6
The Corinthian League
Elisabetta Poddighe
During Alexander’s reign relations between the Greeks and the Macedonian kingdom were regulated by the charter of the “Corinthian League.” This modern expression refers to the political and military pact between Philip II and the Greeks ratified at Corinth after the defeat of the allied Greeks at Chaeroneia, and then renewed by Alexander in 336. The pact set the seal on a design for establishing Macedonian hegemony that would insure control over Greece and unite it in a war against Persia. It achieved its purpose because Alexander, in his relations with the Greeks, constantly sought to emphasize the legitimacy of his leadership: on the basis of traditional Greek hegemonic practice, Alexander regulated his political activity in Greece and used key themes of Greek propaganda as a catalyst against his opponents, and by turning their opposition to tyranny and their concern for freedom to his own advantage.
Alexander’s Accession to Leadership of the Corinthian League
After Philip’s assassination at Aegae in 336, Alexander inherited, together with the Macedonian kingdom, his father’s Panhellenic project to lead the Greeks in the conquest of Persia. Part of this legacy was the Corinthian League, founded for this purpose by Philip. This was a league of autonomous Greek states (excluding Sparta) that in early 337 proclaimed peace and autonomy for the Greeks who swore not to attack the kingdom of Macedonia. The peace required recognition of the conditions established in the postwar period, that is, the complete political and/or territorial reorganization of the cities that had challenged Macedonia for hegemony in Greece (Athens, Sparta, and Thebes), now policed by garrisons stationed in Corinth,Ambracia, Thebes, and Chalcis.1 A common council (koinon synedrion) of the Greeks was established at Corinth, hence the name “Corinthian League.” Voting rights were assigned to the member states on a proportional basis; these also conceded supreme command (hegemonia) to Philip (and to his descendants) in the event of war.2 It had been agreed in advance that action must be taken against Persia, the common enemy, and predictably perhaps, the delegates consented to the proclamation of a war of revenge for the outrages committed against the Greeks in the Great Persian Wars of the fifth century, more than 150 years before (D.S. 16.89.2; Plb. 3.6.13).3 This consent (eunoia), which confirmed the “Greekness” of the war of revenge, legitimized the leadership role of the Macedonian kingdom, though Philip did not live to exploit it. Yet there can be no doubt that Philip’s most important legacy, though always a fragile one, was Greek adherence to the Panhellenic project.
The Lawful Inheritance
In the meeting with the Greek delegations after Philip’s death, Alexander demanded the consent of the Greeks as his paternal inheritance (D.S. 17.2.2), clearly the consent won by his father when he promised to lead the Greeks in a war against Persia. Later, when Alexander moved south into Greece, he demanded once again hegemony over Greece as part of his father’s legacy (D.S. 17.4.1), and once again, as we shall see, he stressed the Panhellenic character of this undertaking. Both demands underlined a key concept: the Macedonian kingdom was the legitimate leader of the Greeks against the barbarians and Alexander, as Philip’s heir in all respects, was determined to confirm the legitimacy of his leadership and status.4
Although the claim to Philip’s position as leader of the Greeks was juridically founded, many Greeks did not intend to acknowledge it. The Athenians and the Thebans proclaimed that “they did not want to concede hegemony over the Greeks to the Macedonians” (D.S. 17.3.2, 4). Athenian negotiations with the Persian king Darius III demonstrated that many Athenians saw the Macedonian king as a more dangerous and “common” enemy than the Persian, a warning already delivered by Demosthenes ([Dem.] 10.33–4; D.S. 17.4.8). Peace appeared especially precarious in the places where, after the surrender to Philip, compliant regimes and military garrisons had been installed. It was these interventions in the cause of “pacification” that surely precipitated the first revolt against Alexander (336): the Aetolians debated recalling the exiles proscribed by Philip; the Ambracians drove out the Macedonian garrison and set up a democratic regime; the Thebans decreed the removal of their garrison; and, probably at this stage, the Philiades were deposed at Messene (D.S. 17.3.3–5; [Dem.] 17.4).
Alexander’s determination to follow Philip’s path of mediation in the pursuit of supreme leadership in Greece is certainly indicated by his policy of intervening in the Greek world only on a firm legitimate basis. Diodorus strongly emphasized this when he pointed out how the Greeks had legitimized Philip’s hegemonic aspirations, not only on the basis of Macedonian military superiority demonstrated at Chaeroneia (16.89.1), but also as a result of the discussions and meetings “in the cities” that convinced the Greeks to endorse the Persian campaign (16.89.2–3). The contents of those discussions are unknown, but it is certain that the language used was precisely the Panhellenic rhetoric that claimed the Greek (and Macedonian) right to territorial expansion and to the civilizing of the non-Hellenic peoples (cf. Isoc. 5.16.111–16).5 The Greeks could tolerate – sometimes defend – Macedonian leadership only in terms of “antibarbarian” rhetoric (Aeschin. 3.132; Plu. Phoc. 17.7). Therefore, it was a foregone conclusion that Alexander would request a formal reconfirmation of his supreme command and undertake formal negotiations with the Greeks (D.S. 17.4.1–9) by reiterating the Panhellenic grounds for the anti-Persian crusade (Ael. VH 13.11).
The Panhellenic Crusade and Acknowledgment of Hegemony over Greece
Negotiations with the Greeks insured, first of all, that the Thessalian and Delphic Amphictyonies (koina) recognized Alexander’s hegemony (D.S. 17.4.1–2). According to the sources, Alexander persuaded the Thessalian League to grant him the double title ofhegemon and archon. This he claimed by appealing to the common descent (syggeneia) of the Argeads and of the Aleuads, the ruling dynasty of Larissa, from Heracles and Achilles whose exploits prefigured the Asian campaign (D.S. 17.4.1; Just. 11.3.1–2).6 It would seem that the Aleuad connection was also the basis for the Amphictyonic council’s concession of hegemony over Greece to Alexander (D.S. 17.4.2). Indeed, a reevaluation of the Aleuads was linked to exploiting the myth of the Aeacidae7 whose cult was an essential ingredient in Delphic propaganda. Alexander’s visit to the sanctuary at Delphi, possibly confirmed by an inscription (SIG3 1. 251), is perfectly coherent with this diplomatic policy (Plu. Alex. 14.6).8 Presumably the Panhellenic grounds for the war against Persia were also confirmed in negotiations with the Amphictyonies which, according to the Alexander Romance, were incited to make war against the “barbarians” (Ps. Call. 1.25.1). In any case, their acknowledgment of the hegemony confronted the Corinthiansynedrion with a fait accompli by emphasizing the principle of dynastic hegemony ratified at Delphi in 346 (D.S. 16.60.4–5) and at Corinth in 337, thereby legitimizing Macedonia’s hegemonic role.9 It is significant that the Panhellenic sanctuaries were delegated, later, to inform the allied Greek cities of federal decisions and to host the federal assemblies (see below).10 This procedure would later be repeated in the League of 302 promoted by Antigonus I (Monophthalmus) and Demetrius, which attributed a kind of “foundation act” to an amphytictyonic psephisma (Lefèvre 1998: 97). This ordered too that, in peacetime, the federal assemblies were to be held during the sacred games (Moretti 1967, no. 44, ll. 65ff.).11
The glorification of cultural and religious themes most likely to promote Greek participation in the campaign was also a determining factor in negotiations with the states that refused to acknowledge Macedonian hegemony (D.S. 17.4.3–6). Once again, the criteria were the same as those adopted by Philip after Chaeroneia. In Boeotia, Alexander ruled with an iron hand (D.S. 17.4.4; Just. 11.2.9), continuing Philip’s policy which had imposed an oligarchic junta and a Macedonian garrison on this traditional hotbed of Persian sympathizers. At the same time, he favored the other Boeotian cities, especially Plataea, because its forefathers had provided the field of battle where the Persians were defeated in 479.12 Now on the eve of the Panhellenic crusade, Plataea welcomed home its exiles. This was a decisive step for Macedonian propaganda which would soon portray Alexander as the champion of the Plataean cause (see below).
At Athens, which had hurriedly sent ambassadors to Boeotia to request pardon for not having conceded hegemony immediately,13 favorable conditions for peace and the alliance sealed with Philip were confirmed (D.S. 16.87.3; Plu. Phoc. 16.5).14 Ratification came under Athena’s protection, to which anti-Persian propaganda reserved a determining role (Mari 2002: 260ff.). Macedonian officers “in charge of the common defense” later set up an inscription in Athena’s sanctuary at Pydna recording Athenian contributions to Alexander’s army; a copy of this was, in turn, displayed on the Athenian acropolis (IG II2 329, ll. 12ff.).15
It must be noted that the agreements were reached without threat of sanctions. Thessaly’s resolution to retaliate militarily against Athens (Aeschin. 3.161) would seem to belong to another context,16 and it is highly improbable that Alexander, as hegemon of the League, would assume responsibility for a measure such as this. As long as the synedrion had not legitimized his role, Alexander was determined not to punish violations of the peace.
