CHAPTER TWENTY
In Palestine, two underground Jewish organisations, the Irgun and the Stern Gang – the former led by a future Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin – had begun to pursue a campaign of assassination against British Mandate officials and soldiers, hoping thereby to drive the British out of Palestine. They also killed fellow Jews who sought actively to oppose them. Of the forty-two people assassinated by the Stern Gang, more than half were Jews. In February, two British police officers were killed in Haifa. In March, three British policemen were killed in Tel Aviv and three more in Haifa. In August 1944 the Stern Gang made a failed attempt to kill Sir Harold MacMichael, the British High Commissioner; during the attack both his aide-de-camp and his police driver were wounded.
The Jewish Agency rejected terror as a means of advancing the Zionist cause. Within a few days of the assassination attempt on MacMichael, Churchill was informed that, at the insistence of Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, the Agency was co-operating closely with the Mandate authorities to find the would-be killers, their organisers and their weapons.
On 27 September an Irgun force estimated at 150 attacked four British police stations. Two days later, a senior British police officer of the Criminal Intelligence Department was assassinated while walking to his office in Jerusalem. The Jewish Agency and the British authorities worked closely to end these acts of terror. During the course of this co-operation, known to the Jews of Palestine as the ‘Season’ – the hunting season – the Jewish Agency’s defence force, the Haganah, helped the British to secure the arrest of three hundred Irgun and Stern Gang members; 251 of them were deported to detention camps in British-controlled Eritrea and Sudan.
Weizmann knew that each act of Jewish terrorism would strike a blow at his attempts to persuade the British Government, by argument and negotiation, to secure a Jewish State in Palestine once the war was ended. Churchill accepted Weizmann’s assurances that terrorism was not the path chosen by the Jews of Palestine or by the Zionist movement in their search for statehood.
In October 1944, while in Cairo, Churchill attended a conference on the post-war future of the Middle East. On 20 October he told the conference that, while ‘the Arabs have done nothing for us except to revolt in Iraq,’ he did not want to upset the Arabs in Syria, who were seeking independence from France, ‘because of the pill – Zionism – which he knew they would have to swallow in Palestine.’1
On 4 November 1944, after Churchill had returned to London, Weizmann was invited to Chequers to discuss the future of Palestine over lunch. The meeting marked a decisive moment in the direction that Zionist diplomacy would take. When Weizmann asked Churchill to make a public statement about setting up a Jewish State in Palestine after the war, Churchill replied that he could make ‘no pronouncement just now,’ nor would he be able to say anything ‘until the end of the German war, which might take from three to six months.’ He then warned Weizmann that, as Prime Minister, he had ‘little support in the Conservative Party’ for the idea of a Jewish State.
When Weizmann replied that he had heard that opinion in the Conservative Party was ‘veering round’ on Palestine, Churchill replied that it might be so, but it was a slow process, and he would have to ‘speak to them on the subject.’ Churchill then told Weizmann that he had been rather struck by the opposition to Zionism among certain Jews in the United States, and mentioned the name of Bernard Baruch. In reply, Weizmann said that there might be a few rich and powerful Jews who were still against Zionism, but that these Jews ‘did not know very much about the subject.’ He would like to repeat to Churchill what he had once said to Balfour, that Balfour ‘met the wrong type of Jews.’ Smiling at this, Churchill reiterated that still there were some Jews who were opposed to Zionism, and again mentioned Baruch. Those Jews who were against Zionism, Weizmann replied, had also been those who were against Roosevelt and Churchill. Churchill commented that Weizmann was right, and that he, Churchill, knew it.
Churchill told Weizmann that if opponents of Zionism in the Conservative Party started talking in the same way as the military, ‘it only hardened his heart.’ But he would still like to have as much support as he could get. Weizmann then asked what truth there was in the rumours he had heard about a Partition scheme for Palestine that would give the Jews ‘merely a beach-head – or a bathing beach – in Tel Aviv.’ Such rumours, Churchill said, were ‘a pack of lies.’ He had seen Field Marshal Lord Gort, the distinguished soldier who would succeed Sir Harold MacMichael as High Commissioner for Palestine, and had told Gort how he felt about the matter.
