ὅπερ	the very one(s) which
* ὅστις, ἥτις, ὅτι	who (indirect pronoun), whoever (indefinite)
* ὅταν	whenever
* ὅτε	when
* ὅτι	because (or from ὅστις)
* οὐ	not
* οὗ	where
οὐδαμόθεν	from nowhere
* οὐδαμοῦ	nowhere
* οὐδαμῶς	not at all
* οὐδὲ	and not, nor; not even
* οὐδείς, οὐδεμία, οὐδέν	no, nobody, nothing
* οὐδέποτε	never
οὐδεπώποτε	never yet
* οὐκοῦν	surely; therefore
* οὔκουν	certainly not, I don’t think
* οὖν	therefore, so
οὖς, ὠτός, τό	ear
οὐσία, -ας, ἡ	being, existence; essence, substance
* οὔτε	neither, nor
* οὗτος, αὕτη, τοῦτο	this
* οὕτω(ς)	thus, in this way; so
οὑτωσί	in this very way
* ὀφθαλμός, -οῦ, ὁ	eye
ὄψις, -εως, ἡ	eyesight, vision
πάθος, -ους, τό	experience, suffering, emotion
παιδικά, -ῶν, τά	beloved (pl. for sg.)
* παίς, παιδός, ὁ/ἡ	child, boy, girl
* πάλαι	long ago, some time ago; a while ago
* παλαιός, -ή, -όν	old, of old
* πάλιν	back, again
παντάπασι	all in all, wholly
πανταχόθεν	from all quarters, from everywhere
πανταχοῦ	everywhere
παντοδαπός, -ή, -όν	of every kind
πάντως	entirely
πάνυ	very
* παρά + acc.	beside, near, with
* παρά + dat.	by the side of, in the presence of
παραγίγνομαι	be beside, be at hand
παραλυπέω	trouble, grieve besides
παραμένω	stay near
παραμυθία, -ας, ἡ	encouragement, gentle persuasion
παραπίπτω	fall in one’s way
* παρασκευάζω	prepare
παρατίθημι	place beside
* πάρειμι	be present
παρέρχομαι	pass by, arrive at
* παρέχω	provide, offer
παρίσταμαι	stand beside
* πᾶς, πᾶσα, πᾶν	all, whole, every
* πάσχω, aor. ἔπαθον, perf. πέπονθα	suffer, experience
* παύω	stop; (mid.) cease
* πείθομαι	obey; believe, trust
* πειράομαι	try, attempt
* περί + acc./gen.	about, concerning
περίειμι	go around
πῇ	in what way? How?
πιθανός, -ή, -όν	trustworthy, plausible, persuasive
* πίνω	drink
πίστις, -εως, ἡ	trust, belief
* πλήν + gen.	except
πνεῦμα, -ματος, τό	breath, spirit
πόθεν	from where
* ποιέω	do, make
* ποῖος, -α, -ον	of what sort?
* πόλεμος, -ου, ὁ	war
* πολλάκις	often
* πολύς, πολλή, πολύ	much; (pl.) many
* πορεύομαι	make a journey, march
* ποτε	once, at some time
* πότερον	(introduces a question with two options)
ποτόν, -οῦ, τό	drink
* που	I suppose (particle)
που	somewhere (indefinite)
* πρᾶγμα, -ατος, τό	business, thing, matter
πραγματεία, -ας, ἡ	occupation, business, diligent effort
πρέπει	it is fitting
* πρίν	before
* πρό + gen.	before, in front of
προειδέναι	inf. of πρόοιδα ‘know in advance’
προειρημένων	perf. mid. part. from προλέγω ‘say beforehand’
προθυμέομαι	be eager
προλέγω	say beforehand
πρόοιδα	know in advance
* πρός + acc.	towards, to, regarding
προσέοικα	seem fit; resemble (+ dat.)
προσήκω	be fitting
προσπάσχω	experience, suffer in addition
προσπίπτω, aor. προσέπεσον	befall, encounter; attack
προστάττω	put in place, appoint, assign
προστεταγμένη	perf. mid. part. from προστάττω
προσφέρω	add
* πρότερος, -η, -ον	former, previous
* πρῶτον	first (adv.)
πώποτε	ever
* πῶς	how?
πῃ	in some way, somehow
* ῥᾴδιος, -α, -ον, comp. ῥᾷων, -ον	easy, light
* σαφής, -ές	clear
* σημαίνω	show
σιτίον, -ου, τό	food, grain
σκέπτομαι	examine, consider
* σκοπέω	inspect, examine
* σοφός, -ή, -όν	wise
σπουδάζω	be busy, serious; hurry
στάσις, -εως, ἡ	faction-fighting, civil strife
* σὺ	you (sg.)
