1

Epigrams by Lutatius Catulus (fr. 1) and Callimachus (AP 12.73 = 4 HE)

Francis Cairns

I Is Catulus fr. 1 a free adaptation of AP 12.73?

Lutatius Catulus fr. 1 (Morel/Blänsdorf, Courtney) has been the subject of many studies over many years; without exception they have started from the premise that it is modelled, albeit freely, on Callimachus AP 12.73 (= 41 Pf. = 4 HE).¹ This premise has not only influenced the interpretation of fr. 1; it also underlies current restorations of the corrupt beginning of AP 12.73.5, and the interpretation of a challenging expression in fr. 1.3. Thus O. Schneider — but see below n. 2 — restored the name Theotimus (as Θεύτιμον) at AP 12.73.5 from fr. 1.1, and Jacobs hypothesised δίφησον as the next word on the supposition of its equivalence to quaesitum (fr. 1.5).² As for Catulus fr. 1, Pope, following Page, interpreted quid si non in line 3 as equivalent to καὶ μέν at AP 12.73.3; he extended this interpretation to a number of other Latin contexts, asserting that quid si non and similar expressions should be interpreted as ‘and yet’.³

The two texts, with their verbal equivalences/near equivalences coded to preempt lengthy discussion, are:

Ἥμισύ μευ ψυχῆς ἔτι τὸ πνέον, ἥμισυ δ’ οὐκ οἶδ’

εἴτ’ Ἔρος εἴτ’ Ἀίδης ἥρπασε· πλὴν ἀφανές.

ἦ ῥάτιν’ ἐς παίδων πάλιν ᾤχετο; καὶ μὲν ἀπεῖπον

πολλάκι· ‘τὴν δρῆστιν μὴ ὑποδέχεσθε, νέοι.’

†ουκισυνιφησον† ἐκεῖσε γὰρ ἡ λιθόλευστος

κείνη καὶ δύσερως οἶδ’ ὅτι που στρέφεται.

(Callimachus AP 12.73 = 4 HE)

4 ὑποδέχεσθε Hecker:⁴ ὑπέχεσθε P: μή νυ δέχεσθε Page

5 ουκισυνιφησον P: Θεύτιμον O. Schneider: δίφησον Jacobs: alii alia

Half my soul still breathes; half I do not know whether Love or Hades has seized it, only it is gone. Is it off again to one of the boys? And yet I often forbade them: ‘Don’t give refuge to the runaway, young men.’ (?)Look for it at * * (?), for I know that worthy of stoning it skulks, wretched in love, somewhere in that quarter.

Aufugit mi animus; credo, ut solet, ad Theotimum

deuenit. sic est, perfugium illud habet.

quid si non interdixem, ne illunc fugitiuum

mitteret ad se intro, sed magis eiceret?

ibimus quaesitum. uerum, ne ipsi teneamur,

formido. quid ago? da, Venus, consilium.

(Lutatius Catulus fr. 1 Morel/Blänsdorf, Courtney)

My soul has run away from me; I think it has gone to stay, as usual, with Theotimus. Yes, that is the refuge it has found. What if I had not decreed that he should not take in the runaway, but rather eject it? I will go search for it; but I am afraid I may be restrained myself. What am I to do? Advise me, Venus.

The scholarly consensus that Lutatius Catulus fr. 1 is a free adaptation of Callimachus AP 12.73 should not inhibit us from comparing the two epigrams without this initial assumption. Certainly there is an overall thematic resemblance between them: both treat the metaphorical theme of the lover’s (half-)soul as a serial runaway, and both show concern about the present whereabouts of the (half-)soul and the company it is (or may be) keeping. Moreover there are five⁵ verbal equivalences or near equivalences (of varying degrees of grammatical parity) between the two epigrams. They are (as coded above): i) mi animus (fr. 1.1) and μευ ψυχῆς (AP 12.73.1) in the same sedes; ii) ad … | deuenit (fr. 1.1–2) and ἐς … ᾤχετο (AP 12.73.3); iii) interdixem (fr. 1.3) and ἀπεῖπον (AP 12.73.3); iv) fugitiuum (fr. 1.3) and δρῆστιν (AP 12.73.4); v) mitteret ad se intro (fr. 1.4) and (on the assumption that this, or something similar, was what Callimachus wrote) ὑποδέχεσθε (AP 12.73.4).

