A Note on Sources

This is a work of narrative nonfiction that took two years to report and write. All the interviews for this book were on-the-record. They were conducted with those working on the front lines of the opioid epidemic—Drug Enforcement Administration investigators, agents, and lawyers; plaintiffs’ attorneys; Justice Department officials; state, city, county, local, and tribal authorities; drug rehabilitation workers; drug users; and experts in the fields of addiction and treatment. Some of these interviews were done while we were reporting on the epidemic for the Washington Post. That newsroom-wide effort culminated in a 2019 investigative series called “The Opioid Files.”

For this book, we conducted more than 160 hours of additional interviews with the DEA agents, investigators, and staff attorneys assigned to investigate the opioid industry, as well as the plaintiffs’ lawyers retained by the more than four thousand cities, towns, counties, and Indian tribes that sued two dozen drug manufacturers, distributors, and chain pharmacy stores. We requested the opportunity to speak with attorneys representing the main defendants in the lawsuits; they either declined to discuss the case or did not return our written requests for interviews. Only one defense attorney we contacted consented to an interview. Over the years, the companies and their trade associations have issued numerous statements defending their activities. We have published a representative sample of these statements online, which can be found here: americancartelbook.com.

In addition to the interviews, this book relies on thousands of government records. They include Immediate Suspension Orders and Orders to Show Cause issued by the DEA against the companies; settlement agreements and memorandum of understanding between the companies and the Justice Department and the DEA; and court records and transcripts of hearings and proceedings held in federal and state courts and before DEA administrative law judges. The book also relies on thousands of internal government and company emails, documents, memorandum, and reports, along with a Washington Post analysis of 500 million transactions contained in the DEA’s ARCOS database, which tracks the path of every pain pill in the United States, from manufacturer to distributor to pharmacy. The records and the database were obtained following a year-long legal battle waged by the Post and the owner of the Charleston Gazette-Mail. Many of the records and the database can be accessed through the Post’s website. Hundreds of thousands of additional records that have been disclosed in numerous court proceedings and government investigations can be accessed through an opioid document repository managed by Johns Hopkins University and the University of California, San Francisco. It is our hope that these documents and the database, along with this book and the other groundbreaking books and projects documenting the conduct of the companies, will help the public better understand how the nation became addicted to opioids and who should be held to account for the deadliest drug epidemic in American history.

Prologue

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi and Paul T. Farrell Jr., along with articles in the Charleston Gazette-Mail by Eric Eyre.

1 Late on his last day as a DEA agent: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

2 Almost everyone had already cleared out: The Drug Enforcement Administration website.

3 It was an unusual feeling: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

4 Joe’s friends had known for months: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

5 The shape of that reckoning: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

6 In Huntington, West Virginia: Interview with Paul Farrell.

7 A local news story: Eric Eyre, “Drug Firms Poured 780M Painkillers into WV amid Rise of Overdoses,” Charleston Gazette-Mail, December 17, 2016.

8 Paul’s family had lived in Huntington: Interview with Paul Farrell.

9 Paul’s younger brother: Interview with Patrick Farrell.

10 By 2018, this sprawling coalition: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, MDL No. 2804.

11 A modern-day opium war: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website.

12 Over time, it became apparent to Paul: Interview with Paul Farrell.

13 They aren’t, Joe would say one day: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

Chapter 1: Joe Rann

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi and DEA agent Matt Murphy; a DEA memorandum documenting the January 3, 2006, meeting between the Office of Diversion Control and the McKesson executives; the Memorandum of Agreement between the DEA and McKesson; and articles about John H. Hammergren in the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, and the Daily Beast.

1 Joseph T. Rannazzisi was furious: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

2 Headquartered in San Francisco: McKesson Corporation annual reports.

3 The firm had been shipping: DEA memorandum about McKesson meeting, January 3, 2006.

4 As the chief of the DEA’s Office of Diversion Control: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

5 Euphoria-inducing, heroin-like pain pills: CDC website.

6 almost as many as the U.S. military: National Archive Vietnam War U.S. Military Fatal Casualty Statistics.

7 Joe’s job was to make sure: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

8 Three distributors—companies that purchase the pills: Russ Britt, “Growing Share of ‘Big Three’ Gets Federal Attention,” MarketWatch, May 30, 2007.

9 Joe had summoned the executives: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

10 Joe and his team sat down: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi; LinkedIn profiles.

11 Hammergren was a quarry far different: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

12 A life in law enforcement: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

13 But now kiddie dope was killing: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

14 DEA leadership expected: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

15 He had sent every drug company: DEA communications; interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

16 Four months earlier: DEA communications; interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

17 By the end of the year: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

Chapter 2: Dr. Evil

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi, a 2003 GAO report on Purdue and its marketing campaign, interviews that the Associated Press and NPR conducted with Hershel Jick, articles in the Washington Post, a copy of the Austin Powers video, Pain Killer: An Empire of Deceit and the Origin of America’s Opioid Epidemic by Barry Meier, and Dreamland: The True Tale of America’s Opiate Epidemic by Sam Quinones.

1 Inside a Dallas conference hall: Exhibits in MDL No. 2804.

2 It was about 9 a.m.: Exhibits in MDL No. 2804.

3 The voice of comedian Mike Myers: Exhibits in MDL No. 2804.

4 The company had introduced Fentora: Sari Horwitz, Scott Higham, Dalton Bennett, and Meryl Kornfield, “Inside the Opioid Industry’s Marketing Machine,” Washington Post, December 6, 2019.

5 Dr. Evil said he was unhappy: MDL exhibits.

6 Fentora had been approved: Fentanyl Buccal Tablets Information, FDA website.

7 “Tell the Street,” Dr. Evil said: MDL exhibits.

8 The use of opium to relieve pain: The Drug Enforcement Administration Museum, History of Opium; Barry Meier, Pain Killer: An Empire of Deceit and the Origin of America’s Opioid Epidemic (Random House, 2003).

9 In 1914, the federal government: History, DEA website.

10 During congressional hearings: “Importation and Use of Opium Hearings,” House Committee on Ways and Means, January 11, 1911.

11 Ten years later, the use of heroin: “History of Heroin,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime website.

12 Even though opioids were heavily regulated: Meier, Pain Killer.

13 But it was the pharmaceutical company Purdue Pharma: Meier, Pain Killer; A. Van Zee, “The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy,” American Journal of Public Health 99, no. 2 (2009).

14 The 104-word note was written: H. Jick and J. Porter, “Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with Narcotics,” New England Journal of Medicine 302, no. 2 (1980).

15 In interviews more than thirty years later: Taylor Haney and Andrea Hsu, “Doctor Who Wrote 1980 Letter on Painkillers Regrets That It Fed the Opioid Crisis,” NPR, June 16, 2017; Marilynn Marchione, “Painful Words: How a 1980 Letter Fueled the Opioid Epidemic,” Associated Press, May 31, 2017.

16 At one point, Time magazine: Sarah Zhang, “The One-Paragraph Letter from 1980 That Fueled the Opioid Crisis,” The Atlantic, June 2, 2017.

17 But the real rate of addiction: National Institute on Drug Abuse website.

18 The companies paid doctors: Horwitz et al., “Inside the Opioid Industry’s Marketing Machine.”

19 The Joint Commission: Horwitz et al., “Inside the Opioid Industry’s Marketing Machine.”

20 They also showered them with little gifts: U.S. General Accounting Office. OxyContin Abuse and Diversion and Efforts to Address the Problem. GAO-04-110. Washington, D.C., 2003.

21 The companies dangled big bonuses: Horwitz et al., “Inside the Opioid Industry’s Marketing Machine.”

22 Between 1996 and 2001: U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 110th Cong., 1st sess., 1997, vol. 153.

23 Drug manufacturers also paid movie stars: Horwitz at al., “Inside the Opioid Industry’s Marketing Machine.”

24 Joe Rannazzisi was incensed: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

Chapter 3: Lightning Strike

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi, along with the Memorandum of Agreement between the DEA and McKesson, SEC filings by AmerisourceBergen and the DEA Order to Show Cause issued against Cardinal Health. It is also based on a Washington Post analysis of Automation of Reports and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS) data obtained through a lawsuit filed by the Post and HD Media, the owner of the Charleston Gazette-Mail, in MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation.

1 When his warnings to executives: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

2 He decided to deploy: Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Department of Justice and McKesson Corporation, May 2, 2008.

3 McKesson’s executives pleaded: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

4 Agents and investigators shut down: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

5 Joe’s teams struck five other McKesson warehouses: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

6 On April 24, 2007: “DEA Suspends Orlando Branch of Drug Company from Distributing Controlled Substances,” DEA press release.

7 Within five months: “AmerisourceBergen Signs Agreement with DEA Leading to Reinstatement of Its Orlando Distribution Center’s Suspended License to Distribute Controlled Substances,” AmerisourceBergen press release.

8 Joe next trained his sights: September 30, 2008, Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Department of Justice and Cardinal Health.

9 In Florida, pharmacies typically dispensed: September 30, 2008, Memorandum of Agreement.

10 Maybe they’ll finally get the message: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

11 That same year, Mallinckrodt: ARCOS data analysis by the Washington Post.

12 It costs drug makers pennies: Drug Information Database, Drugs.com.

13 But for now, Joe wanted: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

Chapter 4: The Alliance

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi, along with the July 30, 2020, deposition of Healthcare Distribution Alliance president John Gray, and internal Alliance and drug company emails and memos that are now part of MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation.

1 Top corporate officers: Healthcare Distribution Alliance memos; Deposition of HDA president John Gray.

2 Joe viewed The Alliance: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

3 On September 25, 2007: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

4 Before joining The Alliance: Anita T. Ducca, HDA website.

5 “Develop a strategy for outreach”: Ducca emails now part of MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation.

6 Two and a half weeks earlier: Ducca emails.

7 Under AmerisourceBergen’s system: June 22, 2007, Memorandum of Agreement between the DEA and AmerisourceBergen.

8 On December 7: Jack Crowley, “Our Friends at DEA,” email now part of MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation.

9 For nearly thirty-one years: Jack Crowley LinkedIn profile.

10 “I see our friends are at it again”: Crowley emails.

Chapter 5: “We Will Not Get Fined Again!”

This chapter is based on internal Alliance and drug company emails and memos that are now part of MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation. It is also based on the Memorandum of Agreement between the DEA and the McKesson Corp.

1 In 2008, Congress shut down: Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act, S 980, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional record 154, pt. 4: 4632–4635; Mary Pat Flaherty and Gilbert M. Gaul, “Experimentation Turns Deadly for One Teenager,” Washington Post, October 21, 2003.

2 As one major source for illicit drugs: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

3 Long lines of customers lingered in parking: Leonora LaPeter Anton, “The Pain Clinic Next Door,” Tampa Bay Times, May 30, 2010; Pat Beall, “How Florida Spread Oxy across America,” Palm Beach Post, July 6, 2018.

4 As Joe’s teams raided: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

5 Inside the drug companies: Jack Crowley, “DEA and Suspicious Orders,” email, 2008.

6 On March 20: Kristen Freitas, “DEA Strategy Document and FDA Update,” email, 2008.

7 Over the years: Congressional campaign finance reports.

8 Freitas began her career: Healthcare Distribution Alliance website; LinkedIn.

9 Most of the questions: DEA strategy update email.

10 Two months later: May 2, 2008, Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Department of Justice and McKesson Corporation.

