4

Judicial Process and Proof

Introduction

Justice and religion were inseparable in ancient Mesopotamia.¹ Justice in Mesopotamia was a matter that ultimately belonged to the gods, and in particular to the solar deity Šamaš (Sumerian Utu). There were numerous people who could serve functionally as judges, but the king was the chief earthly agent of justice. In fact, the “Laws of Ešnunna” §48 states that the king presided over the more extreme cases that involved the death penalty, and other text types also point to this as well.² Although this judicial function belonged to the palace and not the temple, the establishment and execution of justice had religious dimensions to it. This is seen in numerous ways, including the presentation of “law” collections before the gods, the issuing of edicts as pious acts, and the use of oaths and the River Ordeal. Indeed, trials could also take place in relation to chapels and in the temple complex, or at the very least move there in order that oaths might be taken. Further, judges often decided cases in the temple.³

During the Ur III period, the Dublamaḫ functioned as a courthouse and belonged to the Ekišnugal complex at Ur.⁴ In the Ur III text BM 110306, the merchant A-nini received goods that were stolen from a grave. The merchant was not held responsible for receiving the stolen goods and took an oath at the Dublamaḫ. He then had to go to the gate of the palace, possibly in reference to the royal palace at Ur.⁵ This example shows some of the relationship between religion and the judicial practice. This interconnection between the judicial process and religion likely contributes to the emergence of the notion of refinement through ritual performance in the prison.⁶

Punishments and reparation through the judicial system, as such, occurred not only between the community and the offender, as discussed in Chapter 6, purification played an important role in the reparation of the relationship between an offender and their personal god. The ritual purification for uncleanness connects to the notion of refinement through imprisonment, which, although not always present in imprisonment, features in the “Hymn to Nungal” and in later rituals that use the prison as part of the ritual process. At the very least, this hints at the ancient Mesopotamian conceptuality that came to be attached to imprisonment, even if such concepts did not accurately reflect everyday reality.

When conceiving of the judicial process in relation to imprisonment, it is necessary first to describe Mesopotamian justice, at least in broad strokes. Then I will sketch the steps leading up to the rendering of a decision. This helps to demonstrate the ways in which justice is connected to the king as a servant of the gods.

Although there would have been numerous similarities in practice and some degree of continuity, it would be incorrect to assume that the judicial process occurred in a singular manner across Mesopotamia. Indeed, it is likely that judicial processes were handled differently in various locales and were oftentimes situational. Justice could be administered at a local level without direct intervention from the crown, whereas some cases were handled within the king’s court. It is known that cases were tried in numerous ways, but there appears to be a general pattern, which will be discussed below. The diversity in judicial practice further explains the multifunctional nature of imprisonment, which occurred in numerous contexts for a variety of reasons. Nuances about geographic and historical approaches to justice together with anomalous situations are peripheral to the focus of this book, so only a provisional sketch of the basic process as it relates to imprisonment and the judicial function of the crown bears mentioning here.

In this chapter, after discussing Mesopotamian justice, the judicial process from the summoning of the parties to the execution of justice is traced. Those accused of criminal activity were detained. Trials involved the gathering of evidence, such as witnesses and written documentation, but there were also the supra-rational ordeals.

The awe-inspiring context of approaching the king in his palace and Nungal in the judicial process is described in the literary record, which connects the religious and political dimensions of the judicial process. The greatness of the king and his support by the gods, together with the ordeals, get at the inevitability of justice. The whole process presents justice as inescapable. This intersection between religion, power, and politics perhaps shows how common, multifunctional detention for the purpose of holding and coercion could come to have ideology attached to it that involved purification before the gods.

Justice in Mesopotamia

As stated above, justice belonged particularly to Utu (Akk. Šamaš), the solar deity and god of justice. The right to rule was passed down by the gods, which means the common declaration in edicts about the righteous king is a claim about the fitness of the king to rule over the people. These assertions stretch back into the third millennium with rulers such as UruKAgina in his reforms claiming to have remitted debt, as well as various social and administrative reforms. Such claims about the right to rule in relation to justice are attested in the Old Babylonian period as well. In his prologue, Ḫammurapi mentions his fitness to reign by divine provision, and the laws were intended to demonstrate his faithful execution of that office.

While, as discussed in Chapter 3, the actual function of these law collections is unclear, it is evident that there was an expectation for the king to administer justice. For example, the storm-god at Mari required this of the king:

I have put you back on the throne of your father and given you the weapons with which I fought against the (primordial) Sea. (…) Listen to this single word from me: when someone who has a legal case, appeals to you, saying: “Someone has wronged me,” stand up and make your decision; answer him righteously. That is all I want of you (Durand 1993: 45).⁷

After citing this text, Démare-Lafont writes:

But this was not merely rhetoric: the king indeed was his subjects’ judge and had to be accessible to all, at least in the early second millennium BC. This was a duty imposed on the king by the gods, as the storm-god reminds him: “When a complainant, male or female, appeals to you, hold audience and give them justice. That is all I ask from you” (Lafont 1984: 11).⁸

It is evident, then, that an important function of the king related to providing access to justice.

The Mesopotamian notion of justice is reflected in the edicts that were issued by Old Babylonian kings when they ascended the throne, edicts which could also be issued at various points in their reigns. Justice, however, was not equally applicable for all. Thus, for example, “The Edict of Ammiṣaduqa” differentiates between native Babylonians and houseborn slaves (wilid bītim) by not releasing the latter.⁹

“The Edict of Ammiṣaduqa”¹⁰

V 25. [šum-ma] ˹dumu˺ nu-um-ḫi-a dumu e-mu-ut-ba-˹lum˺^[ki]

26. [dumu i-da]-ma-ra-az^ki dumu unu^ki

27. [dumu i₃.si]. ˹in˺.na^ki dumu ki.sur.ra^ki

28. [dumu murgu]˹^ki˺ i-il-tum i-il-šu-ma

29. [pa-ga]-˹ar˺-šu aš-ša-as-su₂

30. [u₂-lu x x] x a-na ku₃.babbar a-na ˹ki˺-[iš]-˹ša˺-tim

31. [u₂-lu a-na ma-an^?]-˹za˺-za-ni

32. [x x aš-šum šar-rum] ˹mi˺-ša-ra-am

33. [a-na ma-tim iš]-˹ku˺-nu

34. [uš-šu]-ur an-˹du˺-[ra]-˹ar˺-šu

35. [ša]-ki-˹in˺

36. [šum-ma] geme arad wi-li-˹id˺ e₂

37. [dumu nu]-˹um˺-ḫi-a dumu e-mu-ut-ba-lum˹^ki˺

38. [dumu i]-˹da˺-ma-ra-az^ki dumu unu^ki

39. [dumu i₃].si.in.na^ki dumu ki.sur.ra^ki

VI.

1. dumu murgu˹^ki˺ […]

2. ˹ša˺ ši-˹im˺ x […]

3. [a-na] ˹ku₃.babbar˺ in-˹na˺-[di-in]

4. [u₂]-˹lu˺ a-˹na ki˺-iš-ša-tim

5. ˹ik-ka˺-ši-iš

6. [u₂]-˹lu˺ a-na ˹ma˺-[an^?]-za-za-ni

7. ˹in˺-ne-˹zi˺-ib

8. [an]-du-ra-ar-˹šu˺

9. [u₂]-˹ul˺ iš-ša-˹ak-ka˺-an

Translation: If a son of Numḫia, a son of Emut-balum, a son of Ida-maraz, a son of Uruk, a son of Isin, a son of Kisura, a son of Malgûm, has assumed a debt obligation, and [has sold] for silver himself, his wife, [or his children] into debt service [or as a] pledge—[because the king] has established justice [for the land], he is released, his freedom is restored. If a houseborn male or female slave [a son of] Numḫia, a son of Emut-balum, a son of Ida-maraz, a son of Uruk, a son of Isin, a son of Kisura, a son of Malqûm […] has been sold [for] silver (and) has either been delivered in debt service or left as a pledge his freedom shall not be established.

The edict clearly distinguished between children born in certain cities as non-slaves and houseborn slaves. As such, irrespective of their place of birth, houseborn slaves did not enjoy the same rights as the native population. The wilid bītim have been identified by Kraus as a distinctive group of slaves who could not gain freedom except at the discretion of the master.¹¹ While native citizens had a variety of avenues by which they could move in and out of forms of bonded labor and slavery, the wilid bītim were specifically excluded from royal edicts that secured the release of the those of the native population who had temporarily lost their freedom.

This reveals that justice in Mesopotamia was not about personal equality as much as it was about keeping things in the proper order. While the temple did not have an official judicial capacity, justice was the business of the gods. The king was the primary agent of the gods for the execution of justice. This connection between religion and justice elucidates further the connection between the prison and the prison goddess, Nungal, particularly in relation to purification through ritual lament, which will be explored more fully in Chapter 6.

Judicial Summoning

People accused of “crimes” or entangled in a dispute would be summoned. The process was often handled by judges writing letters. For example, the Old Babylonian letter, BM 103087, reads as follows:¹²

Obverse

1. a-na ^d+en.zu-˹iš˺-me-a-˹ni˺

2. qi₂-bi₂-ma

3. um-ma di.ku₅^meš-ma

4. ^dutu u₃ ^damar.utu li-ba-al-˹li-ṭu₂˺-[ka]

5. ^mri-iš-^dutu

6. aš-šu°-mi-ka u₂-lam-mi-id

7. a-li-a-am-ma

8. a-pu-ul-šu

 (remainder uninscribed)

Translation: Speak to Sîn-išme’anni, thus (say) the judges: May Šamaš and Marduk keep [you] in good health. Rīš-Šamaš informed (us) on your behalf. Come up (here) and answer him!

It is known that those accused of “crimes” were pursued if they did not appear of their own accord. This is seen quite clearly in the earlier Ur III period. Much like those charged with pursuing runaways, messengers are also attested as traveling to capture bandits and, in some instances, traveling to kill bandits.¹³ This demonstrates that individuals were utilized during the Ur III period to capture those accused of “crimes” and flight. While the Irisagrig texts also point to the execution of certain criminals, others were detained.

It is unlikely that the responsibility to capture only fell to those serving in an official capacity. With runaway slaves, at least, there seems to be a communal responsibility to detain and return fugitives, as can be seen in the Old Babylonian text the “Laws of Ḫammurapi” §§15–20. Further, since detention occurred in households, as well as institutional contexts, some individuals would have been able to capture and temporarily detain suspects. This would particularly be the case for anyone who worked in an official capacity as an agent of the administrative or governing bodies. Such capture and summoning can be seen in the following letter.

In the recently published letter, CUSAS 36:61, the recipient of the letter, one Sîn-ḫili, captured two of the robbers but apparently let them go.

