6
The Black Prince married Joan of Kent on 6 October 1361 at Lambeth in a ceremony conducted by the archbishop of Canterbury, Simon Islip. The pair had required a papal dispensation before the wedding could take place because they were related within the third and therefore prohibited degree.1 It was not the match his father had wanted, nor can it have been enjoyed greatly by a knight of the prince’s household, Bernard Brocas, a ‘tres bon chevalier qui moult grandement avoit servi le prince et pour lui tant en ses guerres que autrement avoit moult travaillié’.2 Bernard had been made an esquire at the landing at La Hougue in 1346 and fought with the prince at Crécy, Poitiers (although not in the 1355 expedition) and would do so again at Nájera. He had seen service in Normandy in 1359 and 1361, in which year he asked the prince to act on his behalf in asking for the hand of the recently widowed Joan Holland. The prince approached the countess of Kent but almost immediately married her himself.3
Joan remains as ‘shadowy’ a figure as her husband, and like him she was not referred to by her famous soubriquet in any contemporary literature. The Fair Maid’s father was Edmund, earl of Kent, the sixth son of Edward I, and she was raised at court after his execution. It seems likely that Edward and Joan knew each other from an early age since Queen Philippa was closely involved with her upbringing. She is most renowned for her marital entanglements. After contracting a marriage to Thomas Holland, he was called abroad on military service and during this time she was convinced or forcefully persuaded by her family or the crown to marry William Montague. On Holland’s return, he found his wife married to the earl of Salisbury. His military rewards and booty enabled him to press a case before the pope that eventually resulted in the annulment of Joan’s marriage to Montague and her reunion with Holland. In 1352, the death of Joan’s elder brother led to her acquisition of the titles countess of Kent, and Lady Wake of Liddel, and Holland received the title of earl of Kent soon before his death in 1360.4
Court and Government
The Principality of Aquitaine was created on 19 July 1362 and formed the basis for some of the most contentious events of Edward’s career, and is the area that has received some of the least historical attention.5 This is predominantly due to the scarcity of available sources. The failure of the prince’s administration to enrol accounts at Westminster as its predecessors had done and successors would do, in addition to the loss of the Gascon register, leaves one reliant on other, more oblique documentation.
Much of the interest in the prince’s rule stems from its consequences. The reopening of the war in 1369 has often been attributed to the poor relations established by the prince with the indigenous nobility and to the general attitude and arrogance displayed by the English administration. Sir John Chandos, who as the king’s lieutenant paved the way for the arrival of the prince and accepted the territories resulting from Brétigny on behalf of the monarch, initially established that administration. It was not a simple task; the Rouergue in particular was most reluctant to become ‘English’ as were many towns, but with no outside support they were forced to submit. Belleville was a difficult area and the French argued that it had not formed part of the treaty, and Ponthieu and the viscounty of Montreuil also proved troublesome. It is often stated or implied that, had Chandos remained in office, the collapse of the principality might not have been so precipitous or complete, indeed that it might not have happened at all.6 The evidence for this is slim and does not take account of the very different political conditions at work in the early years of the 1360s compared to the first decade of the reign of Charles V.
The intrinsic importance of the local nobility in the governance of any late medieval kingdom is as evident as the consequence of a failure to maintain good relations with those nobles. As Edward II, Isabella and Richard II discovered this was not always easy. How much more difficult might it have been if they had been at war with such disaffected elements for over twenty years prior to gaining power, and if the lands and reputations of those elements had been the target of one of the most thorough examples of thechevauchée and the devastation that accompanied it, which had been seen in the war up to that point?
From the outset there was vigorous opposition to the Brétigny settlement; Pierre Bernard, count of Périgord, Jean d’Armagnac, Pierre Raymond de Comminges and Armand d’Eauze, vicomte de Castelbon, denied the right of the king of France to give them over to a new sovereign. Similarly, Gaston Fébus, always looking to play off the Plantagenets and Valois against one another, refused to do homage for Béarn, which he considered a sovereign allod and tried to assert his claim to Bigorre.7
The principality of Aquitaine is often glibly referred to as making up about a third of all France without much consideration for what the governance of such an area would involve. It was perhaps five times as large as the duchy Edward III had inherited in 1327, consisting of 24 bishoprics, 2 archbishoprics (Auch and Bordeaux), and 13 sénéchausées. The geopolitical structure of this entity had little in common with the Gascony that preceded it and on which structures and modes of government the administration of the new territories depended.8 The principality was also very much a frontier region, not only against the uncertainties of Navarre and Charles ‘the Bad’ but also the very particular boundaries of the Atlantic and the Pyrenees. Furthermore, the hugely expanded inland borders proved only too vulnerable to assault (in those areas where allegiance was not freely returned to the French) after the collapse of the treaty in 1368/9. The traditional ‘English’ duchy of Gascony had formed a linguistic and ethnic unit while the principality was a wholly artificial political construction. Analogies might be drawn and vestigial associations made with the Angevin Empire, but although English royal memory may have been long, there was little sympathy among the inhabitants of the surrendered territories. By contrast, the Gascons, although fiercely independent, looked to England and the population did not consider itself to be occupied by a foreign power. For France, the frontier of Gascony was a march comparable to those in Scotland and Wales, with which the prince and his officials were well acquainted. Similarly, the area was also highly fortified not as a result of conquest but political fragmentation. Those castles under Anglo-Gascon control formed what has been described as the ‘nervous system of the administration’9 giving command of communications and supply routes by both road and water. Unfortunately, from the point of view of central government, sites within the old duchy and certainly beyond its borders were held by independent members of the nobility who bitterly resented any attempt to curtail their local authority either by representatives of the king of England or their neighbours.
