Chapter 5

FROM BLACKLOW HILL TO BANNOCKBURN: JUNE 1312 TO JUNE 1314

AFTER GAVESTON'S DEATH

According to the Vita Edwardi Secundi, the king was deeply saddened and grieved when he heard the news of Gaveston's death, but commented that Gaveston was foolish to let himself fall into the hands of the earls. Some reacted with derision to the king's moderation. But the author added that he was certain that ‘the king grieved for Piers as a father at any time grieves for his son. For the greater the love, the greater the sorrow.’ Edward's apparent moderation however concealed a determination to destroy Gaveston's killers when the opportunity arose.¹ There was no doubting the depth of Edward's grief for Gaveston, whose embalmed body, dressed in cloth of gold, remained where it lay in the house of the Dominicans in Oxford. During June and July 1312 it was watched over by Thomas de London and Philip de Eyndon who had been appointed by the king and by Gaveston's widow, Margaret de Clare.² Edward II also dealt generously with Gaveston's widow and children. Margaret, who was Edward's niece, was granted lands worth 2,000 marks a year in September 1312; while Gaveston's daughter Joan was brought up among the nuns at Amesbury in Wiltshire, a convent with the closest of royal associations since the time of Eleanor of Provence. A suitably aristocratic marriage was also arranged later for Joan. Amy, another, and probably illegitimate, daughter of Gaveston, was to serve as a lady of the bedchamber for both Queen Isabella and Queen Philippa.³

The political situation in the summer of 1312 was very tense, with a real danger of civil war. The immediate effect of Gaveston's death, regarded by some as a judicial execution and by others as an act of murder,⁴ was to divide the magnates. The earls of Lancaster, Warwick and Hereford and their supporters withdrew to Worcester to make their own plans, in case it came to open warfare.⁵ Here, on 3 July, Henry de Percy, one of the three magnates who had accepted Gaveston's surrender at Scarborough, formally threw in his lot with them.⁶ The other two, the earls of Pembroke and Surrey, allied themselves definitively with the king, whom they had rejoined in Lincolnshire by 6 July.⁷ Until Edward's defeat at Bannockburn in June 1314 Pembroke was to be the most prominent and influential member of the king's council.⁸

The king's own strong inclination was to fight.⁹ Some of his advisers, notably the earl of Pembroke, ‘whose interest it was to vanquish the earls’, Hugh Despenser a councillor of long standing ‘who was perhaps even less deserving than Piers’, Henry de Beaumont another controversial figure whose removal from court had been ordered by the Ordainers, Edmund Mauley steward of the royal household, and some of Gaveston's former knights were in favour of attacking the magnates. Allegedly they argued that the king ‘would surely triumph since he was lawfully striving for his rights’ against faithless men who could not be victorious.¹⁰ If Edward had decided to fight, he could have called on the immediate services of his own household knights, numbering nearly fifty in 1312, as well as the retinues of the earls of Pembroke and Surrey and others.¹¹ Some warned of the dangers to the kingdom if the king embarked on open civil war: he might be captured by his enemies and even if he defeated the earls, this would benefit only Robert Bruce who had already occupied the whole of Scotland and would soon have forced Northumbria to pay tribute.¹²

Edward first made sure of the loyalty and security of the city of London.¹³ Stopping briefly at the earl of Pembroke's castle of Hertford, the king rode into London on about 20 July and summoned the mayor and citizens before him and his council at Blackfriars, the house of the London Dominicans. Here the king personally delivered a powerful speech. ‘These are wondrous times’ (Le secle se mene mervylousement), he said; the magnates were in arms against him; he ordered the mayor and citizens to pledge to hold the city for him; and threatened that, if they were unable or unwilling to do so, the king's men would do it for them. After a day's debate the mayor, aldermen and the entire community of London came before the king and promised that they would not open the gates of the city to the king's enemies. Whereupon the king complimented them on their loyalty, they acknowledged him and left.¹⁴

Hoping that London was secured, in early August Edward went to Dover,¹⁵ where he fortified the castle and took the fealty of the Cinque Ports.¹⁶ This was presumably to ensure diplomatic and potentially also military communications with France, as well as local defence. On 16 August, as the opposition earls were advancing towards London,¹⁷ he ordered the constables of Oxford and Wallingford castles to raise as many foot soldiers as they could and bring them to London on 27 August; some men were also summoned from the county of Ponthieu in France.¹⁸

Having ensured that he could defend himself against a possible baronial attack, Edward decided to gain his revenge upon Lancaster and his allies by political and diplomatic means. On 4 August Edward summoned the earls of Lancaster, Hereford and Warwick, in their capacity as former Ordainers, to appear before him at Westminster or London on 27 August ‘to treat of the Ordinances and to correct the same’. He claimed that some of the Ordinances were damaging and prejudicial to him as king while others went beyond the powers of the commission given to the Ordainers in 1310.¹⁹

At about the same time Edward enlisted papal and French aid in his attack on the Ordinances. The embassies which he had sent to the papal curia in October 1311 and February 1312 had already resulted in the appointment in May 1312 of two envoys, Arnaud Nouvel cardinal-priest of St Prisca and Arnaud d'Aux bishop of Poitiers (soon to become cardinal-bishop of Albano), with authority to restore peace in England and with specific powers to annul the Ordinances.²⁰ These two envoys reached London on 29 August and were to play an important mediating role in English affairs during the coming months.²¹ On 6 August Edward had sent three more envoys to the pope. The purpose of this mission is not stated but it probably marked the beginning of the negotiations, concluded in 1314, for a large papal loan which helped for a time to give Edward some financial security.²²

Edward had already sent an embassy to France in the middle of May, just before Gaveston's surrender at Scarborough.²³ Now, on 6 August, he sent two of his closest baronial allies, the earl of Pembroke and Henry de Beaumont, to visit Philip IV.²⁴ Their business, which they also explained to the papal envoys who were still in France awaiting an opportunity to cross to England, was not described specifically but there is little doubt that it too concerned the earl of Lancaster and the Ordinances. On 17 August Pembroke and Beaumont rejoined the king at Faversham in Kent, bringing with them two of Philip IV's clerks, William de Novo Castro and Master Raymond Subiran.²⁵ They were soon supplemented by a French envoy, Count Louis of Évreux, the half-brother of Philip IV and already well known in England, who arrived in London on 13 September.²⁶ Like their papal counterparts, the French clerks and envoy were to play an important part in the negotiations between Edward and the English magnates.²⁷

The magnates were not however prepared to allow Edward to gain his ends by diplomacy. They were no doubt well aware of the precedents set by Louis IX in the Mise of Amiens of 1264 and by Clement V in 1305 and did not want a repetition of either.²⁸Instead of attending the opening of parliament on 20 August, Lancaster and the others kept both their distance and their armed retainers. They had no intention of discussing the Ordinances either then or on 27 August. Instead the baronial army advanced as far as Ware in Hertfordshire, where they halted and remained for two weeks.²⁹ It is not clear whether the army then advanced further, but there was evidently a fear that they would do so and perhaps even occupy London.³⁰ In order to prevent this, the bishops of Norwich and Bath & Wells, and the earl of Richmond were ordered on 3 September to prohibit the earls of Lancaster, Warwick and Hereford from appearing armed before the king.³¹

There was good reason to fear a Lancastrian entry into London. Despite Edward's words to its citizens in July, the city was still extremely volatile. Suspecting that some of the Londoners were preparing to open the gates to Lancaster, the constable of the Tower of London, John Cromwell, arrested and imprisoned several of them in the Tower.³² On 20 September, after the king had withdrawn to Windsor, the earl of Pembroke, Hugh Despenser, Edmund Mauley the steward of the royal household, Nicholas de Segrave the marshal of the household, and John Cromwell went to the Guildhall to ask for further security for holding the city against the king's enemies. The citizens replied that they had already given their word and need do no more, and then produced a list of complaints against the steward, the marshal and Cromwell. Pembroke and the others promised to deal with these matters at Westminster the following day, but as they were leaving a riot broke out when it was falsely rumoured that they intended to arrest John de Gisors, the mayor of London, and they barely escaped without injury. That night Cromwell sent members of the Tower garrison to attack the Tower ward, to which the Londoners responded by destroying the wall of an enclosure next to the Tower and arresting Cromwell's men. When the mayor appeared before the council at Westminster the following day, Pembroke and the other councillors accused the citizens of having attacked the enclosure in order to break open the Tower prison and loot the royal treasury.³³Relations between the king and London were therefore left in a delicate state. It was not surprising that on 30 September the king ordered the raising of 1,000 foot soldiers in Kent and Sussex, or that on 5 October he stated that, despite their safe conducts, the baronial negotiators were not to be allowed to stay in or even pass through London.³⁴

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY

Little is known about the early meetings between the magnates and the various mediators. On 23 August the earl of Gloucester passed through London with his retinue, probably to make initial contact with them.³⁵ Gloucester and later the papal envoys as well based themselves in the town and abbey of St Albans.³⁶ There is mention of an attempt by Cardinal Arnaud Nouvel and Bishop Arnaud d'Aux to send some of their clerks to meet the barons at Wheathampstead near St Albans; but they were rebuffed on the facetious grounds that England already had enough clerks capable of negotiating. The papal envoys then withdrew in alarm and returned to London.³⁷ A more significant meeting took place at Markyate near St Albans in late September.³⁸ As a result safe conducts until 13 October were granted on 28 September at the request of the papal envoys, Louis of Évreux and the earls of Gloucester and Richmond for the earl of Hereford, Robert de Clifford, John Botetourt, John de Heslarton, Adam de Herwynton, and Michael de Meldon to meet the cardinal, earls and other members of the council.³⁹

A treaty was finally agreed between Edward II and the magnates on 20 December 1312 after long and tortuous negotiations. The king's negotiators were the earl of Pembroke, Hugh Despenser and Nicholas de Segrave. The earl of Hereford was the chief baronial negotiator, while the earl of Lancaster was represented throughout the negotiations by his steward, Michael de Meldon. Neither Lancaster nor Warwick came near the king during this period, no doubt because they feared treachery if they did so. Mediation between the two sides was provided by the moderate earls of Gloucester and Richmond, by the two papal envoys and by the French envoy, Louis of Évreux.⁴⁰ On 30 September the papal and French envoys in London wrote to Hereford and the other baronial representatives enclosing letters from the king proposing a meeting. They said that they would be remaining in London until a date suggested by the king and that if Hereford and the others came within that period they would find the envoys at the Temple. Hereford evidently responded to the invitation and it is likely that the subsequent negotiations were held at the Temple. Although it was then in royal hands, following the seizure of the Templars' property, the Temple was a neutral point, conveniently placed between London and the royal palace at Westminster.⁴¹

It is not possible to provide a chronology for the negotiations between their beginning in September and conclusion in December 1312. The tentative early stages are probably represented by the account given in the Vita of the king's complaints that the magnates had infringed his royal prerogative by cruelly putting to death the man to whom he had granted peace, and that they wished to seize the crown and set up for themselves another king. To which Lancaster allegedly replied that the magnates had acted lawfully according to the Ordinances which had been approved and issued with the assent of the king and his barons. He protested that they had committed no crime against the crown and ‘that it had never entered their heads to wish to set up another as king’.⁴²

The main negotiations are recorded in three documents, all of them undated, which make it possible to say what issues were raised and how they were finally resolved. These are a list of royal objections to the Ordinances, the Prima Tractatio ad Pacem Confirmandam and the Rationes Baronum.⁴³ The objections to the Ordinances were drawn up by the two French royal clerks, William de Novo Castro and Raymond Subiran, who had come to England with the earl of Pembroke in August.⁴⁴ They argued, for example, that the Ordinances were invalid because the Ordainers had not been elected by the prelates, earls and barons as a whole but by a small committee; that the Ordinances were uncertain and doubtful in all respects; that the Ordainers had exceeded their powers, thereby diminishing the legal rights and the revenues of the king; that the Ordinances had offended against Magna Carta, the Charter of the Forest, and the king's coronation oath, and the Ordainers were for that reason excommunicate; they also noted that Louis IX of France and Pope Clement V had previously quashed very similar ordinances. The document then continued with a list of objections to eleven specific ordinances.⁴⁵ This document was so legalistic and unrealistic politically that the barons promptly rejected it on the grounds that England was not governed by written law but by ancient laws and customs, which could be changed only by agreement between the king, prelates, earls and barons. This they said applied to the Ordinances as a whole which should therefore retain their validity. The document could never have formed the basis of negotiations, since it invited the magnates to agree to an unconditional surrender to the crown.⁴⁶ Nonetheless, the objections give an insight into Edward II's views of his rights as king, while it is possible that the document was put aside in the royal archives against further use in the future.⁴⁷

The second document, the Prima Tractatio, is more significant but also much more difficult to interpret. The Prima Tractatio begins by stating that since the earls of Gloucester, Lancaster, Richmond, Pembroke, Surrey, Hereford, Warwick and Arundel had heard that the king was angry with them (est engrossi devers eux), they were willing, if the king gave them sufficient security and agreed to receive them as his lieges, to come to Westminster and humbly beg his pardon. They also offered to provide 400 men-at-arms for six months at their own expense for the next Scottish campaign and to persuade parliament to grant an aid for the same purpose, as well as to restore all the goods seized from Gaveston at Newcastle. In return the king would promise to maintain the Ordinances, remove all evil councillors, return all seized lands, and release all persons illegally imprisoned. All rancour and ill-feeling should be forgiven by both sides, except for those who had contravened the Ordinances.⁴⁸ On the face of it, these were moderate terms for a political settlement, and there are certain similarities between it and the treaty that was eventually agreed in December.⁴⁹ It is just possible that in the autumn of 1312 all eight earls – ranging from the royal supporters Pembroke and Surrey to the mediators Gloucester and Arundel, and the king's opponents, Lancaster, Warwick, Hereford and Arundel – were prepared to co-operate in presenting terms to the king and to join in seeking pardons for their actions as if they were all equally guilty. It is hard to believe, however, given the bitterness between Pembroke and Lancaster and Warwick resulting from Gaveston's death, that such an act of baronial solidarity could have taken place. One possible explanation of the Prima Tractatio is that it was a draft treaty put forward by the earls of Gloucester and Richmond as a basis for further negotiations. It is more likely however that it was presented on behalf of the opposition earls themselves. This suggestion fits the account given in the Vita Edwardi Secundi, whose author states that at some stage the king asked the magnates to draw up a list of their demands, and that they then did so, asking for the confirmation of the Ordinances and for pardons for the death of Gaveston. Edward's reaction to these demands, and so we may suppose to the Prima Tractatio, was to accept all the Ordinances except those concerning finance, to agree to pardon the earls, but to refuse to accept that Gaveston should be declared a traitor to prevent his widow or daughter from claiming possession of his lands. Edward remained adamant on this last point and proceeded to wear down his opponents by dragging out the negotiations.⁵⁰

Further light is thrown on the negotiations which led to the December treaty by the third document, the Rationes Baronum, which forms part of the report sent to Clement V in 1313 by his two envoys.⁵¹ The Rationes shows that the magnates were dissatisfied with the security and safe conduct which the king claimed to have offered them only propter necessitatem. They argued that this implied the king had acted under compulsion and that he might therefore repudiate his guarantees. The form of security was also deficient since it suggested that they had murdered Gaveston and not executed him as an enemy of the king and the realm. The barons continued to insist on the removal from court under the terms of the Ordinances of twenty objectionable persons, including Henry de Beaumont, Edmund Mauley, and a number of former associates of Gaveston, whose names were inserted after the Rationes.⁵²