CUSAS 36: 61¹⁴

Obverse

1. a-na ^dsuen-ḫi.li simug

2. qi₂-bi₂-ma

3. um-ma ^dnanna-ša₃.la₂.su₃-ma

4. aš-šum ḫu-ub-tim

5. ša na-ab-ra-ra-a

6. ˹ša ta˺-aš-pu-ra-am

7. [um-ma] ˹at˺-ta-a-ma

8. [x lu₂ ša] ˹a˺-aš-ki-pa-da

9. [il-li]-˹ku˺-ni-im-ma

10. [ḫu-ub]-˹ta˺-am

11. [i-na] ˹ud˺.nun^ki

12. [iḫ-bu-tu]-u₂

13. [al]-˹li˺-ik-ma

14. i-na am-da-a-bu-ki-ia

15. lu₂ ˹ši˺-na

Reverse

16. aṣ-ṣa-ba-˹at˺

17. a-wa-ti-im

18. ša ta-aš-pu-ra-am

19. šar-ra-am u₂-la-am-mi-id

20. mi-nu-um ša ta-am-ta-ag-ru-ma

21. a-wi-le tu-wa-aš-ši-ru

22. šar-ru-um u₂-da-ab-bi-ba-an-ni

23. a-wi-le-e šu-ri-a-am-ma

24. šar-ru-um pa-ni-šu-nu

25. li-mu-ur

26. ap-pu-tum

Translation: To Sîn-ḫili the smith speak, thus Nanna-šalasu:

With regard to the robbery of Nabrarā that you wrote to me about as follows: “[n men] from Aškipada came and committed [a robbery in] Usab (Adab). [I] went and captured two of the men in Amdābukiya.” I told the king the message you sent me. How was it that you consented to set the men free? The king harassed me (about it). Have the men brought to me so the king can see them in person. Important!

Once the king learned that the robbers had been released, he “harassed” the letter writer about the matter. So the letter writer sends the letter to have the men recaptured and brought into the presence of the king. This letter shows both the king’s authority in judicial matters and the pursuit and capture of those accused of a “crime.”

Detainment of Suspects

When a person was accused of “crimes,” the suspect would be detained. It would be wrong to think of this detainment occurring in a single context that was standardized across ancient Mesopotamia. Rather, imprisonment took place in a variety of contexts, such as temples, personal households, and roadhouses. In fact, as seen in Chapter 2, it is likely that the existing mechanisms of guards and officials, together with administrative contexts with detention functions, provided a suitable holding place for someone accused of a “crime” or flight.

Imprisonment was used to confine a person until the judicial process was complete. This aspect of imprisonment is particularly well-attested and undisputed. The “Hymn to Nungal” provides a literary depiction of the prison that highlights this process. In lines 58–61 of the “Hymn to Nungal,” the prison serves as a holding place until guilt is determined or until the person is absolved.

“Hymn to Nungal,” lines 58–61¹⁵

When the time arrives, the prison is made up as for a public festival; the gods are present at the place of interrogation, at the river ordeal, to separate the just from the evildoers; a just man is given rebirth. Nungal clamps down on her enemy, so he will not escape her clutches.

The text portrays Nungal’s house with the patron goddess Nungal serving to detain suspects until guilt was established or not. This function of detention is attested in the record.

In the Old Akkadian text (ITT 1, 1287), five armed men were brought to Irisagrig and were living in prison (e₂-eš₂-ka i₃-še₁₂), likely in relation to a claim.¹⁶ In a letter from the same period (FAOS 19: Gir 25), runaways were to be imprisoned until the governor arrived.¹⁷

An Old Babylonian letter further elucidates this function of imprisonment in relation to the judicial process. BM 103136 states that the four men, who were accused of murder, were interrogated in the prison.¹⁸ This process connects with the literary vision preserved in Nungal, where the prison was used as part of the judicial process. The prison was utilized to detain suspects as part of the investigative process.¹⁹

As part of the process, investigations were launched to determine the facts of a case; this could be performed by officials or royal representatives, depending on the case. For the Ur III period, Molina argues that the commissioner (maškim) investigated and prepared evidence while also overseeing the transportation of suspects to the judicial proceeding.²⁰ As part of the process, witnesses could be brought in and interrogations also took place, which could include beatings (AbB 12, 65, cited in Chapter 5).²¹ Oaths were also taken in the name of the king and/or gods as will be discussed more fully below. Oaths could be used as part of the process and were employed to bring a case to conclusion, even if a person was acquitted.²² Such oaths were performed in the presence of emblems, at the gates of the palace, in temples, and in the presence of Nungal, the prison goddess, as attested beyond the literary record.²³ When a prisoner was brought before the court and the temple, the process was intended to include an awe-inspiring approach.

Judicial Process

Disputes seem to be settled normally through a standard process.²⁴ Those involved in a dispute were summoned to report before those tasked to serve as judges, whether functionally or also in title. Numerous individuals could serve a judicial function. Cases were settled by individuals of various professions but who functioned as judges, as is the case of Lu-Enlilla, who was identified as a judge in a text that states, “the seal of Lu-Enlilla the judge was rolled,” but his actual seal legend that was rolled identifies him as a shipping agent (ga-eš₈ a-ab-ba-ka).²⁵ Some officials, however, bear the title, such as Royal Judge (di-ku₅ lugal).²⁶

Assemblies at the city gate and the elders of a city also determined cases in early Mesopotamia. For higher profile cases, kings also judged disputes.²⁷ While there is a religious component and function of the temple in judicial proceedings, certain rights to punish belonged to the king. Such limitations can be seen in a letter from Mari, published by Démare-Lafont. The letter discusses a Ḫananean named Ḫardum whose lad escaped with two slave girls (geme₂) to Šubartum. Ḫardum caught up with the runaways and in his anger gouged out the eyes of the young fugitive. Ḫardum requested permission to kill the man and place him on a pole to make an example of the runaway.

RA 91: 110²⁸

Obverse:

1. a-na be-li₂-ia qi₂-bi₂-⌜ma⌝

2. um-ma i-ba-al-pi₂-⌜an⌝

3. arad-ka-a-ma

4. 1(diš) lu₂-tur ḫa-ar-di-im ḫa-ni-im

5. 2(diš) geme₂ ša-wi-ti-šu it-ru-ma

6. a-na šu-bar-tim in-na-<bi>-it

7. u₂-ka-aš-ši-is-su₂-ma

8. i-na šu-bar-tim iṣ-ba-ta-aš-šu

Bottom Edge:

9. i-na ap-pi₂-šu

10. i-ni lu₂-tur-šu

11. u₂-ga-al-li-il

Reverse:

12. a-na ṣe-ri-ia

13. ˹il-li˺-kam-ma

14. ki-a-am iq-be₂-e-em

15. um-ma-a-mi lu₂ ša-˹a-tu˺

16. lu-du-uk-ma i-na ^gišga-ši-ši-im

17. li-iš-ša-ki-in-ma

18. wa-ar-ku-um i-na qa-ti-šu

19. li-mu-ur an-ni-tam iq-be₂-e-em-ma

20. a-na-ku ki-a-am a-pu-ul-šu

Top Edge:

21. um-ma a-na-ku-ma

22. ˹ba˺-lum be-li₂-ia mi-im-ma

23. [u₂]-ul te-ep-pe₂-eš

24. a-na be-li₂-ia lu-uš₂-pu-˹ur˺-/ma

Left Edge:

25. ma-li be-li₂ i-qa-˹ab˺-be₂-e-em

26. lu-pu-uš₂ an-˹ni-tam˺ a-pu-ul-šu

27. an^!-ni-tam la an-ni-[tam] ˹be˺-li₂ li-iš-pu-/[ra]-am

Translation: Say to my lord, thus (says) Ibâl-pî-El, your servant. A young man of Ḫardûm, the Ḫananean, accompanied two female slaves, friends of his, fled to Šubartu. He (Ḫardûm) overtook him and seized him in Šubartu. In his anger,²⁹ he blinded his young man. He came to me, thus he said, “I want to kill this man, and he should be placed on a pole that everyone may learn from his example.” This is what he said to me, and I responded thus, “You cannot do anything without my lord. Let me send to my lord. Whatever my lord says, I will do.” This is what I replied to him. Let my lord write to me what should happen.

Since the young man ran away with two female dependents (likely slaves), this could explain the physical severity of the punishment. The letter does suggest that physical punishment was acceptable in certain cases depending on the specifics of the case, but the death penalty could not be carried out without consent from the ruling authorities. As mentioned above, this is in keeping with “Laws of Ešnunna” §48, which indicates that cases involving the death penalty were to be decided by the king. Yet even cases that went before the court were not necessarily judged by the king and could be delegated to others, as can be seen during Ḫammurapi’s reign.³⁰

As stated above, for the Ur III period, the commissioner (maškim) gathered evidence as well as transported the suspect to the court.³¹ For those who did not want to appear before the judges, their presence could be forced through pursuit and capture. This was certainly the case in examples where the person was accused of a “crime,” while failure to participate in matters of property dispute resulted in a negative judgment for the absent party.

Once the parties involved in a dispute met, there was a chance for them to come to an agreement. This sometimes occurred prior to the presentation of evidence but also later in the process before the ordeals.³²

As part of the judicial process, witnesses and documentation could be produced. Evidence could also be gathered through interrogation, which sometimes took a violent form.³³ The participants would also partake in oath-taking, which will be discussed more fully below.³⁴ It should be noted, however, that there was a general historical trajectory toward written evidence and documentation and away from oaths, which was one of the most important aspects of legal material in the earlier periods.³⁵

Trials were public spectacles that often occurred at the city gate or quay with no procedural differentiation between civil and criminal cases, which also included the same sort of evidence.³⁶ Charpin describes the process further, “The next stage was for the judges to make their decision, which was done in the temple, and they would stipulate that the unsuccessful litigant give his successful opponent a document confirming his agreement to the decision, a ṭuppi lā ragāmin (‘a tablet of non-complaining’), which stated that he would never again raise the matter.”³⁷ Judgments were written on a tablet and in the Ur III period are known to be stored in the archives.³⁸

Because the ordeals are connected to the prison and the prison goddess, these will be discussed more fully below. If a person refused to take the oath, that person’s testimony was not accepted, and they would receive a negative judgment unless an agreement could be reached with the other party.³⁹ For now, it is worthy of note that judgments were typically financial in nature, while penalties related to “crimes” could also include corporal punishment.⁴⁰ The person could be imprisoned after the trial until the judgment was carried out or until payment was made. Otherwise, imprisonment was not used as a form of punishment with the exception of a few potential instances.⁴¹ Imprisonment was employed, however, to restrict movement as part of the judicial process; to coerce reparation; and until corporal punishment was carried out.

The Awe of the Judicial Process

The prison and Nungal imagery of terror connects also to the king in his court with the ability to execute justice and strike terror in the heart of offenders. As Henry Stadhouders and Strahil Panayotov state, “The goddess Nungal of Old Babylonian depiction has been said to epitomize the deeply fixed fear of the government and the long arm of the law.”⁴² In the history of prisons in modernity, Foucault highlights the terror of being watched or surveilled as a mechanism of power and control.⁴³ The proclivity for those in power to seek control by striking terror in the hearts of the people has deep historical roots and connects to the prison in ancient Mesopotamia.

In the “Hymn to Nungal,” the accused was led naked into the presence of the prison goddess, as part of a terrifying process.⁴⁴ If the literary imagery and the grand nature of palaces are any indication of what it would be like to enter into the palace when trials came before the court, the process was intended to inspire awe in the prisoner. In this section, I review some of the literary strands that communicate the sense of awe that was entailed in the king’s court, the prison, and the judicial procedure. It should be noted that these are particular literary perspectives and loaded ideology that connect to imprisonment and the judicial process.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Hallo isolated some instances where the Sumerian terms e₂-gal and e₂ gu-la (see lines 32ff., 40ff., 69 in “Hymn to Nungal”) denote places of detention.⁴⁵ This is fitting, since for the Ur III period, it should be noted that there were various “big houses” in Ur and Nippur, for example, that were not royal residences, per se. Instead, these were royal storehouses, which could serve numerous functions. As discussed above, the e₂-gal in the Sumerian text Proverb 6:3 is referenced in context with Nungal, the prison godess: e₂-gal tir-ra-am₃ lugal ur-maḫ-e ^dnun-gal sa-šu₂-uš-gal ĝuruš dul-dul-e (“the big house is a forest, the king, a lion, Nungal, a net thrown over man”).⁴⁶ Again in this text a prisoner was held captive by Nungal like in a net, and the palace enclosed as if it were a forest. The king, whose responsibility was to execute justice, was like a powerful lion of the forest.