The principality was a complex, internally dissonant body, founded on little more than military conquest and with common traditions only so far as they might be described as ‘Angevin’. ‘L’Aquitaine repose sur un equilibre complexe où intervient tout une suite des forces différentes. Elles depend essentiellment d’une mentalité anglo-gasconne.’10
The transition of territory and authority began in October 1360 and the first major town to be handed over was La Rochelle. There were two main tasks, ‘réorganisation administrative d’une part, d’autre part effort considérable pour assurer l’application de la paix’.11 On 1 July 1361, John Chandos was charged with annexing the new territories, and Richard Stafford and William Farley were chosen to take responsibility of the administration. Neither of these were long-term appointments: Stafford, the seneschal, had left office by 12 January 1362, and may have been replaced by Chandos in the greater office of constable of Aquitaine; Farley died on 11 September 1362 although his final accounts were not handed in until 1365.12 Several other members of the prince’s retinue were important in overseeing the transfer of territories while others were concerned with making preparations for his arrival. These included Nigel Loryng, William Felton (an old military companion of the prince’s, later to be seneschal of Poitou and the Limousin), Adam Hoghton (bishop of St Daid’s and chancellor of England, 1377–8) who was responsible for annexing Bigorre, Thomas Driffeld and Stephen Cosington.13
The three great offices of state were the constable, seneschal and chancellor. The first to hold these offices in the principality were Thomas Felton (William’s kinsman but not his brother), John Chandos and John Harewell, the constable and chancellor of Bordeaux (1362–4).14 The seneschal was the head of government with a variety of changing duties. He presided over the council and the judicial business of the court of Gascony. The constable of Bordeaux was the next most important official accountable for financial matters. He paid the salaries of most officials, received their accounts and was guardian of the seal.15 The constables of Bordeaux came from a variety of backgrounds with previous experience in the duchy or having served the Black Prince before his arrival in Aquitaine. Bordeaux, with its population of 20,000–30,000, was the administrative capital of the principality and the constable was the chief financial minister. He was based at the castle of the Ombrière where he received revenue and made payments for which he had to account at the exchequer. He reviewed the accounts of lesser officials and had a variety of other duties, which required an extensive staff. These duties included the management of supplies and victuals, the supervision of coinage and the upkeep of castles and fortresses. Authority in Bordeaux was concentrated in a very few individuals. If they failed to be effective, it damaged the whole administration. John Streatley (in office 28 April 1348–12 September 1350 and 18 January 1354–1 July 1361) assisted Chandos with the transfer of lands and was a frequent member of the prince’s council and had also served him as an envoy. He was chancellor of Aquitaine from 1362 to 1364. Chivereston and Streatley stayed for a time at the head of the Aquitaine administration. William Farley had been keeper of the wardrobe of the duke of Gascony and succeeded Streatley as constable (20 September 1361) at the time of the handover of territories with William Loryng as his lieutenant. He travelled to Gascony around the same time as Stafford and Nigel Loryng (c. July 1361). Farley received the first accounts but died of plague soon after.16 It was after this that the administration began to develop. Bernard Brocas (not the Fair Maid’s suitor) was controller and receiver of the money due to the king at this time. He was the most experienced Englishman in south-western French financial affairs having served as controller to Nicolo Uso di Mare, John Streatley and Farley, and in 1357 he had also been keeper of the seal. He succeeded Farley on 9 December 1362 with responsibility to collect all revenues due to the king until 19 July 1362 when he had created the principality. If his activities and practice were followed by the prince’s officials then accounts were very closely scrutinised. John Ludham graduated from being the prince’s clerk to become constable. The next most important fiscal officer was the controller who was also based in the Ombrière and kept a counter-roll of the constable’s records and whose salary was half that of his superior. There was also amemorandus to guard the castle archives. Other officers included the judge of Aquitaine, the provosts with authority over towns, the bailiffs and reeves with responsibility for individual districts.17
The centre of authority was the court and it was shaped by the character and in the image of the prince himself; ‘L’atmosphere de la cour, au milieu de laquelle il évoluait, était brillante, et il avait probablement l’habitude de s’imposer à sa place, parmi beaucoup d’hommes de naissance et de talent. Dans ce milieu, l’exercise d’armes était une activité essentielle, et chacun s’y trouvait rompu.’18 The prince’s household and administration in England and Wales had been geared towards warfare and it continued to be so in Aquitaine.
Every day there were more than eighty knights at his table and four times as many squires. They jousted and held revels at Angoulême and Bordeaux; all the nobles were there, joyful and happy, generous and honourable; and all his subjects loved him well because he did so much good for them.19
The prince was accompanied to Bordeaux by a retinue of 250 men-at-arms, including three bannerets, 60 knights and 320 archers, and feed was requisitioned for 1,000 horses.20 A large number of ships were needed to transport such a retinue as well as those who had been involved in overseeing the transfer of lands after Brétigny.21 The prince was delayed until April 1363 because of the lack of available ships.22 A strong military presence was vital; frontiers had to be defended against the Free Companies and in wariness against French incursions. The military character of the court was certainly not all for show, prior to the Spanish expedition of 1367 a number of the court were involved in the battles of Cocherel and particularly in the victory for the Montfort claim to Brittany at Auray.23 Thus, while there was a formal peace between England and France (or perhaps a cold war), both countries continued to support opposing sides in extraneous conflicts.