11 “By failing to report suspicious orders”: May 2, 2008, Department of Justice press release.

12 Joe was not pleased: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

13 Nineteen days after the settlement: May 21, 2008, McKesson communications.

Chapter 6: The Blue Highway

This chapter is based on internal DEA documents, along with articles in the Washington Post and the Palm Beach Post and a Washington Post analysis of ARCOS data obtained by a lawsuit filed by the Post and HD Media, the owner of the Charleston Gazette-Mail, in MDL 2084, National Prescription Opiate Litigation.

1 The route between the pill mills: Interviews with DEA agents and investigators.

2 With the internet pharmacies decimated: Beall, “How Florida Spread Oxy”; interviews with DEA agents and investigators.

3 Founded in 1867 in St. Louis: Mallinckrodt website.

4 By 2008, Mallinckrodt was manufacturing: ARCOS data analysis by the Washington Post.

5 Members of the Sackler family, who controlled Purdue: Sarah Cascone, “In a Landmark Move, the Metropolitan Museum of Art Has Removed the Sackler Name from Its Walls,” Artnet.com, December 9, 2021.

Chapter 7: “Just Like Doritos”

This chapter is based on a November 29, 2018, deposition of Victor Borelli and articles in the Washington Post and the Sun-Sentinel of Fort Lauderdale. It is also based on settlement documents between the DEA and Mallinckrodt and internal company emails that are now part of MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation.

1 Victor Borelli was a driven national salesman for Mallinckrodt: Deposition of Victor Borelli, November 29, 2018, in Baltimore, Maryland; Scott Higham, Sari Horwitz, and Steven Rich, “Internal Drug Company Emails Show Indifference to Opioid Epidemic,” Washington Post, July 19, 2019.

2 In May 2008, Borelli sent an email: Victor Borelli, email, 2008, In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, MDL No. 2804.

3 In another email: Victor Borelli, “Re: Oxy 30,” email, 2009.

4 By age forty-six: Borelli deposition.

5 And then, in 2005: Borelli deposition.

6 Borelli’s drive for sales: Brenda Rehkop, “RE: Sunrise Wholesale,” email, 2008, In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, MDL No. 2804.

7 Another executive forwarded the email: Cathy Stewart, “RE: Sunrise Wholesale,” email, 2008, In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, MDL No. 2804.

8 Sunrise Wholesale was sending oxycodone: Draft Partial Excerpt of Complaint, July 10, 2015; Lenny Bernstein and Scott Higham, “The Government’s Struggle to Hold Opioid Manufacturers Accountable,” Washington Post, April 2, 2017; Bill Whitaker, “Who’s Responsible for the Opioid Epidemic? Doctors or Pharmaceutical Companies?” 60 Minutes, September 30, 2018; Marc Freeman, “Former Doctor Who Overprescribed Pain Pills Gets 157 Years in Prison,” Sun Sentinel, July 31, 2018.

9 In 2009, an executive at Mallinckrodt: Borelli deposition.

10 In the seven years: Borelli deposition.

11 On a single day in 2010, KeySource ordered: Brenda Rehkop, “RE: Item#85300,” email, 2010.

Chapter 8: Follow the Pills

This chapter is based on interviews with Jim Geldhof and James Rafalski, along with the June 15, 2010, DEA Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension filed against Harvard Drug. It is also based on the federal indictment of the George brothers, the U.S. attorney’s office prosecution memo in the case against Mallinckrodt, and the Memorandum of Agreement between the DEA and Mallinckrodt.

1 In the fall of 2010: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

2 Jim Geldhof, the supervisor: Interview with Jim Geldhof.

3 One of them was James Rafalski: Interview with James Rafalski.

4 Harvard Drug was based: Interview with James Rafalski; ARCOS data analysis by the Washington Post.

5 The twins had recruited doctors: Thomas Francis, “How Florida Brothers’ ‘Pill Mill’ Operation Fueled Painkiller Abuse Epidemic,” NBC News, May 7, 2012; Bob LaMendola, “How the George Brothers Made Millions with Pill Mills,” South Florida Sun Sentinel, August 25, 2011; Michael LaForgia, “Twin Kingpins behind Some of the Most Brazen Pain Clinics in South Florida,” Palm Beach Post, March 31, 2012.

6 On June 10, 2010, Rafalski: Francis, “How Florida Brothers’ ‘Pill Mill’ Operation Fueled Painkiller Abuse Epidemic”; LaMendola, “How the George Brothers Made Millions with Pill Mills”; LaForgia, “Twin Kingpins behind Some of the Most Brazen Pain Clinics”; DEA Order to Show Cause, Immediate Suspension of Registration, Harvard Drug Group, June 15, 2010.

Chapter 9: “Pillbillies”

This chapter is based on internal drug company emails now part of MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation, and a Washington Post analysis of ARCOS data obtained by a lawsuit filed by the Post and HD Media, the owner of the Charleston Gazette-Mail, in the litigation.

1 The parody was of the theme song: “RE: Saw This And Had To Share It…” email, 2011; Meryl Kornfield, “Drug Distributor Employees Emailed a Parody Song about ‘Pillbillies,’ Documents Show,” Washington Post, May 23, 2020.

2 In 2011, nearly sixteen thousand people: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website.

3 That year alone, AmerisourceBergen distributed: ARCOS analysis by the Washington Post.

4 One of the world’s largest pharmaceutical service companies: “Fortune 500: AmerisourceBergen,” CNN Money, May 23, 2011.

5 AmerisourceBergen was one of the companies: DEA Settlement and Release Agreement, AmerisourceBergen, June 22, 2007.

6 The legislation required companies: HB 7095: Prescription Drugs, 2011 session, Florida House website.

7 On April 21, 2011, Ann Berkey: Ann Berkey, “Florida Pill Mill,” email, 2011.

8 The lobbyist for AmerisourceBergen: Rita Norton, “RE: Florida Pill Mill,” email, 2011.

9 The push to kill the legislation: “Florida Governor Signs ‘Pill Mill’ Bill,” Associated Press, June 3, 2011.

10 There was an element of karma: “Pillbillies” email, Exhibits in MDL No. 2804.

Chapter 10: Broward County North

This chapter is based on interviews with Jim Geldhof, Lisa Roberts, and Kathy Chaney, and articles in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the Washington Post, and the New York Times, along with Dreamland: The True Tale of America’s Opiate Epidemic by Sam Quinones.

1 On a warm June night in 2011: Interview with Jim Geldhof.

2 One by one: Video provided by Lisa Roberts and SOLACE.

3 People sitting in the rows: Interview with Jim Geldhof.

4 The Appalachian city of 20,000: “Portsmouth, Ohio,” Ohiohistorycentral.com.

5 Located almost as far south: Interview with Lisa Roberts; Sam Quinones, Dreamland: The True Tale of America’s Opiate Epidemic (Bloomsbury, 2015).

6 Residents, many on disability: Interview with Lisa Roberts; Quinones, Dreamland.

7 The hardened DEA supervisor: Interview with Jim Geldhof.

8 Chaney was crying: Interview with Kathy Chaney.

9 Portsmouth was 90 percent White: U.S. Census; Noel King, “Why Is the Opioid Epidemic Overwhelmingly White?” NPR, November 4, 2017.

10 Addiction experts theorized: Gina Kolata and Sarah Cohen, “Drug Overdoses Propel Rise in Mortality Rates of Young Whites,” New York Times, January 16, 2016.

11 One of the speakers that night: Interview with Lisa Roberts.

12 One of the most notorious in Portsmouth: U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Ohio, “Scioto County Doctor Sentenced to 7 Years in Prison for Role in Pill Mill,” November 13, 2019; Lenny Bernstein, David S. Fallis, and Scott Higham, “How Drugs Intended for Patients Ended Up in the Hands of Illegal Users: ‘No One Was Doing Their Job,’” Washington Post, October 22, 2016.; John Caniglia, “‘Unfathomable’: How 1.6 Million Pills from a Small-Town Doctor Helped Fuel the Opioid Crisis in Ohio,” Cleveland.com, September 1, 2019.

13 Vying with Temponeras: U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Ohio, “Chicago Physician Receives Four Life Sentences for Illegally Distributing Pills That Led to Deaths of Four People,” February 14, 2012.

14 When the town hall ended: Interview with Jim Geldhof.

Chapter 11: “Game, Set, Match”

This chapter is based on DEA settlement documents with Harvard Drug, KeySource Medical, Masters Pharmaceutical, and Mallinckrodt, and the Decision and Order issued by the DEA in its case against Masters Pharmaceutical. It is also based on DEA PowerPoint presentations documenting pill distribution patterns in Florida, draft complaints against Mallinckrodt and settlement documents prepared by the U.S. attorney’s office in Detroit, and interviews with Jim Geldhof, James Rafalski, and Barbara Boockholdt.

1 The bodies were piling up: Declaration of Joseph Rannazzisi, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Eric H. Holder Jr., et al.

2 It was clear from the DEA’s pill-tracking ARCOS database: ARCOS data analysis by the Washington Post; Interview with Jim Geldhof.

3 Geldhof saw that one of the worst offenders: Interview with Jim Geldhof.

4 Masters was already well known: “Masters Pharmaceutical Fined by DEA,” FDA News, May 5, 2009.

5 But it was clear to Geldhof: Interview with Jim Geldhof.

6 Poring over documents the DEA had collected: Interview with James Rafalski.

7 He discovered that between 2009 and 2010: Interview with James Rafalski.

8 On August 23, 2011: DEA PowerPoint presentation, Mallinckrodt, August 23, 2011.

9 Barbara Boockholdt, chief of the DEA’s regulatory division: Interview with Barbara Boockholdt.

10 Rafalski sat in silence: Interview with James Rafalski.

11 It was a rare 5.8-magnitude earthquake: John Hopewell, “Remembering the 2011 Virginia Earthquake That Rocked the Eastern U.S.,” Washington Post, 2016.

12 Rafalski tried to lighten the mood: Interview with James Rafalski.

13 Three weeks later: Aaron C. Davis, Shawn Boburg, and Robert O’Harrow Jr., “Little-Known Makers of Generic Drugs Played Central Role in Opioid Crisis, Records Show,” Washington Post, July 27, 2019.

14 The subpoena delivered a gold mine: Interviews with Jim Geldhof and James Rafalski.

15 “This is game, set, match”: Interviews with Jim Geldhof and James Rafalski.

Chapter 12: A Betrayal

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi and Imelda L. “Mimi” Paredes and articles in the Indianapolis Star, the Washington Post, and the New York Times.

1 Joe Rannazzisi called her: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

2 At her desk inside DEA headquarters: Interview with Mimi Paredes.

3 In 1993, three years after he graduated: Isabel Wilkerson, “3 Promising Naval Officers Leave Tears and Disbelief,” New York Times, December 7, 1993; Mark Fitzhenry, “Ex-Navy QB Grizzard, Runner O’Neill Killed,” Washington Post, December 2, 1993.

4 Paredes was devastated: Interview with Mimi Paredes.

5 Barber was cool: Interview with Mimi Paredes.

6 Like Paredes, Barber had served: Interview with Mimi Paredes; Amy Lynch, “Army Past Helps Quarles & Brady Partner Provide Real-World Advice,” Indianapolis Star, February 13, 2015.