συγκρίνω	combine
συζυγία, -ας, ἡ	coupling, joining together
συλλήβδην	taken together (adv.)
συμβαίνει	it happens
συμπαραλαμβάνω	take along with one
σύμπας, -πασα, -παν	all together, at once
σύμφημι	agree
συμφύρω	mix up with, knead up with
συναγείρω	gather, collect
συναθροίζω	gather, collect
συνδοκεῖ (+ dat.)	seem good also
* σφεῖς	they
* σφόδρα	very
* σχεδόν	almost
σχῆμα -ατος, τό	shape, form, figure
σχολή, -ῆς, ἡ	leisure, ease, free time
σχολῇ	hardly (adv.)
* σῶμα, -ατος, τό	body
* ταράττω	disturb, trouble, put in disorder
ταραχή, -ῆς, ἡ	disturbance, disorder
ταύτῃ	in this way (adv.)
ταὐτόν	= τὸ αὐτόν (crasis)
* τάχ᾽ ἄν	perhaps
* ταχύς, -εῖα, -ύ	quick
τείνω	stretch; direct
τεκμήριον, -ου, τό	proof
* τελευτάω	die, finish, come to an end
* τιμάω	honour, value
* τις, τι	a certain, someone, something
* τίς, τί	who? which? What?
* τοι	look now
τοίνυν	well then
τοιόσδε, -άδε, -όνδε	such as this
* τοιοῦτος, -αύτη, -οῦτο	of such a kind, such
* τότε	then
* τρέπομαι, aor. ἐτραπόμην	turn oneself
τρέφω	nourish, rear, cause to grow
τρίς	three times
* τρόπος, -ου, ὁ	way
τροφή, -ῆς, ἡ	food, nourishment, nurture
* τυγχάνω, aor. ἔτυχον, fut. τεύξομαι	encounter (+dat.); happen to, really be (+ part.)
ὑγιεία, -ας, ἡ	health
* ὑμεῖς	you (pl.)
ὑπερφυῶς	enormously
* ὑπὸ (+ gen.)	under, by, at the hands of
ὑποδημάτα, -ων, τό	sandals, shoes
ὑπολαμβάνω	take up; reply
ὑπομιμνήσκω	remind, mention
* ὕστερος, -α, -ον	later
* φαίνομαι	appear, seem
φανερός, -ή, -όν	clear, visible
φάρμακον, -ου, τό	drug
φαῦλος, -η, -ον	petty, bad, feeble
φέρε	come!
* φέρω, fut. οἴσω	carry; (mid.) win
* φεύγω	flee
* φημί	say
φθίνω	decay, waste away
φθίσις, -εως, ἡ	wasting away, decay
φιλομαθής, ές	fond of learning
* φίλος, -η, -ον	dear, pleasing
φιλοσοφέω	be a philosopher, love wisdom
φιλοσοφία, -ας, ἡ	philosophy
φίλοσοφος, -ου, ὁ	philosopher, lover of wisdom
φλυαρία, -ας, ἡ	nonsense, rubbish
φοβερός, -ή, -όν	frightening
* φόβος, -ου, ὁ	fear
φράζω	speak, say, tell
φρονέω	have understanding, be wise, think
φρόνησις, -εως, ἡ	wisdom, thought, knowledge
φρόνιμος, -η, -ον	sensible, prudent, wise
φροντίζω	consider, care, be thoughtful, worry
φύσις -εως, ἡ	nature, character; origin, birth
φυτόν, -οῦ, τό	plant
* χαίρω	rejoice, enjoy; greet; say goodbye (χαίρειν ἐάω)
* χαλεπός, -ή, -όν	difficult, harsh, painful
* χεῖρων, -ον	worse
* χρή	it is necessary
* χρήματα, -ων, τά	money
* χράομαι (+ dat.)	use
* χρόνος, -ου, ὁ	time
χωλός, -ή, -όν	lame, limping; defective
χωρίζω	separate, divide
χωρίς (+ gen.)	apart from, without
χωρισμός, -οῦ, ὁ	separation
ψύχω	make cool, cold
ψυχή, -ης, ἡ	life, soul, spirit, mind
* ὧδε	thus, in the following way
* ὥς	as, how, that, since
* ὥς + future participle	in order to
* ὥς + superlative	as … as possible
ὡσαύτως	in this very way
* ὥσπερ	just as, just as if
ὡσπερεὶ	just as if
* ὥστε	with the result that
ὤτων	see οὖς

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