The scarcity of administrative and other ‘formal’ sources means that we must rely more heavily on the evidence of Froissart and other chroniclers. Their reliability is, of course, in doubt and their manipulation of detail and character may leave one with a somewhat skewed impression. The following statement shows the opportunities for distortion and is also indicative of a broadly held opinion of the prince. ‘Under his [Froissart’s] improving touch, Edward the Black Prince, no longer appears the vicious tyrannical despot he actually was, instead he emerges the chivalrous knight …’24 Edward’s character is open to question. It has been shrouded in chivalric propaganda and was subject to only the mildest criticism in his lifetime. However, he must be judged by the standards of his own age in which it was entirely possible to be a ‘vicious, tyrannical despot’ and a chivalrous knight at one and the same time. In much the same way, the leaders of the mercenary Free Companies, men such as Robert Knolles and Gregory Sais, who often found themselves in the prince’s service, were considered praiseworthy by Froissart and Cuvelier despite their lowly birth, questionable tactics and loyalty which was strong for as long as they were paid.25
Despite the war, French and English knights considered themselves part of the same international brotherhood. Beyond a shared adherence to a code of conduct and culture, knightly solidarity could also be expressed in a more binding way. Brotherhood-in-arms had developed from Germanic roots into a legal association with many connotations; it certainly provided the legal basis for a profitable commercial relationship. Hugh Calveley and Bertrand du Guesclin formed such an alliance. They fought together and on opposing sides during the Castilian civil war, which brought the Iberian Peninsula fully into the arena of the Hundred Years War. Calveley served with du Guesclin to depose Pedro the Cruel in favour of his half-brother, Enrique of Trastamara. Calveley was recalled to the English side in 1367 when the Black Prince became involved. At the battle of Nájera, du Guesclin was captured but in accordance with their agreement Calveley paid part of his ransom.26
Despite such links, the chivalric ethos which the prince brought to Aquitaine was not necessarily the same as that which already existed there. In England and Northern France, the ideal of knighthood tended to merge with one of loyalty and duty to one’s lord. This may not have applied in Occitania.27 Southern French literature laid stress on largesse (ostentatious generosity), friendship and voluntary aid, while the weakness of ‘feudal’ bonds is indicated by the advocation of a sense of loyalty between companions or equals rather than between lord and vassal. There was also an emphasis on individual rights to inherit and on fighting to uphold one’s rights and those of one’s allies. This is not to say that concepts of loyalty and duty did not exist, but they were not fixed or clearly delineated responsibilities. Thus, the knightly ethic of the south was a very pragmatic one: there was no sense of disdaining conflict with one’s inferiors or showing mercy. As a result, there is little evidence of a chivalric ideology or attempt to cultivate a particularly ‘knightly’ way of life although there was a strong courtly culture. This had been disseminated and encouraged by the troubadours for whom the ideal court had a harmonious social atmosphere, characterised by music and female company, in which gifts were freely dispensed. Princes should not be aloof but discriminating, tactful and willing to take advice. The cardinal sin was avarice, the opposite of largesse, and this was often indicated by the lack of feasts hosted by a prince. This was not a charge of which Edward could have been accused. According to Froissart, the early years of the principality seem to have been taken up almost entirely with feasting. From the arrival at La Rochelle where the prince and Joan were met by Chandos with a ‘belle compagnie de chevaliers’ there was feasting and festivities and the giving of gifts and beautiful jewels. After the prince had received the oaths of homage from his great vassals during his tour of the principality Froissart tells us that he could not record all the feasts, the honours done to the prince nor all those that came to see him.28
The troubadours also levelled criticism at princes and courts in which the sway of flatterers, administrators and bureaucrats was seen as too extensive. If such beliefs were representative of wider opinion then attitudes and behaviour evident in the Black Prince’s court could be seen as both delighting the indigenous nobility and yet also contributing to the eventual collapse of the principality. Blame for the souring relationship of the prince and his greater vassals and their eventual rebellion has been attributed to the prince’s haughtiness and his unwillingness to allow the Gascons any part in government. The prince was said to force his greatest vassals to wait days to see him and then leaving them on their knees perhaps for hours.29
With regard to other courtly pursuits, it is usual to see the Black Prince as a man with little or no interest in literary or academic activities. However, there was a literary circle around him, book owners and authors in their own right, men such as Simon Burley, Richard Stury, Philip de la Vache, Lewis Clifford and John Clanvowe.30 In Languedoc there was a long-standing literary tradition and among the prince’s neighbours was Charles of Navarre who became the patron of Guillaume de Machaut some time after John of Bohemia had died at Crécy, according to some at the hand of the Black Prince. It may have been from John that the prince acquired the device of the three ostrich feathers, one of the earliest stable non-ordinal badges. It first appeared on a seal shortly after his appointment as prince of Aquitaine.31
As elsewhere, there was a long tradition and powerful culture of hunting in southern France. In Gaston Fébus, the prince had a neighbour who was an acknowledged master of the art as is shown in his Livre de Chasse.32 In organising a meeting in which the prince hoped to secure Gaston’s homage for Béarn, the count of Foix asked that Chandos’ hounds be brought so that he might see them. The sport was considered an essential part of chivalric and military education. Hawking was also extremely popular and the great ceremony that accompanied such events is evident in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight that may have been written for an English audience abroad. The prince had, prior to 1362, maintained a considerable number of hounds and falcons for hunting. It does not appear that these or at least all of them were brought to Aquitaine, as there are references in the Register regarding falcons being transferred to the prince’s manor of Wallingford for the season after he was resident in Gascony.33
The prince also spent lavishly on clothes and jewels and moved more quickly to ensure the presence in Bordeaux of his goldsmith and two embroiderers than he did to ensure his administrators had enough money for their own expenses.34 There was a great deal of concern with garments as many chronicles and the sumptuary laws demonstrate. Richard II was subjected to heavy criticism for his expenditure on clothing; it may have been a trait he inherited from his father and mother. Records exist of the payment of £715 to an embroiderer for work for the prince, Joan and her daughter, while in 1362, £200 was paid for jewelled buttons for Joan, the equivalent of the wages of a master-craftsman for ten years. The princess seems to have become a sartorial icon in Aquitaine and many followed her style of dressing in tight-fitting garments of silk and ermine with low-cut necklines and wearing pearls and precious stones in her hair.35
The importance of music in the prince’s household, throughout his life, is evident in records of the purchase of instruments and payments to minstrels.36 In 1352, the prince was sent four silver-gilt and enamelled pipes along with a bagpipe, cornemuse and drum by the count of Eu, who had been captured at Crécy.37 In 1355, these instruments were given to Ralph of Exeter and John Martyn, minstrels in the prince’s employ.38 For the journey to Gascony in 1363, the prince was accompanied from England by six minstrels dressed in ray, a broadly striped cloth. The rates of pay were probably similar to those of the king’s minstrels, 20s. a year in peace, 7½d. or a shilling a day on campaign and this military facet of the minstrels’ life should not be overlooked. In addition to standard wages, minstrels probably also received generous tips.39 Music played an important part in both court ceremonial and general entertainment. Before the battle of Winchelsea, Edward III enjoyed hearing his minstrels play a German dance that Chandos had learned.40Southern France was an excellent area for musicians to find employment and also to gain inspiration and exposure to one of the most important composers of the age. Both Charles of Navarre and Gaston Fébus were patrons of musicians, the most significant of whom was Guillaume de Machaut, a key figure of the French Ars Nova, and the most distinguished composer of the Middle Ages, particularly renowned for his four-voice Messe de Notre Dame.
