The war between the Athenians and Peloponnesians and the allies on either side now really begins. For now all intercourse except through the medium of heralds ceased, and hostilities were commenced and prosecuted without intermission. The history follows the chronological order of events by summers and winters.
2.1
431
1st Year/Summer
HELLAS
The war begins.
The Thirty Years’ Peace which was entered into after the conquest of Euboea lasted fourteen years. In the fifteenth year, the forty-eighth year of the priestess-ship of Chrysis at Argos, during the ephorate of Aenesias at Sparta and in the last month but two of the archonship of Pythodorus at Athens, six months after the battle of Potidaea and just at the beginning of spring, a Theban force a little over three hundred strong, under the command of their boeotarchs, Pythangelus son of Phyleides, and Diemporus son of Onetorides, about the first watch of the night, made an armed entry into Plataea, a city of Boeotia in alliance with Athens. [2] The gates were opened to them by a Plataean called Naucleides, who, with his party, had invited them in, meaning to put to death the citizens of the opposite party, bring over the city to Thebes, and thus obtain power for themselves. [3] This had been arranged through Eurymachus son of Leontiades, a person of great influence at Thebes. For Plataea had always been at variance with Thebes; and the latter, foreseeing that war was at hand, wished to surprise her old enemy in time of peace, before hostilities had actually broken out. Indeed this was how they got in so easily without being observed, as no guard had been posted. [4] After the soldiers had taken up positions in the agora those who had invited them in wished them to set to work at once and go to their enemies’ houses. This, however, the Thebans refused to do, but determined to make a conciliatory proclamation, and if possible to come to a friendly understanding with the citizens. Their herald accordingly invited any who wished to resume their old place in the federation of all the Boeotians to take up positions beside them, for they thought that in this way the city would readily join them.
2.2
431
1st Year/Summer
PLATAEA
In the fifteenth year of the Thirty Years’ Peace, Thebes attacks Plataea.
On becoming aware of the presence of the Thebans within their gates, and of the sudden occupation of the city, the Plataeans concluded in their alarm that more had entered than was really the case, the night preventing their seeing them. They accordingly came to terms, and accepting the proposal, made no movement; especially as the Thebans offered none of them any violence. [2] But somehow or other, during the negotiations, they discovered the scanty numbers of the Thebans, and decided that they could easily attack and overpower them; the mass of the Plataeans being averse to revolting from Athens. [3] At all events they resolved to attempt it. Digging through the common walls of the houses, they thus managed to join each other without being seen going through the streets, in which they placed wagons without the beasts in them, to serve as a barricade, and arranged everything else as seemed suitable for the occasion. [4] When everything had been done that circumstances permitted, they watched their opportunity and went out of their houses against the enemy. It was still night, though daybreak was at hand: in daylight it was thought that their attack would be met by men full of courage and on equal terms with their assailants, while in darkness it would fall upon panic-stricken troops, who would also be at a disadvantage from their enemy’s knowledge of the locality. So they made their assault at once, and came to close quarters as quickly as they could.
2.3
431
1st Year/Summer
PLATAEA
After perceiving the weakness of the occupying enemy force, the Plataeans counterattack.
The Thebans, finding themselves outwitted, immediately closed up to repel all attacks made upon them. [2] Twice or thrice they beat back their assailants. But the men shouted and charged them, the women and slaves screamed and yelled from the houses and pelted them with stones and tiles; besides, it had been raining hard all night; and so at last their courage gave way, and they turned and fled through the city. Most of the fugitives were quite ignorant of the right ways out, and this, with the mud, and the darkness caused by the moon being in her last quarter, and the fact that their pursuers knew their way about and could easily stop their escape, proved fatal to many. [3] The only gate open was the one by which they had entered, and this was shut by one of the Plataeans driving the spike of a javelin into the bar instead of the bolt; so that even here there was no longer any means of exit. [4] They were now chased all over the city. Some got on the wall and threw themselves over, in most cases with a fatal result. One party managed to find a deserted gate, and obtaining an axe from a woman, cut through the bar; but as they were soon observed only a few succeeded in getting out. Others, scattered about in different parts of the city, were destroyed. [5] The most numerous and compact body rushed into a large building next to the city wall: the doors on the side of the street happened to be open, and the Thebans fancied that they were the gates of the city, and that there was a passage right through to the outside. [6] The Plataeans, seeing their enemies in a trap, now consulted whether they should set fire to the building and burn them just as they were, or whether there was anything else that they could do with them; [7] until at length these and the rest of the Theban survivors found wandering about the city agreed to an unconditional surrender of themselves and their arms to the Plataeans. [8] While such was the fate of the party in Plataea, [2.5.1] the rest of the Thebans who were to have joined them with all their forces before daybreak, in case of anything miscarrying with the body that had entered, received the news of the affair while on the road, and pressed forward to their assistance. [2] Now Plataea is nearly eight miles from Thebes, and their march was delayed by the rain that had fallen in the night, for the river Asopus had risen and was not easy of passage; [3] and so, having to march in the rain, and being hindered in crossing the river, they arrived too late, and found the whole party either slain or captive. [4] When they learned what had happened, they at once formed a design against the Plataeans outside the city. As the attack had been made in time of peace, and was perfectly unexpected, there were of course men and stock in the fields; and the Thebans wished if possible to have some prisoners to exchange against their countrymen in the city, should any chance to have been taken alive. [5] Such was their plan. But the Plataeans suspected their intention almost before it was formed, and becoming alarmed for their fellow citizens outside the city, sent a herald to the Thebans, reproaching them for their unscrupulous attempt to seize their city in time of peace, and warning them against any outrage on those outside. Should the warning be disregarded, they threatened to put to death the men they had in their hands, but added that, on the Thebans retiring from their territory, they would surrender the prisoners to their friends. [6] This is the Theban account of the matter, and they say that they had an oath given them. The Plataeans, on the other hand, do not admit any promise of an immediate surrender, but make it contingent upon subsequent negotiation: the oath they deny altogether. [7] Be this as it may, upon the Thebans retiring from their territory without committing any injury, the Plataeans hastily got in whatever they had in the country and immediately put the men to death. The prisoners were a hundred and eighty in number; Eurymachus, the person with whom the traitors had negotiated, being one.
2.4
431
1st Year/Summer
PLATAEA
The Thebans are defeated; many surrender.
2.5 431
1st Year/Summer
PLATAEA
Theban reinforcements arrive too late. When the Plataeans threaten to harm the prisoners, the Thebans retire without taking hostages; but the Plataeans execute the prisoners anyway.
MAP 2.5 PLATAEA AND THEBES
This done, the Plataeans sent a messenger to Athens, gave back the dead to the Thebans under a truce, and arranged things in the city as seemed best to meet the present emergency. [2] The Athenians meanwhile, having had word of the affair sent them immediately after its occurrence, had instantly seized all the Boeotians in Attica, and sent a herald to the Plataeans to forbid their proceeding to extremities with their Theban prisoners without instructions from Athens. The news of the men’s death had of course not arrived; [3] the first messenger having left Plataea just when the Thebans entered it, the second just after their defeat and capture; so there was no later news. Thus the Athenians sent their orders in ignorance of the facts; and the herald on his arrival found the men slain. After this the Athenians marched to Plataea and brought in provisions, and left a garrison in the place, also taking away the women and children and such of the men as were least able-bodied.
2.6
431
1st Year/Summer
PLATAEA
Athenian instructions to preserve the prisoners arrive too late. Athens sends supplies and a garrison, and gives refuge to Plataean noncombatants.
With the affair at Plataea the treaty had been broken by an overt act, and Athens at once prepared for war, as did also Sparta and her allies. They resolved to send embassies to the King and to such other of the barbarian powers as either party could look to for assistance, and tried to ally themselves with the uncommitted states at home. [2] Sparta, in addition to the existing naval forces, gave orders to the states that had declared for her in Italy and Sicily to build vessels up to a grand total of five hundred, the quota of each city being determined by its size, and also to provide a specified sum of money. Till these were ready they were to remain neutral and to admit single Athenian ships into their harbors. [3] Athens on her part reviewed her existing confederacy, and sent embassies to the places more immediately round the Peloponnesus, Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus; perceiving that if these could be relied upon she could carry the war all round the Peloponnesus.
2.7 431
1st Year/Summer
HELLAS
Both sides prepare for war. Sparta sends embassies to neutrals and barbarians, and asks her Italian and Sicilian allies to build triremes.
And if both sides nourished the boldest hopes and put forth their utmost strength for the war, this was only natural. Zeal is always at its height at the commencement of an undertaking; and on this particular occasion the Peloponnesus and Athens were both full of young men whose inexperience made them eager to take up arms, while the rest of Hellas stood straining with excitement at the conflict of its leading cities. [2] Everywhere predictions were being recited and oracles being chanted by such persons as collect them, and this not only in the contending cities. [3] Further, some time before this there was an earthquake at Delos, for the first time in the memory of the Hellenes. This was said and thought to be ominous of the events impending; indeed, nothing of the kind that happened was allowed to pass without remark. [4] Men’s feelings inclined much more to the Spartans, especially as they proclaimed themselves the liberators of Hellas. No private or public effort that could help them in speech or action was omitted; each thinking that the cause suffered wherever he could not himself see to it. [5] So general was the indignation felt against Athens, whether by those who wished to escape from her empire, or were apprehensive of being absorbed by it. [2.9.1] Such were the preparations and such the feelings with which the contest opened. The allies of the two belligerents were the following. [2] These were the allies of Sparta: all the Peloponnesians within the Isthmus except the Argives and Achaeans, who were neutral; Pellene being the only Achaean city that first joined in the war, though her example was afterwards followed by the rest. Outside the Peloponnesus the Megarians, Locrians, Boeotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians. [3] Of these, ships were furnished by the Corinthians, Megarians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians; and cavalry by the Boeotians, Phocians, and Locrians. The other states sent infantry. This was the Spartan confederacy. [4] That of Athens comprised the Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyraeans, Zacynthians, and some tributary cities in the following countries, namely, the seaboard part of Caria with its Dorian neighbors, Ionia, the Hellespont, the Thracian cities, the islands lying between the Peloponnesus and Crete toward the east, and all the Cyclades except Melos and Thera. [5] Of these, ships were furnished by Chios, Lesbos, and Corcyra, infantry and money by the rest. Such were the allies of either party and their resources for the war.
2.8 431
1st Year/Summer
HELLAS
Enthusiasm for war among young men runs high. Most Hellenes hope for Sparta to win, fearing absorption in Athens’ empire or desiring liberation from it.
2.9
431
1st Year/Summer
HELLAS
The allies of the two belligerents are listed.
MAP 2.8 PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE AND OTHER SPARTAN ALLIES
MAP 2.9 THE ATHENIAN SUBJECT STATES AND ALLIES
Immediately after the affair at Plataea, Sparta sent round orders to the cities in the Peloponnesus and the rest of her confederacy to prepare troops and the provisions requisite for a foreign campaign, in order to invade Attica. [2] The several states were ready at the time appointed and assembled at the Isthmus; the contingent of each city being two-thirds of its whole force. [3] After the whole army had mustered, the Spartan king, Archidamus, the leader of the expedition, called together the generals of all the states and the principal persons and officers, and exhorted them as follows:
2.10
431
1st Year/Summer
ISTHMUS
Sparta and her allies assemble forces at the Isthmus.
“Peloponnesians and allies, our fathers made many campaigns both within and without the Peloponnesus, and the elder men among us here are not without experience in war. Yet we have never set out with a larger force than the present; and if our numbers and efficiency are remarkable, so also is the power of the state against which we march. [2] We ought not then to show ourselves inferior to our ancestors, or unequal to our own reputation. For the hopes and attention of all Hellas are bent upon the present effort, and its sympathy is with the enemy of the hated Athens. [3] Therefore, numerous as the invading army may appear to be, and certain as some may think it that our adversary will not meet us in the field, this is no sort of justification for the least negligence upon the march; but the officers and men of each particular city should always be prepared for the advent of danger in their own area. [4] The course of war cannot be foreseen, and its attacks are generally dictated by the impulse of the moment; and where overweening self-confidence has despised preparation, a wise apprehension has often been able to make head against superior numbers. [5] Not that confidence is out of place in an army of invasion, but in an enemy’s country it should also be accompanied by the precautions of apprehension: troops will by this combination be best inspired for dealing a blow, and best secured against receiving one. [6] In the present instance, the city against which we are going, far from being powerless to defend itself, is on the contrary most excellently equipped at all points; so that we have every reason to expect that they will take the field against us, and that if they have not set out already before we are there, they will certainly do so when they see us in their territory wasting and destroying their property. [7] For men are always exasperated at suffering injuries to which they are not accustomed, and on seeing them inflicted before their very eyes; and where least inclined for reflection, rush with the greatest heat to action. [8] The Athenians are the very people of all others to do this, as they aspire to rule the rest of the world, and are more in the habit of invading and ravaging their neighbors’ territory, than of seeing their own treated in the like fashion. [9] Considering, therefore, the power of the state against which we are marching, and the greatness of the reputation which, according to the event, we shall win or lose for our ancestors and ourselves, remember as you follow where you may be led to regard discipline and vigilance as of the first importance, and to obey with alacrity the orders transmitted to you; as nothing contributes so much to the credit and safety of an army as when its soldiers, although numerous, quickly act on the orders transmitted to them.”
2.11
431
1st Year/Summer
ISTHMUS
Archidamus, Sparta’s king, speaks to the army, calling for caution, vigilance, and discipline.
Dismissing the assembly after this brief speech, Archidamus first sent off Melesippus son of Diacritus, a Spartan, to Athens, in case she should be more inclined to submit on seeing the Peloponnesians actually on the march. [2] But the Athenians did not admit him into the city or to their assembly; Pericles having already carried a motion against admitting either herald or embassy from the, Spartans after they had once marched out. The herald was accordingly sent away without an audience, and ordered to be beyond the frontier that same day; in future, if those who sent him had a proposition to make they must retire to their own territory before they dispatched embassies to Athens. An escort was sent with Melesippus to prevent his holding communication with anyone. [3] When he reached the frontier and was just going to be dismissed, he departed with these words: “This day will be the beginning of great misfortunes to the Hellenes.” [4] As soon as he arrived at the camp, and Archidamus learnt that the Athenians had still no thoughts of submitting, he at length began his march, and advanced with his army into their territory. [5] Meanwhile the Boeotians, sending their contingent and cavalry to join the Peloponnesian expedition, went to Plataea with the remainder and laid waste the country.
2.12
431
1st Year/Summer
ATTICA
After the final herald sent by Archidamus to the Athenians is rebuffed, the Peloponnesians invade Attica.
While the Peloponnesians were still mustering at the Isthmus, or on the march before they invaded Attica, Pericles son of Xanthippus, one of the ten generals of the Athenians, finding that the invasion was to take place, conceived the idea that Archidamus, who happened to be his guest-friend, might possibly pass by his estate without ravaging it. This he might do, either from a personal wish to oblige him, or acting under instructions from Sparta for the purpose of creating a prejudice against him, as had been before attempted in the demand for the expulsion of the accursed family. He accordingly took the precaution of announcing to the Athenians in the assembly that, although Archidamus was his guest-friend, yet this friendship should not extend to the detriment of the state, and that in case the enemy should make his houses and lands an exception to the rest and not pillage them, he at once gave them up to be public property, so that they should not bring him into suspicion. [2] He also gave the citizens some advice on their present affairs in the same strain as before. They were to prepare for the war, and to carry in their property from the country. They were not to go out to battle, but to come into the city and guard it, and get ready their fleet, in which their real strength lay. They were also to keep a tight rein on their allies—the strength of Athens being derived from the money brought in by their payments, and success in war depending principally upon conduct and capital. [3] Here they had no reason to be despondent. Apart from other sources of income, an average revenue of six hundred talents of silver was drawn from the tribute of the allies; and there were still six thousand talents of coined silver in the Acropolis, out of nine thousand seven hundred that had once been there, from which the money had been taken for the Propylaea, the other public buildings, and for Potidaea. [4] This did not include the uncoined gold and silver in public and private offerings, the sacred vessels for the processions and games, the Median spoils, and similar resources to the amount of five hundred talents. [5] To this he added the treasures of the other temples. These were by no means inconsiderable, and might fairly be used. Nay, if they were ever absolutely driven to it, they might take even the gold ornaments of Athena herself; for the statue contained forty talents of pure gold and it was all removable. This might be used for self-preservation, and must every penny of it be restored. [6] Such was their financial position—surely a satisfactory one. Then they had an army of thirteen thousand hoplites, besides sixteen thousand more in the garrisons and on the battlements at Athens. [7] This was the number of men on guard at the time of the first invasion: it was composed of the oldest and youngest levies and the resident aliens who had heavy armor. The Phaleric Wall ran for four miles before it joined the wall that ran round the city; and of this last nearly five miles had a guard, although part of it was left without one, namely, that between the Long Wall and the Phaleric. Then there were the Long Walls to the Piraeus, a distance of some four miles and a half, the outer of which was manned. Lastly, the circumference of the Piraeus with Munychia was nearly seven miles and a half; only half of this, however, was guarded. [8] Pericles also showed them that they had twelve hundred horse including mounted archers, with sixteen hundred archers unmounted, and three hundred triremes fit for service. Such were the resources of Athens in the different departments when the Peloponnesian invasion was impending and hostilities were being commenced. Pericles also urged his usual arguments to show that they would survive in the war.
2.13
431
1st Year/Summer
ATHENS
Pericles donates his country estate to the city and describes Athens’ best war strategy to the assembly, listing the city’s financial and military resources.
The Athenians listened to his advice, and began to bring in their wives and children from the country, and all their household furniture, even to the woodwork of their houses which they removed. Their sheep and cattle they sent over to Euboea and the adjacent islands. But they found it hard to move, as most of them had always been used to living in the country.
2.14
431
1st Year/Summer
ATTICA
The Athenians move inside the city walls.
From very early times this had been more the case with the Athenians than with others. Under Cecrops and the first kings, down to the reign of Theseus, Attica had always consisted of a number of independent cities, each with its own town hall and magistrates. Except in times of danger the king of Athens was not consulted; in ordinary seasons they carried on their government and settled their affairs without his interference; sometimes they even waged war against him, as in the case of the Eleusinians with Eumolpus against Erechtheus. [2] In Theseus, however, they had a king whose intelligence matched his power; and one of the chief features in his organization of the country was to abolish the council chambers and magistrates of the petty cities, and to merge them in the single council chamber and town hall of the present capital. Individuals might still enjoy their private property just as before, but they were henceforth compelled to have only one political center, namely, Athens; which thus counted all the inhabitants of Attica among her citizens, so that when Theseus died he left a great state behind him. Indeed, from him dates the Synoecia, or Feast of Union, which is paid for by the state, and which the Athenians still keep in honor of the goddess. [3] Before this the city consisted of the present Acropolis and the district beneath it looking rather toward the south. [4] This is shown by the fact that the temples of the other deities, besides that of Athene, are in the Acropolis; and even those that are outside it are mostly situated in this quarter of the city, as that of the Olympian Zeus, of the Pythian Apollo, of Earth, and of Dionysus in the Marshes, the same in whose honor the older Dionysia are to this day celebrated in the month of Anthesterion not only by the Athenians but also by their Ionian descendants. [5] There are also other ancient temples in this quarter. The fountain too, which, since the alteration made by the tyrants, has been called Enneacrounos, or Nine Pipes, but which, when the spring was open, went by the name of Callirhoe, or Fairwater, was in those days, from being so near, used for the most important offices. Indeed, the old fashion of using the water before marriage and for other sacred purposes is still kept up. [6] Again, from their old residence in that quarter, the Acropolis is still known among Athenians as thecity.