As to the details of any partition, Churchill commented, he, too, was for the inclusion of the Negev in any Jewish State, as was Weizmann. If the Jews could get the ‘whole of Palestine,’ Churchill added, ‘it would be a good thing.’ But if it came to a choice between no State at all, and Partition, then they should take Partition.
American Jews, Churchill told Weizmann, must give active support, and not merely criticism. If he and Roosevelt were to meet at the conference table, they would ‘get what they wanted’ for the Jews of Palestine.
Weizmann then indicated the kind of speech he thought Churchill might make to the Arabs. Churchill replied that he had already spoken in that way, but that Roosevelt and he would do it again. Churchill then referred to Jewish terrorism in Palestine, in particular the recent murder of British soldiers, but, as Weizmann’s record of the discussion noted, Churchill ‘had not laboured the point.’
Churchill also promised Weizmann that in everything concerning the future of Palestine, the Zionist leader would be consulted, and he asked Weizmann whether it was the Zionists’ intention ‘to bring in large numbers of Jews into Palestine?’ Weizmann replied in the affirmative, telling Churchill that they had in mind something like 100,000 or more Jews a year for some fifteen years. Churchill asked whether that meant something like one-and-a-half million Jews, to which Weizmann replied that this was so ‘in the beginning.’
Weizmann also spoke of the large numbers of Jewish children in Europe who would have to be brought to Palestine after the war, to which Churchill replied ‘that it would be for the Governments to worry about the children.’ He then mentioned financial aid, whereupon Weizmann told him that ‘if the political field were clear then the financial problem would become one of secondary importance.’
The luncheon was over. It had been, Weizmann noted, ‘a long and most friendly conversation.’ Churchill took Weizmann to his study, and repeated his three themes: nothing would happen until the end of the war; he was in close touch with the Americans on the subject; and Weizmann would be consulted. Churchill seemed worried, Weizmann noted, that America ‘was more or less academic’ in its attitude, and that he, Churchill, was not supported in the Conservative Party. Nor, Weizmann noted, did Churchill ‘think much of the Arabs and their attitude to the war.’
Weizmann wanted to show Churchill a map in order to make his points against Partition, but Churchill, who was confident of his own grasp of the geographic aspects and did not want just then to be drawn into such details, countered, to Weizmann’s disappointment, by saying ‘that he did not want to study maps with Dr Weizmann.’ At one stage in the conversation Churchill mentioned that he had a committee sitting on the Palestine problem, on which were ‘all their friends’: Sir Archibald Sinclair, and ‘the Labour people.’
During their luncheon Churchill had told Weizmann that Lord Moyne, then Minister Resident in Cairo – a man believed by the Zionists to be totally opposed to their aspirations for statehood – had come round to Churchill’s way of thinking with regard to the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine after the war. Churchill was emphatic that Moyne had ‘changed and developed in the past two years’, and advised Weizmann to go to Cairo as soon as possible to see Moyne and discuss the future of Palestine with him.2 The British Government would arrange air transport.
Weizmann, relieved to learn of Moyne’s change of heart, readily agreed to go. But twenty-four hours after Weizmann left Chequers, and before he could set off for Cairo, two Jewish terrorists, Eliahu Bet-Zouri and Eliahu Hakim, members of the Stern Gang, attacked Moyne’s car outside his home in Cairo, killing Moyne and his driver.
Churchill was deeply distressed by the murder of one of his close friends. As Walter Guinness, Lord Moyne had been his Financial Secretary at the Treasury twenty years earlier. In reporting Moyne’s murder to the War Cabinet on 6 November, Churchill suggested that the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Stanley, should see Weizmann ‘and impress upon him that it was incumbent on the Jewish Agency to do all in their power to suppress these terrorist activities.’3 Speaking in the House of Commons of his grief, Churchill noted that during the past year Moyne had ‘devoted himself to the solution of the Zionist problem,’ and he added, ‘I can assure the House that the Jews in Palestine have rarely lost a better or more well-informed friend.’4
As Churchill prepared a formal statement for Parliament on Moyne’s murder, he was pressed by Oliver Stanley either to suspend Jewish immigration to Palestine altogether, or to threaten to suspend it unless all terrorism ceased. Churchill was reluctant to take either course, writing to Stanley a few hours before he was due to speak in the House of Commons: ‘Will not suspension of immigration or a threat of suspension simply play into the hands of the extremists? At present, the Jews generally seem to have been shocked by Lord Moyne’s death into a mood in which they are more likely to listen to Dr Weizmann’s counsels of moderation. The proposed announcement would come as a shock of a different kind and, so far from increasing their penitence, may well provide a not unwelcome diversion and excite bitter outcry against the Government.’