As discussed above, Hallo and Civil connect this to similar imagery in “Bilgameš and Ḫuwawa A,” which also mentions Nungal. In this earlier Sumerian recension of “Bilgameš and Ḫuwawa A,”⁴⁷ the heroes slay Ḫuwawa and present his head before the god Enlil. In the text, Enlil has Nungal imprison some of the magical auras in the story, which belonged to Ḫuwawa, connecting Nungal to the forest.⁴⁸

Based on Proverb 6:3, the palace served as a canopy like a forest, the king like a lion, and the prison goddess like a net that captures, suggesting the certainty of justice. Perhaps the following incantation and the later recension of Gilgameš, this time the Standard Babylonian version, provide some further clues about this literary relationship between the forest and the palace with its judicial function.

The juridical function of the king in the context of the palace conveys a similar awe-inspiring idea as that found with Nungal. Nungal’s role in justice, in fact, is related to the king (“The Hymn to Nungal,” lines 27–31). In a much later text, used here for illustrative purposes, an incantation seeks to deal with the fear of entering into the palace, which has a tribunal function.

A 373: lines 1–12⁴⁹

§ 1

1. šiptu: ekallu ša šiprūša dannū

2. šupšuqū la našâma šeressa dannat

3. tēkêtu mali šipirša

4. arki^? daltīša^? puluḫtu bašât

5. āšib libbīša labbu lā gāmilu

6. ērib libbīša Šamaš usappa

7. ana Nusku u Bēlet-ekalli illakū supûšu

8. Šamaš uṣur pīya šullima qibītī

9. lūrub ina šulmema ṭūbātiš lutūra

10. bēlī Šamaš lūmur gimil dumqīka–tê šipti

11. ka’inim.ma e₂.gal.ku₄.ra du₃.du₃.bi ina pê qātīka temessi

12. šipta šalāšīšu tamannuma ana ekalli terrub

Incantation: The palace whose tasks are harsh, arduous to the point of being unbearable and whose punishment is severe-labor for it is fraught with protests. Behind^? its door^? terror reigns, its resident is a merciless lion. He who enters its interior will pray to Šamaš, his prayers will be rendered up to Nusku and Bēlet-ekalli (saying): “O Šamaš, watch over my speech (in there), make my request (to the prince) successful, so that I go in safely and come back well-pleased. My Lord Šamaš, may I see your grace!” Incantation formula.

Text of an Egalkura spell: Its use in ritual: You wash your hands with straw, recite the spell three times and then you enter the palace.⁵⁰

One key function of a king in ancient Mesopotamia was to execute justice.⁵¹ The awe of the king and Nungal should strike terror into the hearts of prisoners and potential offenders. Perhaps it is this function combined with the idea conveyed in the Standard Babylonian version of Gilgameš that indicates how the forest is related to the “big house.”

In this later version of Gilgameš, entering the forest of Ḫumbaba strikes terror in the hearts of Gilgameš and Enkidu. F. N. H. Al-Rawi and Andrew R. George in their recent edition of the Standard Babylonian Version of Tablet V published new material relating to Gilgameš and Enkidu in the cedar forest of Ḫumbaba.⁵² When Gilgameš and Enkidu entered the forest, they were met with a cacophony of animal sounds that represent the court of the great king Ḫumbaba. The entire context of the sounds and the forest produced terror as the heroes approached:

[Gilgameš] opened his mouth to speak,

saying to Enkidu:

“[Why,] my friend, are we trembling like weaklings,

[we] who came across all the mountains?” (V:34–36)⁵³

The awe-inspiring context of the forest caused fear to seize Gilgameš and Enkidu, much like the incantation above that deals with entering into the palace. While the ominous approach and subsequent slaying of Ḫumbaba as well as the destruction of the forest serve a number of literary functions in the story, the fear of the forest (in this case Ḫumbaba’s court) may be connected to the literary imagery of the forest described as a “big house” through the earlier Sumerian tale of “Bilgameš and Ḫuwawa.” This connection is represented in the proverb above, where the “big house,” or palace, is a forest and the king is a lion. The lion was a powerful threat in the forest, and so also was the king in his palace. Bringing the strands of this connected imagery back together, entering into the court of the king or into the presence of Nungal was intended to inspire awe.

All of this also has a religious coercive element, as the king is meant to be the chief agent of justice for the gods, and Nungal was a goddess as well. The terror felt upon entering into the judicial process was intended to encourage honesty and provide a coercive element to the process. The forest serves as apt imagery with its ability to cover over a person together with its many dangers. With this contextual perspective, oath-taking and the River Ordeal are considered in what follows, as they relate to the judicial process and imprisonment and further elucidate the intersection between the religious and judicial in early Mesopotamia.

Oaths

Oaths played a particularly important role in life in early Mesopotamia, as they related to all aspects of the legal process from legal transactions and agreements to judicial trials. For example, in BM 103090⁵⁴ a case was examined in the temple of Zababa and the oath was taken there. The letter writer was concerned that the verdict be followed through with and requested that the standard of Zababa, the witnesses, and the representatives be present in order to examine the case in the temple of Zababa.

Oaths are typically divided into those that require some action in the future (promissory) and those which relate to the things that have occurred or the current state of affairs (assertory).⁵⁵ Assertory oaths can be further divided into “formal” and “weakened” oaths.⁵⁶ Formal oaths are the more standard assertory oaths, and these were used to finalize transactions or proceedings. Bruce Wells, Rachel Magdalene, and Cornelia Wunsch write about the use of formal assertory oaths in the judicial process:

That is, when taken, it was the decisive factor in a trial and ensured a favorable verdict for the party that swore the oath. The court decided which party should take the oath, and, in the Old Babylonian period, for instance, that was usually the defendant. Such a decision typically came at the end of a trial when a court required one of the parties to swear by one or more deities—and sometimes by the king, as well—to the veracity of his or her position. The court then often moved to a cultic site where the oath was performed; in some instances, a divine statue or emblem was moved to the site of the trial.⁵⁷

Such oaths were essential to bring finality to the trials, since the threat of divine punishment was intended to deter dishonesty. The threat of perjury before the gods could result in last minute resolutions to cases.⁵⁸

The weakened assertory oath did not bring finality but sought to strengthen testimony and was voluntary rather than mandatory. These oaths typically include swearing by the name of the king.⁵⁹

The significance of oath-taking can perhaps be obscured by the vast amount of writing preserved in the record; the increasing importance of the written text; and because of developments in the significance of writing for the formation of agreements. But the importance of oath-taking is visible in the Amorite treaties of the 17th century BC, since writing was used to facilitate agreements and oath-taking ceremonies, especially when parties were unable to be present with one another while taking the oath.⁶⁰ In this way, the writing of agreements was subservient to the oaths taken before the gods. This appears to have changed over time since written documents became more significant in treaties that had implications for posterity. After these developments, it is possible to speak of treaties proper, where curses by the gods are threatened against anyone who changes the word of the treaty.⁶¹ Further according to Westbrook, certain oaths mostly fall out of the later contractual record:

Documents recording the standard contractual forms may also record a promissory oath, by one or both parties. For the most part, the oath relates to ancillary matters: either special terms not usually found in that type of contract, or (most frequently) a promise not to deny, contest, or alter the terms of the completed contract in the future. In the third millennium, oaths are sometimes recorded for central obligations of the contract, e.g. repayment of a loan. This type of oath disappears in the second millennium, where only ancillary oaths are recorded. By the first millennium, it is rare to find any mention of an oath in the records of standard contracts.⁶²

Yet for the early period, the oath remained a key feature in many contractual agreements, since it served to finalize the agreement and existed as an attempt to circumvent any future contesting of an agreement. These preventive measures could be further strengthened by threats of punishment, both corporal and in the form of fines.⁶³

One example of the combination of oaths in written documentation comes from texts dealing with slave sales. These text types serve as apt examples as they also bear some of the early marks of the historical transition from oaths to a more evidentiary approach in the history of Mesopotamia.

Oaths are frequently attested in early Old Babylonian slave sales and other transactions but fall out of late Old Babylonian examples.⁶⁴ Slave sales during this period reflect to some extent the political context in which the transactions were made. The slave contract during the Old Babylonian period underwent significant changes from the reign of Abiešuḫ and continuing throughout the rest of the period.⁶⁵ The earlier contracts include a number of statements which are omitted in the later material. Similarly, additions are made to the Late Old Babylonian contracts which are not found in the previous documents. For instance, many of the early slave contracts include mention of the slave crossing the bukānum, which is also found in contracts dealing with the sale of land. This is followed by a statement that the heart of the seller is content, and the transaction is complete. Finally, the oath is taken in the names of gods and the king that a claim will not be made challenging the agreement.

The Old Babylonian text, CT 8, 22, in which a girl is sold by her father, serves as an example.

CT 8, plate 22 (Bu 1891-5-9-374):⁶⁶

Obverse:

1. 1(diš) ^dutu-nu-ri dumu.sal i-bi-ša-a-an

2. ki i-bi-^dša-a-an a-bi-ša

3. 1(diš) ^dbu-ni-ni-a-bi^!(T: AM)

4. u₃ be-li-su-nu i-ša-mu-ši

5. a-na ^dbu-ni-ni-a-bi a-ša-at

6. a-na be-li-su-nu a-ma-at

7. u₄-um ^dutu-nu-ri a-na be-li-su-˹nu˺

8. be-el-ti-ša u₂-ul be-el-ti at-ti

9. iq-ta-bu u-ga-la-ab-ši

10. a-na ku₃.babbar i-na-ad-di-˹iš-ši˺

11. ˹sa₁₀˺.til-la.bi.šu 5(diš) gin₂.ku₃.babbar

12. [in].na.an.la₂ giš.gan.na

13. [ib₂.ta].bal.gu₃.bi al.til

14. [šag.ga.ni] al.du₁₀

Bottom Edge:

15. [ukur.su] lu₂-lu₂.ra

16. [inim.nu].ma₃.ma₃.a

Reverse:

17. [mu ^d]utu ^da-a ^damar.˹utu˺

18. [u₃ ḫa]-˹am˺-mu-ra-pi₂ in.pa₃.de^meš

19. igi ma-zi-a-am-i₃-li₂ [dumu] im-gur-3(u)

20. igi im-gur-rum dumu i-din-3(u)

21. igi i-za-ma-nu-um dumu ^dutu ˹x˺-KI^?

