Chapter 9
The Roman Senate may have dictated the terms of the Treaty of Apameia, and Cn. Manlius Vulso may have arranged the peace treaty between King Eumenes and the Galatian states, but the Roman enforcers had then gone back to Italy and their triumphs. The Asia Minor states were left to themselves to settle down in the new conditions and exploit them. Most states were unhappy about the situation and within a few years they were busy going to war or intriguing to rearrange matters. It was the same reaction as in Greece a little earlier: the Romans having left the local states and removed themselves took it for granted that the others would stay away – as Antiochos had failed to do, to his later regret. In Greece the Romans quickly returned; in Asia, further away and without any power of any real consequence, it was local states who set about rearranging matters; the Roman reply was merely the occasional visit of a senatorial delegation, often ineffectively attempting to exercise some control.
The separate agreement between Eumenes and the Galatians did not involve the Galatian state in more than observing peace with the king. No territory was taken from the Galatians, though Eumenes received the reversion of Antiochos’ lost Asia Minor lands, defined as Hellespontine Phrygia (the area through which Attalos I and the Aigosages had campaigned thirty years before), Greater Phrygia and Phrygia Epiktetos, which were Galatia’s neighbours to the west, various territories to the south of Phrygia, and Lykaonia, south of Galatia.1 This took the Pergamene boundary once again to the Taurus Mountains and along the southern border of Kappadokia, and it made Eumenes’ kingdom the western and southern neighbour of the Galatian states, a reversion to the extended kingdom briefly gained by Attalos I in the 220s. To the east and south of Galatia there was Kappadokia, whose King Ariarathes had paid talents to the Romans in the peace treaty, but by marrying his sister to King Eumenes he had possibly transformed their enmity into friendship, though a marriage ‘alliance’ was a poor basis for political decisions. To the north of Galatia there was Paphlagonia, whose King Morzeos of Gangra was a Galatian friend, and Pontos, along the Black Sea coast, an energetic power for the moment.
The peace agreed between Eumenes and the Galatian states at the behest of Manlius Vulso is nowhere detailed, other than in a very brief summary.2 It must be assumed that an agreement was reached, but Vulso did not wait to enforce its terms or oversee it, being in a hurry to reach Italy, and it is unclear if Rome was a party to the treaty. Since the Asian states went to war with each other only two years later, it seems reasonable to suppose that the terms as agreed formed little more than a truce, neither being at all satisfied with them. The terms imposed on other states in Asia in the Apameia treaty were also a source of annoyance to them and their neighbours, and Bithynia, the Galatians, and Pontos were all uneasy at the growth of Pergamene power, as were its weaker neighbours, and Rhodes. No doubt this was, in part, the Roman intention.
The repercussions of military defeat in the Galatian states were severe, over and beyond the casualties suffered and the prisoners taken away. The practice of the tribal authorities of carrying their treasure with them on the campaign had resulted in much of it being seized by the Romans, either looted by the Romans or confiscated by Vulso. In addition, it may be assumed that looting and destruction had taken place everywhere within reach of the Roman army during its advance, certainly in Gordion. Vulso had succeeded in keeping control of most of his troops on the early part of the approach march, largely because he was able to extract fines and tribute and subsidies (‘bribes’) from a succession of cities, out of which he could buy supplies and pay the soldiers’ wages, but in Galatian territory he could loose his soldiers to go off to fend and forage for themselves. The army camped at Gordion, whence the inhabitants had fled before their arrival. The town had been the major market centre, and it had been left stocked with goods:3 no doubt these had all been stolen, consumed, or destroyed by the time the Roman army moved out. Archaeological investigation suggests that the town suffered destruction as well as a sack.