If immigration were suspended, Churchill pointed out, ‘Dr Weizmann will no doubt join in the protests (saying that the whole community are being punished for the acts of a small minority), but the initiative in such a situation will pass to the extremists. Thus those responsible for the murder will be themselves the gainers. It may well unite the whole forces of Zionism and even Jewry throughout the world against us instead of against the terrorist bands.’
The situation certainly called for ‘signal action’, Churchill told Stanley, ‘but should it not be more clearly directed against that section of the community with whom the responsibility lies – e.g. by enforcing even more drastic penalties in the case of those found in possession of firearms or belonging to proscribed societies? In particular, might not action be taken against the nominally respectable leaders of the party, whose extremist wing are the authors of these political crimes? If their national status is non-Palestinian, they might be deported: if Palestinian they should be banished.’5
As Churchill wished, the rules on immigration remained unchanged; indeed, an increasing number of Jewish survivors of the atrocities in eastern Romania were at that very moment being allowed to proceed by train from Istanbul to Palestine. Although Churchill would allow no punitive measures against the Jewish community, he spoke strongly in a statement in the House of Commons on 17 November of the impact of ‘a shameful crime which has shocked the world and has affected none more strongly than those like myself who, in the past, have been consistent friends of the Jews and constant architects of their future. If our dreams for Zionism are to end in the smoke of assassins’ pistols, and our labours for its future to produce only a new set of gangsters worthy of Nazi Germany, many like myself would have to reconsider the position we have maintained so consistently and so long in the past.’
There were cheers from many members. Churchill continued: ‘If there is to be any hope of a peaceful and successful future for Zionism these wicked activities must cease, and those responsible for them must be destroyed, root and branch.’ There were further cheers. Churchill then told the House: ‘I have received a letter from Dr Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization – a very old friend of mine – who has arrived in Palestine, in which he assures me that Palestine Jewry will go to the utmost limit of its power to cut out this evil from its midst. In Palestine, the Executive of the Jewish Agency has called upon the Jewish community – and I quote his actual words – “to cast out the members of this destructive band, deprive them of all refuge and shelter, to resist their threats, and render all necessary assistance to the authorities in the prevention of terrorist acts and in the eradication of the terrorist organisation”. These are strong words, but we must wait for these words to be translated into deeds. We must wait to see that not only the leaders but every man, woman, and child of the Jewish community does his or her best to bring this terrorism to a speedy end.’