22. igi 3(u)-iš-me-an-ni dumu ḫa-ia-˹nu-um˺

23. igi 3(u)-i-din-nam dumu ṣil₂-li₂-eš-tar

24. igi ^dutu-ba-ni dumu ^dadad-ra-bi

25. igi anum-ra-bi dumu ib-ni-^dmar.tu

space

26. iti a-ia-ru-um u₄.3(diš).kam

27. mu ^gišgu-za ^dṣar-pa-ni-tum

Translation: Šamaš-nūrī, daughter of Ibišan, Bunini-abī and Bēlissunu purchased her from Ibi-šan, her father. To Bunini-abī, she is a wife. To Bēlissunu, she is a slave girl. On the day, Šamaš-nūrī says to Bēlissunu, her mistress, you are not my mistress, he shall shave her. She shall be sold for silver. Five shekels of silver were given for her purchase price. The pestle was crossed. The case is completed. His heart is content. In the future, neither will complain against the other. By the name of Šamaš, Aya, Marduk, and Ḫammurapi they swore. Before Maziam-ilī, the son of Imgur-Sin. Witnesses. Month Ayyarum (2). Day 3. Year of the throne of Ṣarpanitum.

In this instance, they swear by the names of the gods Šamaš, Aya, Marduk, and the king Ḫammurapi.

In general, the later contracts omit the elements present in early documents (pestle crossing; declaration of contentment; and the oath) but add other standard clauses and material relating to the sale. In the Late Old Babylonian slave sale documents, the price of the slave was stated and an additional payment (SI.BI) was included. There is also mention of a teb’ītum or “investigation,” as it is generally understood.⁶⁷ The slave could not have epilepsy or some other condition, which would render the slave unfit for normal service. The assumption is that if the slave had a prior condition of epilepsy at the time of the sale, the period of investigation should reveal this problem in one month’s time. The seller was further held responsible for any claims that might be made against the slave. This transition could be an early example of the movement away from the oaths and the supranatural aspects of legal process to the more evidentiary approach that characterizes the later periods.

In the following earlier examples from the Ur III, oaths are employed in relation to debts and in relation to promises to fulfil obligations. Festschrift Owen 2010: 203–4, 2 appears to be an example where the son of a debtor is seized to retire a portion of an outstanding debt.

Festschrift Owen 2010: 203–4, 2 = Festschrift Sigrist 2008: 167⁶⁸

1. 1/3(diš) ma-na 1/2(diš) gin₂ ku₃-babbar

2. šeš-a-ni-ir

3. ur-kal-la-mu

4. in-da-an-tuku-am₃

5. ša₃-bi 1(u) gin₂ ku₃-babbar-še₃

6. šeš-a-ni lu₂-dingir-ra dumu-ni

7. ur-kal-la-mu

8. igi ki-aĝ₂-še₃ in-na-an-dib₅

9. 1(u) 1/2(diš) gin₂ ku₃-babbar^!(T:KU) in-da-an-tuku-a

10. 1(u) gin₂ ku₃ sa₁₀-am₃ lu₂-dingir-/ra-ka i₃-me-a

Reverse:

1. ur-kal-la-mu

2. nam-erim₂-e ki-aĝ₂-e ba-an-šum₂

3. inim-ma-dingir maškim nam-/erim₂-bi-im

4. la-lu₅-mu gudu₄ nam-erim₂ ku₅-ra₂-bi-im

5. 1(diš) u₃-ma-ni

6. 1(diš) du-du-mu

7. lu₂-inim-ma sag dib₅-ba-me

8. ur-^dli₉-si₄ di-ku₅

9. 1(diš) kal-la-mu dumu inim-^dšara₂

10. 1(diš) ur-niĝar^ĝar egir-re₂

11. 1(diš) ur-^dba-ba₆ dumu gu-du-du

12. 1(diš) a-kal-la dumu lugal-iti-da

13. 1(diš) i₃-da-mu

14. lu₂ ki-ba gub-ba-me

15. mu en-unu₆-gal ^dinanna ba-ḫun

Translation: Šešani has twenty and one half shekels of silver (as a debt) from Ur-kalamu. From its middle for ten shekels of silver Šešani’s son, Lu-dingira, transferred to Ur-kalamu in the presence of Ki’aĝ. [Šešani] has ten and one half shekels of silver (as a debt to Ur-kalamu), the purchase price of Lu-dingira being ten shekels of silver. Ki’aĝ caused Ur-kalamu to take the oath. Inima-AN, administrator of the oath, Lalumu, was the priest of the oath. Umani (and) Dudumu witnesses of the seizure of the person (slave). Ur-Lisi_, the judge, Kallamu, son of Inim-Šara, Ur-Niĝar, second-in-command, Ur-Baba_, son of Gududu, Akalla, the son of Lugal-itida, Idamu, men who were standing in that place. The year Enunugal was installed as priest of Inanna (Amar-Suen 5).

If the son was to be sold as a slave, the value was ten shekels of silver. This amount was credited to the account of Šešani toward the retirement of the debt with the remaining amount to be repaid subsequently. In this example, the creditor took the oath since he had received the son of the debtor, which resulted in a different amount being owed.

A similar text includes the default clause that if the debtor does not repay the loan, the debtor will hand over his son to the creditor. In this instance, the debt was low enough to be retired by a single son, whereas in the above text the seizure of a son cannot quite make up half of the deficit. The obvious difference was between a loan of 20 1/2 shekels of silver and a loan of 8 shekels of silver.

ZA 53: 83–85, 22⁶⁹

Obverse:

1. 8(diš) ˹gin₂˺ [ku₃-babbar]

2. ki ˹ur˺-[…]

3. nin-ki-[…]

4. du₁₁-ga-[…-ta]

5. ŠI-BU-[…šu ba-an-ti]

6. iti ezem-[^dšul-gi-ta]

7. iti ezem [še-il₂-la-še₃]

8. su-˹su˺-[dam]

9. u₄-da nu-[u₃-su]

10. ibila-˹ni˺

Reverse:

1. nam-arad₂-še₃ du-da

2. mu lugal-bi in-˹pa₃˺

3. 1(diš) ga-du

4. 1(diš) a-a-ni

5. 1(diš) ur-^dnusku

6. 1(diš) ga-a-ga-ma

7. 1(diš) du₁₀-ga-mu ma₂-gin₂

8. 1(diš) ur-^dsuen

9. 1(diš) ur-eš₃-ku₃-ga

10. 1(diš) ba-sa₆-ga

11. 1(diš) a-ḫu-a

12. lu₂-inim-ma-bi-me

13. iti ezem-^dšul-gi

Left Edge:

1. mu us₂-sa ki-maš^ki u₃ ḫu-ur₅-ti^ki ba-ḫul

Seal:

1. ur-^d[…]

2. dumu ur-[…]

Translation: 8 shekels [of silver] from Ur-[x] Ninki[…] Duga-[…] ŠI.BU-[…received]. [From] the month of the festival [of Šulgi] to the month of the festival of [the harvest] (shall be) paid [back]. Should it not be [paid back] his heir shall go into slavery. By the name of the king he swore. Gadu, A’ani, Urnusku, Ga’agama, Dugamu, the boat-builder, Ur-Suen, Ur-Eškuga, Basaga, Aḫu’a are witnesses. Month of the Festival of Šulgi. The year after Kimaš and Ḫurti were destroyed.

In this instance, failure to repay the loan resulted in the seizure of a child. The entire agreement was finalized by an oath taken in the name of the king, and witnesses were listed. Such oaths were also used as part of guaranty clauses.

One such Ur III self-sale document seems to exclude the possibility that debt was the cause behind the sale, since the agreement includes an oath in which one of the guarantors swears, “If the slave woman has claims (on her), I will become a slave woman (in her place).”

OIP 104, 193 370⁷⁰

Obverse:

1. 1(diš) sag-munus

2. en-ni-ma-mi

3. mu-ni-im

4. ku₃-babbar sa₁₀-ma-ni 2(diš) gin₂ igi-3(diš)-gal₂

5. a-na nu-˹ḫi˺-dingir

6. ga-ga-za ˹a˺-na sa₁₀ i-di₃-in

7. ša-at-ir₃-ra

8. u₃ a-ḫu-ni dumu-ni

9. mu-qi₃-bu

10. um-ma ša-at-ir₃-ra

11. ni-iš lugal it-ma

Reverse:

1. šu-ma geme₂ a-ru-gi-ma-/ni ir-da-ši-i₃

2. a-na-ku-u₃ lu geme₂

3. igi a-na-a ḫa-za-num₂

4. igi šu-^dnin-šubur

5. igi ba-luḫ-e₂-a

6. igi šu-˹li˺ -[um]

7. igi šu-^d˹nin-šubur˺ [dub]-sar

8. igi-ne-˹ne˺-še₃

9. mu lugal-bi in-pa₃

10. nu-ub-gi₄-gi₄-da

11. mu bad₃-gal nibru^ki

12. uri₃^ki-ma ba-du₃-a

Translation: One female person, Ennī-Mami is her name, the silver of her purchase price is 2 1/3 shekels of silver. To Nūḫi-ilum she sold herself. Šat-Irra and Aḫuni, her son, are the guarantors. By the life of the king Šat-Irra swore: “If the slave woman has claims (on her), I will become a slave woman (in her place).” Before Ana’a, the mayor, before Šu-Ninšubur, before Paluḫ-Ea, before Šu-lē’ûm, before Šu-Ninšubur, the scribe, before them she (Ennī-Mami) swore by the name of the king that she will not contest. The year the great walls of Nippur and Ur were built (Ibbi-Suen 6^?).

If the woman selling herself had a debt, then there would have been an obligation on her. On this basis, it may be established that the cause behind this sale was not debt but some other factor or difficulty.

Oaths, as religious actions, touch on numerous spheres of life and are well-attested throughout early Mesopotamia. For example, beyond legal transactions, oaths also added to the solemnity of pious acts, such as the oath of UruKAgina, who on the heels of this declaration of freedom vows to the god Ningirsu that the king would not “subjugate the orphan (or) widow to the powerful” (RIME 1.9.9.1 xii: 23–28).⁷¹

Beyond the conclusion of disputes and contracts, oath-taking was central to the entire judicial process. When evidence was lacking or there were conflicting accounts, the oaths were also employed to decide the case. Sometimes disputes could be settled by one party’s unwillingness to testify or by mutual agreement prior to swearing an oath.⁷² Nicholas Postgate writes:

The courts did however have more solemn forms of appeal to divine sanction, brought in where a clash of evidence or an absence of evidence made it impossible to decide on a human level. This “oath of purgation” is a feature common to most early legal systems, and involves the close interlocking of the human and divine sanction. In part, it is indeed the fear of perjury and the consequent divine vengeance that acts as a sanction, and this of course could operate quite independently of any judicial context; but in part the point is that the oath is taken, or not taken, under conditions specified by the court as part of the court proceedings—so that whether or not someone was prepared to take the oath constituted evidence on a human level.⁷³

Such oaths could be made in the name of the king, the gods, or both.

In the Ur III period, oaths were pronounced in relation to important judgments at the Dublamaḫ, which belonged to the Ekišnugal in Ur.⁷⁴ Even a favorable judgment for a person accused of robbery concluded with an oath.⁷⁵ The requirement of both parties to take oaths, as was done in the Old Akkadian, Ur III, and Old Babylonian periods, served to deter retrying cases, whereas in criminal cases the oath allowed the person, once found innocent, to absolve themselves.⁷⁶

This notion of demonstrating innocence and concluding a dispute through oath-taking is attested in the Old Babylonian text the “Laws of Ḫammurapi.” The unpermitted removal of the slave mark (abbuttum), the means by which humans were identified as slaves in the Old Babylonian period, by a barber was a punishable offence. In “Laws of Ḫammurapi” §226, the barber who removes the mark without authority to do so was to have his hand cut off.