The confiscation and seizure of the public treasures drastically reduced the resources of the Galatian states, but also reduced the authority of the tribal chieftains. It is probable that their authority in part depended on their ancestry, and on their native ability, but in order to gather a loyal following, it would be necessary for each chieftain to be generous with supplies and gifts. Only if by doing so he could hold on to his clients.4 In social terms one may see, on the social summit, a small group of aristocrats, the ‘chiefs’, together with a wider set of their clients; these will have formed the landowners, and will have composed the cavalry in wartime; this force numbered 10,000 at Mount Magaba. The rest of the population were the peasantry, paying taxes in kind and accepting protection and receiving justice in exchange. These will have been the infantry at the battles, where they were clearly untrained, probably badly armed, if at all, and were all too willing to leave the battle line at the earliest opportunity. These were the main casualties, who were killed in the Roman pursuits, or captured to be sold as slaves. The wealthier men could probably ransom themselves. The loss of the public treasure and the extensive looting of private possessions after the lost battles therefore drastically impoverished both the tribal authorities and the individual lords, and this will have reduced their political authority as well. It amounted to the partial and temporary destruction of the political system as it had existed since the Galatian settlement in the 270s. Galatian society entered into a prolonged period of crisis from which it emerged much changed.
The first political result was the emergence of a single man of power. A shattering defeat is exactly the sort of occasion when this could take place, as the defeated rallied round a man of authority. The man was Ortiagon, who had been the leader of the Tolistobogii in the battle at Mount Olympos, a man already widely admired, and acknowledged as a notable warrior. Eposognatos may have aspired to the same position in the same tribe, but his pro-Roman policy had been unacceptable to other lords; after the defeats, this would be still less acceptable. Polybios provides a favourable portrait of Ortiagon (and another of his formidable wife), but this is only a partial view, from the point of view of a civilized and intelligent Greek. Within Galatia his achievement was to rally the remaining men of authority, presumably to exercise a powerful influence, and to implement some sort of coherent and no doubt careful foreign policy.5
The events of the Roman invasion and the defeats cast light on the Galatians’ political system. The three states which had operated independently since the time of their settlement had, of course, also been linked by their common origins, and by the existence of the Council, which had some limited authority over all three. In the course of the Roman attack it was clear to all that, no matter how independent they had been, and had acted, the Romans and perhaps the Attalids and the Seleukids saw them simply as ‘Galatians’. Vulso attacked them all, paying no heed to the separate states as political entities, and all had suffered indiscriminately from Roman savagery. The reduction in wealth and in the numbers of the male population was drastic; the military performance had been lamentable, even ludicrous. The loss of prestige of the aristocracy would take years to recover.
The emergence of Ortiagon as a single dominating man with some sort of state-wide authority apparently covering all three states implies the collapse of the existing governmental systems. There had been no place for single authority figures since the leaders of the original tribes in their crossing from Europe. The impact of war and the military defeats had in effect also nullified whatever treaty had been agreed by the Galatian lords with Eumenes before the crisis. This may explain the vague nature of the agreement, and the evident difficulty Vulso and Eumenes had in producing it – for who on the Galatian side could make an agreement which would stick? It is quite possible that Ortiagon had, perhaps ostentatiously, avoided participation in the peace process, such as it was; ratification, presumably something which should have been done by the several states individually, probably never took place in any meaningful way. Ortiagon’s emergence as a leader and a rallying figure after the defeat and the humiliating peace, presupposes a loss of authority by the states. The casualties in the battles will have fallen heaviest on the aristocracy, whose task it was to stand in the front of the battle line; it is quite likely that many tetrarchs and chiefs had died, and governmental confusion will have followed.
The most aggrieved of the Pergamene enemies was King Prusias of Bithynia. He had been stripped of some Phrygian territory for Eumenes’ benefit, but had failed to hand over all of it. Eumenes set about a campaign which was ostensibly designed to take over the disputed land, but his preparations and activities were so elaborate that rather more than a mere occupation of disputed territory was probably intended. He mobilized both his fleet and his army, took the fleet himself through into the Propontis, and his brother Attalos meanwhile took the army to take over the disputed land. Prusias had made himself disliked already by seizing the small cities of Kieros and Teion on the Black Sea coast from Herakleia Pontike, but Herakleia was itself unpopular for its general aggressiveness. In the face of Pergamon’s attack, Prusias was able to gather support from his brother-in-law Philip V of Macedon (who himself was busy in a revisionist campaign in Thessaly) and from Ortiagon in Galatia. But the allies lost.6 An inscription from Pergamon recorded Eumenes’ military success, particularly a victory by Attalos at Mount Lypedron in Phrygia, and another, from Telmessos in the south, lists Pergamon’s enemies as Prusias and Ortiagon, and adds ‘and their allies’, which means that several other rulers or cities – not necessarily large – were involved in the anti-Attalid coalition.7
Ortiagon therefore was able to bring a Galatian contingent into the war, one which was sufficiently large to allow him to be counted as an independent ally of Prusias, though he also shared in the general defeat, and the Telmessos inscription refers to his death. He is described by Polybios as being ambitious to rule all Galatia. This may well have been his ambition, but realizing it would be difficult. He had emerged as a war commander of the Tektosages in 189, and so had participated in their defeat by the Romans. He was prominent in the next years, and commanded the ‘Galatian’ contingents in the war with Eumenes. Once again the references are to ‘Galatians’; it is evident that the internal arrangements in Galatia were either unknown to the rest of Asia Minor or something regarded as not worth knowing. We are not entitled to assume that Ortiagon was more than a war commander both against the Romans and against Eumenes. On the other hand, he was clearly a very prominent figure, and he may well have had ambitions. But the second defeat cannot have increased his support or prestige. His death followed and this ended his intentions; he had no political successor. His son was prominent later.
