Notes

PREFACE

1. In truth the math really is not that hard, just some algebra and basic calculus in addition to the steps for solving the game. I know this because otherwise I would not have been able to do it. I am neither a game theorist nor a mathematician. This is probably also a good time to make it clear to any readers with training in game theory that the model makes no contribution to game theory. My goal is to say something about interrogational torture, and game theory is just a tool to that end. For more on the technical details associated with the model, see Appendices A to C.

CHAPTER 1

1. The following narrative of events is based on: McGirk Calabresi and Shannon (2002), Shane (2008), Risen (2006), Soufan (2011), Soufan (2009), Johnston (2006), Mayer (2008), Suskind (2006), Tenet and Harlow (2007), Rodriguez Jr and Harlow (2012), Thiessen (2010), Rizzo (2014), Grey (2006), McDermott and Meyer (2012), United States Senate (2014a).

2. According to one report, he occupied his days “masturbating like a monkey in the zoo. … He didn’t care that they were watching him” (Mayer 2008, p. 175). It is unclear, however, whether this type of behavior predated, or was the consequence of, his confinement. Former Bush speech writer Marc Thiessen interprets Zubaydah’s masturbation as “resistance” to interrogation, providing a new rationale for adolescent boys everywhere (Thiessen 2010, p. 87).

3. Zubaydah’s own account to the International Committee of the Red Cross largely corroborates these accounts (International Committee of the Red Cross 2007, pp. 29–32)).

4. And still does in modern French. La Question is the simple title of Henri Alleg’s memoir of the torture he suffered at the hands of French paratroopers in Algeria (Alleg, Calder, and Sartre 2006).

5. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genghis_Khan.

6. Respondents were placed into these groups based on how they responded to questions on whether harsh interrogation methods are effective and whether they are justified. A methodology statement with question wording is available at http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/torture/.

7. Available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/14/torturepol2012_n_2301492.html.

8. Available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/12/torture-report-poll_n_6316126.html.

9. See, for example, the exchange surrounding my article in the March 2012 issue of Political Research Quarterly.

10. I fully recognize that formal logic and mathematics are themselves preeminent vehicles for making many people’s eyes glaze over and dream longingly of cleaning underneath the refrigerator, but bear with me for a bit.

11. You can see the scene here: https://youtube.com/watch?v=CemLiSI5ox8. Whatever the other merits of the film, this is a terrible attempt at game theory. First, there are only four brunettes and five guys. Second, it never considers the preferences of the women and thus the likelihood of success with the blonde or any of the brunettes. This is not just sexist, but also ignores a pretty important part of the strategic dynamic. Finally, Hollywood actually gets the solution wrong! Nash himself would never have proposed this solution, and we will see why in a moment.

12. Law and Order SVU aficionados, however, will notice that I am faithful to the basic storyline and even much of the actual dialog of the original episode; only the jail sentences are contrived.

13. Technically speaking, it’s a Nash equilibrium, named after the same John Nash of A Beautiful Mind.

14. Though it may have been a game attempt at convincing his friends in order to provide an opening for himself, as one friend seems to suspect: “Nash, if this is some way for you to get the blonde on your own, you can go to hell.”

15. You can see the painting of waterboarding at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vann_Nath.

16. See http://www.thisweekinpalestine.com/details.php?catid=20&id=2761&edid=168. Shabeh (also writteen shabach) is a favorite stress position torture of the Israeli security forces.

17. “FACTBOX—New US consumer financial bureau has wide powers,” Reuters, September 14, 2010. Available at http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2010/09/14/factbox-new-us-consumer-financial-bureau-has-wide-powers/. Accessed June 29, 2012.

18. See http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/credit-card-act/feb2011-factsheet/.

CHAPTER 2

1. The following quotes liberally from Wallach (2006), pp. 482–484).

2. The following narrative of events is based on Coffman’s testimony from the trial transcript in the author’s possession (Coffman 1983, pp. 202–247)). I am grateful to Dinah Olaniyan, Dennis Dimsey, and Scott Woodward for their assistance obtaining the relevant transcripts from this case.

3. A “trusty” was an inmate the prison staff used to perform menial tasks and, in an earlier time, control and administer punishments to other prisoners. Although outlawed by the 1970s, the system persisted in Texas for another decade. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusty_system.

