The loose and hegemonic political unity of China during the Shang and early Zhou eras had been completely destroyed by the beginning of what the Chinese called the Warring States era (480-221 bce). This name is a fairly accurate representation of the primary concern of Chinese statesmen of that time. Given the larger scale and intensity of warfare, a whole class of thinkers arose to provide military advice to the rulers of the various states. As warfare became an almost constant feature of life, its practitioners became more professional, and Chinese society itself came to be dominated by full-time warriors and their concerns. Unification of China under the Qin (221-206 bce) and Han (202 bce-220 ce) dynasties saw the addition of systems designed to maintain central control over the vast armies that were used to ensure domestic peace and expand the borders of the Chinese empire. These borders were not peaceful. As China became unified, the steppe nomads to the north formed their own loose union and posed a significant military threat to the settled peoples to their south. Both the Qin and Han dynasties found it necessary to devote a significant amount of energy and resources to countering the threats from the north.
After a particularly brutal raid by northern steppe armies in 771 bce, the unity of China shattered. The result was literally hundreds of independent states, all nominally owing allegiance to the Zhou king. In spite of various conferences, treaties, and the like, these states engaged in a series of wars, both large- and small-scale, as small states became absorbed into larger states, and large states broke up into smaller states. And the warfare of this era was not as gentlemanly as portrayed in much of the literature of later times. In fact, by the fifth century bce, battles had become increasingly deadly, with mass slaughter of defeated opponents becoming almost regular affairs.
Wars of Unification Deadly warfare led to a need for larger and larger armies. By the third century bce, some armies had reached sizes of several hundred thousand men. Military campaigns became intricately planned and executed operations, in which battles might last several days, rather than one or two as was usual in the past. The Warring States era also saw the construction of vast numbers of castles, walls, and other defensive fortifications, with new building materials and techniques developed to combat sieges. Besiegers countered defensive works with innovative tools and techniques of their own, including the use of besieging armies that reached enormous sizes. Interestingly, the tremendous efforts required in this era to overcome the sometimes elaborate defensive fortifications led to a general reluctance of commanders throughout Chinese history to engage in sieges.
States were forced to innovate in government and to actively promote the economic development of their lands. In agriculture, freeholding became the norm, replacing the serfdom that had characterized earlier periods. It was found to be more efficient to tax the production, and resources that had been used to supervise manorial estates could be put to other uses. The states also encouraged trade and other commerce through massive irrigation works and road-, canal-, and bridge-building projects. Professional bureaucracies were instituted to ensure efficient collection of taxes and management of the public works projects.
Military and economic reforms that proved successful were quickly adopted by other states. Really, they had little choice, as those states with advantages would soon use them to destroy their weaker neighbors. By the third century bce, the seven major states contending for domination were engaged in an almost endless round of warfare (Figure 2.2). One of the first to institute such reforms was Qin. Qin’s location and early adoption of reforms such as a policy of accepting in its employ men of talent wherever they hailed from provided it with advantages, but its main advantage was the weakness of its enemies. For example, in 260 bce, the state of Zhao, one of Qin’s most formidable foes, suffered a serious defeat in which it reportedly lost over 400,000 men. While remaining politically intact, Zhao was unable to regain its earlier strength, succumbing a few years later to another determined attack by Qin. The same situation later befell the state of Chu, for most of the period considered the most powerful of the contending states. In 221 bce, Qin armies succeeded in uniting China with the defeat of Qi.
A Shift to Infantry-Based Militaries Early in the Warring States era, most battles began, as in the past (and as in Bronze Age southwest Asia), with a core of chariots backed up by several thousand infantrymen of dubious quality. The main job of the infantry was to mop up the scattered remnants of a defeated enemy. As the armies became larger, the role of chariots decreased. Also, the increasing use of the deadly crossbow—introduced sometime in the fifth century bce—greatly reduced the effectiveness of mobile chariots.
The growing need for large numbers of soldiers for campaigns led to several military-related reforms, the most significant being the use of various forms of conscription to fill the ranks. As freeholding became the dominant form of agriculture, the male farmers of a certain age were registered by government agents. Villages were organized into militia units for defense, with the members equipped by the government and trained at set times of the year. Upon mobilization for large-scale operations, the militia units were integrated into the regular army. Thus, states created fairly large reserves while minimizing the costs to their treasuries.
