With all his military knowledge, Washington must have understood that he had no chance of defeating the British in traditional open battle. King George’s Royal British Army was the best-trained, best-equipped military force in the Western Hemisphere. The Royal Navy could not only deliver an army and supplies to any shore, it could establish a near-impenetrable naval blockade. Washington, when he arrived at Cambridge, Massachusetts on 3 July 1775, took command of a large gang of 14,000 poorly disciplined and short-term enlistments. He also discovered that there was not enough gunpowder to put up even the feeblest resistance to an attack. Luckily, the British had no intentions of mounting another assault against the Massachusetts militia. They had lost almost 300 men on 19 April at Lexington and Concord, and another 1,000 at their ‘victory’ on 17 June at the Battle of Bunker Hill, across the harbour from Boston.
With the British in control of Boston and its harbour, and the colonials having tenuous control of the land surrounding Boston, Washington implemented a three-stage plan. First, he went about the arduous task of turning the New England colonial militias into the Continental army. Second, he ordered the Continental army’s first major assault – on the British Province of Quebec – which ended in heavy defeat at the cost of very few enemy casualties. Finally, he sent Henry Knox to the recently captured Fort Ticonderoga at the southern end of Lake Champlain in New York for cannons and ammunition.
In March 1776, Washington placed the Ticonderoga artillery on the Dorchester Heights, overlooking Boston. The stunned British commander, Sir William Howe, ordered a full British evacuation. While the British sailed to Nova Scotia to regroup, Washington moved his army south to New York City.
On July 4, 1776 the Declaration of Independence, a statement which announced that the thirteen American colonies regarded themselves as independent States, and no longer a part of the British Empire, was adopted by the Continental Congress. A few days later, the British landed a huge force of 32,000 Redcoats in New York City – vastly outnumbering the Continental’s 19,000. Washington’s inexperience in large-scale warfare told as he left his flank open on Long Island, allowing the British to easily surround his force and inflict heavy casualties. Much of the killing was carried out by German Hessian mercenaries, hired by the Crown to increase their numbers. Washington’s army would have been completely destroyed had Sir William Howe not halted his attack to await Washington’s surrender, which was the time-honoured tradition in European warfare. Capitalizing on this opportunity to save his army, Washington led an amphibious retreat across the East River.
Washington’s troubled attempt at holding New York City continued with a rout, retreat and escape of his forces a few weeks later at Manhattan, then a defeat at White Plains, and finally the surrender of 2,800 men on 16 November 1776 at Fort Washington. Suffering one defeat after another, he was left with only one choice – to completely leave the State of New York, cross into New Jersey, and continue to Pennsylvania. With these humiliations, and the fact that enlistments of most of Washington’s army were due to expire at the end of December, the British had good reason to believe this revolution would be over in a few months. Convinced of this, Sir William Howe went into winter quarters, confidently leaving advanced garrisons at Trenton and Princeton. This allowed Washington to execute one of the most daring military operations in American history.
On 18 December 1776, Washington wrote to John Augustine Washington, ‘I think the game is pretty near up’. He had lost New York and now the British had New Jersey under their control. Trenton, New Jersey, less than thirty miles from Philadelphia and the capital, was the foremost British post and held by hired German Hessians. No longer content with consulting his aides or with Congress, Washington decided to adopt the type of hit-and-run tactics he had seen the ‘Canadian’ French and Indians use during the previous war.
On Christmas Day, Hessian commanders scoffed at ridiculous reports of an approaching column of American troops. But while the Hessians enjoyed themselves, Washington marched 2,400 men north along the Delaware River, and under darkness, crossed the river in large cargo boats. Once across, they marched nine miles to Trenton, and on 26 December, caught the Hessians by surprise. Shocked and prevented from getting into formation, 900 Hessians quickly surrendered.
Once back across the Delaware, Washington made clear to his officers the reality of their victory: it was one day of glory but little more. The British were still in control of New Jersey and a threat to Philadelphia. He told them that they must quickly strike again. So traversing back across the Delaware River they camped behind the Assunpink Creek west of Trenton. By nightfall, a large British force, under the command of Lord Charles Cornwallis, arrived to retake the town. When they tried to cross the Assunpink Creek, they were repulsed by Continental cannons and halted to stake tents for the night.
From across the river, the British watched the American army’s campfires burn throughout the night. The next morning they discovered that Washington had, in fact, left a few men to tend the fires while his army continued on. His next objective was the British garrison at Princeton where three regiments were stationed.
Arriving in full daylight on 3 January 1777, Washington’s advance guard ran into two of the regiments that were on their way to support Cornwallis at Trenton. Panic ensued when the advanced guard retreated and ran into the main force of their American comrades. The professional British soldiers coolly formed ranks and prepared fire. Washington, on a tall white horse, galloped up, took control, and personally led the charge. When the two forces came within thirty yards of one another, with Washington still between the lines, both fired. One of Washington’s aides covered his face to keep from seeing his commander killed. In the exchange of volley, heavy killing and bloodshed, the British line was broken and, with great fortune, Washington remained untouched.