On 20 December a treaty was finally made between the king and the barons. The agreement was sealed in Cardinal Arnaud's room in London, in the presence of the two papal envoys, Count Louis of Évreux, and the earls of Gloucester and Richmond, all of whom had acted as mediators. The earl of Hereford, Robert de Clifford, and John Botetourt represented Lancaster and Warwick, both of whom were absent, while the earl of Pembroke, Hugh Despenser the Elder, and Nicholas de Segrave represented the king. Under its terms the barons were to come to Westminster to receive the king's pardon; the jewels and horses seized at Newcastle on 4 May were to be restored to royal envoys at St Albans on 13 January 1313; and a parliament, for which a form of security for the barons was included, was to be summoned for 18 March. All offences committed against Gaveston were to be pardoned, and in return no action was to be taken against Gaveston's followers. The barons also promised that the coming parliament would discuss the granting to the king of an aid for the Scottish war and would also consider measures to ensure that no one brought armed retainers to future parliaments. The king promised to investigate the grievances of two of Lancaster's retainers, Gruffudd de la Pole and Fulk Lestrange, and to restore the lands of Henry de Percy.⁵³ The treaty appeared to be a considerable victory for the king since, unlike the Rationes Baronum, it made no direct mention of the Ordinances and contained no reference to the baronial demands that Gaveston should be declared the king's enemy or for the removal of ‘evil councillors’. The treaty was however a paper victory since it could not be assumed that these major issues would not be heard of again. Much would also depend on whether its terms were performed and especially on whether the earls of Lancaster and Warwick, who were not present when the treaty was agreed, would give it their approval.⁵⁴

THE BIRTH OF AN HEIR TO THE THRONE

Edward II could feel some degree of satisfaction with what had been achieved by December 1312. Without giving away anything of vital importance to himself, he had apparently, with the aid of papal and French mediation, as well as several of the English earls, worn down his opponents. All the while a parliament had been going about its business but without making the grant of taxation which Edward so badly needed. In place of such a grant and perhaps as a way of showing his confidence Edward used his royal prerogative to impose a tallage at the rate of a tenth of revenues and a fifteenth of the value of moveable goods on 16 December, the last day of the parliament.⁵⁵

An even greater source of satisfaction and of personal happiness was the birth at Windsor on 13 November of Edward and Isabella's first child, the future Edward III. The infant boy was baptized by Cardinal Arnaud Nouvel in the chapel of St Edward at Windsor on 16 November. His godfathers were the other papal envoy, Arnaud d'Aux, bishop of Poitiers, the bishops of Bath & Wells and of Worcester, Louis count of Évreux, the earls of Pembroke and Richmond, and Hugh Despenser.⁵⁶ The happiness of the occasion was almost marred by the insistence of Louis of Évreux, probably acting on instructions from Philip IV, that the child should be named after a French king, therefore Philip or Louis. The English magnates present refused to accept this. There is no reason to think that Edward II disagreed with them, and so Edward was the name chosen.⁵⁷ The news of the birth had immediately been proclaimed in London where it was received with rejoicing. On 4 February 1313 Edward and Isabella came to Westminster. From there they went to the city of London where they were greeted by the members of the London guild of fishmongers, who staged an elaborate pageant in Isabella's honour, in which the arms of England and France were conspicuous, and afterwards accompanied her from Westminster to the royal palace at Eltham.⁵⁸ The birth of an heir to the throne was clearly a great relief to everyone and raised the prospect of greater political stability in the future. But that was a long way offand in the meantime the young Edward would have to survive the perils of childhood. If the child were to die, there were still however Edward II's half-brothers, Thomas of Brotherton and Edmund of Woodstock, now twelve and eleven years old. Partly in recognition of his status as heir presumptive and partly perhaps to give Edward the renewed comfort of having an earldom in the hands of someone to whom he was close, Thomas was made earl of Norfolk on 16 December 1312.⁵⁹

EDWARD AND ISABELLA

Although the marriage of Edward and Isabella had begun inauspiciously after a long delay since their betrothal in 1303, and was overshadowed by wrangling between England and France over the duchy of Aquitaine and Isabella's dower, as well as the tensions over Gaveston, it appears to have been a successful one. Isabella was only a child of twelve when she first came to England in 1308 and was understandably ill at ease in a new and unfamiliar environment. Isabella's biographer has shown that she spent most of her time in her husband's company, apart from occasional absences, such as her pilgrimages to Canterbury in July 1308 and in October 1311.⁶⁰ Once the initial problems over her dower were settled in the summer of 1308, she was treated with generosity both financially and in grants of land. Although this may in part have been to win the agreement of Isabella and her father to the return of Gaveston from Ireland, a growing intimacy between the youthful Isabella and her much older and more experienced husband was probably also starting to develop.⁶¹ By the year 1311–12, for which Isabella's household records survive, her establishment numbered over 200 people; her tailor, John Faleise, employed sixty seamstresses to maintain and repair the queen's robes, and also guarded her jewels, plate and valuable clothing, which were stored in the Tower of London.⁶² Isabella's attitude towards Gaveston and his relations with her husband is harder to determine. Her initial hostility to Gaveston may have been dictated as much by her father's attitude as by any personal antipathy. As she became more established at the English court and in her husband's affections, and a property holder in her own right, her attitude may well have changed. Although there is some evidence that she contacted the opposition earls in early 1312, this may have been an attempt to try to reduce the tension between them and the king rather than an indication of any sympathy with them. Isabella's closest companions included Henry de Beaumont and his sister Isabella de Vescy, associates of Gaveston, whose removal the barons were also demanding.⁶³

Isabella and her husband spent the Christmas of 1311 at Westminster before leaving for the reunion with Gaveston at York on 13 January. She was there for the festivities that followed the birth of Gaveston's daughter and it was probably at this time of happiness that she became pregnant.⁶⁴ The jollities continued on the morning of Easter Monday, 27 March, when the ladies of Isabella's chamber followed a customary practice by hauling Edward II out of his bed.⁶⁵ On 4 May Isabella became caught up in the events which led to Gaveston's capture and death when she and Edward were forced to flee from Newcastle to Tynemouth to escape the followers of the earl of Lancaster and his allies. Contrary to the report in Trokelowe's chronicle, written at St Albans, the pregnant Isabella was not abandoned at Tynemouth; instead she left there with her husband on 5 May and accompanied him to Scarborough before returning to York on 17 May.⁶⁶

Isabella remained in York until the end of July when Edward sent members of his household to escort her south, first to Westminster and then to Windsor, which she had probably reached by 17 September.⁶⁷ She and Edward then remained there for the rest of her pregnancy.⁶⁸ On 20 October Edward gave leave to nostre treschiere Compoingne Isabel … Royne Dangleterre to make her last will and testament. Edward granted her all the moveable goods ‘which are and will be hers, and all the gold and silver vessels, and all her jewels in whatever place they are or shall be found’. After her death these would all be sold by her executors to perform the terms of her will. Edward also granted her all the county of Ponthieu and the land of Montreuil and all the other lands which she held or would hold in the kingdom of England or in France or elsewhere, to be exploited by her executors for three years after her death. Lastly her executors were given powers to purchase land worth £1,500 sterling to found a hospital for the relief of poor people and for the salvation of the souls of herself and Edward.⁶⁹ It is possible that Isabella had had a difficult pregnancy, that there was a real possibility of her dying in childbirth, and that Edward was showing his concern for his wife's spiritual welfare. This may have been the case, but the existence of a copy of the document in Paris⁷⁰ strongly suggests that it was made partly at the suggestion and perhaps at the insistence of the French envoys, in order to ensure that the terms of Isabella's dower were continued after her death. It would be interesting to know the details of Isabella's will, but it has not survived in either the English or the French archives.⁷¹ In the event, all went well and on 13 November two members of Isabella's household, John Launge and his wife, informed the king that he had a son.⁷²

MORE NEGOTIATIONS

Despite the treaty which had been agreed on 20 December 1312, mutual suspicion between the king and the barons remained strong, causing delays in performing the terms of the treaty and also contributing to the failure of the parliaments which were summoned for 18 March and 8 July 1313. At first, however, attempts were made to implement the treaty. On 16 December, four days before the final agreement, a general safe conduct until 3 June 1313 was issued for Lancaster and his supporters to move freely about the country. On the 18th Henry de Percy's lands were restored until the coming parliament. On 26 December a commission was issued to investigate Gruffudd de la Pole's complaints about the seizure of his lands,⁷³ but went beyond the terms of the treaty by including complaints against Gruffudd by the king's chamberlain, John Charlton.⁷⁴ Fulk Lestrange's complaints were brought within the terms of the commission on 31 December. On 7 January John Sandal and Ingelard Warley were appointed to receive Gaveston's property at St Albans on 13 January, and on 8 January parliament was summoned, as had been agreed, for 8 March.⁷⁵ Almost at once, difficulties began to appear. The imprisonment of one of Henry de Percy's knights, Edmund Darel, led the barons to conclude that their safe conducts were worthless, to their refusal to confirm the treaty and their failure to restore the jewels and horses at St Albans on 13 January.⁷⁶ The king's envoys, Sandal and Warley, remained at St Albans until the 15th, when, in righteous indignation, they drew up a formal protestation before witnesses, which they sent to Cardinal Arnaud. The earl of Hereford then attempted to mediate between the king and the magnates, telling the cardinal that he had asked Lancaster, Warwick and Clifford, for the sake of their own honour and the common good, to restore the goods as soon as possible. Hereford also promised that when he next met the other magnates he would do all in his power to persuade them to observe the terms of the treaty.⁷⁷

Darel's release was ordered on 18 January,⁷⁸ but this announcement had no immediate effect since in the meantime events had moved on. Soon after 13 January Lancaster sent his chaplain Hugh Skillehare from Pontefract to the cardinal with a further list of demands to be passed on orally to the king. Lancaster said that he was still prepared to return the jewels and horses to the king, but the offer contained a major regression since he described the restoration of the property as if it were the forfeit of a felon's goods to the crown.⁷⁹ Lancaster and his allies knew perfectly well that the property captured at Newcastle on 4 May 1312 had really belonged to the king and not to Gaveston, but by maintaining the fiction that it had been Gaveston's Lancaster was trying to force the king to accept that Gaveston had been a criminal and a traitor.⁸⁰ Lancaster's attitude to Gaveston made the December treaty for all practical purposes a dead letter, since Gaveston's status had been a major issue in the negotiations leading up to the agreement. Edward II flatly refused to accept the implication that Lancaster and his colleagues had legally executed Gaveston. After adding several other lesser demands, Lancaster's envoy concluded by stating that Lancaster and Warwick were planning to meet other magnates before 23 February to discuss the terms of the treaty and decide whether or not to give final approval. Their approval would of course depend on the king's acceptance of the new demands.⁸¹

The papal envoys reacted by asking the earls of Gloucester, Richmond and Hereford to meet them in London. Here they decided that they should meet members of the king's council before replying to Lancaster. In the talks that followed the king was represented by the earl of Pembroke, Hugh Despenser and John Sandal. Pembroke and his fellow councillors ignored Lancaster's claim that Gaveston was a felon and an enemy of the king on the grounds that it contained no request for them to answer.⁸² They were able to deal with most of Lancaster's other demands without much difficulty, except for one relating to the appointment of royal justices to investigate the dispute between Gruffudd de la Pole and John Charlton. This proved so intractable that the talks almost broke down because of it. The matter was referred to the king by Hugh Despenser after intense attempts at persuasion by the papal envoys, who themselves met Edward at Sheen on 29 January.⁸³ Two other matters also remained unresolved: the restoration of the jewels and horses, and the confirmation by Lancaster and Warwick of the December treaty. On 10 February the papal envoys wrote to Lancaster, Warwick, Hereford, John Botetourt and Robert de Clifford to announce that they were sending the bishop of St David's, Master Walter de Thorp and two of their chaplains to discuss these questions.⁸⁴

The focus of the mediation between the king and the magnates now moved from London further north, possibly to Lancaster's castle of Kenilworth in Warwickshire.⁸⁵ In the instructions to their messengers the papal envoys made it clear to Lancaster and the others that by their failure to restore the jewels and horses in accordance with the treaty they were harming the king's honour and endangering the safety of the kingdom, already threatened by the Scots and by disturbances in Gascony, as well as causing unease to the pope and to the French king. They were told firmly that if they continued to act in this way, the king would be justified in acting against them.⁸⁶ The pressure seems to have been successful, since by 27 February Hereford, Clifford and Botetourt had delivered the jewels to the bishop of Worcester and John Sandal and received acquittance for them.⁸⁷ However this still left unsettled the question of the confirmation of the treaty as a whole by Lancaster and Warwick.

Parliament had been summoned to meet at Westminster on 18 March, but the king remained at Windsor, allegedly because of an illness, which was generally thought to be feigned,⁸⁸ while the magnates failed to appear in person.⁸⁹ For the moment there was stalemate and on 7 April parliament was adjourned until 6 May. Negotiations however continued outside parliament. The state of affairs was summed up in a document sent to the king by his opponents shortly after parliament opened on 18 March.⁹⁰ The document listed points in the December treaty which had been implemented or on which both sides were agreed, but also listed those on which agreement had still to be reached. The earls recalled that they had now restored the jewels and other property taken at Newcastle ‘by reason of Gaveston’,⁹¹ as the treaty required; they reaffirmed their readiness to come to Westminster to ask for the king's pardon and their willingness to grant an aid in parliament for the Scottish war; and they repeated their promise not to bring armed followers to parliament after their pardon, since the problems concerning Henry de Percy and Gruffudd de la Pole were now being settled in accordance with the treaty. The magnates expressed themselves satisfied that after they had been pardoned the king would act towards them as a faithful lord. Tacitly they also returned to the form of the treaty by omitting any reference to Gaveston as a felon or as an enemy of the king, in contrast to Lancaster's position in February. These concessions in themselves would do much to produce a settlement. However the magnates demanded a fuller form of acquittance for Gaveston's goods than they had received in February, and objected to the form of pardon to them as Gaveston's enemies which they had been offered in the December treaty, since it would then appear to have been extorted from the king, contrary to his coronation oath and their homage to him. The magnates included a new form of pardon, to be held in the custody of the archbishop of Canterbury, the bishops of London and Chichester, and the earls of Gloucester, Richmond and Arundel, until the magnates had made their submission. The magnates also declared that there was no need to give special pardons to Gaveston's former adherents, since, they argued, only the king would have power to bring any suit against them. They attributed their failure to appear in parliament on 18 March to the fact that the summons had not been made in the usual form, and they therefore asked for a correct form of summons so that they might attend parliament and make their submission.⁹² The king's objections to this document probably centred on the demand that Gaveston's followers should not be specially pardoned, since there might then be a baronial demand for their exile under the terms of the Ordinances. Apart from this point there seems to have been relatively little to prevent an early settlement.

By the time parliament reassembled on 6 May there were signs that another attempt to achieve a settlement would soon be made. On 3 May, at the request of Cardinal Arnold, Louis count of Clermont a newly arrived French envoy, and the earls of Gloucester and Richmond, the earl of Lancaster and his followers were given a safe conduct until 24 June to meet the papal envoys and the king's councillors at Bedford; the current parliament came to an end on 19 May and four days later a new parliament was summoned to meet at Westminster on 8 July.⁹³ There is however no evidence that any more meetings between the king's representatives and those of the magnates did take place, and a further six months were to elapse before a settlement was finally achieved.

ENGLAND AND FRANCE

While the delicate negotiations were going on between king and barons, other important business was also being conducted. This consisted of a sustained attempt by Edward II to improve relations with France, partly in order to resolve existing problems over the English-ruled duchy of Aquitaine but also with the intention of obtaining French support in Edward's continuing disputes with his baronial opponents.

In November 1312 the bishop of Exeter had been ordered to prepare Edward II's legal defence at the Paris parlement to appeals against English officials in Aquitaine;⁹⁴ he was also to represent Edward in the problems arising out of the Process of Périgueux, which had begun in 1311 and was the latest attempt to resolve Anglo-French differences.⁹⁵ On 15 January 1313 the king's council met at Westminster to discuss these issues and it was probably here that a decision was taken to send a high-ranking embassy to Paris.⁹⁶ On 4 February the earl of Pembroke, the bishop of Exeter and Master Thomas de Cobham were appointed to be the king's proctors in Paris and were given full powers to answer on any matters concerning Gascony.⁹⁷ On 14 February, several days after the departure of Pembroke and Exeter,⁹⁸ a most important addition was made to their business when Pembroke was authorized to arrange a personal meeting between Edward II and Philip IV to resolve outstanding Anglo-French disputes.⁹⁹

Edward was in two minds as to whether he should allow Pembroke to leave England at such a critical juncture in the negotiations with the magnates. On 9 February the papal envoys had written to Philip IV, telling him of the dangers to England from internal dissension and external enemies and asking him to deal promptly with Pembroke's business so that he could return quickly to England where his services were badly needed; and on 14 February Edward II himself went so far as to write to Pembroke recalling him to England because royal affairs there were even more pressing.¹⁰⁰ Pembroke did not however return immediately and continued to Paris where on 14 March he reached an agreement for Edward II to meet Philip IV at Amiens on 20 May.¹⁰¹ The plan was changed when Philip IV's cousin Louis de Clermont arrived in England at the end of April with an invitation for Edward and Isabella to attend the knighting of Philip's sons in Paris.¹⁰² The intended meeting at Amiens was therefore abandoned in favour of a great social occasion in Paris.

