7
Meanwhile events were moving very rapidly in East Pakistan. The two wings of Pakistan, East and West, differed greatly both ethnically and also in density of population. The 1961 census figures of population showed East Pakistan to include ten million Hindus, and West Pakistan 43,000,000. They differed markedly in language and culture, East Pakistan, the former province of East Bengal, was culturally and linguistically more akin to West Bengal than to the Urdu and Punjabi culture and language of the western wing. The people of East Pakistan resented the dominance of the western wing, most feeling that the western wing was being developed at the expense of the eastern. Resentment against the western wing rose dramatically. In 1966 the announcement of the 'Six Points of sheikh Mujibur Rehman', the leader of the Awami League, in effect demanded provincial autonomy. In 1967, Mujib and some others were charged with secession, in a trial that was to be known as the Agartala Conspiracy Case. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, Gen. Yahya Khan replaced Gen. Ayub Khan and assumed control of the country.
Elections were held in 1970. sheikh Mujib's Awami League won 160 of the 162 seats in the east. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party won 81 of the 138 seats in the west. Bhutto rejected Mujib's six points and refused to share power with Mujib. In January 1971 Bhutto went to Dacca in order to work out a deal with Mujib but failed to do so.
Meanwhile, Pakistan secretly began reinforcing its army in the eastern wing via Sri Lanka. On 15 March, Yahya Khan arrived in Dacca to negotiate with Mujib. No agreement was reached and the meeting of the National Assembly was again postponed. Yahya replaced the commander in the east, Lt Gen. Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, who was sympathetic to the people of the east, with the ruthless Lt Gen. Tikka Khan. Incidentally Tikka Khan had been a student in August 1947 at the gunnery staff course I was conducting at the school of Artillery, Deolali before his move to Pakistan in November 1947.Yahya returned to the west leaving Tikka Khan to 'deal with the situation'. Tikka issued orders for a crackdown to start at 0100 on 26 March. Meanwhile Mujib issued a message calling on the people of East Pakistan to resist and drive out the Pakistanis.
Dacca was brought under the control of the army in a matter of hours In the course of an action in which several thousand Bangladeshis were slaughtered. Mujib was arrested in the early hours of 26 March and flown out to Karachi. A number of Bengali leaders escaped. Resistance was fierce, particularly at Dacca University. Meanwhile, in Chittagong, Major Ziaur Rehman took over command of his infantry battalion 8 East Bengal Regiment and seized the radio station. He broadcast from there was a declaration of independence. Major Zia resisted the Pakistan Army and withdrew his battalion to Belonia in the east. Meanwhile elements of the five battalions of the East Bengal Regiment began withdrawing to India.
On 31 March the Indian parliament, shocked by the atrocities committed, passed a resolution calling upon Pakistan to transfer power to the people of East Bengal. Meanwhile, refugees began initially trickling into India, and soon became a flood. In all, some 10 million eventually took refuge in India.
At the beginning of April, I received a telephone call from Gen. Manekshaw telling me that the government required the army to move immediately into East Pakistan. I was momentarily taken aback, although I had expected that we would at some stage be required to move into East Pakistan and had begun planning accordingly. However, to move in immediately was something that I had not expected as we did not have the wherewithal for the conduct of a swift military campaign. I told Manekshaw that we had mountain divisions which were not equipped or trained for riverine warfare. There were several very wide un-bridged rivers we would have to cross and that we lacked the bridging resources for this and had very limited motor transport. Furthermore, with the monsoon due to set in some weeks, the terrain would be virtually impassable. Manekshaw then said that he would get back to me. The next morning he spoke again saying the bureaucrats in Delhi were accusing the army of being cowardly. I retorted that he could tell them that it was the eastern army that was cowardly. He then demanded to know when we would be ready to move in. I replied that provided we got the troops and equipment we required, we could be ready by 15 November, as by then the terrain would have become more amenable. He responded that he would inform government accordingly.
Mrs Gandhi accompanied by Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram, Y.R. Chavan, and Defence secretary K.B. Lall were briefed in the operations room at army headquarters. I had sent a brief with Brig Adi sethna, the BGS at HQ Eastern Command. This was read out by General Sam Manekshaw. He turned to Mrs Gandhi, requesting postponement of operations till after 15 November, to which she agreed. Lt Col Sukhjit Singh GSO 1 Operation in the MO Directorate at Army HQ(later brigadier) was present at this meeting. There is no traceable record of any cabinet meeting as Manekshaw claimed.