But there are also major thematic differences between fr. 1 and AP 12.73⁶ which reduce their verbal overlap very considerably:

1) in AP 12.73 a half-soul runs away; in fr. 1 a whole soul runs away.

2) in AP 12.73 a half-soul has been snatched either by Love or by Death; in fr. 1 there is no mention of snatching by anyone.

3) in AP 12.73 the speaker is initially not sure what has happened to the half-soul, or where it might be (this is especially so if ἦ ῥάτιν’ ἐς παίδων πάλιν ᾤχετο (3) is a question, not a statement); in fr. 1 the whole soul’s whereabouts are unhesitatingly stated in the first couplet.

4) in AP 12.73 the half-soul may have fled to an unknown and unnamed member of a group of (plural) ‘young men’; in fr. 1 the whole soul has fled to a single known and named individual, Theotimus.

5) in AP 12.73 the speaker ends with a triumphant conclusion about the half-soul’s whereabouts, accompanied by abusive name-calling of the half-soul; in fr. 1 the speaker ends by expressing fear of being ‘caught’, and then begs Venus for advice.

Those scholars who have regarded Catulus as freely adapting AP 12.73 have explained the differences between the two epigrams as due to Catulus’ alterations of and additions to his supposed Greek model. Catulus thus emerges as a highly original poet handling Callimachus’ epigram in a novel and confident way, and so engaging in imitatio cum aemulatione. Such analyses are legitimate and potentially productive if the proposed Greek model of a Latin poem is in fact its model. But it goes without saying that, when this is not the case, they are invalid, and may actually obstruct the correct interpretation of the Latin poem.

The first question posed by the two epigrams is therefore whether an overall shared situation and a certain amount of verbal overlap are enough – in the face of the many conceptual differences between them – to establish AP 12.73 as the model for fr. 1. The Greek name Theotimus (1) proclaims that fr. 1 did have a Greek model, but might Catulus have had in mind a different Greek epigram, one which designated a named individual as the specific destination of the lover’s whole soul, which made no mention of snatching, and which ended not with confident abuse of the beloved but with timid fear on the part of the lover? Hellenistic epigrammatists frequently indulged in self-imitation, and they also habitually wrote two or more epigrams as variations on the same theme.⁷ They also imitated their epigrammatic predecessors: the ‘Meleagrian sequences’ of the Palatine Anthology sometimes display chains of such imitations and self-imitations.⁸

To these considerations may be added the commonplace subject matter of the two epigrams. The metaphorical δραπέτης (δρήστης) – the runaway who may be Love, or the lover, or the lover’s (half)-soul – is a familiar figure of Hellenistic and Roman literature, featured also in Moschus 1 (῎Ερως Δραπέτης), Meleager AP 5.177 = 37 HE and Propertius 2.29; cf. also Plutarch, Alcibiades 6; Lucilius Bk. 29 fr. 75 Charpin⁹ and Apuleius, Metamorphoses 5.31.2; 6.4.5; 6.8.2–3 (with Kenney (1990) ad locc.). The ‘half-soul’ found in Callimachus is another widespread topos with earlier outcroppings,¹⁰ as is the fear confessed by Catulus’ lover.¹¹ It can, then, reasonably be hypothesised that Catulus knew Hellenistic epigrams about the runaway soul other than AP 12.73, and that he was translating/adapting another epigram altogether. Indeed, if fr. 1 had been a Greek epigram, no one would have characterised it as an imitation/adaptation of AP 12.73; it would instead have been regarded as an independent variation on the same theme. The non-survival of the hypothesised real epigrammatic model of fr. 1 is no obstacle. Large numbers of Hellenistic literary epigrams have perished. For example, P.Vindob.G. 40611¹² lists 226 epigram incipits, of which only one can (probably) be recognised as a survivor, i.e. Asclepiades AP 12.46 = 15 HE.¹³ Similarly P.Oxy. LIV.3724, of the ‘later first century’, ‘mentions about 175 epigrams’, of which ‘only 31 have been identified elsewhere.’¹⁴ In other, smaller, papyrus lists of epigrams and epigram incipits the proportion of items already known varies.¹⁵