These remarks were met by what the parliamentary record noted as ‘Loud cheers.’ The primary responsibility for destroying the terrorists, Churchill stressed, lay with the British authorities in Palestine, who had already, two weeks before Moyne’s murder, arrested and deported 251 Jews suspected of terrorist activities. But even though the primary responsibility was that of the government, Churchill added, full success depended upon the ‘wholehearted’ co-operation of the entire Jewish community, a co-operation the British Government was entitled to demand and to receive.6
Unknown to Churchill, on 16 December Eliahu Golomb, the head of the underground forces of the Haganah, which had denounced the murder of Lord Moyne and was working closely with the British to halt Jewish terrorism, met secretly with Nathan Friedman-Yellin, a member of the Stern Gang’s ruling triumvirate. Two Stern Gang members were then on trial for Moyne’s murder, and the triumvirate wanted to carry out some spectacular act of warning and reprisal. One possibility being discussed was to assassinate Churchill himself. After a stormy discussion, Friedman-Yellin promised Golomb that the Stern Gang would not make any attempts on Churchill’s life.7
The continuing acts of Jewish terror inside Palestine, not only against the British but also in a mounting spiral of violence against the Arabs, could not completely be curbed by the Jewish Agency. Churchill was under pressure to send British reinforcements to Palestine, and also to Syria where local Arabs were fighting the French. But with British troops engaged in trying to prevent a Communist takeover in Greece, he declined to do so, writing to the head of his Defence staff, General Ismay, on 28 January 1945: ‘As long as we keep our troops well concentrated, a certain amount of local faction fighting can be tolerated and we can march in strength against the evil-doers. I am therefore not admitting the need of great reinforcements. Suppose a lot of Arabs kill a lot of Jews or a lot of Jews kill a lot of Arabs, or a lot of Syrians kill a lot of French or vice versa, this is probably because they have a great desire to vent their spite upon each other. Our attitude should be one of concentration and reserve. We really cannot undertake to stop all these bloodthirsty people slaying each other if that is their idea of democracy and the New World. The great thing is to hold on to the important strategic places and utter wise words in sonorous tones. I should like to think it very likely that there would be civil wars in these countries unless they are stopped by a series of decrees from the three victorious Great Powers. We are getting uncommonly little out of our Middle East encumbrances and paying an undue price for that little.’ Having vented his frustration, Churchill told Ismay: ‘The above obiter dicta are not to go beyond you.’8
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The assassins of Lord Moyne were brought to trial in Egypt. Churchill followed the case closely. ‘Everyone would be in favour of these two assassins having a fair trial,’ he wrote to Eden, ‘but if they are found guilty of having murdered Walter Moyne and are not put to death with all proper despatch by the Egyptian Government, I cannot measure the storm that will arise.’9
Moyne’s murderers were found guilty. When, almost two months later, Churchill learned they had not yet been executed, he telegraphed to the British Ambassador to Egypt: ‘I hope you will realise that unless the sentences duly passed upon the assassins of Lord Moyne are executed, it will cause a marked breach between Great Britain and the Egyptian Government. Such a gross interference with the course of justice will not be compatible with the friendly relations we have established. As they may be under pressure from Zionist and American Jewry, I think it right to let you know my personal views on the matter. You will no doubt use the utmost discretion and propriety in anything you may do. I have no reason of course to believe that the law will not be allowed to take its course and only send you this for greater assurance.’10
‘It is of the utmost importance,’ Churchill telegraphed to the ambassador again, from the Crimea, on 12 February, ‘that both assassins should be executed,’ and he instructed the ambassador to make ‘an instant complaint’ at the delay.11 The executions duly took place.
Angered and dismayed though Churchill was by Lord Moyne’s murder, he refused to allow it to deflect him from his Zionist sympathies. When the question of Moyne’s successor arose, it was Churchill who personally turned down two Colonial Office nominees, Lord Selborne and Lord Winterton, senior Conservatives with long experience of government and administration, both of whom, he soon found out, were hostile to the idea of a Jewish State in Palestine.
* * *
In December 1944 Churchill flew from Britain to Greece, seeking to halt a Moscow-inspired Communist insurgency, and to persuade the Greek Communists to join a national government. To give his arguments the backing of force, he proposed moving a complete division of British troops, twelve thousand men, from Palestine to Greece. ‘This of course would mean,’ he pointed out to the War Office, ‘that no violent action could be taken in Palestine, irritating the Jews, such as the search for arms on a large scale, until the situation is easier all round.’12
Conscious of the strong Conservative opposition to any future Jewish State in Palestine, and aware that his own views carried almost no weight with the Party of which he had been the leader since the autumn of 1940, Churchill advised Weizmann to go to the United States to win the support of the President and Congress. In a top-secret report, dated December 1944, the London office of the Washington-based Office of Strategic Services (OSS) noted that when Weizmann reached the United States he intended to see Roosevelt and representatives of the government ‘with a view to seeking their aid for the prosecution of his plans. Mr Churchill himself, he said, had recommended him to adopt this course.’13
Churchill’s instinct was right: Weizmann did indeed find more support in political circles in the United States than he had found in Britain, but despite Churchill’s assurance to Weizmann that if Churchill and Roosevelt were to meet at the conference table ‘they would get what they wanted’ for the Jews of Palestine, even Roosevelt – unknown to Churchill – was about to change his mind about supporting the Zionist hopes of statehood.