The refugees continued to pour in. The defence minister, Jagjivan Ram, visited Calcutta but was unable to persuade the Communist - United Front Government to allot land for the refugee camps. The minister requested me to accompany him to attend a cabinet meeting in Writers' Building to persuade the state government to do so. After a long two-hour session the cabinet eventually agreed. Then Jagjivan Ram, an outstanding defence minister, hugged and thanked me profusely.
We were not getting much assistance from the United Front Government to obtain personnel to man the camps. A delegation from the RSS came to see me, volunteering to help; their contribution was invaluable. They also helped our troops to dig trenches. After the war they helped to repatriate the refugees.
A few days later I was visited at my residence by a delegation from the Border Security Force (BSF) headed by its Director General, K. Rustomji, accompanied by Golok Mazumdar (deputy inspector general) and Maj. Gen. Narinder Singh, who was then seconded to the BSF. They were in a jubilant mood. Rustomji then told me that as the army did not wish to throw the Pakistanis out of East Pakistan, the government had asked the BSF to do so. I thought he was joking and laughed. He then replied that the reason why he had come to see me was to invite me to attend the victory parade that he intended to hold in Dacca in couple of weeks or so. I told Rustomji that his forces would be thrown back in a couple of weeks and that he should instead aim to set up bases in the Sunderbans and Chittagong hill tracts. As I expected, about a fortnight later, I received a phone call from the BSF commander from the border post at Bongaon saying his forces had been surrounded a few miles inside East Pakistan. He added that he was about to be attacked by Pakistani tanks and that I should immediately send the army to assist him. I knew there were no tanks in that area, and that his intention was to get the eastern army prematurely involved. I then asked him whether a relief column could reach him, to which he replied in the affirmative. I then told him that if a column could reach him then he could very well return. I told him to fall back with elements of the East Bengal regiments, and that we would cover the final stages of the withdrawal with troops from our side of the border. Some six BSF personnel were captured and paraded by the Pakistanis in Dacca. This was a far cry from the victory parade planned by Rustomji!.
Pakistani artillery began shelling the retreating BSF and East Bengal units. Some shells landed on our side of the border. The acting Bangladesh Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed was scheduled to meet a British member of parliament at the customs post on the East Pakistan side of the border. Accompanied by Capt. 'Kaka' Sandhu, GSO 3 Operations of our HQ, I met Tajuddin at the customs post and apprised him of the impending approach of the Pakistan Army. He said he had to remain until the meeting was over. Sandhu and I organized elements of the East Bengal Regiment to provide security for the scheduled meeting. A protective cordon being placed around the customs post. The meeting went off as scheduled and Tajuddin left. We then supervised the withdrawal of the remaining elements of the BSF and East Bengal units. When I went to re-site one of the machine guns an East Bengal soldier laughingly told me that he had no ammunition. I had earlier had 7 Punjab, one of our infantry battalions deployed to cover the withdrawal. When the leading elements of the Pakistani forces approached the post, I directed the unit to stop them from taking over the post and removing the Bangladesh flag which was flying it. They opened fire and prevented the Pakistanis approaching the customs post and the Bangladesh flag continued to fly over the post right up to and after the cessation of hostilities. Despite the initial setback, the BSF played a significant role thereafter in the liberation of Bangladesh. They helped to train the Mukti Bahini; they, together with the CRP worked closely with the army and took part in many operations in peripheral areas right up to the cessation of hostilities. They deserve great credit for their contribution to our victory.
Meanwhile, in early April, a number of Bengali resistance leaders began arriving in Calcutta, prominent amongst them Tajuddin, Nazrul Islam, Mansur Ali, Qamaruzzaman, Col M.A.G. Osmani, and Wing Cmdr Khondkar. A 'Government in Exile' was established and located in a bungalow at 8 Theatre Road, Calcutta. I met with them and discussed a wide range of projections. They wanted to hold a meeting of some of the parliamentarians who had arrived at Baidyanath Tala, which they called Mujibnagar. I advised against this, suggesting that they take the example of Charles de Gaulle and the Free French Government during the second World War and proclaim a provisional government. Tajuddin asked me to give him a draft declaration. I prepared a short draft and gave it to him, and this was taken to some legal luminaries who expanded it and rewrote it in a legal format. This declaration was eventually issued on 17 April at Baidyanath Tala just within East Pakistan.