In 183 the new king of Pontos, Pharnakes I, seized control of the city of Sinope.8 This was annoying, but it provoked no decisive response for the moment. Pharnakes apparently took this absence of a reaction as an encouragement for his wider ambitions. He made contact with at least two Galatian chieftains, Kassignatos and Gaizatorix.9 The latter was of the Tektosages, though Kassignatos’ tribe is not known; it is clear, however, that they could act on their own authority and without restraint by any higher authority. Kassignatos for one had a fairly lengthy career of command. Gaizatorix may have ruled a small region of Paphlagonia, perhaps an indication of the elasticity of Galatia’s borders, or perhaps of the expansionism of these lords.10 But the main point is that they could act independently, and were able to bring some military support to an alliance.
A dispute between Kings Pharnakes and Eumenes then boiled up into open war when Pharnakes sent one of his commanders into Galatia, ravaging the land. The Pergamene army marched against the Pontian, as far as the Halys River; this brought Kassignatos and Gaizatorix to offer to change sides, an offer which was rejected.11 The war ended with Pharnakes’ defeat, and one item in the peace treaty was that he cease intriguing in Galatia, which was thus clearly under Pergamene protection. The rejection of help from the two Galatian chiefs was also a rejection of Galatian independence; Eumenes had no wish to be beholden to any of those under his ‘protection’.
The weakness and divisions of the Galatians are obvious from these events. Their central position in Asia Minor, however, made the country important, hence it was the prize for which Pharnakes and Eumenes were fighting. And yet no Galatian was involved in the discussion of the peace terms, nor probably in any preliminary discussions. Eumenes forced Pharnakes to retire, and extracted from him a substantial indemnity as compensation for costs and damages – but none of this, it seems, went to Galatia, which had probably suffered most from the fighting. Hostages and prisoners – who may well have been in part Galatian – were to be restored. The effect was to make all Galatia into an Attalid protectorate.
This was the nadir of Galatian fortune and power. Devastated by the Romans and by Pharnakes’ invasion, chieftains such as Kassignatos and Gaizatorix, were divided and probably discredited after their conduct, and, an attempt at a near-kingship, or perhaps a tyranny, by Ortiagon having failed, the occupation and protection by an ancient enemy had brought the country to its lowest condition so far.