2.15
431
1st Year/Summer
ATTICA
Thucydides tells how the cities of Attica became politically united.
The Athenians thus long lived scattered over Attica in independent cities. Even after the centralization of Theseus, old habit still prevailed; and from the early times down to the present war most Athenians still lived in the country with their families and households, and were consequently not at all inclined to move now, especially as they had only just restored their establishments after the Persian invasion. [2] Deep was their trouble and discontent at abandoning their houses and the hereditary temples of the ancient state, and at having to change their habits of life and to bid farewell to what each regarded as his native city.
2.16
431
1st Year/Summer
ATTICA
The Athenians are greatly distressed at having to abandon their country homes.
When they arrived at Athens, though a few had houses of their own to go to, or could find an asylum with friends or relatives, by far the greater number had to take up their dwelling in the parts of the city that were not built over and in the temples and chapels of the heroes, except the Acropolis and the temple of the Eleusinian Demeter and such other places as were always kept closed. The occupation of the plot of ground lying below the Acropolis called the Pelasgian had been forbidden by a curse; and there was also an ominous fragment of a Pythian oracle which said—
2.17
431
1st Year/Summer
ATHENS
Rural Athenians settle wherever they can within the city walls. Athens prepares a fleet of one hundred triremes to raid the Peloponnesus.
Better it will be to leave the Pelasgian unworked
[2] Yet this too was now built over in the necessity of the moment. And in my opinion, if the oracle proved true, it was in the opposite sense to what was expected. For the misfortunes of the state did not arise from the unlawful occupation, but the necessity of the occupation from the war; and though the god did not mention this, he foresaw that it would be an evil day for Athens in which the plot came to be inhabited. [3] Many also took up their quarters in the towers of the walls or wherever else they could. For when they were all come in, the city proved too small to hold them; though afterwards they divided the long walls and a great part of the Piraeus into lots and settled there. [4] All this took place while great attention was being given to the war; the allies were being mustered, and an armament of a hundred ships equipped for the Peloponnesus. [5] Such was the state of preparation at Athens.
Meanwhile the army of the Peloponnesians was advancing. The first city they came to in Attica was Oenoe, where they were to enter the country. Halting before it, they prepared to assault the wall with siege engines and other means. Oenoe, standing upon the Athenian and Boeotian border, was of course a walled city, and was used as a fortress by the Athenians in time of war. So the Peloponnesians prepared for their assault, and wasted some valuable time before the place. This delay brought the gravest censure upon Archidamus. Even during the levying of the war he had gained credit for weakness and Athenian sympathies by the half measures he had advocated; and after the army had assembled he had further injured himself in public estimation by his loitering at the Isthmus and the slowness with which the rest of the march had been conducted. But all this was as nothing to the delay at Oenoe. During this interval the Athenians were carrying in their property; and it was the belief of the Peloponnesians that a quick advance would have found everything still out, had it not been for his procrastination. Such was the feeling of the army toward Archidamus during the siege. But he, it is said, expected that the Athenians would shrink from letting their land be wasted, and would make their submission while it was still uninjured; and this was why he waited.
2.18
431
1st Year/Summer
ATTICA
The Peloponnesians besiege Oenoe. Archidamus’ slow pace is criticized, but he hopes the Athenians will give in before their property is ravaged.
MAP 2.19 ATHENS AND ITS DEFENSES
But after he had assaulted Oenoe, and every possible attempt to take it had failed, as no herald came from Athens, he at last broke up his camp and invaded Attica. This was about eighty days after the Theban attempt upon Plataea, just in the middle of summer, when the corn was ripe, and Archidamus son of Zeuxis, king of Sparta, was in command. Encamping in Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, they began their ravages, and putting to flight some Athenian horse at a place called Rheiti, or the Brooks, they then advanced, keeping Mount Aegaleus on their right, through Cropia, until they reached Acharnae, the largest of the Athenian demes, or townships. Sitting down before it, they formed a camp there, and continued their ravages for a long while.
2.19
431
1st Year/Summer
ATTICA
Failing to take Oenoe, Archidamus marches into Attica to Acharnae. It is midsummer and the corn is ripe.
The reason why Archidamus remained in order of battle at Acharnae during this incursion, instead of descending into the plain, is said to have been this. [2] He hoped that the Athenians might possibly be tempted by the multitude of their youth and by their unprecedented preparedness for war to come out to battle and attempt to stop the devastation of their lands. [3] Accordingly, as they had not met him at Eleusis or the Thriasian plain, he tried to see if they could be provoked to a sally by the spectacle of a camp at Acharnae. [4] He thought the place itself a good position for encamping; and it seemed likely that such an important part of the state as the three thousand hoplites of the Acharnians would refuse to submit to the ruin of their property, and would force a battle on the rest of the citizens. On the other hand, should the Athenians not take the field during this incursion, he could then fearlessly ravage the plain in future invasions, and extend his advance up to the very walls of Athens. After the Acharnians had lost their own property they would be less willing to risk themselves for that of their neighbors; and so there would be division in the Athenian counsels. [5] These were the motives of Archidamus for remaining at Acharnae.
2.20
431
1st Year/Summer
ATTICA
Archidamus hopes that Athens will now give battle, since the Acharnaean hoplites might not fight for the property of others after their own had been destroyed.
In the meanwhile, as long as the army was at Eleusis and the Thriasian plain, hopes were still entertained of its not advancing any nearer. It was remembered that Pleistoanax son of Pausanias, king of Sparta, had invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army fourteen years before, but had retreated without advancing farther than Eleusis and Thria, which indeed proved the cause of his exile from Sparta, as it was thought he had been bribed to retreat. [2] But when they saw the army at Acharnae, barely seven miles from Athens, they lost all patience. The territory of Athens was being ravaged before the very eyes of the Athenians, a sight which the young men had never seen before and the old only in the Persian wars; and it was naturally thought a grievous insult, and the determination was universal, especially among the young men, to sally forth and stop it. [3] Knots were formed in the streets and engaged in hot discussion; for if the proposed sally was warmly recommended, it was also in some cases opposed. Oracles of the most various import were recited by the collectors, and found eager listeners in one or other of the disputants. Foremost in pressing for the sally were the Acharnians, as constituting no small part of the army of the state, and as it was their land that was being ravaged. In short, the whole city was in a most excited state; Pericles was the object of general indignation; his previous counsels were totally forgotten; he was abused for not leading out the army which he commanded, and was made responsible for the whole of the public suffering.
2.21
431
1st Year/Summer
ATTICA
Outraged by the sight of the enemy ravaging their land, the Athenians wish to sally out to attack. They turn against Pericles, whose past advice they now forget.
He, meanwhile, seeing anger and poor judgment just now in the ascendant, and confident of his wisdom in refusing a sally, would not call either an assembly or a meeting of the people, fearing the fatal results of a debate inspired by passion and not by prudence. Accordingly, he attended to the defense of the city, and kept it as quiet as possible, [2] though he constantly sent out cavalry to prevent raids on the lands near the city from flying parties of the enemy. There was a trifling affair at Phrygia between a squadron of the Athenian horse with the Thessalians against the Boeotian cavalry; in which the former had rather the best of it, until the hoplites advanced to the support of the Boeotians, when the Thessalians and Athenians were routed and lost a few men, whose bodies, however, were recovered the same day without a truce. The next day the Peloponnesians set up a trophy. [3] Ancient alliance brought the Thessalians to the aid of Athens; those who came being the Larissaeans, Pharsalians, Cranaeans, Pyrasians, Gyrtonians, and Pheraeans. The Larissaean commanders were Polymedes and Aristonus, two party leaders in Larissa; the Pharsalian general was Menon; each of the other cities had also its own commander.
2.22
431
1st Year/Summer
ATTICA
Pericles, certain that the Athenians should avoid a land battle, refuses to call an assembly or a meeting of the people. A cavalry skirmish takes place between Athenians and Thessalians against the Boeotians.
In the meantime the Peloponnesians, as the Athenians did not come out to engage them, broke up from Acharnae and ravaged some of the demes between Mounts Parnes and Brilessus. [2] While they were in Attica, the Athenians sent off the hundred ships which they had been preparing round the Peloponnesus, with a thousand hoplites and four hundred archers on board, under the command of Carcinus son of Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son of Antigenes. [3] This armament weighed anchor and started on its cruise, and the Peloponnesians, after remaining in Attica as long as their provisions lasted, retired through Boeotia by a different road to that by which they had entered. As they passed Oropus they ravaged the territory of Graea which is held by the Oropians from Athens, and reaching the Peloponnesus broke up to their respective cities.
2.23
431
1st Year/Summer
ATTICA
After Athens sends a fleet to raid Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesian army returns home.
After they had retired the Athenians set guards by land and sea at the points at which they intended to have regular stations during the war. They also resolved to set apart a special fund of a thousand talents from the moneys in the Acropolis. This was not to be spent, but the current expenses of the war were to be otherwise provided for. If anyone should move or put to the vote a proposition for using the money for any purpose whatever except that of defending the city in the event of the enemy bringing a fleet to make an attack by sea, it should be a capital offense. [2] With this sum of money they also set aside a special fleet of one hundred triremes, the best ships of each year, with their captains. None of these was to be used except with the money and against the same peril, should such peril arise.
2.24
431
1st Year/Summer
ATTICA
Athens sets aside a reserve of one thousand talents and one hundred triremes for defense against a naval attack.
ILLUSTRATION 2.22 ATHENIAN CAVALRY RECRUITS ON PARADE, AS REPRESENTED IN THE PARTHENON FRIEZE
MAP 2.24 ATHENIAN NAVAL RAIDS IN 431; THESSALIANS WHO ASSISTED ATHENS IN 431
Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred ships round the Peloponnesus, reinforced by a Corcyraean squadron of fifty vessels and some others of the allies in those parts, cruised about the coasts and ravaged the country. Among other places they landed in Laconia and made an assault upon Methone; there being no garrison in the place, and the wall being weak. [2] But it so happened that Brasidas son of Tellis, a Spartiate, was in command of a guard for the defense of the district. Hearing of the attack, he hurried with a hundred hoplites to the assistance of the besieged, and dashing through the army of the Athenians, which was scattered over the country and had its attention turned to the wall, threw himself into Methone. He lost a few men in making good his entrance, but saved the place and won the thanks of Sparta by his exploit, being thus the first officer who obtained this notice during the war. [3] The Athenians at once weighed anchor and continued their cruise. Touching at Pheia in Elis, they ravaged the country for two days and defeated a picked force of three hundred men that had come from the vale of Elis and the immediate neighborhood to the rescue. [4] But a stiff squall came down upon them, and not liking to face it in a place where there was no harbor, most of them got on board their ships, and doubling Cape Ichthys sailed into the port of Pheia. In the meantime the Messenians, and some others who could not get on board, marched over by land and took Pheia. [5] The fleet afterwards sailed round and picked them up and then put to sea; Pheia being evacuated, as the main army of the Eleans had now come up. The Athenians continued their cruise, and ravaged other places on the coast.
2.25
431
1st Year/Summer
PELOPONNESUS
The Athenian fleet, reinforced by allies, raids the coast of the Peloponnesus.
About the same time the Athenians sent thirty ships to cruise round Locris1a and also to guard Euboea; Cleopompus son of Clinias being in command. [2] Making descents with the fleet he ravaged certain places on the seacoast, captured Thronium, and took hostages from it. He also defeated at Alope the Locrians that had assembled to resist him.
2.26
431
1st Year/Summer
LOCRIS
An Athenian fleet attacks Locris.
During the summer the Athenians also expelled the Aeginetans with their wives and children from Aegina, on the ground of their having been the chief agents in bringing the war upon them. Besides, Aegina lies so near the Peloponnesus that it seemed safer to send colonists of their own to hold it, and shortly afterwards the settlers were sent out. [2] The banished Aeginetans found an asylum in Thyrea, which was given to them by Sparta, not only on account of her quarrel with Athens, but also because the Aeginetans had laid her under obligations at the time of the earthquake and the revolt of the Helots. The territory of Thyrea is on the frontier of Argolis and Laconia, reaching down to the sea. Those of the Aeginetans who did not settle here were scattered over the rest of Hellas.
2.27
431
1st Year/Summer
AEGINA
After Athens expels the Aeginetans Sparta gives them refuge at Thyrea.
The same summer, at the beginning of a new lunar month, the only time, by the way, at which it appears possible, the sun was eclipsed after noon. After it had assumed the form of a crescent and some of the stars had come out, it returned to its natural shape.
2.28
431
1st Year/Summer
HELLAS
An eclipse of the sun.
MAP 2.29 MACEDONIA AND THRACE
During the same summer Nymphodorus son of Pythes, an Abderite whose sister Sitalces had married, was made their proxenus by the Athenians and sent for to Athens. They had hitherto considered him their enemy; but he had great influence with Sitalces, and they wished this prince to become their ally. Sitalces was the son of Teres and king of the Thracians. [2] Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first to establish the great kingdom of the Odrysians on a scale quite unknown to the rest of Thrace, a large portion of the Thracians being independent. [3] This Teres is in no way related to Tereus who married Pandion’s daughter Procne from Athens; nor indeed did they belong to the same part of Thrace. Tereus lived in Daulis, part of what is now called Phocis, but which at that time was inhabited by Thracians. It was in this land that the women perpetrated the outrage upon Itys; and many of the poets when they mention the nightingale call it the Daulian bird. Besides, Pandion in contracting an alliance for his daughter, would consider the advantages of mutual assistance, and would naturally prefer a match at the above moderate distance to the journey of many days which separates Athens from the Odrysians. Again the names are different; and this Teres was king of the Odrysians, the first by the way who attained to any real power. [4] Sitalces, his son, was now sought as an ally by the Athenians, who desired his aid in the reduction of the Thracian cities and of Perdiccas. [5] Coming to Athens, Nymphodorus concluded the alliance with Sitalces, made his son Sadocus an Athenian citizen, and promised to finish the war in Thrace by persuading Sitalces to send the Athenians a force of Thracian horse and peltasts. [6] He also reconciled them with Perdiccas, and induced them to restore Therme to him; upon which Perdiccas at once joined the Athenians and Phormio in an expedition against the Chalcidians. [7] Thus Sitalces son of Teres, king of the Thracians, and Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, became allies of Athens.
2.29
431
1st Year/Summer
THRACE
Athens concludes alliances with Shakes, king of Thrace, and Perdiccas, king of Macedonia.
MAP 2.31 LATER ATHENIAN EXPEDITIONS OF 431
Meanwhile the Athenians in the hundred vessels were still cruising round the Peloponnesus. After taking Sollium, a city belonging to Corinth, and presenting the city and territory to the Acarnanians of Palaira, they stormed Astacus, expelled its tyrant Evarchus, and gained the place for their confederacy. [2] Next they sailed to the island of Cephallenia and brought it over without using force. Cephallenia lies off Acarnania and Leucas, and consists of four states, the Paleans, Cranaeans, Samaeans, and Pronnaeans. Not long afterwards the fleet returned to Athens.
2.30
431
1st Year/Summer
ACARNANIA
The Athenian fleet conducts operations in Acarnania.
CEPHALLENIA
Cephallenia joins the Athenians.
Toward the autumn of this year the Athenians invaded the Megarid with their whole levy, resident aliens included, under the command of Pericles son of Xanthippus. The Athenians in the hundred ships round the Peloponnesus on their journey home had just reached Aegina, and hearing that the citizens at home were in full force at Megara, now sailed over and joined them. [2] This was without doubt the largest army of Athenians ever assembled, the state being still in the flower of her strength and yet unvisited by the plague. Full ten thousand hoplites were in the field, all Athenian citizens, besides the three thousand before Potidaea. Then the resident aliens who joined in the incursion were at least three thousand strong; besides which there was a multitude of light troops. They ravaged the greater part of the territory, and then retired. [3] Other incursions into the Megarid were afterwards made by the Athenians annually during the war, sometimes only with cavalry, sometimes with all their forces. This went on until the capture of Nisaea.
2.31
431
1st Year/Summer
MEGARA
An army under Pericles ravages Megara.
Atalanta also, the deserted island off the Opuntian coast, was toward the end of this summer converted into a fortified post by the Athenians, in order to prevent privateers issuing from Opus and the rest of Locris and plundering Euboea. Such were the events of this summer after the return of the Peloponnesians from Attica.
2.32
431
1st Year/Summer
OPUNTIAN LOCRIS
The Athenians fortify a base on Atalanta.
In the ensuing winter the Acarnanian Evarchus wishing to return to Astacus, persuaded the Corinthians to sail over with forty ships and fifteen hundred hoplites and restore him; himself also hiring some mercenaries. In command of the force were Euphamidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chrysis, [2] who sailed over and restored him, and after failing in an attempt on some places on the Acarnanian coast which they were desirous of gaining, began their voyage home. [3] Coasting along shore they touched at Cephallenia and made a descent on the Cranian territory, and losing some men in a surprise attack by the Cranians, put to sea somewhat hurriedly and returned home.
2.33
431/0
1st Year/Winter
ACARNANIA
A Corinthian fleet retakes Astacus, raids Acarnania, and is repulsed at Cephallenia.
In the same winter the Athenians gave a funeral at the public cost to those who had first fallen in this war. It was a custom of their ancestors, and the manner of it is as follows. [2] Three days before the ceremony, the bones of the dead are laid out in a tent which has been erected; and their friends bring to their relatives such offerings as they please. [3] In the funeral procession cypress coffins are borne in carts, one for each tribe; the bones of the deceased being placed in the coffin of their tribe. Among these is carried one empty bier decked for the missing, that is, for those whose bodies could not be recovered. [4] Any citizen or stranger who pleases joins in the procession: and the female relatives are there to wail at the burial. [5] The dead are laid in the public sepulcher in the most beautiful suburb of the city, in which those who fall in war are always buried; with the exception of those slain at Marathon, who for their singular and extraordinary valor were interred on the spot where they fell. [6] After the bodies have been laid in the earth, a man chosen by the state, of approved wisdom and eminent reputation, pronounces over them an appropriate eulogy; after which all retire. [7] Such is the manner of the burying; and throughout the whole of the war, whenever the occasion arose, the established custom was observed. [8] Meanwhile these were the first that had fallen, and Pericles son of Xanthippus was chosen to pronounce their eulogy. When the proper time arrived, he advanced from the sepulcher to an elevated platform in order to be heard by as many of the crowd as possible, and spoke as follows:
2.34
431/0
1st Year/Winter
ATHENS
The Athenian procedure for burying their war dead is described. Pericles is chosen to deliver this war’s first funeral oration.