Figure 2.2 Warring States China, c. 350 BCE
Increasing Military Professionalism
As the fighting of the Warring States era became deadlier, statesmen found it necessary to hire professionals for their armies. Aristocratic ancestry as a prerequisite for a military commission faded into unimportance at a time when defeat in battle often meant slaughter for the defeated. Those with military skills, knowledge, and especially experience were in high demand in all the states, and success in battle was the quickest route up the social scale.
This period also saw the proliferation of military manuals and treatises on warfare, the most famous of which was Sun Zi’s The Art of Warfare (see the Sources box “Sun Zi”). In this way, military practices, often described in detail in these manuals, set precedents for many of China’s later warfare traditions. These traditions included an emphasis on a professional army, with command positions being predominantly gained through merit; a preference for massed formations, rather than small-unit combat; patience in building up large forces prior to a campaign, including supply preparations; use of diplomacy as an integral part of military strategy; and a desire to gain a military advantage—through numbers, use of topography, surprise, diplomacy, trickery, and so on—so as to cause the opponent to surrender or retreat without having to engage in combat. If fighting was necessary, a strategy of both lenience and ruthlessness was used to ensure victory. This might require some explanation. In the Warring States era, military theory and practice stressed the basically moral nature of war. Simply, a ruler should go to war for moral causes—in particular, to maintain or restore justice. In such a righteous war, the opponent was seen as an enemy of heaven, of the natural order of the universe. If he could be made aware of the seriousness of his transgressions, then he should be treated leniently. However, if he persisted in his opposition, the ruler was morally justified in using any and all means to crush him. Hence, we see extraordinary tolerance for those who surrendered or defected along with extraordinary cruelty for those who were defeated in battle.
Most of the military writings of the age have been lost. Nevertheless, it is clear that, during the late Warring States era, military commanders were expected to be familiar with the basic principles of military organization, training, strategy, and tactics, as explicated in those works. Many of the battles of the era were consciously fought along lines set forth in The Art of Warfare and other texts. By the end of the Warring States era, the Chinese had come to increasingly agree that the political division of the land was unnatural and that harmony and justice required that China be unified, by force of arms if necessary.
The earliest Chinese treatise on warfare is The Art of Warfare, traditionally said to have been written by Sun Wu (more commonly referred to as "Sun Zi,” or "Master Sun”), but including at least a few additions and modifications from later centuries. The exact date of its compilation is not clear, though it was widely read by the late Warring States era. It is impossible to exaggerate the influence of this work on later Chinese military history. There are a vast number ofcommentaries still extant, by later Chinese military thinkers and commanders, and from the early Ming dynasty (1368-1644), knowledge ofSun Zi’s The Art of Warfare was required of all prospective officers in the military.
In this excerpt, Sun Zi notes the importance of diplomacy as an aspect of military affairs.
It takes a person of civil virtue to bring peace to the empire; it takes a person of martial virtue to quell disorder in the land. The expert in using the military has three basic strategies that he applies: The best strategy is to attack the enemy at the level of wisdom and experience; the second is to expose the injustice of the enemy’s claims; and the last is to attack the enemy’s battle position.
And when it has been decided to resort to force, Sun Zi’s advice is unequivocal.
Thus in war, I have heard tell of a foolish haste, but I have yet to see a case of cleverly dragging on the hostilities. There has never been a state that has benefited from an extended war. . . . Hence, in war prize the quick victory, not the protracted engagement. Thus, the commander who understands war is the final arbiter of people’s lives, and lord over the security of the state.
In the next exerpt, Sun Zi discusses the role the commander plays in preparing his men for battle—the importance of obtaining and maintaining their loyalty and obedience. We can also note the personal nature of the relationship between a commander and his men, a common feature of Chinese military thinking.
In war it is not numbers that give the advantage. If you do not advance recklessly, and are able to consolidate your own strength, get a clear picture of the enemy’s situation, and secure the full support of your men, it is enough. ... If you punish troops who are not yet devoted to you, they will not obey, and if they do not obey, they are difficult to use. But once you have their devotion, if discipline is not enforced, you cannot use them either. Therefore, bring them together by treating them humanely and keep them in line with strict military discipline. This will assure their allegiance.
source: Sun-Tzu, The Art of Warfare, trans. Roger Ames (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993).