“Laws of Ḫammurapi” §226⁷⁷

šum-ma šu.i / ba-lum be-el arad2 / ab-bu-ti arad2 la še-e-em / u₂-ga-al-li-ib / kišib.la₂ šu.i šu-a-ti / i-na-ak-ki-su₂

Translation: If a barber shaves off the slave-lock of a slave not belonging to him without the consent of the owner of the slave, they shall cut off the hand of that barber.

If, however, someone forced the barber to remove the mark against the barber’s will, the barber shall take the oath, but the individual who forced the barber to remove the mark is to be put to death (“Laws of Ḫammurapi” §227).

“Laws of Ḫammurapi” §227⁷⁸

šum-ma a-wi-lum / ˹šu.i i-da-aṣ˺-ma / ab-bu-ti / arad2 la še-e-em / ug-da-al-li-ib / a-wi-lam šu-a-ti / i-du-uk-ku-šu-ma / i-na ka₂-šu / i-ḫa-al-la-lu-šu / šu.i i-na i-du-u₂ / la u₂-gal-li-bu / i-tam-ma-ma / u₂-ta-aš-šar

Translation: If a man misinforms a barber so that he then shaves off the slave-lock of a slave not belonging to him, they shall kill that man and hang him in his own doorway. The barber shall swear, “I did not knowingly shave it off,” and he shall be released.

This attests to the use of the oath in establishing innocence and concluding a dispute.

The function of oaths in the judicial process is illustrated well by a dispute from the Old Babylonian period.

Veenhof 2003, Festschrift Wilcke (BM 96998)⁷⁹

Obverse:

1. aš-šum ^mṣu₂-˹ra˺-rum dumu ^fši-ma-at-ištar

2. a-ḫa-at la-ma-sa₃-ni lukur ^dutu dumu.munus i₃-li₂-iš-me-a-ni

3. ^mir₃-ku-bi ugula mar.tu ša erin₂ na-we-e zimbir^ki

4. ^mqur-ru-du-um ugula gidri ^mi-na-pa-le-šu ugula gidri {A}

5. ^mib-ni-^den.zu dumu e₂ dub.ba.a u₃ ši-bu-ut a-ri-šu

6. ma-ḫar ^damar.utu-mu-ba-li₂-iṭ a-bi erin₂

7. ^mdamar.utu-mu-ša-lim a-bi erin₂

8. ^mel-me-šum pisan.dub.ba

9. i₃-li₂-i-qi₂-ša-am gal.ukkin.na erin₂ ka₂ e₂.gal

10. i-na zimbir^ki-am-na-nim

11. i-nu-ma ši-ip-ra-tim ša zimbir^ki u₂-še-pi₂-/šu

12. ki-a-am iq-bu-u₂ um-ma šu-nu-ma

13. ^mšu-mu-um-li-ib-ši dumu a-na-^dutu-li-ṣi ša₃ erin₂ ša qa₂-ti-ni

14. ^mfši-ma-at-ištar a-ḫa-at la-ma-sa₃-ni

15. dumu.munus i₃-li₂-iš-me-a-ni i-ḫu-uz-ma

16. ^mṣu₂-ra-rum ma-ra-šu u₃ a-bi-su₂-<um> ma-˹ra-šu^?˺

17. ˹ša˺ erin₂ ka-aš-šu-u₂ il-qu₂-˹u₂˺

18. 2(diš) ma-ri a-na šu-mu-um-li-ib-ši dumu a-na ^dutu-li-ṣi

19. ša₃ erin₂ ša qa₂-ti-ni ni^?-mu-ur

20. i-na-an-na ^mṣu₂-ra-rum ma-ra-šu

21. ^mla-ma-sa₃-ni lukur ^dutu dumu.munus i₃-li₂-iš-me-a-ni il-qe₂-˹e-šu˺

22. ma-aḫ-ri-ša wa-ši-ib an-ni-tam iq-bu-u₂-ma

23. ^mla-ma-sa₃-ni lukur ^dutu u₃ a-ḫi-a-ia-am-ši a-ḫa-ša

24. dumu.meš i₃-li₂-iš-me-a-ni

25. a-na ma-ḫar a-wi-le-e u₂-qe₂-er-ri-bu-šu-nu-ti

26. aš-šum ṣu₂-ra-rum šu-a-ti i-ša-lu-šu-nu-ti-ma

27. ki-a-am iq-bu-u₂ um-ma šu-nu-ma

28. ^mši-ma-at-ištar a-ḫa-at-ni a-na mu-tim u₂-ul ni-id-di-in

29. a-li-ku-tam il-li-ik-ma

Bottom Edge:

30. ^mšu-mu-um-li-ib-ši dumu a-na-^dutu-˹li-ṣi˺

31. it-˹ti˺ ma-du-tim i-te-er-ru-ub-ši-˹ma˺

32. ri-ik-sa-ti-ša u₂-ul ˹iš˺-ku-˹un˺

33. ka-sa^!-sa₃ ˹u₂-ul iš˺-ku-˹un˺-[ma]

34. ter-ḫa-as-sa₃ u₂-ul ni-im-˹ḫu˺-ur

35. an-ni-tam iq-bu-u₂-ma

Reverse:

36. ši-bi ša i-na ka-si-ša uš-bu i-˹ri˺-šu-šu-nu-˹ti˺

37. u₂-ul ub-lu-nim

38. a-wi-lu-u₂ a-wa-ti-˹šu˺-nu i-mu-ru-ma

39. a-na ka₂ ^dutu a-la-kam i-na ši-pa-ri-im

40. ka-sa-a-am u₃ pa-ṭa-ra-am iq-bu-šu-nu-/ši-im

41. ki-ma a-wi-lu-u₂ iq-bu-u₂

42. šu.nir ^dutu a-lik maḫ-ra ša e₂.di.ku₅.kalam.ma

43. šu.nir ^dutu ša e₂.di.ku₅.da₂

44. i-na ka₂ ^dutu ša e₂.di.ku₅.da₂ uš-zi-zu

45. ^mir₃-ku-bi ugula mar.tu ša erin₂ na-we-e zimbir^ki

46. ^mqur-ru-du-um ugula gidri ^mi-na-pa-le-šu ugula gidri x

47. ^mib^!-ni-^den.zu dumu e₂ dub.ba.a u₃ ši-bu-ut a-ri-šu

48. a-na ši-pa-ri-im a-na sa-na-qi₂-im u₂-ul im-gu-ru

49. ^mla-ma-sa₃-ni lukur ^dutu i-na ši-˹pa˺-ri-im ki-a-am ˹iq˺-bi-i-ma

50. ^ma-bi-su₂-um u₃ ṣu₂-ra-rum a-˹na ^m˺šu-mu-um-li-ib-ši u₂-ul al-du

51. a-na-ku-ma^! u₂-ra-ab-bi-šu-nu-ti-ma an-ni-tam iq-bi

52. u₄.kur₂.še₃ ir₃-ku-bi ugula mar.tu qur-ru-du-um ugula gidri / i-na-pa-le-šu ugula gidri

53. ^mib-ni-^den.zu dumu e₂ dub.ba.a u₃ ši-bu-ut a-ri-šu aš-šum a-bi-su₂-um

54. u₃ ṣu₂-ra-rum ma-re-ša a-na la-ma-sa₃-ni lukur ^dutu u₂-ul i-ra-gu-mu

55. mu ^dutu ^damar.utu u₃ am-mi-di-ta-na lugal in.pad₃.˹de₃.eš˺

56. igi dingir-šu-a-bu-šu ugula mar.tu igi ^den.zu-a-ḫa-am/-i-din-nam ugula gidri

57. igi ^damar.utu-mu-ba-li₂-iṭ sanga ^dne₃.˹eri₁₁˺.gal

58. igi e-tel-pi₄-^dutu dumu i-ku-˹un-pi₄˺-^dutu

59. igi si-ni-i dumu sig-^da-a sanga ˹šu.nir^?˺ ^dutu e₂.di.ku₅.kalam.ma^!

60. igi ^den.zu-iš-me-a-ni dumu ^dutu.[nu]-˹ur˺.bar.ra

61. sanga ^dutu e₂.di.[ku₅].da₂

62. igi ˹i˺-din-^dbu-ne-ne igi i-˹bi-^d˺nin.šubur

63. dumu.meš e₂.˹dub.ba.a˺

64. gir₃ nu-ur₂-^diškur nimgir ^? mar.tu

Top Edge:

65. iti ab.e₃ u₄ 2(u) 6(diš).kam

66. mu ˹am-mi-di-ta-na˺ lugal.e

67. ^d˹lama ^dlama bar.su₃.ga.ke₄˺

68. ^d˹inanna nin˺.gal [kiš]˹^ki˺.a in.˹ne˺.en.ku₄.˹ra˺

(Various Seals)

Translation: Because of Ṣurārum, son of Šimat-Ištar, sister of Lamassani, the nadītum of Šamaš, daughter of Ili-išmeanni, Warad-Kubi, the general of the troops in the Sippar countryside, Qurrudum the captain, Ina-palêšu the captain, Ibni-Sîn the military scribe, and the elders of…, before Marduk-muballiṭ and Marduk-mušallim, two “fathers of the troops,” Elmešum, the šandabakkum, (and) Ili-iqīšam, the “personnel director of the palace gate,” in Sippar-Amnānum, when they had to organize the work of Sippar, made the following declaration:

“Šumum-libši, son of Ana-Šamaš-līṣi, who belonged to the troops under our command, married Šimat-Ištar, sister of Lamassani, daughter of Ili-išmeanni and Ṣurārum is his son and Abisu(m) his oldest son, whom the Kassite troops took along. We^! have observed that Šumum-libši, son of Ana-Šamaš-līṣi, who belonged to the troops under our command, had two sons. But now Lamassani, the nadītum of Šamaš, daughter of Ili-išmeanni, has taken his son Ṣurārum and lives with her.”

When they had stated this, one brought Lamassani, the nadītum of Šamaš, and her brother Aḫi-ayamši, before the gentlemen. The latter interrogated them concerning the mentioned Ṣurārum, and they made the following declaration: “We have not married off our sister Šimat-Ištar. She became a philanderer and Šumun-libši, son of Ana-Šamaš-līṣi, like the many other men used to visit her. He neither established a marriage contract for her, nor did he provide her…, nor did we receive the bridal payment for her.”

When they made this declaration, they requested from them (the plaintiffs) witnesses who had been present when he bound her by marriage, but they did not bring them. The gentlemen thereupon considered their case and ordered them to go to the Gate of Šamaš, to bind or release in the throw-net. As the gentlemen gave this order one made the emblem of Šamaš, “The Vanguard” of “The House-of-the-Judge-of-the-Land,” (and) the emblem of Šamaš of “The House-of-Judgment” take their stand in the Gate of Šamaš of the “House-of-the-Judgment.”

Warad-Kubi, the general of the troops of the Sippar countryside, the captains Qurrudum and Ina-palêšu, Ibni-Sîn, the military scribe, and the elders of…refused to approach the throw-net. But Lamassani, the nadītum of Šamaš, declared as follows in the throw-net: “Abisum and Ṣurārum were not born as sons of Šumum-libši; I am the one who has raised them.” This she declared.

(That) in the future Warad-Kubni, the general, Qurrudum and Ina-palêšu, the captains, Ibni-Sîn, the military scribe, and the elders of…will not raise claims for Abisum and Ṣurārum, her sons, against Lamassani, the nadītum of Šamaš, they have sworn with an oath by Šamaš, Marduk, and king Ammiditana.