From Corinth 337 to Corinth 336: The Letter and the Spirit of the Agreements with Alexander
At Corinth the Greeks definitively recognized Alexander’s legitimacy. The same delegates who had met in 337 confirmed Alexander’s functions as hegemon and strategos autokrator (D.S. 17.4.9; Arr. 1.1.1–3; Plu. Alex. 14.1; Just. 11.2.5);17 it seems that they also met in the same place, the city or the sanctuary of Isthmia,18 symbolic sites associated with the first anti-Persian Greek federation of 480 (Hdt. 7.145). The roll of those taking the oath must also have included the cities and states of continental Greece (except Sparta) together with some of the Aegean and Ionian islands (Rhodes–Osborne, no. 76b, ll. 2ff.).
Several clauses of the treaty (synthekai) are preserved in the Demosthenic oration On the Treaty with Alexander, possibly delivered by Hypereides.19 There is general agreement that the treaty completely renewed the agreements with Philip (Buckler 2003: 516). The allies swore to guarantee the peace (eirene/koine eirene),20 that is, the autonomy and freedom of the Greeks ( [Dem.] 17. 8), based on provisions tested in recent peace and alliance treaties such as the Peace of Antalcidas (387/6), the charter of the Second Athenian League (377), and the Athenian koine eirene of 371. The parameters of autonomy were defined with formulas preserved on inscriptions and in fourth-century historical accounts; on the negative side these stated what was forbidden: namely, not to attack states that had sworn to the peace and not to overthrow existing regimes (Rhodes–Osborne, no. 76, ll. 8–14; [Dem.] 17.10.14).21 Other stipulations defined the right to political and territorial sovereignty22 and obliged the Greeks to maintain the social status quo; illegal executions and banishment were prohibited as were the confiscation and redistribution of land, the remission of debts, the freeing of slaves, and the restoration of exiles to their home cities ( [Dem.] 17.10, 15–16). Even in this case, however, the ban on fomenting revolution (neoterismos) was limited to improving a clause in the charter of the Second Athenian League that urged the allies “to live at peace” (Rhodes–Osborne, no. 22, ll. 10–11). The result was that the Greeks guaranteed preservation of the status quo on the basis of principles elaborated during their long experience with hegemony and that the rights of the dominant state were safeguarded precisely on the basis of these formal guarantees.
Even the administrative machinery delegated to safeguard the regulations and their activation were regulated by criteria that gave only formal guarantees to the allies. The common council assigned the seats and votes to the delegates according to objective factors such as population and military strength;23 it appears that councilors could not be prosecuted in their home states for their decisions (cf. Moretti 1967: no. 44, ll. 75ff.). The council’s wide authority encompassed arbitration,24 protection of the social order, and ratification of war but, in the crucial areas, it was firmly controlled by the Macedonian state. In maintaining social order, it was the Macedonian military, “the board in charge of common defense,” that assisted the synedrion ( [Dem.] 17.15; Bosworth 1992a: 148) and it was the role of the hegemon to propose to the council that it declare war against transgressors of the agreements.
In this case Greek diplomatic tradition also provided the principles that were to be followed. Armed intervention was regulated by a guarantee (or sanction) clause that had long been tested in fifth- and fourth-century treaties between the Greek states. In the Peace of Athens of 371 such a clause had demonstrated its potential, one capable of guaranteeing an alliance between signatories without ratification of a distinct treaty of symmachia (Alonso 2003b: 355ff.).25 That the clause was to be activated only at the victim’s request (Rhodes–Osborne, no. 76, ll. 18–19, Alonso 1997: 186) broadened its legitimate basis. The report of a clear abuse was sufficient for declaring war. The twofold role of the hegemon as advocate of peace (Arr. 2.14.6) and leader of the alliance, and the fact that peace was not guaranteed by the stamp of an external authority,26 insured that the hegemondetermined when sanctions would be declared.
Philip had activated the machinery for sanctions in 337: he had proposed that the synedrion declare war against the Persians in revenge for the sacrileges against the Greek temples in 480 (D.S. 16.89.2; Plb. 3.6.13), and declared afterward that he also wanted to liberate the Greeks in Asia (D.S. 16.91.2). Alexander repeated this procedure (Just. 11.5.6; D.S. 17.24.1). The Greeks and Macedonians could easily portray themselves as the victims of these earlier offenses that required punishment and thus the war could be interpreted as one of just retribution. In his letter to Darius III after Issus, Alexander referred to the offenses committed in 480 and denounced those of more recent date, namely, the plot against Philip and, after his death, the attempt to break up the peace among the Greeks (Arr. 2.14.4–6; Curt. 4.1.10–14).27 The transgression of law and decency (paranomia) by the Persians was evident in both cases (D.S. 16.89.2; Plb. 3.6.13): the violation of the laws of war regarding respect for sanctuaries (Ilari 1980: 258ff.) and the infringement of the norms regulating relations between states (Ryder 1965: 147). Even the Greek judgment that Greek autonomy in Asia entailed freedom for Greeks everywhere provided a legitimate basis for action against the Persians (Musti 2000: 176). There is no reason, however, to believe that the non-allied Greeks of Asia made a formal request for help;28 rather it was the allies of Corinthian League who were the injured party (adikoumenoi).
Once war was declared, the prerogatives of the hegemon were renewed and everything was readied for the campaign. With an army of about 40,000 men Alexander renewed the expedition that Philip had earlier sent to Asia (D.S. 16.91.2). Less than a quarter of the army came from cities belonging to the League.29 In this context, the hegemon had a legitimate basis for dealing with (predictable) Greek resistance. The synedrion’s resolution to punish any Greek who fought on the Persian side (Arr. 1.16.6, 3.23.8), a resolution inspired by the “oath of Plataea” sworn at Corinth in 480,30 would permit Alexander not only to punish the numerous31 mercenaries recruited by Darius III, but all Persian sympathizers.
Modern scholars have often seen in Alexander’s approach to the Persian sympathizers,32 and in general his relations with the Greeks, evidence of an early and growing indifference to the League’s charter.33 Analysis of actual cases, however, demonstrates that the League was in fact what it claimed to be: an instrument for exercising control over the allies in the hands of the hegemon who used it according to his prerogatives throughout his entire reign.
Alexander and the Greeks of the Corinthian League in the Context of the Persian War
The ideological profile of the campaign against the Persians and the network of relations with the allies justified the hegemonic role of the Macedonian king. As enforcer of the eunoia of the Greeks, Alexander’s duty was to assert the primacy of civilization over barbarism; once electedhegemon, he was able to exercise his prerogatives in order to achieve his purpose.
On the other hand, many Greeks felt that Macedonian hegemony was an attack on the freedom of the poleis.34 Although in hostile cities such as Athens reaction to these conditions took different forms, ranging from pragmatic acceptance of the new political reality (Aeschin. 2.164–5; Plu. Phoc.16.735) to pursuit of their own claims to hegemony (Dem. 18.60–72), the resolve to oppose the Macedonian tyrant usually prevailed. Opponents’ demands followed a constant pattern that emphasized those elements of the treaty guaranteeing the freedom and autonomy of the allies, while obscuring the campaign, the alliance, and the powers ascribed to its leader. But it was precisely the “emergency powers”36 decreed by the synedrion for conquering the Persian empire that were to be used against rebellious Greeks who, as Persian sympathizers, were the enemies of peace.
Panhellenism and the Exercise of Hegemony against Theban Resistance
The war against Thebes is a striking example of resistance by the more hostile Greek allies (Thebes and Athens) to Macedonian leadership and the determination of the hegemon to oppose it on legal grounds. In the case of Thebes, sanctions had to demonstrate that defection from the accords would not be tolerated (D.S. 17.9.4; Plu. Alex. 11.17); at the same time it also had to emphasize that intervention was legitimate. Therefore, rebels had to be punished on the basis of League accords and wartime propaganda.
Late in the summer of 335, the exiles proscribed by Philip after Chaeroneia returned. After attacking and isolating the Macedonian garrison on the Cadmea, the Thebans installed a democratic regime, overthrowing the 300-member politeuma that had been set up two years before.37 The rebels were convinced that Alexander had died in battle against the Illyrians. When this news turned out to be false, the majority of the Thebans resolved to hold fast to their original intentions.38 The rebellion, which violated several clauses of the League charter, rapidly spread to the rest of Greece: the Arcadians revived their league and sent an army to the Isthmus; the Eleans exiled the pro-Macedonian party; the Athenians ordered the deployment of their forces. The rebellious Thebans invited the Greeks to return to the peace terms agreed in 387/6 with Persia which was financing the rebellion.