2.35
431/0
1st Year/Winter
ATHENS
Pericles begins his Funeral Oration by noting how difficult it is to properly praise the dead, but, since it is the law, offers to do his duty and make the attempt.
“Most of my predecessors in this place have commended him who made this speech part of the law, telling us that it is well that it should be delivered at the burial of those who fall in battle. For myself, I should have thought that the worth which had displayed itself in deeds would be sufficiently rewarded by honors also shown by deeds; such as you now see in this funeral prepared at the people’s cost. And I could have wished that the reputations of many brave men were not to be imperiled in the mouth of a single individual, to stand or fall according as he spoke well or ill. [2] For it is hard to speak properly upon a subject where it is even difficult to convince your hearers that you are speaking the truth. On the one hand, the friend who is familiar with every fact of the story may think that some point has not been set forth with that fullness which he wishes and knows it to deserve; on the other, he who is a stranger to the matter may be led by envy to suspect exaggeration if he hears anything above his own nature. For men can endure to hear others praised only so long as they can severally persuade themselves of their own ability to equal the actions recounted: when this point is passed, envy comes in and with it incredulity. [3] However, since our ancestors have stamped this custom with their approval, it becomes my duty to obey the law and to try to satisfy your several wishes and opinions as best I may.”
“I shall begin with our ancestors: it is both just and proper that they should have the honor of the first mention on an occasion like the present. They dwelt in the country without break in the succession from generation to generation, and handed it down free to the present time by their valor. [2] And if our more remote ancestors deserve praise, much more do our own fathers, who added to their inheritance the empire which we now possess, and spared no pains to be able to leave their acquisitions to us of the present generation. [3] Lastly, there are few parts of our dominions that have not been augmented by those of us here, who are still more or less in the vigor of life; while the mother country has been furnished by us with everything that can enable her to depend on her own resources whether for war or for peace. [4] That part of our history which tells of the military achievements which gave us our several possessions, or of the ready valor with which either we or our fathers stemmed the tide of Hellenic or foreign aggression, is a theme too familiar to my hearers for me to dwell upon, and I shall therefore pass it by. But what was the road by which we reached our position, what the form of government under which our greatness grew, what the national habits out of which it sprang; these are questions which I may try to solve before I proceed to my eulogy upon these men; since I think this to be a subject upon which on the present occasion a speaker may properly dwell, and to which the whole assemblage, whether citizens or foreigners, may listen with advantage.”
2.36
431/0
1st Year/Winter
ATHENS
After Pericles praises all those who contributed to Athens’ acquisition of its empire he describes the form of government under which the city grew great.
“Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighboring states; we are rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration favors the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; if to social standing, advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition. [2] The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbor for doing what he likes, or even to indulge in those injurious looks which cannot fail to be offensive, although they inflict no real harm. [3] But all this ease in our private relations does not make us lawless as citizens. Against this fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the laws, particularly such as regard the protection of the injured, whether they are actually on the statute book, or belong to that code which, although unwritten, yet cannot be broken without acknowledged disgrace.”
2.37
431/0
1st Year/Winter
ATHENS
Praising Athens’ unique democratic institutions, Pericles says equality before the law leads to rewards based on merit and creates a society both free and law-abiding.
“Further, we provide plenty of means for the mind to refresh itself from business. We celebrate games and sacrifices all the year round, and the elegance of our private establishments forms a daily source of pleasure and helps to distract us from what causes us distress; [2] while the magnitude of our city draws the produce of the world into our harbor, so that to the Athenian the fruits of other countries are as familiar a luxury as those of his own.”
2.38
431/0
1st Year/Winter
ATHENS
Pericles notes that Athens provides means for pleasure and recreation.
“If we turn to our military policy, there also we differ from our antagonists. We throw open our city to the world, and never by alien acts exclude foreigners from any opportunity of learning or observing, although the eyes of an enemy may occasionally profit by our liberality; trusting less in system and policy than to the native spirit of our citizens; while in education, where our rivals from their very cradles by a painful discipline seek after manliness, at Athens we live exactly as we please, and yet are just as ready to encounter every legitimate danger. [2] In proof of this it may be noticed that the Spartans do not invade our country alone, but bring with them all their confederates; while we Athenians advance unsupported into the territory of a neighbor, and fighting upon a foreign soil usually vanquish with ease men who are defending their homes. [3] Our united force was never yet encountered by any enemy, because we have at once to attend to our marine and to despatch our citizens by land upon a hundred different services; so that, wherever they engage with some such fraction of our strength, a success against a detachment is magnified into a victory over the nation, and a defeat into a reverse suffered at the hands of our entire people. [4] And yet if with habits not of labor but of ease, and courage not of art but of nature, we are still willing to encounter danger, we have the double advantage of not suffering hardships before we need to, and of facing them in the hour of need as fearlessly as those who are never free from them.”
2.39
431/0
1st Year/Winter
ATHENS
Pericles says that Athens is open to the world, relying upon its citizens’ natural capacity, not special training, to meet any challenge.
“Nor are these the only points in which our city is worthy of admiration.”
“We cultivate refinement without extravagance and knowledge without effeminacy; wealth we employ more for use than for show, and place the real disgrace of poverty not in owning to the fact but in declining the struggle against it. [2] Our public men have, besides politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, we regard the citizen who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless, and we are able to judge proposals even if we cannot originate them; instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all. [3] Again, in our enterprises we present the singular spectacle of daring and deliberation, each carried to its highest point, and both united in the same persons; although with the rest of mankind decission is the fruit of ignorance, hesitation of reflection. But the prize for courage will surely be awarded most justly to those who best know the difference between hardship and pleasure and yet are never tempted to shrink from danger. [4] In generosity we are equally singular, acquiring our friends by conferring not by receiving favors. Yet, of course, the doer of the favor is the firmer friend of the two, in order by continued kindness to keep the recipient in his debt; while the debtor feels less keenly from the very consciousness that the return he makes will be a payment, not a free gift. [5] And it is only the Athenians who, fearless of consequences, confer their benefits not from calculations of expediency, but in the confidence of liberality”
2.40
431/0
1st Year/Winter
ATHENS
Pericles applauds Athens’ concern for culture, her sensible use of wealth, her inclusion of all citizens in politics, her combination of daring and deliberation in action, and her liberal generosity.
“In short, I say that as a city we are the school of Hellas; while I doubt if the world can produce a man, who where he has only himself to depend upon, is equal to so many emergencies, and graced by so happy a versatility as the Athenian. [2] And that this is no mere boast thrown out for the occasion, but plain matter of fact, is proved by the power of the state acquired by these habits. [3] For Athens alone of her contemporaries is found when tested to be greater than her reputation, and alone gives no occasion to her assailants to blush at the antagonist by whom they have been worsted, or to her subjects to question her title to rule by merit. [4] Rather, the admiration of the present and succeeding ages will be ours, since we have not left our power without witness, but have shown it by mighty proofs; and far from needing a Homer for our eulogist, or other of his craft whose verses might charm for the moment only for the impression which they gave to melt at the touch of fact, we have forced every sea and land to be the highway of our daring, and everywhere, whether for evil or for good, have left imperishable monuments behind us. [5] Such is the Athens for which these men, in the assertion of their resolve not to lose her, nobly fought and died; and well may every one of their survivors be ready to suffer in her cause.”
2.41
431/0
1st Year/Winter
ATHENS
Pericles says Athens is a model for Hellas, a city worthy to rule others, and worthy of the devotion of the men who died in her cause.
“Indeed if I have dwelt at some length upon the character of our country, it has been to show that our stake in the struggle is not the same as theirs who have no such blessings to lose, and also that the eulogy of the men over whom I am now speaking might be by definite proofs established. [2] That eulogy is now in a great measure complete; for the Athens that I have celebrated is only what the heroism of these and their like have made her, men whose fame, unlike that of most Hellenes, will be found to be no greater than what they deserve. And if a test of worth be wanted, it is to be found in their closing scene, and this not only in the cases in which it set the final seal upon their merit, but also in those in which it gave the first intimation of their having any. [3] For there is justice in the claim that steadfastness in his country’s battles should be as a cloak to cover a man’s other imperfections; since the good action has blotted out the bad, and his merit as a citizen more than outweighed his demerits as an individual. [4] But none of these allowed either wealth with its prospect of future enjoyment to unnerve his spirit, or poverty with its hope of a day of freedom and riches to tempt him to shrink from danger. No, holding that vengeance upon their enemies was more to be desired than any personal blessings, and reckoning this to be the most glorious of hazards, they joyfully determined to accept the risk, to make sure of their vengeance and to let their wishes wait; and while committing to hope the uncertainty of final success, in the business before them they thought fit to act boldly and trust in themselves. Thus choosing to die resisting, rather than to live submitting, they fled only from dishonor, but met danger face to face, and after one brief moment, while at the summit of their fortune, left behind them not their fear, but their glory.”
2.42
431/0
1st Year/Winter
ATHENS
Pericles asserts that these men died gloriously, preferring death to submission or dishonor.
“So died these men as became Athenians. You, their survivors, must determine to have as unaltering a resolution in the field, though you may pray that it may have a happier outcome. And not contented with ideas derived only from words of the advantages which are bound up with the defense of your country, though these would furnish a valuable text to a speaker even before an audience so alive to them as the present, you must yourselves realize the power of Athens, and feed your eyes upon her from day to day, till love of her fills your hearts; and then when all her greatness shall break upon you, you must reflect that it was by courage, sense of duty, and a keen feeling of honor in action that men were enabled to win all this, and that no personal failure in an enterprise could make them consent to deprive their country of their valor, but they laid it at her feet as the most glorious contribution that they could offer. [2] For this offering of their lives, made in common by them all, they each of them individually received that renown which never grows old, and for a tomb, not so much that in which their bones have been deposited, but that noblest of shrines wherein their glory is laid up to be eternally remembered upon every occasion on which deed or story shall be commemorated. [3] For heroes have the whole earth for their tomb; and in lands far from their own, where the column with its epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every breast a record unwritten with no monument to preserve it, except that of the heart. [4] These take as your model, and judging happiness to be the fruit of freedom and freedom of valor, never decline the dangers of war. [5] For it is not the miserable that would most justly be unsparing of their lives; these have nothing to hope for: it is rather they to whom continued life may bring reverses as yet unknown, and to whom a fall, if it came, would be most tremendous in its consequences. [6] And surely, to a man of spirit, the degradation of cowardice must be immeasurably more grievous than the unfelt death which strikes him in the midst of his strength and patriotism!”
2.43
431/0
1st Year/Winter
ATHENS
Pericles calls upon those who survive to emulate the war dead’s valor and patriotism, saying that they risked all and lost their lives, but the renown of their deeds will last forever.
ILLUSTRATION 2.44 ATTIC MARBLE RELIEF OF C. 430 B.C. COMMEMORATING THE ATHENIANS WHO DIED IN THE FIRST YEAR’S FIGHTING OF THEPELOPONNESIAN WAR
2.44
431/0
1st Year/Winter
ATHENS
Pericles comforts the parents of the war dead while acknowledging their grief. He advises those who can to have more children and those past child-bearing age to ease their years with the knowledge that their sons died with honor.
“Comfort, therefore, not condolence, is what I have to offer to the parents of the dead who may be here. Numberless are the chances to which, as they know, the life of man is subject; but fortunate indeed are they who draw for their lot a death so glorious as that which has caused your mourning, and to whom life has been so exactly measured as to terminate in the happiness in which it has been passed. [2] Still I know that this is a hard saying, especially when you will constantly be reminded by seeing in the homes of others blessings of which once you also enjoyed; for grief is felt not so much for the want of what we have never known, as for the loss of that to which we have been long accustomed. [3] Yet you who are still of an age to beget children must bear up in the hope of having others in their stead; not only will they help you to forget those whom you have lost, but will be to the state at once a reinforcement and a security; for never can a fair or just policy be expected of the citizen who does not, like his fellows, bring to the decision the interests and apprehensions of a father. [4] While those of you who have passed your prime must congratulate yourselves with the thought that the best part of your life was fortunate, and that the brief span that remains will be cheered by the fame of the departed. For it is only the love of honor that never grows old; and honor it is, not gain, as some would have it, that rejoices the heart of age and helplessness.”
2.45
431/0
1st Year/Winter
ATHENS
He says that the sons and brothers of the dead may seek to equal their renown, but that their widows should best seek to avoid notice of any sort.
“Turning to the sons or brothers of the dead, I see an arduous struggle before you. When a man is gone, all are wont to praise him, and should your merit be ever so transcendent, you will still find it difficult not merely to overtake, but even to approach their renown. The living have envy to contend with, while those who are no longer in our path are honored with a goodwill into which rivalry does not enter. [2] On the other hand if I must say anything on the subject of female excellence to those of you who will now be in widowhood, it will be all comprised in this brief exhortation. Great will be your glory in not falling short of your natural character; and greatest will be hers who is least talked of among the men whether for good or for bad.”
“My task is now finished. I have performed it to the best of my ability, and in words, at least, the requirements of the law are now satisfied. If deeds be in question, those who are here interred have received part of their honors already, and for the rest, their children will be brought up till manhood at the public expense: the state thus offers a valuable prize, as the garland of victory in this race of valor, for the reward both of those who have fallen and their survivors. And where the rewards for merit are greatest, there are found the best citizens.”
2.46
431/0
1st Year/Winter
ATHENS
Pericles concludes by reminding those present that Athens will pay for the upbringing of the children of the dead.
[2] “And now that you have brought to a close your lamentations for your relatives, you may depart.”
2.47
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATHENS
The Spartans invade Attica again. Plague appears in Athens.
Such was the funeral that took place during this winter, with which the first year of the war came to an end. [2] In the first days of summer the Spartans and their allies, with two-thirds of their forces as before, invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of Sparta, and established themselves and laid waste the country. [3] Not many days after their arrival in Attica the plague first began to show itself among the Athenians. It was said that it had broken out in many places previously in the neighborhood of Lemnos and elsewhere; but a pestilence of such extent and mortality was nowhere remembered. [4] Neither were the physicians at first of any service, ignorant as they were of the proper way to treat it, but they died themselves the most thickly, as they visited the sick most often; nor did any human art succeed any better. Supplications in the temples, divinations, and so forth were found equally futile, till the overwhelming nature of the disaster at last put a stop to them altogether.
2.48
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATHENS
Thucydides describes the origin and progress of the plague. He himself was stricken by it.
It first began, it is said, in the parts of Ethiopia above Egypt, and thence descended into Egypt and Libya and into most of the King’s country. [2] Suddenly falling upon Athens, it first attacked the population in the Piraeus, which was the occasion of their saying that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the reservoirs, there being as yet no wells there, and afterwards appeared in the upper city, when the deaths became much more frequent. [3] All speculation as to its origin and its causes, if causes can be found adequate to produce so great a disturbance, I leave to other writers, whether lay or professional; for myself, I shall simply set down its nature, and explain the symptoms by which perhaps it may be recognized by the student, if it should ever break out again. This I can the better do, as I had the disease myself, and watched its operation in the case of others.
2.49
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATHENS
Symptoms of the plague and its progression through the body are described.
That year then is agreed to have been otherwise unprecedentedly free from sickness; and such few cases as occurred, all turned into this. [2] As a rule, however, there was no ostensible cause; but people in good health were all of a sudden attacked by violent heats in the head, and redness and inflammation in the eyes, the inward parts, such as the throat or tongue, becoming bloody and emitting an unnatural and fetid breath. [3] These symptoms were followed by sneezing and hoarseness, after which the pain soon reached the chest, and produced a hard cough. When it fixed in the stomach, it upset it; and discharges of bile of every kind named by physicians ensued, accompanied by very great distress. [4] In most cases also an ineffectual retching followed, producing violent spasms, which in some cases ceased soon after, in others much later. [5] Externally the body was not very hot to the touch, nor pale in its appearance, but reddish, livid, and breaking out into small pustules and ulcers. But internally it burned so that the patient could not bear to have on him clothing or linen even of the very lightest description; or indeed to be otherwise than stark naked. What they would have liked best would have been to throw themselves into cold water; as indeed was done by some of the neglected sick, who plunged into the rain tanks in their agonies of unquenchable thirst; though it made no difference whether they drank little or much. [6] Besides this, the miserable feeling of not being able to rest or sleep never ceased to torment them. The body meanwhile did not waste away so long as the distemper was at its height, but held out to a marvel against its ravages; so that when they succumbed, as in most cases, on the seventh or eighth day, to the internal inflammation, they had still some strength in them. But if they passed this stage, and the disease descended further into the bowels, inducing a violent ulceration there accompanied by severe diarrhea, this brought on a weakness which was generally fatal. [7] For the disorder first settled in the head, ran its course from thence through the whole of the body, and even where it did not prove mortal, it still left its mark on the extremities; [8] for it settled in the privy parts, the fingers and the toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, some too with that of their eyes. Others again were seized with an entire loss of memory on their first recovery, and did not know either themselves or their friends.
2.50
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATHENS
Birds of prey abstained from eating plague victims or were poisoned. Such birds actually vanished from the area.
But while the nature of the distemper was such as to baffle all description, and its attacks almost too grievous for human nature to endure, it was still in the following circumstance that its difference from all ordinary disorders was most clearly shown. All the birds and beasts that prey upon human bodies either abstained from touching them (though there were many lying unburied), or died after tasting them. [2] In proof of this, it was noticed that birds of this kind actually disappeared; they were not about the bodies, or indeed to be seen at all. But of course the effects which I have mentioned could best be studied in a domestic animal like the dog.
2.51
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATHENS
Strong and weak alike succumbed to the illness. Despair robbed the afflicted of resistance. Those who nursed the sick were stricken in turn. Only people who had survived the plague could show compassion with impunity.
Such then, if we pass over the varieties of particular cases, which were many and peculiar, were the general features of the distemper. Meanwhile the city enjoyed an immunity from all the ordinary disorders; or if any case occurred, it ended in this. [2] Some died in neglect, others in the midst of every attention. No remedy was found that could be used as a specific; for what did good in one case, did harm in another. [3] Strong and weak constitutions proved equally incapable of resistance, all alike being swept away, although dieted with the utmost precaution. [4] By far the most terrible feature in the malady was the dejection which ensued when anyone felt himself sickening, for the despair into which they instantly fell took away their power of resistance, and left them a much easier prey to the disorder; besides which, there was the awful spectacle of men dying like sheep, through having caught the infection in nursing each other. This caused the greatest mortality. [5] On the one hand, if they were afraid to visit each other, they perished from neglect; indeed many houses were emptied of their inmates for want of a nurse: on the other, if they ventured to do so, death was the consequence. This was especially the case with such as made any pretensions to goodness: honor made them unsparing of themselves in their attendance in their friends’ houses, where even the members of the family were at last worn out by the moans of the dying, and succumbed to the force of the disaster. [6] Yet it was with those who had recovered from the disease that the sick and the dying found most compassion. These knew what it was from experience, and had now no fear for themselves; for the same man was never attacked twice—never at least fatally. And such persons not only received the congratulations of others, but themselves also, in the elation of the moment, half entertained the vain hope that they were for the future safe from any disease whatsoever.