In the presence of Ilšu-abušu, the general, of Sîn-aḫam-idinnam, the captain, of Marduk-muballiṭ, the priest of Nergal, of Etel-pî-Šamaš, the son of Ikūn-pî-Šamaš, of Sinî, son of Ipiq-Aya, priest of Šamaš of the “House-of-the-Judge-of-the-Land,” of Sîn-išmeanni, son of Šamaš-nūr-barra, priest of Šamaš of the “House-of-Judgment,” (and) of Iddin-Bunene (and) Ibbi-Ilabrat, secretaries.

Supervised by Nūr-Adad, the herald of the Amorites.

On the 26th day of month 10 of the year “King Ammiditana brought the luxuriant protective deities (which pray for his life, into her temple) to Inanna, the great lady of Kish” (year 29).

In this illustrative and clarifying text, the judicial process in relation to oaths can be accessed through a dispute over filiation and the accompanying responsibilities through familial relations. In this example, two oaths are in view: one taken as a material part of the process of gathering evidence and one that brought the dispute to its official conclusion. Further, it will be seen how Nungal, the prison goddess, is involved in the judicial process and not just connectable to it via the literary text, “Hymn to Nungal.” This, however, does not mean that the “Hymn to Nungal” reflects everyday practice in its entirety. But it does root some of the ideology in everyday practice.

In BM 96998,⁸⁰ the dispute is about whether two boys are the sons of Šumun-libši and his alleged wife Šimat-Ištar, and thus required to perform obligatory service for their father’s household, or whether they are considered belonging to and were raised by Lamassani, the sister of Šimat-Ištar, who was a nadītum of Šamaš. Despite the claims of the general, captains, military scribe, and elders, Lamassani and her brother claim that many men visited their sister and that their sister was not married to Šumun-libši. As proof, they declare they never received a bridal price. The result was that the dispute was to be settled by taking an oath in the “throw-net” and before the emblem of Šamaš, religious symbols. Lamassani willingly takes the oath, but those who were claiming that the boys owe the service required of the household of Šumun-libši were unwilling to take the oath. This meant that the case was automatically decided in favor of Lamassani, as seen in the judgment rendered. Although they did not take the oath in the “throw-net” as part of the trial, the general, captains, military scribes, and elders swore by the names of Šamaš, Marduk, and by the name of the king that they would not raise a claim in the future. This brought the matter to a conclusion. Again, two types of oaths are seen in this text. One served as evidence to strengthen a testimony; the other was used to bring the entire matter to conclusion.

The oath related to testimony was said to have taken place in the “throw-net.” This is relevant as it connects the matter to Nungal, the prison goddess. In the text MSL 11, 142 viiii 40, e₂-sa-par₂ (“house of the casting net”) is glossed as “the house of Nungal.”⁸¹ Further, the prison is described in the “Hymn to Nungal” as follows:

House, a pitfall waiting for the evil one; it makes the wicked tremble! House, a net whose fine meshes are skillfully woven, which gathers up people as its booty! House, which keeps an eye on the just and on evildoers; no one wicked can escape from its grasp (lines 5–7).

Its bolt is a horned viper, slithering in a wild place. House, surveying heaven and earth, a net spread out! No evildoer can escape its grasp, as it drags the enemy around (lines 24–26).

Her battle-net of fine mesh is indeed cast over the land for her; the evildoer who does not follow her path will not escape her arm (lines 38–39).⁸²

But this connection between oaths and Nungal is not restricted to the literary. The swearing of oaths was another “ordeal” that can also be connected to the prison goddess Nungal through other texts.⁸³ In Old Babylonian texts from Sippar, the accused and accusers swore oaths at the gate of Nungal.⁸⁴ The awe-inspiring presence of Nungal was meant to induce honesty. The fear of lying under oath in this context relates to the terror that would be felt before the metaphorical net that was cast over the prisoner.⁸⁵ It is fitting that this occurred in Sippar, where the cult to Šamaš, the solar god of justice, was situated.

The use of emblems and other implements related to deities was integral to the oath process. It seems that these emblems were brought out, likely from the cella, in order to be utilized as part of the swearing process.⁸⁶ A letter housed in the Michael C. Carlos Museum, Atlanta, mentions a case dealing with a slave girl and her mother. These females were determined by the judging officials not to be present and so unable to be brought back. The decision rendered by the Burgomaster and the City Elders results in the statement, “we decided the case and the weapon of Marduk has been placed” (x.3.210).⁸⁷ The action seems to relate to the placement of a weapon of Marduk as part of the judicial process that should satisfy the person asking to bring the slave woman and her mother. This is just one example of the use of such implements as part of the judicial process.

As such, justice was a matter of religion that ultimately fell within the purview of their earthly agent, the king. Imprisonment and the prison goddess, Nungal, belonged to the Mesopotamian system of justice, which combined testimony, witnesses, and ordeals to render judgments. The terror of approaching the king and deities such as Šamaš or Nungal was intended to reduce false testimony and discourage criminal behavior. Since the gods are supposed to find out misdeeds, and their agent, the king, was tasked with maintaining justice, the entire system utilized religious coercion to maintain order.

Of course, it must be noted that there was also a recognition that a person could simply lie while under the oath, which is why other measures such as the River Ordeal were also taken. Yet the assumption was that the gods would know if a person was not telling the truth, and the process could also involve various ritualistic ordeals. The ordeal nature of at least some oath-taking is exemplified in the Mari practice, in which herbs could be consumed as a part of the oath. If the person lied, the herbs were supposed to transform into poison.⁸⁸ While in part the awe of the king and the gods was intended to result in truthful testimony, the greater assumption was an institutional belief that the gods would know and reveal any false testimony. This revelation could be further aided with the River Ordeal.

The River Ordeal

The River Ordeal was a ritual that relied upon the gods to decide cases that could not be verified by other means. This practice is attested as early as the mid-third millennium.⁸⁹ There does not appear to have been a singular way that the ordeal was carried out, but in general the ordeal involved casting suspected individuals or those caught in a dispute into the river with the expectation that the river would indicate guilt and absolve the innocent.

In the “Laws of Ḫammurapi,” the River Ordeal was reserved for serious issues related to sorcery, adultery, and murder, while in the earlier Old Akkadian period less serious civil disputes were also decided through this means.⁹⁰ Claus Wilcke writes of the practice in the early period, “Most disputes are over fields, some over silver, barley, oxen and sheep, one is about a slave.”⁹¹ For the Old Babylonian period, the River Ordeal is connected to the prison through the “Hymn to Nungal,” but it is also related to imprisonment as part of the judicial process in documents of practice, as will be seen below.

The “Hymn to Nungal” begins by depicting the prison as a dark and sombre place. After expounding on the nature of the prison and the greatness of the prison goddess Nungal, the text describes prisoners being led naked into her presence. At the appointed time, a festival was held during which the River Ordeal was used to separate the innocent from the guilty. After the ordeal, the innocent person was released, but the guilty was returned into the prison. This was achieved by the prison’s chief prosecutor reaching out her hands and snatching the person from death. This is likely in reference to the guilty person being rescued from the river ordeal and returned to the prison.⁹²

The River Ordeal is also referenced several times in the law codes. Démare-Lafont writes:

The ordeal is documented from the third to first millennium, most frequently taking place in the deified river. The ordeal was always preceded by an oath whose veracity was tested by the oath-taker’s immersion in the river: the guilty sank, the innocent floated in the water. The law collections prescribe an ordeal in the case of suspected false accusations (Roth 1997: 18: Laws of Ur-Namma §13), of adultery (Roth 1997: 18: Laws of Ur-Namma §14; Roth 1997: 106: Laws of Hammurabi §132; Roth 1997: 160: Middle Assyrian Laws, tablet A §12), and witchcraft (Roth 1997: 81: Laws of Hammurabi §2), while evidence from Old Babylonian Mari demonstrates its use in political affairs (Durand 1988: no. 249).⁹³

Although the practice is well-attested, there remain many questions about the ordeal. J. Bottéro suggests that sinking in the river represented a negative judgment, while floating was an indication of innocence.⁹⁴ Durand, however, argues that the ordeal involved an attempt to cross the river.⁹⁵ As Charpin writes: “In Ancient Mesopotamia a divine ordeal always involved the god of the river, but exactly what happened in that test of physical strength is still a matter of discussion.”⁹⁶

The initial paragraphs of the “Laws of Ḫammurapi” relate to the judicial process and the River Ordeal.

“Laws of Ḫammurapi”⁹⁷

§1 šum-ma a-wi-lum a-wi-lam / u₂-ub-bi-ir-ma / ne-er-tam e-li-šu / id-di-ma / la uk-ti-in-šu / mu-ub-bi-ir-šu / id-da-ak

Translation: If a man accuses another man and charges him with homicide but cannot bring proof against him, his accuser shall be killed.

§2 šum-ma a-wi-lum / ki-iš-pi₂ / e-li a-wi-lim id-di-ma / la uk-ti-in-šu / ša e-li-šu / ki-iš-pu na-du-u₂ / a-na ^di₇ / i-il-la-ak / ^di₇ i-ša-al-li-a-am-ma / šum-ma ^di₇ / ik-ta-ša-su₂ / mu-ub-bi-ir-šu / e₂-su₂ i-tab-ba-al / šum-ma a-wi-lam šu-a-ti / ^di₇ / u₂-te-eb-bi-ba-aš-šu-ma / iš-ta-al-ma-am / ša e-li-šu / ki-iš-pi₂ id-du-u₂ / id-da-ak / ša ^di₇ / iš-li-a-am / e₂ mu-ub-bi-ri-šu / i-tab-ba-al

Translation: If a man charges another man with practicing witchcraft but cannot bring proof against him, he who is charged with witchcraft shall go to the divine River Ordeal, he shall indeed submit to the divine River Ordeal; if the divine River Ordeal should overwhelm him, his accuser shall take full legal possession of his estate; if the Divine River Ordeal should clear that man and he should survive, he who made the charge of witchcraft against him shall be killed; he who submitted to the divine River Ordeal shall take full legal possession of his accuser’s estate.

§3 šum-ma a-wi-lum / i-na di-nim / a-na ši-bu-ut / sa₃-ar-ra-tim / u₂-ṣi-a-am-ma / a-wa-at iq-bu-u₂ / la uk-ti-in / šum-ma di-nu-um šu-u₂ / di-in na-pi₂-iš-tim / a-wi-lum šu-u₂ / id-da-ak

Translation: If a man comes forward to give false testimony in a case but cannot bring evidence for his accusation, if that case involves a capital offense, that man shall be killed.

§4 šum-ma a-na ši-bu-ut / še u₃ ku₃-babbar / u₂-ṣi-a-am / a-ra-an / di-nim šu-a-ti / it-ta-na-aš-ši

Translation: If he comes forward to give (false) testimony for (a case whose penalty is) grain or silver, he shall be assessed the penalty for that case.