The third British regiment, still in Princeton, surrendered without resistance on hearing the astonishing news of the defeat of their companion regiments. Then Washington’s youthful recklessness resurfaced with a yearning to attack Brunswick, the main British base in New Jersey. This time, though, his aides prevailed, and Washington moved his exhausted troops to Morristown, New Jersey to sit out the winter. The British, unwilling to see any more outposts taken, withdrew north to within a few miles of New York City.
The military damage inflicted on the British by Washington’s two victories was minor, but the psychological impact on both sides was huge. For the British, these victories forced Howe to rethink his strategies of holding down large areas of ground with a network of posts against an army as mobile and unconventional as Washington’s. For the Americans, they were a boost for morale and gave them renewed hope. They convinced Washington to broaden his hit-and-run tactics to a war of attrition. As he had learned from the French and Indian War, one does not need to win all the battles to win the war.
Howe began his 1777 campaign by moving back into New Jersey. He hoped to lure Washington out of his Morristown encampment onto a nearby plain for one decisive battle. Howe also believed that the New Jersey citizens, still loyal to the Crown, would rally to his support. Howe was wrong on both counts. Washington refused to leave the safety of the Morristown Heights and the citizens grabbed their weapons and harassed the British flanks. Howe consequently returned to New York City and began preparing a naval transport of his army to Philadelphia: surely Washington would not allow the Continental Capital to fall without a fight.
However, Howe was unaware that in March 1777 Washington had informed Congress that he had no intentions of defending Philadelphia if Howe made it his target. Washington’s objective was now to preserve his army, not to occupy or protect ground.
At the end of July 1777, over two hundred British ships sailed from New York Harbour, and by mid-August, the British entered the Chesapeake Bay on their way to Philadelphia. Washington made a stand against the British behind a seemingly strong position at Brandywine River, but due to poor intelligence about the region’s geography the British easily swept behind American defences. As at Long Island, Washington succeeded in leading his army to safety, but suffered the ignominy of looking incompetent, especially in comparison with General Horatio Gates’ resounding victory over General John Burgoyne’s army at Saratoga, New York. It was during this time that Gates started rivalling Washington to displace him as commander-in-chief. Gates’ success at Saratoga, combined with Washington’s inability to hold New York, the loss of Philadelphia, and then Brandywine, gave him real grounds for his appeal but the attempt was ultimately and controversially unsuccessful, ending with his own discrediting.
Gates’ victory marked the turning point of the war. Now Louis XVI of France officially recognized America’s struggle for independence and began supplying money, weapons, troops and warships. The capture of the rebel capital accomplished little in advancing the British cause, except in allowing Howe and his army to live in great comfort. Largely made up of Loyalists, the citizens of Philadelphia vied with each other to stage fashionable balls. At any time Howe could have marched his troops to Washington’s winter camp at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania and crushed his army – near-naked and starving by comparison. Failing in this respect to wage a continuous, all-weather war, and pursue his enemy, Howe was replaced by General Sir Henry Clinton in 1778.
When Clinton arrived to take command, Washington, in an exchange of prisoners, was reunited with his once second-in-command, General Charles Lee. Years earlier, having served with distinction in the British army as a brilliant tactician, Lee had emigrated from England after insultingKing George III in person. In 1775, when Washington took command of the newly created Continental army, he had made Lee his second-in-command. En route from New York to their camp near Trenton, Lee had allowed himself to be captured by the British.
The British marched out of Philadelphia on their way back to New York in early June 1778, and Washington caught up with them at Monmouth Courthouse, New Jersey. Lee was assigned to make the first assault, but believing he was outnumbered by superior British troops, instead ordered a retreat. Washington, perturbed by the lack of cannon and gunfire from the first assault, rode to the front where he found Lee comfortably chatting with his staff. Before Lee could explain his actions, Washington lashed out, according to one account, ‘Till the leaves shook … never have I enjoyed such swearing before or since’. (There is good reason to believe that Lee’s actions were an act of treason in order to regain acceptance in the British Army.) Having dismissed Lee, Washington stopped the retreat, brought order out of chaos, and led them to success.
With the main British army confined to New York City and New Jersey to the north, Sir Henry Clinton decided to re-strategise, moving the fighting to the Southern States. His campaign began with a successful attack on Savannah, Georgia, and within a month his army controlled the State. From there he planned to move north and conquer each State consecutively. Clinton would not remain in the South to command, returning instead to New York City, leaving this phase of the war to Lord Charles Cornwallis.
In late 1780, Washington sent General Nathaniel Greene south with orders to slow and harass the British advance, but to never face Cornwallis in a major battle. From 1780 to 1781, Greene fought six small battles, losing five. His method was simple: ‘We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again.’ Despite the losses, Greene’s strategy worked wonderfully, and by April 1781, Cornwallis moved his tired and frustrated army to Yorktown, Virginia, a sleepy tobacco port on the Chesapeake Bay to rest.
In response to this news, Washington and the French troops moved south and surrounded the town. In August, twenty-nine French warships arrived and sealed off the entrance to Chesapeake Bay. Their arrival cut Cornwallis off from the British navy and any hope of rescue by sea. After days of an unremitting cannonade, Cornwallis had no choice but to surrender on 19 October 1781. The Battle of Yorktown would be the last major battle of the American Revolution.