7 As serious as he could be: Interview with Mimi Paredes.

8 Barber at times: Interview with Mimi Paredes.

9 He joined a law firm, Quarles & Brady: Scott Higham and Lenny Bernstein, “The Drug Industry’s Triumph over the DEA,” Washington Post, October 15, 2017.

10 Paredes felt betrayed: Interview with Mimi Paredes.

11 Joe understood that these former civil servants: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

Chapter 13: Cardinal Knowledge

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi, along with court documents and motions filed as part of Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Eric H. Holder Jr. in U.S. district court, sworn declarations by Rannazzisi and Ruth Carter filed in that case, and the June 8, 2012, decision in the DEA’s case against CVS by DEA chief administrative law judge John J. Mulrooney II.

1 The phone calls haunted Joe Rannazzisi: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

2 It was so bad: “State Surgeon General Declares Public Health Emergency,” Florida Department of Health, July 1, 2011.

3 Joe dispatched one of his best investigators: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

4 Joe had one drug company fixed firmly: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi; Declaration of Joseph Rannazzisi, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Eric H. Holder Jr., et al.

5 Cardinal had a banner year: Cardinal Health annual report, 2011.

6 The numbers in the DEA’s ARCOS database: Interview with Ruth Carter; “Sanford History,” sanfordfl.gov; Declaration of Ruth A. Carter, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Eric H. Holder Jr., et al.

7 Two CVS pharmacies in Sanford: Interview with Ruth Carter.

8 “I knew it was bad”: Interview with Ruth Carter.

9 On October 18, 2011: Interview with Ruth Carter.

10 Between 2008 and 2011, the company sold more than 5 million pills: Interview with Ruth Carter.

11 Material turned up in the search: Interview with Ruth Carter.

12 Ten days after serving the warrants: Interview with Ruth Carter.

13 Cardinal had sold that store 2.2 million oxycodone tablets: Interview with Ruth Carter.

14 Carter interviewed the pharmacist-in-charge: Interview with Ruth Carter.

15 Time to shut these motherfuckers down: Interview with Ruth Carter.

Chapter 14: “Because I’m the Deputy Attorney General”

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi and Imelda L. “Mimi” Paredes, along with emails written by Jamie Gorelick, Craig Morford, and Randolph Moss to Justice Department officials, which were obtained pursuant to a lawsuit filed by the Washington Post under the Freedom of Information Act.

1 On November 22, 2011: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

2 James H. Dinan headed: LinkedIn profile.

3 “Joe, what are your guys doing in Florida?”: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

4 The agency determined: Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Eric H. Holder Jr., 846 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2012).

5 Dinan cautioned Joe: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

6 Craig S. Morford, who served: Memo from Craig Morford to DEA administrator Michele Leonhart.

7 The implication was clear: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

8 Several hours earlier, Jamie Gorelick: Jamie Gorelick, “Time-Sensitive Correspondence,” email, 2011; WilmerHale website; “Gorelick to Leave Justice Department,” Justice Department, January 15, 1997.

9 Joe thought the outside pressure: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

10 The previous night: Jamie Gorelick, email, 2012.

11 Like Gorelick, Moss had served: “District Judge Randolph D. Moss,” U.S. District Court District of Columbia website.

12 Moss sent an email to Dinan: Randolph Moss, Cardinal Health, email, 2012.

13 Shortly before 2 p.m.: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi; U.S. General Services Administration website.

14 Joe took a seat: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi; U.S. General Services Administration website.

15 On his drive back to DEA headquarters: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi; U.S. General Services Administration website; interview with Mimi Paredes.

16 The companies were going over his head: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

Chapter 15: Imminent Danger

This chapter is based on emails obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, and court documents and hearing transcripts filed in Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Eric H. Holder Jr., et al., the Order to Show Cause against CVS, and the Justice Department settlement with CVS.

1 Joe Rannazzisi kept his word: Immediate Suspension Orders against CVS and Cardinal Health.

2 Just before Joe struck: Jamie Gorelick, “Cardinal/DEA,” email, 2012.

3 That afternoon: Transcript of Motions Hearing before the Honorable Judge Reggie B. Walton, United States District Judge, February 3, 2012.

4 Walton, a former public defender: “Senior Judge Reggie B. Walton,” U.S. District Court District of Columbia website.

5 “These are extremely dangerous drugs”: “Senior Judge Reggie B. Walton,” U.S. District Court District of Columbia website.

6 The DEA had accused Cardinal: “Cardinal Health, Inc., Agrees to Pay $34 Million to Settle Claims That It Failed to Report Suspicious Sales of Widely-Abused Controlled Substances,” U.S. Attorney’s Office Colorado, October 2, 2008.

7 Without hearing from the DEA: Temporary Restraining Order, Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Eric H. Holder Jr., et al., February 3, 2012.

8 After the ruling, Gorelick sent Goldberg a told-you-so email: Jamie Gorelick, “Cardinal Health v. Holder (DDC)—TRO,” email, 2012.

9 “Thanks Jamie”: Stuart Goldberg, “RE: Cardinal Health v. Holder (DDC)—TRO,” email, 2012.

10 That afternoon, the DEA agents: Interviews with Joe Rannazzisi and Ruth Carter.

11 The company was free to ship pain pills: Transcript of Motions Hearing before the Honorable Judge Reggie B. Walton, United States District Judge, February 29, 2012.

12 Walton began the hearing: Transcript of Motions Hearing before the Honorable Judge Reggie B. Walton, United States District Judge, February 29, 2012.

13 Walton had heard enough: Transcript of Motions Hearing before the Honorable Judge Reggie B. Walton, United States District Judge, February 29, 2012; Memorandum Opinion, Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Eric H. Holder Jr., et al., March 7, 2012.

14 The Alliance, on behalf of its thirty-four members: Cardinal Health, Inc., v. Eric H. Holder, U.S. Court of Appeals, Amicus Curiae Brief of Healthcare Distribution Management Association, March 6, 2012.

15 But less than three months after Walton’s ruling: Administrative Memorandum of Agreement, between Cardinal Health and the DEA, May 15, 2012; “Cardinal Health Brings Resolution to Litigation with DEA Settlement,” Cardinal Health, May 15, 2012.

16 CVS, headquartered in Woonsocket: Cardinal Health, Inc., v. Eric H. Holder, U.S. Court of Appeals, Appellees’ Opposition to Appellant’s Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, March 7, 2012; “CVS Caremark CEO Merlo’s 2012 Pay Jumps 44%,” MarketWatch, March 29, 2013.

17 “A pittance”: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

Chapter 16: “At the Corner of Happy & Healthy”

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi and former Oviedo police chief Jeffrey Chudnow, along with the Settlement and Memorandum of Agreement between the DEA and Walgreens, internal Walgreens emails now part of MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation, and articles in the Washington Post.

1 On March 15, 2011, Jeffrey Chudnow: Interview with Oviedo Police Chief Jeffrey Chudnow; Letters from Chudnow to executives, March 15, 2011.

2 Chudnow got no response: Interview with Oviedo Police Chief Jeffrey Chudnow.

3 Chudnow also wrote formal letters: Interview with Oviedo Police Chief Jeffrey Chudnow.

4 Joe Rannazzisi and his team: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

5 The Oviedo pharmacies were among: Robert Reed, “Walgreens Leaves ‘the Corner of Happy and Healthy’ behind with New Slogan,” Chicago Tribune, December 1, 2017.

6 Between 2006 and 2012, Walgreens sat atop: Jenn Abelson, Aaron Williams, Andrew Ba Tran, and Meryl Kornfield, “At Height of Crisis, Walgreens Handled Nearly One in Five of the Most Addictive Opioids,” Washington Post, November 7, 2019.

7 On April 4, 2012, the DEA launched: Settlement and Memorandum of Agreement, June 10, 2013; ARCOS data analysis by the Washington Post.

8 On January 10, 2011, Kristine Atwell: Kristine Atwell, “High Quantity Stores 68297,” email, 2011.

9 The month after Atwell raised her alarm: Walgreens Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of Registration, Department of Justice, September 13, 2012.

10 In September 2012, the DEA shut down the Jupiter warehouse: Walgreens Order to Show Cause and Immediate Suspension of Registration.

11 That practice seemed to come in conflict: “Oath/Promise of a Pharmacist,” International Pharmaceutical Federation.

12 Executives there began formulating a pharmacy store survey: Rick Gates, “Florida Focus on Profit (Svihra),” email, 2011.

13 In June 2013, Walgreens agreed to pay: “Walgreens Agrees to Pay a Record Settlement of $80 Million for Civil Penalties under the Controlled Substances Act,” Drug Enforcement Administration, Miami, June 11, 2013.

14 That year, Walgreens posted $72 billion in revenue: Walgreens annual report, 2013.

Chapter 17: “Crisis Playbook”

This chapter is based on drug industry documents and emails unsealed in MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation, as well as documents made public as part of the lawsuits filed against the tobacco industry.

1 To turn things around: “Proposed Plan for the Public Launching of Tassc,” APCO Associates, September 30, 1993; “Crisis Playbook: An Interactive Guide to Crisis Communications, HDA”; “APCO Holdings, Revenue, Growth, & Competitor Profile,” incfact.com.

2 In 1993, APCO took on a damaged brand: “Proposed Plan for the Public Launching of Tassc,” APCO Associates, September 30, 1993; “Crisis Playbook: An Interactive Guide to Crisis Communications, HDA”; “APCO Holdings, Revenue, Growth, & Competitor Profile,” incfact.com.

3 For $515,000, The Alliance: HDMA Executive Committee Meeting, June 2, 2013.

4 “Who’s to blame?”: HDMA Executive Committee Meeting, June 2, 2013.

5 APCO also created talking points: “HDMA-APCO Stakeholder Research and External Positioning Project,” June 2, 2013.

6 In phase two of the project: “HDMA-APCO Stakeholder Research and External Positioning Project.”

7 The playbook proposed responses: “HDMA-APCO Stakeholder Research and External Positioning Project.”

8 Six months after the Orlando meeting: Tom Twitty, “DEA Strategy Task Force Meeting Update,” email, 2013.

Chapter 18: Marsha and Tom

This chapter is based on internal Healthcare Distribution Alliance emails and lobbying strategy documents, along with Justice Department and DEA emails, the Pennsylvania Crime Commission report on organized crime in the state, and congressional campaign finance and lobbying reports. It is also based on articles in the Patriot News of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the Associated Press, the Morning Call of Allentown, Pennsylvania, The Atlantic, the Daily Item of Sunbury, Pennsylvania, and The Hill newspaper in Washington, D.C.

1 Marsha Blackburn was a former beauty queen: Kris Kitto, “Understanding the Beauty-Queen Politician,” The Hill, September 15, 2008; U.S. Senate Biographies, “Marsha Blackburn”; Blake Farmer, “Several Famous People Held This Trying Summer Job,” NPR, July 15, 2011; “Best & Worst of Congress,” Washingtonian, September 1, 2004.

2 Lobbyists for The Alliance: HDA minutes.

3 “Rep. Marino’s office is very open to feedback”: Jewelyn Cosgrove, “Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act,” email, 2013.

4 Marino was a second-term congressman: Biographical Directory of the United States Congress; Candy Woodall, “Did Tom Marino’s Controversial Past Force Him out of the Running for Trump’s Drug Czar?” Penn Live, May 5, 2017; “Organized Crime in Pennsylvania: A Decade of Change,” Pennsylvania Crime Commission, 1990 Report; Francis Scarcella, “Tom Marino Defeats Chris Carney in the 10th District,” Daily Item, November 3, 2010; Russell Berman, “The Class of 2010 Heads Home,” The Atlantic, February 22, 2016.