Chivalry throughout Western Europe was undergoing change in accordance with varying military tactics and a number of socio-political developments as noted previously. In the principality, such changes were reinforced by differing courtly traditions and England and Aquitaine were sometimes at odds with one another. This is not to say that chivalry was dead. On the contrary, in the prince’s court, chivalric traditions were reinforced by the influence of secular orders of chivalry, such as the Garter, of which the Black Prince and members of his retinue were important members. Chivalry also remained intrinsically linked to the crusade. The crusading movement had lost impetus after the fall of Acre in 1292 and the destruction of the Order of the Temple in 1314. However, one of the great courtly occasions in Aquitaine was the visit of Peter of Lusignan, king of Cyprus, in 1364. Peter had toured Europe passing through Avignon, London and Paris in search of support for a crusade. He was met at Angoulême where there was held ‘une très grosse et noble feste’. He encouraged many to join his crusade including Chandos, Thomas Felton, Nigel Loryng, Richard Punchardoun, Simon Burley and Baldwin Frevill, although the earl of Warwick was the only one to take up the offer. Peter’s visit lasted for a month. The festivities that accompanied the visit were combined in some accounts with the birth of a son to the prince and Joan in early March 1365 at Angoulême.41 On 27 April, a splendid tournament was held to celebrate the birth of Edward of Angoulême and the ‘churching’ of his mother. Accounts of the event vary; Froissart for once appears to be quite restrained, merely stating that 40 knights and 40 esquires comprised the princess’s entourage. The Chronicle of the Grey Friars of Lynn states that Joan’s retinue consisted of 24 knights and 24 lords and noted the presence of 154 further lords and 706 knights at the festivities. The prince stabled 18,000 horses at his own expense and the celebrations lasted for ten days. The cost of the candles alone was said to be over £400.42
There were certainly political benefits in maintaining a lavish court beyond the munificence usually expected of a sovereign. The Languedocian culture that delighted in conspicuous consumption demanded a magnificent court. It helped to placate the nobility and gain their support, at least for a time. Accusations that luxurious living led to the prince’s downfall have been made, and the expenses of the court and household were very large but were almost insignificant beside the military expenditure occasioned by the Nájera campaign and the administrative costs of running a hugely enlarged and financially disparate state with machinery and organisations designed for a much smaller province.43
1367: Nájera, the Beginning of the End
Endemic, if not constant hostilities changed the complexion of England, France and those other states that were dragged within the orbit of the Hundred Years War, and the demands of that conflict and the pressures which it engendered did not end during the all too brief periods of truce. The development of the contract army created a surplus of military manpower in peacetime that banded together in the form of the mercenary Free Companies, ensuring that in France (official) peace with England did not mean an end to military activity. Rather ‘war became a full-time occupation, one in which mercenaries served as the undisciplined instruments of royal policy’.44 The practical problems of bands of unemployed mercenaries roaming the French countryside were real enough and further enhanced by contemporary attitudes to combat, conflict and the bearing of arms. War had acquired a social mystique providing a means for the ennoblement of the common man. In Froissart’s habitual phrase, any man could ‘better himself in the profession of arms’. The mercenary forces seized upon such attitudes, and the religious and idealistic justification of chivalry made it difficult to recognize the actions of soldiers for what they were. In this context, chivalry did not limit war but quite the reverse. Chivalry also underpinned the potential financial benefits that could be accrued in war and it was in the interests of the military classes to maintain that state of affairs. Froissart was not unaware of the brutalities of war or that strategic considerations could overcome the code of chivalry, nor that ransom money was the prize for which men fought. Nonetheless, he seems to have been completely taken in by the spectacle of battle. He made little distinction between mercenaries serving the highest bidder and knights serving their king or prince as indentured retainers. The distinction was, in any case, becoming very uncertain. Professional captains such as Calveley, Knolles, Nicholas Dagworth and Walter Hewitt (who was very active in the Breton civil war) thrived in the Hundred Years War. They proved to be a very considerable military force at Auray (1364) and in 1362 when the Great Company defeated French royal forces under Jean II’s chamberlain, the count of Tancarville, at the battle of Brignais on 6 April 1362. The mercenary forces were led by Seguin de Badefol and the defeat has been compared to both Crécy and Poitiers. There were some tactical similarities between the encounters and it is possible that de Badefol and a number of the routier commanders had fought on the plain of Maupertuis in 1356.45
The defeat at Brignais may have contributed to a change of attitude in France, later compounded by the accession of Charles V. If the Free Companies were not to be defeated then perhaps they could be encouraged to go elsewhere and if in so doing they might further French interests then so much the better. The destination chosen was Moorish Spain: the purported intention, a crusade to drive the enemies of Christ from the Iberian Peninsula; the real purpose, to expel the Companies from France and to replace the English allied King Pedro ‘the Cruel’ of Castile with his half-brother, Enrique ‘the Bastard’ of Trastamara.