§5 šum-ma da-a-a-nu-um / di-nam i-di-in / pu-ru-sa₃-am / ip-ru-us₂ / ku-nu-uk-kam / u₂-še-zi-ib / wa-ar-ka-nu-um-ma / di-in-šu i-te-ni / da-a-a-nam šu-a-ti / i-na di-in i-di-nu / e-ne-em / u₂-ka-an-nu-šu-ma / ru-gu-um-ma-am / ša i-na di-nim šu-a-ti / ib-ba-aš-šu-u₂ / a-ra₂ 1(u) 2(diš)-šu / i-na-ad-di-in / u₃ i-na pu-uḫ₂-ri-im / i-na ^gešgu-za / da-a-a-nu-ti-šu / u₂-še-et-bu-u₂-šu-ma / u₂-ul i-ta-ar-ma / it-ti da-a-a-ni / i-na di-nim / u₂-ul uš-ša-ab

Translation: If a judge renders a judgment, gives a verdict, or deposits a sealed opinion, after which he reverses his judgment, they shall charge and convict that judge of having reversed the judgment which he rendered and he shall give twelvefold the claim of that judgment; moreover, they shall unseat him from his judgeship in the assembly, and he shall never again sit in judgement with the judges.

In §1, a person who makes an unsubstantiated claim of murder against another shall be killed. The second paragraph requires the “River Ordeal” in relation to an accusation of witchcraft. The accused is thrown into the river as part of a ceremony. If the river overtakes the individual, the accuser will possess the estate of the accused. If, however, the accused party is not overtaken, the accuser will be killed, and the accused will take possession of the accuser’s estate.

In §§3–4, the penalty for giving a false testimony is talionic. The severity of the judicial process continues in §3, where the death penalty is given for providing a false testimony in relation to a “capital crime.” False testimony for “crimes” that involve silver or grain penalties, however, are met with in kind punishment in §4. Finally, §5 penalizes a judge for reversing a judgment by requiring that he give twelvefold of the judgment rendered. Further, the judge will be unseated permanently.

In the “Laws of Ḫammurapi,” just the accused goes through the River Ordeal. However, in the late literary text, “Nebuchadnezzar King of Justice,” Column III, 21–Column IV 26, both the accused and the accuser are submitted to the ordeal, a text which in part appears to be interacting intertextually with the early laws of “Laws of Ḫammurapi.”⁹⁸

(21) A man charged (another) man with murder, but did not prove it. (22) They were brought before him and he sent them upstream from Sippar (23) to the bank of the Euphrates to the presence of Ea, king of the Apsû, (24) for a judgment by night. (25) The troops of the guard, keeping both under close surveillance, (26) kept a fire burning. When dawn shone (27) prince, regent and troops, gathering as the king had commanded, (28) stood over them. (1) Both went down to the river…[…] (2) Ea, king of the Apsû, beloved of his kingship to […] . (3) to behold justice, which, from time immemorial…[…] (4) […] had not been heard with the ears, the innocent [(…)] (5) […]…he made him jump in and safely brought him [to the bank]. (6) The one who had returned to them dived into the water and from dawn (7) to midday no one saw him, nor was [his] voice heard. (8) The troops of the guard, who had stood over them from evening to morning, (9) became worried and sought…(10) “What can we say? How can we answer…the king?” (11) The king heard and became angry with the troops of the guard. (12) A messenger went to and fro, but they did not…the man. (13) He crossed the ford of the river and moved (?) into the desert; (14) since no one had ever seen him, they could not answer. (15) The keeper(?) of the bridge and some scouts went along the river, (16) watching the banks from ford to ford. (17) When midday arrived his corpse came up from the river. (18) The head was bruised, and from the mouth, ears, and nostrils blood was flowing, (19) and the skull was hot like burning coals. (20) His body was covered with sores. (21) The peoples observed (this) and spoke in accents of fear: (22) all the lands were borne down with fear. (23) The enemy, the evil one, the foe went into hiding. (24) A second time, after a man charged (another) man…(25) he took the oath by Šamaš but despised the magic circle. (26) The god…, the great lord, who is Marduk who dwells in Esagil…⁹⁹

In this case, the unprovable accusation relates to murder. The description of the “River Ordeal” points to a brutal end for the false accuser who was found dead, bloodied, and badly burned. This was through the judgment of Ea (Sumerian Enki), the god of wisdom and purification.

Beyond literary texts and law codes, the connection between the River Ordeal and imprisonment is evident in the following letter from Mari:

ARM 26, 257¹⁰⁰

Obverse

4ʹ. [an-ni-tam ^den.zu-be-el-ap]-lim iq-bi-ma ki-a-am a-pu-ul-šu

5ʹ. [um-ma a-na-ku-ma a]-wa-tum ša iq-bu ra-be₂-et

6ʹ. [a-na šu-ug-ri]-˹im˺ u₂-ul na-ṭa₃-at ša la ba-la-ṭi₃-šu

7ʹ. [ši]-˹i˺ an-ni-tam aq-bi-šum-ma u₂-ul im-gu-ra-an-ni

8ʹ. il-qi₂-ma lu₂.tur ša-a-tu a-na e₂ ne-pa-ri-im uš-te-ri-ib

9ʹ. i-na ša-ni-im ^den.zu-be-el-ap-lim ki-a-am iq-bi

10ʹ. um-ma-a-mi li-il-li-ku lu₂.meš ḫa-na-yu

Bottom Edge:

11ʹ. ša lu₂.tur iṣ-ba-tu ^di₇ li-iš-lu-˹u₂^?˺

Reverse:

[…]

12ʹ. ˹šum˺-ma iš-li-mu ^gišsi₂-ik-ka-tam ip-pi₂-i lu₂.tur [ša-a-tu]

13ʹ. li-im-ḫa-ṣu₂ u₂-la-šu-ma li-il-li-ik lu₂.[tur] ˹šu˺-u₂

14ʹ. ^di₇ li-iš-li-ma a-na ṣi₂-it pi₂-˹šu˺ [^d]i₇ li-iṣ-ba-su₂

15ʹ. [an-ni-tam ^den.zu-be]-˹el˺-ap-lim iq-be₂-em-ma [ki]-a-am a-pu-ul-šu

16ʹ. [um-ma a-na-ku-ma] an-nu-tum ṣa-bi-tu-ut lu₂.tur ša-a-tu

17ʹ. [la-a i-ša-lu]-˹u₂˺ u₃ i-na-an-na u₃^? i-na ka₂ e₂<-kal₂>-lim

18ʹ. […]-be₂-ra it-ti ṣa-ab ia-ku-un-RU

19ʹ. […] 1 ninda la ub-ba-lu ^di₇ i-ša-lu-u₂

20ʹ. […be-li₂]-˹ia˺ an-ne₂-ki-a-am e-li ^di₇ da-an-nu

21ʹ. […li]-˹il˺-li-ku lu₂.meš šu-nu ma-ḫa-ar

22ʹ. […] e-pe₂-ra-am i-na qa-qa-di-šu li-ip-pu-uṣx-ma

23ʹ. […an-ni-tam] ˹aq˺-bi-šum-ma u₂-ul im-gu-ra-an-ni

24ʹ. [u₃ lu₂.tur šu-u₂ a-na e₂ ne]-pa-ri-im šu-ru-ub

25ʹ. […] x x x x

Translation: This is what Sîn-bēl-aplim (Babylonian official) said. I answered him as follows: “The matter discussed is serious; it is not suitable for ignoring^?. It has to do with his death.” This is what I told him, but he did not agree with me. He took this boy and had him placed in jail. The next day, Sîn-bēl-aplim said this, “The nomads who captured this boy should go and plunge in the River (god). If they come out safely, they should drive a peg into the boy’s mouth.¹⁰¹ Or, the boy should plunge into the River and let the River seize him in accord with the pledge he makes (lit. “what comes out of his mouth”).”

This is what Sîn-bēl-aplim told me, but I answered him, “These men, having seized this boy, (must not plunge)…but now, at the gate of the palace…along with the troops of Yakun-(A)ru…not worth a piece of bread. They will plunge…in this way, they are prevailing^? over River…they should go and before these men…he should smash dirt over his head…” This is what I told him, but he did not agree with me…The boy has been placed in jail.

The river ordeal was not just used in relation to “crime” and could be used as to settle disputes in Mari. Jack M. Sasson writes:

When suzerains fail to settle disputes among vassals by arbitration, they called on the gods to adjudicate. The dossier on ordeals of territorial disputes is large, with Mari (through its diplomats) often playing the role of arbitrator, hence the reports. It is important to note that, even when the disputants had access to nearby rivers, the ordeals took place in Hit, a town often referenced after the River god as ^díd^ki = Nārum (with inconsistent applications of the ideograms).¹⁰²

By revealing the will of the gods, the River Ordeal was intended to determine guilt and innocence. The process was part of a public ritual that displayed before the people the dangers of illicit behavior, providing another religious dimension to the judicial system.

Further, the River Ordeal was conceptually tied to birth in the womb in later texts. The womb was a prison or ordeal of sorts, and the baby must pass through the birth canal to life. Even the womb was described as having doorbolts and locks.¹⁰³ For example, Marduk is said to release mercifully the baby from the womb and the innocent prisoner.¹⁰⁴ In this way, watery ordeals were also associated with prisons. But in the text dealing with Adapa and Marduk, there was a plea for Marduk to be merciful, forgiving the “crimes” and canceling curses. Marduk was extolled as:

You take the hand of the one who cannot rise (to the surface) during a river-ordeal. The one who is cast into the bed of Namtar (= death), you rise up. […] who was cast into his prison, you show him the light (lines 97–99).¹⁰⁵

Amar Annus writes of ordeals and floods: “The rich imagery discussed above indicates that the deluge and ordeal were two interchangeable symbols for the liminality that was encountered in dangerous periods of human life when birth and death were at stake. Such matters were the particular area of exorcist’s expertise in Mesopotamia.”¹⁰⁶ These intersecting concepts relating to ordeals, the prison, and judicial procedure, tie together with notions of purification, rebirth, and the prison in Chapter 6.

Imprisonment of the Guilty

Once guilt was determined, the guilty person was seized but likely only until the judgment could be carried out.¹⁰⁷ Imprisonment after the trial was mostly, if not exclusively, used until retributive justice was carried out or until restitution. The latter of which is seen in examples of imprisonment related to debt.

This is in stark contrast to the “Hymn to Nungal,” in which the guilty person is brought back into the prison, where through suffering and lament, the person is refined and then released, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. It is possible that there is an element of punishment attached to this literary vision of imprisonment, but again that is not the focus of the text. Rather, it is the ritualistic transformation of the person, which is the primary focus of the text.

Conclusion

Justice and religion were inextricably linked in ancient Mesopotamia, and the prison together with the prison goddess, Nungal, played important roles in the judicial process. In early Mesopotamia, there appears to have been emphasis placed on the religious aspects of the judicial process through oaths and ordeals. The religious elements of the judicial system can be seen further in the function of emblems of deities, temples, and even the gate of Nungal for securing reliable testimony and bringing disputes and criminal cases to conclusion.

Multifunctional and multicontextual detention appears to be related to all phases of the judicial process. Imprisonment was used to detain the accused as part of the investigative process. During this time, prisoners could be interrogated but also officials could compile evidence. Oaths and ordeals also attest to the relationship between justice, imprisonment, and Nungal, herself. After establishing guilt, the person could be imprisoned and held until a punishment or restitution was made, depending on the nature of the offense. While the religious function of imprisonment in relation to justice can be seen further in Chapter 6, it is useful to consider what it was like to be imprisoned in ancient Mesopotamia.

Prisons in Ancient Mesopotamia: Confinement and Control until the First Fall of Babylon. J. Nicholas Reid, Oxford University Press. © J. Nicholas Reid 2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192849618.003.0005

¹ Charpin 2015: 173.