The hypothesised real model of Catulus fr. 1 almost certainly referred to a Θεύτιμος; and since Θεύτιμος is a good Cyrenean name,¹⁶ the odds are that it was also by Callimachus. Less probably, the model of fr. 1 was a Meleagrian imitation either of AP 12.73 or of a similar piece. Meleager AP 12.52 = 81 HE employs the ‘half-soul’ motif, which he doubtless derived from Callimachus; and Meleager might have enhanced that motif in another (now lost) epigram by writing about his entire soul running off. Callimachus and Meleager seem to have exercised a disproportionate influence on their Roman successors, but it is an open question whether the Garland of Meleager reached Rome before the death of Catulus in 87 BC.¹⁷

II The language of Catulus fr. 1

Important work has been done on linguistic aspects of Catulus fr. 1. Pascucci (1979) argued for the influence of Plautus’ language upon the epigram;¹⁸ and Perutelli (1990) followed up with a similar contribution focused on Terence, concluding that Catulus’ language, rather than being narrowly Plautine, is more broadly comic and theatrical.¹⁹ Roman comedy was indeed a natural choice for Catulus, since like its predecessor, Greek New Comedy, it covers erotic themes and manifestly possesses the requisite vocabulary. Hence Pascucci and Perutelli were able to illustrate many linguistic elements of fr. 1 with specific, and in some cases numerous, comic parallels, and to show that Catulus’ engagement with the language of Roman comedy was deep and meaningful. Pascucci’s pointers to the combination of perfugium and aufugit at Cistellaria 161 and to the phrase deuenit ad Theotimum at Bacchides 318 are particularly tantalising;²⁰ Catulus presumably found equivalents of these terms in fr. 1’s true model. When Catulus was translating it, the name Θεύτιμος led him to recollect Bacchides 318, which comes from a completely different context.

Despite its strong links with comedy, however, fr. 1 engages with another linguistic register too. Just as its model had most likely done with regard to Greek legal language, it exploits the terminology of Roman law, and some interpretative advances are possible in this area. A few legal elements of fr. 1 were noted by earlier scholarship,²¹ but little was made of them. In fact fr. 1 is a tissue of termini technici of the law, and of ‘legalisms’ – i.e. vocabulary not formally part of the technical terminology of Roman law, but found frequently enough in legal contexts to give additional colouring of the law to the epigram. The presence of such legal language in fr. 1 is of course justified primarily by Catulus’ treatment of his soul (doubtless in the wake of his model) as a fugitiuus, a runaway slave, a condition of interest to lawmakers and lawyers, and equipped with its own title in the Digest (11.4: De Fugitiuis).²² The details of the legal language of fr. 1 are as follows:

aufugit (1): aufugere is used fairly often in legal texts of a slave ‘running away’, e.g. idem Pomponius ait, si cum rebus aufugerit fugitiuus, posse furti actione sollicitatorem conueniri rerum nomine, quia opem consilium contrectatori tulit. quod et Sabinus significat. Si duo serui inuicem sibi persuaserunt et ambo simul aufugerunt, alter alterius fur non est (Ulpian Digest 47.2.36.2–3, cf. also 13.6.12.1; 21.1.17.3 (all Ulpian); Labeo Digest 49.15.30 pr.)

perfugium (2): perfugium could be considered a legal technical term, but it and its cognates are used not of fugitive slaves but of military deserters: cf. in such contexts perfugit (Ulpian Digest 48.4.2 pr.), perfuga (Codex Theodosianus 9.45.4.2) and perfugia (Codex Theodosianus 12.1.50.2).²³ The equivalent legal technical term where runaway slaves are concerned seems to be refugium. Cf.: quod autem praetor ait ‘recepisse’, ita accipimus, si susceperit seruum alienum ad se: et est proprie recipere refugium abscondendi causa seruo praestare uel in suo agro uel in alieno loco aedificioue (Ulpian Digest 11.3.1.2). But refugium would not fit the metre, so Catulus has substituted perfugium; the closeness of susceperit … ad se in Digest 11.3.1.2 to mitteret ad se intro (fr. 1.4) is perhaps also worth noting (see also below §III.b).