4. The following narrative of events is based on Hicks’s testimony from the trial transcript in the author’s possession (Hicks 1983, pp. 9–91)).

5. So obvious it hits you between the eyes.

6. See http://gawker.com/5866267/this-is-what-a-cia-black-site-looks-like.

7. Huffington Post/YouGov, December 10–11, 2014. Poll results available here: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/12/torture-report-poll_n_6316126.html. Methodology statement available here: http://data.huffingtonpost.com/yougov/methodology.

8. See http://www.cbsnews.com/news/torture-and-reaction-to-the-senate-intelligence-report/.

9. See http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/PenningtonTortureEssay.htm.

10. Let’s bracket for the moment how on earth such scales might be constructed.

11. The burden on torture proponents is higher; presumably we would not support interrogational torture if it is just a coin flip whether it works or not.

12. I’m grateful to Ken Benoit for clarifying this point.

13. Knowing contextual information about the detainee, such as rank and role in Al Qaeda, will help with, but not solve, this problem.

14. ABC News/Washington Post, December 16, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/new-poll-finds-majority-of-americans-believe-torture-justifiedaft911-attacks/2014/12/16/f6ee1208-847c-11e4-9534-f79a23c40e6c_story.html CBS News, December 11–14, 2014, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/torture-and-reaction-to-the-senate-intelligence-report/; Pew Research Center, December 11–14, 2014, http://www.people-press.org/2014/12/15/about-half-see-cia-interrogation-methods-as-justified/; Huffington Post/YouGov, December 10–11, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/12/torture-report-poll_n_6316126.html.

CHAPTER 3

1. Swiftian, but not entirely unrealistic: http://dcmo.defense.gov/about/mission-and-vision.html. Over the top, but not by much: Jose Rodriquez, the former head of the program, refers to “sharing best practices with other intelligence collectors” (Rodriguez Jr and Harlow 2012, p. 147). A February 2003 CIA memo on the program stated that “resources are critical to the success of the Program’s ability to meet identified customer requirements,” supported “oversight of all activities to ensure quality control,” and predicted “increased demand for more HVT program services” (Central Intelligence Agency 2003a, p. 13).

2. For some on the academic left, it also makes me somehow complicit in aiding and abetting torture. For a rebuttal to this view employing a “discourse” of reason, logic, and empirical evidence see (Schiemann 2012b).

3. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that I clarify this point and for suggestions about the tone elsewhere in the book.

4. Bentham’s own views changed over the years and were somewhat contradictory. See (Davies 2012), who examines Bentham’s unpublished writings on torture.

5. This is not the place to explore them, but there are other utilitarian arguments for torture (e.g., Allhoff 2006 and Kershnar 2010) as well as utilitarian arguments against torture (e.g., Arrigo 2004, Brecher 2007, Bufacchi and Arrigo 2006, and Morgan 2000).

6. This contradicts their claim that torture is effective. Moreover, the mathematical expression they chose (but did not justify) for the threshold does not work in the way they apparently believe. If there is no chance the person with the information is the actual wrongdoer, the threshold equals zero. If there is no chance that any other alternatives to torture will work, which is the entire reason why they argue that torture is needed, the threshold is actually undefined (there is a zero in the denominator).

7. Dershowitz is very defensive about being labeled a proponent of torture, since his goal is to minimize the practice, but the fact of the matter is that his “conditional normative position” would enshrine it in law and it is not a mischaracterization of his position to say so (Dershowitz 2003, p. 277).

8. Posner also argues that “sleep deprivation, close confinement in chilly or dirty cells, bright lights (the old ‘third degree’), shouting, threats, truth serums, and lies” could fall below torture and be “merely coercive” (Posner 2004, p. 292).

9. If the FISA courts and the courts nominally supervising the NSA phone and internet surveillance programs are any indication, and I think they are, Posner may well be right.

10. It seems to me that Krauthammer is to be applauded here for avoiding euphemisms such as “enhanced interrogations.” Krauthammer is advocating inhumane treatment and doesn’t shrink from it. As he puts it, “moral honesty is essential.”

