The Naxal movement was born in the little thatch-hut village of Naxalbari in north Bengal around 1967. The movement spread and soon became a serious threat to governance in the state. As the police could not handle the situation, the then Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi took a pragmatic decision in October 1969 to use the army.
Army Chief Sam Manekshaw and secretary to the goverment Govind Narayan, met me in Fort William, the Eastern Command Headquarters. They told me that since the police were unable to handle the Naxals, the army would have to do so. I told Manekshaw that it was not the army's job, and that the police should try harder.
Manekshaw then said that the police were unable to deal with the situation, and therefore Mrs Gandhi had directed that the army should be assigned the task, and that I was to be put in charge of the operations.
I then informed Manekshaw that though we had 20 Infantry Division near Naxalbari, we did not have sufficient troops south of the Ganga. I asked for two more divisions. Done, said Manekshaw, adding that he would be good to me and also allot the 50 Para Brigade. I then asked for orders in writing. Manekshaw replied that there could be nothing in writing; no publicity and no records were to be kept. Govind Narayan concurred.
By the end of 1969, 4 and 9 Infantry Divisions and 50 Para Brigade were moved into West Bengal.
We were fortunate that the Naxalite movement was in its nascent stages and that their cadres were not well equipped. Our major concern then was the attempts by the movement to infiltrate the left wing trade unions. We took preventive action and deployed troops in sensitive factory areas and also deployed them in the mofussil areas
Unfortunately, one of the founders of the movement, Charu Mazumdar, who was coming around to negotiating table, died in police custody in July 1972.
Intensive military operations were conducted, and by mid-1971 the Naxals were driven out of West Bengal. During this period two elections were held and the army was deployed right down to the polling booths to ensure free and fair voting.
Today, the Naxal insurgency has spread to cover a large swathe of the country, from the Tarai right down to the south. The state governments with their police and paramilitary forces have not been able to deal with it. There is not enough coordination between the various states. The insurgency is gaining momentum, and the situation is one of increasing concern.
The insurgency is spreading from the forests and mofussil and tribal areas to small urban pockets and soon likely to spread to towns and cities. In certain areas, the Naxals have infiltrated government institutions. The modernization of their weaponry, their intensive training, and their intelligence gathering capability is developing rapidly. They have links with other organizations, like the Maoists in Nepal and Bhutan and other insurgents in the north east. Pakistan's ISI is also likely, in case they have not done so already, to seize the opportunity to collaborate with them.
The Naxal pattern of operations is also likely to change from the rural areas to industries to urban complexes. They are already infiltrating trade unions and government institutions. They are likely in future to increasingly target infrastructure. Possible targets are the electricity distribution system (pylons, capacitors) road and rail communications, telephone radio relay, mobile phone towers and government institutions. They are already targeting prominent politicians and officials.
The army and air force had earlier been used in the 1920s to deal with the Moplah uprising. The air force was used by the British against the Faqir of Ipi in Sind in 1940 and also to bomb Mizo rebel camps, while the army was used in West Bengal against the Naxals.
The army is currently involved in counter-insurgency operations in Jammu & Kashmir as also in the north-east. These are precedents to employ the army and air force to conduct anti-Naxal operations.
Two factors are required to keep an insurgency going strong: bases and lines of supply for money, arms and ammunition. The strong bases are in the forests, the mofussil areas, and are now spreading to the towns. In some areas, the Naxals are running a parallel government and are collecting 'taxes'. They are obtaining weapons by seizing them from the police and paramilitary, and explosives and detonators from the mines. With such access to sources of finance, weapons, and explosives, the insurgency will continue to escalate.
This notwithstanding, the government (both at the central and state levels) as well as the armed forces, are not in favour of using the military to counter the Naxals, but are we prepared to let the situation escalate further?
Shakespeare's Hamlet is the tragedy of procrastination. Hamlet knew what he had to do, but kept on postponing it. Let future generations not say that we are the hamlets of our age. [Earlier published in a slightly different form by sify.com]