EDWARD AND ISABELLA IN FRANCE

The opposition earls were unhappy about Edward's going to France and advised against it, ostensibly because of rumours that the Scots had invaded England and might even march on London, but probably because they feared – with good reason – the consequences for themselves of a closer friendship between England and France.¹⁰³ Edward II and Isabella, accompanied by the earls of Pembroke and Richmond, Hugh Despenser, Henry de Beaumont and many others, duly left for France from Dover on 23 May and reached the outskirts of Paris on 1 June.¹⁰⁴ The royal party remained there until 9 June, when they moved to Pontoise where they stayed until 30 June.¹⁰⁵ Their visit to Paris was marked by high ceremony and scenes of lavish display.¹⁰⁶ On their entry into Paris on 2 June Edward and Isabella were, according to one chronicler, received with solemnity and joy as ‘the whole city rose up and went forth to meet them’.¹⁰⁷ In a ceremony reminiscent of Edward's own knighting at Westminster Abbey in 1306, the three sons of Philip IV – Louis king of Navarre, Philip and Charles – were knighted in Notre Dame on 3 June, together with almost 200 other young men;¹⁰⁸ on 6 June Philip IV and Edward II, and many other nobles, took the cross and made crusading vows in Notre Dame. Isabella also took the cross with other royal and noble wives, on 9 June, on condition that she would go to the Holy Land only in the company of her husband.¹⁰⁹ A series of six celebratory banquets was given between 2 and 7 June by Philip IV and Edward II, and by the king of Navarre, Louis of Évreux and Charles of Valois.¹¹⁰

Edward's banquet was held at noon on 5 June inside richly appointed tents set up in the meadows surrounding Saint-Germain-des-Prés on the Left Bank, where he and Isabella were lodging.¹¹¹ According to the chronicler Godefroy de Paris, the guests were served by attendants on horseback and the tents were lit by great torches even though it was the middle of the day.¹¹² Edward II's minstrel, the crwth player and singer William Craddock, performed for his guests; while another attraction was a ‘castle of love’ constructed by the armourer of Louis of Navarre and used to provide further entertainment between courses. The scale of the entertainment can be judged by the quantity of food donated to Edward by his father-in-law for his banquet alone, amounting to 94 oxen, 189 pigs, 380 rams, 200 pike, 160 carp and 80 barrels of wine. Altogether Philip IV gave his son-in-law more than £2,000 worth of supplies during his stay.¹¹³ No doubt overcome by all the good living, on the morning of 7 June Edward did not get up in time to meet the French king, preferring to lie in bed with Isabella.¹¹⁴

The display and the generosity surrounding Edward's state visit to Paris were of course designed to show off the splendour of the French monarchy and especially of Philip IV the great king of France, who had put down the power of the papacy and of the Templars, and who was now to be seen surrounded in his capital city by his sons and brothers, and attended by his son-in-law and vassal Edward II and his French queen.¹¹⁵ The occasion was commemorated by the presentation to Philip of a translation from Castilian into Latin by the physician Raymond of Béziers of the text of Kalila and Dimna, a collection of tales featuring animals as protagonists and embodying moral lessons for princes as well as other humans.¹¹⁶ The manuscript was embellished with six miniatures,¹¹⁷ one of which shows Edward II girding the king of Navarre with his sword while Philip IV extends his hand as if giving a blessing; another shows Philip IV and Edward II riding out with trumpets preceding them, while a caption states that on the third day of Pentecost the kings of France and of England and a great force of nobles received the banner of the heavenly angel (vexillum angeli celestis) from the Dominican Nicholas de Fréauville, cardinal priest of St Eusebius, who was Philip IV's former confessor. This must be a reference to their taking of the cross. In another illumination the cardinal is shown bestowing blessings upon Philip IV, Edward II and the king of Navarre. In order to emphasize his importance, Philip IV is depicted slightly larger than those around him, including Edward.¹¹⁸

A second manuscript associated with the visit to Paris is the elaborately illuminated text of the Apocalypse which was commissioned for presentation to Isabella by her father. In another obvious reference to the taking of the cross by Philip IV and Edward II one of the illustrations shows a French monarch and an English prince leading the kings of the East gathered together for the battle of Armageddon.¹¹⁹

The formal business of Edward's visit to France began after the move to Pontoise, where he was visited by deputations of his Gascon subjects and where negotiations took place with Philip IV.¹²⁰ Having brought Edward II to France, and comfortable in the knowledge that Gaveston was no more and that Isabella had produced a half-French heir to the English throne, Philip IV was in a benign and conciliatory mood. The discussions ended on 2 July when Philip, as a mark of esteem for Edward's personal visit and taking the cross, remitted all penalties incurred by Edward and his subjects in Gascony for alleged offences against France. Philip also confirmed his letters patent of 1286 regulating all appeals to Paris by subjects of the duchy.¹²¹ A settlement between Amanieu d'Albret, one of the most rebellious of those subjects, and the seneschal of Gascony was also achieved by giving d'Albret 20,000 livres tournois ‘for his good services’.¹²² Edward for his part could be well satisfied with his visit to France. He could now rely on the support of his father-in-law in the battles which lay ahead with the Scots and the English magnates; he had apparently reached a settlement of the problems concerning Gascony; and he had not been forced to accept anything he did not want, notably the provision of military assistance for Philip against his rebellious subjects in the county of Flanders.¹²³ Edward had however agreed, at Philip's instigation, to renew for a further year the truce with the Scots, which expired on 10 June; but for the moment this probably suited him. Edward was not ready for a military confrontation with the Scots.¹²⁴

On 2 July Edward and Isabella left Pontoise for Poissy where both they and Philip IV spent the next three days. This was a highly symbolic location since it was where the French crusading saint and king, Louis IX, had been born and baptized, and where Philip IV had founded a Dominican priory in his memory.¹²⁵ While there, the two kings were visited by Guillaume de Villeneuve, the Franciscan bishop of an unnamed diocese in Persia, who came to Edward as the messenger of ‘the emperor of the Tartars’. Guillaume was the latest and probably the last in a line of envoys from the Mongol rulers of Persia who had been visiting the kings of England and of France in the quest for an alliance since the middle of the thirteenth century. Given that Edward II and Philip IV had just taken the cross, it was an appropriate moment for such a visit. Nothing more however is heard of Guillaume.¹²⁶

The other recorded incident at Poissy was potentially much more serious. During the night a fire started in Edward's wardrobe, destroying many of Edward and Isabella's belongings and forcing them to escape ‘naked’ into the ‘street’.¹²⁷ Godefroy de Paris was as effusive in his praise of Edward's courage in saving Isabella as he was of Isabella's beauty. Whatever the truth of Edward's behaviour, Isabella suffered burns to one of her hands, for which she required extensive medical treatment after her return to England.¹²⁸

‘PEACE’ AT LAST

Singed but otherwise largely intact, Edward and Isabella returned to England at the port of Sandwich on 16 July and reached London on 23 July.¹²⁹ Edward II had originally promised that he would be back in England in time for the opening of parliament on 8 July¹³⁰ and for further negotiations with the magnates. Whether because of the importance of the diplomatic business he was conducting in Paris, or because he wanted to wear down the barons by further delay, or because he was enjoying himself too much in France, or a combination of all these factors, it soon became clear that Edward would not be back in time. On 1 July the earls of Gloucester and Richmond and the bishops of Bath & Wells and Worcester were appointed to open and to continue the parliament until the king's arrival.¹³¹ The earls of Gloucester and Richmond and some other magnates and prelates had waited in London as instructed, but the opposition magnates who had attended (it is not known who these were) gave up and left before the king's return, claiming that the king's advisers had persuaded him to delay his return in order to weaken his opponents.¹³² As late as 19 July Edward appears to have expected a parliament to be held, since he advised the Kent justices to delay any cases involving the earl of Pembroke whose presence in parliament was urgently needed.¹³³ The parliament ended on 25 or 27 July without, so far as is known, achieving anything. Although no useful contact had been made with the opposition leaders, it is likely that the king's advisers, and perhaps Edward himself, felt that it was at last time to resolve the deadlock between the king and his opponents. Edward's position was now stronger than it had been earlier in the year. He could rely on support from France, and he was strengthened by the death of his old opponent, Archbishop Robert Winchelsey of Canterbury, on 11 May 1313. This also gave Edward the opportunity to influence the appointment of Winchelsey's successor. Edward had been in Canterbury on 20 and 21 May, but did not attend Winchelsey's funeral in the cathedral on the 23rd. The earl of Gloucester, the bishops of Worcester and Exeter, and four other bishops were however present. On the very day of the funeral Edward wrote secretly to the pope from Dover to inform him that he intended to approach him with his own nominee for the vacant see of Canterbury.¹³⁴ Although in the meantime the monks of Christ Church, Canterbury had elected the distinguished scholar Master Thomas Cobham as archbishop, Edward II got his way and on 1 October 1313 his old ally, Walter Reynolds, the bishop of Worcester and keeper of the Great Seal, was provided to Canterbury by Clement V.¹³⁵ The enthronement of Reynolds at Canterbury on 17 February 1314 was to be attended by Edward and Isabella, the bishops of Winchester, Bath & Wells, Norwich and Worcester, the earls of Gloucester and Pembroke, as well as by other dignitaries.¹³⁶

The next phase in the tortuous politics of 1313 began when Edward held a council at Eltham on 22 July, followed on 26 July by the summons of a new parliament to meet at Westminster on 23 September.¹³⁷ This decision was made in the presence and presumably with the advice of the earls of Pembroke and Richmond, Hugh Despenser the Elder, and the bishops of Bath & Wells, Worcester (the chancellor), and Exeter. The events of the next few weeks are obscure, until on 28 August Edward wrote asking Pembroke to meet other members of the council at Chertsey on 17 September to discuss the business of the coming parliament. On the same date Edward also requested his father-in-law, Philip IV, to send Enguerrand de Marigny, his chamberlain and in effect chief minister, and Louis of Évreux to assist in negotiating with the magnates.¹³⁸

On their way to parliament the earls of Arundel, Lancaster, Gloucester, Hereford and Warwick met at Brackley on 19 September, ostensibly to hold a tournament, but in reality to plan a common baronial approach to the king when they arrived at Westminster. The king tried unsuccessfully to prohibit the planned tournament but may also have sent the earl of Pembroke to meet the earls and report back to the council on their intentions.¹³⁹

According to the Vita, the magnates came to London on 23 September, the day parliament was due to begin, but for some time had no contact with the king, who was reluctant to meet them. The magnates then demanded that Edward should fulfil his promises of pardon and finally, under pressure, the king gave way.¹⁴⁰ It is not known what further demands the magnates made or whether these differed from their earlier ones in March, but there was certainly a period of further negotiation and mediations between the magnates' arrival and the issue of pardons by the king. As in 1312, the mediation was performed by the papal envoys and by the earls of Gloucester and Richmond. Louis of Évreux is also said to have taken part, but this must have been at a later stage of the negotiations, since he and Enguerrand de Marigny were still awaited on 14 October.¹⁴¹

The first sign of an impending agreement came on 4 October, when the sections of the Ordinances dealing with Henry de Beaumont and his sister Isabella de Vescy were abrogated as being prejudicial to the king.¹⁴² By 14 October the negotiations were sufficiently far advanced for the magnates to make a formal submission to the king: on this date Lancaster, Warwick, Hereford, Arundel, Henry de Percy, Robert de Clifford and John Botetourt came before Edward in Westminster Hall and asked for and received his pardon. To mark the settlement the earls dined with the king that night and returned the honour the following night.¹⁴³ The magnates attended parliament for the first time on 15 October¹⁴⁴ and the king's pardons to them were published the next day. The list was headed by Lancaster and the others just mentioned, together with two of Lancaster's leading retainers, Robert de Holland and Gruffudd de la Pole. The earl of Surrey's name was also included, presumably because of his role in the pursuit and surrender of Gaveston in 1312. As the king's leading councillor, the earl of Pembroke did not require a pardon, but at least eleven of his retainers were included in the list.¹⁴⁵

No further decisions emerged from parliament until the end of October, suggesting that hard bargaining was still in progress. On 30 October the prelates, earls and barons declared in parliament that it was the king's prerogative alone to bear arms. This was an important concession, which fulfilled the magnates' promise in the treaty of December 1312 that they would stop bringing their armed retainers to parliaments once they had received pardon.¹⁴⁶ On 5 November the magnates were given a formal acquittance for their restoration of Gaveston's property, as they had demanded after the first acquittance in February 1313.¹⁴⁷ On 6 November the king confirmed his earlier ordinance giving a full pardon the earls for Gaveston's death, but in return they had to agree to a pardon for Gaveston's former adherents, which they had previously refused to concede.¹⁴⁸ The dispute between Lancaster's two retainers, Gruffudd de la Pole and Fulk Lestrange, and the king's chamberlain, John Charlton, which had been a major problem in January and February 1313, was settled on 3 November by the appointment of new justices in place of those of December 1312, and by the pardoning of all three parties on 6 November.¹⁴⁹ As in the treaty of December 1312, the Ordinances were not mentioned in the settlement,¹⁵⁰ nor was the removal of any royal ministers required;¹⁵¹ and Gaveston and his supporters were not described as enemies of the king and the kingdom.¹⁵² With these problems at last removed from political debate, at least in public, the king had regained some of the freedom of action within his own kingdom for which he had been striving since the death of Gaveston in June 1312.

The settlement reached in October 1313 was essentially the same as the treaty of December 1312, and, so far as its details were concerned, there was no good reason why it should not have been made earlier. The delay was caused on the one hand by the king's reluctance to give any final pardon to the magnates responsible for the death of Gaveston and by his hope that he might succeed in using diplomatic means to improve his position against his opponents. On the other hand the behaviour of Lancaster in particular in raising new causes of dispute with Edward in January 1313 does not suggest that he and his allies were seeking an early settlement either. Yet neither side was willing or strong enough to risk a military confrontation, with the result that most of 1313 was spent in arguing over the details of a settlement which neither could ultimately avoid. The agreement of October 1313 was a compromise, symbolized by the magnates' lack of unity and by their failure to enforce and the king's inability to destroy the Ordinances.¹⁵³ By dint of persistence and the skilful use of both domestic and external¹⁵⁴ political support Edward had achieved a great deal. The appointment of his old ally and friend, Walter Reynolds, bishop of Worcester and chancellor, as archbishop of Canterbury in succession to Winchelsey was another indication of his success, as was the great improvement in Edward's financial position.