As hegemon Alexander intervened to punish the defection and collaboration with the Persians.39 The legitimacy of the intervention took on a distinctive character as Greek forces joined Alexander’s army during its march to Boeotia from Illyria where news of the rebellion had reached him (Arr. 1.7.5–7).40 These forces included Phocians and Thessalians, but especially Orchomenians, Thespians, and Plataeans, all Boeotians and all enemies of Thebes. As the only Boeotians who had opposed the “barbarian” during the Persians wars (Hdt. 7.132.1) they guaranteed legitimacy to federal sanctions. The support of these “champions” of Greek liberty41 compensated for the massive abstention of other allies in the war, the legality of which, in this and other cases, was no less serious an issue.42 The case of the Arcadians demonstrates this: declaring themselves ready to support the Theban revolt, they were persuaded to accept the hegemon’s decision by not being required to furnish troops (Din. 1.18–20).43
The exemplary purpose of sanctions required an exemplary use of the hegemon’s prerogatives and, in fact, this was guaranteed. The herald’s proclamation that traditionally announced an ultimatum invited the Thebans to accept the offer of peace; this also emphasized the “constitutionality” of the punitive war. Only after the Theban counter-proclamation, which invited violation of the accords, did punitive war (timoria) against the rebels begin.44
The hegemon also exercised his prerogatives after the battle which ended rapidly with the foreseeable defeat of the Thebans (Bosworth 1988a: 32ff.). On the basis of the rule that allowed the federal authority to select the synedrion’s meeting place, the allied council did not gather at Corinth as usual, but probably in Alexander’s camp.45 Here, the fate of the defeated, usually reserved to the hegemon (Alonso 2003a: 353), was delegated to the allies (Arr. 1.9.9); this was certainly intended to emphasize that Alexander would not be responsible for the anticipated vengeful decisions of Thebes’ neighbors, and to use the synedrion against Persian sympathizers. Once military action had punished the defection, the campaign’s propaganda apparatus conditioned debate among the allies about the final sentence. Thebes’ earlier and more recent Persian sympathies, along with abuses committed against the Boeotian cities and Athens, placed the sentence firmly within a Panhellenic context. The decision to destroy Thebes, to sell the prisoners into slavery, and to banish the exiles from everywhere in Greece was just retaliation for the damage done by the Thebans to Plataea in 374/3 and Orchomenus in 364. The synedrion’s decision to link the destruction of Thebes with the reconstruction of Plataea, along with Alexander’s pledge to carry this out, was an appropriate recognition of the Panhellenic status of the city that, in 479, had sacrificed its territory in the name of freedom.46 The execution of a cruel sentence seemed legitimate from a Panhellenic point of view (Aeschin. 3.133), and the “just” condemnation of Thebes echoes later in the Alexander Romance where a personified Mt. Cithaeron exults at the city’s destruction (Ps. Call. 1.46.1; Gargiulo 2004: 109ff.).
The Athenians, instigators of the revolt and Persian accomplices as well, paid a less drastic price for their crimes. Alexander directed the negotiations in person. The demand that those anti-Macedonian politicians most heavily involved in the revolt be turned over to the synedrion was reformulated in bilateral negotiations with Demades and Phocion (Arr. 1.10.3–6; Plu. Phoc. 9.10–17). Condemnation was reserved for those generals who had most compromised themselves with the Persians and who had fled Greece to fight on the side of Darius III.47 The need to move quickly into Asia (Arr. 1.10.6) and to be moderate in his treatment of Athens convinced Alexander that he had to assume the role of final judge in deciding the fate of Persian sympathizers. This operating principle was used for the first time now and would be repeated at Chios and Sparta (see below).
Alexander’s Exercise of Absolute Sovereignty after his Departure for Asia
Even after Alexander’s arrival in Asia in spring 334, intervention among the allied cities appeared to be consistent with the League’s mission. The visit to the tombs of the Greek heroes, Protesilaus, Ajax, and Achilles, leaders of the mythical first campaign in Asia, and sacrifices at the sanctuary of Athena Ilias, symbolically emphasized the significance of Alexander’s presence in Asia and his campaign.48 It was soon clear that Alexander was in a position to lead the alliance in pursuit of its objectives, not only in defeating the Persian army, but also by punishing those Greek mercenaries who fought for the Persians. He also exerted pressure on allied cities that impeded the war’s success. In each case the appeal to the League’s mission was formal in nature.
After the first victory over the Persians at the Granicus in summer 334, the “spoils of war captured from the barbarians in Asia” were offered to Athena in the name of the League (Arr. 1.16.7; Plu. Alex. 16.17–18); captured Greek mercenaries were sentenced to hard labor in Macedonia for having fought “against Greece” (Arr. 1.16.6, 1.29.5–6). Soon after, the imposition of pro-Macedonian regimes in the allied cities of the Peloponnesus and the Aegean islands followed. These, the anonymous Athenian orator tells, were based on ideological principles governing the League’s actions: in Greece the principles of status quo and homonoia and, in Asia, the battle against despotism prevailed ( [Dem.] 17.4, 7, 10). The anonymous orator went on to condemn constitutional upheavals that violated the accords – “as if Alexander’s absolute sovereignty extended over perjury also” (12) – and also pointed out that they did not even have a consistent ideological basis: on the one hand (at Messene) the installation of tyrants was legitimate because they were in power “before” the accords (7); on the other hand (at Lesbos) the tyrants, though in power “before” the accords, were deposed with the “laughable” justification that they were detestable.49 It is evident, however, that in both cases intervention punished defecting allies and helped achieve success in the war.
This intervention must be placed within the context of war against the attempted Persian reconquest of the Aegean;50 this engaged Macedonian and League forces from the spring of 333 to the spring and summer of 332. The victories of the satraps Pharnabazus and Autophradates fed anti-Macedonian ferment in the island states of Chios and Lesbos, who now allied themselves with the Persians; on the Greek mainland Autophradates’ support of Agis of Sparta resulted in certain counter-measures also mentioned by the anonymous Athenian orator ( [Dem.] 17.4, 7, 10). Alexander’s victory at Issus in the autumn of 333 helped considerably in rallying the temporary support of most mainland Greeks and placated their hostility. At the Isthmian Games in 332, the delegates of the Corinthian League decreed a golden crown for Alexander. In the same year, the king, in his letter to Darius III, officially confirmed the League’s resolve to avenge fifth-century Persian offenses against the Greeks (see above), and dealt exemplary punishments to those island communities that had defected.
The Hegemon and the Allies Chios and Lesbos after their Defection from the Accords: The Imposition of Democracies and Readmission to the League
The Macedonian reconquest of the islands (Arr. 3.2.3–7) was sanctioned by agreements defined by the sources as homologiai.51 As reported by the anonymous orator, the oligarchs’ treachery was punished by removal from office. The oligarchies had probably already been in power when the League was formed in 337. They were accepted at first and then deposed after their defection (Bosworth 1988a: 192; Lott 1996: 38). Removing the oligarchies as an effective anti-Persian measure had been demonstrated during the “liberation” of the Greek cities in Aeolia and Ionia. In the summer of 334, after the victory at the Granicus, Alexander had sent his agent Alcimachus to depose the oligarchies in those cities and install democratic regimes, thereby insuring their autonomy and remission from paying Persian tribute (Arr. 1.18.1–2). Obviously, it would be consistent to extend this measure to those allied cities that had left the alliance and joined the Persians. Experience with the non-allied cities of Ephesus, Priene, Aspendus, and Soli had already shown that institutional democratization did not necessarily guarantee effective freedom or a common juridical status; instead it satisfied in different ways the various military, propaganda, and financial needs of the war.52 Furthermore, the democratic model was a part of Greek political culture and therefore ideal for reuniting the islands to the anti-Persian league.