interdixem (3): interdico is an omnipresent and iconic technical term of Roman law (there are over 850 examples in the Digest alone); it must, then, have at least a legalistic flavour in Catulus fr. 1, and indeed lines 3–4 probably refer specifically to two types of interdict offered in the praetor’s edict. Gaius Institutes 4.138 ff. discusses interdicts and specifies their sphere of application as possessio: he distinguishes two kinds – when the praetor is either ordering something to be done, or something not to be done: quod tum maxime [praetor] facit, cum de possessione aut quasi possessione inter aliquos contenditur; et in summa aut iubet aliquid fieri aut fieri prohibet. (4.139). Gaius goes on to clarify this distinction at 4.140–2, describing the second type as ‘prohibitory’ (interdicta prohibitoria) and splitting the first type (also known as decreta) into ‘restitutory’ (interdicta restitutoria) and ‘exhibitory’(interdicta exhibitoria); cf. also Justinian Institutes 4.15.1: summa autem diuisio interdictorum haec est, quod aut prohibitoria sunt aut restitutoria aut exhibitoria. An ‘exhibitory interdict’ could order a defendant to produce someone – a slave, freedman, family member, or thing (Gaius Institutes 4.162; Ulpian Digest 43.5.3.7–11; 43.30.3.1). In these terms ne illunc fugitiuum | mitteret ad se intro (fr. 1.3–4) seems to allude to the prohibitory interdict, whereas sed magis eiceret (4) appears to evoke the exhibitory interdict.

fugitiuum (3): fugitiuus is the standard legal technical term for a runaway slave.

eiceret (4): eicere is uncommon in legal texts. Pascucci (1979) 124 = (1983) 648 noted the use of eiecere at Codex Iustinianus 7.6.1.3 of a master expelling a sick slave from his house. Pascucci described this as a ‘tarda attestazione’, although in fact the text refers to, and may be quoting from, an edict of diuus Claudius, i.e. the Emperor Claudius. The use of the past participle passive of eicere in Paul’s commentary on the praetorian edict (Digest 39.2.18.15) does bring the word into rough association with an interdict. It concerns possession, and speaks of the plaintiff as aut non admissus aut eiectus with respect to property. This single example does not make eicere a legal technical term, but it can perhaps fairly be described as a legalism in fr. 1. The praetor’s edict of course forbade harbouring other people’s slaves: cf. Ulpian Digest 11.3.1 pr., 2; 11.3.5 pr. (and see below §III.b).

quaesitum (5): quaero is common in legal texts and it has a number of technical senses.²⁴ In the Digest it, and its compounds,²⁵ are used of ‘searching’ for a runaway slave. Cf., e.g., si quis amico peregre eunti mandauerit, ut fugitiuum suum quaerat et si inuenerit uendat … (Gaius Digest 18.1.35.3); qui quaeri apud se prohibuit (Ulpian Digest 11.4.1.2). The form quaesitum is particularly legalistic in tone, occurring as it does more than 600 times in the Digest.²⁶ Catulus might be exploiting quaero’s ambivalence – another of its common meanings is ‘hold a judicial enquiry’ – in order to extract some further wry humour from his situation. But the primary meaning of ibimus quaesitum (5) is ‘we will go and search ’. ibimus will either be an authorial plural or it will cover Catulus and his slaves or freedmen.

teneamur (5): because tenere, in various of its forms, makes a very large number of appearances in legal texts (over 1,800 occurrences in the Digest alone) it patently has at least a legal flavour in a context such as this. Morelli pointed to the phrase tene me quia fugi inscribed on slaves’ collars.²⁷ But a reference to slaves’ collars does not explain fr. 1’s teneamur since Catulus seems to be afraid, not about what will happen to his runaway soul, but about his own (and perhaps his attendants’) future.²⁸ teneamur is therefore more plausibly either another authorial plural or a reference to himself and his followers; and, even if his soul is included in the ‘we’, the main actor is still Catulus. One legal meaning of teneamur which coheres with the erotic context of the epigram is ‘lest we be captured’ or ‘restrained’, i.e. Catulus fears that he, like his soul, will be seized by Theotimus. tenere in legal texts can refer to the physical restraining of individuals, e.g. at Ulpian Digest 20.1.21.1: si debitor seruum, quem a non domino bona fide emerat et pignerauit, teneat, Seruianae locus est ….²⁹ But in legal contexts teneri can also mean ‘to be held legally liable’;³⁰ for this sense and its implications see further below §III.b.