ROYAL FINANCES

Edward had begun his reign suffering from an acute shortage of ready money. This was a major reason for the continued exploitation of prises and purveyance and for the political and social tensions which these produced. It also went far to explain Edward II's failure to mount any concerted campaign in Scotland. A solution to his financial problems was therefore just as important as a peace settlement with the magnates. In May 1313, for example, Cardinal William Testa, the papal chancellor who was then visiting England as a papal envoy, loaned Edward 2,000 marks, to be repaid on 10 June when the king was in Paris.¹⁵⁵ Also in May the Genoese merchant and banker Antonio Pessagno was authorized to borrow £20,000 on Edward's behalf;¹⁵⁶ in June Edward borrowed £33,000 from Philip IV while he was in Paris; and in July, at Ibouvillers in France, Pessagno borrowed a further £15,000 from Enguerrand de Marigny.¹⁵⁷ These sums were probably all needed to meet the substantial costs of Edward's stay in France. Much more was needed and this gradually became available over the coming months. One of the terms of the agreement between the king and the magnates was a grant of taxation, the first since 1309. This was forthcoming in November 1313 with the approval of a twentieth and a fifteenth on moveables, to be used for the war in Scotland.¹⁵⁸ Earlier in the year, in late July and August, Edward had attempted to borrow sums totalling nearly £8,000 for use in the war from the bishops of the Canterbury province and the prelates and abbots of the province of York.¹⁵⁹

Edward's finances were greatly assisted by a loan which he negotiated with the pope. This had been under discussion since August 1312 and had originally been intended to help Edward hold out against the demands of his opponents. Details of the loan were not agreed until 28 October 1313, making it an important factor in the political situation which emerged from the 1313 settlement. Clement V agreed to make a private loan of 160,000 florins to be secured on the revenues of the duchy of Aquitaine. Since Edward needed the approval of Philip IV, as suzerain of Aquitaine, he crossed to Boulogne on 12 December, accompanied by the earl of Pembroke and Hugh Despenser, for a meeting with Philip at Montreuil. Edward returned to England on 20 December.¹⁶⁰ The loan agreement was confirmed on 20 January 1314 in the king's chamber at Westminster, in the presence of Pembroke and other councillors, and the money amounting to 160,000 florins, equivalent to £25,000 sterling, was received by Pessagno on the king's behalf in March, just in time for the coming campaign in Scotland.¹⁶¹ This was not the only financial assistance which Edward obtained from the pope. During the Council of Vienne in 1312 Clement V had imposed a universal sexennial tenth upon the Church in aid of the crusade which he was then proposing. This enabled Edward to take advantage of his new-found status as a crusader to ‘borrow’ much of the money collected, nominally to assist his crusading plans but in fact for his own use. Edward ultimately obtained about £18,500 from this source.¹⁶²

Antonio Pessagno's role was crucial in the king's financial arrangements.¹⁶³ From modest beginnings as a supplier of spices and small loans to the royal household in 1311, Pessagno was officially designated ‘the king's merchant’ in April 1312. By this time he was already owed over £2,000 by the crown. In February 1313 an agent of the Frescobaldi wrote that Pessagno ‘is now in such a condition that he fears nobody … and is so generous in the court … that everybody likes him’.¹⁶⁴ He had the further advantage that he was connected by marriage with the Fieschi, one of the ruling families in his native Genoa and also powerful in the Church. In addition, through the Fieschi he could claim a connection with the English ruling family itself.¹⁶⁵

Between 1312 and 1319 he was the king's chief financier, taking over the role previously performed by the Frescobaldi until their bankruptcy and exclusion from England by the Ordainers in 1311. During these seven years he advanced at least £144,000 to the king for the expenses of the royal household and of warfare, an annual average of approximately £20,500, which was higher than the annual average of any other royal banker between 1272 and 1337. Promises of ‘gifts’ to him in return for the use of his money amounted to almost £7,000. In 1314 Pessagno provided more than half the supplies needed for the English army in Scotland as well as large amounts of cash: at least £21,000 between March and June 1314. It was not through lack of resources that the English army was disastrously defeated at Bannockburn on 24 June 1314.¹⁶⁶ In November 1314 Pessagno acknowledged that he had recovered £104,900 from the king, while a balance of £6,605 was still due to him.¹⁶⁷

A MID-TERM ASSESSMENT

In a famous assessment of Edward II in 1313 the author of the Vita Edwardi Secundi remarked:

Behold, our King Edward has now reigned six full years and up until now he has achieved nothing praiseworthy or memorable, except that he has made a splendid marriage and has produced a handsome son and heir to the kingdom … Oh! If our King Edward had borne himself as well [as King Richard the Lionheart] at the outset of his reign, and not accepted the counsels of wicked men, not one of his predecessors would have been more renowned than he. For God had endowed him with gifts of every virtue, and had made him equal to or indeed more excellent than other kings. Certainly if anyone cared to describe those qualities which ennoble our king, he could not find his like in the land. His ancestry, stretching back to the tenth generation, shows his nobility. At the beginning of his reign he had wealth, a land of abundance, and the goodwill of his people … If he had followed the advice of the barons, he would have humbled the Scots with ease. Oh! If he had practised the use of arms, he would have exceeded the prowess of King Richard. Physically this would have been inevitable, for he was tall and strong, a handsome man with a fine figure. But why linger over this description of him? If only he had given to arms the attention that he expended on rustic pursuits, he would have raised England on high; his name would have resounded through the land. Oh! What hopes he raised as prince of Wales! All hope vanished when he became king of England. Piers Gaveston led the king astray, threw the country into confusion, consumed its treasure, was exiled three times, and then returning lost his head. But there still remain at the king's court those from Piers's intimates and members of his household, who disturb the peace of the whole country and persuade the king to seek vengeance. Give peace in our time, O Lord, and may the king be at one with his barons!¹⁶⁸

From what has already been written in this book, it should be clear that, despite all his faults and especially his adherence to Gaveston, Edward II showed considerable ability when it came to exploiting divisions among his enemies and mobilizing the diplomatic and financial support of powerful allies, such as the king of France and the pope. This talent was shown to good effect in the political and financial settlement that had been achieved by the end of 1313. The Vita's mid-term assessment of Edward underestimated both his abilities and the difficulties he faced when he first became king. He most certainly did not inherit wealth; nor was there any easy military option which would have defeated the Scots and brought them securely under English rule. The Vita's anxiety about the future peace of the kingdom was however well founded, since the peace between Edward and the barons was an uneasy one. Above all, the personal hostility between Edward and Lancaster remained. It was also highly unlikely that the last had been heard of the Ordinances. The mutual distrust was expressed by the authors of the Flores Historiarum and of the Lanercost chronicle who remarked that ‘the king always kept his distance from the earls, as before, led on by false counsel’ and that ‘the king promised many things to them, which afterwards he did not fulfil’.¹⁶⁹

A SCANDAL AT THE FRENCH COURT

As was usual in the history of Anglo-French relations in this period, agreements had a habit of starting to unravel almost as soon as they were made. The successes achieved during Edward's visit to Paris in the summer of 1313, when the two kings had met face to face, had shown the value of personal contacts. But after Edward returned home, when Philip IV was perhaps in a less benign mood and his officials resumed control of affairs, problems concerning Gascon appeals to the Paris parlement and other matters soon resurfaced. It is likely that these were among the reasons for Edward's brief meeting with Philip at Montreuil in December 1313, but more diplomacy was clearly needed.¹⁷⁰ In January 1314 Edward II and his council decided to resort to personal diplomacy once more and to send Isabella to present a set of petitions at the next session of the parlement.¹⁷¹ Isabella set out from Dover on 28 February with an impressive entourage, including the earl of Gloucester, Henry de Beaumont and his sister, Isabella de Vescy, and a large number of royal clerks.¹⁷² She stopped at Boulogne on 3 March to make an offering at the church where she and Edward had been married in 1308, and reached Paris by 16 March. She remained in and around Paris until 18 April, when she began her return journey.¹⁷³ In the meantime much had happened. Isabella had presented the petitions as planned and obtained a number of concessions from her father.¹⁷⁴ The most important was Philip's acceptance that appeals lodged at the Paris parlement by subjects of the English crown in Aquitaine could be withdrawn without prejudice, provided that the appellants did so of their own free will and the cases did not prejudice the French king's rights.¹⁷⁵ Even so, the gains reaped by Isabella's visit were modest and, as usual, many issues were left unsettled.

What made her visit even more significant was a major scandal which erupted at the French court while she was in Paris. The city was already in a state of high excitement, following the execution by burning on 15 March of Jacques de Molay, the Grand Master of the Knights Templar. Allegedly de Molay had pronounced a curse as he died upon Philip IV and all his family, and upon the pope. Within days of de Molay's execution it was discovered that the wives of Philip IV's three sons, Louis, Philip and Charles were engaged in adulterous affairs with two young knights, the brothers Philippe and Gautier d'Aunay. In April 1314 the young women were disgraced and sentenced to life imprisonment, while the two knights were broken on the wheel at Pontoise.¹⁷⁶ Several chroniclers claimed that Isabella was instrumental in the discovery of the affairs: it was alleged, for example, that she had given purses to two of her sisters-in-law, who had then given them to their lovers. When Isabella saw the purses in the possession of Philippe and Gautier she secretly told her father of her suspicions.¹⁷⁷ The facts that Isabella was personally very close to her father and that she had several meetings with him during her stay in Paris¹⁷⁸ lend plausibility to the claim that she played some role in revealing the scandal. On the other hand most of the chroniclers wrote well after the events and did not have any particularly close connections with the French court.¹⁷⁹ The only near-contemporary source with any possible bearing on the question is the metrical chronicle of Godefroy de Paris, cited earlier for its account of Edward and Isabella's visit to France in 1313. Having described Isabella as ‘the most beautiful woman in the kingdom and the Empire’ and ‘as wise and prudent as any woman could be’, Godefroy went on to say that ‘through her many things were later disclosed and revealed in France’, without stating exactly what these were.¹⁸⁰ The mystery therefore remains.

The scandal was only the first of a series of disasters to afflict the French monarchy, seeming to bear out the Templar's curse all too evidently. In November 1314 Philip IV died at the age of forty-six, having reigned since 1285; by January 1328 all three of Philip's sons had succeeded to the throne in turn and each had died without a male heir. Isabella retained her place in her father's affections to the end. In a codicil to his will, dated at Fontainebleau on 28 November, the day before he died, Philip IV left his daughter (carissime filie nostre Regine Anglie) two rings, one containing a large lodestone, the other set with a ruby called ‘the cherry’, which she had given to him. He also left ‘a beautiful cup’, which carissima Ysabella Regina Anglie carissima filia nostra had also given him, to the sisters of Poissy; and a golden fleur-de-lys worth £1,000 tournois to the church of St Mary, Boulogne, where Isabella and Edward had been married.¹⁸¹

DISASTER IN SCOTLAND

After her return from France, Isabella made an offering for her safe arrival at Canterbury on 29 May. She then travelled north to join her husband, reaching Berwick on the border with Scotland on 14 June.¹⁸² Edward was already there, preparing to enter Scotland with his army for the campaign which led to the fateful encounter with his nemesis, Robert Bruce, at Bannockburn on 24 June.

The traditional view of Edward II's 1314 Scottish campaign is that it was undertaken in response to news received in the summer of 1313 that Philip de Mowbray, the Scottish commander of the English-held castle of Stirling in the Scottish Lowlands, had agreed to surrender to the Scots if he were not relieved by 24 June 1314.¹⁸³ The threat to Edward II's honour was too great even for such an unwarlike king to resist the challenge, and the defeat at Bannockburn was the inevitable result. The reality was however very different since, as Professor Archie Duncan has shown, the Scottish siege of Stirling began in late March 1314 and not a year earlier; Mowbray's agreement with Edward Bruce was not made until mid-May 1314; and Edward II first heard of it on 26–27 May, when he was already at Newminster in Northumberland and well on his way to join his army mustering at Berwick.¹⁸⁴

Much had happened in the north since Edward II's last campaign in 1310–11. Little had been achieved by that campaign except to ensure that English garrisons continued to hold on to a number of strongly fortified castles in strategic positions in Scotland, such as Perth, Stirling and Edinburgh, as well as key bases on or near the border, at Carlisle, Berwick-upon-Tweed and Newcastle upon Tyne. The situation began to change rapidly once Edward withdrew to deal with the demands of the Ordainers in 1311 and the prolonged crisis caused by the pursuit and death of Gaveston in 1312.

Within days of Edward's departure from Berwick in July 1311 Robert Bruce began raiding the north of England, bringing devastation to the counties of Northumberland, Cumberland and Westmorland. Unable to defend themselves, and receiving no assistance from the king, local communities bought truces with the Scots. The ‘men of Northumberland’, for example, are recorded as having bought a truce from the Scots in three successive years, 1311, 1312 and 1313, in return for payments of £2,000 in each of the first two years and ‘a very large sum’ in 1313.¹⁸⁵ These payments also enabled the Scots to pay for the costs of besieging English-held castles in Scotland.¹⁸⁶ By the end of 1313 this system of local truces was breaking down, probably because the northern counties were having difficulty in raising any more money.¹⁸⁷ In retaliation Edward Bruce invaded England in April 1314, ravaging the lands of the bishop of Carlisle and briefly attacking the city of Carlisle itself.¹⁸⁸

Since 1311 the Scots had also captured several of the Scottish castles remaining under English control. Berwick, the first great Scottish fortress to fall to the English in 1296 and now the key to any future invasion of Scotland, was attacked on the night of 6 December 1312. The Scots were frustrated only by the timely barking of a dog inside the walls. Perth was taken early in 1313 after the Scots pretended to have broken off their siege and then scaled the walls at night; Dumfries fell a month later after a long siege, and Linlithgow when a loaded haywain concealing eight Scots was jammed into the gateway; Roxburgh was captured on 19–20 February 1314 by another surprise night attack; while Edinburgh was taken in March, again at night, after attackers had climbed the castle rock.¹⁸⁹ The captured castles were then demolished, to prevent the English reoccupying them and to avoid the need for the Scots to divert scarce resources in money and manpower. Finally, in March 1314, Stirling castle, the key to the Scottish Lowlands, which Edward I had captured in 1304, came under siege by Robert Bruce and his brother Edward.¹⁹⁰ If this fell, the English position in Scotland would be fatally undermined and their remaining Scottish supporters left with little option but to change sides or to flee.

Edward II's plans for a new Scottish campaign were already far advanced by this time. Although his military achievements were few and far between when compared with those of his father Edward I and his son Edward III, there is no reason to believe that Edward II was a reluctant warrior. Before 1314 he had campaigned in Scotland on five occasions, four times in his father's reign and once during his own. There is little doubt that he would have fought there more often if the financial and material resources had been available and if he had not been constantly distracted by his disputes with Lancaster and the other opposition magnates. In the summer of 1313 Edward's thoughts were again turning towards Scotland. The abortive parliament held in July 1313 was intended to consider the war, but the continuing negotiations between Edward and the magnates prevented any progress on this occasion. Once the negotiations were concluded in October and early November Edward's plans were developed steadily and with deliberation. The taxation granted to him by parliament in November 1313 was due to be collected by 24 June 1314.¹⁹¹ On 28 November Edward announced his intention to be at Berwick with his army, also on 24 June 1314, and called upon his loyal subjects in Scotland to continue their support.¹⁹² This was probably Edward's response to an assembly held by Robert Bruce at Dundee in October 1313, at which Bruce gave his enemies a year in which to swear fealty to him or lose their lands. At about the same time the Anglo-Scots of Lothian appealed to Edward for help and protection.¹⁹³ On 26 November Edward summoned a parliament to meet at Westminster on 21 April 1314, and presumably intended to discuss Scotland further,¹⁹⁴ and on 23 December he summoned the earl of Lancaster, seven other earls and eighty-seven barons to be at Berwick with their military service on 10 June 1314.¹⁹⁵ Edward even interceded with the emperor at Constantinople to ensure that an English knight, Sir Giles d'Argentein, the third best knight in Christendom according to John Barbour, would be released from captivity in Salonika in time to fight against the Scots.¹⁹⁶

The coming campaign was planned to be on a large scale. For the first time in the reign money was no problem: taxation, borrowings and Antonio Pessagno's credit operations ensured that. Edward was concerned that the purveyance of victuals should be made with all possible haste ‘as in the time of the king's father’.¹⁹⁷ The outcome was that supplies of grain and other foodstuffs were stockpiled at Carlisle and Berwick on a scale that exceeded anything achieved during the reign of Edward I.¹⁹⁸

By 26 February Edward had decided to go to Scotland shortly after Easter (7 April) and from then on the pace of events accelerated.¹⁹⁹ On 24 March he cancelled the parliament due to meet on 21 April because the Scots were threatening to invade the north of England and to attack Berwick, and replaced it with a summons to the earl of Lancaster and twenty-one other magnates to be at Newcastle on 1 June.²⁰⁰ The earl of Pembroke was appointed as keeper of Scotland and to act as the king's lieutenant in the north until his arrival; by 16 April he was already at Berwick.²⁰¹ Another loyal supporter of the king, Edmund Mauley the steward of the royal household, was given custody of the castle of Cockermouth in Cumberland.²⁰²