I felt that it would be advantageous to get the Bengali elements of the Pakistan Deputy High Commission in Calcutta to join the freedom movement. I asked our intelligence to make the necessary contacts. This Col Khara did. However, the staff of the Deputy High Commission wanted to have guarantees for their future service and pensions. I discussed this with Tajuddin and he agreed to their requests. At a meeting with Tajuddin and Rustomji, I told them that it would not be desirable for the army to continue with the operation and that it would be more appropriate for the BSF to do so. This was agreed to and the defection of the Bengali personnel of the Deputy High Commission took place. There was however to be an unfortunate repercussion. Mrs Gandhi learnt of it and congratulated Manekshaw on what the army had engineered. Manekshaw, who made out that he had orchestrated every move, was unaware of these events and screamed at J.S. Aurora for not briefing him. Aurora, who was also unaware of this matter, telephoned me at 10 p.m. demanding an explanation. I told him that this was an intelligence matter and that I had not informed anyone. I told him that if he was not satisfied he could get himself another chief of staff. The following morning I handed over to him a list of the names of officers I thought might be suitable replacements. He took the list and said he would speak to Manekshaw. I began preparing to hand over notes. Some hours later, Aurora entered my office and rather sheepishly told me that I was to stay on. I told him that I would not, under any circumstances, accept being spoken to in the manner he had done the night before. He then walked out. I had no further problems in this regard until the night of 13 December which I will relate later.
Earlier, at the end of March 1971, the Indian government had taken a decision to help the Mukti Bahini. Manekshaw spoke to me, placing me in direct charge of the operation. I got down to organizing camps in the border areas. I visualized a force of some 8000 trainees to be expanded to 20,000 and planned for a training period of some three months for the rank and file and an additional two months for junior leaders. I apprised Army HQ accordingly. After some weeks Manekshaw spoke to me, saying he did not agree with my projections and that he required 100,000 to be trained. I told him that it was beyond the capacity of our camps to train 100,000 guerillas and that it was essential that the training of recruits be thorough. Regarding the method of employment, I suggested that they be infiltrated back into East Pakistan to set up cells there and recruit others for operations. Manekshaw again disagreed. He retorted that three weeks training was sufficient. I responded that our camps were not sausage machines, with young raw recruits going through one end and emerging from the other as a competent guerilla. He responded that as I was incapable of training 100,000 to attack Pakistan fortified posts, he would send a competent general to do so. I waited for the officer who was being appointed to arrive. Meanwhile, Nambiar of the state Bank of India came to see me, asking me for accommodation to set up a bank to finance the equipping of the Mukti. I made available, on a temporary basis, a building in Fort William, which continues to be occupied by them. Maj. Gen. Onkar Singh Kalkat, a member of Manekshaw's inner circle, arrived. I briefed him and allotted him the necessary wherewithal to function. Manekshaw was very interested in the progress of the Mukti Bahini and would telephone on a daily basis to enquire about the number of lungis, rifles, and other items of equipment that were being issued, as also the numbers trained. Maj. Gen. Kalkat was at a loss to answer. Manekshaw then restarted phoning me for updates. I told him that as he had appointed a very capable officer for this task, he should talk to him. He then retorted that Kalkat was incapable of coping and I should answer. I told him that as Kalkat was working directly under the army commander and not me, he should talk to the former. After a short while the army commander entered my room through the interconnecting swing door looking very worried, saying that Manekshaw had spoken to him and made him responsible for overseeing Kalkat and to brief him daily on the progress of equipping as also of details of the operations of the Mukti Bahini. Aurora then told me that as he would have his hands full answering Manekshaw's queries, I could concentrate on planning and organizing the infrastructure, while he would concentrate on the army element of the Mukti Bahini. I was, however, to be responsible directly for the naval and air force components. This was indeed most fortunate for me, leaving me free to get on with operational and logistical planning without interference. The basic layout set up by me continued to function. Major Zia was to be in charge of the Chittagong sector, Major Khalid Musharaf for Comilla, Major Safiullah for Mymensingh, Wing Comdr Bashar for Rangpur, Lt Col Zaman for Rajshahi, Major Usman for Kushtia and Major Jalil for Khulna. Tiger Siddiqui was to operate from his own area of influence in Tangail.