consilium (6): dare consilium is found in Roman legal texts of jurists giving formal legal opinions.³¹ Catulus’ urgent and climactic plea to Venus to give him consilium in a situation of obvious legal complexity evokes such opinions, which were sought by individuals in legal difficulties and conflicts. Such advice from jurisconsults is described as consilium in the Digest: e.g. … Annio consilium omnes iuris periti dederunt, ut cum eo ageret ius ei non esse in eo loco ea posita habere inuito se (Alfenus Digest 8.5.17.1); ex consilio Labeonis Ofilii Cascellii Trebatii eum quem in potestate habebat solum heredem fecit et ab eo alteri dimidiam partem hereditatis, cum in suam tutelam uenisset, legauit (Iavolenus Digest 28.6.39 pr.); sed consilio Neratii Prisci et Aristonis ei propter necessitatem soluendae pietatis denegata est (Papinian Digest 37.12.5 pr.). Venus, then, is introduced implicitly as a jurisconsult in line 6, just as her son Amor is explicitly characterised as a jurisconsult at Ovid, Heroides 20.30: consultoque fui iuris Amore uafer.

A few other terms are worth mentioning here, either to exclude them or in one case to suggest, although more hesitantly, that it too might be included as a legalism. deuenit (2) can probably be excluded: the one Digest example of deuenire (Marcellus Digest 37.15.3 pr.) does show a slave ‘coming under the protection’ of someone who is not his master, but deuenire is not used in any legal text in connection with fugitiui. Similarly mitteret ad se intro (4) is not technical: intro is absent from the Digest, and, although intromittere occurs twice in the perfect participle passive (Ulpian Digest 21.1.1.1 pr.; 48.2.4 pr.), this is in the unrelated content of individuals who have been ‘put into’ the arena to fight beasts. On the other hand sed magis (fr. 1.4), which appears thirty-seven times in the Digest, might have a legal flavour here.

Catulus’ legal technical terms and legalisms make overall sense, and, more importantly, they appear to allude to specifics of Roman law (see below §III.b).

III Legal implications

(a) Callimachus (AP 12.73 = 4 HE)

As illustrated above (§I), metaphorical ‘runaways’ feature not infrequently in Hellenistic (and Roman) poetry. Their real-life equivalents were the subject of legal provisions in the Hellenistic,³² as well as the Roman, world. But in AP 12.73 Callimachus’ interest in the legal aspects of his subject matter appears to be limited: he describes his half-soul as a ‘runaway ’ (δρῆστις, 4), and he touches on the topic of ‘receivers’ of runaway slaves (who were acting illegally) when he recollects his frequent past injunctions to the young men not to receive his half-soul: ‘τὴν δρῆστιν μὴ ὑποδέχεσθε, νέοι’ (4). But Callimachus does not seem to explore these topics further.³³ The erotic dimension of AP 12.73 was clearly his foremost concern: half of his soul, full of desire, has run off to one of the young men, so he wants to work out who that young man is. The alternative Callimachean model hypothesised above (§I) for Catulus fr. 1 may have been more committed to following up the legal aspect of a slave’s flight, and given Catulus his impetus in this direction.

(b) Catulus fr. 1

The erotic meaning and implications of Catulus fr. 1 are equally clear. His soul has run away to his beloved Theotimus, i.e. it has fallen in love with Theotimus. Catulus is afraid that if he goes to Theotimus’ house to look for his runaway soul, he will be wholly ensnared (‘body and soul’) by his beloved (teneamur, 5). But the network of (Roman) legal technical terms and legalisms which binds fr. 1 together suggests that Catulus did not intend them to be linguistic ornaments only, but rather to make sense conceptually, and to give his epigram a secondary dimension of meaning in the legal sphere. This raises two questions: first, what are the Roman legal implications of Theotimus providing a ‘refuge’ for a fugitiuus who has run off to him, particularly when it is revealed that Catulus and his soul have had prior dealings with Theotimus, and indeed that Catulus had already formally prohibited him from admitting his fugitive soul and ordered him to eject it? Second, what in legal terms is the dominus Catulus afraid of, i.e. what legal meaning should be attached to teneamur (5)?