In March and April 1314 orders were sent out for the mustering of 17,000 infantry from English counties and 3,000 from Wales, to assemble at Berwick by 19May.²⁰³ Edward II's own personal retinue amounted to thirty-two bannerets and eighty-nine knights, over seventy of whom were recruited for the campaign and had not served him before.²⁰⁴ The earl of Pembroke also greatly enlarged his retinue for the occasion, having a total of about eighty knights and men-at-arms in his service, including the followers of two important magnates, his nephew John Hastings of Abergavenny and Maurice de Berkeley.²⁰⁵ With the followers of the earls of Gloucester and Hereford, Hugh Despenser, Robert de Clifford and other barons, it is likely that over 2,000 knights and men-at-arms were present in the army which fought at Bannockburn.²⁰⁶ The army as a whole did not however reach the size expected. The infantry contingent from England and Wales may have numbered as many as 15,000 of the 20,000 expected.²⁰⁷ Altogether Edward II may have had 15,000–20,000 infantry and cavalry under his command, still a very substantial force, and probably the largest army put into the field since Edward I's Falkirk campaign in 1298.²⁰⁸ Even the author of the Vita Edwardi Secundi, usually scathing in his criticism of Edward, was moved to remark that ‘all who were present agreed that never in our time has such an army marched out of England’.²⁰⁹

The only immediate fly in the ointment, apart from the uncertainty attaching to any military enterprise, however well prepared, was the failure to serve in person of four of the leading magnates, the earls of Lancaster, Warwick, Arundel and Surrey, who followed the precedent of 1310–11 and sent the minimum service required by law, possibly amounting to as few as sixty knights and men-at-arms in all.²¹⁰ Their argument that the campaign had not been decided upon in parliament was a transparent excuse,²¹¹ since a Scottish campaign had implicitly been part of the business of the parliament held in the autumn of 1313, when a subsidy had been granted for that purpose. The real cause of the absence of Lancaster and Warwick was their fear that if Edward were victorious in Scotland he would then turn against them in England,²¹² while a royal defeat would naturally strengthen their hand against the king. The earl of Surrey's absence may have been caused partly by his efforts to annul his marriage to Edward's niece, Joan de Bar, which probably put him on bad terms with the king,²¹³ but also by fear of Lancaster, who was an uncomfortably near neighbour of his in Yorkshire.²¹⁴ The earl of Arundel may have been influenced by the example of his brother-in-law, Surrey, or, as is more likely, he simply followed what he thought was the more powerful party. Of the magnates who accompanied the king to Scotland only Hereford's presence is of any special interest. Although a Lancastrian supporter in 1312, his part in persuading Lancaster to accept the outcome of the peace negotiations in 1312 and 1313 marked him out as a moderate. He was the king's brother-in-law, having married Edward's sister Elizabeth, the widowed countess of Holland, in 1302, and held the hereditary office of constable of England, which gave him a leading role in time of war. After the 1313 settlement he had remained at court and may even have made an indenture to serve the king in the 1314 campaign.²¹⁵

TO LOSE A BATTLE

Edward left Westminster to join his army in late March, was at St Albans abbey between 30 March and 1 April, and at Ely cathedral for Easter, 7 April, where he prepared himself spiritually for the coming campaign. He was probably in high spirits at the prospect of defeating Robert Bruce in battle: when shown the relics of St Alban kept at Ely he jokingly remarked that he had already seen them at St Albans.²¹⁶ After Easter Edward moved north, reaching York in early May, Durham on 21 May, Newminster in Northumberland on 26 May, and finally Berwick-upon-Tweed, where the army was gathering, on about 11 June.²¹⁷

While he was at Newminster Edward received the fateful news that Philip de Mowbray, the constable of Stirling had promised to surrender to the Scots unless relieved by Midsummer's Day (the Nativity of St John the Baptist), 24 June; and that ‘the Scots are striving to assemble great numbers of foot in strong and marshy places, extremely hard for cavalry to penetrate, between us and our castle of Stirling’.²¹⁸ The information at once determined the direction of the English advance and the location of any likely battlefield, but also gave the Scots ample time to prepare themselves. Edward thought about the implications and on 27 May ordered his infantry to be pushed forward as quickly as possible to prevent the fall of Stirling.²¹⁹

So far Edward and his military advisers had acted sensibly. Having carefully organized and planned the coming campaign, they were now reacting rationally to news of the enemy's activities and likely intentions and were aware of some at least of the dangers they were facing. They were also aware, momentarily at least, of the advantage that the employment of English and Welsh infantry, mostly archers, might have over the English heavy cavalry in any battle before Stirling. Despite the absence of Lancaster and the other earls, there were many experienced commanders in the army: the earls of Hereford and Pembroke (the latter had beaten Robert Bruce in battle at Methven in 1306), Robert de Clifford, and others, including the king himself. They had not however fought any serious actions against the Scots for several years and were in a sense ‘out of practice’. What they did not yet know, and possibly Robert Bruce himself did not yet know, was whether there would be a pitched battle at all. Edward also failed to foresee the danger that would be caused by discord between leading members of his own army and by his own over-confidence.

The English army set out from Berwick on 17 or 18 June.

There were in that company quite sufficient to penetrate the whole of Scotland, and some thought that if the whole strength of Scotland had been gathered together, they would not have stayed to face the king's army … The great number of wagons, if they had been placed end to end, would have stretched for twenty leagues.²²⁰ The king therefore took confidence and courage from so great and fine an army and hurried day after day to the appointed place, not as if he was leading an army to battle but rather as if he were going [on pilgrimage] to Santiago. Short were the halts for sleep, shorter still were those for food; hence horses, horsemen, and infantry were worn out with toil and hunger.²²¹

After a march of about 50 miles from Berwick, Edward and his army reached the vicinity of Stirling on 23 June.²²² Robert Bruce's army of about 500 light cavalry and 5,000–6,000 infantry, armed mainly with long spears,²²³ was drawn up in the ‘New Park’, a wooded hunting preserve through which the main road to Stirling passed. At the entrance to the New Park the road was about half a mile to the north of a stream flowing between steep banks, called the Bannock Burn,²²⁴ which was tidal at the point where it flowed into a bend of the River Forth. Much of the surrounding land was intersected by streams, known locally as pols or pows²²⁵ and was boggy. The high road along which the English army had to pass was raised above the surrounding land and extremely constricting for a large force with a long baggage train. In order to make life even more difficult for an advancing army Bruce had in effect laid a minefield by honeycombing ‘the ground on either side of the road with small pits or “pots”, covered with sticks and grass’.²²⁶

Two days of fighting ensued, on 23 and 24 June. The first day's action consisted of two skirmishes between English cavalry and the Scottish cavalry and infantry. Neither was decisive in itself, but together they provided an ill portent for the main battle that followed. The English vanguard was under the joint or rather competing control of two earls: Edward II's nephew, the twenty-three-year-old Gilbert de Clare, earl of Gloucester, eager for glory in his first battle, who claimed that his forebears had always commanded the vanguard; and Edward's brother-in-law, the veteran Humphrey de Bohun, earl of Hereford, hereditary constable of England, who believed that the command was his by right and was deeply offended by Edward's support of Gilbert's claim.²²⁷

As the vanguard advanced over the Bannock Burn and approached the Scottish lines, they saw Robert Bruce himself appear ahead of and separated from his followers. The earl of Hereford's nephew, Sir Henry de Bohun, took this as a golden opportunity to kill Bruce in single combat, and charged with the lance. Skilfully, Bruce avoided his opponent and with one blow of his battleaxe split Sir Henry's helmet and head in two. Bohun died on the spot. It was a telling moment of drama and was followed by a general mêlée, in which the earl of Gloucester was knocked off his horse.²²⁸

In the other engagement of the day, a division of English cavalry, led by Sir Thomas Gray and Sir Henry de Beaumont, headed directly for Stirling castle, either to discover whether the way was open for the main body of the army to follow or to relieve the castle. A well disciplined body of Scottish spearmen advanced to meet them. With no archers to attack the Scottish troops, who were in a close formation (or schiltrom), the English cavalry were helpless against the hedge of spears. Grey's horse was killed under him and he was captured; other English knights were killed too. The remainder withdrew, some making for Stirling castle and others for the main body of the army.²²⁹

Overnight the rest of the English cavalry force, and probably some of the infantry, crossed the Bannock Burn with difficulty and made camp. It was an anxious time since the English were disturbed by the events of the day before and were afraid of a Scottish night attack.²³⁰ The English high command suffered from deeply divided counsels. According to the Vita, the earl of Gloucester, together with the veteran and more experienced knights, advised the king not to fight the next day, but to rest and let his army recuperate as much as possible. Edward, who had been with the rearguard and had not witnessed the previous day's fighting at first hand, was furious and ‘scorned the earl's advice, and grew very heated with him, charging him with treachery and deceit. “Today”, said the earl, “it will be clear that I am neither a traitor nor a liar”’.²³¹ Had the English but known it, the Scots were also unsure of themselves. Bruce wished to avoid the risk of defeat in a pitched battle and was considering a withdrawal into rough country where the English army could not easily follow him. Allegedly his mind was changed by Sir Alexander Seton, a Scottish knight in English service, who saw how demoralized and divided the English were and changed sides during the night.²³²

On the following day, 24 June, the feast of the Nativity of St John the Baptist, the English army advanced from their uncomfortable overnight encampment on to an area of ground, identified by Professor Barrow as lying between Balquiderock and Broomridge.²³³Here the battle would be fought. It was at least firm ground, but it was too small to allow full deployment of the English cavalry and infantry. The steep-sided Bannock Burn and marshy ground lay behind and the Firth of Forth on their flank. If anything went wrong, there would be no easy escape.²³⁴ It is arguable, however, that Edward and his commanders had no intention of fighting on this constricted piece of ground, since they did not seriously expect the Scots to fight and were deployed in a line of advance designed to bring them along the road to Stirling castle but not for battle. When the Scots attacked unexpectedly on the English flank, Edward II and his army were therefore not well placed to fight back.²³⁵

Instead of melting away, the Scots advanced. Their infantry first emerged from the New Park where they had been hidden and then stopped and knelt down to pray. When Edward II saw this he thought at first that they were kneeling in submission and refused to believe that the Scots intended to fight²³⁶ until after an exchange of arrows between both sides.²³⁷ The English vanguard, led by the earl of Gloucester, then charged the Scottish infantry, but could not break through the mass of spears. Determined to maintain his honour and his claim to command, the earl of Gloucester charged ahead of the rest, was cut off and killed.²³⁸ Had he been wearing a surcoat bearing his arms, he might have been recognized and saved for ransom, but the press of men and horses was so great that nothing was likely to preserve him.²³⁹

The Scottish infantry then advanced in close formation on the rest of the English cavalry, who were so tightly bunched together that they were pressed against the Scottish spears and suffered severely.²⁴⁰ In a similar critical situation at the battle of Falkirk in 1298, Edward I had saved the day by introducing his archers, who shot down the Scottish spearmen in their thousands.²⁴¹ This would not happen again. In 1314 the archers were kept in the rear instead of protecting the flanks of the cavalry.²⁴² By the time some archers were brought up to the front of the battle, it was too late. The small force of Scottish cavalry charged them and drove them in confusion from the battlefield. The battle then turned into a grim slaughter of the English cavalry.²⁴³

Edward II gave no speech to his troops before the battle²⁴⁴ and appears to have played little part in its direction, apart from his determination to fight an army which he regarded as little more than a rabble.²⁴⁵ Once the fighting started, the very constricted space in which the battle was fought soon took its conduct beyond the control of Edward or any of his commanders. Edward stayed with a division of cavalry, and was flanked for his immediate protection by the earl of Pembroke and Sir Giles d'Argentein. At all costs Edward had to be saved, since his capture by the Scots would have turned disaster into catastrophe. As soon as defeat became obvious Pembroke seized the reins of the king's horse and led him away from the battle ‘against his will, for it pained him to leave’. ‘When the Scottish knights, who were on foot, grabbed the caparison of the king's warhorse with their hands to bring him to a halt, he struck behind him with a mace, so forcefully that there were none that he hit, whom he did not beat to the ground.’ Edward's horse was wounded in the belly and could go no further, but he was remounted on a riding horse. Once he was sure that Edward could reach safety, Sir Giles d'Argentein, like the blind king John of Bohemia at the battle of Crécy in 1346, rode back into the thick of the fight and was killed.²⁴⁶ The death of Sir Edmund Mauley, the steward of the king's household, and the capture of one of his household clerks, the keeper of his privy seal, Sir Roger de Northburgh, together with both the seal and the king's shield, are another indication of just how close a call Edward experienced.²⁴⁷ It was no wonder that Edward made a vow to the Virgin Mary that if he escaped he would found a house for twenty-four Carmelites at Oxford.²⁴⁸

Edward and his escort of about 500 men first went to Stirling castle, where the constable Philip de Mowbray according to different reports either told Edward that if he came inside he would be besieged and captured by the Scots or refused to admit him.²⁴⁹Edward then made his way to Dunbar castle, pursued by a troop of Scottish cavalry led by Sir James Douglas, who captured any English knights who lagged behind through fatigue or to relieve themselves.²⁵⁰ Edward was lucky that Patrick, the earl of Dunbar, who held Dunbar castle and who had upheld the English cause in Lothian, decided to help. Instead of taking Edward prisoner,²⁵¹ he performed one last service for the English crown. From Dunbar Edward escaped by sea to Berwick,²⁵² which he reached on 27 June. There he was met by Isabella, who supervised the cleaning of his armour and loaned him her privy seal, in place of his own.²⁵³ From the time he left Berwick, at the head of a splendidly equipped and confident army, to his return in humiliation, only ten days had elapsed.

With Edward's departure from the battlefield the English army dissolved into panic-stricken flight. Many men and horses were lost trying to cross the Bannock Burn; others were drowned in the River Forth. Of those who escaped, one force of Welsh infantry, numbering several thousand, kept its order and managed to reach Carlisle; many other members of the English army made their way back to Berwick.²⁵⁴ In the absence of muster rolls for the Scottish campaign, there is no way of knowing the total English losses:²⁵⁵Barbour's figure of 30,000 dead is greater than the numbers engaged on both sides combined, while his figure of 200 spurs taken from dead knights and men-at-arms might even be an underestimate.²⁵⁶ But there are some indications. Apart from the deaths of the earl of Gloucester, Giles d'Argentein and Edmund Mauley, others killed included Sir Robert de Clifford, a prominent political figure and one of the leading commanders in the battle, Sir Payn Tybetot, and Sir William Marshal, a former Ordainer.²⁵⁷The Annales Londonienses, probably reflecting a contemporary newsletter, lists about forty knights among the dead, including those already mentioned.²⁵⁸ The earl of Pembroke narrowly escaped with his life, but at least four of the knights in his retinue were killed, either in the battle itself or in covering Edward's flight to Dunbar through Linlithgow and Winchburgh.²⁵⁹ One of those who died was John Comyn, Pembroke's nephew and son of John Comyn of Badenoch who had been murdered by Robert Bruce in 1306, a reminder that the Anglo-Scottish war embraced a civil war within Scotland as well as a war for an independent Scotland.²⁶⁰

Many others were taken captive by the Scots. The most notable prisoner was the earl of Hereford, who fled with many others to Bothwell castle, believing it still to be under English control, only to find that its Scottish constable, Walter Fitz Gilbert, had decided to change sides.²⁶¹ Other prisoners included the earl of Angus, Robert de Umfraville, and Ingram de Umfraville, both Scots in the English service; John de Segrave; Anthony de Lucy; Ralph de Monthermer, the stepfather of the dead earl of Gloucester and formerly titular earl of Gloucester himself; and John Giffard.²⁶² At least ten of the earl of Pembroke's retainers, including several members of the Berkeley family, were also captured.²⁶³

Material losses were enormous.