11. On CIA association with torture in Latin America see (Karl 2011), McCoy (2006), Chapter 3, Otterman (2007), Chapters 5–6, and Quigley (2011). On renditions pre-9/11 see (Mayer 2008), Chapter 6, pp. 101–138.

12. See (Central Intelligence Agency 2003d).

13. See (Levin 2004), Bradbury (2005a), Bradbury (2005b), and Bradbury (2005c).

14. The memo did not rule out other techniques; and, as we will see, other documents show other techniques were included in the Standard list.

15. Other techniques were also possible, subject to “specific approval” (Central Intelligence Agency 2003c, p. 2).

16. A later memo on waterboarding expanded this responsibility so that “[a]ny member of the interrogation team”—not just the medical officer—“has the obligation to voice concern, and if necessary to halt” waterboarding “in the event a detainee were to be perceived as unable to withstand the affects [sic] of the waterboard for any reason” (Central Intelligence Agency 2005, p. 3).

17. The draft guidelines dated September 2003 are reproduced as Appendix F in (Central Intelligence Agency 2004c), pp. 147–158. The September 2003 and December 2004 guidelines differ somewhat. Partly this appears to be due to rewriting and different redaction decisions, but there also appear to be some shifts in policy. In general, the 2003 version is harsher, with diapering and a standard sleep deprivation length of 72 hours as opposed to 48 hours in 2003. In 2004, water dousing is listed among the enhanced techniques whereas it is a standard technique in 2003.

18. See also (Central Intelligence Agency 2004a), pp. 2–3.

19. This is evident in other CIA documents as well. “Sleep deprivation will end sooner if the medical or psychologist observer finds contraindications to continued sleep deprivation” (Central Intelligence Agency 2004a, pp. 14–16)). “Any member of the interrogation team has the obligation to voice concern, and if necessary to halt” waterboarding “in the event a detainee were to be perceived as unable to withstand the affects [sic] of the waterboard for any reason” (Central Intelligence Agency 2005, p. 3).

20. Other category II techniques were similar to the CIA torture program: isolation, light and sound deprivation, food manipulation, forced nakedness, forced grooming (e.g., forced shaving), and manipulation of phobias such as the use of dogs.

21. At least in the United States. Some of them may be subject to arrest if they travel abroad.

22. Yoo is now a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley and Bybee is a federal judge.

23. The “additional techniques” were isolation, prolonged interrogations (e.g., 20 hours per day), prolonged standing, sleep deprivation, physical training, face slap/stomach slap, removal of clothing, and inducing anxiety via aversions (e.g., dogs) (Danner 2004, pp. 191–192)). Not all of these were actually employed.

24. For a more technical treatment of this ratio idea and interrogational torture as an “epistemic system,” see (Koppl 2005), pp. 91, 94. See (Rumney 2006), p. 481 for an empirical approach to reliability. For the reasons stated in the Chapter 2, the empirical approach to this question seems, to me, a dead end.

CHAPTER 4

1. At the risk of being overly repetitive, if we had empirical data, we could assess how torture actually does work and compare those findings to our benchmarks.

2. This chapter and much of those that follow will read as perhaps even more cold and calculating. The logic of torture advocated by proponents is a brutal one, and we will reproduce that logic to assess whether it works as they claim.

3. One of my regrets concerning the article that launched this project was not having the space to explain fully the subtitle: “How Good Guys Get Bad Information with Ugly Methods.” I meant “guys” in the colloquial, “we’re all on the same team” sense, not in the strictly gender-identification sense. It is very clear from CIA documents, memoirs, and detainee testimonials that key analysts, debriefers, interrogators, and rendition “ninja” team members were female. I’ll also continue to capitalize Interrogator and Detainee to refer to players in the game as opposed to interrogators or detainees generally.

4. Two points are in order here. First, a sequential move game is equivalent to a simultaneous move game if players are ignorant of the other player’s choice. If you’ve moved before me but I have no idea what you’ve done, then it’s the same thing as if we choose at the same moment. This is another difference from the original Law and Order SVU episode in which Deborah thought that Carlo had already moved, making it sequential, not simultaneous. Second, in the case of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the sequence does not matter anyway, since “rat out” is a dominant strategy for both players: Each is better off choosing it no matter what the other player does. As we’ll see, in truly sequential games without a dominant strategy, the timing of moves can make a big difference.