2.52
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATHENS
The crowded and poor housing of the refugees aggravated the calamity. Burial and cremation rites were upset due to the large number of victims.
An aggravation of the existing calamity was the influx from the country into the city, and this was especially felt by the new arrivals. [2] As there were no houses to receive them, they had to be lodged at the hot season of the year in stifling cabins, where the mortality raged without restraint. The bodies of dying men lay one upon another, and half-dead creatures reeled about the streets and gathered round all the fountains in their longing for water. [3] The sacred places also in which they had quartered themselves were full of corpses of persons that had died there, just as they were; for as the disaster passed all bounds, men, not knowing what was to become of them, became utterly careless of everything, whether sacred or profane. [4] All the burial rites before in use were entirely upset, and they buried the bodies as best they could. Many from want of the proper appliances through so many of their friends having died already, had recourse to the most shameless modes of burial: sometimes getting in first before those who had raised a pile, they threw their own dead body upon the stranger’s pyre and ignited it; sometimes they tossed the corpse which they were carrying on the top of another that was burning, and so went off.
2.53
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATHENS
Obsessed by death, men sought pleasure with no respect for honor, law, or the gods.
Nor was this the only form of lawless extravagance which owed its origin to the plague. Men now did just what they pleased, cooly venturing on what they had formerly done only in a corner, seeing the rapid transitions produced by persons in prosperity suddenly dying and those who before had nothing succeeding to their property. [2] So they resolved to spend quickly and enjoy themselves, regarding their lives and riches as alike things of a day. [3] Perseverance in what men called honor was popular with none, it was so uncertain whether they would be spared to attain the object; but it was settled that present enjoyment, and all that contributed to it, was both honorable and useful. [4] Fear of gods or law of man there was none to restrain them. As for the first, they judged it to be just the same whether they worshipped them or not, as they saw all alike perishing; and for the last, no one expected to live to be brought to trial for his offenses, but each felt that a far severer sentence had been already passed upon them all and hung ever over their heads, and before this fell it was only reasonable to enjoy life a little.
Such was the nature of the calamity, and heavily did it weigh on the Athenians; death raging within the city and devastation without. [2] Among other things which they remembered in their distress was, very naturally, the following verse which the old men said had long ago been uttered:
2.54
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATHENS
The Athenians argued about ancient prophecies and oracles. The plague struck Athens most severely and never entered the Peloponnesus.
A Dorian war shall come and with it pestilence.
[3] So a dispute arose as to whether dearth and not death had not been the word in the verse; but at the present juncture, it was of course decided in favor of the latter; for the people made their recollection fit in with their sufferings. I suppose, however, that if another Dorian war should ever afterwards come upon us, and a famine should happen to accompany it, the verse will probably be read accordingly. [4] The oracle also which had been given to the Spartans was now remembered by those who knew of it. When the god was asked whether they should go to war, he answered that if they put their might into it, victory would be theirs, and that he would himself be with them. [5] With this oracle events were supposed to tally. For the plague broke out so soon as the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, and never entering the Peloponnesus (not at least to an extent worth noticing), committed its worst ravages at Athens, and next to Athens, at the most populous of the other cities. Such was the history of the plague.
MAP 2.56 ORIGINS OF THE PLAGUE; ATHENIAN RAIDS IN THE PELOPONNESUS, 430
2.55
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATTICA
Attica is ravaged, but Pericles again restrains the Athenians.
After ravaging the plain the Peloponnesians advanced into the Paralian region as far as Laurium, where the Athenian silver mines are, and first laid waste the side looking toward the Peloponnesus, next that which faces Euboea and Andros. [2] But Pericles, who was still general, held the same opinion as in the former invasion, and would not let the Athenians march out against them.
2.56
430
2nd Year/Summer
PELOPONNESUS
Pericles leads an expedition to raid Epidaurus and nearby cities.
However while they were still in the plain, and had not yet entered the Paralian land, he had prepared an armament of a hundred ships for the Peloponnesus, and when all was ready put out to sea. [2] On board the ships he took four thousand Athenian heavy infantry, and three hundred cavalry in horse transports, then for the first time made out of old triremes; fifty Chian and Lesbian vessels also joining in the expedition. [3] When this Athenian armament put out to sea, they left the Peloponnesians in Attica in the Paralian region. [4] Arriving at Epidaurus in the Peloponnesus they ravaged most of the territory, and even had hopes of taking the city by an assault: in this however they were not successful. [5] Putting out from Epidaurus, they laid waste the territory of Troezen, Halieis, and Hermione, all cities on the coast of the Peloponnesus, and thence sailing to Prasiae, a maritime city in Laconia, ravaged part of its territory, and took and sacked the place itself; after which they returned home, but found the Peloponnesians gone and no longer in Attica.
2.57
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATTICA
This longest invasion of Attica lasted forty days.
During the whole time that the Peloponnesians were in Attica and the Athenians on the expedition in their ships, men kept dying of the plague both in the armament and in Athens. Indeed it was actually asserted that the departure of the Peloponnesians was hastened by fear of the disorder; as they heard from deserters that it was in the city, and also could see the burials going on. [2] Yet in this invasion they remained longer than in any other, and ravaged the whole country, for they were about forty days in Attica.
2.58
430
2nd Year/Summer
POTIDAEA
Athenian reinforcements accomplish nothing at Potidaea and suffer heavy losses from the plague.
The same summer Hagnon son of Nicias, and Cleopompus son of Clinias, the colleagues of Pericles, took the armament of which he had lately made use, and went off upon an expedition against the Chalcidians in the Thracian region and against Potidaea, which was still under siege. As soon as they arrived, they brought up their siege engines against Potidaea and tried every means of taking it, [2] but did not succeed either in capturing the city or in doing anything else worthy of their preparations. For the plague attacked them here also, and committed such havoc as to cripple them completely, even the previously healthy soldiers of the former expedition catching the infection from Hagnon’s troops; while Phormio and the sixteen hundred men whom he commanded only escaped by being no longer in the neighborhood of the Chalcidians. [3] The end of it was that Hagnon returned with his ships to Athens, having lost one thousand and fifty out of four thousand hoplites in about forty days; though the soldiers stationed there before remained in the country and carried on the siege of Potidaea.
2.59
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATHENS
Oppressed by invasion and plague, Athens rejects Pericles and sends peace envoys to Sparta; after they fail, Pericles speaks to the Athenian assembly.
After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians a change came over the spirit of the Athenians. Their land had now been twice laid waste; and war and pestilence at once pressed heavy upon them. [2] They began to find fault with Pericles, as the author of the war and the cause of all their misfortunes, and became eager to come to terms with Sparta, and actually sent ambassadors thither, who did not however succeed in their mission. Their despair was now complete and all vented itself upon Pericles. [3] When he saw them exasperated at the present turn of affairs and acting exactly as he had anticipated, he called an assembly, being (it must be remembered) still general, with the double object of restoring confidence and of leading them from these angry feelings to a calmer and more hopeful state of mind. He accordingly came forward and spoke as follows:
2.60
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATHENS
Pericles rebukes the Athenians, calling upon them to hold the good of the state above private concerns; he describes himself as a wise and honest patriot.
“I was not unprepared for the indignation of which I have been the object, as I know its causes; and I have called an assembly for the purpose of reminding you of certain points, and of protesting against your being unreasonably irritated with me, or cowed by your sufferings. [2] I am of the opinion that national greatness is more to the advantage of private citizens than any individual well-being coupled with public humiliation. [3] A man may be personally ever so well off, and yet if his country be ruined he must be ruined with it; whereas a flourishing commonwealth always affords chances of salvation to unfortunate individuals. [4] Since then a state can support the misfortunes of private citizens, while they cannot support hers, it is surely the duty of everyone to be forward in her defense, and not like you to be so confounded with your domestic afflictions as to give up all thoughts of the common safety, and to blame me for having counseled war and yourselves for having voted it. [5] And yet if you are angry with me, it is with one who, as I believe, is second to no man either in knowledge of the proper policy, or in the ability to expound it, and who is moreover not only a patriot but an honest one. [6] A man possessing that knowledge without that faculty of exposition might as well have no idea at all on the matter: if he had both these gifts, but no love for his country, he would be but a cold advocate for her interests; while were his patriotism not proof against bribery, everything would go for a price. [7] So that if you thought that I was even moderately distinguished for these qualities when you took my advice and went to war, there is certainly no reason now why I should be charged with having done wrong.”
2.61
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATHENS
Pericles asserts that Athens has no choice between war or submission, and that his policy remains correct except for the weakness of the Athenians themselves, who must overcome private griefs caused by the unforeseeable plague.
“For those of course who have a free choice in the matter and whose fortunes are not at stake, war is the greatest of follies. But if the only choice was between submission with loss of independence, and danger with the hope of preserving that independence—in such a case it is he who will not accept the risk that deserves blame, not he who will. [2] I am the same man and do not alter, it is you who change, since in fact you took my advice while unhurt, and waited for misfortune to repent of it; and the apparent error of my policy lies in the infirmity of your resolution, since the suffering that it entails is being felt by everyone among you, while its advantage is still remote and obscure to all, and a great and sudden reverse having befallen you, your mind is too much depressed to persevere in your resolves. [3] For before what is sudden, unexpected, and least within calculation the spirit quails; and putting all else aside, the plague has certainly been an emergency of this kind. [4] Born, however, as you are, citizens of a great state, and brought up, as you have been, with habits equal to your birth, you should be ready to face the greatest disasters and still to keep unimpaired the luster of your name. For the judgment of mankind is as relentless to the weakness that falls short of a recognized renown, as it is jealous of the arrogance that aspires higher than its due. Cease then to grieve for your private afflictions, and address yourselves instead to the safety of the common-wealth.”
2.62
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATHENS
Pericles argues that the Athenians’ naval supremacy permits them to go wherever they wish at sea; that the loss of land and houses is trivial; and that they may face the war with confidence based on a true assessment of their resources.
“If you shrink before the exertions which the war makes necessary, and fear that after all they may not have a happy result, you know the reasons by which I have often demonstrated to you the groundlessness of your apprehension. If those are not enough, I will now reveal an advantage arising from the greatness of your dominion, which I think has never yet suggested itself to you, which I never mentioned in my previous speeches, and which has so bold a sound that I should scarce adventure it now were it not for the unnatural depression which I see around me. [2] You perhaps think that your empire extends only over your allies; I will declare to you the truth. The visible field of action has two parts, land and sea. In the whole of one of these you are completely supreme, not merely as far as you use it at present, but also to what further extent you may think fit: in fine, your naval resources are such that your vessels may go where they please, without the King or any other nation on earth being able to stop them. [3] So that although you may think it a great privation to lose the use of your land and houses, still you must see that this power is something widely different; and instead of fretting on their account, you should really regard them in the light of the gardens and other accessories that embellish a great fortune, and as, in comparison, of little moment. You should know too that liberty preserved by your efforts will easily recover for us what we have lost, while, the knee once bowed, even what you have will pass from you. Your fathers receiving these possessions not from others, but from themselves, did not let slip what their labor had acquired, but delivered them safe to you; and in this respect at least you must prove yourselves their equals, remembering that to lose what one has got is more disgraceful than to be thwarted in getting, and you must confront your enemies not merely with spirit but with disdain. [4] Confidence can indeed a blissful ignorance impart, ay, even to a coward’s breast, but disdain is the privilege of those who, like us, have been assured by reflection of their superiority to their adversary. [5] And where the chances are the same, knowledge fortifies courage by the contempt which is its consequence, its trust being placed, not in hope, which is the prop of the desperate, but in a judgment grounded upon existing resources, whose anticipations are more to be depended upon.”
2.63
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATHENS
Pericles points out that the Athenian empire is a tyranny that cannot be given up without risk.
“Again, your country has a right to your services in sustaining the glories of her position. These are a common source of pride to you all, and you cannot decline the burdens of empire and still expect to share its honors. You should remember also that what you are fighting against is not merely slavery as an exchange for independence, but also loss of empire and danger from the animosities incurred in its exercise. [2] Besides, to recede is no longer possible, if indeed any of you in the alarm of the moment has become enamored of the honesty of such an unambitious part. For what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe. [3] And men of these retiring views, making converts of others, would quickly ruin a state; indeed the result would be the same if they could live independent by themselves; for the retiring and unambitious are never secure without vigorous protectors at their side; indeed, such qualities are useless to an imperial city, though they may help a dependency to an unmolested servitude.”
2.64
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATHENS
Pericles concludes that all has gone according to plan except for the plague. He calls on the Athenians to cease parleying with the Spartans and to redouble their efforts to win the war.
“But you must not be seduced by citizens like these, nor be angry with me who, if I voted for war, only did as you did yourselves, in spite of the enemy having invaded your country and done what you could be certain that he would do if you refused to comply with his demands; and in addition to what we expected, the plague has come upon us—the only point indeed at which our calculation has been at fault. It is this, I know, that has had a large share in making me more unpopular than I should otherwise have been, quite undeservedly, unless you are also prepared to give me the credit for any success with which chance may present you. [2] Besides, the hand of Heaven must be borne with resignation, that of the enemy with fortitude; this was the old way at Athens, and do not you prevent it being so still. [3] Remember, too, that if your country has the greatest name in all the world, it is because she never bent before disaster; because she has expended more life and effort in war than any other city, and has won for herself a power greater than any hitherto known, the memory of which will descend to the latest posterity; even if now, in obedience to the general law of decay, we should ever be forced to yield, still it will be remembered that we held rule over more Hellenes than any other Hellenic state, that we sustained the greatest wars against their united or separate powers, and inhabited a city unrivaled by any other in resources or magnitude. [4] These glories may incur the censure of the slow and unambitious; but in the breast of the energetic they will awake emulation, and in those who must remain without them an envious regret. [5] Hatred and unpopularity at the moment have fallen to the lot of all who have aspired to rule others; but where hatred must be incurred, true wisdom incurs it for the highest objects. Hatred also is short-lived; but that which makes the splendor of the present and the glory of the future remains forever unforgotten. [6] Make your decision, therefore, for glory then and honor now, and attain both objects by instant and zealous effort: do not send heralds to Sparta, and do not betray any sign of being oppressed by your present sufferings, since they whose minds are least sensitive to calamity, and whose hands are most quick to meet it, are the greatest men and the greatest communities.”
2.65
430
2nd Year/Summer
ATHENS
Thucydides gives an account of Pericles’ character, accomplishments, and leadership; and then offers an analysis of why Athens, by failing to follow Pericles’ advice, ultimately lost the war.
Such were the arguments by which Pericles tried to cure the Athenians of their anger against him and to divert their thoughts from their immediate afflictions. [2] As a community he succeeded in convincing them; they not only gave up all idea of sending to Sparta, but applied themselves with increased energy to the war; still as private individuals they could not help smarting under their sufferings, the common people having been deprived of the little that they ever possessed, while the higher orders had lost fine properties with costly establishments and buildings in the country, and, worst of all, had war instead of peace. [3] In fact, the public feeling against him did not subside until he had been fined. [4] Not long afterwards, however, according to the way of the multitude, they again elected him general and committed all their affairs to his hands, having now become less sensitive to their private and domestic afflictions, and understanding that he was the best man of all for the needs of the state. [5] For as long as he was at the head of the state during the peace, he pursued a moderate and conservative policy; and in his time its greatness was at its height. When the war broke out, here also he seems to have rightly gauged the power of his country. [6] He outlived its commencement two years and six months, and the correctness of his foresight concerning the war became better known after his death. [7] He told them to wait quietly, to pay attention to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a favorable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing private ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite foreign to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies—projects whose success would only conduce to the honor and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war. [8] The causes of this are not far to seek. Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent control over the multitude—in short, to lead them instead of being led by them; for as he never sought power by improper means, be was never compelled to flatter them, but, on the contrary, enjoyed so high an estimation that he could afford to anger them by contradiction. [9] Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently elated, he would with a word reduce them to alarm; on the other hand, if they fell victims to a panic, he could at once restore them to confidence. In short, what was nominally a democracy was becoming in his hands government by the first citizen. [10] With his successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude. [11] This, as might have been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a host of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so much through a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to occupy themselves with private squabbles for the leadership of The People, by which they not only paralyzed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil discord at home. [12] Yet after losing most of their fleet besides other forces in Sicily, and with faction already dominant in the city, they could still for three years make head against their original adversaries, joined not only by the Sicilians, but also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at last by the King’s son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally succumb till they fell the victims of their own intestine disorders. [13] So excessively abundant were the resources from which the genius of Pericles foresaw an easy triumph in the war over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians.
2.66
430
2nd Year/Summer
ZACYNTHUS
The Peloponnesians send a fleet to Zacynthus.
During the same summer the Spartans and their allies made an expedition with a hundred ships against Zacynthus, an island lying off the coast of Elis, peopled by a colony of Achaeans from the Peloponnesus, and in alliance with Athens. [2] There were a thousand Spartan hoplites on board, and Cnemus, a Spartiate, as admiral. They made a descent from their ships, and ravaged most of the country; but as the inhabitants would not submit, they sailed back home.
2.67
430
2nd Year/Summer
THRACE
With the help of Sadocus, Sitalces’ son, Athenians in Thrace capture Spartan envoys to the Persian king. Sent to Athens, the envoys are executed without trial.
At the end of the same summer the Corinthian Aristeus, with the envoys from Sparta Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Protodamus, and Timagoras from Tegea, and a private individual named Pollis from Argos, came to Sitalces son of Teres, king of Thrace, on their way to Asia to persuade the King to supply funds and join in the war. They hoped to induce Teres, if possible, to forsake the alliance of Athens and to march on Potidaea which was then beseiged by an Athenian force. They also hoped to persuade Teres to convey them across the Hellespont to Pharnabazus, who was to send them up country to the King. [2] But there chanced to be with Sitalces some Athenian ambassadors, Learchus son of Callimachus, and Ameiniades son of Philemon, who persuaded Sitalces’ son, Sadocus, the new Athenian citizen, to put the men into their hands and thus prevent their crossing over to the King and doing their part to injure his city. [3] He accordingly had them seized, as they were traveling through Thrace to the vessel in which they were to cross the Hellespont, by a party whom he had sent on with Learchus and Ameiniades, and gave orders for their delivery to the Athenian ambassadors, by whom they were brought to Athens. [4] On their arrival, the Athenians, afraid that Aristeus, who had been notably the prime mover in the previous affairs of Potidaea and their Thracian possessions, might live to do them still more mischief if he escaped, slew them all the same day, without giving them a trial or hearing the defense which they wished to offer, and cast their bodies into a pit; thinking themselves justified in using in retaliation the same mode of warfare which the Spartans had begun, when they slew and cast into pits all the Athenian and allied traders whom they caught on board the merchantmen round the Peloponnesus. Indeed, at the outset of the war, the Spartans butchered as enemies all whom they took on the sea, whether allies of Athens or neutrals.