Amongst all their misfortunes this one thing at least turned to the advantage of our army, that, while our people sought safety in flight, a great part of the Scottish army turned to plunder; because, if all the Scots had been equally intent on the pursuit of our men, few of our men would have escaped the Scots … Oh! day of vengeance and misfortune, day of ruin and dishonour, evil and accursed day, not to be reckoned in our calendar, that stained the reputation of the English, and robbed the English and enriched the Scots, in which our men's costly belongings, valued at two hundred thousand pounds, were snatched away! So many fine noblemen, [and] strong young men, so many noble horses, so much military equipment, costly garments, and gold plate – all lost in one harsh day, one fleeting hour.²⁶⁴

While the author of the Vita Edwardi Secundi spoke of the shame and dishonour and the human and material losses brought about by the battle, he was also aware that it had a wider significance in the history of warfare. ‘Indeed I think it is unheard of in our time for such an army to be scattered so suddenly by infantry, unless when the flower of France fell before the Flemings at Courtrai [in 1302].’²⁶⁵ He was perfectly right in his perception that something was shifting in the balance between cavalry and infantry. For the well armed and heavily armoured man on horseback war was an exciting and sometimes dangerous sport, but he did not expect to be killed, least of all by his despised social inferiors, the infantry armed with spears or with bows. The battle of Courtrai²⁶⁶ and now the battle fought near Stirling²⁶⁷ had shown that even the most noble of men was in danger of losing his life at the hands of infantry. Within a few years English tactics were to change dramatically: knights and men-at-arms would now fight on foot alongside archers and would win great victories against both the Scots and the French.²⁶⁸

English armies were not used to being defeated by the Scots, whom they had overwhelmed in previous encounters such as the battles of the Standard in 1138, Dunbar in 1296 and Falkirk in 1298. English expectations were coloured by these experiences, making it all too easy to forget their embarrassing defeat by William Wallace at Stirling Bridge in 1297 (Edward I was not present, so perhaps this did not count as a ‘real’ trial of arms between the English and the Scots) and the close-run battle at Falkirk, when the intervention of the English archers turned the tide. Robert Bruce understood as well as anyone else that to challenge the king of England in open battle was to take a grave risk. This is why he appears to have delayed his decision to fight Edward II before Stirling until the last possible moment, knowing finally that the English were both overconfident of victory and divided in their counsels and that the choice of battlefield was favourable to the Scots. But it also explains why most of the Scottish campaigning during the war with England consisted either of surprise attacks on English-held castles or of swiftly moving raiding parties made up of the light cavalry known as hobelars.²⁶⁹

There was no escaping the scale and the significance of the disaster suffered by the English at Bannockburn. The largest and best equipped English army in a generation had been routed by a much smaller Scottish force. The battle gave the Scots a great advantage in their war with England. The fortress of Stirling, for whose relief the battle was nominally fought, swiftly fell into Scottish hands and was demolished.²⁷⁰ The position of Scottish supporters of the English crown was now untenable. Only those who were attached to the English court, such as Robert de Umfraville and David de Strathbogie, the earls of Angus and Atholl, could continue their allegiance, while Donald, earl of Mar, a Scottish prisoner in England who was released as a consequence of Bannockburn, elected to stay in England and to serve the English crown.²⁷¹ Robert Bruce was now free, if he wished, to resume raiding the northern counties of England with renewed ferocity and also to consider opening a new front against England in the lordship of Ireland. Bruce used his victory to obtain good value from his most prominent prisoners, obtaining the release of his wife, daughter and sister in return for the earl of Hereford.²⁷² Bruce could also afford to be generous in victory. The bodies of the earl of Gloucester and Robert de Clifford were returned to their families for burial, while two of his prisoners, the Yorkshire knight Sir Marmaduke de Tweng and Sir Ralph de Monthermer, were released without any demand for ransom.²⁷³ The latter brought back with him Edward II's privy seal which had been captured in the battle.²⁷⁴

However, Bruce's victory did not win the war or secure the independence of Scotland. Edward II was defeated in battle in 1314 but there was no indication that either he or any of his leading subjects believed that the war itself was lost and that Bruce should be formally recognized as king of the Scots. If Edward II had even thought of ending the war by recognizing Robert Bruce – and there is not the slightest evidence that he did so – his deposition from the throne might have occurred even sooner than it did. Only the capture of Edward at Bannockburn and a subsequent deal to ransom him might have given Bruce what he wanted, and even then such an agreement under duress would probably have been repudiated the moment Edward set foot back on English soil.²⁷⁵ The war between England and Scotland was doomed to drag on with no end in sight.

¹ Vita, 52–3.

² These details are taken from Hamilton, 99–100, 166–7. The body was to stay in Oxford until Dec. 1314 when it was moved to the king's palace at Langley and finally buried amidst great splendour in the Dominican church there in Jan. 1315.

³ Hamilton, 100–2, 167; Hamilton, ‘Another daughter?’ On the fate of other members of Gaveston's family and his former retainers see Hamilton, 102, 167.

⁴ For the text of a poem written in approval of his death, see Hamilton, 102–3.

⁵ Vita, 52–3. The earl of Warwick was already at Worcester on 22 June, three days after Gaveston's death: BL, Add. Ms. 28024, ff. 122, 122d (Beauchamp cartulary).

⁶ DL 25/1900. In this document Percy gave his support to the earl of Hereford ‘in the quarrel touching Sir Piers de Gaveston’. It is likely that he gave similar guarantees to the other earls. When Percy's change of sides became known, orders were given on 30 and 31 July for his arrest and for the seizure of his lands into royal hands: Foedera, II, i, 173.

⁷ C 53/98,m.2; E 101/375/8, f. 27; E 101/374/17; Ann. Lond., 208.

⁸ See Phillips, chs 2 & 3; Maddicott, 132–3. Significantly, Pembroke was instrumental in ordering the arrest of Percy: Foedera, II, i, 173.

⁹ Vita, 54–5.

¹⁰ Flores, 336–7; Vita, 54–5.

¹¹ Flores, 337. The figure of 1,000 men-at-arms suggested by Flores may be exaggerated but between them the king and his magnate supporters could probably have put together an effective force: Phillips, 39. Dr Alistair Tebbit has made a detailed study of Edward II's household knights and their numbers in his 2006 Bristol Ph.D. thesis, ‘The household knights of Edward II, 1307–1326’, and in his paper ‘Household knights and military service under the direction of Edward II’, in Dodd & Musson, eds, The Reign of Edward II, 76–96.

¹² Vita, 54–5.

¹³ In sharp contrast with the autumn of 1326 when the loss of London helped to ensure Edward II's loss of his throne.

¹⁴ Ann. Lond., 208, which has the French texts of the king's speech and the citizens' reply; Williams, Medieval London, 272.

¹⁵ He was at Dover between about 7 and 9 Aug. and at Canterbury and other places in Kent until the middle of Aug.

¹⁶ Ann. Lond., 209; Maddicott, 133. The earl of Surrey also organized the defences of Sussex which were under threat from the men of the earl of Arundel and others: SC 1/50/63; SC 1/49/8 & 103.

¹⁷ Although the earls were ordered on 4 Aug. not to bring armed retainers to the parliament which had been summoned to meet at Westminster on 20 Aug., it was probably clear then that they would defy the command: CPR, 1307–13, 489–90.

¹⁸ E 101/375/8, f. 38; CPR, 1307–13, 486.

¹⁹ CPR, 1307–13, 489–90. The language of the Latin original is much stronger: see PW, II, ii, App., 53, and Foedera, II, i, 175. Edward's envoy, John Benstede, met Lancaster near Blackburn on 19 Aug.: E 101/309/18.

²⁰ Phillips, 40–1. Arnaud Nouvel was a Cistercian monk and master of Roman law from the Languedoc; he was also papal vice-chancellor; Arnaud d'Aux came from Gascony and had close ties to Clement V: Menache, Clement V, 44–5, 80.

²¹ Ann. Paul., 271–2; Phillips, 43.

²² Foedera, II, i, 175, 196, 203; Phillips, 71–2. One of the envoys was Bertrand de Sauviac, count of Campania, a nephew of Clement V.

²³ Phillips, 41.

²⁴ Both men were French magnates in their own right. Pembroke held Montignac and other lands in Poitou and was married to Beatrice, daughter of Ralph de Clermont, constable of France. Henry de Beaumont was the younger son of Louis de Brienne, viscount of Beaumont in Maine, and distantly related to Edward II's mother, Eleanor of Castile: Phillips, 3–5; article on Beaumont by J.R. Maddicott in Oxford DNB.

²⁵ Foedera, II, i, 175; CPL, 1305–42, 104, 107; E 101/375/8, ff. 7, 9; Phillips, 40. Raymond entered Edward II's service on 15 Aug.: E 101/375/8, f. 10.

²⁶ Ann. Paul., 271–2; Phillips, 43, 47, 65–6.

²⁷ With Gaveston out of the way, Philip IV was now much more prepared to help his fellow ruler and son-in-law: cf. Maddicott, 136–7.

²⁸ In 1264 Louis had ruled against the baronial plan of reform of 1258 and in favour of Henry III, while in 1305 Clement V had absolved Edward I of his oath to uphold the Articuli super Cartas of 1300: Maddicott, Simon de Montfort, 258–65; Menache, Clement V, 251–3. The barons had good reason to be cautious since the French clerks who drew up the objections to the Ordinances later in 1312 raised these precedents: Ann. Lond., 212.

²⁹ Trokelowe, 78; Ann. Lond., 210; Vita, 56–7; Maddicott, 133.

³⁰ Although the Vita, 56–7, says that the magnates reached London, there is nothing to suggest that Lancaster and his colleagues did in fact enter the city: cf. Maddicott, 133.

³¹ CPR, 1307–13, 490.

³² Williams, Medieval London, 273.

³³ Ann. Lond., 215–17; Ann. Paul., 272; Williams, 273; Phillips, 44–5.

³⁴ CPR, 1307–13, 498; CCR, 1307–13, 481; Foedera, II, i, 181. These orders were issued ‘on the information of Pembroke’, i.e. at his instigation.

³⁵ CCR, 1307–13, 475. The earl of Gloucester's mediating role is particularly emphasized in the Vita, 58–9.

³⁶ Trokelowe, 77–8.

³⁷ Trokelowe, 77–8; Phillips, 44; Maddicott, 134.

³⁸ This probably explains the presence of the bishop of Norwich at St Albans on 24 Sept.: Norfolk and Norwich Record Office, Register of John Salmon, f. 48.

³⁹ CPR, 1307–13, 498. As each safe conduct expired, it was renewed for a further period. A stimulus for the opening of negotiations was probably given by the presence in the king's company at Windsor of the papal envoys on 15 Sept., the earls of Gloucester and Richmond on 16 Sept., and of Pembroke on 26 Sept.: E 101/375/2, m.3.

⁴⁰ Phillips, 43–4; Maddicott, 135.

⁴¹ DL 36/2/208. Clifford is known to have stayed at his hospice next to St Dunstan's in Fleet Street: E 403/164, m.2.

⁴² Vita, 58–61. On baronial threats to restrain or even to remove the king see Vita, lvi–lvii.

⁴³ The first two are known only from the Ann. Lond., 210–15. Stubbs's marginal date of July 1312 for both documents appears to be a guess which is not supported by other evidence. The Rationes Baronum are known from the report on the negotiations of 1312–13 compiled by the papal envoys and preserved in ASV, Instrumenta Miscellanea, 5947. The document has been edited by R.A. Roberts as Edward II, the Lords Ordainers and Piers Gaveston's Jewels and Horses, Camden 3rd ser., xli (London, 1929). There is also a transcript of the document in The National Archives: PRO 31/9/59.

⁴⁴ Both men were also involved in the making of the treaty of 20 Dec.: Foedera, II, i, 191–2.

⁴⁵ Ann. Lond., 211–15

⁴⁶ Ann. Lond., 215; Phillips, 47; Maddicott, 136–7.

⁴⁷ There is no evidence that this was the case, but the document, or something like it, would have been useful in trying to persuade the pope to annul the Ordinances.

⁴⁸ Ann. Lond., 210–11; Phillips, 47; Maddicott, 135.

⁴⁹ Phillips, 47; Maddicott, 135.

⁵⁰ Vita, 62–5; Lanercost, 219; Phillips, 47–8; Maddicott, 135.

⁵¹ The first 12 membranes of the report refer wholly to events in 1313; the next three, which include the Rationes Baronum and the treaty of 20 Dec., refer to problems which were no longer issues in 1313 but do fit the context of late 1312: Edward II, ed. Roberts.

⁵² Edward II, ed. Roberts, 15–17; Phillips, 48–9.

⁵³ For the text of the treaty see Edward II, ed. Roberts, 17–21; Foedera, II, i, 191–2; Ann. Lond., 221–5. There are several other copies in manuscript: see Phillips, 49, n. 4.

⁵⁴ Phillips, 49–50; Maddicott, 137–9.

⁵⁵ Lay Taxes, 30–1. A tallage, which was a tax imposed on royal lands and on boroughs at the king's discretion, did not require the approval of parliament, but such levies were now very rare and met with increasing resistance. The 1312 tallage yielded less than the 1304 tallage. Payments were slow and were still being received in May 1316. In June 1332 Edward III also attempted to levy a tallage but was forced to abandon it during the parliament of the following Sept.: Lay Taxes, 37. For fuller details of the 1312 parliament see PROME.

⁵⁶ The details of the birth and baptism are given in CCR, 1307–13, 558; Foedera, II, i, 187. Edward II had a special veneration for the chapel of St Edward, which had originally been built by Henry III, but which was refurbished and re-established by Edward II in 1313. See ch. 2 of this book.

⁵⁷ Trokelowe, 79; Historia Anglicana, 134–5; Maddicott, 152. In a marginal note the editor of Walsingham identifies the proposed name as Louis, but there is nothing in the text to indicate whether Louis or Philip was intended. This episode may help to explain the bitter words exchanged between the French envoys and the English magnates at the Christmas feast: Historia Anglicana, 135.

⁵⁸ Ann. Lond., 221; Doherty (D.Phil.), 49–50; idem, Isabella, 55. Isabella had been given the manor of Eltham in Nov. 1311: CPR, 1307–13, 395, 398.

⁵⁹ Edmund had to wait until 1321 for his promotion, when he was made earl of Kent.

⁶⁰ Doherty (D.Phil.), 33, 39; idem, Isabella, 48–50.

⁶¹ Doherty (D.Phil.), 35, 39; idem, Isabella, 48–9.

⁶² Doherty (D.Phil.), 39; Doherty, Isabella, 49. Her household records for 1311–12, in BL, Cotton Ms. Nero C. VIII, ff. 121–52, have been edited by F.D. Blackley & G. Hermansen as The Household Book of Queen Isabella of England for the Fifth Regnal Year of Edward II (Edmonton, Alberta, 1971). In the previous year, 1310–11, her household expenses were still accounted for as part of Edward II's household. At that time only 60 people were listed as members of her household: E 101/374/5, ff. 32–33v.

⁶³ Doherty (D.Phil.), 40–1; Doherty, Isabella, 49–50. Cf. Maddicott, 124–5.

⁶⁴ Isabella was still only sixteen and unlikely to have been able to have children much earlier than 1312.

⁶⁵ Bod., Tanner Ms. 197, f. 54; Doherty (D.Phil.), 41; Doherty, Isabella, 51. The practice was associated with Christ's resurrection. Any man found still in bed on Easter Monday morning could be ‘taken prisoner’ and made to pay for his release. The amount of Edward's ‘ransom’ in 1312 was £20. The custom went back to the reign of Edward I: Prestwich, ‘The court of Edward II’, 66.

⁶⁶ CCR, 1307–13, 459–60; Trokelowe, 75–6; Isabella's Household Book, xxvi; Maddicott, 125. Trokelowe's account confuses the events of 1312 with those of October 1322 when Isabella was left at Tynemouth after Edward II's defeat by the Scots at Byland.

⁶⁷ Doherty (D.Phil.), 47; idem, Isabella, 54.

⁶⁸ According to Doherty (D. Phil.), 47, n. 4, during this period Edward left Windsor on c. 25 Oct., returned on the 30th, left again on 9 Nov. and returned on 12 Nov., the day before his son's birth: citing E 101/375/2, m.4. However, the details given in Itinerary, ed. Hallam, suggest that Edward was at Windsor for most if not all of this time. This seems more likely, since Edward probably did not want to be too close to the scene of the negotiations with the opposition magnates at the Temple.

⁶⁹ This document is calendared very briefly in CPR, 1307–13, p. 508, but the full text is given from the Patent Roll in Foedera, II, i, 184.

⁷⁰ AN, J 633, no. 34.

⁷¹ AN, J 403, which contains French royal wills does not include any mention of that of Isabella.

⁷² E 159/89, m.15; Doherty (D.Phil.), 47; idem, Isabella, 54.

⁷³ CPR, 1307–13, 516, 546–7; PW, II, ii, 93.