The unification of China did not lead to the end of warfare in China. The first Qin emperor worked to create a unified military system subject to his control, and his armies were kept busy quelling internal resistance to Qin rule and expanding the borders of the empire in all directions. After the chaos of the collapse of the Qin, the early Han emperors employed their military forces primarily to ensure internal order and to defend against the aggressive raids of the Xiongnu to the north. Expansion on a large scale resumed under the emperor Han Wudi, but Han armies found it difficult to control the Xiongnu, who were often able to avoid battle merely by running away into the vast depths of the steppes.
In the Qin era, military matters were dominant in public life. Military men held a large proportion of influential and prestigious positions, and the military was seen by many as a means of social mobility. The succeeding Han dynasty also came to power through military means, and, in the early years, military men continued to play important roles. Efforts were undertaken even under the first Han emperor to place the military under some measure of civilian control. By the second century CE, this included placing trusted eunuchs in command of armies. However, stresses both internal and external forced such reliance on the military that by the end of the dynasty most of China was under the control of military men, who eventually abolished the Han imperial rulers.
Centralized Control Under the Qin
Final battles began with the ascension of Prince Zheng of Qin in 246 bce. The westernmost of the warring states, Qin benefited from centuries of warfare against the nomadic tribes along its western borders. Once these tribes had been subdued, Qin was prepared to expand eastward. Geography assisted Qin in its task, protected as it was by chains of mountains whose passes were relatively easy to defend. By taking control of Ba and Shu (modern-day regions of Sichuan Province), Qin also gained access to abundant agricultural products, as well as further protecting its rear.
It is remarkable that the warfare of the various states that had lasted centuries ended with a few years of fighting, the result being the unification of China under the Qin dynasty. The guiding philosophy of the state of Qin was Legalism, which emphasized strong central rule of most aspects of society and most especially exalted military prowess. Legalism also stressed the use of capable professional officials, and, as noted earlier, Qin had already earned a reputation as being open to the hiring of competent civil and military men from other states.
The period of Qin rule of China was marked by the imposition of centralized and systematized control of the whole empire, in accord with Legalist philosophy. The role of the army was critical to this process. At the head of each command was a general, responsible not only for maintaining domestic peace but also for crushing resistance to Qin reforms. While strictly speaking not responsible for civil administration, in practice these generals and their armies often became dominant in nonmilitary-related affairs. It is no exaggeration to say that Qin China was in essence a military state.
Qin Tomb Soldiers
The fearsome First Emperor of the Qin dynasty had over 6000 full-size terra cotta soldiers buried with him, symbolizing the terror and militarism that both centralized China and made the First Emperor an object of fear and hatred.
Almost immediately after subjugating the remaining states of China, Qin armies engaged in expeditions to expand the territory of the empire. In the north, armies under the general Meng Tian pushed Qin territory far beyond the Ordos region, inflicting several defeats on the Xiongnu. Unfortunately, the records are not clear regarding almost anything involved in this undertaking, so we know little about the numbers or the course of the campaign. Somewhat clearer are the records of campaigns to the south, where large Qin infantry armies wrested control of much of the present-day provinces of Fujian and Guangdong from the tribal peoples who lived there. A naval fleet was also constructed to take advantage of the rivers that criss-crossed much of southern China. Qin military innovation was required as the local peoples hindered and harassed Chinese armies through guerrilla warfare. However, most of these territories reverted to local control after the collapse of the Qin and had to be reconquered by the succeeding Han dynasty.
The disruption of peoples’ lives caused by the centralization policies of the Qin, such as almost confiscatory tax rates, led to a great deal of discontent. Within two years of the death of Qin Shihuangdi (the First Emperor) in 210 bce, fighting broke out in several areas. The new leaders of the dynasty lacked the dynamism and ability of Shihuangdi, and Qin armies were unable to contain the spreading rebellion. Most of the old aristocracy had been destroyed either during the warfare of the Warring States era or by the Qin, and so rebel armies were most often led by men of commoner status, and even some of peasant stock. A key figure in the rebellion and later civil wars was Liu Bang, who was serving as a minor local official at the beginning of the Qin collapse. Courage in battle and proven leadership ability led Liu Bang to command one of the main rebel armies. He gained many adherents and much local support through policies that stressed incorporating defeated enemies into his army and drastically restricting the looting and pillaging of his soldiers. In 202 bce, after defeating his main rival for power, Liu Bang proclaimed the Han dynasty and himself as its first emperor, called Gaodi.