The prince was not unaware that steps were being taken for military action and in November 1365 he sent a number of his household officials to Avignon to observe the crusaders receiving a papal blessing and funding for the crusade. But he may well have been taken in by the ruse and seems to have given his blessing for many of his associates to participate in the crusade. It was when his father took belated steps to prevent English involvement in the campaign and indeed ordered that du Guesclin should not be allowed passage over the Pyrennees that retaliatory preparations in Aquitaine began to take shape.
The Black Prince had the most to lose from a French allegiance with Castile, so close to the borders of Aquitaine. The means by which he undertook the Nájera campaign highlights the apparent inconsistencies of the chivalric ethic and of military service, which were nonetheless permitted and indeed lauded in the chronicles of Froissart and others. Many of those members of the Companies that Bertrand du Guesclin led to Castile and who were actively involved in the deposition of Pedro were English and Gascon and were recalled by the prince to serve in his own expedition, designed to reverse the political situation for which they were responsible.
The motivation for, and conditions that surrounded, the Spanish campaign of 1367 were very different and less certain than those of the prince’s previous military operations. The expedition has been described as ‘something of a crusade for an abstract principle’.46 The enemy as well as the theatre of operations changed, although Enrique had French support. Perhaps, like the expeditions of 1346, 1355–6 and certainly 1359, it was a campaign for a throne, although not the throne of France, and in strategic terms, while the army tried to live off the land, it was not a chevauchée after the model of 1355.
The prince’s advisors questioned the wisdom of committing troops to Pedro’s cause. He was counselled that,
… it is reasonable that you should be content with what you have, and not seek to make enemies. It is well known that Don Pedro of Castile … is now and has always been, a man of great pride, cruelty and wickedness. Through him the kingdom of Castile has suffered many wrongs and many valiant men have been beheaded and murdered without any just cause … He is also an enemy of the Church, and has been excommunicated by the Holy Father. He has had the reputation … of being a tyrant, and has always, without any justification, made war on his neighbours, the Kings of Aragon and Navarre whom he has tried to dethrone by force. It is also generally rumoured and believed that he murdered his young wife, your cousin, the Duke of Bourbon’s daughter … For everything that he has suffered since is merely God’s punishment.47
A Trastamaran propagandist might as well have written this speech, attributed by Froissart to one of the prince’s council. Rebellion against Pedro was justified since he was a tyrant and enemy of Christ, although Knighton blamed the pope for the usurpation of Pedro’s throne. These same arguments were presented to the prince before the battle of Nájera.48 The proximity of Aquitaine had considerable implications with regard to the participation of any of the Iberian kingdoms in the Anglo-French war, as did the Castilian fleets in the maritime struggle. In addition to this, the prince’s own desire to be again involved in a military campaign cannot be overlooked. Support for Pedro in a successful coup would replace the Francophile Enrique providing military and, more particularly, naval assistance, with a galley fleet capable of summer operations in northern waters. Enrique had, by 1365, been offered financial assistance from Aragon, France and the papacy. By deposing him, the prince would have an ally on his border. Furthermore, England, although not the prince personally, was obliged to lend Pedro assistance in accordance with the Anglo-Castilian treaty of 1362.49 Consequently, Martín López de Cordoba was sent to remind Edward III of this and urge his support. On 6 December 1365, the king issued an order, forwarded to the prince at Bordeaux, forbidding Englishmen to fight his Castilian allies. López also probably managed to dispel the worst prejudices about Pedro and ’transmit a sense of Enrique’s pro-French villainies’.50 He may well have stopped in Aquitaine on his way home to deliver the same message.
The role and importance of the Castilian galley fleet in the war may have spurred the prince to involvement in the civil war in 1366–7. From the end of the thirteenth century, the French and English had made diplomatic efforts to secure the support of Castilian naval power. It became of marked importance after the treaty of Toledo in 1368, which provided Charles V with the support that eventually brought him victory at La Rochelle in 1372. Throughout the decade, the Castilians raided along the English southern coast. In 1374, the Isle of Wight was attacked. In 1375, thirty English ships were burned in the Bay of Bourgneuf. In 1377, French ships collaborated with the Castilians harrying the south coast of England. Rye was captured, Lewes was burned, the Isle of Wight overrun, Plymouth and Hastings were burned and Portsmouth and Dartmouth attacked. Winchelsea and Gravesend were assaulted in 1380.51 The failure of the English to ensure there was a sympathetic ruler in Castile proved costly.