Some inscriptions of uncertain date (c.332?) from Chios and Lesbos probably refer to this institutional reorganization.53 The best evidence of the numerous juridical instruments at the disposal of the hegemon are Alexander’s so-called first54 and second letter to the Chians.55 These contain, respectively, a constitutional plan for Chios and a message to its inhabitants regarding some questions arising from the first measure. The first letter probably referred to an edict (diagramma) issued after the reconquest of the island.56The royal decree installed a democratic regime and reintegrated the pro-Macedonian exiles into civic life. The presence of a temporary garrison insured the application of the prescribed measures. A board of scribes was to draw up and revise the laws so that they would be in harmony with the democratic regime and the return of the exiles. These norms, whether amended or written, were to be submitted to Alexander. As king and supreme commander, Alexander would oversee the application of the measures. As supreme commander, he ordered that Chios provide twenty triremes as part of the “fleet of the Hellenes,” this probably the fleet equipped by Hegelochus in 333.57 Moreover, in conformity with the decrees already voted by the synedrion, he decided the fate of Persian sympathizers: he proclaimed the banishment and arrest of those who had fled the city; he deferred judgment of Persian sympathizers remaining on the island to the synedrion; and, finally, he mediated in the dispute between the Chians and Persian sympathizers who had returned home. In line with this role of direct mediation, already used in dealing with Athenian Persian sympathizers, Alexander decided the fate of the Persian sympathizers who had been captured on the island later. Taken to Egypt by Hegelochus (possibly after being judged by the synedrion), these were then sent by Alexander to Elephantine (Curt. 4.5.17; Arr. 3.2.3–7).58
The anonymous writer reports ( [Dem.] 17.7), and the epigraphic record indirectly confirms, that intervention in the cities of Lesbos was equally drastic. A group of documents from Eresus59 gives an account of the judicial proceedings against the tyrants Agonippus and Eurysilaus, guilty of collaborating with the Persians during the Aegean war, and then tried and exiled in 332. In this case, once again, a diagramma probably established the democratic regime that tried and exiled the two tyrants, a democratic regime whose judicial proceedings regarding the exile of Persian sympathizers had to conform to the decisions (kriseis) of Alexander and his successors.60
The installation of a democratic government and the forced civic reorganization at Mytilene (perhaps an ally since 33761) were probably also a result of the desertion in 333. Two decrees from the city62 record the measures issued by the deliberative democratic organs (the bolla and the damos) installed by Alexander after Hegelochus’ reconquest of Lesbos in 332 (Arr. 2.2.6; Worthington 1990: 207).63 These measures were probably based on a diagramma (Bencivenni 2003: 47) that ordered, in the name of the king, the return of the exiles, the installation of a democratic regime, and civic reconciliation between the pro-Macedonian exiles and the Persian sympathizers. Once again Alexander oversaw the difficult civil reconciliation and the fate of the Persian sympathizers, apparently without the intervention of the synedrion.
The “New” Peloponnesian Tyrants and Loyalty to the Corinthian Accords
The constitutional changes in the Peloponnesian cities, coordinated by Antipater,64 Alexander’s deputy for Greek affairs, and in his absence, by Corrhagus the garrison commander of Acrocorinth, appear justified by the need to insure control over Greece in the years when Agis of Sparta was preparing war against Macedonia (see below). Both acted autonomously, that is, apparently without consulting the synedrion, and both appealed to the statutory principles of the status quo and (possibly) of civil concord (homonoia).
In about 333, during the first phase of negotiations between Agis and the Persians, the Philiades, tyrants overthrown in the disorders following Philip’s death, were brought back to Messene ( [Dem.] 17.7).65 Their restoration to power was formally legitimate, but at this point it functioned especially to reinforce control over Sparta’s eastern borders and, therefore, was linked to the measures adopted at Sicyon and Pellene for securing Sparta’s northern borders. At Sicyon, an anonymous tyrant, known in Athens as “thepaidotribes” (“the professional trainer”) was brought back from exile ( [Dem.] 17.16; possibly he was Aristratus (Poddighe 2004: 187ff.)). His return had been imposed by an edict (prostagma), probably on the grounds of institutional continuity. At Pellene, however, soon before Agis’ revolt and with the support of Corrhagus,66 the tyrant Chaeron replaced the preceding regime which the anonymous Athenian orator thought democratic ( [Dem.] 17.10). The historical circumstances of his installation are obscure, as Chaeron’s supposed tyrannical ambitions derive from a topos elaborated by Athenian democratic propaganda, probably shaped by Demochares (Marasco 1985: 113ff.), and still recognizable in Pausanias in the second century AD (7.27.7).67 The hypothesis based on Athenaeus (11.509b; cf. Marasco 1984: 163ff.), however, that the deposed regime was not democratic and that wide support for Chaeron’s action resulted from serious social conflicts would suggest that intervention was based on the need to insure social order (homonoia) which would explain the synedrion’s silence. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that Alexander’s intentions to suspend tyrannical regimes, once Asia had been conquered, had a reassuring effect on the synedrion. Furthermore, the consolidation of relations between Antipater and the Peloponnesian tyrants, though worrisome, could be tolerated for strategic reasons.68 In any case, the effectiveness of the intervention at Pallene became evident when, soon afterward, Pellene was the only Achaean city that did not join Agis’ anti-Macedonian revolt, the ultimate Greek threat to the war against Persia.69
Anti-Macedonian Resistance during Alexander’s Absence
The territorial reorganization imposed on Sparta after Chaeroneia kept the city out of the League.70 Alexander called attention to this when, in 334, he dedicated the arms taken at the Granicus to Athena for the Greeks “except the Spartans” (Arr. 1.16.7; Plu. Alex.16.17–18). Spartan determination to modify this territorial arrangement, secured by Macedonian garrisons, may well have helped spark Agis’ revolt; but there were appeals also to antityrannical rhetoric and such slogans as “freedom for the Greeks” (D.S. 17.62.1–63.3; Just. 12.1.6). Moreover, the agreements with the Persian king meant that the rebels were seen as enemies of peace and of the campaign against Persia. During the conflict, however, the league charter operated as it was set up and it is important to note these procedures.
We know from Arrian that after the battle of Issus, Agis obtained ships (ten triremes) and money (thirty talents) from Autophradates (2.13.4–6). Enlisting 8,000 mercenaries dismissed by Darius, he reestablished Persian control over most of Crete. Victory over Corrhagus, who commanded Macedonian forces in the Peloponnesus while Antipater was engaged in Thrace against Memnon, followed his operations on Crete (Aeschin. 3.165). At this point some of the allies joined the revolt: the Achaeans (except for Pellene), the Eleans, and the Arcadians (except for Megalopolis).71Yet the adherence of these and “other” Greeks recorded by Diodorus (17.62.7) probably had no significant effect, and Agis began the siege of Megalopolis with an army totaling some 32,000 men.72
League sanctions brought the support of a number of Greek allies in this punitive war and these joined Antipater’s army during its march to the Peloponnesus. The percentage and the composition of the Greek allies are much discussed (D.S. 17.63.1); the size of the Macedonian force Alexander entrusted to Antipater in 334, whether 12,000 or 4,000/5,000, is also uncertain.73 The federal army, however, included troops from Corinth, Messenia, Argos, Megalopolis, as well as from Boeotia and Thessaly.74 The composition of the hegemon’s de facto allies (and also Sparta’s traditional enemies), and the fact that there was apparently no preliminary meeting of the synedrion, suggests that the response taken now followed that of the Theban crisis of 335. But unless we believe that the charter was non-operative from the beginning, we have no reason to consider the 331 intervention as anomalous. The absence of allies was common to both punitive wars. For most Greeks, but especially the more hostile Aetolians and Athenians (Aeschin. 3.165; D.S. 17.62.7), the option of neutrality seemed legitimate. The Aetolian decision to abstain was perhaps due to good relations with Antipater (Plu. Alex. 49.8) who, in exchange for neutrality in the face of Agis’ revolt, tolerated the Aetolian occupation of Oeniadae (Mendels 1984: 132ff.; cf. below). In the case of Athens, however, the decision to respect the federal sanction was the outcome of heated debate. There has been a useless attempt to question this by accepting Diodorus’s claim (17.62.7) that Athenian neutrality was a response to Alexander’s benevolent treatment (Sawada 1996: 88ff.),75 or by denying the strength of the interventionist position (Brun 2000: 88 ff.), or even by refusing to recognize the force of the Corinthian charter (Blackwell 1999: 58ff.). Instead, respect for the treaty was the fundamental criterion for evaluating the legality of the assembly’s decisions ( [Dem.] 17.1, 5, 7, 11–12, 14, 17–19). These decisions determined the outcome of the revolt. Agis’ army was defeated near Megalopolis (dated to spring 330) and Agis himself was killed.