Maj. Gen. Kalkat was unable to cope with the task assigned to him. He was a good conventional soldier but out of his depth in the environment that then obtained. Manekshaw replaced him with Maj. Gen. 'Jimmy' Sarcar. Sarcar was a soft-spoken Bengali, who spoke fluent Bengali, and unlike Kalkat was tactful and soon established a good rapport with the Mukti Bahini. I for my part continued to discretely oversee the operations.
The seniormost Bengali Pakistan Army officer to defect, Col Osmani, was difficult to deal with. He preferred to concentrate on raising and equipping regular infantry battalions rather than giving priority to the guerrilla-style Mukti Bahini and their operations. I had wanted Osmani and his battalions to be concentrated around Mymensingh to the north of Dacca, to form a firm base for what was in my view the best approach to Dacca. Osmani was opposed to this and I was unable to dissuade him. His home was in the Sylhet area and he preferred to concentrate his battalions there. He got his way and moved his battalions from the north to the east, thus denuding the area of troops that I had visualized as forming the base for the thrust on Dacca.
We were not getting positive coverage in support of the freedom movement from the international press which was sceptical about the reported atrocities. It was essential for us to have a sympathetic and supportive international press, because favourable international opinion was an important prerequisite for the successful pursuit of our mission to liberate Bangladesh from the Pakistani yoke. I asked Brig. Sethna to concentrate on the Indian press while I would handle the foreign press. I briefed Nicholas Tomalin of the Sunday Times and helped him with his first piece, which dealt with the atrocities of the Pakistan Army. Tomalin was an outstanding war correspondent who took risks and went into East Pakistan to see things for himself. He was later killed on the Golan Heights, reporting, as always, from the front. Sydney Schanberg from the New York Times was another outstanding war correspondent, and was sympathetic to the Bengali freedom struggle. Schanberg later became editor of the New York Times. He was involved in events in Cambodia, and his authoritative book, The Killing Fields, was a best-seller and later made into a movie. Later, during our advance into East Pakistan, Schanberg walked with our advancing troops from the east all the way to Dacca. There were others too. Allan Hart of the BBC went into East Pakistan and filmed some of the atrocities perpetrated there. We sent in a Granada television team with Gita Mehta (daughter of Orissa politician Biju Patnaik) and Vanya Kewley. The team went in from the east and produced some startling footage. There were other famous correspondents, Tony Clifton of Newsweek, Gavin Young of the Sunday Observer, and Simon Winchester, among others. I spent a considerable amount of time briefing some of them. The international press correspondents were initially lukewarm in their coverage, but with the passage of time they exposed the atrocities committed. When war broke out the international press was almost entirely supportive of the freedom struggle in Bangladesh. Due credit must be given to these brave correspondents for highlighting the atrocities and thus generating support for the liberation of Bangladesh. Unfortunately our ministers and bureaucrats have yet to learn how to handle the international press much to the detriment of our interests.
Unfortunately, we did not have a proper infrastructure for the conduct of war at the highest level. The chiefs of staff of the army, navy, and air force chair the Chief of staffs Committee by rotation, their tenure dependant on the remaining period they have to serve, which may in some cases be a few weeks. The chairman has little say in the affairs of the other two services which are autonomous. Much depends on the personalities of the service chiefs, their equation with the defence minister and to a lesser extent with the prime minister. The defence secretary, an officer of the India Administrative service, has no operational responsibility and is generally not briefed on operational plans. However, the 'babus' in South Block feel that civil control of the armed forces means civil service control. I had to tell them on more than one occasion that they were government servants and not the government, which comprised the elected members of the cabinet.