The first question can be answered without difficulty. Harbouring someone else’s runaway slave was an offence penalised by the praetorian edict: cf. ait praetor: ‘qui seruum seruam alienum alienam recepisse persuasisseue quid ei dicetur dolo malo, quo eum eam deteriorem faceret, in eum quanti ea res erit in duplum iudicium dabo.’ (Ulpian Digest 11.3.1 pr.). Ulpian goes on to explain the meaning of the praetor’s recepisse: quod autem praetor ait ‘recepisse’, ita accipimus, si susceperit seruum alienum ad se: et est proprie recipere refugium abscondendi causa seruo praestare uel in suo agro uel in alieno loco aedificioue (Digest 11.3.1.2). Giving refuge to a runaway might under certain circumstances also be theft: cf. qui ex uoluntate domini seruum recepit, quin neque fur neque plagiarius sit, plus quam manifestum est … quod si dominus uetuit et ille suscepit, si quidem non celandi animo, non est fur, si celauit, tunc fur esse incipit (Ulpian Digest 47.2.48.2–3). uetuit in this context is of interest, given Catulus’ prior interactions with Theotimus. Legally speaking, then, Theotimus is multiply in the wrong when he gives refuge to Catulus’ soul.

The second question is more complex. The primary metaphorical sense of teneamur (5) is ‘be (erotically) captured’ uel sim.; this, of course, initially suggests that Catulus intended us to think of the (secondary) legal meaning of teneamur as involving physical restraining – one of the two legal senses of tenere noted above (§II). In that case Catulus will be afraid of being restrained physically by Theotimus (and even perhaps enslaved by him). Theotimus has received his soul, and some receivers of runaway slaves were fugitiuarii (slave-catchers), shady characters potentially capable of committing further illegal acts³⁴ such as seizing and enslaving a free individual; hence a dominus looking for his runaway slave might experience such a fear. But there is no indication that Theotimus is a fugitiuarius, and moreover a Roman magistrate of Catulus’ status (possibly accompanied by attendants) would not have needed to fear such an outcome. Nor would he have needed to seek a legal opinion, as he does in the final line. So, even if a Roman reader at first assumed that teneamur referred to physical restraint, da, Venus, consilium (6) would have compelled him to change his mind.

Consequently the alternative legal sense of teneamur mentioned above (§II) is more plausibly in play within the epigram’s secondary metaphor: Catulus is afraid of incurring legal liability, and being summonsed to court. His fear springs from the fact that his runaway soul has been admitted by Theotimus into his house (fr. 1.2, 4), so Catulus must enter the house of Theotimus to search for it. Under Roman law there was a long-standing prohibition on entering another person’s house without their consent – domum ui introire. This was a form of iniuria, and (in the words of Alan Watson) ‘although iniuria was specifically treated in the XII Tables [VIII.2, 3, 4, 5] it came to be considered part of edictal law after the edictum generale was issued in the last quarter of the third century B.C.’³⁵ Eventually iniuria became a criminal offence under the Lex Cornelia de iniuriis of 81 BC. We do not know whether forced entry into someone’s house was specifically penalised in the XII Tables, but Ulpian Digest 47.10.5 pr. lists it along with punching or beating someone as an offence covered by the Cornelian law: Lex Cornelia de iniuriis competit ei, qui iniuriarum agere uolet ob eam rem, quod se pulsatum uerberatumue domumue suam ui introitam esse dicat. So it is fairly certain that it featured as a ground for legal action in the praetor’s edict, and it seems to have been considered a serious offence. Paul Digest 47.10.23 summarises and records a relevant response of the jurist Ofilius, a pupil of Servius and contemporary of Cicero: qui in domum alienam inuito domino introiret, quamuis in ius uoca, actionem iniuriarum in eum competere Ofilius ait. Here we see that entry contrary to the wishes of the owner was regarded as in itself constituting uis, i.e. no outright violence was necessary to create the offence. Ofilius’ ruling also reinforces the notion that Romans regarded a breach of the sacrosanctity of the home as a major illegal act: even the intent to summons a person to court did not justify forced entry, which still remained iniuria.³⁶