Even when the war was over, the charter operated regularly. Antipater entrusted all decisions to the federal synedrion which met with its regular membership at Corinth (Curt. 6.1.19; D.S. 17.73.5). The fact that the meeting was not limited only to allies is evidence that Antipater was worried that an autocratic approach to the question would arouse Alexander’s resentment, a concern indicated by the sources and which cannot be considered unfounded.76 The synedrion legitimately discussed both the allies who had defected (Eleans, Achaeans, and Arcadians) and the Spartans. Those who had been in contact with the Persians (Arr. 2.15.2; Curt. 3.13.15) were guilty of treason. For this, the synedrion could take action against any Greek, even those who were not members of the League. After imposing a fine on the Eleans and the Achaeans (obliged to pay 120 talents for damage caused by the siege) and banishing only the guilty Tegeans, the synedrion also discussed at length the case of Sparta.77 Because consensus among the delegates was impossible, in spite of the arguments for and against, the synedrion entrusted the matter to Alexander while giving the Spartans the option of sending their own delegates to the king to ask for pardon (D.S. 17.73.5–6; Curt. 6.1.20). This decision was based on precedents where the defendants were to be judged at the highest level: in the case of Athens as an alternative to the synedrion’s judgment and in the case of Chios apparently following the synedrion’s judgment. The intervention on the number and composition of the hostages handed over to Antipater pending the final sentence is consistent with the three-way negotiations from which the synedrion was excluded (McQueen 1978: 53ff.). Alexander’s decision is not recorded; but the hypothesis of Sparta’s forcible enrollment in the League is probable and testifies to a strong interest in the League as late as 330.78
After Gaugamela: Alexander, the League, and “Greek Freedom”
The campaign’s ideological profile and its relationship with the allies changed after Gaugamela when the conquest of the Persian capitals (Babylon, Susa, Persepolis, Ecbatana) and the discharge of the Greek contingents in Alexander’s army signaled the end of the war of revenge.79 The catalyst for rallying consent then became “Greek freedom.” This principle satisfied several needs. Ideologically, it consolidated Greek association with the Asian campaign once the destruction of Persepolis had satisfied the desire for revenge (Flower 2000: 115ff.); it also governed relations with the allied states. In this latter area, although long empty of juridical content,80 the principle of freedom supported Alexander’s leadership aspirations more than the binding principle of autonomy. It was also a more effective answer to the antityrannical views of his Greek opponents.
If we are to believe Plutarch, immediately after his coronation as “King of Asia,” Alexander provided factual proof that the principle of freedom was important for his political activity. He wrote to the Greeks informing them that tyranny had ended and autonomy had begun for the Greeks in Asia (Alex. 34.2; Hamilton 1969: 91). In this context, he promised the citizens of Plataea that he would rebuild their city as compensation for their forefathers’ sacrifices in providing the battleground for the Greeks in the fight “for freedom”; he sent a portion of the spoils of war to the Crotonians in Italy so that they could honor the memory of Phayllus, who had fought at Salamis (480) with the single ship given by western Greeks in the Hellenic cause (Hdt. 8.47; Plu. Alex. 34.2–4). Alexander rallied greater consensus in the years following 330 by exalting the principle of freedom for the Greeks (Flower 2000: 118ff.), and it is not surprising that this seems to be defended in the contemporary Letter to Alexander that has been attributed to Aristotle.81 On two occasions the freedom of the Greeks was extolled with a public proclamation. The rebuilding of Plataea, that “martyr” to freedom, was announced by a herald at the Olympic Games of 328 (Plu. Arist. 11.9; cf. Fredricksmeyer 2000: 138). In a similar manner, at the Olympic Games of 324, the return of the exiles was announced to the Greeks. This latter act is a striking example of the impact of the freedom principle on Alexander’s Greek policy.82
The Exiles’ Decree, Greek Freedom, and the Corinthian League
At Opis in Mesopotamia, in the spring of 324, Alexander proclaimed the Exiles’ Decree to his army in which many exiles were serving. One of the objectives of the Decree was to reinstate mercenaries in their native cities, a measure that took care of their needs and provided the king with a strong base of support in the Greek cities (Green 1991: 449ff.; Landucci Gattinoni 1995: 63ff.). The Decree’s impact on life in the city-states was predictable and it also explains Craterus’ return to Europe. He was given the task of bringing Macedonian veterans back home and a new assignment as Antipater’s replacement as administrator of Macedonia, Thrace, Thessaly, and of “Greek freedom” (Arr. 7.12.4).83 It is possible that Alexander intended to extend the Asian experiment in “liberation” to the mainland Greeks and that the exiles’ return was a preliminary to the type of institutional democratization that took place in 319 following Polyperchon’s diagramma (Heckel 1999: 492ff.).84 But whatever Alexander’s plans were, it is clear that the Exiles’ Decree was intended as a reaffirmation of his own political procedures and an improvement on those of Philip and Antipater. This policy was consistent with his new role as King of Asia and ruler of all the Greeks ( [Plu.] Vit. X or. 852d).85
The important fact, however, is that Alexander intended to adapt the juridical instrument at his disposal for this purpose, namely, the Corinthian League. Violating or ignoring its charter was neither useful nor necessary.86 On the contrary, Alexander was anxious to legitimize the Decree: by insuring an effective flow of information and adjusting its content to previous decisions of the League, and by entrusting its application to recognized authorities, that is, Antipater and eventually to the allies (D.S. 18.8.4; Just. 13.5.7). The choice of the Olympic Games as a platform points to a hegemonic voice that permitted an exchange of information without any meeting of the synedrion.
The Decree was promulgated at the beginning of the Olympic Games between the end of July and the beginning of August. The emissary, Nicanor of Stageira, delivered an open letter to the winner of the herald’s competition who read it to the more than 20,000 exiles present at Olympia (D.S. 18.8.2–5; Just 13.5.1–3).87
Delegates from the cities, including Demosthenes, were also present in the audience (Din. 1.82).88 The Decree ordered the return of all Greek exiles, with the exception of those guilty of sacrilege and murder, and required the cities to apply the measures under threat of military reprisal (D.S. 17.109.1, 18.8.2–4). In the text, as read by the herald, it appeared that everyone was to benefit from the Decree. But it is certain that the cases of application and exemption, as well as the procedures governing the exiles’ reinstatement in their native cities, were contained in a more ample document than the proclamation, probably a diagramma. Plutarch clearly indicates that there were exceptions such as the Thebans (Mor. 221a); Diodorus also records categories of exiles that, in 324, did not benefit from the return because they had been proscribed by the generals (Antipater) after Alexander had crossed into Asia (18.56.4).89 These few but significant exceptions confirmed the federal measures against Thebes, Tegea, and Pellene. Confirmation of these sentences created a dangerous difference in the fate of the cities in the regions to which they belonged (Arcadia, Achaea, and Boeotia), and, in view of possible resistance from the regional leagues, a second rescript was issued that Nicanor himself brought into Greece (Hyp. 5, col. 18). This might have been a warning to the Achaean and Arcadian (and possibly Boeotian90) leagues regarding debate about or military opposition to its application (Worthington 1986: 115ff.), or it might have been a measure ordering their dissolution (Bosworth 1988a: 77; Whitehead 2000: 415). In any case it was a measure conceived to insure the security of the return of the exiles (kathodos), as well as the office that had been entrusted to Antipater (D.S. 18.8.4).
Arcadian Tegea seems to be the “exception to the exception” in that it allowed the return of exiles proscribed after 334; an inscription in Delphi, datable probably to 324, is evidence for this (Bencivenni 2003: no. 4; Rhodes–Osborne, no. 101). This exception can be explained by the concentration of hostile mercenaries on nearby Cape Taenarum.91 This threat led to the reinstatement of most exiles including those recently condemned and who had been unable to attend public festivals (ll. 21–4),92 and those of longer date (for whom Alexander was especially concerned) including possibly the Tegeans who had been proscribed during the civil war that brought the establishment of the Arcadian koinon (Xen. Hell. 6.5.10; D.S. 14.34.3, 5; McKechnie 1989: 26). The economic difficulties of integrating exiles93 are evidence that the royal decree forced the integration of estranged groups and explains the decision to display the document at Delphi, a procedure usually reserved for interstate treaties (Bencivenni 2003: 97).
Athens, Samos, and Greek Freedom
The Exiles’ Decree arose from the determination to deal with different kinds of cases (Cargill 1995: 41–2; Bosworth 1998: 76). For some of these, Alexander was under strong pressure at court. Examples include the exiles from Oeniadae in Acarnania and from Samos, the victims respectively of Aetolian and Athenian colonialism. The fact that individual cases were not mentioned in the text of the Decree proves, according to some, that initially Alexander was indifferent;94 but this is no argument since the text of the Decree, as read by the herald, did not mention any specific cases. The Oenidaean and Samian cases were, however, crucial from the Macedonian perspective. The exiles banished by the Aetolians and the Athenians belonged to the category of those whose exile was unjust and longstanding and whose reinstatement demanded the allies’ support (D.S. 18.8.2–4; Just. 13.5.4, 7). In about 330 (D.S. 18.8.6–7; Jehne 1994: 241ff.), the Aetolians had occupied Oeniadae during a controversial campaign of expansion (Landucci Gattinoni 2004: 112ff.). Alexander certainly promised to punish this abuse and perhaps too the understanding between the Aetolians and Antipater (Plu. Alex. 49.8) who had tolerated their aggression (Mendels 1984: 131).