5 The average cost of running a successful House campaign: “American Government,” Open Secrets.

6 The three-page bill did nothing: H.R. 4709—Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2014.

7 The legislation was the brainchild: Jill Wade Tyson, “DAG Diversion Enforcement Meeting,” email, 2014.

8 In 2013, as they pushed: House campaign finance reports.

9 Patrick Kelly, The Alliance’s executive vice president in charge of lobbying: “Chronology of HDMA/HDA Executive Committee and Board of Directors’ Drug Abuse and Diversion Discussions at Meetings/Conference Calls,” HDA, January 2, 2018.

10 “This is all so sensitive”: Kristen Freitas, email, 2013.

11 Thorsen agreed: Carlyle Thorsen, email, 2013.

Chapter 19: Playing Games

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi; emails and internal documents now part of MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation; the transcript and video of the April 7, 2014, House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee hearing; and articles in the Washington Post.

1 On April 7: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

2 Members of Congress took their seats: Transcript and video recording from House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health hearing, April 7, 2014.

3 The industry smoothed the way: Campaign finance records.

4 Joe delivered his opening statement: Hearing transcript.

5 The Alliance had already identified: Higham and Bernstein, “The Drug Industry’s Triumph”; Scott Higham, Sari Horwitz, Steven Rich, and Meryl Kornfield, “Inside the Drug Industry’s Plan to Defeat the DEA,” Washington Post, September 13, 2019.

6 “Sometimes it seems that”: Hearing transcript.

7 The question, almost word for word: Higham et al., “Inside the Drug Industry’s Plan”; Deposition of Patrick M. Kelly, “Potential Hill Questions for DEA,” Exhibit in MDL No. 2804.

8 Joe briefly answered: Hearing transcript.

9 “We were looking for a little bit”: Hearing transcript.

10 Blackburn moved quickly: Hearing transcript, Higham et al., “Inside the Drug Industry’s Plan.”

11 Paredes was appalled: Interview with Mimi Paredes.

12 Joe looked up at the dais: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

Chapter 20: “Tom Marino Is Trying to Do That?”

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi, along with internal Justice Department emails and memos obtained by the Washington Post under the Freedom of Information Act. It is also based on transcripts and videos of congressional hearings, and articles in the Washington Post.

1 It was an early afternoon: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

2 The DEA had already warned in a memo: Higham and Bernstein, “The Drug Industry’s Triumph.”

3 Five minutes before the hearing ended: Transcript and video recording from House Judiciary Committee hearing, April 8, 2014.

4 Holder had announced: Jerry Markon, “Holder Calls Deaths from Heroin Overdoses an ‘Urgent and Growing Public Health Crisis,’” Washington Post, March 10, 2014.

5 Actor Philip Seymour Hoffman: Markon, “Holder Calls Deaths from Heroin Overdoses.”

6 “I was troubled by some language”: Hearing transcript.

7 Marino followed up three weeks later: Rep. Tom Marino letter to Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., April 30, 2014.

8 On June 4, Bill Tighe: Bill Tighe, “DAG Diversion Enforcement Meeting,” email, 2014, obtained under a Freedom of Information request made by the Washington Post.

9 “Linden Barber used to work for DEA”: Jill Wade Tyson, email, obtained under a Freedom of Information request made by the Washington Post.

10 In 2001, in one of the earliest lawsuits: Civil Action No. 01-C-137-S.; Debbie Cenziper, Emily Corio, Kelly Hooper, and Douglas Soule, “They Looked at Us Like an Easy Target,” Washington Post, October 18, 2019.

11 Despite that connection: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

12 The attorney general was juggling: Sari Horwitz, “Eric Holder Says Republicans Have Made Him a ‘Proxy’ to Attack President Obama,” Washington Post, July 2, 2012.

13 Joe knew Holder couldn’t be expected to know: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

Chapter 21: “Be Zen”

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi, Imelda L. “Mimi” Paredes, Eric Akers, and John Partridge, as well as lobbying reports filed in the U.S. House and Senate, internal drug industry emails, and the invitation for the Marino luncheon, which were unsealed as part of MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation.

1 On June 24, 2014: Rita Norton, “Rep. Marino Lunch,” email, 2014.

2 It was the continuation of the money flowing: Campaign finance and lobbying reports.

3 A week after the Marino fund-raiser: Interviews with Joe Rannazzisi, Mimi Paredes, and Eric Akers.

4 Paredes could see Joe’s eyes narrow: Interview with Mimi Paredes.

5 “What problem are you trying to address”: Interviews with Joe Rannazzisi, Mimi Paredes, and Eric Akers.

6 Paredes could almost feel the heat: Interview with Mimi Paredes.

7 “Wait a minute”: Interviews with Joe Rannazzisi, Mimi Paredes, and Eric Akers.

8 “Oh, fuck”: Interview with Eric Akers.

9 Joe didn’t regret what he said: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

10 She told Paredes not to worry: Interview with Mimi Paredes.

11 Tyson and Akers tried to clean up: Interview with Eric Akers.

Chapter 22: “You’re Being Paranoid”

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi and Imelda L. “Mimi” Paredes, along with congressional testimony, the letter Representatives Tom Marino and Marsha Blackburn wrote to Justice Department inspector general Michael Horowitz, former Attorney General Eric Holder’s public remarks about the Marino-Blackburn bill, and articles in the Washington Post.

1 At a daylong law enforcement conference: “Attorney General Holder Announces Plans For Federal Law Enforcement Personnel To Begin Carrying Naloxone,” Department of Justice, July 31, 2014.

2 Joe couldn’t have been happier: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

3 The Ensuring Patient Safety and Effective Drug Enforcement Act: Congressional record.

4 One afternoon that summer: Interviews with Joe Rannazzisi and Mimi Paredes.

5 A few weeks later: Interview with Mimi Paredes.

6 On September 18: Transcript and video recording from House Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations Subcommittee, September 18, 2014.

7 A week later, on September 25: Reps. Marsha Blackburn and Tom Marino, letter to Inspector General Michael Horowitz, September 25, 2014; Jackie Kucinich, “Two House Republicans Accuse DEA official of Intimidation,” Washington Post, September 29, 2014.

8 Paredes now understood: Interview with Mimi Paredes.

Chapter 23: “The Best Case We’ve Ever Had”

This chapter is based on interviews with David Schiller, Jim Geldhof, Jim Rafalski, and Imelda L. “Mimi” Paredes, along with internal DEA and Justice Department emails, settlement agreements between the federal government and McKesson, and documents and briefs filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C.

1 David Schiller was a rock star: Lenny Bernstein and Scott Higham, “‘We Feel Like Our System Was Hijacked’: DEA Agents Say a Huge Opioid Case Ended in a Whimper,” Washington Post, December 17, 2017; Bill Whitaker, “Whistleblowers: DEA Attorneys Went Easy on McKesson, the Country’s Largest Drug Distributor,” 60 Minutes, December 17, 2017.

2 But none of those cases: Interview with David Schiller.

3 As the assistant special agent in charge: Interview with David Schiller; Bernstein and Higham, “‘We Feel Like Our System Was Hijacked.’”

4 Schiller and his lead investigator: Interviews with David Schiller and Helen Kaupang.

5 DEA lawyers from headquarters: “Registration Consequences for McKesson Corporation for Violations of the Controlled Substances Act,” DEA memo, November 4, 2014.

6 Schiller couldn’t get a straight answer: Interview with David Schiller.

7 McKesson first appeared on Schiller’s radar: Interview with David Schiller; Bernstein and Higham, “‘We Feel Like Our System Was Hijacked.’”

8 A grand jury indicted Clawson: People of Colorado v. Robin Steinke et al.; grand jury indictment.

9 As he did with every investigation: Interview with David Schiller.

10 The timeline began in 2008: Interview with David Schiller; U.S. Department of Justice Memorandum of Understanding with McKesson, January 5, 2017.

11 Schiller contacted other DEA field offices: Interview with David Schiller; U.S. Department of Justice Memorandum of Understanding with McKesson, January 5, 2017.

12 Schiller called Joe Rannazzisi: Interview with David Schiller; U.S. Department of Justice Memorandum of Understanding with McKesson, January 5, 2017; interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

13 A week before Christmas in 2014: Interview with David Schiller; U.S. Department of Justice Memorandum of Understanding with McKesson, January 5, 2017; interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

14 As Schiller waited to pass through security: Interview with David Schiller; U.S. Department of Justice Memorandum of Understanding with McKesson, January 5, 2017; interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

15 Joe had decided to shun the sit-down: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

16 Partridge, an unflappable twenty-five-year veteran: Interview with John Partridge.

17 In Detroit, Jim Geldhof: Interview with Jim Geldhof.

18 Geldhof traced the start of the problem: Interview with Jim Geldhof; Lenny Bernstein and Scott Higham, “Investigation: The DEA Slowed Enforcement while the Opioid Epidemic Grew Out of Control,” Washington Post, October 22, 2016.

19 One of those lawyers: Interview with Jonathan P. Novak.

20 “What are you doing”: Interview with Jim Geldhof.

21 In Washington: Quarterly reports from the Chief Administrative Law Judge John J. Mulrooney II obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request; Bernstein and Higham, “Investigation.”

22 On the final day of March 2015: David Schiller and Mimi Paredes, “RE: McKesson,” emails, March 2015.

23 It got worse: Interviews with David Schiller and Mimi Paredes.

24 But Hobart, McKesson’s attorney: Bernstein and Higham, “‘We Feel Like Our System Was Hijacked.’”

25 Paredes was unsympathetic: Interview with Mimi Paredes; Paredes, “MCK Settlement Position on Outstanding Terms,” email, 2015.

Chapter 24: The Mushroom Treatment

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi and Imelda L. “Mimi” Paredes, along with articles in the Washington Post and internal emails from the Healthcare Distribution Alliance and drug companies that are now part of MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation.

26 At the end of August: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

27 Three months earlier: Sari Horwitz, “Top FBI Official Is Appointed to Take Helm at the DEA,” Washington Post, May 13, 2015.

28 One DEA official warned Joe: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

29 When Rosenberg first arrived: Jack Riley, Drug Warrior: Inside the Hunt for El Chapo and the Rise of America’s Opioid Crisis (Hachette, 2019).

30 Soiles met Joe outside an elevator: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

31 After thirty years at the DEA: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

32 He also had to introduce the man named: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi; Del Quentin Wilber, “A DEA Agent, an Undercover Sting, and ‘The Merchant of Death,’” Washington Post, September 5, 2012.

33 The latest version of the bill: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi; Del Quentin Wilber, “A DEA Agent”; “Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016,” 114th Congress, 2nd Session; Higham et al., “Inside the Drug Industry’s Plan.”

34 Within days of Joe submitting: HDA Board of Directors Meeting, September 28, 2015.

Chapter 25: An Expensive Speeding Ticket

This chapter is based on interviews with Jim Geldhof, James Rafalski, and Brien O’Connor, along with settlement agreements between the federal government and McKesson and Mallinckrodt, and prosecution memos prepared by the U.S. attorney’s office in Detroit.