Unfortunately, the equation between the army and air force chiefs at service Headquarters was less than cordial. The army and air force chiefs were not on speaking terms. The air chief of staff, Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lall was a competent professional officer. My problem was that I had to deal with two air force command headquarters, one in Shillong and the other in Allahabad, both several hundred miles away. Dealing day to day with one distant Air Force Command HQ was difficult enough, with two, well nigh impossible. I asked Manekshaw to speak to Lall to rationalize this by redrawing the boundaries so that we would only have to deal with one Air Force Command Headquarters. Manekshaw declined, saying that he could not speak to Lall. Fortunately, I was able to meet Lall and apprise him of our difficulties. I also asked him to locate an advanced headquarters of the air force at Fort William in order to facilitate our day-to-day dealings on operational matters, as Shillong was a long way off. Lall said he would examine the matter. A few days later he altered the boundaries so that we only had to deal with one air force command headquarters in Shillong. He also authorized the formation of an advanced headquarters at Fort William commanded by an air commodore. Lall was a very competent, pragmatic officer with vision.
We had very little reliable intelligence of the Pakistani military order of battle and topography. The small-scale maps we had of East Pakistan were over 50 years old and completely out of date. We asked the Mukti Bahini to get us up to date Pakistani maps and they handed over to us complete map coverage of East Pakistan. I took the maps down to the survey of India's office in Park street, Calcutta. The survey of India staff were most helpful and reproduced the maps as they were. We were able to distribute them to all concerned well before the commencement of operations. The survey of India at Calcutta undertook this project without obtaining the prior sanctions required, and these were subsequently regularized. No lesson seems to have been learnt from this. In 1987 the army went into Sri Lanka without proper maps, and this had an adverse effect on the conduct of operations. Further, for the Sri Lanka operations, Chief of the Army staff Gen. K. Sunderji advised the government that he would complete his mission in 72 hours! Forces were committed piecemeal and the operation proved to be infructuous.
We began obtaining topographical data with particular emphasis on rivers, tides, bridging sites, ferries, rail and water communication. The corps of engineers branch at the Eastern Command HQ then compiled this data into a topographical manual. We knew little about the ports. Fortunately I had a friend in the shipping business who had earlier worked in Chittagong and Mangla Chalna and got him to brief the director of naval intelligence on the ports and anchorages.
We got very little hard intelligence from the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), and they actually provided us with just two half sheets of data during the entire period. We therefore had to build up intelligence on the Pakistani order of battle and the location of their units. Pakistani reinforcements to East Pakistan were arriving by air via Sri Lanka and we were unable to identify them. In April and May, I was badgering the director of Military intelligence (DMi), Maj. Gen. Batra at Army HQ to place the signal intelligence units in the east under our operational control. The DMI maintained that we at eastern army command were not competent to process and evaluate what he called 'raw information', and that he and his staff would pass on to us what they considered to be relevant. So far we had received very little from the Military intelligence Directorate. His negative approach was frustrating because we could not work without immediate access to signal intercepts. I then spoke to Gen. Manekshaw, promising him that if he placed the units under our command we would give copies of intercepts to the DMI, the navy, and the airforce. Manekshaw agreed and placed the signal intelligence units directly under us. Eastern Command was the only army regional command to have this privilege. We redeployed the units and were not only able to intercept traffic between East and West Pakistan but were able to re-construct the complete order of battle of the Pakistani Army in the east. We were also able to break the Pakistani naval code, that had remained unchanged for months, and to take pre-emptive action. One particular intercept in the later stages of the war was to have serious consequences. The intercept indicated a rendezvous for river craft at Gupta Crossing on the Meghna river. Manekshaw interpreted this to indicate that elements of the Pakistan Army were attempting to flee to Burma. I argued with him that these were not sea-going craft and that in any case there were no sizeable numbers of troops that could be evacuated to Burma. He then ordered Maj. Gen. Inder Gill (director of military operations at Army HQ) to broadcast that he, Manekshaw, knew what they were up to at Gupta Crossing. I requested Gill not to broadcast this message as it would compromise our code-breaking. He, however, was unable to persuade Manekshaw. The broadcast was made and the Pakistan Navy immediately changed their code. subsequently we were unable to read any further naval wireless traffic.
On 1 December 1971 we intercepted a message from West to East Pakistan regarding a warning to merchant shipping not to enter the Bay of Bengal and restricting civilian aircraft from flying near the Indian borders. We also intercepted signals from the submarine Ghazi off Sri Lanka right up to 27 November off Vishakhapatnam. We passed these on the Army Headquarters, the navy, and air force. These intercepts indicated that Pakistan intended to attack India in the course of the next few days. It was perhaps due to this prior information that the Pakistani attacks on our airfields on 3 December were anticipated and therefore only minor damage was inflicted to our air fields and planes.