From its founding in 202 bce to roughly 130 bce, most of the military efforts of the Han dynasty concerned internal conflict rather than external expansion or defense. Han China was certainly threatened by outsiders during this period, subjected to often destructive raids by the Xiongnu, who were emboldened by the civil wars engulfing China. A few military expeditions were launched against the Xiongnu by the early Han emperors, but these proved almost universally to be failures. In fact, in one campaign led by Gaodi himself, the Chinese army was destroyed, and the emperor barely escaped capture.
Actually, the Xiongnu were interested not so much in conquest as in the goods that could be acquired through plunder. With almost two-thirds of the Han realm in the hands of semi-independent kings, many of whom felt they were entitled to rule even more of the land, the imperial court decided to essentially pay off the Xiongnu while concentrating their military efforts on subduing the recalcitrant kings. The Xiongnu probably were aware of their advantageous position, and their demands increased as time went by. When Han courts refused to meet the added demands for silk, jewelry, and other products, the Xiongnu resumed raiding—in one instance, over 30,000 of their mounted archers penetrated deep into China and left a wide swath of devastation.
In subduing the kingdoms, Gaodi took advantage of the facts that his territory was larger than that of any single king and that he could usually count on the loyalty and support of at least a few of the other kings. His initial moves were cautious. Under various pretexts, he was able to defeat one king after the other, replacing them with Liu family members. Several of these campaigns were major military endeavors that required the mobilization and dispatch of tens of thousands of infantry and even at times included the use of allied Xiongnu cavalry. Gaodi was mortally wounded in 195 bce in a battle against one of the more aggressive kings. By this time, Gaodi had succeeded in placing family members on the thrones of nearly all the remaining kingdoms and in further circumscribing their independent power. However, his successors, determined to further assert central control, found that family ties were no guarantee of obedience. The Han court’s taxation policies and civil and military administration increased their reach and efficiency, such that a rebellion in 122 bce by the remaining kings was relatively easily overwhelmed by imperial armies.
The reign of Han Wudi (141-87 bce) represented not only the triumph of imperial centralism but also the high point of Han expansionism. Tremendous economic growth during the early decades of the Han dynasty meant greatly increased resources for the imperial government, even with tax rates far below those that had been imposed in the late Warring States and especially Qin eras. A professional bureaucracy based on the Confucian ideal of appointment according to merit (and Warring States and Qin era experiences) was able to efficiently collect the taxes and utilize them to raise and maintain a large, professional military force and to fund vast military campaigns in China’s frontier regions.
There were several stimuli for these campaigns, including increased threats from the Xiongnu to the north, the need to secure trade along the Silk Road, a desire to spread the reach of Chinese civilization, and the will of the emperor Wudi. Indeed, the Silk Road did not exist before the Chinese military campaigns secured the trade routes of Inner Asia. The emperor spent large sums constructing this gateway to Central Asia from the east and to China from the west, and he established garrisons to protect the way stations along the route. Wudi also responded to increased Xiongnu raiding activity by adopting an aggressive policy of conquest and subjugation. A desire to expand direct and indirect Chinese control, cultural as well as political, and a curiosity about other lands also animated Wudi to dispatch Chinese armies far from the Central Plain. The will of this emperor, then, was the crucial factor in the initiation of the major military campaigns of the Han dynasty. Still, it was economic growth and an efficient bureaucracy that made these campaigns possible. These gave Chinese armies the resources needed, as well as in most cases superior weapons. Han opponents, with the possible exception of Korea, did not have the technological skills—especially in metallurgy—to compete in the manufacture of mass quantities of high-quality weapons.
Early in Han Wudi’s reign, Chinese armies were dispatched to reconquer the Min region (present-day Fujian Province). The lands there were fairly quickly subdued, but many of the native peoples were able to continue fighting, using several small islands along the coast as bases. Hit-and-run attacks apparently were very bothersome. In order to deprive the attackers of potential targets, the coastal population was removed to the interior. Although scholars doubt the evacuation was fully carried out, the Min region remained directly administered by the Han court.