iniuria was a civil, not a criminal, offence in Catulus’ day, but it was certainly something that he would have needed to take account of when thinking of entering Theotimus’ house to recover his runaway soul. A prudent Roman in a situation where his intended actions might make him liable for iniuria would have gone to a jurisconsult in the hope of obtaining a response which might justify what he was planning. This is exactly what Catulus does in the concluding pointe of his epigram: he goes for advice to his jurisconsult Venus, the highest legal authority under his particular circumstances!

IV Conclusions

§I of this paper argues that, contrary to what has been universally believed, the Greek model for Lutatius Catulus fr. 1 is not Callimachus AP 12.73 but a different, now lost Hellenistic epigram, probably also by Callimachus, which exploited the same commonplace thematic material.³⁷ §II examines the under-appreciated legal and legalistic aspects of the vocabulary of Catulus fr. 1, which do not supersede the influence of Roman comedy on the epigram’s language, but endow the epigram with an additional linguistic register. §III follows on from §II by proposing that the legal language of fr. 1 creates an extended secondary metaphor based on Roman law in which Catulus’ soul is a fugitiuus, a runaway slave who has been given refuge by Theotimus. While Theotimus is legally liable for taking in Catulus’ runaway soul, Catulus might also be placing himself in legal jeopardy if he invades Theotimus’ house to recover his soul. In this dilemma Catulus unites metaphor and ‘reality’ by appealing for advice to Venus qua jurisconsult.

I am greatly indebted to Mr Ian Du Quesnay and Prof. Bruce Frier for advice on this chapter, for valuable additional suggestions, and most of all for saving me from errors and excesses; neither of course is responsible for those faults which remain.

¹E.g. Gow at HE II.158 intro.; Cairns (1971) 456 = (2007) 180; Buffière (1977) 97; Pascucci (1979) 122 = (1983) 646; Perutelli (1990) 260 = (2002) 34; Courtney (1993) 76, referring to ‘all the freedom which the notion of uertere carried to the Romans’; Livrea (1996) 68; Maltby (1997) 53, who (45 n. 4) me monente avoided a similar assumption about Catull. 70 and Callim. AP 5.6 = 11 HE; Morelli (2007) 533–4; Gärtner (2010); Landolfi (2011) 434; Acosta-Hughes and Stevens (2012) 210–12; Heyworth (2015a) 391.

²On these suggestions, and on links made by other scholars before O. Schneider between Theotimus and AP 12.73, see Livrea (1996) 68–9 and n. 24. Livrea favoured δίφησον but not Θεύτιμον.

³Cf. Pope (1982), for whom (54–5) fr. 1.3 would begin ‘And yet I had expressly told him not to …’. However, Pope’s examples are not homogeneous, and his formula does not adequately cover all of them. I would prefer as an idiomatic rendering of fr. 1.3 ‘Didn’t I tell him not to …?’.

⁴Hecker’s ὑποδέχεσθε is usually read in place of P’s ὑπέχεσθε, which presents a metrical problem (see Livrea (1996) 70–1, who retains ὑπέχεσθε); but, pace Livrea, no truly satisfactory meaning has yet been found for ὑπέχεσθε.

⁵If Jacobs’ emendation is correct, there is a sixth verbal equivalence, i.e. quaesitum (fr. 1.5) and δίφησον (AP 12.73.5) in the same sedes; but the corruption has often (and perhaps correctly) been regarded as incurable.

⁶Most recently these were re-explored by Gärtner (2010) 441–3, who did not challenge the consensus.

⁷Cf. Gutzwiller (1998) General Index s.vv. Imitation; Variation, of epigrams; and, for a useful brief summary of this topic with bibliography, cf. Kirstein (2002) 113–15.

⁸Cf. Gutzwiller (1998) General Index s.v. Meleagrian sequences, major.