The importance of an Anglo-Castilian alliance is, in this context, clear and may lie at the root of the prince’s willingness to be involved in the 1367 expedition. This is not, however, apparent in contemporary sources. Chandos Herald provides no clue as to the prince’s motivation except that he considered it the honourable course of action. It has been seen as an essentially personal campaign in that ‘the Black Prince was supremely confident in English military superiority and caught up in his own legend’;52 it was a long time since the last campaign, and even longer since the glory of Poitiers. According to Froissart, the prince ignored the advice of Chandos and others on the grounds that ‘c’est contre droit et raison d’un bastart couronner et tenir à terre et royaumme’.53 If this was an attempt by the prince to maintain the true order of succession, it is tempting to speculate about anxiety concerning his own family. His own legitimacy was not in doubt but his marriage to Joan was controversial. The marital entanglements of the Fair Maid of Kent may well have been instigated by her family and by the Crown, yet she was still viewed as something of a ‘fallen woman’. The prince had been counselled against the marriage by the archbishop of Canterbury for the very reason that the legitimacy of any offspring could be challenged. It turned out to be prophetic, as Bolingbroke was to question Richard’s birth. Joan’s pregnancy may have brought such thoughts to the fore. Edward of Angoulême, although still alive, was a sickly child unlikely to survive to inherit the title of king of Galicia offered by Pedro. The Nájera campaign may have been a statement associating the prince with the cause of legitimacy and particularly with the legitimacy of his newly born son, the future Richard II.
That the English would attempt to support Pedro was probable from the moment Enrique received French assistance. The initial motivation may have come in fact from England. On 8 May 1366, Thomas Holland, the prince’s stepson, and Nigel Loryng were ordered to Gascony and further reinforcements followed behind. Negotiations were opened with Charles of Navarre, necessary because of Enrique’s alliance with Aragon, as he controlled the remaining passes through the Pyrenees.54 The prince’s own preparations were further galvanised by the collapse of Pedro’s position in Castile. The prince met Pedro at Capbreton in August and the negotiations culminated in the treaty of Libourne on 23 September.
The prince undertook to advance 56,000 florins to Charles of Navarre on behalf of Pedro. The expenses of the prince’s retinue and those of the Gascon lords were assessed at 550,000 florins, based on the supposition that the campaign would last no more than six months. By the time the army left Gascony this figure had alreadyrisen to 1,659,000 florins (£276,500).55 The treaty proved to be a disaster and it can only be assumed that the prince knew full well that Pedro would be unable to fulfil his side of the bargain and hoped to exploit the situation once his ally was reinstated in Castile. Certainly ‘it is clear … that neither the prince nor Charles [of Navarre] put much trust in Pedro’.56
These discussions were common knowledge and the response, at the instigation of Pere of Aragon, in January 1367, was discussions between Enrique and Charles of Navarre. Charles agreed to break his agreement with the prince and Pedro and oppose their advance into Castile. It was rescued initially only by the action of Hugh Calveley whose raids on Miranda and Puenta-le-Reina forced Charles of Navarre to return to the allied fold after having given his support to Trastamara.57
The prince was also responsible for the defence of the principality of Aquitaine during his absence. Measures were put in place to guard against the ravages of those members of the Free Companies not involved in Spain. Much more significant was the alliance made by Louis of Anjou, Pere of Aragon and Enrique, made with the assent of Charles V, aiming to attack both Navarre and Aquitaine. James Audley remained behind and was entrusted with the defence of the principality. In addition, wider measures were put in place for the defence of Engalnd and particularly Wales. It may have been that there was a fear of a retaliatory Castilian naval raid when the Nájera campaign was underway.58
The prince mustered his army, which numbered between 6,000 and 8,500 troops (between a third and a half recruited from the Great Company) at Dax and crossed the Pyrenees in three main groups. The lack of wardrobe accounts, the dearth of information from Aquitaine and the few remaining indentures mean that there is limited evidence for the Nájera campaign. The main source for the operation is the account by Chandos Herald, which is so complimentary of the role of John of Gaunt that it has been suggested that it was a propaganda piece to further his subsequent Castilian ambitions, although Richard II is a more likely patron.59 Edward received a letter from Enrique on 28 February that, rather than asking the prince where he wished to meet for battle as suggested by Chandos Herald, was both an attempt to placate the invaders and show Enrique’s determination to defend his kingdom.60 Previously, Enrique had requested the return of du Guesclin, then passing through Aragon on his way back to France. First, Thomas Felton led a reconnaissance mission to spy out the enemy army, based at Santo Domingo, to prevent Pedro reaching Burgos. This party included several notable members of the prince’s retinue including William Felton, two scions of comital families in Thomas Ufford (knight of the Garter) and Hugh Stafford (son of earl Ralph, who served the prince consistently from 1359), Knolles and Simon Burley. There is some confusion about which Felton led the operation; Russell states it was William, kinsman of the seneschal of Aquitaine, Chandos Herald and Froissart indicate that it was the seneschal himself, and Barber maintains that both were involved and the force was led by Thomas. As William was seneschal of Poitou, and Thomas, seneschal of the principality, it would seem likely to have been the latter that led the expedition. The contingent, made up of 200 men-at-arms and archers, was guided quickly across Navarre.61 They crossed the river at Logroño and camped at Naveretta. After trying to establish what force Enrique had established at Santo Domingo, a raid was made on the watch in which Simon Burley captured the knight in command and other prisoners were also taken. From these, the reconnaissance party established the strength of Enrique’s army and sent messengers to inform the prince. The result of these reports was what Russell describes as ‘a first-class strategic error’, but Fowler has explained in the context of the movement of Enrique’s troops and mistrust of Charles of Navarre.62 Rather than taking the safe crossing of the river at Logroño and the relatively easy route thereafter to Burgos, the prince determined to follow the road from Pamplona into Álava and then travelled south-west to cross the Ebro at Miranda. The uncertainty of the position of Charles of Navarre may have prompted Edward to open another line of communication with Gascony. After a difficult journey the army arrived, short of provisions, in Salvatierra, which surrendered to Pedro. Enrique, at this point, did have an opportunity to effectively end Pedro’s aspirations of regaining control. Had he followed the advice of Charles V and both du Guesclin and Audrehem, the English army would have been bottled up in Álava until lack of supplies forced a retreat.