1 By September 25, 2015: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, McKesson Form 8-K.

2 The fine was $50 million more: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, McKesson Definitive Proxy Statement “McKesson Revenue & Profit,” Macrotrends.net.

3 Jim Geldhof was in his office: Interview with Jim Geldhof.

4 Masters had appealed the agency’s decision: United States Court of Appeals, Masters Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. DEA.

5 Rafalski’s other big case: Interview with James Rafalski.

6 “We will argue that thousands of orders”: McKesson prosecution memo, August 7, 2014.

7 On July 10, 2015: Leslie Wizner, “Subject to FRE 408 Settlement Negotiations,” letter, 2015.

8 She also asserted that Mallinckrodt knew: Wizner, “Subject to FRE 408 Settlement Negotiations.”

9 O’Connor countered that there was nothing: Interview with Brien T. O’Connor.

10 By the fall, Geldhof was losing his patience: Interview with Jim Geldhof.

Chapter 26: Banjo

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi and Jim Geldhof, and the transcript of the oral arguments in United States v. Moore, October 7, 1975.

1 There is a long-standing tradition: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

2 “Why don’t you come over”: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

3 Joe’s friend Jimmy Soiles: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

4 The next day: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

5 Over and over, he listened: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi; “United States v. Moore,” No. 74-759, Transcript of oral arguments, October 7, 1975.

6 Joe was struck by how Marshall seemed to anticipate: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

7 That question also haunted Jim Geldhof: Interview with Jim Geldhof.

Chapter 27: A Public Nuisance

This chapter is based on interviews with Paul T. Farrell Jr. and the 2016 investigation into the opioid industry by the Charleston Gazette-Mail, which was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting. It is also based on Joe Rannazzisi’s sworn declaration filed in Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Eric H. Holder Jr., the friend-of-the-court briefs crafted by the Healthcare Distribution Alliance, known at the time as the Healthcare Distribution Management Association, and notes and documents from Farrell’s meeting with Washington Post reporters Lenny Bernstein and Scott Higham.

1 On February 10, 2017: Interview with Paul Farrell.

2 Two months before Paul’s trip: Interview with Paul Farrell; Eric Eyre, “Drug Firms Poured 780M Painkillers into WV amid Rise of Overdoses,” Charleston Gazette, December 17, 2016.

3 Paul thought the amount: Interview with Paul Farrell; Eyre, “Drug Firms Poured 780M Painkillers.”

4 Sometimes it seemed like there were as many Farrells: Interview with Paul Farrell; Eyre, “Drug Firms Poured 780M Painkillers.”

5 He even beat Hillary Clinton: Mingo County election records; Rick Holmes, “On the Road with Rick Holmes: The Battles of ‘Bloody Mingo,’” Hannibal Courier Post, December 13, 2018.

6 The day after his brother’s challenge: Interview with Paul Farrell.

7 It gave county commissioners the power: West Virginia Code of Ordinances, Chapter 91: Nuisances.

8 Paul started poring over cases: Interview with Paul Farrell.

9 That’s when he spotted: Interview with Paul Farrell, Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Eric H. Holder Jr.

10 Paul also found the case: Interview with Paul Farrell, Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Eric H. Holder Jr.; Masters Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. DEA.

11 He downloaded every document: Interview with Paul Farrell.

12 Paul had one final stop: Interview with Paul Farrell.

Chapter 28: “Our Allies”

This chapter is based on interviews with Joe Rannazzisi, Imelda L. “Mimi” Paredes, John Partridge, and Richard W. Fields, along with emails and documents now part of MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation. It is also based on Chuck Rosenberg’s June 22, 2016, testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, congressional lobbying reports, federal campaign finance records, an article by DEA chief administrative law judge John J. Mulrooney II in the Marquette Law Review, and articles in the Washington Post.

1 There was a reason Joe didn’t call Paul Farrell: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

2 One day, after he began his new job: Interviews with Joe Rannazzisi and Richard Fields.

3 On his last night: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

4 His senior deputy, John Partridge: Interview with John Partridge.

5 His most trusted legal counsel: Interview with Mimi Paredes.

6 He felt that he was to blame: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

7 On March 17, 2016: U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., 2016, vol. 163.

8 A senior DEA official said: Higham and Bernstein, “The Drug Industry’s Triumph.”

9 It passed by unanimous consent: S.483—Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, 114th Congress.

10 The drug industry had spent $60 million: Campaign finance records.

11 The night the House approved: Burt Rosen, “S. 483 (Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act),” email, 2016.

12 On June 22, Rosenberg testified: Transcript and video recording from Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, June 22, 2016.

13 Joe was watching the hearing: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

Chapter 29: “They’re Gonna Get Hammered”

This chapter is based on interviews with Paul T. Farrell Jr. and James Rafalski, along with the transcript of the January 12, 2017, hearing in Masters Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. DEA. before the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., and the June 30, 2017, ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals in the Masters case. It is also based on the amicus briefs filed in the Masters case by the Healthcare Distribution Alliance, the National Association of Chain Drug Stores, and the Generic Pharmaceutical Association; the DEA’s decision and order in its case against Masters; and the 2009 Memorandum of Understanding between Masters and the DEA.

1 Paul Farrell settled into his windowless law office: Interview with Paul Farrell.

2 Richard T. Lauer, an attorney: Masters Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. DEA, No. 15-1335, Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Audio of oral arguments, January 12, 2017.

3 It was still early: Interview with Paul Farrell.

4 Masters had paid a $500,000 fine: Masters Pharmaceutical, Inc., Memorandum of Agreement with the DEA.

5 But a year after paying the fine: James Rafalski report.

6 Lauer tried to stay on message: Audio of January 12, 2017, hearing.

7 The attorney representing the Justice Department: Audio of January 12, 2017, hearing.

8 Listening to the hearing at his office: Interview with Paul Farrell.

Chapter 30: On the Road

This chapter is based on interviews with Paul T. Farrell Jr. and Michael J. Fuller Jr., along with local news accounts of the DuPont and nursing home cases and settlements, and a Washington Post analysis of ARCOS data obtained by a lawsuit filed by the Post and HD Media, the owner of the Charleston Gazette-Mail.

1 The commissioners in Mingo County: Interview with Paul Farrell.

2 Mingo County had become a hot spot: ARCOS data analysis by the Washington Post.

3 To meet the demand: ARCOS data analysis by the Washington Post.

4 Paul Farrell sat in the back: Interview with Paul Farrell.

5 At first the commissioners were skeptical: Interview with Paul Farrell.

6 On March 9, 2017, he filed his first suit: Cabell County Commission v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp. et al., Complaint.

7 That spring, he ran into a lawyer: Interviews with Paul Farrell and Michael Fuller.

8 Paul, as always, wouldn’t take no for an answer: Interviews with Paul Farrell, Michael Fuller, and Amy J. Quezon.

9 Fuller suggested they team up: Interviews with Paul Farrell, Michael Fuller, and Amy J. Quezon; “DuPont, Chemours Agree to Settle Teflon Cases for $671M,” Law360, February 13, 2017.

10 Paul began to imagine the possibilities: Interview with Paul Farrell.

Chapter 31: Field of Dreams

This chapter is based on interviews with Mark Zban and Paul T. Farrell Jr., along with articles about Zban’s sports career in the Charleston Gazette and the Charleston Daily Mail.

1 Fifteen-year-old Paul Farrell: Interview with Paul Farrell.

2 His uncle had played football at Marshall: Interview with Mark Zban.

3 For Paul, it was a slow-motion, cinematic experience: Interview with Paul Farrell.

4 Paul’s family knew Zban’s family: Interviews with Paul Farrell and Mark Zban.

5 By the time he reached his early thirties: Interview with Mark Zban.

6 Paul was heartbroken: Interview with Paul Farrell.

7 As his addiction deepened: Interview with Mark Zban.

8 A year after his release: Interview with Mark Zban.

9 “Looks like you’re doing well”: Interview with Paul Farrell.

10 Zban remarried: Interview with Mark Zban.

11 Watching Zban’s life unravel: Interview with Paul Farrell.

12 “This is the true essence of the epidemic”: Interview with Paul Farrell.

Chapter 32: “The Hunt Is On”

This chapter is based on interviews with James Rafalski, Jim Geldhof, and Paul T. Farrell Jr., along with the June 30, 2017, ruling handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals in Masters Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. DEA.

1 One week into his retirement: Interview with James Rafalski.

2 “I’ve got some good news”: Interviews with James Rafalski and Jim Geldhof.

3 In a scathing thirty-eight-page opinion: U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit Court, Masters Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. DEA., No. 15-1335, Decision, June 30, 2017.

4 Rafalski had spent nearly seven years: Interview with James Rafalski.

5 The ruling was unanimous: D.C. Circuit Court decision.

6 In Huntington, West Virginia: Interview with Paul Farrell.

Chapter 33: “Make Them Pay”

This chapter is based on interviews with James Rafalski, Jim Geldhof, Michael J. Fuller Jr., Paul T. Farrell Jr., and Jim Peterson.

1 The dining room was in the secluded Italianate mansion: Interview with Jim Peterson.

2 Damn, Rafalski thought: Interview with James Rafalski.

3 Rafalski, along with Jim Geldhof: Interviews with James Rafalski and Jim Geldhof.

4 But Paul pressed him: Interviews with James Rafalski and Paul Farrell.

5 Rafalski figured he could combine: Interview with James Rafalski.

6 Joining Paul and the partners: Interviews with Paul Farrell and Michael Fuller.

7 “This is a chance to make them pay”: Interview with Paul Farrell.

Chapter 34: Legal Titans

This chapter is based on interviews with Paul J. Hanly Jr., Jayne Conroy, and Paul T. Farrell Jr., along with obituaries in the New York Times and the Washington Post.

1 At 11 a.m. on November 15: Interviews with Paul Farrell and Paul Hanly.

2 Between 1999 and 2017: North Carolina Attorney General Josh Stein website.

3 The scion of a colorful political family: Interview with Paul Hanly.

4 Hanly grew up admiring Kenny: Robert Hanley, “Ex-Mayor John V. Kenny of Jersey City Dies at 82,” New York Times, June 3, 1975.

5 Hanly had been working opioid cases: Interviews with Paul Hanly and Jayne Conroy.

6 Like Hanly, she dressed stylishly: Interview with Jayne Conroy.

7 Conroy grew up sailing: Interview with Jayne Conroy.

8 For years afterward, Conroy and Hanly: Interviews with Paul Hanly and Jayne Conroy; National Trial Lawyers Top 100 website.

9 On the day after Christmas: Interview with Paul Hanly.

10 They reached out to John Simmons: Interviews with Paul Hanly and Jayne Conroy.

11 Simmons grew up in nearby East Alton: Conroy interview; John Simmons biography, Simmons Hanly Conroy website.

12 Conroy and Hanly laid out their case: Interviews with Paul Hanly and Jayne Conroy.

13 In 2007, Purdue settled the lawsuits: Interviews with Paul Hanly and Jayne Conroy.

14 The department brought its own case: Barry Meier, “In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million,” New York Times, May 10, 2007.

15 In his Manhattan office: Interviews with Paul Hanly and Jayne Conroy.

16 By this time, Hanly had a personal experience: Interview with Paul Hanly.

17 About a year after meeting with Bizzarro: “Simmons Hanly Conroy Files Suffolk County, N.Y., Lawsuit against Drug Companies over Opioids Epidemic and Addiction,” Simmon Hanly Conroy website, August 31, 2016.