The Decree had an even stronger impact on Athens which was obliged “to return Samos to the Samians” as we read on the cast of a now lost Samian inscription (SIG3312, II. 11–14; Hallof 1999: 392ff.). The Samians had been expelled by Athenian cleruchs established on the island beginning in 36595 and the Athenians were not disposed to allow their return (D.S. 18.8.7). Even when, shortly before the king’s death, groups of Samian exiles tried to return to the island from their base on Anaea, Athenian reaction was very firm; clearly, the island was a possession not to be surrendered (Badian 1976: 289ff.). Alexander’s position, strengthened by pressure from the supporters of the Samian cause such as Gorgus of Iasus, did not allow for indecision.96 Alexander’s hostility was already clear in the autumn of 324 when, during the annual sacrifice to Dionysus at Ecbatana, the prospect of a siege and war against Athens seems to have discussed (Ephippus of Olynthus, FGrH 126 F5, preserved in Athen. 12.538a–b). Resentment grew further that summer when Harpalus, Alexander’s treasurer, fled to Athens with a considerable portion of the royal treasury.97 Harpalus was later mocked in a satyr play, which also reflected hostility toward Athens (Ath. 13.596a; Gadaleta 2001: 109ff.).
The Exiles’ Decree was primarily intended for political exiles, but also for so many others who had been forced from their homes on account of poverty and who had, as in the case of a number of Athenians, taken up mercenary service (Landucci Gattinoni 1995: 61ff.). The prospect, however, of dispossessed Athenian cleruchs returning to Athens was upsetting, as these amounted to a third of all adult (male) Athenian citizens (Habicht 1996: 401). In this light, the Samian question is paradigmatic for understanding the social meaning of the Decree and the reasons for Athenian opposition to it on behalf of freedom.
According to Curtius (10.2.6), Athens claimed the role of vindex publicae libertatis against Alexander, emphasizing that the Decree’s social consequences would be to bring back the “dregs” (purgamenta) of the city. Athenian accusations against Alexander, expressed in typically antityrannical language, do not appear explicitly related to the return of the Samian cleruchs. This should not be surprising: the Samian issue was a clear case of colonialism (Shipley 1987: 166), embarrassing to the cause of freedom and therefore ignored, as seen in the total silence of the Athenian sources.98However, it is probable that Curtius’ reference to the “dregs” concerns the cleruchs of Samos whom the orator Demades (in Athenaeus) characterized as the “deposit of the dregs” of the city (Ath. 3.99d; see Brun 2000: 105 n. 38; Poddighe 2007).
Alexander’s death delayed the decision regarding Samos and only when Perdiccas raised the question again after the Lamian War (a war strongly motivated by the Exiles’ Decree), were the Samians restored (D.S. 18.18.9).99 But Alexander’s conduct of the matter is evidence that he had a perfect grasp of the Greek interpretation of freedom. In a letter to the Athenians, Alexander “returned to sender” the accusation of despotism when he called attention to the theme of Samian freedom in the following statement:100 “I would not have given you that free and admirable city: you have it, having received it from him. . . who was said to be my father” (Plu. Alex. 28.2). Hypothetically, the context of the letter could be that referred to by Ephippus (see above). In both cases, there was a reference to the king’s divine descent, a very topical issue in 324101 in the context of the confrontation with Athens. Clearly, Alexander intended to defend the rights of the Samians by turning against Athens the very theme of freedom by which it claimed its right to the island.
1 The battle and postwar period: Hammond–Griffith 596–614; Buckler 2003: 500–11. Garrisons: D.S. 17.3.3, 8.7; Arr. 1.7; Plu. Arat. 23; Din. 1.18; Bosworth 1994a, 1994b; Buckler 2003: 511ff. The case of Chalcis (Plb. 38.3.3) is uncertain: Bosworth 1998: 48 n. 6; Faraguna 2003: 100 n. 4.
2 The oath sworn by the Greeks, preserved in a fragmentary inscription (Tod 1946: no. 177 = Rhodes and Osborne, no. 76), concedes hegemony to the Macedonian kingdom on a dynastic basis (l. 11; cf. Arr. 3.24.5): Perlman 1985: 170ff.; Hammond–Walbank 571; Hatzopoulos 1996: 297; Mari 2002: 113 n. 2.
3 Philip emphasized the prospect of the advantages involved in this (D.S. 16.89.3; Plb. 3.6.12): Hammond–Griffith 631. On the passage from Polybius: Walbank 1967: 307ff.; Seibert 1998: 27ff.
4 On Alexander’s inheritance of authority, see Hammond–Walbank 16 n. 2; Squillace 2004: 20.
5 On Panhellenism in Macedonian propaganda see Seibert 1998: 7–58; Flower 2000: 96–135. On the invention of an ancient enmity between Macedonians and Persians see Brosius 2003. Her undervaluation, however, of the expansionistic aims of the undertaking is unacceptable. Cf. Sakellariou 1980: 136ff.; Fredricksmeyer 1982: 85ff.; Bosworth 1988a: 17ff.; J. R. Ellis 1994: 784ff.; Seibert 1998: 28ff.
6 Sordi 1984a: 10 n. 5; Harris 1995: 175ff.; Helly 1995: 59ff.; Sanchez 2001: 253; Squillace 2004: 47ff. For a different view: Heckel 1997: 90ff.
7 The symbols on a commemorative Larisean drachma are evidence of this: Sordi 1996: 38ff.; Squillace 2004: 48; cf. Just. 11.3.1.
8 Plutarch places the visit in 335: Sordi 1984a: 9.
9 Sordi 1984a: 9–13; Hammond–Walbank 14ff.; Lefèvre 1998: 94; Mari 2002: 221ff. Sanchez 2001: 253ff., however, distinguishes between Amphictyonic and Corinthian hegemony.
10 The reconstruction of Plataea and Thebes was announced at the Olympic (Plu. Alex. 34.2; see below) and Isthmean Games (Ps. Call. 1.47.1–7). The synedrion seems to have met at the Isthmus in 332 (D.S. 17.48.6; Curt. 4.5.11) and in 330 at the Pythian Games (Aeschin. 3.254).
11 Helly 1995: 66; Sanchez 2001: 246; Mari 2002: 222. The relevance of the League of 302 to Philip and Alexander remains under discussion: Moretti 1967: 116ff.; Bosworth 1988a: 190ff.; Mari 2002: 135ff., 222ff.; Buckler 2003: 516 n. 26; Rhodes–Osborne 379.
12 D.S. 16.87.3, 17.8.3; Arr. 1.7.1; Just. 9.4.7–8; Paus. 4.27.10, 9.1.8, 6.5; Anth. Pal. 6.344; Dio Chrys. 37.42; Gullath 1982: 12ff.; Heckel 1997: 92.
13 According to Diodorus (17.4.5–8) Demosthenes was among them, but other sources give a different date for the episode (Aeschin. 3.160–1; Plu. Dem. 23.2–3).
14 The dissolution of the Second Athenian League (Paus. 1.25.3) was counterbalanced by the transfer of Oropus (Hyp. 3.16; [Demad.] Concerning the Twelve Years 9; [D.] 17.26; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 61.6, 62.2; D.S. 18.56.6–7; Plu. Alex. 28.1–2; Just. 9.4–5; Plb. 5.10.1, 4; Paus. 1.34. 1; Brun 2000: 58 n. 11; Whitehead 2000: 207ff.; Faraguna 2003: 100 n. 4).
15 Heisserer 1980: 23; Voutiras 1998: 116; Rhodes–Osborne 379. Against: Tronson 1985: 15ff. On the “defense offers” see Hammond–Griffith 639ff.; Culasso Gustaldi 1984: 67ff.
16 In 335, so Sanchez 2001: 245ff.; Mari 2002: 135; Hammond–Walbank 15.
17 The functions of hegemon and strategos autokrator, considered distinct by Diodorus (17.4.9; cf. Heckel 1997: 85ff.), appear to be interchangeable elsewhere and hegemony seems to include command of the expedition or campaign (strateia: Aeschin. 3.132; Arr. 1.1.2, 2.14.4, 7.9.5; Plu. Alex. 14.1; Just. 11.2.5). Even Philip is defined as strategos autokrator (D.S. 16.89.1–3; FGrH 255, ll. 24–5; Just. 9.5.4) or hegemon of the strateia (D.S. 16. 91.2; Plu. Mor. 240a; Plb. 9.33.7): Bosworth 1980b: 48ff.; Jehne 1994: 181ff.; Hammond 1999a; Sisti 2001: 306ff.
18 D.S. 17.4.9; Just. 11.2.5 (Corinth); Plu. Alex. 14.1 (Isthmia, but in 335). The place chosen by Philip is uncertain (Mari 2002: 193 n. 3).
19 According to the traditional chronology of Demosthenes’ speeches, the oration was given in 336/5 (Debord 1999: 469; some think 333 more probable: Will 1982: 202–3; Sordi 1984b: 23ff.) or 331 in the context of the debate following the revolt of Agis III (Cawkwell 1961; Bosworth 1994a: 847; Habicht 1997: 21; Blackwell 1999: 58 n. 79; Brun 2000: 78 n. 29). Differing are Culasso Gustaldi 1984: 159ff. (after 330) and Squillace 2004: 64 (335/4). Bosworth 1992a: 148 n. 17 attributes the oration to Hypereides, as does Whitehead 2000: 7 n. 26, on stylistic grounds. In the discussion below, the orator will simply be referred to as the “anonymous Athenian.”