2.68
430
2nd Year/Summer
AMPHILOCHIAN ARGOS
The Ambraciots and their allies attack Amphilochian Argos, but fail to take the city. The history of enmity between these two peoples is described.
About the same time, toward the close of the summer, the Ambraciot forces, with a number of barbarians that they had raised, marched against the Amphilochian Argos and the rest of that country. [2] The origin of their enmity against the Argives was this. [3] This Argos and the rest of Amphilochia were colonized by Amphilochus son of Amphiaraus. Dissatisfied with the state of affairs at home on his return after the Trojan war, he built this city in the Ambracian gulf, and named it Argos after his own country. [4] This was the largest city in Amphilochia, and its inhabitants the most powerful. [5] Under the pressure of misfortune many generations afterwards, they called in the Ambraciots, their neighbors on the Amphilochian border, to join their colony; and it was by this union with the Ambraciots that they learnt their present Hellenic speech, the rest of the Amphilochians being barbarians. [6] After a time the Ambraciots expelled the Argives and held the city themselves. [7] Upon this the Amphilochians gave themselves over to the Acarnanians; and the two together called the Athenians, who sent them Phormio as general and thirty ships. Upon his arrival they took Argos by storm, and made slaves of the Ambraciots; and the Amphilochian Argives and Acarnanians inhabited the city in common. [8] After this began the alliance between the Athenians and Acarnanians. [9] The enmity of the Ambraciots against the Argives thus commenced with the enslavement of their citizens; and afterwards during the war, the Ambraciots collected this armament among themselves and the Chaonians, and other of the neighboring barbarians. Arrived before Argos, they became masters of the country; but not being successful in their attacks upon the city, returned home and dispersed among their different peoples.
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NAUPACTUS
Phormio’s ships are at Naupactus.
CARIA, LYCIA
Athens’ squadron to collect tribute and put down privateers in Caria and Lycia suffers a defeat.
Such were the events of the summer. The ensuing winter the Athenians sent twenty ships round the Peloponnesus, under the command of Phormio, who stationed himself at Naupactus and kept watch against anyone sailing in or out of Corinth and the Crisaean gulf Six others went to Caria and Lycia under Melesander, to collect tribute in those parts, and also to prevent the Peloponnesian privateers from taking up their station in those waters and molesting the passage of the merchantmen from Phaselis and Phoenicia and the adjoining continent. [2] However, Melesander, going up the country into Lycia with a force of Athenians from the ships and the allies, was defeated and killed in battle, with the loss of a number of his troops.
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POTIDAEA
Potidaea surrenders on terms. Athens criticizes its generals for granting terms and sends settlers to colonize the site.
The same winter the Potidaeans at length found themselves no longer able to hold out against their besiegers. The inroads of the Peloponnesians into Attica had not had the desired effect of making the Athenians raise the siege. There were no provisions left; and so far had distress for food gone in Potidaea that, besides a number of other horrors, instances had even occurred of the people having eaten one another. So in this extremity they at last made proposals for capitulating to the Athenian generals in command against them, Xenophon son of Euripides, Hestiodorus son of Aristocleides, and Phanomachus son of Callimachus. [2] The generals accepted their proposals, seeing the sufferings of the army in so exposed a position; besides which the state had already spent two thousand talents upon the siege. [3] The terms of the capitulation were as follows: a free passage out for themselves, their children, wives, and auxiliaries, with one garment apiece, the women with two, and a fixed sum of money for their journey. [4] Under this treaty they went out to Chalcidice and other places, according as was in their power. The Athenians, however, blamed the generals for granting terms without instructions from home, being of opinion that they could have gained control of the city without granting terms. They afterwards sent settlers of their own to Potidaea, and colonized it. Such were the events of the winter, and so ended the second year of this war of which Thucydides was the historian.
ILLUSTRATION 2.69 FRAGMENT OF TRIBUTE LIST FROM 440/39
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PLATAEA
The Peloponnesians attack Plataea instead of Attica this year, despite Plataean appeals and protests.
The next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, instead of invading Attica, marched against Plataea, under the command of Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Spartans. He had encamped his army and was about to lay waste the country, when the Plataeans hastened to send envoys to him, and spoke as follows: [2] “Archidamus and Spartans, in invading the Plataean territory you do what is wrong in itself, and worthy neither of yourselves nor of the fathers who begot you. Pausanias son of Cleombrotus, your countryman, after freeing Hellas from the Medes with the help of those Hellenes who were willing to undertake the risk of the battle fought near our city, offered sacrifice to Zeus the Liberator in the agora of Plataea, and calling all the allies together restored to the Plataeans their city and territory, and declared it independent and inviolate against aggression or conquest. Should any such be attempted, the allies present were to help according to their power. [3] Your fathers rewarded us thus for the courage and patriotism that we displayed at that perilous epoch; but you do just the contrary, coming with our bitterest enemies, the Thebans, to enslave us. [4] We appeal, therefore, to the gods to whom the oaths were then made, to the gods of your ancestors, and lastly to those of our country, and call upon you to refrain from violating our territory or transgressing the oaths, and to let us live independent, as Pausanias decreed.”
MAP 2.72 OPERATIONS IN ASIA, PLATAEA, AND CHALCIDICE
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PLATAEA
Archidamus offers neutrality to Plataea, with guarantees of protection and restitution after the war.
The Plataeans had got thus far when they were cut short by Archidamus saying, “There is justice, Plataeans, in what you say, if you act up to your words. According to the grant of Pausanias, continue to be independent yourselves, and join in freeing those of your fellow countrymen who, after sharing in the perils of that period, joined in the oaths to you, and are now subject to the Athenians; for it is to free them and the rest that all this provision and war has been made. I could wish that you would share our labors and abide by the oaths yourselves; if this is impossible, do what we have already required of you—remain neutral, enjoying your own; join neither side, but receive both as friends and neither as allies for the war. With this we shall be satisfied.” [2] Such were the words of Archidamus. The Plataeans, after hearing what he had to say, went into the city and acquainted the people with what had passed, and presently returned for answer that it was impossible for them to do what he proposed without consulting the Athenians, with whom their children and wives now were; besides which they had their fears for the city. After his departure, what was to prevent the Athenians from coming and taking it out of their hands, or the Thebans, who would be included in the oaths, from taking advantage of the proposed neutrality to make a second attempt to seize the city? [3] Upon these points he tried to reassure them by saying: “You have only to deliver over the city and houses to us Spartans, to point out the boundaries of your land, the number of your fruit trees, and whatever else can be numerically stated, and yourselves to withdraw wherever you like as long as the war shall last. When it is over we will restore to you whatever we received, and in the interim hold it in trust and keep it in cultivation, paying you a sufficient allowance.”
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PLATAEA
Plataea consults Athens, which asks her to honor their alliance.
When they had heard what he had to say, they reentered the city, and after consulting with the people said that they wished first to acquaint the Athenians with this proposal, and in the event of their approving to accede to it; in the meantime they asked him to grant them a truce and not to lay waste their territory. He accordingly granted a truce for the number of days requisite for the journey, and meanwhile abstained from ravaging their territory. [2] The Plataean envoys went to Athens, and consulted with the Athenians, and returned with the following message to those in the city: [3] “The Athenians say, Plataeans, that they have never, since we became their allies, on any occasion abandoned you to an enemy, nor will they now neglect you, but will help you according to their ability; and they solemnly call upon you by the oaths which your fathers swore, to keep the alliance unaltered.”
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PLATAEA
Plataea decides to remain with Athens. Archidamus offers prayers to justify an assault on Plataea.
On the delivery of this message by the envoys, the Plataeans resolved not to be unfaithful to the Athenians but to endure, if it must be, seeing their lands laid waste and any other trials that might come to them, and not to send out again, but to answer from the wall that it was impossible for them to do as the Spartans proposed. [2] As soon as be had received this answer, King Archidamus proceeded first to make a solemn appeal to the gods and heroes of the country in the following words: “Ye gods and heroes of the Plataean territory, be my witnesses that not as aggressors originally, nor until these had first departed from the common oath, did we invade this land, in which our fathers offered you their prayers before defeating the Medes, and which you made favorable to the Hellenic arms; nor shall we be aggressors in the measures to which we may now resort, since we have made many fair proposals but have not been successful. Graciously accord that those who were the first to offend may be punished for it, and that vengeance may be attained by those who would righteously inflict it.”
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Thucydides describes the Peloponnesian siege operations and the Plataean counterworks.
After this appeal to the gods Archidamus put his army in motion. First he enclosed the city with a palisade formed of the fruit trees which they cut down, to prevent further exit from Plataea; next day they threw up a mound against the city, hoping that the largeness of the force employed would insure the speedy reduction of the place. [2] They accordingly cut down timber from Cithaeron, and built it up on either side, laying it like latticework to serve as a wall to keep the mound from spreading abroad, and carried to it wood and stones and earth and whatever other material might help to complete it. [3] They continued to work at the mound for seventy days and nights without intermission, being divided into relief parties to allow some to be employed in carrying while others took sleep and refreshment; the Spartan officer attached to each contingent keeping the men to the work. [4] But the Plataeans, observing the progress of the mound, constructed a wall of wood and fixed it upon that part of the city wall against which the mound was being erected, and built up bricks inside it which they took from the neighboring houses. [5] The timbers served to bind the building together, and to prevent its becoming weak as it advanced in height; it had also a covering of skins and hides, which protected the woodwork against the attacks of burning missiles and allowed the men to work in safety. [6] Thus the wall was raised to a great height, and the mound opposite made no less rapid progress. The Plataeans also thought of another expedient; they pulled out part of the wall upon which the mound abutted, and carried the earth into the city.
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PLATAEA
A siege warfare of moves and countermoves is described.
Discovering this, the Peloponnesians twisted up clay in wattles of reed and threw it into the breach formed in the mound, in order to give it consistency and prevent its being carried away like the soil. [2] Stopped in this way the Plataeans changed their mode of operation, and digging a mine from the city calculated their way under the mound, and began to carry off its material as before. This went on for a long while without the enemy outside finding it out, so that for all they threw on the top their mound made no progress in proportion, being carried away from beneath and constantly settling down in the vacuum. [3] But the Plataeans fearing that even thus they might not be able to hold out against the superior numbers of the enemy, had yet another invention. They stopped working at the large building in front of the mound, and starting at either end of it inside from the old low wall, built a new one in the form of a crescent running in toward the city in order that in the event of the great wall being taken this might remain, and the enemy have to throw up a fresh mound against it, and as they advanced within might not only have their trouble over again, but also be exposed to missiles on their flanks. [4] While raising the mound the Peloponnesians also brought up siege engines against the city, one of which was brought up upon the mound against the great building and shook down a good piece of it, to the no small alarm of the Plataeans. Others were advanced against different parts of the wall but were lassoed and broken by the Plataeans; who also hung up great beams by long iron chains from either extremity of two poles laid on the wall and projecting over it, and drew them up at an angle whenever any point was threatened by the engine, and loosing their hold let the beam go with its chains slack, so that it fell freely and snapped off the nose of the battering ram.
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PLATAEA
Unable to take the city by assault, the Peloponnesians plan to besiege it. A last attempt to burn out the defenders fails.
After this the Peloponnesians, finding that their siege engines effected nothing, and that their mound was met by the counterwork, concluded that their present means of offense were unequal to the taking of the city, and prepared for its circumvallation. [2] First, however, they determined to try the effects of fire and see whether they could not, with the help of a wind, burn the city, as it was not a large one; indeed they thought of every possible expedient by which the place might be reduced without the expense of a siege. [3] They accordingly brought bundles of brushwood and threw them from the mound, first into the space between it and the wall; and this soon becoming full from the number of hands at work, they next heaped the faggots up as far into the city as they could reach from the top, and then lighted the wood by setting fire to it with sulfur and pitch. [4] The consequence was a fire greater than anyone had ever yet seen produced by human agency, though it could not of course be compared to the spontaneous conflagrations known to occur sometimes through the wind rubbing the branches of a mountain forest together. [5] And this fire was not only remarkable for its magnitude, but was also, at the end of so many perils, within an ace of proving fatal to the Plataeans; a great part of the city became entirely inaccessible, and had a wind blown upon it, in accordance with the hopes of the enemy, nothing could have saved them. [6] As it was, there is also a story of heavy rain and thunder having come on by which the fire was put out and the danger averted.
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PLATAEA
The Peloponnesians build a siege wall around Plataea. The defenders are described.
Failing in this last attempt the Peloponnesians left a portion of their forces on the spot, dismissing the rest, and built a wall of circumvallation round the city, dividing the ground among the various cities present; a ditch being made within and without the lines, from which they got their bricks. [2] All being finished by about the rising of Arcturus, they left men enough to man half the wall, the rest being manned by the Boeotians, and drawing off their army dispersed to their several cities. [3] The Plataeans had before sent off their wives and children and oldest men and the mass of the noncombatants to Athens; so that the number of the besieged left in the place comprised four hundred of their own citizens, eighty Athenians, and a hundred and ten women to bake their bread. [4] This was the sum total at the commencement of the siege, and there was no one else within the walls, bond or free. Such were the arrangements made for the blockade of Plataea.
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CHALCIDICE
Athenian forces win an initial success at Spartolus but then suffer heavy losses when defeated by peltasts and cavalry.
The same summer and simultaneously with the expedition against Plataea, the Athenians marched with two thousand hoplites and two hundred horse against the Chalcidians in the Thracian region and the Bottiaeans, just as the corn was getting ripe, under the command of Xenophon son of Euripides, with two colleagues. [2] Arriving before Spartolus in Bottiaea, they destroyed the corn and had some hopes of the city coming over through the intrigues of a faction within. But those of a different way of thinking had sent to Olynthus; and a garrison of hoplites and other troops arrived accordingly. These issuing from Spartolus were engaged by the Athenians in front of the city: [3] the Chalcidian hoplites, and some auxiliaries with them, were beaten and retreated into Spartolus; but the Chalcidian horse and light troops defeated the horse and light troops of the Athenians. [4] The Chalcidians already had a few peltasts from Crusis, and presently after the battle were joined by some others from Olynthus; [5] upon seeing them the light troops from Spartolus, emboldened by this extra force and by their previous success, with the help of the Chalcidian horse and the reinforcement just arrived again attacked the Athenians, who retired upon the two divisions which they had left with their baggage. [6] Whenever the Athenians advanced, their adversary gave way, pressing them with missiles the instant they began to retire. The Chalcidian horse also, riding up and charging them just as they pleased, at last caused a panic amongst them and routed and pursued them to a great distance. [7] The Athenians took refuge in Potidaea, and afterwards recovered their dead under truce, and returned to Athens with the remnant of their army; four hundred and thirty men and all the generals having fallen. The Chalcidians and Bottiaeans set up a trophy, took up their dead, and dispersed to their several cities.
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ACARNANIA
At Ambraciot invitation, a Peloponnesian expedition sails to the Ambracian Gulf and launches an attack on Acarnania.
The same summer, not long after this, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, being desirous of reducing the whole of Acarnania and detaching it from Athens, persuaded the Spartans to equip a fleet from their confederacy and send a thousand hoplites to Acarnania, arguing that if a combined movement were made by land and sea, the coastal Acarnanians would be unable to march, and the conquest of Zacynthus and Cephallenia would follow easily upon the possession of Acarnania. Thus, the cruise round the Peloponnesus would no longer be so convenient for the Athenians. Besides which there was a hope of taking Naupactus. [2] The Spartans accordingly at once sent off a few vessels with Cnemus, who was still admiral, and the hoplites on board; and sent round orders for the fleet to equip as quickly as possible and sail to Leucas. [3] The Corinthians were the most forward in the business; the Ambraciots being a colony of theirs. While the ships from Corinth, Sicyon, and the neighborhood were getting ready, and those from Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia, which had arrived before, were waiting for them at Leucas, [4] Cnemus and his thousand hoplites had run into the gulf, giving the slip to Phormio, the commander of the Athenian squadron stationed off Naupactus, and began at once to prepare for the land expedition. [5] The Hellenic troops with him consisted of the Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians with whom he came; the thousand barbarian Chaonians, who, belonging to a nation that has no king, were led by Photys and Nicanor, the two members of the royal family to whom the chieftainship for that year had been assigned. With the Chaonians came also some Thesprotians, like them without a king, [6] some Molossians and Atintanians led by Sabylinthus, the guardian of King Tharyps who was still a minor, and some Parauaeans under their king Oroedus, accompanied by a thousand Orestians, subjects of king Antiochus and placed by him under the command of Oroedus. [7] There were also a thousand Macedonians sent by Perdiccas without the knowledge of the Athenians, but they arrived too late. With this force Cnemus set out, without waiting for the fleet from Corinth. Passing through the territory of Amphilochian Argos, and sacking the open village of Limnaea, they advanced to Stratus the Acarnanian capital; convinced that once this was taken, the rest of the country would speedily come over.
MAP 2.80 AMBRACIAN-PELOPONNESIAN OPERATIONS IN ACARNANIA
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ACARNANIA
The Acarnanians ambush and defeat the barbarian division of the Peloponnesian army in front of Stratus.
The Acarnanians, finding themselves invaded by a large army by land, and from the sea threatened by a hostile fleet, made no combined attempt at resistance, but remained to defend their homes, and sent for help to Phormio, who replied that when a fleet was on the point of sailing from Corinth, it was impossible for him to leave Naupactus unprotected. [2] The Peloponnesians meanwhile and their allies advanced upon Stratus in three divisions, with the intention of encamping near it and attempting the wall by force if they failed to succeed by negotiation. [3] The order of march was as follows: the center was occupied by the Chaonians and the rest of the barbarians, with the Leucadians and Anactorians and their followers on the right, and Cnemus with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots on the left; each division being a long way off from, and sometimes even out of sight of, the others. [4] The Hellenes advanced in good order, keeping a lookout till they encamped in a good position; but the Chaonians, filled with self-confidence, and having the highest reputation for courage among the tribes of that part of the continent, without waiting to occupy their camp, rushed on with the rest of the barbarians, with the idea that they should take the city by assault and obtain the sole glory of the enterprise. [5] While they were coming on, the Stratians becoming aware how things stood, and thinking that the defeat of this division would considerably dishearten the Hellenes behind it, occupied the environs of the city with ambuscades, and as soon as they approached engaged them at close quarters from the city and the ambuscades. [6] A panic seizing the Chaonians, great numbers of them were slain; and as soon as they were seen to give way the rest of the barbarians turned and fled. [7] Owing to the distance by which their allies had preceded them, neither of the Hellenic divisions knew anything of the battle, but fancied they were hastening on to encamp. [8] However, when the flying barbarians broke in upon them, they opened their ranks to receive them, brought their divisions together, and stopped quiet where they were for the day; the Stratians not offering to engage them, as the rest of the Acarnanians had not yet arrived, but contenting themselves with slinging at them from a distance, which distressed them greatly as they could not move without their armor. The Acarnanians are thought to excel in this mode of warfare.