⁷⁴ For the background to the dispute between De la Pole and Charlton, which erupted every time there was a national crisis, see R. Owen, ‘Welsh Pool and Powys-Land’, Collections relating to Montgomeryshire, xxix (Welshpool, 1929), 257–60; and M.C. Jones, ‘The feudal barons of Powys’, ibid., i (1868). For the immediate situation see Maddicott, 140–2.

⁷⁵ CPR, 1307–13, 546; Foedera, II, i, 194; PW, II, ii, 80.

⁷⁶ For the complicated details of this episode see Phillips, 54–5, citing Edward II, ed. Roberts, 1–2, 4–5, 8; Maddicott, 139.

⁷⁷ Edward II, ed. Roberts, 2–7; Phillips, 55; Maddicott, 143.

⁷⁸ CCR, 1307–13, 504; Phillips, 55, n. 3.

⁷⁹ Edward II, ed. Roberts, 7; Phillips, 56; Maddicott, 142–3.

⁸⁰ See the discussion of this issue in Chaplais, 90–1.

⁸¹ Edward II, ed. Roberts, 7–9. For further details see Phillips, 56. There is no evidence that Lancaster and Warwick did hold such a meeting.

⁸² Edward II, ed. Roberts, 9–10, 12, 15.

⁸³ Ibid., 9–12; SC 1/49/21; Phillips, 57; Maddicott, 144.

⁸⁴ Edward II, ed. Roberts, 12–13.

⁸⁵ Lancaster was probably there on 16 Feb.: DL 25/2253.

⁸⁶ Edward II, ed. Roberts, 13–15; Phillips, 58; Maddicott, 145.

⁸⁷ Edward II, ed. Roberts, 13–15; Foedera, II, i, 203–5 (text of the letters patent in French of Edward II acknowledging receipt of the jewels and horses, and including a detailed inventory of all the items). For a copy of the French text see Chaplais, 125–34; and for an English translation see Hamilton, 119–27. The king's letters of acquittance were dated at Windsor on 27 Feb. The actual delivery of the jewels took place c. 23 Feb.; the horses were returned during the following month: Edward II, ed. Roberts, 16–17.

⁸⁸ Vita, 66–7.

⁸⁹ Ann. Lond., 225, 227.

⁹⁰ Ann. Lond., 225–9. The document is known only from this source.

⁹¹ ‘par encheson de Pieres de G.’: Ann. Lond., 226; i.e. they did not claim that the goods necessarily belonged to Gaveston personally.

⁹² Ann. Lond., 225–9; Phillips, 59.

⁹³ CPR, 1307–13, 569; PW, II, ii, 94.

⁹⁴ The most pressing appeal had been made by a leading Gascon nobleman, Amanieu d'Albret, against John de Ferrers, the former seneschal of Gascony. The dispute between the two men had led in 1312 to open war in the duchy and to the murder of Ferrers: GR, 1307–17, no. 834; Vale, 164–73.

⁹⁵ The Process of Périgueux was the successor to the inconclusive Process of Montreuil in May and June 1306: see Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration, 87–100.

⁹⁶ CCR, 1307–13, 488, 496; Foedera, II, i, 190.

⁹⁷ For further details of the problems the embassy (esp. Pembroke) had to deal with see Phillips, 60–1; Vale, 164–73.

⁹⁸ Pembroke left London on 10 or 11 Feb. and reached Paris by 2 March: CCR, 1307–13, 567; E 101/375/8, f. 19; GR, 1307–17, no. 1171.

⁹⁹ AN, J 918, no. 18 (the original letters patent under the seal of Edward II); a copy is preserved in BL, Cotton Ms. Julius E. I, f. 45 (a register of Gascon documents).

¹⁰⁰ Edward II, ed. Roberts, 21–2; GR, 1307–17, no. 846.

¹⁰¹ AN, J 633, no. 35 (original letters patent of the earl of Pembroke). Pembroke then returned to England, probably in order to attend the parliament which was due to start on 18 March; he left behind the bishop of Exeter and Thomas de Cobham to continue the embassy's other business: E 101/375/8, ff. 19–20; Phillips, 61.

¹⁰² E 101/375/2, m.9; Vita, 66–7; CCR, 1307–13, 579.

¹⁰³ Vita, 66–7; Maddicott, 149.

¹⁰⁴ CCR, 1307–13, 583; E 101/375/2, m.9. The English contingent amounted to about 220 people in all: Foedera, II, i, 212–13.

¹⁰⁵ E 101/375/8, f. 30v; E 101/375/2, mm.9, 10.

¹⁰⁶ For a detailed account see Brown & Regalado. For a timetable of the events in Paris between 2 and 10 June, see ibid., 60–1, table 3.1.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 59; 76, n. 22.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 59–62.

¹⁰⁹ E 101/375/8, ff. 20, 30v; E 30/1422 (certificate of taking the cross by Edward and Isabella); Grandes Chroniques de France, ed. J. Viard, viii (Paris, 1934), 288–9; Brown & Regalado, 60, 64. Philip IV was acting in fulfilment of a vow he had made at the Council of Vienne in April 1312: ibid., 63.

¹¹⁰ Chronique métrique de Godefroy de Paris, ed. J.-A. Buchon (Paris, 1827), 186–7; Brown & Regalado, 60–1.

¹¹¹ Brown & Regalado, 62–3, 66. See also the map of Paris in 1313, ibid., 65.

¹¹² Godefroy de Paris, ed. Buchon, 186.

¹¹³ Brown & Regalado, 59, 62–3; 77, n. 24; 78–9, nn. 37–41. On 14 June Edward had to pay a Paris citizen 60s for the grass eaten by the oxen given to him by Philip IV: E 101/375/8, f. 32; Brown & Regalado, 77, n. 24.

¹¹⁴ This is the tactful description of the event by Godefroy de Paris: ed. Buchon, 194; Brown & Regalado, 60. Later in the day, however, he did make an offering in the Sainte-Chapelle.

¹¹⁵ See Brown & Regalado, 72–3.

¹¹⁶ The ms. is preserved as BN, Latin Ms. 8504. The tales originated in India in a Sanskrit book of fables of about the third century and were passed via Persian and Arabic across the Muslim world to Muslim and Christian Spain. They were translated from Arabic into Castilian under the auspices of Edward II's uncle, Alfonso X of Castile in about 1251: Dictionary of the Middle Ages, ed. J.R. Strayer, iii (New York, 1983), 31–2. For a more detailed study of this very interesting text see N. F. Regalado, ‘Kalila et Dimna, Liber regius’, in Satura: Studies in Medieval Literature in Honour of Robert R. Raymo, ed. N.M. Reale & R.E. Sternglantz (Donington, Lincs, 2001), 103–23 (note that in the list of contents the title of this paper is given as ‘Raymond de Béziers's Kalila et Dimna (Paris, BNF Ms. Lat. 8504): inscribing a tutorial performance in a primer for princes’).

¹¹⁷ BN, Latin Ms. 8504, ff. 1v–2.

¹¹⁸ For a discussion of the manuscript and a description of the miniatures see Brown & Regalado, 58, 61.

¹¹⁹ Philip and Edward are shown followed by the rulers of Castile and the German Empire, ‘as they face the enemy in the apocalyptic guise of dragon, beast and false prophet’: Lewis, ‘Apocalypse’; see esp. 224–7. The illustration is reproduced in ibid., 227, from f. 50 of this ms.

¹²⁰ Brown & Regalado, 72; 85, n. 110.

¹²¹ Foedera, II, i, 220; E 30/52 & 612; C 47/27/8/29; C 47/29/7/19; C 47/30/4/26; Phillips, 63–4.

¹²² C 47/29/7/17; GR, 1307–17, no. 979; Phillips, 64; Vale, 172–3.

¹²³ Cf. Lalou, ‘Les Négociations’, 349. As vassals of the French crown, kings of England could technically be called upon to provide military service to their overlord in respect of their duchy of Aquitaine. Service had never in fact been provided, although Edward II was to give Louis X some naval assistance against Flanders in 1315: Vale, 59. Edward had his own problems with Flanders, which was providing food supplies to the Scots: Foedera, II, i, 210.

Edward had however made one important concession concerning Flanders even before leaving for France when he issued the Ordinance of the Staple, which ordered that all English wool merchants should sell their wool at a single ‘staple town’ on the continent, rather than in a variety of places as in the past. Tout believed that this decision was somehow connected with the Ordinances of 1311 and with the attempts of the Ordainers to impose a greater degree of control on the royal system of administration. A more likely explanation is that it was a gesture to Philip IV of France, who was anxious not to see the staple at Bruges, in the county of Flanders, and also an attempt to persuade the Flemings to cease their assistance of the Scots. By May 1314 the staple was located at Saint Omer, in the county of Artois, a loyal part of the kingdom of France: Tout, Place of the Reign, 221–6; W. S. Reid, ‘The Scots and the Staple Ordinance of 1313’, Speculum, xxxiv (1959), 598–610.

¹²⁴ Brown & Regalado, 72; 85, n. 109; C 47/29/8/2, a protest by the English parliament later in the summer of 1313.

¹²⁵ Brown & Regalado, 72; 85, n. 114.

¹²⁶ E 101/375/8, f. 30; Phillips, Medieval Expansion, 129; and, more generally, ch. 7, ‘The lost alliance: European monarchs and Mongol “crusaders”’; Brown & Regalado, 72; 85, n. 115. Whether Guillaume's visit to France was more than a coincidence and was part of another attempt by the Mongol ruler of Persia (although himself now a Muslim) to engage France and England in a joint campaign against Muslim Egypt is unknown. The most recent Mongol efforts to achieve this had taken place in 1307, just as Edward II became king: Phillips, 128–9.

¹²⁷ Chronique métrique de Godefroy de Paris, ed. Buchon, 196–7: ‘Oduard car nus toute nue / la royne mist en la rue’. This probably means in their nightclothes, rather than literally naked: Brown & Regalado, 71.

¹²⁸ Doherty (D. Phil.), 53; idem, Isabella, 56–7. Doherty rightly discounts Trease's suggestion that a miscarriage some time in 1313 is the explanation of Isabella's illness: H. Trease, ‘The spicers and apothecaries of the royal household in the reigns of Edward I and Edward II’, Nottingham Medieval Studies, iii (1959), xlvi.

¹²⁹ CCR, 1313–18, 66; Foedera, II, i, 222; Phillips 64.

¹³⁰ PW, II, ii, 94; Vita, 66–7.

¹³¹ CPR, 1307–13, 594; Phillips, 64; Maddicott, 150.

¹³² Vita, 72–3; Phillips, 64; Maddicott, 150.

¹³³ C 81/85/2746A; Phillips, 64.

¹³⁴ Denton, Robert Winchelsey, 15–16.

¹³⁵ Menache, Clement V, 63–4; Wright, The Church and the English Crown, 245–6; Vita, 76–9.

¹³⁶ Trinity College Cambridge, Ms. R.5.41, f. 112d (a continuation of the chronicle of Gervase of Canterbury); Trivet (Cont.), 11; Ann. Paul., 275; Trokelowe, 82; Phillips, 72.

¹³⁷ SC 1/49/22; C 53/100, m.7; PW, II, ii, 114.

¹³⁸ SC 1/49/23; Foedera, II, i, 226; Philips, 65. The dispatch of French envoys had probably been discussed while Edward was in Paris. The two papal envoys had been seeking the return of Louis of Évreux since the previous Feb.: Edward II, ed. Roberts, 22. On de Marigny see J. Favier, Un conseiller de Philippe le Bel (Paris, 1963).

¹³⁹ Foedera, II, i, 227–8; Phillips, 65; Maddicott, 150.

¹⁴⁰ Vita, 74–5.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.; Flores, 337; E 101/375/9, f. 33; Phillips, 66; Maddicott, 150.

¹⁴² CPR, 1313–17, 27, 29; Phillips, 66.

¹⁴³ Liber de Antiquis Legibus, ed. Stapleton, 252 (this is a London chronicle); Vita, 74–5; Phillips, 67; Maddicott, 151.

¹⁴⁴ Liber de Antiquis Legibus, 252.

¹⁴⁵ CPR, 1313–17, 21–6; Phillips, 66–7; Maddicott, 150–1.

¹⁴⁶ CPR, 1313–17, 26; Ann. Lond., 224; Phillips, 67.

¹⁴⁷ CPR, 1313–17, 25; Ann. Lond., 227; Phillips, 67.

¹⁴⁸ CPR, 1313–17, 26; Ann. Lond., 227; Phillips, 67; Maddicott, 150.

¹⁴⁹ Edward II, ed. Roberts, 15; CPR, 1307–13, 546–7; CPR, 1313–17, 26, 66; Phillips, 67; Maddicott, 150–1.

¹⁵⁰ Except for the removal of the clauses concerning Henry de Beaumont: CPR, 1313–17, 27, 29; Phillips, 67.

¹⁵¹ The Vita, 74–7, emphasizes the unpopularity of Hugh Despenser together with Lancaster's inability to have him removed from the council.

¹⁵² Phillips, 68; Maddicott, 151.

¹⁵³ Phillips, 68–9; Maddicott, 151. During the most difficult period of the negotiations with the king in early 1313 both Lancaster and Warwick spent much of their time on their own personal estates, making communication between them and the magnates who were negotiating very difficult: Maddicott, 152–3. It is also significant that after agreement was finally reached in Oct. 1313 the earl of Hereford, who had negotiated on the magnates' behalf, stayed with the king, while the other magnates went home: Vita, 76–7.

¹⁵⁴ The two papal envoys were in England continuously from late Aug. 1312 until late Nov. 1313. On 19 Nov. the queen gave the envoys each a gold ring, valued at £50 and £35 respectively before their departure for Avignon: E 101/375/9, f. 35.

¹⁵⁵ CPR, 1307–13, 573. Edward did not however pay on the due date and in Oct. 1313 Testa appointed proctors to reclaim the money from the earl of Pembroke and other guarantors: E 329/69; Phillips, 71.

¹⁵⁶ CPR, 1307–13, 571.

¹⁵⁷ CPR, 1313–17, 4; Phillips, 71; Brown & Regalado, 59, 77, n. 25. It is not clear whether these sums were denominated in pounds sterling or livres tournois.

¹⁵⁸ CPR, 1313–17, 49–51; Ann. Lond., 227.

¹⁵⁹ Foedera, II, i, 223, 225. It is not clear how much of the money was actually collected.

¹⁶⁰ Phillips, 71–2. Edward's orders in Nov. 1313 for the handing over of the former possessions of the Templars to the Knights Hospitaller were also intended to meet with the approval of both the pope and Philip IV; so too was the safe conduct granted to the bishop of Glasgow: Foedera, II, i, 234–7.

¹⁶¹ CPR, 1313–17; Phillips, 71–2. There is a detailed account of the negotiating of this loan in Y. Renouard, ‘Édouard II et Clément V d'après les rôles gascons’, in Renouard, Études d'histoire médiévale, ii (Paris, 1968), 935–57.

¹⁶² See W.E. Lunt, ‘Clerical tenths levied in England by papal authority during the reign of Edward II’, in Anniversary Essays in Mediaeval History by Students of Charles Homer Haskins, ed. C.H. Taylor (Boston & New York, 1929), 166–71. Most of the money borrowed was never repaid.

¹⁶³ What follows draws heavily on the article on Pessagno by E.B. Fryde in the Oxford DNB.

¹⁶⁴ R.W. Kaeuper, ‘The Frescobaldi of Florence and the English crown’, Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, x (1973), 82–3.

¹⁶⁵ On the link between the Fieschi and the English crown see Phillips, ‘“Edward II” in Italy’, 218–19.

¹⁶⁶ Fryde in the Oxford DNB.

¹⁶⁷ Fryde in the Oxford DNB. The details of repayments and the sources from which they came are recorded in the acquittance given to him on 27 Nov. 1314: CPR, 1313–17, 203–6.

¹⁶⁸ Vita, 68–71.

¹⁶⁹ Flores, 337; Lanercost, 223; Maddicott, 151.

¹⁷⁰ E.A.R. Brown, ‘Diplomacy, adultery and domestic politics at the court of Philip the Fair’, in Documenting the Past, ed. J.S. Hamilton & P. J. Bradley (Woodbridge, Suffolk & Wolfeboro, NH, 1989), 62–3.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 62–5. The reasoning behind the decision to send Isabella is given in a memorandum prepared for the council: C 47/27/8/31: the text is printed in Brown, 78–80.The petitions presented by Isabella are contained in E 30/1530: Brown, 80–3.