In 112 bce, Wudi dispatched his first expedition against the south (roughly, present-day provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi), as well as the small southern kingdom of Nanyue (present-day northern Vietnam). This region had been briefly occupied by Qin armies but had reverted to independence during the chaos attending the fall of the Qin dynasty. Peoples in the Nanyue region, including many Chinese who had fled there, had established a kingdom organized roughly on Chinese lines and accepted nominal Han sovereignty. Wudi decided to impose direct Chinese control over the region, and hundreds of small watercraft were constructed to transport the Han armies. The local peoples were no match for the Chinese, who reportedly arrived with armies of over 100,000 men. The sophisticated Han supply train kept its forces for the most part well fed and well supplied with technologically advanced weapons. Nanyue, like the Min region, was incorporated as a directly administered region of the Han realm.
During the Warring States era, many Chinese refugees had fled to Korea, bringing their skills and culture along with them. The Qin period saw an even larger infusion of Chinese into Korea, including one Wei Man (Wiman in Korean), who had been made military commander of Korea by the king. In 190 bce, Wei Man had used his army to take control of Korea and begin a new dynasty, which maintained amicable relations with Han China. On various pretexts, Wudi in 109 bce sent military forces to invade Korea. A force of 60,000 traveled overland along with a force of about 7000 by sea. However, there was no co - ordination between the two groups, and the Korean army was able to force a withdrawal. Later in the year, a second expedition attacked Korea with more coordination, and this one proved successful. Northern Korea was incorporated into the Han realm, although this did not last more than a few years.
The largest, most complex, and most significant of Wudi’s campaigns were those directed against the Xiongnu. Beginning in 129 bce, Wudi dispatched several expeditions against the Xiongnu, with armies that numbered in the tens of thousands. As in most military campaigns of the early and mid-Han era, the armies usually consisted of a core of regular or “military colony” troops, with most of the men being conscripts drawn from throughout the empire. Campaign armies also normally contained several units of cavalry. It is not clear how all the cavalry forces were raised, though we know that most came from allied nomadic tribes, including subjugated Xiongnu. Wudi’s military commanders were aware that without cavalry they were unlikely to catch their Xiongnu opponents, who could evade the more plodding Chinese infantry simply by withdrawing farther into the steppes. (See Chapter 6 for more on steppe armies.)
Wudi’s expeditions were meticulously planned, with logistics (carts, oxen, laborers, food, weapons, and so on) carefully considered before the army left its camps. As northern territories suitable for agriculture were acquired, colonists—often convicts and their families—were settled to further solidify Chinese control (see below). These colonies also provided men and supplies for later expeditions. In Turkestan, the Han established fortified garrisons, especially in or near major cities along the Silk Road. The increased trade, and taxes obtained from such, was expected to defray much of the cost of the military campaigns.
At great expense, Wudi and his armies succeeded in extending Han control over much of the north and west. Chinese armies were not always victorious, especially in the last decades of Han Wudi’s reign. One of the worst defeats came in 99 bce, when the Xiongnu defeated a major Han force under the illustrious general Li Guangli, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers. In 90 bce, Li blundered into a Xiongnu ambush, losing many thousands more of his men and being captured himself. Defeat in battle was deadly for both sides, as Chinese victories also often led to the slaughter of thousands of Xiongnu. Control of the captured regions remained tenuous throughout the Han dynasty, and the enormous expenses of the campaigns led to an almost empty treasury on the death of Han Wudi.
One major aspect of Han control of the northern and western frontier regions was the establishment of tun-tian, or “military colonies.” In the first century bce, garrisons were established along the frontier and in newly acquired territories, especially along the Silk Road. These were augmented agricultural colonies populated sometimes by tens of thousands of colonists, who were expected to make garrisons as self-sufficient as possible, provide men for regular and militia forces, and contribute toward sinicizing the regions. As new territories were acquired in Xiongnu lands, additional colonies were established and older ones greatly expanded. In some cases, the geography of the land was modified to suit agricultural settlement: Irrigation works and canals were constructed, and in one case a major river was redirected.
While only a few of the colonies were ever really self-supporting, the colonization was so effective that dismantling of the colonies was a perennial bone of contention in diplomatic contacts between the Xiongnu and Han China. A large colony at Turfan—a main station along the Silk Road—was subject to almost yearly Xiongnu raids and changed hands several times over the last two centuries of the Han dynasty. For defense of the colonies, the Han relied on large numbers of crossbowmen mounted along palisades and other walled fortifications.