Eumenes used his domination of Galatia in part to recruit soldiers from the Galatian warrior class, which was always a useful way to defuse political opposition, though he probably did not do so until he was once again at war, and so needed the extra troops. His choice was always cavalry, that is, men from the Galatian aristocracy, the leaders of the society. He became involved in the third war of Rome against Macedon (171–167), and took part of his army to Europe. At one point he had a regiment of 1000 Galatian horse with him, commanded by Kassignatos,12 while others were on board Attalid ships in the naval defeat of Chios.13 One reason for recruiting such troops must have been to remove them from Galatia, since by the time of the war it must have been clear to Eumenes that the Pergamene domination was proving increasingly irksome to the Galatians. Sure enough, in 168, while Eumenes was in Thessaly supporting the Roman forces against Perseus of Macedon, a major rebellion against Pergamene authority began in Galatia. This compelled Eumenes to return home from the war in Greece, taking his Galatian cavalry with him, despite being requested to leave it in Europe to serve with the Roman forces – which was a considerable compliment to its quality.14
Eumenes appealed more than once to Rome for help in facing this Galatian uprising, a welcome indication of its seriousness and of the revived Galatian strength. Eumenes was defeated in one encounter and had to retreat, carried in a litter because he was ill. It would seem that he had been over-confident, a mistake he did not repeat, and on this occasion he escaped his pursuers by a simple ruse.15 He sent his brother Attalos to Rome first, and later he went himself, but, in a notorious display of Roman ingratitude and political embarrassment, he was turned away by an invented law which was supposed to prevent Rome from accepting visits by any kings. The Senate did send a legate, P. Licinius, supposedly to mediate (which was hardly what Eumenes wanted) but he was less than successful in his negotiations with the Galatian commander Solovettios. As a result the Galatians, having thus defied Roman authority, were certainly encouraged still more in their defiance of Eumenes.16
Both sides retired to their homelands for the winter of 167/166. Eumenes was still ill, not for the first time in the midst of a war, but he organized a new muster of his own forces now that it had become clear that no help was to be had from Rome. He recruited extra mercenaries, possibly also receiving help from Ariarathes of Kappadokia, who may well have felt he was menaced by an independent Galatia, and from the Seleukid king Antiochos IV, whose reign marked a brief moment of Seleukid-Attalid friendship.17 It is not known what became of the cavalry force he brought back from Europe.
In the spring of 166 the Galatian forces again moved out of their territory into Attalid Phrygia, camping at Synnada, where Licinius had met them the year before. Eumenes brought his army from Sardis, where it had mustered, to Apameia Kelainai. All this rather suggests that the Galatians, essentially on the offensive in the face of Eumenes’ greater strength and potential, were aiming to campaign into the southern part of the Pergamene territories, possibly hoping for local support in some of the lands which had been transferred to Eumenes in the Apameia treaty. Eumenes advanced his army, however, and met and defeated the Galatians not far from Synnada.18
It is evident in all this that the Galatians had made a considerable recovery from their distraught condition in 179, when the whole territory was down and out. They had been able to muster a big enough army to face and defeat the Pergamene army at least once, and Eumenes’ victory in the final battle was not decisive. He had been compelled to recruit a large mercenary force to achieve that victory, at great expense, and the Galatians had apparently succeeded in taking the fighting into Eumenes’ territory. When the Roman Senate finally laid down the terms of peace, they did so by, in effect, repeating the terms of Manlius Vulso’s treaty of 188, which declared that the Galatians should be autonomous, that Eumenes should not interfere in its affairs (a repeat of the condition Eumenes had imposed upon Pharnakes), and the Galatians should not raid beyond their borders.19
The Galatians were able to send an embassy to Rome during 166 to lay their complaints before the Senate, whose reply was simply to repeat the terms of peace. One wonders if this embassy had been one of the suggestions made to Solovettios by Licinius in their meeting – a meeting for which no first-hand evidence was available from either Livy or Polybios. Until then, of course, the Attalid version of affairs, despite the prohibition of Eumenes visiting Rome, had been the only one being presented to the Senate, and it was always Attalid practice to distort and propagandize. So being able to speak up for the Galatians and so achieve a public recognition of their autonomy by the Senate was worth an embassy. The absence of any serious reference to it in the major historians is perhaps a reflection of their heavy, and perhaps unhealthy, dependence on Attalid sources for Asian affairs.
Eumenes celebrated the battle as a victory and broadcast this interpretation throughout Asia and beyond. It was celebrated by his Greek audience and by his government. The range of relieved communities stretched from the Ionian league on the Aegean coast to the community of Amlada near the Taurus, which may be attributed to scare stories put out by the Attalids in their chosen role as defenders of Hellenic civilization.20 This is, however, not necessarily to accept Eumenes’ claim that it was an important victory, or that these relieved places were damaged or even threatened in the war, and all of them seem in some way dependent upon the Attalids.21 The Roman embassy and the Senate’s decision were not in fact an end to the war, and the celebrations in the Greek cities were perhaps as much due to the diversion of the Galatian invasion away from them as it was for the result of Eumenes’ battle. If the Galatians were able to send an embassy to Rome in 166 or 165 they were still in a condition of effective independence and military defiance. Eumenes failed to restore his earlier domination of Galatia – that is, the Galatians by their combination of military aggressiveness and diplomacy, succeeded to some extent in their rebellion, though the defeat allowed Eumenes to continue his occupation and ‘protection’ of Galatia. Resentment at this also continued.