20 On the question of terminology: Buckler 1994: 114; Rhodes–Osborne 376.
21 Perlman 1985: 156ff.; Lanzillotta 2000: 144ff.; Musti 2000: 172ff.; Buckler 2003: 511ff. See also Sakellariou 1980: 142; J. R. Ellis 1994: 784; Rhodes–Osborne 378.
22 Extended also to territorial waters: [D.] 17.19–21; Alonso 1997: 186ff.; Lanzillotta 2000: 152.
23 Hammond–Griffith 632ff.; Buckler 2003: 514; Rhodes–Osborne 378.
24 There is epigraphic evidence of arbitration between the islands of Melos and Cimolos for the possession of three islets in the Melos group (Tod 1946: no. 179; Ager 1997: no. 3; Magnetto 1997: no. 1; Rhodes–Osborne, no. 82). The verdict (in favor of Cimolos) seems to have been delivered by Argos on the authority of a “synedrion of the Hellenes” (ll. 3–5) that seems identifiable as the Corinthian synedrion; cf. Ager 1996: 40ff., Rhodes–Osborne 404.
25 The alliance, explicitly defined by Arrian (3.24.5), was provided for by the synthekai (Bosworth 1980b: 46–51; Hammond–Walbank 571ff.; Hatzopoulos 1996: 297; Blackwell 1999: 49; Buckler 2003: 513ff.). See also Magnetto 1994: 283ff. The absence of the term symmachia from the text of the Greeks’ oath (Rhodes–Osborne 376), however, seems decisive for those who deny the existence of the alliance (Ryder 1965: 158; Hammond–Griffith 628; Jehne 1994: 157ff.; Faraguna 2003: 102), or else they admit it in a stage successive to the oath (Tod 1948: 177, 229; Heisserer 1980: 16; Sakellariou 1980: 145).
26 Differently from the Peace of 386: Schmidt 1999: 92ff.; Buckler 2003: 512.
27 Atkinson 2000: 332 defends the historicity of the letter. Cf. Bosworth 1980b: 277ff.; Squillace 2004: 102ff.
28 Thus Jehne 1994: 157ff. and Faraguna 2003: 102. Seibert 1998: 15ff. rightly emphasizes that the liberation theme only applied to operations undertaken in place (D.S. 16.1.5–6, 91.2; 17. 24). Moreover, even once they were liberated the Ionian cities remained outside the League either as allies (Rhodes–Osborne 379) or as subjects (Bosworth 1998: 63).
29 D.S. 17.17.3–5; Just. 11.6.2; Plu. Alex. 15.1; Arr. 1.11.3.
30 Hdt. 7.132; Lycurg. Leoc. 81; D.S. 9.3.1–3; Bosworth 1988a: 189ff.
31 According to the sources (Curt. 5.11.5; Paus. 8.52.5) there were 50,000: Green 1991: 157ff.
32 Arr. 1.16.6, 19.6, 29.5; 3.6.2, 23.8; Curt. 3.1.9.
33 Already during the strateia: Prandi 1983: 32; Errington 1990: 82ff.; Blackwell 1999: 77ff. After 330: Heisserer 1980: 233ff. After 325/4: Bosworth 1988a: 220ff.; 1998: 73ff.
34 For an evaluation of the survival of the free poleis after Chaeroneia: Price 1988: 324ff.; Green 1990: xx–xxi, 24ff., 196ff.; Bencivenni 2003: 1ff.
35 On the views of Aeschines and Phocion: Tritle 1988: 123ff.; 1995. Against: Bearzot 1985: 135ff.
36 Hammond–Walbank 79; against: Blackwell 1999: 43 n. 37.
37 Just. 9.4.7–8 (Gullath 1982: 10; Heckel 1997: 92). Possibly the politeuma excluded manual workers (Arist. Pol. 1278a25; Poddighe 2002: 83, 98ff.).
38 The Thebans opposed to this were spared by Alexander after the battle (Plu. Alex. 11.12).
39 Aeschin. 3. 239–40; Din. 1.18–21; D.S. 17.8–14; Arr. 1.7–10; Just. 11.3.6–4, 8; Plu. Alex. 11; Dem. 20.4–5; Bosworth 1980: 73ff.; Gullath 1982: 20ff.; Hammond–Walbank 56ff.; Worthington 1992: 162ff.; Heckel 1997: 87ff.; Blackwell 1999: 46ff.; Brun 2000: 71ff.; Sisti 2001: 321ff.; Squillace 2004:112ff.
40 Bosworth 1980b: 76ff.; Green 1991: 142; Sisti 2001: 323ff.
41 Hdt. 8.34, 8.50, 9.16, 25; Squillace 2004: 124ff.
42 The penalties imposed in 302 for failure to send a military contingent (Moretti 1967: no. 44, ll.95ff.) are evidence that there was frequent abstention. The sanctions (20 drachmas per day for each hoplite) were imposed whenever a contingent was required from a city.
43 Only those who supported the revolt were punished (Bosworth 1980b: 92).
44 D.S. 17.9.5–6; Plu. Alex. 11.7–9; Alonso 1995: 211ff.; Squillace 2004: 122ff.
45 There is evidence for normal procedures only in 302 (Moretti 1967: no. 44, ll. 70ff.). The place (Borza 1989: 128; Blackwell 1999: 46) and composition of the meeting is uncertain; either the victorious (Arr. 1.9.9; Just. 11.3.8) or all the delegates to thesynedrion (D.S. 17.14.1); Bosworth 1980b: 89ff.; Heckel 1997: 94.
46 Arr. 1.9.9; D.S. 17.14.2–4; Just. 11.3.9–11; Plu. Alex. 11.11. On Theban responsibility with respect to Athens, Plataea, and Orchomenus: Isocr. Plat. 31; Arr. 1.9.7; D.S. 15.46.5–6, 79.3–6. On the measures in favor of Plataea: Arr. 1.9.10; Plu. Arist. 11.3–9;Alex. 34. 2; Prandi 1988: 138ff. On the significance of the condemnation: Plu. Alex. 11.11; Plb. 4.23.8, 5.10.6, 9.28.8, 38. 2.13–4; Heckel 1997: 92ff.
47 The sources differ on the number and identity of the Athenians (Arr. 1.10.4; Plu. Phoc. 17.2; Dem. 23.4; Suda s.v. “Antipater”; Heckel 1997: 102ff.; Sisti 2001: 334ff.) and on the final decisions (Arr. 1.10.6; Just. 1. 4.11; Landucci Gattinoni 1994: 60; Heckel 1997: 103; Brun 2000: 73ff.).
48 D.S. 17.17.1–3; Plu. Alex. 15.4; Arr. 1.11.3–7; Just. 11.5.12; Flower 2000: 108ff.
49 The pacts (synthekai) and the accords (homologiai) ratified in 336 and 332 (see below). Against: Debord 1999: 469ff.
50 Arr. 2.1.1–5, 13.4–5, 3.2.3–7; Curt. 3.1.19–20, 4.1.36–7, 5.14–21; D.S. 17.29.1–4; Bosworth 1988a: 52ff.; Debord 1999: 466ff.; Rhodes–Osborne 416ff.
51 [D.] 17.7; Arr. 3.2.6. See Rhodes–Osborne, no. 85b, l. 35.
52 Bosworth 1998: 61ff.; Debord 1999: 476ff.; Mossé 2001: 52ff.; Faraguna 2003: 113ff. Epigraphic documentation on Alexander’s intervention at Priene in Rhodes–Osborne, no. 86. Cf. Bosworth 1998: 64ff.; Debord 1999: 439ff.; Faraguna 2003: 109ff.; Squillace 2004: 155ff.; Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 1092ff. On Aspendos: Magnetto 1997: 24ff.; Bosworth 1998: 62ff.; Faraguna: 2003: 112.
53 Prandi 1983: 27; Bosworth 1988a: 192ff.; Hammond–Walbank 73ff.; Lott 1996: 26ff.; Brun 2000: 85ff.; Faraguna 2003: 109ff.; Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 1023ff., 1028, 1067ff. According to a different reconstruction (Heisserer 1980: 27ff.; Labarre 1996 25ff.; Rhodes–Osborne 414ff.; Squillace 2004: 64), the inscriptions would be evidence for earlier constitutional changes. This theory is founded on the hypothesis that, on the islands allied to the League in 336 following the operations of Parmenio and Attalus (Diod. 16.91.2), democracies had already been installed, then deposed after the insurrection led by Memnon of Rhodes in 335 (D.S. 17.7.2–3, 8–10) and reinstated by Alexander in 334. It seems, however, that the islands were not involved in Parmenios’s operations nor in Memnon’s insurrection (Hammond–Walbank 73 n. 2; Green 1991: 139ff. Against: Labarre 1996: 24ff.).