5. In the original article I used the terms “weak” and “strong” respectively for these detainee types. Although I was simply following language used by writers on torture from the ancients forward and not making value judgments, I now consider it a mistake, regret it, and thus will use the more descriptive terms “Cooperative” and “Resistant” in this book.

6. I should make a quick note of caution here. It just so happens that both players receive a payoff of two in this outcome, but this is purely coincidental and has no bearing on solving the game. Their payoffs are completely independent.

7. The technical definition of a subgame is a part of the original game such that the complete history of the game to that point is common knowledge (both players know it, each knows the other knows it, each knows that the other knows that they know it, and so on). In our example, the two nodes where the Interrogator moves (after “information” and after “no information”) are subgames, as is the entire game.

8. You may have noticed that, to keep things moving, we did not check to see whether the other two possible strategy profiles—{“information”, (“no torture”,“no torture”)} and {“no information”, (“torture”,“no torture”)}—constitute Nash equilibria. You can check for yourself, but I can also save you the trouble and tell you that they are are not.

9. See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/28/jeremiah-denton-dead-dies_n_5050132.html

10. This is not mere speculation; according to two former CIA officials, it actually happened at the secret CIA prison in Poland. A CIA debriefer told KSM that she knew everything about him and that he shouldn’t lie to her. KSM’s response? He leaned back in his chair and replied, “Then why are you here?” (Goldman 2013).

CHAPTER 5

1. These player types correspond closely to the player types in Wantchekon and Healy (1999).

2. I thank former military interrogator Matthew Alexander for pointing this out to me.

3. Technically, it transforms the game from one of incomplete information to one of imperfect information.

4. For the exceedingly nerdy, some more game theory jargon: Decision nodes connected by a dashed line are information sets—that is, a set of nodes at which a player has identical moves and does not know at which of these nodes she is moving. See Gibbons (1992), pp. 119–120.

5. Unfortunately for the innocent, however, a strict adherence to this rule meant there was no way to end their torment by falsely confessing. Roth (1964), pp. 99–104 relates the awful suffering of Elvira del Campo in 16th-century Toledo, who begged her torturers to tell her to what she should confess.

6. If you are risk-seeking, you would actually be willing to pay more, whereas if you are risk-averse, you would be willing to play only if you paid even less than $5.50.

7. Since the weights are equal in this case, .5 and .5, it’s actually a regular average. We want to leave open the possibility, however, that the probabilities and thus the weights will be different, resulting in a weighted average.

8. In order to keep the notation as simple as possible, I have not indexed v and k for the Cooperative and Resistant types. This will not be a problem since the Resistant type always plays “no information” and so the thresholds involving v and k are always those of the Cooperative type. See Appendix A.

9. If you don’t have a kid in middle or high school and thus haven’t been forced recently to go back over algebra, we can multiply both sides of the inequality by and change the direction of the inequality, and the relationship remains the same without the negatives.

10. The quote is taken from Hayek’s Nobel Prize in economics acceptance speech, December 11, 1974, available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1974/hayek-lecture.html.

11. It is well known, for example, that many torturers suffer psychological trauma as the result of their activities (Atkinson 2007; Fanon 1963, pp. 264–270); Rejali 2007, pp. 524–526)).

12. Recall too that there are two versions of the game, one assuming leading questioning and one assuming objective questioning.

13. Note that this does not change the Pragmatic Interrogator’s information set. Although her payoffs are the same as those of the “no information” information set ( after torture and after no torture), she knows she is receiving some type of information from a Cooperative Detainee. She must, however, decide whether or not to torture prior to fully understanding the information’s value. I am grateful to Livio Di Lonardo for forcing me to clarify this point.

CHAPTER 6

1. For the non-card players: Diamonds and hearts are red, clubs and spades are black.

2. Speaking loosely, a PBE is an equilibrium in which beliefs and strategies are in a sort of harmony: The beliefs are consistent with the strategies in that equilibrium and the strategies are optimal, given player beliefs. For a clear introduction and step-by-step example, see Gates and Humes (1997), pp. 113–139; for a more technical but still accessible statement, see Gibbons (1992), pp. 175–183. For a fascinating look at the origins and real-world practical uses of Bayes’ Rule, see McGrayne (2011).