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ACARNANIA
Cnemus withdraws through Oeniadae.
As soon as night fell, Cnemus hastily drew off his army to the river Anapus, about nine miles from Stratus, recovering his dead next day under truce, and being there joined by the friendly Oeniadae, fell back upon their city before the enemy’s reinforcements came up. From hence each returned home; and the Stratians set up a trophy for the battle with the barbarians.
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OFF PATRAE
A Peloponnesian fleet carrying troops is attacked in open water by Phormio’s triremes. The Peloponnesians form a defensive circle.
Meanwhile the fleet from Corinth and the rest of the confederates in the Crisaean gulf, which was to have cooperated with Cnemus and prevented the coastal Acarnanians from joining their countrymen in the interior, was stopped from doing so by being compelled about the same time as the battle at Stratus to fight with Phormio and the twenty Athenian vessels stationed at Naupactus. [2] For they were watched, as they coasted along out of the gulf, by Phormio, who wished to attack in the open sea. [3] But the Corinthians and allies had started for Acarnania without any idea of fighting at sea, and with vessels more like transports for carrying soldiers; besides which, they never dreamed of the twenty Athenian ships venturing to engage their forty-seven. However, while they were coasting along their own shore, there were the Athenians sailing along in line with them; and when they tried to cross over from Patrae in Achaea to the mainland on the other side, on their way to Acarnania, they saw them again coming out from Chalcis and the river Evenus to meet them. They slipped from their moorings in the night, but were observed, and were at length compelled to fight in midpassage. [4] Each state that contributed to the armament had its own general; the Corinthian commanders were Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. [5] The Peloponnesians ranged their vessels in as large a circle as possible without leaving an opening, with the prows outside and the sterns in; and placed within all the small craft in company and their five best sailers to move out at a moment’s notice and strengthen any point threatened by the enemy.
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OFF PATRAE
Phormio skillfully waits for dawn winds to disturb the enemy formation and then attacks, routing the enemy and capturing twelve triremes.
The Athenians, formed in line, sailed round and round them, and torced them to contract their circle, by continually brushing past and making as though they would attack at once, having been previously cautioned by Phormio not to do so till he gave the signal. [2] His hope was that the Peloponnesians would not retain their order like a force on shore, but that the ships would fall foul of one another and the small craft cause confusion; and if the wind which usually rose toward morning should blow from the gulf (in expectation of which he kept sailing round them), he felt sure they would not remain steady an instant. He also thought that it rested with him to attack when he pleased, as his ships were better sailers, and that an attack timed by the coming of the wind would tell best. [3] When the wind came up, the enemy’s ships were now in a narrow space, and what with the wind and the small craft dashing against them, at once fell into confusion: ship fell foul of ship, while the crews were pushing them off with poles, and by their shouting, swearing, and struggling with one another, made captains’ orders and boatswains’ cries alike inaudible, and through being unable for want of practice to clear their oars in the rough water, prevented the vessels from obeying their helmsmen properly. At this moment Phormio gave the signal, and the Athenians attacked. Sinking first one of the commanders’ ships, they then disabled all they came across, so that no one thought of resistance for the confusion, but all fled for Patrae and Dyme in Achaea. [4] The Athenians gave chase and captured twelve ships, and taking most of the men out of them sailed to Molycrium, and after setting up a trophy on the promontory of Rhium and dedicating a ship to Poseidon, returned to Naupactus. [5] As for the Peloponnesians, they at once sailed with their remaining ships along the coast from Dyme and Patrae to Cyllene, the Eleian arsenal where Cnemus and the ships from Leucas that were to have joined them also arrived after the battle of Stratus.
ILLUSTRATION 2.84 THE MODERN TRIREME OLYMPIAS AT SEA, ROWING (TOP) AND UNDER SAIL
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CYLLENE
Peloponnesian commissioners arrive to reorganize the fleet. The reinforcements requested by Phormio are diverted to Crete.
The Spartans now sent to the fleet of Cnemus three commissioners, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron, with orders to prepare to engage again with better fortune, and not to be driven from the sea by a few vessels. [2] For they could not at all explain their defeat, the less so as it was their first attempt at sea; and they fancied that it was not that their navy was so inferior, but that there had been misconduct somewhere, not considering the long experience of the Athenians as compared with the little practice which they had had themselves. The commissioners were accordingly sent in anger. [3] As soon as they arrived they set to work with Cnemus to order ships from the different states, and to put those which they already had in fighting order. [4] Meanwhile Phormio sent word to Athens of their preparations and his own victory, and desired as many ships as possible to be speedily sent to him, as he stood in daily expectation of a battle. [5] Twenty were accordingly sent, but instructions were given to their commander to go first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, who was proxenus of the Athenians, had persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, promising to procure the reduction of that hostile city; his real wish being to oblige the Polichnitans, neighbors of the Cydonians. [6] He accordingly went with the ships to Crete, and, accompanied by the Polichnitans, laid waste the lands of the Cydonians; and, what with adverse winds and stress of weather, wasted no little time there.
MAP 2.86 PHORMIO’S OPERATIONS OFF NAUPACTUS; THE PELOPONNESIAN RAID ON THE PIRAEUS6a
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ACHAEAN RHIUM
Both fleets maneuver to gain advantage. The Peloponnesian commanders decide to encourage their men with a speech.
While the Athenians were thus detained in Crete, the Peloponnesians in Cyllene got ready for battle, and coasted along to Panormus in Achaca, where their land army had come to support them. [2] Phormio also coasted along to Molycrian Rhium, and anchored outside it with twenty ships, the same as he had fought with before. [3] This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians. The other, in the Peloponnesus, lies opposite to it; the sea between them is about three-quarters of a mile broad, and forms the mouth of the Crisaean gulf. [4] At this, the Achaean Rhium, not far off Panormus, where their army lay, the Peloponnesians now cast anchor with seventy-seven ships, when they saw the Athenians do so. [5] For six or seven days they remained opposite each other, practicing and preparing for the battle; the one resolved not to sail out of the Rhia into the open sea, for fear of the disaster which had already happened to them, the other not to sail into the straits, thinking it advantageous to the enemy to fight in the narrows. [6] At last Cnemus and Brasidas and the rest of the Peloponnesian commanders, being desirous of bringing on a battle as soon as possible, before reinforcements should arrive from Athens, and noticing that the men were most of them cowed by the previous defeat and out of heart for the business, first called them together and encouraged them as follows:
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ACHAEAN RHIUM
The Peloponnesian commanders call on their men to be brave despite their inexperience.
“Peloponnesians, the late engagement which may have made some of you afraid of the one now in prospect really gives no just ground for apprehension. [2] Preparation for it, as you know, there was little enough; and the object of our voyage was not so much to fight at sea as an expedition by land. Besides this, the chances of war were largely against us; and perhaps also inexperience had something to do with our failure in our first naval action. [3] It was not, therefore, cowardice that produced our defeat, nor ought the determination which force has not quelled, but which still has a word to say with its adversary, to lose its edge from the result of an accident; but admitting the possibility of a chance miscarriage, we should know that brave hearts must be always brave, and while they remain so can never put forward inexperience as an excuse for misconduct. [4] Nor are you so behind the enemy in experience as you are ahead of him in courage; and although the science of your opponents would, if valor accompanied it, have also the presence of mind to carry out in an emergency the lesson it has learnt, yet a faint heart will make all art powerless in the face of danger. For fear takes away presence of mind, and without valor art is useless. [5] Against their superior experience set your superior daring, and against the fear induced by defeat the fact of your having been then unprepared; [6] remember, too, that you have always the advantage of superior numbers, and of engaging off your own coast, supported by your hoplites; and as a rule, numbers and equipment give victory. [7] At no point, therefore, is defeat likely; and as for our previous mistakes, the very fact of their occurrence will teach us better for the future. [8] Steersmen and sailors may, therefore, confidently attend to their several duties, none quitting the station assigned to them; [9] as for ourselves, we promise to prepare for the engagement at least as well as your previous commanders, and to give no excuse for anyone misconducting himself. Should any insist on doing so, he shall meet with the punishment he deserves, while the brave shall be honored with the appropriate rewards of valor.”
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MOLYCRIAN RHIUM
Phormio also encourages his men, seeing that they are frightened by the numerical odds they face.
The Peloponnesian commanders encouraged their men after this fashion. Phormio, meanwhile, being himself not without fears for the courage of his men, and noticing that they were forming in groups among themselves and were alarmed at the odds against them, desired to call them together and give them confidence and counsel in the present emergency. [2] He had before continually told them, and had accustomed their minds to the idea, that there was no numerical superiority that they could not face; and the men themselves had long been persuaded that Athenians need never retire before any number of Peloponnesian vessels. [3] At the moment, however, he saw that they were dispirited by the sight before them, and wishing to refresh their confidence, called them together and spoke as follows:
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MOLYCRIAN RHIUM
Phormio explains why his fleet, despite the odds, should face the coming battle with confidence.
“I see, my men, that you are frightened by the number of the enemy, and I have accordingly called you together, not liking you to be afraid of what is not really terrible. [2] In the first place, the Peloponnesians, already defeated, and not even themselves thinking that they are a match for us, have not ventured to meet us on equal terms, but have equipped this multitude of ships against us. Next, as to that upon which they most rely, the courage which they suppose constitutional to them, their confidence here only arises from the success which their experience in land service usually gives them, and which they fancy will do the same for them at sea. [3] But this advantage will in all justice belong to us on this element, if to them on that; as they are not superior to us in courage, but we are each of us more confident, according to our experience in our particular department. [4] Besides, as the Spartans use their supremacy over the allies to promote their own glory, they are most of them being brought into danger against their will, or they would never, after such a decided defeat, have ventured upon a fresh engagement. [5] You need not, therefore, be afraid of their dash. You, on the contrary, inspire a much greater and better founded alarm, both because of your late victory and also of their belief that we should not face them unless about to do something worthy of such an outstanding success. [6] An adversary numerically superior, like the one before us, comes into action trusting more to strength than to resolution; while he who voluntarily confronts tremendous odds must have very great internal resources to draw upon. For these reasons the Peloponnesians fear our irrational audacity more than they would ever have done a more commensurate preparation. [7] Besides, many armaments have before now succumbed to an inferior through want of skill or sometimes of courage; neither of which defects certainly are ours. [8] As to the battle, it shall not be, if I can help it, in the strait, nor will I sail in there at all; seeing that in a contest between a number of clumsily managed vessels and a small, fast, well-handled squadron, want of sea room is an undoubted disadvantage. One cannot run down an enemy properly without having a sight of him a good way off, nor can one retire at need when pressed; one can neither break the line nor return upon his rear, the proper tactics for a fast sailer; but the naval action necessarily becomes a land one, in which numbers must decide the matter. [9] For all this I will provide as far as can be. Do you stay at your posts by your ships, and be sharp at catching the word of command, the more so as we are observing one another from so short a distance; and in action think order and silence all important—qualities useful in war generally, and in naval engagements in particular—and behave before the enemy in a manner worthy of your past exploits. [10] The issues you will fight for are great—either you will destroy the naval hopes of the Peloponnesians or you will bring nearer to reality the Athenians’ fear of losing control of the sea. [11] And I may once more remind you that you have defeated most of them already; and beaten men do not face a danger twice with the same determination.”
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NAUPACTUS
By sailing toward Naupactus, the Peloponnesians lure Phormio into following them into the straits where they successfully attack him, capturing nine triremes.
Such was the exhortation of Phormio. The Peloponnesians finding that the Athenians did not sail into the gulf and the narrows, in order to lead them in whether they wished it or not, put out at dawn, and forming four abreast, sailed inside the gulf in the direction of their own country, the right wing leading as they had lain at anchor. [2] In this wing were placed twenty of their fastest ships so that in the event of Phormio thinking that their object was Naupactus, and coasting along thither to save the place, the Athenians might not be able to escape their onset by getting outside their wing, but might be cut off by the vessels in question. [3] As they expected, Phormio, in alarm for the place at that moment emptied of its garrison, as soon as he saw them put out, reluctantly and hurriedly embarked and sailed along shore; the Messenian land forces moving along also to support him. [4] The Peloponnesians seeing him coasting along with his ships in single file, and already inside the gulf and close in shore as they so much wished, at one signal turned suddenly and bore down in line at their best speed on the Athenians, hoping to cut off the whole squadron. [5] The eleven leading vessels, however, escaped the Peloponnesian wing and its sudden movement, and reached the more open water; but the rest were overtaken as they tried to run through, driven ashore and disabled; such of the crews being slain as had not swum out of them. [6] Some of the ships the Peloponnesians lashed to their own, and towed off empty; one they took with the men in it; others were just being towed off, when they were saved by the Messenians dashing into the sea with their armor and fighting from the decks that they had boarded.
Thus far victory was with the Peloponnesians and the Athenian fleet destroyed; the twenty ships in the right wing being meanwhile in chase of the eleven Athenian vessels that had escaped their sudden movement and reached the more open water. These, with the exception of one ship, all out-sailed them and got safe into Naupactus, and forming close in shore opposite the temple of Apollo, with their prows facing the enemy, prepared to defend themselves in case the Peloponnesians should sail in shore against them. [2] After a while the Peloponnesians came up, chanting the paeanfor their victory as they sailed on; the single Athenian ship remaining being chased by a Leucadian far ahead of the rest. [3] But there happened to be a merchantman lying at anchor in the roadstead, which the Athenian ship found time to sail round, and struck the Leucadian in chase amidships and sank her. [4] An exploit so sudden and unexpected produced a panic among the Peloponnesians; and having fallen out of order in the excitement of victory, some of them dropped their oars and stopped their way in order to let the main body come up—an unsafe thing to do considering how near they were to the enemy’s prows; while others ran aground in the shallows, in their ignorance of the localities.
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NAUPACTUS
The fleeing Athenian ships reach Naupactus. One of them turns and sinks a pursuer, which causes the Peloponnesian vessels to halt. Some Peloponnesian ships run aground.
Elated at this incident, the Athenians at one word gave a cheer, and dashed at the enemy, who, embarrassed by his mistakes and the disorder in which he found himself, only stood for an instant, and then fled for Panormus, from which he had put out. [2] The Athenians following on his heels took the six vessels nearest them, and recovered those of their own which had been disabled close in shore and taken in tow at the beginning of the action; they killed some of the crews and took some prisoners. [3] On board the Leucadian which went down off the merchantman, was the Spartan Timocrates, who killed himself when the ship was sunk, and was cast up in the harbor of Naupactus. [4] The Athenians on their return set up a trophy on the spot from which they had put out and turned the day, and picking up the wrecks and dead that were on their shore, gave back to the enemy their dead under truce. [5] The Peloponnesians also set up a trophy as victors for the defeat inflicted upon the ships they had disabled in shore, and dedicated the vessel which they had taken at Achaean Rhium, side by side with the trophy. [6] After this, apprehensive of the reinforcement expected from Athens, all except the Leucadians sailed into the Crisaean gulf for Corinth. [7] Not long after their retreat, the twenty Athenian ships, which were to have joined Phormio before the battle, arrived at Naupactus.
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NAUPACTUS
The Athenian ships counterattack, pursuing the Peloponnessans who flee in turn. The Athenians capture six of them and retake their own vessels lost earlier.
Thus the summer ended. Winter was now at hand; but before dispersing the fleet, which had retired to Corinth and the Crisaean gulf, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian captains allowed themselves to be persuaded by the Megarians to make an attempt upon the Piraeus, the port of Athens, which from her decided superiority at sea had been naturally left unguarded and open. [2] Their plan was as follows: the men were each to take their oar, cushion, and rowlock thong, and going overland from Corinth to the sea on the Athenian side, to get to Megara as quickly as they could, and launching forty vessels, which happened to be in the docks at Nisaea, to sail at once to the Piraeus. [3] There was no fleet on the lookout in the harbor, and no one had the least idea of the enemy attempting a surprise; while an open attack would, it was thought, never be deliberately ventured or if contemplated, would speedily be known at Athens. Their plan formed, the next step was to put it in execution. [4] Arriving by night, they launched the vessels from Nisaea but sailed not to the Piraeus as they had originally intended, being afraid of the risk (besides which there was some talk of a wind having stopped them), but to the point of Salamis that looks toward Megara. There the Athenians had a fort and a squadron of three triremes to prevent any vessels from sailing in or out of Megara. They assaulted this fort, towed off the triremes empty, and surprising the inhabitants began to lay waste the rest of the island.
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MEGARA-PIRAEUS
The Peloponnesians plan to raid the Piraeus. They march their sailors by night to triremes at Megara. But instead of sailing to the Piraeus, they stop to pillage Salamis.
Meanwhile fire signals were raised to alarm Athens, and a panic ensued there as serious as any that occurred during the war. The idea in the city was that the enemy had already sailed into the Piraeus; in the Piraeus it was thought that they had taken Salamis and might at any moment arrive in the port; as indeed might easily have been done if their hearts had been a little firmer; certainly no wind would have prevented them. [2] As soon as day broke the Athenians assembled in full force, launched their ships, and embarking in haste and uproar went with the fleet to Salamis, while their soldiery mounted guard in the Piraeus. [3] The Peloponnesians, on becoming aware of the coming relief, after they had overrun most of Salamis, hastily sailed off with their plunder and captives and the three ships from Fort Budorum to Nisaea; the state of their ships also causing them some anxiety, as it was a long while since they had been launched, and they were not watertight. Arrived at Megara, they returned back on foot to Corinth. [4] The Athenians finding them no longer at Salamis, sailed back themselves; and after this made arrangements for guarding the Piraeus more diligently in future, by closing the harbors, and by other suitable precautions.
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PIRAEUS
The Athenians, alarmed by fire signals from Salamis, rush to defend the Piraeus. The Peloponnesians hastily depart. Guards are set at the Piraeus to prevent future surprises.
About the same time, at the beginning of this winter, Sitalces son of Teres, the Odrysian king of Thrace, made an expedition against Perdiccas son of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and the Chalcidians in the neighborhood of Thrace; his object being to enforce one promise and fullfil another. [2] On the one hand, Perdiccas had made him a promise, when hard pressed at the commencement of the war, upon condition that Sitalces should reconcile the Athenians to him and not attempt to restore his brother and enemy, the pretender Philip, but had not offered to fullfil his engagement; on the other, he, Sitalces, on entering into alliance with the Athenians, had agreed to put an end to the Chalcidian war in Thrace. [3] These were the two objects of his invasion. With him he brought Amyntas the son of Philip, whom he destined for the throne of Macedonia, and some Athenian envoys then at his court on this business, and Hagnon as general; for the Athenians were to join him against the Chalcidians with a fleet and as many soldiers as they could get together.