18 He told the Wall Street Journal in December: Thomas Catan and Evan Perez, “A Pain-Drug Champion Has Second Thoughts,” Wall Street Journal, December 17, 2012.

19 In a video cited by the Journal: Video by Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing.

20 Hanly compared his lawsuit: Interview with Paul Hanly.

21 Son of a bitch: Interview with Paul Farrell.

22 Hanly looked at Paul: Interview with Paul Hanly.

Chapter 35: The Drug Czar

This chapter is based on drug industry documents and emails unsealed in MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation, and the Marquette Law Review article written by DEA chief administrative law judge John Mulrooney. It is also based on an NPR story about Tom Marino, the transcript of Senator Orrin Hatch’s floor remarks addressing the joint investigative report into the Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act by the Washington Post and 60 Minutes, and a 2018 investigation by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee into pain patient advocacy groups titled “Exposing the Financial Ties between Opioid Manufacturers and Third Party Advocacy Groups.”

1 Shortly after Donald Trump: Ed O’Keefe, “Tom Marino Set to Serve as White House Drug Czar,” Washington Post, April 11, 2017.

2 To confront the impending public relations crisis: “Key Facts about Opioid Regulation,” Healthcare Distribution Alliance.

3 The prospect of a damning joint report: Gabe Weissman, “Re: 60 Minutes update from NACDS,” email, 2017.

4 Five days later, on Sunday, October 15: Higham and Bernstein, “The Drug Industry’s Triumph.”

5 That evening: Bill Whitaker, “Ex-DEA Agent: Opioid Crisis Fueled by Drug Industry and Congress,” 60 Minutes, June 17, 2018.

6 Since retiring, he had been reluctant: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

7 Several members of Congress: Nancy Cordes, “‘All of Us Were Fooled’: Opioid Report Reverberates across Political World,” CBS News, October 16, 2017.

8 The joint Washington Post/60 Minutes investigative report: Higham and Bernstein, “The Drug Industry’s Triumph”; Whitaker, “Ex-DEA agent.”

9 Manchin told reporters: Cordes, “‘All of Us Were Fooled.’”

10 Two days after the report appeared: Bill Chappell, “Tom Marino, Trump’s Pick as Drug Czar, Withdraws after Damaging Opioid Report,” NPR, October 17, 2017.

11 In the days that followed: U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 115th Cong., 1st sess., 2017, vol. 163.

12 A group calling itself the Academy of Integrative Pain Management: Archive of Sen. Hatch press releases; campaign finance records.

Chapter 36: Jumped the Gun

This chapter is based on interviews with Paul J. Hanly Jr., Paul T. Farrell Jr., Jayne Conroy, and Joe Rice, along with the transcript of the November 30, 2017, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation hearing and the December 12, 2017, MDL transfer order.

1 Paul Hanly was walking: Interview with Paul Hanly.

2 They were among the lawyers: John Schwartz, “Ron Motley, Who Tackled Big Tobacco, Dies at 68,” New York Times, August 22, 2013.

3 “Paul, did you know about this?”: Interview with Paul Hanly.

4 To the two veteran litigators: Interviews with Paul Hanly and Joe Rice.

5 Paul didn’t bother to ask: Interview with Paul Farrell.

6 On November 30, 2017: Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation hearing in St. Louis, Missouri, Transcript, November 30, 2017.

7 As Conroy approached the courthouse: Interview with Jayne Conroy.

8 Conroy didn’t know: Interviews with Paul Farrell and Jayne Conroy.

9 The multidistrict litigation panel: Terry Turner, “Multidistrict Litigation,” Drugwatch.com, September 24, 2021; “MDLS 101: Primer on Multi-District Litigation,” Robins Kaplan LLP, November/December 2016.

10 On November 30: Multidistrict Litigation panel hearing transcript.

11 The first to speak: Multidistrict Litigation panel hearing transcript.

12 Paul had calculated: Interview with Paul Farrell; “A Leader in the National Transvaginal Mesh Litigation,” Farrell & Fuller website.

13 Conroy thought Paul had jumped the gun: Interview with Jayne Conroy.

14 Paul was willing to take that chance: Interview with Paul Farrell.

15 Mark S. Cheffo: Multidistrict Litigation panel hearing transcript.

16 Twelve days after the hearing: Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Transfer Order, December 12, 2017.

17 While Conroy was not happy: Interview with Jayne Conroy.

18 But Paul Farrell was deeply disappointed: Interview with Paul Farrell.

Chapter 37: “This Is Horrific”

This chapter is based on interviews with Paul J. Hanly Jr., Paul T. Farrell Jr., Jayne Conroy, and Joe Rice, along with court filings in MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation, and articles by Cleveland 19 News.

1 Downtown Cleveland was decked: Dan DeRoos, “The Behind-the-Scenes Story about Cleveland’s Christmas Tree,” Cleveland 19 News, November 14, 2017.

2 Jayne Conroy had seen her share: Interview with Jayne Conroy.

3 Judge Polster had ordered: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Order, December 14, 2017.

4 “This is an epidemic unlike anything”: Interviews with Jayne Conroy and Paul Farrell.

5 Paul was unimpressed: Interview with Paul Farrell.

6 Shortly before Christmas: Interviews with Paul Hanly, Jayne Conroy, and Paul Farrell.

7 On Christmas Eve: Interview with Paul Hanly.

8 Hanly scoffed at the suggestion: Interview with Paul Hanly.

9 For Paul, it had become personal: Interview with Paul Farrell.

10 With the litigation slate set: Interviews with Paul Hanly, Jayne Conroy, and Paul Farrell.

11 Hanly still wasn’t completely happy: Interview with Paul Hanly.

Chapter 38: “Tear Each Other Up”

This chapter is based on interviews with Paul T. Farrell Jr., Judge Dan Aaron Polster, and Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, along with the transcript of the January 9, 2018, proceeding before Polster and a March 5, 2018, New York Times article about Polster by Jan Hoffman.

1 On the morning of January 9: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Transcript of Proceedings, January 9, 2018.

2 Polster began his meeting by noting: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Transcript of Proceedings.

3 “I don’t think anyone”: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Transcript of Proceedings.

4 Paul Farrell couldn’t believe: Interview with Paul Farrell.

5 The judge had grown up in Cleveland: Jan Hoffman, “Can This Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?” New York Times, March 5, 2018.

6 Polster told the lawyers: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Transcript of Proceedings.

7 One by one, the key lawyers: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Transcript of Proceedings.

8 Like many lawyers: Interview with Kaspar Stoffelmayr.

9 As the lawyers left: Hoffman, “Can This Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?”

Chapter 39: A Perry Mason Moment

This chapter is based on interviews with Paul T. Farrell Jr. and the transcript of the February 26, 2018, ARCOS hearing held before U.S. district judge Dan Aaron Polster.

1 On February 26 at three: Interview with Paul Farrell.

2 Lawyers for the drug companies: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Transcript of Proceedings, February 26, 2018.

3 James R. Bennett II: LinkedIn profile.

4 He stepped to the podium: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Transcript of Proceedings.

5 Paul was tired: Interview with Paul Farrell.

6 “The important thing”: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Transcript of Proceedings.

7 Paul had already studied: Interview with Paul Farrell.

8 “I don’t mean to interrupt”: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Transcript of Proceedings.

9 Paul felt like he was in a scene: Interview with Paul Farrell.

10 “With the Privacy Act concerns”: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Transcript of Proceedings.

11 He ordered the DEA: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Protective Order Re: DEA’s ARCOS Database, March 6, 2018.

12 “Nothing is going to be revealed”: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Transcript of Proceedings.

Chapter 40: The Death Star

This chapter is based on interviews with Paul T. Farrell Jr., along with the July 31, 2018, deposition of Nathan Hartle.

1 Covington & Burling: “Firm History,” Covington & Burling LLC website; Jonathan O’Connell, “Covington & Burling Set to Move Headquarters to CityCenterDC,” Washington Post, May 16, 2012.

2 On July 31, 2018: Interview with Paul Farrell.

3 As Paul began the deposition: Interview with Paul Farrell.

4 For seven hours: Deposition of Nathan Hartle, July 31, 2018.

Chapter 41: The Digital Detectives

This chapter is based on interviews with Anthony Irpino, Pearl A. Robertson, Evan M. Janush, Paul T. Farrell Jr., and Derek W. Loeser, along with the January 23, 2008, audit of Cardinal’s compliance program by Cegedim Dendrite Compliance Solutions. It is also based on Judge Dan Aaron Polster’s April 11, 2018, litigation track order; Victor Borelli’s January 27, 2009, email exchange with Steve Cochrane, vice president of sales for KeySource Medical; and internal emails between Janush and Farrell.

1 For weeks on end in 2018: Interview with Anthony Irpino.

2 It was backbreaking work: Interviews with Anthony Irpino and Pearl Robertson.

3 “This epidemic is such a scourge”: Interview with Anthony Irpino.

4 On April 11: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Case Management Order One, April 11, 2018.

5 Paul Farrell added more lawyers: Interview with Paul Farrell.

6 One of those hot documents: Interview with Evan Janush.

7 There was a reason why: Ronald W. Buzzeo, “Cardinal Healthcare’s Suspicious Order Monitoring (SOM) System,” January 23, 2008.

8 Janush scored another coup: Interview with Evan Janush; Evan Janush, “Have You Seen the ‘HDMA Crisis Playbook’?” email, 2018.

9 “I have a man crush”: Paul Farrell, “[Opioid-MDL-Leadership] Superstar Evan Janush,” email, 2018.

10 Across the country in a Seattle law firm: Interviews with Anthony Irpino and Derek Loeser.

11 Paul believed he was on a hot streak: Interview with Paul Farrell.

Chapter 42: The Magician

This chapter is based on interviews with Mark Lanier, Jayne Conroy, Paul J. Hanly Jr., and Paul T. Farrell Jr., along with articles in the New York Times, Reuters and the American Lawyer.

1 As the opioid case moved closer: Interviews with Paul Hanly and Jayne Conroy.

2 Lanier had lots of business: Interviews with Paul Hanly, Jayne Conroy, and Mark Lanier.

3 The founder of the Christian Trial Lawyers Association: Interview with Mark Lanier; Champion Forest Baptist Church website.

4 He collected ancient Hebrew manuscripts: Interview with Mark Lanier; Lanier Theological Library website.

5 He spent hundreds of thousands of dollars: Interview with Mark Lanier; Jonathan D. Glater, “A Houston Holiday: Barbecue, Al Green, and 5,000 Guests,” New York Times, December 13, 2003.

6 In preparation for trials: Interview with Mark Lanier.

7 That spring, Paul met with Hanly: Interviews with Jayne Conroy, Paul Hanly, and Paul Farrell.

8 On April 23, 2019: Interviews with Paul Farrell, Mark Lanier, Jayne Conroy, and Paul Hanly.

Chapter 43: The 60 Minutes Man

This chapter is based on interviews with Mark Lanier, Joe Rannazzisi, Paul T. Farrell Jr., Paul J. Hanly Jr., and Jayne Conroy, along with the transcript of the May 15, 2019, deposition of Rannazzisi.

1 Joe Rannazzisi wasn’t feeling well: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

2 Joe had decided to leave his job: Interviews with Joe Rannazzisi and Richard Fields.

3 “Mr. Rannazzisi, thank you”: Joe Rannazzisi deposition, May 15, 2019.