¹⁷² Brown, ‘Diplomacy’, 65–6. To carry them across the Channel 26 ships and 13 barges were required.

¹⁷³ Brown, ‘Diplomacy’, 66–7. Isabella's itinerary during her stay in France can be traced in E 101/375/9 (Isabella's wardrobe book for 7 Edward II, 1313–14).

¹⁷⁴ For a detailed assessment of the issues raised in the petitions and the manner in which they were answered see Brown, ‘Diplomacy’, 69–73.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 71–2. The usual rule was that an appeal, once lodged, could not be withdrawn and had to proceed to a final decision by the parlement. This could often be seriously to the disadvantage of the duke of Aquitaine, i.e. the king of England.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 73–7

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 74–6. The story of the purses comes from the Myreur des Histors by Jean d'Outremeuse, ed. S. Bormans, 7 vols (Brussels, 1964–8), vi, 196–8.

¹⁷⁸ E 101/375/9, ff. 3v, 5, 24; Brown, ‘Diplomacy’, 66. Jean d'Outremeuse, for example, not only wrote much later in the fourteenth century but is also notorious for embroidering or even inventing the stories he told. See G. Kurth, Etude critique sur Jean d'Outremeuse, 2nd ser., vii (Brussels, 1910), and Phillips, ‘The quest for Sir John Mandeville’, in The Culture of Christendom, ed. M.A. Meyer (London, 1993), 246–7.

¹⁷⁹ Brown, ‘Diplomacy’, 74–7.

¹⁸⁰ Chronique métrique de Godefroy de Paris, ed. Buchon, 211; Brown, ‘Diplomacy’, 76–7.

¹⁸¹ AN, J 403. no. 18. There is no mention of Isabella in Philip's main will, drawn up at Royaumont in May 1311: J 403, nos 17, 17 bis. No bequests were made to his son-in-law, Edward II, but this probably is not particularly significant.

¹⁸² E 101/375/9, ff.3, 37, 37v; Brown, ‘Diplomacy’, 67; Doherty (D. Phil.), 59.

¹⁸³ Barrow, 195, 202; McNamee, 60–1.

¹⁸⁴ Bruce, 376, note; 402, note; 406, note; McNamee, 60–1.

¹⁸⁵ McNamee, 131.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., 53–6. For a map of the Scottish raids see ibid., 54, and for a detailed discussion of ‘the purchase of peace’, see 129–40.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 56–7. By this time ‘the Scots were exacting tribute at double the rate of “normal” English taxation’: ibid., 56–7, 132.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 57.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 59–60; Barrow, 193–5. The date of Perth's fall is given by McNamee and Barrow respectively as 8 Jan. and 7 Feb. 1313.

¹⁹⁰ Bruce, 402, 440. On the loss of Scottish castles see Vita, 82–5.

¹⁹¹ CPR, 1313–17, 49–51.

¹⁹² Foedera, II, i, 237.

¹⁹³ Bruce, 440; Barrow, 203; McNamee, 6. Robert Bruce's decree disinheriting those who had come to his peace was finally issued at Cambuskenneth on 6 Nov. 1314: Regesta Regum Scottorum, v, The Acts of Robert I, ed. A.A.M. Duncan (Edinburgh, 1988), no. 40, p. 330.

¹⁹⁴ PW, II, ii, 120–5. The parliament was not in the end held. See PROME, Westminster Parliament of April 1314.

¹⁹⁵ CCR, 1313–18, 86; Barrow, 204.

¹⁹⁶ Foedera, II, i, 229; Bruce, 496–7; Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 234–5.

¹⁹⁷ CCW, 395.

¹⁹⁸ McNamee, 125–7 (incl. charts 3 & 4).

¹⁹⁹ CCW, 395; Phillips, 73.

²⁰⁰ CCR, 1313–18, 95.

²⁰¹ Phillips, 73.

²⁰² McNamee, 61.

²⁰³ Rotuli Scotiae, i, Record Commission (London, 1874), 118–21; McNamee, 61.

²⁰⁴ Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 40; Tebbit, ‘The Household Knights’ (Ph.D.) 58–9. See also Dr Tebbit's paper, ‘Household knights’, in Dodd & Musson eds, The Reign of Edward II, 76–96.

²⁰⁵ Phillips, 307. A year earlier his retinue had numbered only 34.

²⁰⁶ The author of the Vita Edwardi Secundi, 88–9, estimated the numbers at 2,000, but the total could have been as many as 2,500: Vita, 87, n. 168. There is no way of knowing with certainty since there are no royal household records for 1313–14 and no muster roll for the Bannockburn campaign. It is possible that the records were lost at Bannockburn: Prestwich, ‘Cavalry service in early fourteenth-century England’, in War and Government in the Middle Ages, ed. J. Gillingham & J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, Suffolk & Totowa, NJ, 1984), 148. See also the discussion in Barrow, 206–7.

²⁰⁷ Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 117, citing the estimates in Barrow, 204–7. McNamee, 62, suggests that the infantry might have been as few as half the expected figure.

²⁰⁸ Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 117.

²⁰⁹ Vita, 88–9.

²¹⁰ Vita, 86–9; Phillips, 73–4; Maddicott, 157–8; Barrow, 206. J.E. Morris's suggestion in Bannockburn (Cambridge, 1914), 34, followed by Barrow, 206, that there was no formal summons of the feudal host is incorrect: such a summons was issued on 23 Dec. 1313: PW, II, ii, 421–2.

²¹¹ Vita, 86–7.

²¹² Knighton, i, 410. Lancaster stayed at his castle of Pontefract in Yorkshire during the campaign and Warwick was certainly at Warwick castle early in May: Knighton, i, 410; BL, Add. Ms. 28024, f. 70; Phillips, 73.

²¹³ F.R. Fairbank, ‘The last earl of Warenne and Surrey’, Yorks. Arch. Journal, xix (1906–7), 198–9. This may explain why Surrey reluctantly gave up the honour of High Peak in Derbyshire to the queen in Feb. 1314: CPR, 1313–17, 38; CCR, 1313–18, 38; CFR, 1307–19, 182. Apart from his change of allegiance in June 1312, when he and Pembroke rejoined the king, Surrey's influence on politics at this time appears to have been minimal: Phillips, 74.

²¹⁴ This may explain why he spent June 1314 at his Yorkshire castle of Sandal, not far from Pontefract: Lambeth, Register of Walter Reynolds, f. 107.

²¹⁵ Vita, 76–7; E 101/68/2/34 (badly damaged); Phillips, 74.

²¹⁶ Historia Anglicana, 138–9.

²¹⁷ The details of his movements can be found in Itinerary, ed. Hallam. Isabella reached Berwick on 10 June, when her husband was nearby at Fenham.

²¹⁸ Bruce, 376, note; 402, note; 406, note; McNamee, 60–1; Barrow, 209, citing Rotuli Scotiae, i, 126–7 (trans. Professor Barrow).

²¹⁹ Barrow, 209; Rotuli Scotiae, i, 126–7.

²²⁰ Vita, 88–9. The army was also to be kept supplied by sea, ships calling at ports such as Edinburgh and sailing into the Firth of Forth (from which it would be easy to replenish both the army and the garrison of Stirling): Barrow, 204; A. Nussbacher, The Battle of Bannockburn, 1314 (Stroud, 2000), 57.

²²¹ Vita, 88–9; Barrow, 209–10. The classic analysis of the battle of Bannockburn is that of Morris, Bannockburn, which has formed the starting point for later scholars. What follows is based mainly on Barrow, and on the ‘Bannockburn Commentary’ and notes, in Bruce, 440–7. Apart from falling into the traditional error that the siege of Stirling began in 1313, Nussbacher's book is a well written and clearly presented account of the battle and its circumstances, but differs in its assessment both of the site of the battle and of Edward II's intentions and competence.

²²² Barrow, 209, and Nussbacher, Battle, 81, give a very clear idea of the route followed and the distances involved in each stage of the journey.

²²³ Barrow, 208–9.

²²⁴ Ibid., 210.

²²⁵ Barrow emphasizes that although the pols often flowed through ‘deep peaty pools with crumbling, overhanging banks’, the word pol itself referred to a stream and not to a pool. Failure to appreciate this distinction has, in Professor Barrow's view, led to a misplacing by modern commentators of the location of the battlefield and a misunderstanding of how the battle was fought: ibid., 212.

²²⁶ Ibid., 217; Bruce, 422–3. For a detailed discussion of the likely battlefield and the various suggested locations see Barrow, 210–16 (incl. a map on 213).

²²⁷ Flores, 158; Vita, 92–3; Barrow, 217.

²²⁸ Barrow, 218; Vita, 88–9; Bruce, 448–51.

²²⁹ Barrow, 219–21; Vita, 90–1; Bruce, 452–7; Scalacronica, 72–5. Gray, the son of the Thomas Gray captured at Bannockburn, began to write in 1355 while he himself was a prisoner of the Scots in Edinburgh castle.

²³⁰ Barrow, 222–4.

²³¹ Vita, 90–1. Ingram de Umfraville, a Scottish nobleman, who was serving with Edward II, apparently also advised a delay: Barrow, 226. Earlier, Philip de Mowbray, the constable of Stirling, had come to Edward II, under a flag of truce, and had told him that the Scots were in a strong position which would make an attack on them difficult. He also apparently said that Stirling was already saved from having to surrender since Edward had relieved it by reaching the vicinity of the castle by the appointed date: Barrow, 217. One may suspect, however, that Mowbray was also safeguarding his own position. He may already have been planning to change sides, as he did immediately after the battle.

²³² Barrow, 222–3; Bruce, 456, note.

²³³ Barrow, 224; see also the map on p. 213. This identification is accepted by Duncan, in his ‘Bannockburn commentary,’ Bruce, 440, 444, but not by Nussbacher, Battle, 102–6, who argues for a site at a lower level.

²³⁴ Barrow, 224, 226.

²³⁵ Nussbacher, Battle, 104–6.

²³⁶ Barrow, 225–6; Bruce, 472–3.

²³⁷ Barrow, 226; Bruce, 482, note.

²³⁸ Barrow, 226; Vita, 90–3; Bruce, 480–1, note.

²³⁹ Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 223, 233.

²⁴⁰ Barrow, 226, 228; Bruce, 475–83: a situation not unlike that of the French knights and men-at-arms at Agincourt in 1415 when the crush was so great that many men died of suffocation: Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 328.

²⁴¹ Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 306, 329.

²⁴² If the English army was arranged in line of advance rather than in line of battle, this might explain the absence of archers in significant numbers.

²⁴³ Barrow, 227. The Scottish cavalry were far fewer in numbers and less heavily equipped than their English counterparts whom they could not expect to defeat in open battle.

²⁴⁴ Unless we include the remarks of astonishment ascribed by Barbour to Edward II when he realized that the Scots were going to fight a pitched battle on open ground: Bruce, 470–1.

²⁴⁵ Bruce, 472–3.

²⁴⁶ Phillips, 74; Barrow, 229; Bruce, 494–7; Scalacronica, 76–7. There is no indication of how Sir Thomas Gray, the author of the Scalacronica, learned the details of Edward's experiences in the battle. Sir Thomas's father, also Sir Thomas, was present at Bannockburn but was already a prisoner by this stage.

²⁴⁷ Barrow, 229. Northburgh's usual function was as keeper of the king's privy seal: Tout, Chapters, ii, 294–5. The loss of records makes it very difficult to work out just how many of Edward II's household knights and clerks were killed or captured at Bannockburn.

²⁴⁸ SC 8/11/512, printed in RP, ii, 35, no. 23; Knowles and Hadcock, Medieval Religious Houses, 198. See also ch. 2 of this book.

²⁴⁹ Vita, 94–5; Bruce, 498–9; Barrow, 230–1.

²⁵⁰ Vita, 94–5; Bruce, 498–9, 508–11; Barrow, 230–1.

²⁵¹ Bruce, 510–13; Scalacronica, 76–7; Barrow, 231. Patrick's loyalty to England was suspect however since his lands were declared forfeit as of 24 June 1314 and he was later confirmed in his earldom by Robert Bruce: Bruce, 512, note.

²⁵² Bruce, 513–15; Scalacronica, 76–7; Lanercost, 227–8; Barrow, 230–1; Phillips, 74–5.

²⁵³ E 101/375/9, ff. 19, 25; Doherty (D.Phil.), 59; idem, Isabella, 59–60; Tout, Chapters, ii, 294–5.

²⁵⁴ Vita, 94–7; Bruce, 494–7; Barrow, 229, 231; Phillips, 74–5.

²⁵⁵ These records were probably among those lost in the battle.

²⁵⁶ Bruce, 500–1, 504–5.

²⁵⁷ Vita, 92–3; Bruce, 504–5.

²⁵⁸ Ann. Lond., 231; Phillips, 75; Barrow, 230. The fullest casualty list in a chronicle appears to be the one in the continuation of Nicholas Trivet: Trivet (Cont.), 15.

²⁵⁹ Bruce, 494–7; Phillips, 74–5.

²⁶⁰ Phillips, 75.

²⁶¹ Bruce, 514–15; Barrow, 231. Bothwell had nominally belonged to the earl of Pembroke after 1301 but had since been taken into royal hands: Bruce, 500, note; Phillips, 74.

²⁶² Vita, 96–7; Lanercost, 228; Barrow, 231.

²⁶³ Phillips, 75: Thomas de Berkeley senior, and Thomas and Maurice de Berkeley the sons of Maurice de Berkeley senior, but not Maurice de Berkeley senior himself: cf. Barrow, 231.

²⁶⁴ Vita, 96–7. See also Bruce, 502–3. According to the fifteenth-century Scottish chronicler Walter Bower, Edward II had brought with him a Carmelite friar and poet, Robert Baston, to celebrate his expected victory over the Scots. Baston was captured at Bannockburn and, in return for his release, required to write Latin verses in honour of the Scottish victory. The verses are however more a record of death and destruction than praise for the achievements of Robert Bruce, beginning ‘Grief is the theme on which I compose this song in unadorned verse’ and ending ‘I am a Carmelite, surnamed Baston. I grieve that I am left to outlive such a carnage.’ The verses make no mention of Edward II and his conduct in the battle. The Latin text, with a facing translation, is published in Scotichronicon, 366–75. A.G. Rigg doubts whether Baston was either present at Bannockburn or the author of the verses: ‘Antiquaries’. However, Edward II's vow to found a house of Carmelites at Oxford was clearly made to a Carmelite who was present at the battle and it seems likely that Baston was the one.

²⁶⁵ Vita, 96–7. The comparison with Courtrai was also noted by Sir Thomas Gray, writing in 1355, when knights had become accustomed to fighting on foot rather than on horseback: Scalacronica, 74–5.

²⁶⁶ J.F. Verbruggen, The Battle of the Golden Spurs (Courtrai, 11 July 1302) (Woodbridge, Suffolk & Rochester, NY, 2002); and The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1998), 190–4 and ch. 3, ‘The foot-soldiers’.

²⁶⁷ At first the battle had no name at all or was referred to as the battle for the relief of Stirling; but by the 1320s it was coming to be known as the battle fought at Bannockburn: Barrow, 215. On the tactics employed by the Scots and the English at Bannockburn see Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 317–18.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 318–23. One of the first indications of a change was the battle of Boroughbridge fought between Edward II and the earl of Lancaster in March 1322 when a royal commander, Andrew Harclay, made use both of the Scottish schiltrom and the English tactic of archery.

²⁶⁹ McNamee, 23–4; Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 52. Hobelars were also familiar in Ireland and had been used by Edward I in Scotland on several occasions. They were to be reintroduced in 1315 to defend the north of England in the aftermath of Bannockburn: McNamee, 24; Phillips, 91.

²⁷⁰ Barrow, 231.

²⁷¹ On all three earls see the articles in the Oxford DNB.

²⁷² Vita, 100–1; Lanercost, 229; Barrow, 231.

²⁷³ Barrow, 231.

²⁷⁴ The keeper of the privy seal, Roger de Northburgh, was released by Nov. 1314: Tout, Chapters, ii, 294–5.

²⁷⁵ Cf. Barrow, 229, which expresses a more optimistic view for the Scots of such an outcome.