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THRACE
Thucydides explains the reasons for the campaign of Sitalces of Thrace against Perdiccas of Macedon.
Beginning with the Odrysians, he first called out the Thracian tribes subject to him between Mounts Haemus and Rhodope and the Euxine and Hellespont; next the Getae beyond Haemus, and the other hordes settled south of the Danube in the neighborhood of the Euxine, who, like the Getae, border on the Scythians and are armed in the same manner, being all mounted archers. [2] Besides these he summoned many of the independent Thracian hill tribes, swordsmen called Dii, mostly inhabiting Mount Rhodope, some of whom came as mercenaries, others as volunteers; [3] also the Agrianes and Leaeans, and the rest of the Paeonian tribes in his empire, at the confines of which these lay, extending up to the Laeaean Paeonians and the river Strymon which flows from Mount Scombrus through the country of the Agrianes and Leaeans; there the empire of Sitalces ends and the territory of the independent Paeonians begins. [4] Bordering on the Triballi, also independent, were the Treres and Tilataeans, who dwell to the north of Mount Scombrus and extend toward the setting sun as far as the river Oskius. This river rises in the same mountains as the Nestus and Hebrus, a wild and extensive range connected with Rhodope.
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THRACE
The peoples of Sitalces’ empire and the forces available to him for this expedition are described.
MAP 2.97 SITALCES’ KINGDOM—ODRYSIAN THRACE
The empire of the Odrysians extended along the seaboard from Abdera to the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine. The navigation of this coast by the shortest route takes a merchantman four days and four nights with a wind astern the whole way: by land an active man, traveling by the shortest road, can get from Abdera to the Danube in eleven days. [2] Such was the length of its coastline. Inland from Byzantium to the Leaeans and the Strymon, the farthest limit of its extension into the interior, it is a journey of thirteen days for an active man. [3] The tribute from all the barbarian districts and the Hellenic cities, taking what they brought in under Seuthes, the successor of Sitalces, who raised it to its greatest height, amounted to about four hundred talents in gold and silver. There were also presents in gold and silver to a no less amount, besides cloth, plain and embroidered, and other articles, made not only for the king, but also for the Odrysian lords and nobles. [4] For there was here established a custom opposite to that prevailing in the Persian kingdom, namely, of taking rather than giving; more disgrace being attached to not giving when asked than to asking and being refused; and although this prevailed elsewhere in Thrace, it was practiced most extensively among the powerful Odrysians, it being impossible to get anything done without a present. [5] It was thus a very powerful kingdom; in revenue and general prosperity surpassing all in Europe between the Ionian gulf and the Euxine, and in numbers and military resources coming decidedly next to the Scythians, [6] with whom indeed no people in Europe can bear comparison, there not being even in Asia any nation singly a match for them if unanimous, though of course they are not on a level with other peoples in general intelligence and the arts of civilized life.
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THRACE
A description of the immense size of Shakes’ empire, as well as its wealth and a few of its customs, illustrates its power.
It was the master of this empire that now prepared to take the field. When everything was ready, he set out on his march for Macedonia, first through his own dominions, next over the desolate range of Cercine that divides the Sintians and Paeonians, crossing by a road which he had made by felling the timber on a former campaign against the latter people. [2] Passing over these mountains, with the Paeonians on his right and the Sintians and Maedians on the left, he finally arrived at Doberus, in Paeonia, [3] losing none of his army on the march except perhaps by sickness, but receiving some additional troops from many of the independent Thracians volunteering to join him in the hope of plunder; so that the whole is said to have formed a grand total of a hundred and fifty thousand. [4] Most of this was infantry, though there was about a third cavalry, furnished principally by the Odrysians themselves and next to them by the Getae. The most warlike of the infantry were the independent swordsmen who came down from Rhodope; the rest of the mixed multitude that followed him being chiefly formidable by their numbers.
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THRACE
Sitalces sets out for Macedon, his army increasing until it numbers perhaps 150,000, of which one-third is cavalry.
Assembling in Doberus, they prepared to descend from the heights upon Lower Macedonia, where the dominions of Perdiccas lay; [2] for the Lyncestae, Elimiots, and other tribes more inland, though Macedonians by blood and allies and dependents of their kindred, still have their own separate governments. [3] The country on the seacoast, now called Macedonia, was first acquired by Alexander, the father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors, originally Temenids from Argos. This was effected by the expulsion from Pieria of the Pierians, who afterwards inhabited Phagres and other places under Mount Pangaeus along the sea beyond the Strymon (indeed the country between Pangaeus and the sea is still called the Pierian gulf), and also by the expulsion of the Bottiaeans, at present neighbors of the Chalcidians from Bottiaea. [4] They also acquired in Paeonia a narrow strip along the river Axius extending to Pella and the sea; and having expelled the Edonians, they occupied Mygdonia between the Axius and the Strymon. [5] From Eordia also were driven the Eordians, most of whom perished—though a few of them still live round Physca—and the Almopians from Almopia. [6] These Macedonians also conquered places belonging to the other tribes, which are still theirs—Anthemus, Crestonia, Bisaltia, and much of Macedonia proper. The whole is now called Macedonia, and at the time of the invasion of Sitalces, Perdiccas, Alexander’s son, was the reigning king.
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THRACE
Thucydides offers a history of Macedon’s foundation and growth.
The Macedonians, unable to take the field against so numerous an invader, shut themselves up in such strong places and fortresses as the country possessed. [2] Of these there was no great number, most of those now found in the country having been erected subsequently by Archelaus son of Perdiccas on his accession, who also cut straight roads, and otherwise put the kingdom on a better footing as regards horses, heavy infantry, and other war material than had been done by all the eight kings that preceded him. [3] Advancing from Doberus, the Thracian host first invaded what had been once Philip’s government, and took Idomene by assault, Gortynia, Atalante, and some other places by negotiation, these last coming over for love of Philip’s son, Amyntas, then with Sitalces. Laying siege to Europus, and failing to take it, [4] he next advanced into the rest of Macedonia to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus, not proceeding beyond this into Bottiaea and Pieria, but staying to lay waste Mygdonia, Crestonia, and Anthemus. [5] The Macedonians never even thought of meeting him with infantry; but the Thracian host was, as opportunity offered, attacked by handfuls of their horse, which had been reinforced from their allies in the interior. Armed with breastplates, and excellent horsemen, wherever these charged they overthrew all before them, but ran considerable risk in entangling themselves in the masses of the enemy, and so finally desisted from these efforts, deciding that they were not strong enough to venture against numbers so superior.
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MACEDONIA
The Macedonians, unable to oppose directly such large forces, withdraw to forts and occasionally harass the enemy with cavalry.
Meanwhile Sitacles opened negotiations with Perdiccas on the objects of his expedition; and finding that the Athenians, not believing that he would come, did not appear with their fleet, though they sent presents and envoys, despatched a large part of his army against the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans, and shutting them up inside their walls laid waste their country. [2] While he remained in these parts, the people farther south, such as the Thessalians, and the Hellenes as far as Thermopylae, all feared that the army might advance against them, and prepared accordingly. [3] These fears were shared by the Thracians beyond the Strymon to the north, who inhabited the plains, such as the Panaeans, the Odomanti, the Droi, and the Dersaeans, all of whom are independent. [4] It was even matter of conversation among the Hellenes who were enemies of Athens whether Sitalces might not be invited by his ally to advance against them also. [5] Meanwhile he held Chalcidice and Bottica and Macedonia, and was ravaging them all; but finding that he was not succeeding in any of the objects of his invasion, and that his army was without provisions and was suffering from the severity of the season, he listened to the advice of Seuthes son of Sparadocus, his nephew and highest officer, and decided to retreat without delay. This Seuthes had been secretly won over by Perdiccas by the promise of his sister in marriage with a rich dowry. [6] In accordance with this advice, and after a stay of thirty days in all, eight of which were spent in Chalcidice, he retired home as quickly as he could; and Perdiccas afterwards gave his sister Stratonice to Seuthes as he had promised. Such was the history of the expedition of Sitalces.
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MACEDONIA
Sitalces fails to reach his goals, runs out of provisions, and is persuaded by his nephew (who had been suborned by Perdiccas) to return to Thrace.
In the course of this winter, after the dispersion of the Peloponnesian fleet, the Athenians in Naupactus under Phormio coasted along to Astacus, disembarked, and marched into the interior of Acarnania with four hundred Athenian hoplites and four hundred Messenians. After expelling some suspected persons from Stratus, Coronta, and other places, and restoring Cynes son of Theolytus to Coronta, they returned to their ships, [2] deciding that it was impossible in the winter season to march against Oeniadae, a place which, unlike the rest of Acarnania, had been always hostile to them; for the river Achelous flowing from Mount Pindus through Dolopia and the country of the Agraeans and Amphilochians and the plain of Acarnania, past the city of Stratus in the upper part of its course, forms lakes where it falls into the sea round Oeniadae, and thus makes it impracticable for an army in winter by reason of the water. [3] Opposite to Oeniadae lie most of the islands called Echinades, so close to the mouths of the Achelous that that powerful stream is constantly forming deposits against them, and has already joined some of the islands to the continent, and seems likely in no long while to do the same with the rest. [4] For the current is strong, deep, and turbid, and the islands are so thick together that they serve to imprison the alluvial deposit and prevent its dispersing, lying, as they do, not in one line but irregularly, so as to leave no direct passage for the water into the open sea. [5] The islands in question are uninhabited and of no great size. There is also a story that Alcmaeon son of Amphiaraus, during his wanderings after the murder of his mother, was bidden by Apollo to inhabit this spot, through an oracle which intimated that he would have no release from his terrors until he should find a country to dwell in which had not been seen by the sun; or existed as land at the time he slew his mother; all else being to him polluted ground. [6] Perplexed at this, the story goes on to say, he at last observed this deposit of the Achelous, and considered that a place sufficient to support life might have been thrown up during the long interval that had elapsed since the death of his mother and the beginning of his wanderings. Settling, therefore, in the district around Oeniadae, he founded a dominion and left the country its name from his son Acarnan. Such is the story we have received concerning Alcmaeon.
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ACARNANIA
Phormio leads an army into Acarnania to ensure its political loyalty. He decides not to attack Oeniadae in winter. Thucydides describes the Achelous River, the Echinades Islands at its mouth, and the myth of Alcmaeon.
MAP 2.102 PHORMIO’s EXPEDITION TO ACARNANIA IN 429
The Athenians and Phormio putting back from Acarnania and arriving at Naupactus, sailed home to Athens in the spring, taking with them the ships that they had captured, and such of the prisoners made in the late actions as were freemen; who were exchanged, man for man. And so ended this winter, and the third year of this war, of which Thucydides was the historian.
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ATHENS
Phormio returns to Naupactus and Athens. His prisoners are exchanged.
2.1.1a Heralds, already a venerable Greek institution in Thucydides’ day, operated under the protection of the god Hermes, and were easily identified by the staff they carried. They alone could travel unmolested between states or armies during wartime in order to deliver messages, take back replies, and make perfunctory arrangements.
From 446/5 to 431. This treaty is reported by Thucydides in 1.115.1.
In the fifteenth year of the treaty, and the forty-eighth year of Chrysis’ priestessship. She is the same Chrysis, presumably, whose carelessness led to the burning of the temple of Hera at Argos, an incident described in 4.133.
For the Spartan ephorate, see Appendix C, Spartan Institutions, ©5-6.
For a discussion of the Athenian eponymous archon, see Appendix A, The Athenian Government, ©6; and for the problem of dating events in classical times, see Appendix K, Calendars and Dating Systems, ©2-3.
This battle is described in 1.62-63.
Thebes: Map 2.5.
Boeotarchs were chief magistrates of the Boeotian federal government.
Plataea: Map 2.5.
Athens, in relation to Plataea and Thebes: Map 2.5.
Agora: the marketplace and the social center of a classical Greek city.
For more on the constitution of the Boeotian Federation, see note 5.38.2a.
City gates were secured by large wooden bars locked into place with special bolts. Like keys, only these bolts could release the bar and permit the gate to open. Lacking the proper bolt, one could only open the gate by cutting through the bar, a noisy and lengthy process. See also 4.111.2.
Asopus river: Map 2.5.
This truce is granted according to the accepted ritual of hoplite warfare. See Appendix F, Land Warfare, ©6.
The narrative of events at Plataea is continued in 2.71-78.
That the Thebans opened hostilities with a surprise attack in peacetime had some adverse effect upon Spartan morale, as we learn in 7.18.
The “King” is the king of Persia; this is the policy recommended by Archidamus earlier in 1.82.1.
Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, Zacynthus, in relation to the Peloponnesus: Map 2.9, AX, BX.
Delos Map 2.9, BY.
Since Herodotus (Book 6.98) mentions an earthquake on Delos in 490, this remark has caused some amazement.
The Isthmus of Corinth, Corinth: Map 2.8,AY.
Argos: Map 2.8, BY.
Achaca: Map 2.8, AX.
Pellene in Achaca: Map 2.8, AY.
Megara, Map 2.8: AY
Presumably he means the Opuntian Locrians (Map 2.8, AY), not the Ozolian Locrians who were allied to Athens (see 3.95.3), or the Italian (Epizephyrian) Locrians.
Boeotia: Map 2.8, AY.
Phocis: Map 2.8, AY.
Ambracia: Map 2.8, AX.
Leucas: Map 2.8, AX.
Anactorium: Map 2.8, AX.
Sicyon: Map 2.8, AY.
Elis: Map 2.8, BX.
The “confederacy” here includes both the Peloponnesian League and the wider Spartan alliance; see Appendix D, The Peloponnesian League, ©3.
Chios: Map 2.9, AY.
Lesbos: Map 2.9, AY.
These “Messenians” lived now at Naupactus (Map 2.9, AX), where Athens settled them after they surrendered to Sparta from Ithome and were forced to leave the Peloponnesus; see 1.103.1-3.
Acarnania: Map 2.9, AX.
Corcyra: Map 2.9, AX.
Zacynthus: Map 2.9, BX.
Caria: Map 2.9, BY.
Ionia: Map 2.9, AY. See Appendix H, Dialects and Ethnic Groups, ©7-8, for the Ionians and the Dorians.
Hellespont: Map 2.9, AY.
The region here called the Thracian cities: Map 2.9, AY.
Peloponnesus: Map 2.9, BX. Crete: Map 2.9, BY.
The Cyclades, islands in the Aegean Sea southeast of Attica: Map 2.9, BY.
Melos: Map 2.9, BY.
Thera: Map 2.9, BY.
Such a relation of “guest-friendship” (xenia) was common between eminent citizens of different states; sometimes it was between an individual and a whole state (in which case the term proxenia, denoting a formalized relationship, was used; see 2.29.1, 2.85.5, 4.78.1, etc.). Such relationships were often hereditary (see 5.43.2, 6, and 6.89 for Alcibiades and Sparta).
The Athenian assembly; see Appendix A, The Athenian Government, ©5, ©7-9.
Pericles’ strategy is set out in his reply to the Spartan envoys (1.144.1); see 2.65.7.
The talent was a large unit of weight and money. See Appendix J, Classical Greek Currency, ©5.
The Propylaea, through the remains of which one still enters the Acropolis at Athens, was the costly and special pride of Pericles’ building program. For financial reasons, the work on it was halted when the Peloponnesian War began and was never thereafter resumed.
For the campaign at Potidaea, which began in 432, see 1.56-65. For the costs of the siege there, see F2.70.2 and 3.17.4.
See Appendix I, Greek Religious Festivals, which notes that religious festivals often included athletic and cultural contests.
Booty taken from the Persians, whom the Greeks regularly referred to as “the Mede” or “the Medes,” although the Medes and Persians were two distinct peoples.
The temples and shrines on the Acropolis, like major shrines elsewhere, accumulated offerings of precious metals and treasure, some of which were used for the ornamentation of the statue of Athena. See note 1.121.3a.
Hoplite is the Greek word for a heavily armed infantryman. See Glossary and Appendix F, Land Warfare, ©2.
Athenian resident aliens (metics) had both rights and obligations but were not citizens. See Appendix A, The Athenian Government, ©2, 4.
Phaleric Wall: Map 2.19, inset.
Long Walls between Athens and the Piraeus: Map 2.19, inset.
The city of the Piraeus, the hill of Munychia: Map 2.19, inset.
Triremes were the standard warship of this period; see Appendix G, Trireme Warfare, ©4-7.
Wooden doors, sills, window frames, shutters, and the like were valuable and so were built to be easily removed. See in 3.68.3 how the Thebans salvaged such items from Plataea when they destroyed that city.
Euboea: Map 2.9, AX, and Map 2.19.
See Appendix I, Greek Religious Festivals, ©8.
See Appendix H, Dialects and Ethnic Groups, ©3-4, 7-8, for more on the Ionians.
Thucydides refers here to the tyrant Pisistratus and his son Hippias, whose rule ended at Athens in 510. They are mentioned above in 1.20.2, and below in 3.104.1 and 6.53.3-59.4.
The Persian invasion of 480-79, when Athens and Attica were pillaged by the Persians. See Appendix E, The Persians, ©4.
Attica and its borders, in relation to Boeotia and Megara: Map 2.5 and Map 2.8, AY.
Oenoe: Map 2.5 and Map 2.19.
Eleusis: Map 2.19.
Thria in the Thriasian plain : Map 2.19.
Rheiti is thought to be at the southeast corner of the Thriasian plain, at the foot of Mount Aegaleus; see Map 2.19 (A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, ii [Oxford, 1956], 71).
Cropia, possible location: Map 2.19, BY.
Acharnae: Map 2.19.
Eleusis: Map 2.19.
Thria in the Thriasian plain: Map 2.19.
Acharnae: Map 2.19.
Attica had been occupied and despoiled by the Persians in 480 and 479.
As a general, Pericles was expected to convene an extraordinary assembly, but it is unclear how he was able to prevent an assembly from being held. See Appendix A, The Athenian Government, ©7.
Phrygia: the location of Phrygia in Attica is unknown.
After a battle in ancient Greece, the victorious side raised a trophy, usually a set of captured armor arranged on a pole, at or near the battlefield; see Appendix F, Land Warfare, ©6.
Ancient alliance, yes, but some Thessalian cavalry betrayed the Athenians and went over to the enemy at the battle of Tanagra, in 457 (see 1.107.7). For the locations of Thessahan Larissa, Pharsalus, Cranon, Pyrasus, Gyrtone, and Pherae, see Map 2.24, inset.
For an explanation of Athenian demes, see Appendix A, The Athenian Government, ©4.
Mount Parnés: Map, 2.19.
Mount Brilessus, more generally known as Mount Pentelikos: Map 2.19.