Han domination of the Silk Road and its northern regions (including Xiongnu territories) depended on the ability of its armies to match the mobility of the Inner-Asian nomadic tribes. Thus, acquisition of a steady supply of horses was essential to the dynasty’s continued control. The need for horses for offensive operations also limited the Han’s ability to defend its territories. Several expeditions, including the famous Heavenly Horses campaign, were launched for the express purpose of acquiring horses for imperial armies. This need was an important reason for another Han policy—that of utilizing some border peoples as allies against Han enemies. Several Qiang tribes (a Tibetan people) were settled within Chinese territory, where, in return for Chinese goods, they assisted in maintaining order. Some of these Qiang tribes were successfully sinicized and, under Han supervision, were often deployed in campaigns against the Xiongnu. However, by the second century CE, Qiang raids rivaled those of the Xiongnu in terms of the damage inflicted on Han China. Now cut off from a steady supply of horses, and facing increased threats, the Han began a steady retreat from the northern and western territories. Although several major battles were fought late in the century as the Han attempted to recover territory, in fact, much of north China was coming increasingly under the control of barbarian regimes, a pattern that would continue for over 300 years following the fall of the Han dynasty.
In contrast, the southern and southwestern territories acquired during the Han era remained under Chinese control even after the fall of the Han dynasty, in the main due to large-scale Chinese migration and successful sinicization of the region. Korea also remained within the Chinese cultural sphere even if not directly ruled by China. In the north and northwest, an aggressive military policy had for many decades protected the trade flow along the Silk Road but provided only temporary—and expensive—respite from Xiongnu attacks. Often, a policy of payment of tribute proved more effective—or at least cheaper—in maintaining the peace along the borderlands of Xion- gnu territory.
Most of the last two centuries of the Han dynasty (23-220, sometimes referred to as the Later Han dynasty) saw large areas of northern and particularly western China come under the control of the Xiongnu and other nomadic peoples. In an expansion of its policy regarding some of the Qiang tribes, the Han court for a while allowed several Xiongnu tribes to reside within Chinese territory, providing a buffer to the more aggressive tribes and serving as the Han’s cavalry arm.
By the mid-second century CE, nomadic raids combined with local Chinese rebellions to seriously weaken the Han. Socially and economically, this period also witnessed the rise of great Chinese families who, in effect, ruled territories from great estates and maintained their own private militaries. Eunuch influence increased at court, and, by the 170s, eunuchs were being put in command of armies; at one point, a eunuch was even appointed as overall commander in chief of the army. Nomad raids, internal rebellions, private armies, and increasingly powerful regional military governors were all signs that the dynasty was in trouble.
The 180s saw the most serious internal rebellion, by a group calling themselves “Yellow Turbans,” which required a major expansion of military force. After successful suppression of the rebellion, the eunuchs at court attempted to reduce the power of the victorious generals and demobilize their armies. Instead, one of the generals marched on the capital, deposed the emperor, and placed another on the throne, while his troops engaged in wholesale slaughter of eunuchs. A coalition of other generals stepped in to “restore” the Han dynasty, but, in reality, China was now divided into almost independent territories under regional military commanders. In 220, the Han dynasty was formally abolished, and several of the regional lords proclaimed new dynasties. For over 350 years, China remained divided and often at war— with itself and outside invaders.
By the Warring States era, the main weapon of the Chinese soldier was the crossbow, mainly for the infantry, but also for many of the cavalry. Making its appearance sometime in the fifth century bce, the crossbow became the main weapon of the infantry by the late Warring States era. Development of the crossbow reached a high point in the early Han era. Han armies marched to battle with their front and flanking units equipped normally with various spears, long axes, or halberd-type weapons, while the main body of troops were armed with crossbows.
Most infantrymen during this whole period were also equipped with some sort of armor, depending on their function and need—and also a shield, though, by the early Han dynasty, fewer troops were routinely equipped with shields. Camps were sometimes protected by mounting connected shields to the sides and tops of carts, which would then encircle the camp. Records suggest that sometimes these “deer horn carts” were also used on a smaller scale as mobile platforms.