54 SIG3 283 = Rhodes–Osborne, no. 84a = Bencivenni 2003: no. 1.
55 SEG xxii. 506 = Rhodes–Osborne, no. 84b.
56 Bencivenni 2003: 18ff. The hypothesis of a preventive document (Bosworth 1980b: 268) is discussed by Prandi 1983: 26ff. Cf. Bosworth 1988a: 193ff.; Debord 1999: 466ff.; Faraguna 2003: 113ff.; Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 1067ff.
57 Arr. 2.2.3; Curt. 3.1.19–20; Hauben 1976: 84ff.; Prandi 1983: 26 n. 10; Debord 1999: 466ff.
58 Bosworth 1980b: 268; 1988a: 193; Hammond, in Hammond–Walbank 74. Against: Prandi 1983:28.
59 Rhodes–Osborne no. 83 = Bencivenni 2003: no. 3.
60 Bosworth 1988a: 192; Debord 1999: 468 ff.; Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 1023ff.
61 Arrian (2.1.4) records an alliance with Alexander (Bosworth 1980b: 181; Hammond–Walbank 73 n. 1) but this might be short for “alliance with Alexander and the Greeks” (as it is for Tenedos: Arr. 2.2.2.): Prandi 1983: 28; Sisti: 2001: 395. Cf. also Badian 1966a: 50; Debord 1999: 472 n. 397.
62 Rhodes–Osborne, no. 85a–b = Bencivenni 2003: no. 2. Debord 1999: 467ff.; Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 1028.
63 For other dates (334, 324, or 319): Rhodes–Osborne 430; Bencivenni 2003: 45ff.
64 Arr. 1.11.3; D.S. 17.17.5; Blackwell 1999: 53 ff.
65 Bosworth 1988a: 188. For 333: Walbank 1967: 567. The years 336 and 335 are proposed respectively by Debord 1999: 469 and Squillace 2004: 64 n. 89.
66 Acad. index Herc., cols. 11, 28ff., 32ff; Culasso Gastaldi 1984: 54ff.; Bosworth 1988a: 194, 201.
67 Pausanias refers the topos to Alexander. For Pausanias’ use of Demochares: Bearzot 1992: 111ff.; Culasso Gastaldi 1984: 54ff., 159ff. attributes the pseudo-Demosthenic oration to Demochares.
68 Bosworth 1988a: 162; Badian 1994: 269; Baynham 1994: 343, 346; Blackwell 1999: 76.
69 Aeschin. 3.163, 165–7; Din. 1.34; D.S. 17.48.1–2, 62–3; Plu. Mor. 219b; Dem. 24.1; Agis. 3; Curt. 4.1.39–40, 6.1.1–21; Arr. 2.13.4–6, 3.16.10; Just. 12.1.4–11; McQueen 1978: 40ff.; Bosworth 1988a: 198ff.; Badian 1994: 258ff.; Baynham 1994: 339ff.; Heckel 1997: 183ff.; Blackwell 1999: 53ff.; Brun 2000: 85ff.; Worthington 2000: 189; Squillace 2004: 131ff. The much discussed chronology of the war places its outbreak in mid 331 (Bosworth 1988a: 200).
70 Laconia’s borders were “rearranged” to the advantage of the Argives, Arcadians, and Messenians (D. 18.64–5, 295; Plb. 9.28.6–7, 33.8–12; Paus. 2.20.1, 38.5, 7.11.2, 8.7.4) and therefore Sparta remained outside the League (Just. 9.5.3; Arr. 1.16.7; Plu. Alex.16.18; D.S. 17.3.4–5): McQueen 1978: 40ff.; Hammond–Griffith 613ff.; Magnetto 1994: 283ff.; Buckler 2003: 507ff.
71 Aeschin. 3.165; Din. 1.34; D.S. 17.62.6–63.4; Curt. 6.1.20; Paus. 7.27.7; Just. 12.1.6.
72 Din. 1.34; McQueen 1978: 52ff.; Bosworth 1988a: 203.
73 Badian 1994: 261ff. (12,000); Bosworth 2002: 65ff. (4,000/5,000).
74 Bosworth 1988a: 203; Baynham 1994: 340; Heckel 1997: 187; Blackwell 1999: 56.
75 Evidence of this is Iphicrates’ mission to Darius III (Arr. 2.15.2; Curt. 3.13.15; Bosworth 1980b: 233ff.) and the ratification of an epidosis of 4,000 drachmas (Tod 1946: no. 198; Faraguna 1992: 256; Rhodes–Osborne, no. 94; against: Brun 2000: 88 n. 20). The abstentionist position, however, backed by Demosthenes and Demades prevailed: Badian 1994: 259; Blackwell 1999: 63.
76 Curt. 6.1.18–19; Baynham 1994: 341–2; Blackwell 1999: 72.
77 Differing: Bosworth 1988a: 203; Blackwell 1999: 70; Worthington 2000: 189.
78 McQueen 1978: 56; Bosworth 1988a: 204; Hammond 1988: 78.
79 Arr. 3.11.1–15.7, 19.5; Curt 4.12.1–16.9; Plu. Alex. 33.8–11; Bosworth 1980b: 329ff.; Sisti 2001: 518ff.
80 Karavites 1984: 191. On eleutheria and autonomy in the fourth century: Bosworth 1992a: 122ff.; Musti 2000: 176ff.; Bertoli 2003: 87ff.
81 Faraguna 2003: 116–18; Squillace 2004: 23ff. (with fuller bibliography).
82 Hyp. Dem., cols. 18–19; Din. 1.81–2; D.S. 17.109.1–2, 18.8.2–7; Curt. 10.2.4–7; Just. 13.5.1–5; Bosworth 1988a: 220ff.; 1998: 73ff.; Hammond–Walbank 80ff.; Blackwell 1999: 145ff.; Flower 2000: 126ff.; Faraguna 2003: 124ff.
83 Bosworth 1994a: 856 n. 24; Sisti and Zambrini 2004: 610.
84 On the diagramma of Polyperchon (D.S. 18.56), cf. Poddighe 2002: 171ff.; Dixon 2007.
85 Culasso Gustaldi 2003: 69ff. (with fuller bibliography).
86 The following judge the Decree to be legitimate: Bikerman 1940: 29 n. 3; Hammond–Walbank 80ff.; Green 1991: 451ff. Against: Heisserer 1980: 233ff.; Errington 1990: 96ff.; Blackwell 1999: 146ff. suggests a provision that had nothing to do with the treaty.
87 Diodorus’ source: for Hieronymus (Bosworth 1988a: 220; Heckel 1999: 491; Flower 2000: 127) or Duris (Prandi 1996: 89; Blackwell 1999: 146 n. 30). It is also discussed whether the 20,000 represented all of the beneficiaries (McKechnie 1989: 26) or only those present at Olympia (Worthington 1990: 201).
88 Din. 1.82–3, 103; Plu. Dem. 9. 1; Worthington 1992: 253; Landucci Gattinoni 1995: 70.
89 Bosworth 1988a: 224; Brun 2000: 104; Poddighe 2002: 186. Against: Jehne 1994: 248 n. 338.
90 The name of the Boeotians is not clearly legible: Bosworth 1988a: 222 n. 39.
91 Heisserer 1980: 221ff.; Worthington 1993: 63ff.; Blackwell 1999: 150; Bencivenni 2003: 95. On their composition: Green 1991: 449ff.; Landucci Gattinoni 1995: 66ff.
92 Probably sanctions for ceremonies that had not been paid for: Bencivenni 2003: 99.
93 SIG3 312; Heisserer 1980: 182; Bosworth 1998: 75ff.
94 Mendels 1984: 147; Worthington 1992: 60.
95 Numbers and places of exile: Shipley 1987: 141ff.; Landucci Gattinoni 1997: 11ff.
96 SIG3 312; Heisserer 1980: 182; Bosworth 1998: 75ff.
97 D.S. 17.108.4; Plu. Dem. 25.1–2; Phoc. 21.3; Curt. 10.2.1–3; Bosworth 1988a: 215ff.; Worthington 1994a: 307ff.; Blackwell 1999: 134ff.
98 In this perspective, silence does not prove either that the Athenians found the problem insoluble (Landucci Gattinoni 1995: 75ff.) or that it would arise later (Worthington 1992: 63).
99 Poddighe 2002: 186.
100 This is a text differently dated and translated (Rosen 1978: 20ff.; Hammond 1993: 174ff.; Jehne 1994: 254 n. 374). For 324: Hamilton 1969: 74; Heisserer 1980: 187 n. 44. For the proposed translation: Bikerman 1940: 34; Cargill 1995: 41.
101 Brun 2000: 104; Mari 2002: 239ff.