There was a story that the Galatians’ general – presumably Solovettios – after a victory murdered his prisoners, sacrificing some and massacring the rest.22 How correct and accurate this account was cannot be known. On the one hand, human sacrifice does appear to have taken place, according to evidence found at Gordion; on the other, it is quite possible that it was an invention or perhaps an exaggeration, an example of Attalid propaganda designed to influence both the Greek cities who were supposedly protected by Eumenes and his victory, or the Romans, with their ancient and continuing fear of Gauls of all sorts. Roman conduct in Greece in the Macedonian War (and their treatment of Perseus as a prisoner) was just as bad as anything the Galatians might have done, with the result that such stories probably lost much of their shock effect. It is related only in Diodoros, two centuries later, and may have not actually happened. If it did, it was no worse than the Roman conduct after the victories of Vulso.
The Galatian embassy in Rome had a degree of success, but Rome’s alliance with Eumenes was too important to both sides to be seriously jeopardized, and so the terms the Galatians were given were a return to those which had been pronounced by Manlius Vulso in 188: autonomy and a prohibition to cross their borders in arms. This was a rebuff to the Galatians,23 but, given that their uprising had been the result of Eumenes’ domination of their country for the previous dozen years, the terms amounted to the achievement of the Galatians’ main aim – a return to autonomy, even if Attalid forces remained in occupation of some parts. The problem of Galatia’s overall weakness, however would always mean that the practice of such autonomy would be often at the mercy of its more powerful neighbours, and of their own divisions. The enforcement of the terms, both to restrain the Galatian activities (including, presumably, their service as mercenaries) and to prevent any intrigues and interferences by Eumenes or Pharnakes or Prusias was impossible, except by Galatian insistence. After all, none of the terms of the original peace of 188 had lasted more than a couple of years, and the Attalids had been serial breakers of the terms; there was no reason to believe that this new formulation of the same terms would last any longer.
In the midst of the senatorial discussions over the Galatian war, King Prusias had arrived in Rome, and during his visit he made a request that he should be allowed to take over an area of territory, formerly part of Antiochos III’s kingdom, but which was now apparently occupied by the Galatians. The Senate refused, but politely, and did not finally close the door on his request, presumably wishing to keep the option open of rewarding Prusias if it seemed profitable.24
One of the results, therefore, of the peace terms of 166, was that the Galatians had moved politically out of Pergamon’s shadow and had become independent diplomatic players. The embassy to Rome of 166/165 was followed by others. The Trokmoi were encroaching on Kappadokian territory, and King Ariarathes complained to Rome about it.25 The Galatians ‘continued to add to and further secure their liberties’, is a curious formulation of Polybios which presumably means asserting their independence.26 Prusias complained that Eumenes was interfering in Galatia contrary to the peace terms, and it seems clear from a set of letters exchanged between Attalid kings and the priests of Kybele at Pessinos that he was correct.27 The Attalid king was therefore once again the main force undermining the peace settlement.
The crisis of the Roman invasion had changed the Galatian governing system of tetrarchs and chiefs, and the emergence of such men as Ortiagon had undermined it still more. Attalid occupation and protection, and the resentment it generated, appears to have had the effect of forcing the Galatians to think in terms of unifying their effort in resistance, and Solovettios seems to have been a war commander for all three states. And yet after the immediate crisis had ended, the three states re-emerged into ‘autonomy’, though still under Attalid dominance. But the change is clear: the ‘autonomy’ of the states had given way twice in two decades before the necessity of accepting a unified command. This would, of course, happen again.