That is, manned with ten hoplites and four archers per trireme, a standard Athenian complement at this time; see Appendix G, Trireme Warfare, ©5.
Oropus: Map 2.24.
See Appendix J, Classical Greek Currency, ©5.
New triremes were built every year to replace those that had been lost, worn out, or retired. Although the trireme design was standardized, some were judged to be better built, or proved to be better or faster sailers, than others. These were “the best ships of each year.”
Laconia: Map 2.24.
Methone, Messenia: Map 2.24. Methone was a city of the Messenian perioikoi; see Appendix C, Spartan Institutions, ©9.
A Spartiate was a full citizen of Sparta and a member of the highest Spartan military caste.
Brasidas will prove to be a major Spartan figure in Thucydides’ history. We next meet him as a commissioner to the Peloponnesian fleet in 2.85.1.
Pheia in Elis: Map 2.24.
Cape Ichthys: Map 2.24.
These were the Messenians from Naupactus; see note 2.9.4c and 1.103.1-3.
Locris (Opuntian): Map 2.24.
Euboea: Map 2.24.
Thronium: Map 2.24, inset.
Alope: Map 2.24, inset.
Aegina: Map 2.24.
Thyrea: Map 2.24. Thucydides describes what happened to the Aeginetans at Thyrea in 4.56.
The earthquake in Laconia and the revolt of the Helots (thought to have taken place in 465) is described by Thucydides in 1.101-3. For a discussion of the Spartan Helots, see Appendix C, Spartan Institutions, ©3-4, 8.
This partial eclipse took place at Athens on August 3, 431, about 5:22 P.M.
Abdera: Map 2.29.
A proxenus, although a citizen and resident of his own state, served as a “friend or representative” (much like a modern honorary consul) of a foreign state.
Odrysian Thrace: Map 2.29.
Daulis: Map 2.24.
Phocis: Map 2.24, inset.
When Procne discovered that Tereus had raped and mutilated her sister, Philomela, she took revenge by serving him a meal that included the flesh of their child, Itys. The gods prevented him from punishing her by turning him into a hoopoe, Philome1ainto a swallow, and Procne into a nightingale.
Perdiccas was king of Macedonia (Map 2.29). His devious role in the Potidaea affair is described above in 1.56-62.
Peltasts were troops armed only with a small light shield, a javelin, and a short sword. Unhinderd by body armor, they could move much more quickly than the fully armed hoplite, whose equipment was both far more heavy and far more expensive than theirs.
Therme: Map 2.29.
Chalcidice: Map 2.29.
We next hear of Sitalces in 2.67, and of Perdiccas in 2.80.
Sollium: Map 2.31, AX.
Corinth: Map 2.31, AY.
Palaira, Acarnania: Map 2.31, AX.
Astacus: Map 2.31, AX. Evarchus returns to Astacus with Corinthian support in 2.33.
Cephallenia: Map 2.31, AX.
Arcanania: Map 2.31, AX. Events in Acarnania will appear next in 2.33.
Leucas: Map 2.31, AX.
Pale, Cranae, Same, Proni, of Cephallenia: Map 2.31, AX.
Megara: Map 2.31, AY.
Athenian resident aliens (metics) had both rights and obligations but were not citizens. See Appendix A, The Athenian Government, ©2, 4.
Nisaea: Map 2.31, AY. The capture of Nisaea by the Athenians in 424 is described in 4.69.
Atalanta: Map 2.31, AY.
Opus: Map 2.31, AY.
Locris (Opuntian): Map 2.31, AY.
Euboea: Map 2.31, AY.
Acarnania: Map 2.31, AX.
Astacus: Map 2.31, AX.
Cephallenia: Map 2.31, AX.
Cranae on Cephallenia: Map 2.31, AX.
The Greek custom at this time was to burn the bodies of the dead and then to gather up the bones and bury them.
For more on Athenian “tribes,” see Appendix A, The Athenian Government, ©3-5.
Marathon (Map 2.31, AY) is where the Athenians defeated an invading force of Persians in 490.
As was done regularly by Sparta; see 1.144.2, and Appendix C, Spartan Institutions, ©1.
see the Introduction (sec. II.v) for a discussion of speeches in Thucydides.
Lemnos: Map 2.29.
Ethiopia is “above” Egypt—up the Nile River and further away from the sea—from a point of view centered in the Mediterranean Sea; see Map 2.56, locator.
Seethe Introduction (sec. I) for a discussion of what is known about Thucydides’ life.
Modern medical authorities do not agree on the identification of this pestilence.
The Greek words are limos, “famine,” and loimos, “pestilence.”
For Thucydides’ attitude toward oracles, see the Introduction (sec. IV.i).
Paralia, Laurium: Map 2.56.
Euboea, Andros: Map 2.56.
Epidaurus: Map 2.56. The unusually large size of this expedition under Pericles is mentioned in 6.31.2.
Troezen, Halieis, Hermione: Map 2.56.
Prasiae: Map 2.56.
This section continues the history of the Potidaean campaign, which was last described in 1.65. For the location of Chalcidice and Potidaea, see Map 2.72, AY. The size of this expedition is mentioned in 6.31.2.
Phormio and his force of 1,600 citizen hoplites was last mentioned in 1.65.
The end of the siege of Potidaea is described in 2.70.
For the office of Athenian general, see Appendix A, The Athenian Government, ©7.
The King of Persia.
It was not all that unusual for Athenians to punish statesmen or generals at whom they were angry or disappointed by fines or exile. Note the fate of the generals Pythodorus, Sophocles, and Eurymedon when they returned to Athens from Sicily in 4.65.3, as well as the punishment of Thucydides himself in 5.26.5.
Pericles was an elected general who could be deposed at any time by popular vote, as he was in 430 (see above, 2.65.3). The only passage where he seems to act, as it were, above the constitution is in 2.22.1, when he is said to have refused to call an assembly or a meeting, and this has caused comment. But whatever is said of that, it is clear that Pericles was at all times fully subject to the will of the assembly. SeeAppendix A, The Athenian Government, ©7.
This Athenian expedition to Sicily is described in Books 6 and 7, below. This chapter was clearly written after the end of the war (see section 12 of the chapter) and scholars have debated whether this statement represents a major change of mind about the Sicilian Expedition or only a shift of emphasis.
The intervention of Cyrus is described in Xenophon’s account of the end of the Peloponnesian war. Xenophon joined Cyrus’ army of mercenaries for the expedition that became the subject of his bookAnabasis. This passage is one of many that must have been written late by Thucydides. See the Introduction (sec. II.ii) on the composition of Thucydides’ text.
Zacynthus: Map 2.72, BX.
Sitalces was last mentioned in 2.29, and will appear next in 2.95.
Spartan contacts with Persia recall Archidamus’ speech; see note 1.82.1a.
Potidaea: Map 2.72, AY.
Hellespont: Map 2.72, locator.
Pharnabazus was the Persian governor (satrap) of the Hellespont region (Map 2.72, locator). See Appendix E, The Persians, ©2.
Aristeus son of Adimantus had led the Corinthians at Potidaea; see 1.60.2-1.65.
Ambracia: Map 2.72, BX.
Amphilochian Argos, probable location: Map 2.72, BX.
Ambracian gulf: Map 2.72, BX.
Acarnania was last mentioned in 2.33. Acarnania: Map 2.72, BX.
Chaonia: Map 2.72, AX.
The history of the conflict between Amphilochian Argos and the Acarnanians on one side, and the Ambraciots on the other, is resumed in 2.80.
Naupactus: Map 2.72, BY.
Corinth: Map 2.72, BY.
Crisaean gulf, now called the Corinthian Gulf: Map 2.72, BY.
Caria and Lycia: Map 2.72, locator.
It is generally believed that when Thucydides reports such collections of money, it is a sign that the tribute has been increased in the course of the preceding summer. See note 4.75.1b;Appendix B, The Athenian Empire, ©2, 10; and illustration 2.69.
Privateers were privately owned boats licensed by the belligerents to attack enemy shipping.
Phaselis and Phoenicia: Map 2.72, locator. Some scholars believe that the region of Phoenicia is not meant here, but some port like Phaselis on the Lycian coast that was called Phoenike.
This picks up the Potidaean narrative from 2.58. For Potidaea, see Map 2.72, AY.
Talent: see Appendix J, Classical Greek Currency, ©5.
Chalcidice: Map 2.72, AY. Events in Chalcidice are next mentioned in 2.79.
For a brief explanation of .tribute lists, see Appendix B, The Athenian Empire in Thucydides, ©11.
This picks up the narrative about Plataea (Map 2.72, BY) from 2.6.
This Pausanias led the Greek forces to victory over the Persians at the battle of Plataea in 479. His later disgrace and death are described by Thucydides in 1.94-96 and 1.128-34.
Agora: the marketplace and social center of a classical Greek city.
Thebes, in relation to Plataea: Map 2.72, BY.
Athens, in relation to Plataea: Map 2.72, BY.
Mount Cithaeron: Map 2.72, BY.
Circumvallation: the building of a wall to surround or isolate a city by land.
Is Thucydides being skeptical about stories of divine intervention? See the Introduction (sec. IV.ii) for a discussion of Thucydides’ attitude toward religion.
The reference is to the Heliacal rising of Arcturus when it first becomes visible after the forty days of invisibility owing to the fact that it rises after the sun; this occurs on approximately September 20.
This is one of the few occasions on which Thucydides mentions women, who in this case might have been slaves. See Appendix A, The Athenian Government, ©2.
The narrative of the siege of Plataea is continued in 3.20.
This picks up the narrative of Chalcidice from 2.70.4, which Thucydides continues next in 2.95. Chalcidice: Map 2.72, AY.
Bottica (Bottike), the “current” location of the Bottiaeans: Map 2.72, AY.
Xenephon son of Euripides was one of the Athenian commanders at Potidaea; see 2.70.1.
Spartolus, approximate location: Map 2.72, AY.
Olynthus: Map 2.72, AY.
Crusis: Map 2.72, AY. Peltasts were troops armed only with a small, light shield, a javelin, and a short sword. Unhindered by body armor, a peltast could move much more quickly than the fully armed hoplite, whose equipment was both far more heavy and far more expensive than theirs.
This continues the narrative of events in Ambracia and Acarnania from 2.68. Ambracia: Map 2.80, AX.
Chaonia: Map 2.80, AX.
Acarnania: Map 2.80, AX.
Zacynthus: Map 2.80, BX.
Cephallenia: Map 2.80, BX.
Naupactus: Map 2.80, BY.
Cnemus was the Spartiate commander of the Peloponnesian fleet that attacked Zacynthus in 2.66.
Corinth: Map 2.80, BY.
Sicyon: Map 2.80, BY.
Leucas:Map2.80, AX.
Anactorium: Map 2.80, AX.
Crisaean gulf, now called the Corinthian Gulf: Map 2.80, BY.
The source for the possible sites of Amphilochian Argos and Limnaea, shown in Map 2.80, is N.G.L. Hammond, “The Campaign in Amphilochia during the Archidamian War,” The Annual of the British School at Athens, 1937, 128-40.
Thesprotis: Map 2.80, AX.
Molossia: Map 2.80, AX.
Atintania: Map 2.80, AX.
Parauaea: Map 2.80, AX.
Orestis:Map2.80, AX.
The Macedonian king Perdiccas was last mentioned in 2.29.6 and will next appear in 2.95. Macedonia: Map 2.80, locator.
Amphilochian Argos, possible location: Map 2.80, AX.
Limnaea, possible location: Map 2.80, AX.
Stratus: Map 2.80, AX.
Anapus river, possible location : Map 2.86, AX.
Oeniadae: Map 2.80, BX. Pericles had failed to capture this city in 1.111.2-3.
The narrative of events in Acarnania is continued in 2.102.
Crisaean gulf, today called the Corinthian Gulf: Map 2.86, BY.
Patrae: Map 2.86, BX.
For the location of this Chalcis, see Map 2.86, BX.
Evenus river: Map 2.86, AX.
The trireme’s design was standardized, but evidently some ships excelled in speed due to superior construction, age, condition, the training and vigor of crews, or some combination of these factors.
Dyme: Map 2.86, BX.
That is, “taking most of them prisoner.”
Molycrium, possible location: Map 2.86, BX.
Cyllene: Map 2.86, BX.
Leucas: Map 2.86, AX.
Stratus: Map 2.86, AX. The battle of Stratus was described in 2.81. 5-8.
This is the same Brasidas who distinguished himself at Methone in 2.25.2. We shall next hear of him as an adviser to the Spartan admiral Alcidas, in 3.69.1.
Crete: Map 2.86, locator, and Map 2.9, BY.
Gortys, Crete: Map 2.9, BY.
Proxenus: see note 2.29.1b.
Cydonia, Crete: Map 2.9, BX.
Polichna, Crete, probable location: Map 2.9, BX.
Cyllene: Map 2.86, BX.
Panormus: Map 2.86, BX.
Molycrian Rhium: Map 2.86, BX.
Achaean Rhium: Map 2.86, BX.
See 7.36.4 and Appendix G, Trireme Warfare, ©11.
Silence was particularly vital on warships so that rowers could hear the cadence, which was played on a shrill pipe, and the commands issued by the keleustes, the chief rowing officers. See also 2.84.3 and 7.70.6.
Naupactus: Map 2.86, BX.
These were the Messenians from Naupactus; see note 2.9.4c and 1.103.1-3.
The paean was a ritual chant that the men of classical Greek armies sang as they advanced into battle, rallied, or celebrated victory.
Triremes, built entirely of wood and carrying no cargo, were so buoyant that they would not have actually sunk to the sea bottom when their seams or planks were split by ramming. Instead, they filled with water—becoming unmaneuverable—and remained floating just at or below the surface of the sea, whence they were collected and towed back as booty to the victor’s camp after battle. When Thucydides uses the word kataduei here (and at 3.78.1 and passim), which literally means “sink down,” he must be referring to the partial sinking of the hulls as they filled with water.
Panormus: Map 2.86, BX.
And which had sailed to Crete; 2.85.4-6.
Megara: Map 2.86, BY.
Piraeus: Map 2.86, BY.
Nisaea: Map 2.86, BY.
Salamis in relation to Nisaea: Map 2.86, BY, and Map 3.51, inset.
Budorum, possible location: Map 2.86, BY; see also Map 3.51, inset.
Although it was important to regularly dry out trireme hulls to maintain their speed and performance (see Appendix G, Trireme Warfare, ©7), an excessively dry hull would leak until the planks had absorbed enough water to swell and close the joints between them.
Sitalces was last mentioned in 2.67. Odrysian Thrace: Map 2.97, BY.
Perdiccas was last mentioned in 2.80. Macedonia: Map 2.97, CX.
Chalcidean affairs were last mentioned in 2.79. Chalcidice: Map 2.97, CX.
Haemus mountains: Map 2.97, AY.
Rhodope mountains: Map 2.97, BY.
Euxine (Black Sea): Map 2.97, BZ.
Hellespont: Map 2.97, CZ.
Getae, approximate location of their territory: Map 2.97, AZ.
Danube river: Map 2.97, AY; and locator.
Scythians, location of their territory: Map 2.97, locator.
Dii, approximate location of their territory: Map 2.97, BY. The Dii reappear in Thucydides’ account of the tragic fate of Mycallessus in 7.29.
Paeonian tribes, approximate location of their territory: Map 2.97, BX.
Strymon river: Map 2.97, BX.
Mount Scombrus: Map 2.97, BX.
Triballi, approximate location of their territory: Map 2.97, BX.
Oskius river: Map 2.97, AY.
Nestus river: Map 2.97, BX.
Hebrus river: Map 2.97, BY.
Abdera: Map 2.97, CY.
Danube river mouth in the Euxine (Black Sea): Map 2.97, AY, and locator.
Byzantium: Map 2.97, BZ.
Talents: see Appendix J, Classical Greek Currency, ©5.
Ionian gulf (Adriatic Sea): Map 2.72, locator.
Mount Cercine: Map 2.97, BX.
Sintians, approximate location of their territory: Map 2.97, BX.
Paeonians, approximate location of their territory: Map 2.97, BX.
Doberus, approximate location somewhere a little to the west of Mount Cercine: Map 2.97, BX.
Odrysian Thrace: Map 2.97, BY.
Getae, approximate location of their territory: Map 2.97, AZ.
Lyncestis: Map 2.97, CX.
Elimia, territory of the Elimiots: Map 2.97, CX.
Macedonia: Map 2.97, CX.
Fifth-century Greeks believed that the ruling house of Macedon originated in Argos in the Peloponnesus.
Pieria: Map 2.97, CX.
Phagres: Map 2.97, CY.
Mount Pangaeus: Map 2.97, CY.
Strymon river: Map 2.97, BX.
Chalcidice: Map 2.97, CX.
Bottiaea: Map 2.97, CX.
Axius river: Map 2.97, BX.
Pella: Map 2.97, CX.
Edonians, approximate location of their territory after their expulsion by the Macedonians: Map 2.97, CY.
Mygdonia: Map 2.97, CX.
Eordia, approximate location: Map 2.97, CX.
Physca: location unknown.
Almopia, approximate location: Map 2.97, CX.
Anthemus: Map 2.97, CX.
Crestonia, approximate location: Map 2.97, CX.
Bisaltia, approximate location: Map 2.97, CX.
Thucydides writes here as if the reign of Archelaus (413-399) was ended, but some scholars have found it hard to accept that he was still writing after 399; see the Introduction (sec. II.ii) for the date of composition of Thucydides’ work.
Doberus, approximate location a little to the west of Mount Cercine: Map 2.97, BX.
Idomene: Map 2.97, BX.
Gortynia: Map 2.97, BX.
Atalante: Map 2.97, CX.
Europus: Map 2.97, CX.
Pella: Map 2.97, CX.
Cyrrhus: Map 2.97, CX.
Bottiaea: Map 2.97, CX.
Pieria: Map 2.97, CX.
Chalcidice: Map 2.97, CX.
They were now settled in Bottica: Map 2.97, CX.
Thessaly: Map 2.97, CX.
Thermopylae, the strategic pass where the Greeks fought the Persians in 480: Map 3.7, BX.
Odomanti, approximate location of their territory: Map 2.97, BY.
Bottica: Map 2.97, CX.
Perdiccas next appears in 4.79.
Sitalces, his nephew Seuthes, and events in Thrace are picked up again in 4.7.
Naupactus: Map 2.102.
Astacus: Map 2.102.
This picks up events in Acarnania from 2.82. Acarnania: Map 2.102.
These were the Messenians from Naupactus; see 1.103.1-3, and note 2.9.4a.
Stratus: Map 2.102.
Coronta: location unknown.
Oeniadae: Map 2.102.
Achelous river: Map 2.102.
Pindus mountain range: Map 2.102.
Dolopia: Map 2.102.
Agraea: Map 2.102.
Amphilochia: Map 2.102.
Thucydides returns to events in Acarnania in 3.7.
Echinades islands: Map 2.102.