The Chinese had learned cast-iron technology by the fifth century bce, long before its invention in the West, and produced some weapons, although until the Han iron was mainly used for agricultural implements. In the Warring States era, rulers needed large quantities of foodstuffs in order to maintain their large armies, and iron implements contributed greatly to the increased efficiency of agricultural productivity. During the Warring States and even the Qin eras, Chinese weapons were made predominantly of bronze, and by the third century bce, the technology of bronze-working was so advanced that the strength and durability of Chinese weapons was unrivaled in the world. The use of iron increased significantly in the third century bce; by the Han period, a large proportion of blade weapons were made of cast iron.
The Warring States era in Chinese history saw a dramatic increase in the level and intensity of warfare. The various states developed an enormous capacity to make war, made possible by an economic and administrative transformation of China that influenced greatly the historical development of Chinese society.
With the resources made available from the tremendous economic growth, the various states raised enormous armies. Professional bureaucracies were also instituted to manage the recruitment, training, and maintenance of these armies. The soldiers and their officers became professional warriors, and men of talent and experience often offered up their services to the highest bidder. Battles became less frequent but increasingly intense, sometimes lasting several days, with the losers subject to horrific slaughter.
Centralization under the Qin and Han dynasties essentially ratified or sometimes modified the changes that had occurred earlier. The professional bureaucracies were able to ensure that the large military expeditions of the Qin and the Han under Wudi were adequately supplied with men and materiel. The manuals of the Warring States era became standard reading for commanders in the subsequent imperial period, as were certain principles that guided actions during and after war. Both the Qin and Han imperial courts strove to maintain a delicate balance between military effectiveness and civil control of the armies. Military men came to dominate society by the late Han, when China was effectively divided into semiindependent, military-ruled territories.
Alexander entered India at the invitation of the king of Taxala, a kingdom in the northwest of India, who saw in Alexander a potentially useful ally against his rival Porus, the most powerful king in the region. (Centuries later, Islamic raiders would also gain entry into India in part by invitation of Hindu kings to whom assistance in local rivalries outweighed the potential threat of invasion that appears foreign only if one falsely assumes Indian unity.) Happy to extend his conquests even farther, Alexander marched east into the Punjab until his army, by now numbering roughly 20,000, was halted by the flooded Hydaspes River. On the far bank sat King Porus with an army of perhaps 35,000, including as many as 100 war elephants.
Unless Alexander could cross the river, his plans for further conquest would be thwarted. But crossing the high waters in the teeth of enemy opposition was impossible. Alexander therefore made camp, as if to wait for the river to subside, and began what may be interpreted as a test of the comparative discipline and stamina of the two armies. Over the course of several weeks, he sent portions of his army both up and down the river in a series of feigned attempts at surprise crossings. Porus responded each time, but his troops began to meet the feints with less vigor—Alexander’s constant, apparently pointless, activity lulled them into com- placency—and they grew restless at the lack of real action. Meanwhile, Macedonian scouts discovered a ford some distance upstream from their camp. Noting the decreased vigilance of the Indian troops, Alexander chose a dark, rainy night and marched half his army to the ford and across the river while the rest remained in the camp, ostentatiously making another feint downstream.
Alexander now had about 6000 cavalry, including the elite Companions, and 5000 infantry, including a portion of the phalanx and some hypaspists (shield bearers; see Chapter 3 for more on Alexander’s army) and light-missile troops, on Porus’s side of the river. Porus drew up his army with the elephants in front, knowing that the horses of Alexander’s cavalry would not face them. Alexander responded by sending half his cavalry on a wide flanking maneuver around the Indian right wing. Anchoring his own right flank on the river and refusing his left to prevent encirclement by Porus’s larger force, he then had his missile troops harass the elephants until they went out of control, disrupting their own lines. At that point, Alexander’s flanking cavalry caught the advancing Indian right wing in the rear and continued down the line while Alexander charged with both the Companion cavalry and the phalanx. After vigorous fighting, Porus’s army fled and Porus was taken captive. Macedonian discipline and combined arms tactics had proven their worth again, with far- reaching consequences for Indian warfare. The symbolic might and elusive military potential of elephants were not destroyed at the Hydaspes, however: They continued in use in India for centuries and were adopted at least in small numbers by Alexander’s successors, who divided his empire between them after his death.