Pessinos had been in the territory settled by the Tolistobogii when they arrived, but only just, and the arriving ‘barbarians’ respected its holiness and autonomy. It was semi-detached from the state, and was also bordered on two sides by Pergamene territory since the awards of the treaty of Apameia. The priest was clearly regarded by the Attalids as a near-independent prince, rather than as a part of the Tolistobogian state, and the Roman delegation in 205 had negotiated directly with the current priest over the transfer of the holy black stone to Rome. Yet when real information about the temple personnel is found, it is clear that the Galatians had established their influence firmly in the temple. Eumenes II and his brother and successor Attalos II corresponded directly with the temple priests. Attis was the main man, which may be a title or an assumed name, and his brother had a Galatian name, Aioiorix.28 It emerges from a much later inscription that half of the priestly college consisted of men with Galatian names.29 This may be assumed to be the result of a deliberate process of accommodation between the temple establishment and the Galatian, and it probably dated from soon after the Galatians’ arrival. It is to be noted that all the urban centres in Galatia – there were not many – continued without interruption after the Galatians took over; this sheds a corrective light on the general methods of the Galatians from the start. The efforts of the Attalids were no doubt aimed at securing the temple’s allegiance, but the evidence of the earlier encounters suggests that the priests were canny enough to avoid too great an acquiescence.
If this arrangement of half the priestly college being Galatians had operated in 205 on the Roman visit, the lack of reaction from the Galatians at this apparent encroachment into their area of influence can be explained by a Galatian decision not to make a fuss. That is, they were permitting the envoys to negotiate about the removal of the stone, seeing it as merely a private matter between the two. Of course, the Attalid king’s letters pretended to a similar influence with the priestly college, but that does not prove that it existed. It has the air, once more, of the Attalid king seizing the chance of boosting their standing with Rome, even if it meant nothing in reality. In 189 the temple supported the Romans in their invasion, but not until the Roman army was well past Pessinos.30 The priests were thus practiced at fastening their friendship onto the most powerful, first the Galatians, then Pergamon, then for the moment, Rome.
The Galatians’ original settlement in what became known as Galatia may well have been seen as a preliminary to expansion, and a couple of items support this notion. The land they acquired was high and dry, cold in winter, and cultivable land was confined to the valleys, where water was available. This effectively dictated pastoral agriculture, sheep herding, which is probably what the native population already did. This pastoralism included the breeding of horses, and this is obviously one of the bases for the predominance of cavalry in the Galatian armies, quite apart from the universal propensity of an aristocracy to ride such beasts. The animals had to be moved, and the society was no doubt always in motion.31 And more land was always needed. Hence the chieftain Gaizatorix, whose territory of Gangra was actually in Paphlagonia,32 and the Trokmoi who in the 160s were complained about by King Ariarathes for encroaching into Kappadokian territory.33 There was also the (unnamed) area which Prusias complained about, an unallocated, formerly Seleukid, territory, but which he claimed had been occupied by Galatians.34 In the war of 168–166 it is noticeable that the Galatian armies moved out of their home territory into the south-east – the area of Amlada – and to the south-west towards Synnada. This could be attempts to annex new territory, rather than simply a campaign against Eumenes. (This was territory which was included in the Roman province of Galatia a century later.) Long ago, Ramsay pointed out that the Pontic, Bithynian and Pergamene kingdoms were all well organized and defended and alert, but to the south of Galatia the territory was, while technically Pergamene, actually scarcely controlled.35
This expansion was clearly undertaken quietly, slowly, and in an unorganized way. None of those who complained were ever able to do much about it other than complain to Rome, for Rome had guaranteed Galatian autonomy. There was clearly no Galatian central authority to whom they could complain or to which Rome could deliver instructions, and probably any complaint given to the tetrarchs of any of the three states would be useless – quite likely the tetrarchs were themselves involved in the Galatians’ expansion. The explanation is the result of the concentration on pastoral farming, which, if there was a strong market, might well have been so developed as to leave the pastures worn out, so the search was on for more pasture land.
Amlada (Amblada to the Greeks) was in Lykaonia or Pisidia, a thinly populated region (like Kappadokia), and, as Ramsay pointed out, it was ‘distant and defenceless’ from the Attalid kingdom, which was so solidly based at the western end of the Asia Minor peninsula.36 It had taken the opportunity to revolt when a Galatian force was operating in the area during the war of 168–166. From the Galatian viewpoint an expedition in this area might well produce dividends such as Amlada, by slicing off (and annexing) the eastern extension of the Attalid kingdom.