4 Joe started to laugh: Joe Rannazzisi deposition; interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

5 “I want to ask you”: Joe Rannazzisi deposition.

6 Paul Farrell had been on the fence: Interview with Paul Farrell.

Chapter 44: A Lone Lawyer

This chapter is based on interviews with Karen Lefton, along with articles in the Washington Post. It is also based on federal court briefs and judicial orders, including the July 9, 2018, Brief in Support of Disclosure of ARCOS Data; the Affidavit of Jeff Leen, Washington Post investigations editor; Judge Dan Aaron Polster’s July 26, 2018, Court Order Denying Relief re ARCOS Data; the audiotape of Lefton’s May 2, 2019, oral argument before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals; and the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in the case.

1 The call came out of nowhere: Interview with Karen Lefton.

2 “This is Jim McLaughlin”: Interviews with Karen Lefton and Jim McLaughlin.

3 Lefton quickly Googled McLaughlin: Interview with Karen Lefton.

4 McLaughlin explained how ARCOS worked: Interviews with Karen Lefton and Jim McLaughlin.

5 Lefton was not McLaughlin’s first choice: Interviews with Karen Lefton and Jim McLaughlin; Joel Achenbach, “How an Epic Legal Battle Brought a Secret Drug Database to Light,” Washington Post, August 2, 2019.

6 On July 9, 2018: U.S. District Court of Northern District of Ohio, Brief in Support of Disclosure of ARCOS data, July 9, 2018.

7 She submitted an affidavit: U.S. District Court of Northern District of Ohio, Affidavit of Jeffrey Leen, July 9, 2018.

8 The DEA and the defendants fought back: U.S. District Court of Northern Ohio, Brief in Response to Washington Post Company’s Motion for Access to the Unredacted Brief in Support of Objections, July 9, 2018.

9 Seventeen days later, Polster: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Opinion and Order, July 26, 2018.

10 Lefton and lawyers for the Gazette-Mail: U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati, Appeal.

11 Lefton stepped to the lectern: U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati, Audio and Transcript of Oral Arguments, May 2, 2019.

12 After the argument: Interview with Karen Lefton.

13 Seven weeks later: Interview with Karen Lefton; U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati, Opinion, June 20, 2019.

14 “Total victory!!!: Karen Lefton, “Fwd: 18-3839 In re: Nat’l Prescription Opiate Lit. ‘opinion and judgment filed’ (1:17-md-02804),” email, 2019.

15 On July 16: Scott Higham, Sari Horwitz, and Steven Rich, “76 Billion Opioid Pills: Newly Released Federal Data Unmask the Epidemic,” Washington Post, July 16, 2019.

16 When two more years of data were released: Steven Rich, Scott Higham, and Sari Horwitz, “More than 100 Billion Pain Pills Saturated the Nation over Nine Years,” Washington Post, January 14, 2020.

17 The reporters also found that death rates from opioids had soared: Sari Horwitz, Steven Rich, and Scott Higham, “Opioid Death Rates Soared in Communities Where Pain Pills Flowed,” Washington Post, July 17, 2019.

18 Joe Manchin, the Democratic senator: Horwitz et al., “Opioid Death Rates Soared.”

19 The Post lifted its paywall: “Drilling into the DEA’s Pain Pill Database,” Washington Post, July 16, 2019.

20 At 5 a.m. on the day the first Post story was published: Interview with Karen Lefton; “How an Epic Legal Battle Brought a Secret Drug Database to Light.”

Chapter 45: My Cousin Vinny

This chapter is based on interviews with Paul T. Farrell Jr., Paul J. Hanly Jr., and Jayne Conroy, and emails between Farrell, Special Master David Cohen, and members of the defense and plaintiffs’ teams.

1 Paul Farrell was something of a worrying puzzle: Interviews with Paul Hanly, Paul Farrell, and trial team members.

2 But Hanly, Jayne Conroy, and the other veterans: Interviews with PaulHanly, Paul Farrell, and trial team members.

3 Paul was at the Washington Plaza Hotel: Interviews with Paul Farrell and Michael J. Fuller Jr.

4 Ten minutes after Fuller replied: Paul Farrell, email.

5 Within an hour: Interview with Paul Farrell.

6 At 2:55 the next morning: Paul Farrell, email.

Chapter 46: RICO

This chapter is based on interviews with Paul T. Farrell Jr., Mark P. Pifko, and Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, along with articles in the Washington Post, and the plaintiffs’ RICO motions and defense motions to exclude RICO from the case. It is also based on Judge Dan Aaron Polster’s September 3 and September 10, 2019, rulings allowing the conspiracy and RICO allegations to proceed, defense motions to disqualify Polster from the case, and the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruling rejecting the defense motions to disqualify Polster.

1 Two months after the My Cousin Vinny episode: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Civil Conspiracy, RICO and OCPA Claims, August 12, 2019.

2 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act—Hardly a Civil Statute (From RICO—Expanding Uses in Civil Litigation, P 3-59, 1984, Arthur F. Mathews, ed.—See NCJ-95991), Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

3 For several years: Interview with Mark Pifko.

4 Paul groaned at the suggestion: Interview with Paul Farrell.

5 Paul now saw The Alliance as part of a conspiracy: Interview with Paul Farrell.

6 Their work culminated in a 138-page brief: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Civil Conspiracy, RICO and OCPA Claims.

7 The plaintiffs also argued that the distributors capitalized: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Memorandum.

8 The pharmacies, through their trade organization: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Memorandum.

9 Lawyers for the drug companies scoffed: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Manufacturers’ Motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ RICO and OCPA Claims, July 19, 2019.

10 Attorneys for the drug distribution companies added: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Distributors’ Motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ RICO and OCPA Claims, July 19, 2019.

11 On September 3 and September 10: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Order Regarding Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Claims, September 3, 2019; In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Opinion and Order Regarding Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motions on RICO and OCPA, September 10, 2019.

12 Paul was delighted: Interview with Paul Farrell.

13 Kaspar Stoffelmayr, who represented: Interview with Kaspar Stoffelmayr.

14 On September 14, lawyers for seven drug companies: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Order Regarding Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment on Civil Conspiracy Claims, Motion to disqualify Judge Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), September 14, 2019.

15 In the two decades of defending major corporations: Interview with Kaspar Stoffelmayr.

16 Polster rejected their request: In Re: National Prescription Opiate Litigation, Opinion and Order denying Defendants’ Motion to Disqualify Judge, September 26, 2019.

17 The defense attorneys took their argument: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Case No. 19-3935, Petition for Writ of Mandamus, October 1, 2019.

18 On October 10, the appellate panel sided with Polster: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Case No. 19-3935, Order, October 10, 2019.

Chapter 47: “We Have a Deal”

This chapter is based on interviews with Mark Lanier, Paul J. Hanly Jr., Paul T. Farrell Jr., Paul J. Geller, Jayne Conroy, Michael J. Fuller Jr., and Joe Rice, along with articles in the Washington Post and the New York Times.

1 Joe Rice, the trial lawyer: Interviews with Joe Rice, Paul J. Hanly Jr., Jayne Conroy, and Paul Farrell.

2 Lanier, as he had promised: Interview with Mark Lanier.

3 “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury”: Lanier mock opening.

4 Complicating the proceedings were four state attorneys general: Interview with Paul Farrell; Lenny Bernstein, Scott Higham, Sari Horwitz, and Aaron C. Davis, “State AGs Dangle $18B Potential Settlement, but Fail to Delay Federal Opioid Trial,” Washington Post, October 15, 2019; Lenny Bernstein, Sari Horwitz, Scott Higham, and Aaron C. Davis, “High-Profile Talks to Avert Landmark Opioid Trial Break Down,” Washington Post, October 18, 2019.

5 Paul Geller, the plaintiffs’ lawyer: Interview with Paul Geller.

6 On Friday, October 18: Bernstein et al., “High-Profile Talks to Avert Landmark Opioid Trial Break Down.”

7 A Muscogee (Creek) Nation official: “Muscogee (Creek) Nation Presents Statement in Consolidated Opioid Suit in Federal Court in Cleveland, OH,” Muscogee Nation website.

8 Paul fumed, telling Polster: Interview with Paul Farrell.

9 Because the attorney general for West Virginia: Eric Eyre, “2 Drug Distributors to Pay $36M to Settle WV Painkiller Lawsuits,” Charlston Gazette-Mail, January 9, 2017; Lenny Bernstein, “West Virginia Reaches $37 Million Opioid Settlement with Drug Shipper McKesson,” Washington Post, May 2, 2019.

10 Paxton told Paul his state was not going to be included: Interview with Paul Farrell.

11 On Saturday, tensions ran high: Interview with Jayne Conroy.

12 One was a video of five drug distribution company executives: Katie Zezima and Scott Higham, “Drug Executives to Testify before Congress about Their Role in U.S. Opioid Crisis,” Washington Post, April 12, 2018.

13 The other exhibit was the damning Austin Powers spoof: Exhibit in MDL No. 2804.

14 That night, Paul took his wife: Interview with Paul Farrell.

15 But that evening: Interviews with Paul Farrell, Joe Rice, and Paul Hanly.

16 Five hours later: Lenny Bernstein, Scott Higham, Sari Horwitz, and Aaron C. Davis, “Last-Ditch Opioid Settlement in Ohio Could Open Door for Much Larger Deal,” Washington Post, October 21, 2019.

17 Paul was thrilled by the amount of money: Interview with Paul Farrell.

Chapter 48: “This Can’t Be Real”

This chapter is based on interviews with Paul T. Farrell Jr. and Mark P. Pifko, along with emails between Farrell and Pifko, and emails between executives at AmerisourceBergen that are now part of MDL 2804, National Prescription Opiate Litigation.

1 At first, Paul Farrell thought someone had pranked him: Interview with Paul Farrell; Mark Pifko, email, 2020.

2 On September 13, 2012, Steve Mays: Email exchange between Steve Mays and Cathy Marcum.

3 The day after learning about the emails: Paul Farrell, email.

4 Polster had continued to push: Polster, court order.

5 Nothing in the “Pillbillies” email surprised Paul: Interview with Paul Farrell.

Chapter 49: “Every Nineteen Minutes”

This chapter is based on interviews with Eric Kennedy; the transcript of the deposition of John M. Gray taken on July 30, 2020; and articles in Law360 and the Cleveland Plain Dealer.

1 Eric Kennedy thought he could hold it together: Interview with Eric Kennedy; Deposition of John Gray.

2 Kennedy wasn’t sure if Gray knew: Interview with Eric Kennedy; Deposition of John Gray.

3 In 2015, heroin overdoses surpassed: CDC website.

4 In a series of missed opportunities: Scott Higham, Sari Horwitz, and Katie Zezima, “The Fentanyl Failure,” Washington Post, March 13, 2019; Sari Horwitz, Scott Higham, Steven Rich, and Shelby Hanssen, “Trump Administration Struggles to Confront the Fentanyl Crisis,” Washington Post, May 22, 2019; Sari Horwitz and Scott Higham, “The Flow of Fentanyl: In the Mail, over the Border,” Washington Post, August 23, 2019; Katie Zezima and Colby Itkowitz, “Flailing on Fentanyl,” Washington Post, September 20, 2019.

5 Fentanyl deaths continued to soar: Higham et al., “The Fentanyl Failure”; Horwitz et al., “Trump Administration Struggles”; Horwitz and Higham, “The Flow of Fentanyl”; Zezima and Itkowitz, “Flailing on Fentanyl.”