² See “Laws of Ešnunna” § 48: awāt napištim ana šarrimma “a capital case is only for the king”; after Roth 1997: 66; Westbrook 2003b: 366. Westbrook points out that adultery also normally falls under the king’s jurisdiction. See discussion below on Judicial Process for other examples pointing to capital cases falling under the purview of the king as judge.

³ Charpin 2012: 147.

⁴ See Steinkeller 1985: 39–46; Molina 2019: 701.

⁵ See full edition and discussion in Molina 2019: 697–703, 707.

⁶ This is explored more fully in this chapter, but also in Chapter 6.

⁷ Durand LAPO 18, 984 = Sasson 2015: 280 5.7.b.iii. Cited after Démare-Lafont 2011: 338. See Durand 1993: 41–61.

⁸ Démare-Lafont 2011: 338. See edition of referenced text in B. Lafont 1984: 7–18.

⁹ See Kraus 1984: 280–84. On andurārum, see Chapter 3, n. 53 and Charpin (1990a). Viewing the edicts as returning people to their original status explains the exclusion of houseborn slaves. Their original status as slaves prevents them from partaking more fully in such releases. On the status of the wilid bītim, see Reid 2017a. On the interface between the laws and the edicts, see Veenhof 1997–2000: 49–83, who argues that the laws were verdicts that related to the ideology of the justice of the king whereas the edicts were more concrete examples of that justice. The situation related to the edicts is more easily assessed. See Charpin 1990a and Charpin 2010b: 83–96.

¹⁰ See Kraus 1984: 180–82.

¹¹ Kraus 1984: 280–84. See also Hallo 1995: 88–89. For earlier evidence related to houseborn slaves, see the ama-tu of the Early Dynastic sources. In particular, note Bartash 2014 on ama-tu denoted as e₂-mi₂-tud-a “born in the female part of the house,” which supports this idea that they were household slaves.

¹² Cited after Reid and Wagensonner forthcoming.

¹³ Owen 2013: 123–125.

¹⁴ Cited after George 2018: 57–58.

¹⁵ After Black, Cunningham, Robson, and Zólyomi 2004: 341.

¹⁶ Steinkeller observes that Puzur-Ḫarim likely made a claim against these five men, which resulted in them being detained while awaiting trial (Steinkeller 1991: 229). See copy by Thureau-Dangin (1910). Steinkeller (1991: 229) provides a transliteration and translation with fuller comments.

¹⁷ See discussion of this text in Chapter 3, Reasons for Imprisonment.

¹⁸ Klaus Wagensonner and I are preparing a full edition of this and another text, BM 103129 cited above, in connection with our project to publish an archive of Old Babylonian letters from Kish. Most of these texts are housed in the British Museum, though we are recreating an archive virtually that will include texts from a variety of collections.

¹⁹ For a first millennium text that references such confinement, see YOS 3, 96 (Clay 1919: Plate 37) in Kleber and Frahm 2006: 116 n. 29.

²⁰ Molina 2019: 700–701.

²¹ Van Soldt 1990: 52–55.

²² Molina 2019: 701.

²³ See section below on oaths.

²⁴ See discussion in Charpin 2012: 146–48.

²⁵ See Steinkeller 1989: 302–3; Démare-Lafont 2011: 337.

²⁶ Démare-Lafont 2011: 342–43.

²⁷ Démare-Lafont 2011: 340–41.

²⁸ Démare-Lafont 1997: 109–19 (110). See also Snell 2001: 57 n. 49.

²⁹ Literally, “in his nose.” See discussion in Démare-Lafont 1997: 111 n. b, how Démare-Lafont points to Durand’s suggestion that the term should be understood as anger based on similar usage in biblical terminology. See אף in Koehler and Baumgartner 2002.

³⁰ Charpin 2012: 149. See too Westbrook 2003b: 366–367.

³¹ Molina 2019: 700–701.

³² Démare-Lafont 2011: 347–48.

³³ See discussion of life on the inside in Chapter 5. See Démare-Lafont on the increase in forms of inquisition used during the first millennium (Démare-Lafont 2011: 350).

³⁴ See Charpin 2012: 146–47. For the Ur III period, see Molina 2019.

³⁵ See Wells, Magdalene, and Wunsch 2010: 13–29. See further Démare-Lafont 2011: 348–50.

³⁶ Démare-Lafont 2011: 345.

³⁷ Charpin 2012: 147.

³⁸ Lafont and Wesbrook 2003: 193.

³⁹ Démare-Lafont 2011: 350–51.

⁴⁰ Démare-Lafont 2011: 352.

⁴¹ See discussion in Reid 2016: 96–100.

⁴² Stadhouders and Panayotov 2018: 636 n. 15.

⁴³ See in particular the discussion of surveillance in Foucault 1995: 195–228. The modern nation-state, as discussed by Spierenburg, focused less on crime prevention through public displays, preferring the idea of the certainty of getting caught as the key motivator for crime prevention (Spierenburg 1984: 204–5).

⁴⁴ This descriptive account will be discussed more fully in Chapter 5 when life under guard is considered.

⁴⁵ Hallo 1979: 161–65. See also Civil 2003: 84–85.

⁴⁶ On this proverb and its interpretation, see Alster 1997: 147; Hallo 1979: 161–65; and Civil 2003: 84–85. See also, Stadhouders and Panayotov who render the lines as follows: “The é.gal is a thicket, the king a lion: Ninegal (var. Nungal) is a net large enough to enmesh many men at a time” (Stadhouders and Panayotov 2018: 636 n. 15).

⁴⁷ For “Bilgameš and Ḫuwawa A,” see Edzard 1990: 165–203; 1991: 165–233. On the Sumerian name, Bilgameš, see George 2003: 71–90.

⁴⁸ Civil 2003: 85.

⁴⁹ Cited after Stadhouders and Panayotov 2018: 632–33.

⁵⁰ Similar ideas to the prison are also present, as noted by the editors of the text. Stadhouders and Panayotov 2018: 636 n. 15.

⁵¹ Charpin 2010b: 83.

⁵² Al-Rawi and George 2014: 69–90.

⁵³ Translation Al-Rawi and George 2014: 77.

⁵⁴ See Reid and Wagensonner forthcoming.

⁵⁵ Wells, Magdalene, and Wunsch 2010: 13–14.

⁵⁶ Wells, Magdalene, and Wunsch 2010: 16–20.

⁵⁷ Wells, Magdalene, and Wunsch 2010: 16.

⁵⁸ Wells, Magdalene, and Wunsch 2010: 14–15 and Démare-Lafont 2011: 350–51.

⁵⁹ Wells, Magdalene, and Wunsch 2010: 17.

⁶⁰ See Lafont 2001: 54–55. Charpin 2010a: 165–166.

⁶¹ See discussion of this “transformation of treaties from protocols of oaths to true contracts” in Charpin 2010a: 166–68.

⁶² Westbrook 2003a: 66.

⁶³ See discussion of such punishments for Old Babylonian Mari in Charpin 2015: 173–92.

⁶⁴ Model contracts, which belonged to final stages of elementary scribal training, often include oaths by the royal name, though some include gods too. See discussion in Spada 2014: §§2.2.3.

⁶⁵ See van Koppen 2004: 10–11 for a summary.

⁶⁶ Pinches 1899.

⁶⁷ On this term, see Stol 1993: 134–35 and CAD T: 305.

⁶⁸ See Molina 2010 and Sallaberger 2008.

⁶⁹ Çig, Kizilyay, and Falkenstein 1959: 83–85. See too Reid 2016: 89 n. 28. (Girsu; Šulgi Year 47, Month 7; Ist L 11053).

⁷⁰ Steinkeller 1989: 326–27 (Sale Documents text 127).

⁷¹ See Frayne 1998: 264–65.

⁷² Démare-Lafont 2011: 350–51.

⁷³ Postgate 1992: 280.

⁷⁴ See Molina 2019: 701; Steinkeller 1985: 39 no. 1; Polonsky 2002: 822ff.

⁷⁵ Molina 2019: 701.

⁷⁶ Démare-Lafont 2011: 351.

⁷⁷ After Roth 1997: 124.

⁷⁸ After Roth 1997: 124.

⁷⁹ Veenhof 2003.

⁸⁰ Veenhof 2003, Festschrift Wilcke (BM 96998).

⁸¹ MSL 11, 142 viii 40 (Landsberger, Civil, and Reiner 1974). The Sumerian term sa-par is loaned into Akkadian as saparru. See CAD S.

⁸² After Black, Cunningham, Robson, and Zólyomi 2004: 339–340.

⁸³ See Veenhof 2003: 325. Charpin uses the presence of lamentation in the “Hymn to Nungal,” and the stationing of lamenters at Sippar to demonstrate the connection between Sippar, Šamaš, and the “gate of Nungal.” Charpin writes, “Cette association est confirmée par le contrat HG 96. Il enregistre la transmission par un père à son fils de << 5 12 jours d’une prébende de lamentateur (isiq kalûtim) du temple de Šamaš de la porte de Manungal, du temple d’Ištar et des autres de Sippar-Yahrurum>>.” Charpin 2017: 82. For an edition of HG 96, see Charpin 1988: 13–32.

⁸⁴ See discussion in Veenhof 2003: 325. See also, Cavigneaux and Krebernik 1998: 618.

⁸⁵ Veenhof 2003: 325. Charpin has recently proposed that the gate of Nungal can be associated with the temple of Šamaš, who is the god of justice (Charpin 2017: 81–83). On this subject, see too Veenhof 2003: 325–8.

⁸⁶ Veenhof 2003: 325–6. On the judicial process, see Dombradi 2004.

⁸⁷ Reid forthcoming.

⁸⁸ Charpin 1996; see too Démare-Lafont 2011: 351. See related discussion of the River Ordeal in Töyräänvuori 2018: 183–222.

⁸⁹ Wilcke 2007a: 168–69. On the river ordeal, see Frymer-Kensky 1977a: 85–87; Gurney 1983: 10–12; Annus 2016: 49–51.

⁹⁰ See discussion in Postgate 1992: 280–81.

⁹¹ Wilcke 2007a: 46.

⁹² Ambos 2013: 107.

⁹³ Démare-Lafont 2011: 351.

⁹⁴ Bottéro 1981: 1005–67.

⁹⁵ See discussion entitled “L’ordalie” in Durand (1988: 518–21).

⁹⁶ Chaprin 2012: 149.

⁹⁷ Roth 1997: 81–82.

⁹⁸ Paul-Alain Beaulieu gave a fascinating talk on the relationship between these two texts at ISAW, NYU in 2015.

⁹⁹ Cited after Lambert 1965: 1–11.

¹⁰⁰ Durand 1988. Translation after Sasson 2015: 228.

¹⁰¹ On the term “drive a peg into his mouth,” see Charpin 2015: 180.

¹⁰² Sasson 2015: 289–90. On Hit in relation to the Ordeal, note Heimpel 2009b: 59–60.

¹⁰³ See discussion in Annus 2016: 52, 58.

¹⁰⁴ See discussion in Annus 2016: 50–51.

¹⁰⁵ Cited after Oshima 2011: 231, 247. See discussion in Annus 2016: 50.

¹⁰⁶ Annus 2016: 55.

¹⁰⁷ In BM 110306, the text mentions an arrest after a court case (Molina 2019: 698–703).