The connection between East and West, between Syria and the Aegean coastal cities, was the old Akhaimenian Royal Road, which had been fortified with cities by Antiochos I and II. The essential strategic point along that road was the city of Antioch in Pisidia, in the midst of the lakes of central Anatolia, with the turbulent and unsubduable Pisidians (such as Amlada) to the south and a range of mountains and then a desert to the north, beyond which was Galatia. And Antioch, which is described by Strabo as ‘on a hill’,37 being a Hellenistic city, was walled. It had been colonized by a group from Magnesia, and in the Treaty of Apameia the Roman Senate had picked it out and made it an autonomous city.38 As such it neatly separated the Pergamene territories in western Asia Minor from those in the east, that is, in Lykaonia, leaving the latter vulnerable to the Galatian army from the north.
The Pergamene army could certainly reach as far as Lykaonia, as it did in the Pergamene-Pontic War in the 180s, but it seems probable that the Attalid kings paid little attention to their eastern province, outside the cities of the Royal Road, and perhaps tended to ignore even those – they did not control Antioch, for example, unless they had violated yet another of the terms of the Apameia treaty. Galatia and Kappadokia were both keen to expand into that southern area, and eventually it was Kappadokia which gained control of it for a time. The Galatians of the Trokmoi were expanding into Kappadokia itself in the 160s, according to King Ariarathes, and it is unlikely that they failed to take advantage of Pergamene neglect of the distant Lykaonian province. It would not need overt conflict for Galatian infiltration to take place, as flocks of sheep were grazed on both sides of the border, which was almost certainly not demarcated. This was all a very slow and insidious movement, liable to erupt into minor warfare; those who moved into Pergamene territory might even be accepted if they could be persuaded to pay the king’s taxes; alternatively, by insisting on their status as Galatians or Kappadokians they might succeed in slicing off part of the Attalid territory for themselves.
The Attalid kingdom survived for only thirty years after the loss of its protectorate over the Galatians, and it appears that Attalos II, Eumenes’ successor, abandoned the attempt to control Galatia. Its liberation was followed by the Galatian revival and expansion. Then in 133 the Attalid kingdom was bequeathed to Rome by Attalos III. The subsequent war to suppress a surviving Attalid claimant was followed by the deliberate break-up of the inheritance by Rome. In 129 the Roman commander Aquillius formed the province of Asia out of the richest (western) part of the kingdom, and awarded Great Phrygia, the territory west and south-west of Galatia, to King Mithradates V of Pontos, and Lykaonia to Ariarathes of Kappadokia.39
For Galatia this put Mithradates in control of lands on two sides of the country, north-east and south-west, and it is normally assumed that he therefore exercised some sort of protectorate over Galatia, in the same way as Eumenes II had done. Certainly he would have had influence there, since his lands boxed in Galatia relatively effectively, but how much influence, and what the supposed ‘protectorate’ consisted of – if either of these existed – it is not possible to say. Perhaps it was no more than the ability to recruit soldiers there. The memory of the success of the Galatian rebellion against Attalid influence and that kingdom’s ‘protectorate’ may well have served to restrain Mithradates from anything too forceful. The award of Lykaonia to Ariarathes may have been a greater blow to the Galatians, since it could have restricted the possibility of expansion, which had probably been taking place. These awards caused trouble at Rome, becoming mixed up in that city’s internal controversies.
These grants to Pontos and Kappadokia were soon revoked, when the recipient kings died – Mithradates V in 121, Ariarathes VII in c.116.40 The lands awarded reverted to Rome, an arrangement which had possibly been understood from the start, since it would give Rome time to concentrate on organizing the province of Asia, while Great Phrygia and Lykaonia were much less valuable territories, and could be controlled in a rough and ready fashion by the kings. The urbanized area south of Great Phrygia, along the line of the road developed by the Achaimenids and now designated by Aquillius as the Via Aquillia, had remained part of the province all through, showing that strategic interests were as high in Roman considerations as was the possession of taxable territories.
The half-century or so following the defeat by Vulso’s army, by damaging Galatia’s governing system loosened any government control over the chiefs. A foreign controller, such as the Attalids or a Pontic king, would have great difficulty in exercising any real power. But it allowed some expansion of Galatian territory at the expense of the neighbours. The growing pressure of Rome after 129 BC was about to compel further changes, and further expansion, a process which would both force a change in its government yet reducing its independence, and still greatly expanding its reach.