6 In 2020, as the Covid pandemic gripped the nation: CDC website.

7 Paul knew about Kennedy’s son: Interview with Paul Farrell.

8 Kennedy began by asking Gray: John Gray deposition.

9 Kennedy read Gray’s email: John Gray deposition.

10 That year, The Alliance had hired: Healthcare Distribution Alliance communications.

11 Gray said he couldn’t recall engaging RAND: John Gray deposition.

12 Rather than hire RAND: HDA communications.

13 Kennedy showed Gray an email: John Gray deposition.

14 Kennedy stood up from his conference table: Interview with Eric Kennedy.

Chapter 50: “We’re Going to Trial”

This chapter is based on U.S. district court trial transcripts, articles in Law360, and interviews with Paul T. Farrell Jr. and Jayne Conroy.

1 Few places in America were hit harder: City of Huntington v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation, et al., No. 3:17-cv-01362, Trial transcripts.

2 The living and the dead were Paul Farrell’s friends and neighbors: Interview with Paul Farrell.

3 Paul thought he could secure a trial: Interview with Paul Farrell.

4 Even though the judge was a lifelong Republican: Emily Field, “Judge with ‘West Virginia Grit’ Takes on 1st Opioid MDL Trial,” Law360, April 28, 2021.

5 Paul and Faber shared a love for their state: Interview with Paul Farrell.

6 Paul was so eager to secure a trial date: Interview with Paul Farrell.

7 Jayne Conroy was deeply troubled: Interview with Jayne Conroy.

8 Paul remained undeterred: Interview with Paul Farrell.

9 The case was scheduled to start: City of Huntington v. AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation, et al., No. 3:17-cv-01362, Docket.

10 On May 2, 2021: Interview with Paul Farrell.

11 The next morning at 9:30: Charleston trial transcripts.

12 “I’ve told my clients you are a student of history”: Charleston trial transcripts.

13 All three defense lawyers made many of the same points: Charleston trial transcripts.

14 Neither could Joe: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

Chapter 51: Death Threats

This chapter is based on U.S. district court trial transcripts, the Twitter feeds of Rex Chapman and Eric Eyre, and interviews with Paul T. Farrell Jr. and Jayne Conroy.

1 Paul Farrell had thought Judge Faber: Interview with Paul Farrell; Charleston trial transcripts.

2 Paul had planned to introduce several other incendiary emails: Interview with Paul Farrell; Charleston trial transcripts.

3 The way the trial was playing out: Interview with Jayne Conroy.

4 Following Zimmerman’s testimony: Lucas Manfield and Lauren Peace, “As Opioid Epidemic Raged, Drug Company Executives Made Fun of West Virginians,” Mountain State Spotlight, May 13, 2021.

5 Rex Chapman, a former University of Kentucky basketball phenom: Rex Chapman’s Twitter account.

6 On Monday, May 17: Interview with Paul Farrell.

7 Nicholas told the judge: Interview with Paul Farrell.

8 Eleven days later: Charleston trial transcripts.

9 Two days earlier, Paul Hanly died: Charleston trial transcripts; interviews with Jayne Conroy and Paul Farrell.

10 Several defense lawyers in the courtroom walked over: Interviews with Jayne Conroy and Paul Farrell.

11 In Cleveland, Judge Polster told a reporter: Katharine Q. Seelye, “Paul J. Hanly Jr., Top Litigator in Opioid Cases, Dies at 70,” New York Times, May 22, 2021.

12 The plaintiffs’ trial team was devastated: Interview with Jayne Conroy.

13 A few months earlier: Interview with Paul Farrell.

Chapter 52: “A Stunning Claim”

This chapter is based on U.S. district court trial transcripts and interviews with James Rafalski, Paul T. Farrell Jr., and members of the plaintiffs’ trial team.

1 For months, attorney Mike Fuller: Interview with James Rafalski.

2 On May 26, he took the stand: Interviews with James Rafalski and Paul Farrell; Charleston trial transcripts.

3 He was exhausted: Interview with James Rafalski.

Chapter 53: “Are You Ready?”

This chapter is based on U.S. district court trial transcripts and interviews with Joe Rannazzisi, Paul T. Farrell Jr., and plaintiffs’ trial team members.

1 Joe Rannazzisi couldn’t wait: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

2 As the two huddled in a corner: Interviews with Joe Rannazzisi and Paul Farrell.

3 The night before his testimony: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

4 Singer began her examination of Joe: Charleston trial transcripts.

5 When the trial resumed the next morning: Charleston trial transcripts.

6 Schmidt started off by attacking Joe: Charleston trial transcripts.

7 At that moment, Joe saw Schmidt’s eyes widen: Charleston trial transcripts; interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

Chapter 54: “Magic or Tragic”

This chapter is based on U.S. district court trial transcripts and interviews with Paul T. Farrell Jr. and plaintiffs’ trial team members.

1 For many members of the plaintiffs’ trial team: Interviews with plaintiffs’ trial team members.

2 After nearly three months: Interview with Paul Farrell.

3 At precisely nine that morning: Interview with Paul Farrell; Charleston trial transcripts.

4 It was Kearse’s turn: Interview with Paul Farrell; Charleston trial transcripts.

5 Each defense attorney was given two hours: Interview with Paul Farrell; Charleston trial transcripts.

6 Once inside, they began celebrating: Interview with Mountain State Spotlight reporter Eric Eyre.

7 Paul slowly walked away: Interview with Paul Farrell.

Epilogue

This chapter is based on interviews with Rich Bishoff, Paul Farrell, Jayne Conroy, Anthony Irpino, Pearl Robertson, Peter Mougey, Joe Rice, Mark Lanier, Mike Fuller, Joe Rannazzisi, Jim Geldhof, James Rafalski, Mimi Paredes, David Schiller, and Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, along with U.S. district court trial transcripts; state court rulings and verdicts in opioid trials in California, Oklahoma, and New York; the jury verdict against the pharmacy chains in federal court in Ohio; and court proceedings in the Purdue Pharma and Mallinckrodt bankruptcy cases.

1 When Rich Bishoff graduated: Interview with Rich Bishoff; Snodgrass Funeral Homes website.

2 The state’s coal industry: James A. Haught, “A Short History of Mining—and Its Decline—in West Virginia,” Register Herald, March 30, 2017; Eric Scheuch, “Life after Coal: The Decline and Rise of West Virginia Coal Country,” Columbia Climate School’s State of the Planet, August 7, 2020.

3 Two decades into his career: Interview with Rich Bishoff.

4 The biggest development came on February 25, 2022: Meryl Kornfield, “Major Drug Distributors and J&J Finalize Opioid Settlement, Launching Nationwide Funding,” Washington Post, February 25, 2022.

5 More than one hundred plaintiffs’ law firms: Interview with Peter Mougey.

6 It took nearly two years: Interview with Peter Mougey.

7 On July 21, the distributors and Johnson & Johnson: Meryl Kornfield and Lenny Bernstein, “Drug Distributors, Johnson & Johnson Reach $26 Billion Deal to Resolve Opioid Lawsuits,” Washington Post, July 21, 2021.

8 Mougey and other plaintiffs’ lawyers: Interviews with Peter Mougey and Jayne Conroy.

9 Every state had to devise: National Opioids Settlement, nationalopioidsettlement.com; Opioid Litigation Global Settlement Tracker, www.opioidsettlementtracker.com/globalsettlementtracker.

10 In a separate deal, hundreds of Native American tribes: Meryl Kornfield, “Native American Tribes Reach Landmark Opioid Deal with Johnson & Johnson, Drug Distributors for up to $665 Million,” Washington Post, February 1, 2022.

11 At the height of the epidemic: Sari Horwitz, Debbie Cenziper, and Steven Rich, “As Opioids Flooded Tribal Lands across the U.S., Overdose Deaths Skyrocketed,” Washington Post, June 29, 2020.

12 Paul’s case in Charleston was not included: Interview with Paul Farrell.

13 On November 1, Orange County Superior Court judge Peter Wilson: Nate Raymond, “California Judge Delivers Drugmakers 1st Trial Win in Opioid Litigation,” Reuters, November 2, 2021; Robert Jablon and Donald Thompson, “Orange County Judge Rules in Favor of Drugmakers in California Opioid Crisis Lawsuit,” Associated Press, November 2, 2021.

14 Just over a week later, on November 9: Meryl Kornfield and Lenny Bernstein, “Oklahoma Supreme Court Overturns Historic Opioid Ruling against J&J,” Washington Post, November 9, 2021.

15 “It was a big blow”: Interview with Jayne Conroy.

16 On November 23, 2021: Meryl Kornfield and Lenny Bernstein, “CVS, Walgreens, and Walmart Are Responsible for Flooding Ohio Counties with Pain Pills, Jury Says,” Washington Post, November 23, 2021.

17 At the conclusion of the six-week trial: Jan Hoffman, “CVS, Walgreens, and Walmart Fueled Opioid Crisis, Jury Finds,” New York Times, November 23, 2021.

18 After the trial, Lanier interviewed: Interview with Mark Lanier.

19 While Conroy savored the victory: Interview with Jayne Conroy.

20 The litigation has become a morass: Interview with Elizabeth Chamblee Burch.

21 On October 21, 2020, the Justice Department announced: “Justice Department Announces Global Resolution of Criminal and Civil Investigations with Opioid Manufacturer Purdue Pharma and Civil Settlement with Members of the Sackler Family,” Justice Department announcement, October 21, 2020; Meryl Kornfield, Christopher Rowland, Lenny Bernstein, and Devlin Barrett, “Purdue Pharma Agrees to Plead Guilty to Federal Criminal Charges in Settlement over Opioid Crisis,” Washington Post, October 21, 2020.

22 On December 16, 2021: Meryl Kornfield, “Judge Overturns Deal Giving Purdue Pharma’s Sackler Family Civil Immunity from Opioid Claims,” Washington Post, December 16, 2021.

23 “The bankruptcy court did not have the authority”: Statement by Attorney General Merrick B. Garland regarding Purdue Pharma Bankruptcy, Justice Department, December 16, 2021.

24 On January 3, 2022: Steven Church, “Purdue Judge Gives Sacklers until Jan. 14 to Negotiate New Deal,” Bloomberg, January 3, 2022.

25 Two months later, on March 3: Meryl Kornfield, “Sackler Family Members to Contribute up to $6 Billion in Latest Agreement to Resolve Opioid Claims,” Washington Post, March 3, 2022.

26 As part of the deal: Meryl Kornfield, “Opioid Victims Confront Purdue Pharma’s Sackler Family: ‘It Will Never End for Me,’” Washington Post, March 10, 2022.

27 In February 2020, the Ireland-based company: Katie Zezima and Katie Mettler, “Drug Manufacturer Mallinckrodt to Pay $1.6 Billion to Settle Opioid Claims,” Washington Post, February 25, 2020.

28 Since testifying in Charleston and Cleveland: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.

29 Mimi Paredes successfully sued: Interview with Mimi Paredes.

30 David Schiller, the lead DEA agent: Interview with David Schiller.

31 It’s been six years since Jim Geldhof retired: Interview with Jim Geldhof.

32 Since retiring from the DEA, James Rafalski: Interview with James Rafalski.

33 When Joe reflects on the cases: Interview with Joe Rannazzisi.