… the King of France sent letters to King Enrique urging him to avoid fighting a pitched battle but to carry on the war in other ways, since he could be certain that the Prince came accompanied by the flower of the world’s chivalry, but they were not the sort of men to stay for long in the kingdom of Castile and would soon go away again …63
However, to do this Enrique had to admit military inferiority. Politically it was necessary to show a position of strength and confidence to the Castilian nobility; militarily it was disastrous. The decision mirrors that taken by Philip VI in 1346. Felton informed the prince of Enrique’s advance to Vitoria. The reconnaissance party kept ahead of the Castilians and eventually halted at Ariñez. The prince led his army to Vittoria but was not met by the Castilians. Indeed, ‘The Bastard was not yet in sight, but was on the plain on the other side of the mountain.’64 In fact the Trastamarans had based themselves at the castle of Zaldiarán from where they sent out the jinetes to harass the Anglo-Gascon foraging parties and a major attack was made on Felton’s outlying force led by Don Tello, the Bastard’s brother. He may first have defeated a small unit under the command of Hugh Calveley. It was perhaps a feint that took place while the main assault was made on Felton. Alternatively the vanguard may have been attacked after the defeat of the English at Ariñez, the chronology is somewhat confused. William Felton was killed and many prisoners were taken including Richard Taunton, Gregory Sais (a Flintshire knight and captain of Beaumont-le-Victomte), Ralph Hastings, Mitton and Gaillard Beguer. The defence of Ariñez allowed the prince time to organise his defences although it seems that the measures taken to secure the army were not of the highest order since the perfidious king of Navarre successfully arranged for himself to be ‘captured’ by Oliver de Mauny, while out hunting on 11March. This event, in combination with dwindling supplies, forced the prince to abandon his position in Vittoria. Another arduous journey brought the army south-east to Los Arcos and then south-west to Navarette, crossing the Ebro at Logroño. In the meantime, Enrique had taken up a defensive position at Nájera, where he had been defeated in 1360, which had the only bridge crossing the Najerilla. On 1April, the prince replied to Trastamara’s letter of 28 February and then deployed his forces to settle the matter. This was made much easier since Enrique, in a manoeuvre reminiscent of the battle of Maldon, abandoned his highly defensive position and crossed the river to fight in a site that ‘offered no tactical advantages whatever’.65
The prince’s troops remained deployed as they had during the crossing of the Pyrenees. The vanguard was led by Chandos and Lancaster, with the two marshals Stephen Cosington and Guichard d’Angle, John Lord Devereux with his sons and the lord of Rays commanding the English contingent of about 3,000 archers and men-at-arms; with them were Calveley, Knolles and Olivier de Clisson. The main body, commanded by the prince, contained his personal retinue, most of the troops of the Great Company, Pedro’s Castilian forces and deserters from Enrique as well as the Navarrese forces now commanded by Martin de la Carra and the Mallorcans, it may have numbered some 4,000 soldiers. Armagnac and Albret held the right wing while on the left was the captal de Buch with men from the Free Companies and Foix. Both wings contained about 2,000 men.
Enrique’s force was perhaps half the size of his opponents’ although it was fresh and well supplied. The English forces were better equipped and had a more organised command structure. Furthermore, they had been under arms together on campaign since February and many were old comrades in arms. Of greater importance were the disadvantages of the Trastamaran army. A divided chain of command underpinned a wide divergence in skill, tactics and equipment. They had, in du Guesclin and Audrehem, an opportunity to use the experience and knowledge of two of France’s finest soldiers who were used to English tactics and military methods. They were ignored. Du Guesclin did manage to have the jinetes more heavily armoured to protect them from the English archers, but he could not convince the Castilian and Aragonese knights to fight on foot.66 Russell makes much of the national differences among Enrique’s army and while this may have undermined the structural unity of the army, it is unlikely that the Anglo-Gascon army was an example of solidarity and fellowship. The differences between the prince and his Gascon lords were already evident and the action of the prince in reducing the number of soldiers Albret brought on campaign was seen as insulting, as was his response to the prince. The ransom that Albret owed Gaston Fébus of Foix had left him in financial difficulties. The more soldiers he brought on campaign the more money he could ‘cream off’ the wages paid by the prince.
The crucial area of battle was the right flank that attacked the Trastamaran wing under Don Tello who fled. This allowed the captal de Buch to deal with the footmen, which in turn permitted Percy, Walter Hewitt and others on the left flank to support Gaunt in the vanguard. du Guesclin was thus enclosed on three sides by the English flanks and vanguard. The main body of the army was then brought up. Enrique had been unable to support du Guesclin and now attempted to make an attack on the prince, but again the archers kept him at bay. Although Enrique rallied his troops three times, eventually they and he fled the field. The routed army was pursued to the river banks by Jaume of Mallorca and the reserve cavalry, where many were killed and drowned.
The failure of the Castilians at Nájera was partly due to morale, numerical inferiority and surprise at the route taken by the prince from Navarette but, more importantly, it was a battle Enrique never had to fight. The invaders could have been bottled up in Álava long before they reached Nájera. Even when they arrived there it would have been entirely possible to hold the bridge over the Najerilla until the invaders’ supplies gave out. Even so, once the decision to fight was made, the conservative Castilian nobility did not make use of the knowledge their French allies had gleaned from earlier encounters with the English. Apart from the Order of the Band, the Castilian knights remained mounted, the troops and horses were lightly armoured and suffered greatly under the attacks of the English archers. The Anglo-Gascon campaign as a whole was poorly organised and certainly entered into with little thought of the consequences and cost. The manoeuvres that brought the prince’s army to Nájera exhausted his army unnecessarily and could have ended the campaign without any sort of major engagement. Nonetheless, the movement of 10,000 soldiers with their horses and baggage through the pass of Roncevalles, some 3,500 feet above sea level in the cold of February, was a logistical triumph.