3. In the RIT game, the Detainee never observes a move by the Interrogator and thus calculates his expected utility in the normal way.

4. The other three are: (no info, info, info), (info, info, no info), (no info, info, no info).

5. A pure strategy is a strategy a player plays with probability 1. There are also mixed strategies, probabilistic combinations of pure strategies such as . If you’ve played rock–paper–scissors and kept your opponent guessing by mixing up which one you threw, then you’ve played a mixed strategy before. To keep things more realistic and tractable, we will solve for only pure strategy equilibria.

6. We only care about the actions of the Pragmatic Interrogator because that type matches up with the pragmatic model. Again, we need a Sadistic Interrogator in the game because it affects the Detainee’s behavior (as we will see shortly), but we want to examine the actions of the Pragmatic type.

7. Another way to think about this is that the other two branches are weighted with zero probability, making everything zero, so you’d just be putting in 0s for the Resistant and Innocent terms in the addition part of your expected value equation.

8. Note the similarity to real-life interrogations: Resistant and Innocent Detainees are observationally equivalent to Interrogators in terms of the information they (fail to) provide.

9. Your updated beliefs are known in Bayesian terminology as “posteriors.”

10. Actually u cannot be zero, since by assumption u is strictly greater than zero but less than or equal to one, that is, . The reason for this is that if , that is equivalent to “no information,” which is covered by the other move. But you get the idea that as u approaches zero, the value of the information also goes down.

11. We explore the implications of this relationship in more detail in Chapter 7.

12. Or almost all of them. There is an additional step necessary for assessing the plausibility of equilibria in which all three Detainee types play “no information”: specifying beliefs off the equilibrium path. The basic idea of calculating expected utility is the same, but going over that here without an example would take us too far astray. See Gibbons (1992), pp. 175–183.

CHAPTER 7

1. In a formal mathematical proof, a proposition might be a theorem, if it is important, or a lemma, if it is an intermediate step to proving a theorem but of little intrinsic interest. Both because the math employed here is so straightforward and because I sometimes rely on empirical assumptions, I stick to the more modest “proposition.” For more on these terms see Moore and Siegel (2013), p. 22

2. Recall from Chapter 6 that is the Detainee’s version of . The threshold has the same function as under leading questioning. We also derived the Innocent Detainee recognition threshold in the last chapter; is the version of the Innocent Detainee recognition threshold in the no information, torture equilibrium. See Appendix A.

3. Nerdily: for all .

4. This is called a proof by contradiction.

5. Keep in mind that we are speaking about the prior probability f and not one of the f thresholds.

CHAPTER 8

1. Since the Sadistic Interrogator always plays torture and we are only interested in the actions of the Pragmatic Interrogator, we can ignore her behavior from now on.

2. This does not mean that there will be less torture overall, however; it simply means that the dark-gray region narrows toward . The space to the left of that region continues to be covered by torture of Innocent and Resistant Detainees.

3. Available at http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/the-certainty-of-donald-rumsfeld-part-1/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.

4. The following account is based primarily on Cassidy’s memoir (Cassidy 1977), but see also Ensalaco (2011), pp. 78–81) as well as Cassidy’s testimony before the International Commission of Inquiry in to the Crimes of the Military Junta in Chile, Helsinki, March 28th–29th, 1976, available at http://www.blest.eu/biblio/arrests/cap4.html.

5. This passage is also startlingly clear evidence of strategically rational thinking, despite just having been subjected to electrical shocks.

6. Later on, DINA officers spoke to some nuns at the convent and the nuns denied any fugitives having been in the house. When Cassidy protested they were lying, the DINA officer said to her: “But a nun would not lie, doctora” (Cassidy 1977, p. 191).

CHAPTER 9

1. Presumably there would be other costs to unwitting confirmation by an innocent detainee, if that confirmation leads the interrogator to believe the detainee possesses valuable information and pressures him into revealing other information which is false or misleading.

2. The following draws on Jehl (2005a), Priest (2004), Jehl (2005b), Isikoff and Hosenball (2005), Gardham (2009), Human Rights Watch (2012), Isikoff and Corn (2007), United States Senate (2006), and Human Rights Watch (2012).

3. Abu Zubaydah was its external emir. The camp appears not to have been directly under bin Laden’s control, but it trained fighters for jihadist causes.