⁹cum manicis catulo collarque ut fugitiuum | deportem.

¹⁰Cf. Nisbet and Hubbard (1970) 48 on Hor. Carm. 1.3.8; and for its basis Livrea (1996) 67–8.

¹¹Cf. Moreno Soldevila (2011) 272–5 s.v. MIEDO POR AMOR (F. Socas), with rich documentation of every type of fear associated with love in antiquity.

¹²Cf. Harrauer (1981); Parsons (2002) 118–20, dating it to the last quarter of the third century BC (120); Parsons et al. (2015).

¹³So Parsons (2002) 120.

¹⁴Cf. Parsons (1987) esp. 65–6.

¹⁵Cf. Parsons (2002) 120–2; SH 976. For a listing of all those known up to 1992 cf. Pordomingo (1994). A comparison of P.Oxy. LIV.3724 and P.Mil.Vogl. VIII.309 also reveals the preferences of individual anthologisers for different epigrammatic types.

¹⁶Three out of the twenty known examples of Θεύτιμος listed at LGPN I–VB s.v. come from Cyrene.

¹⁷Argentieri (2007) 152 dated the Garland to ca. 80 BC or later, although his arguments are not watertight.

¹⁸Pascucci (1979) 123–6 = (1983) II.647–50; Maltby (1997) 54 added some minor Plautine parallels.

¹⁹Perutelli (1990) summarised Pascucci’s findings at 261–2 = (2002) 35–6; he listed his own Terentian parallel material at 262–3 = (2002) 36–7; see further Landolfi (2011) 434–43.

²⁰I am not, however, persuaded by the recent proposal of Heyworth (2015a) that much of fr. 1’s language is derived specifically from Plautus’ Bacchides. Apart from the phrase ad Theotimum | deuenit, Heyworth’s (widely scattered) points of resemblance are either topoi or terms found more or less frequently throughout Plautus – and elsewhere.

²¹E.g. Pascucci (1979) 122–4 = (1983) II.646–8, commenting fleetingly on aufugit, fugitiuus and eiceret.

²²Klingenberg (2005) provides a full array of relevant legal texts, preceded by a discussion.

²³Cod. Theod. 11.30.30 (perfugium) and 11.36.14 (plural perfugia = ?refuge) are not really helpful.

²⁴Cf. OLD s.v. 10.

²⁵Cf. e.g. (all from Ulpian) fugitiuos conquirere (1.15.4 pr.); fugitiuos inquirere (11.4.1.2 – further examples follow); fugitiuum … requirere (11.4.3 pr.).

²⁶Often in the iunctura quaesitum est.

²⁷Morelli (2000) 168 n. 152; tene me ne fugiam was another popular inscription on slave collars.

²⁸Particularly since the normal term for ‘catching’ a runaway slave seems to have been adprehendere (cf. VIR s.v. adprehendo I.B) or comprehendere (cf. VIR s.v. comprehendo II.).

²⁹For further examples see VIR s.v. teneo I.A.

³⁰For numerous examples see VIR s.v. teneo II.B.1.

³¹See VIR s.v. consilium V.B.2.

³²See e.g. Pringsheim (1950) 456–7, 527; Taubenschlag (1955) 83–5; Bruns (1909) I.326–7.

³³The attempt of Giangrande (1975) 16–17 (repeated in his later works) to introduce into AP 12.73 such legal concepts as asylum, the right of slaves πρᾶσιν αἰτεῖν, and sale by auction was convincingly refuted by Livrea (1996) 71 and n. 36.

³⁴Cf. Daube (1952).

³⁵Watson (1974) 155; see also Poláy (1986) Subject Index s.v. Domum vi introire.

³⁶The view of Ulpian Digest 47.8.2.18 that a dominus can seize back his runaway from a bona fide possessor without being liable to the actio bonorum raptorum does not modify this proposition since the seizure is not said to take place in the possessor’s house.

³⁷In Cairns (2015), a parallel paper, I have argued that the initial quatrain of Propertius’ Monobiblos, which is usually regarded as an adaptation of AP 12.101.1–4 (= 103 HE), in fact adapts another (now lost) epigram, probably also by Meleager.