Nájera was only the second major encounter of which the prince took command. As at Crécy and Poitiers, the terrain, the disorganisation and recklessness of the enemy were vital elements in his success. At Nájera the prince was able to advance, masked by the hill of Cuentos, appearing on the Castilian left flank at daybreak, leaving a gentle downward slope between himself and the enemy.67 The knights dismounted and the vanguard advanced under the cover of archer fire. Chandos Herald describes the knights as armed with lances, which were presumably cut down. It may be that they advanced further than intended and came into conflict with the Trastamaran vanguard led by du Guesclin, which had swung around to face them and ‘caused them much mischief’. It was during this exchange that Chandos was knocked to the ground and wounded through the visor by ‘a Castilian, great in stature – by name Martin Fernandez’68 whom he managed to kill. It may have been this wound which left him blind in one eye and was partly responsible for his death at Lussac.
The surprise gained by the hidden movement behind Cuentos gave the English a great advantage. This certainly can be attributed to the prince and/or his advisers. It is difficult to say if the tactics used at Nájera were the prince’s own or whether he simply put into practice those that had been developed by the English over a number of years. It is certain that the total lack of a command structure in the Trastamaran army allowed the English to attack them as separate units rather than a single fighting force. The vanguard, under the command of du Guesclin, was effective but enclosed by superior numbers was not allowed to manoeuvre. Victory was secured with a very small number of Anglo-Gascon casualties. According to the letter sent by the prince to his wife, which was later circulated in England, only Sir John Ferrers, among the English nobles, was killed. He was referring only to the battle itself, as it is clear that William Felton died in the earlier engagement at Ariñez.69 This letter provided the basis for the account of the battle in the Anonimalle and Canterbury chronicles and that of John of Reading. If the tactics used at Nájera were a culmination of those developed throughout the Edwardian ‘military revolution’ then it does not lessen the prince’s reputation. He was using a successful system known to many of his soldiers and using it to very good effect.
That the Black Prince had some skill as a general is not in doubt, although the example of the Spanish campaign shows a limited regard either for political realities or some aspects of the subtleties of wider military strategy. As a leader of men, however, he had great personal qualities. Furthermore, he inherited a military structure that was highly effective and efficient both in the preparation for war and on the battlefield itself. English military successes, including those of the Black Prince, were due to effective recruitment, reinforcement and financing, the provision of the necessary supplies of arms and victuals, and the support of the country at large for the king’s objectives in France. On the battlefield, the prince adopted the tactics that had developed throughout the fourteenth century and, apart from in 1367, his expeditions and campaigns were part of a wider strategic plan. The prince’s retinue was extremely effective in implementing these methods. The strategy and tactics used by the prince and put into action by his retinue were to be highly influential although they were not, in themselves, innovative.70
The consequences of the battle were momentous. It immediately became apparent that the alliance would not last for long. Fractures began to appear over the question of prisoners, many of whom Pedro, being a political pragmatist, wished to execute and whom the Black Prince, in all but one case, being an impecunious knight, wished to ransom. The marshal Audrehem had been taken prisoner by the Black Prince at the battle of Poitiers, a ransom fixed and he swore to be a loyal prisoner and not to take up arms against the prince or his father until the ransom was paid unless he fought in the company of the king of France or one of the princes of the fleur de lys. The ransom had not been fully paid when in 1367 he fought in the company of du Guesclin and Trastamara and was again captured and charged with treason. Since the prince was personally involved he convened a court of twelve knights to hear the case. The laws of knighthood before this court bound the prince and Audrehem equally, but the judges had been chosen by the prince not to hear a case of arbitration but a criminal trial. Audrehem’s defence was that he had not armed himself against the prince but Pedro, and on the basis of this argument he was acquitted. Matters such as this provided legal precedence and this case was used as evidence in the Parlement of Paris twenty-three years later.71
Around this time, the prince began to succumb to the illness, variously although uncertainly diagnosed as dropsy and amoebic dysentery, that would lay him low and eventually claim his life. His army was also suffering with dysentery and probably malaria and had limited supplies. As wage bills rose, attempts were made to ensure that Pedro kept his part of the bargain but he could do little until he established his regime. Relations worsened as Pedro attempted to renegotiate the stipulations of Libourne and refused to make the required territorial concessions. Eventually, the sums were reassessed and agreed at a ceremony in Burgos cathedral on 2 May and Pedro’s daughters remained as hostages in Gascony. Efforts were made to raise funds through loans and taxation as Pedro certainly wanted to be rid of the prince and the Companies who were becoming particularly restive and as time passed and supplies lessened some even considered the chance of continuing employment in Castile, communicating with Enrique with advice that he not begin another campaign while the prince was still in the country. The prince opened negotiatons with Pere of Aragon with a view to seizing Castile, the ambassadors being William Elmham and Hugh Calveley, now something of an expert in Iberian affairs. Events prevented such an attempt; Pedro advised the prince that it was impossible for him to raise the necessary money while the prince and his army were still present, and more significantly Edward learned of the likelihood of Enrique attacking Aquitaine. In the middle of August, the army began to withdraw and returned to Aquitaine, soon to fracture.72
The prince’s interests in Castile did not end when he re-crossed the Pyrenees.
… until his eventual return to England, the prince … was continuously engaged in intense diplomatic negotiations with various Iberian rulers, the aim of which was to mount another military invasion of Castile, in alliance with them. One of its chief purposes was to secure the Castilian crown for himself.73