4. Moussaoui, arrested in August 2001, was alleged to have been a possible back-up in the 9/11 attacks and received a life sentence. Reid is an Australian citizen who tried and failed to set off explosives hidden in the heel of his shoe mid-flight from Paris to Miami on December 20, 2001.

5. The officer left the CIA after the reprimand but was rehired as a contractor. See History Commons, available at http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=_albert__1 as well as United States Senate (2014a), pp. 94–96, 450.

6. See http://www.historycommons.org/searchResults.jsp?searchtext=Ibn+al-Shaykh+al-Libi&events=on&entities=on&articles=on&topics=on&timelines=on&projects=on&titles=on&descriptions=on&dosearch=on&search=Go.

CHAPTER 10

1. We can see this in another way. Recall that the Interrogator will torture when the probability the Detainee is Innocent after “no information” is below , or . A little algebraic manipulation tells us another way of saying this, namely that the Interrogator will torture when the odds of an Innocent to a Resistant Detainee, , are below . We have been assuming that approaches and approaches . If so, then the right side approaches . Thus the condition is met as long as , as we have also been assuming. would violate this condition and the Interrogator would switch to “no torture” because it is sufficiently likely that “no information” came from an Innocent Detainee.

2. The following account draws on Ackerman (2011), Carle (2011), Horton (2011a), Horton (2011b), Leopold (2011), and Suskind (2006). You may notice that the Canadian Intelligence Service report document comes from a group dedicated to exonerating a Canadian suspected of ties to terrorism, Mohamed Harkat, and could therefore reasonably be seen as suspect. I cross checked this document with references in Canadian court documents, which make it clear that this document was made available to Mr. Harkat during legal proceedings and so is authentic. See, for example, Federal Court of Canada (2010), p. 279, § 65.

3. The postscript to the Dubai part of this story is that the CIA then kidnapped off the street two employees of Wazir’s bank in Karachi on their way home from work. When they declined a CIA offer to cooperate with them, the two were also rendered to a black site. The following morning two CIA operatives opened the bank, pretending to be distant cousins filling in while the proprietors were away.

4. The following draws on Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (2003), Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (2005), European Court of Human Rights (2010), Dahlkamp et al. (2004). I gleaned some additional, incidental, details from the German TV documentary, “Jakob von Metzler—Tod eines Bankiersohns,” Philipp Engel, Die groß en Kriminalfälle, Season 7, Episode 1, December 1, 2008. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NlSEQCx2JiI. For the debate about torture this stirred in Germany, see Beestermöller and Brunkhorst (2006).

5. At the time, Zivildienst was an alternative to military conscription for conscientious objectors.

6. German court documents identify some tangentially involved people by the first letter of their last name only.

7. It turned out later that this person was a martial arts instructor for the police.

8. Neither Daschner nor Ennigkeit denies ordering and making these threats. Gäfgen later claimed that Ennigkeit “further threatened to lock him in a cell with two huge black men who would sexually abuse him. The officer also hit him several times on the chest with his hand and shook him so that, on one occasion, his head hit the wall” (European Court of Human Rights 2010, p. 4). No courts have substantiated Gäfgen’s claims.

CHAPTER 11

1. It is also worth recalling from Chapter 8 that there is still surprise torture to the right of under objective questioning.

2. The following narrative relies on El-Masri (2005), European Court of Human Rights (2006), Meek (2005), Grey (2006), Priest (2005).

3. The case of Algerian Laid Saidi was perhaps even worse. Saidi was picked up on the basis of a telephone recording in which he was overheard to speak cryptically about “airplanes.” He was renditioned the usual CIA way to “the dark prison,” another prison in Afghanistan, where he was chained naked in stress positions, was subjected to loud music in almost total darkness, and had cold water thrown on him. Eventually his interrogators played the tape for him. It turns out that he was discussing “tires” and not “planes.” The analyst misunderstood the plural “at-tirat” for “tayarat”. See http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/07/world/africa/07algeria.html?ei=5090&en=17b76be0aba70618&ex=1309924800&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss&pagewanted=all&_r=0.

4. The following narrative relies on Alleg’s memoirs (Alleg Calder and Sartre 2006, Alleg 2012). For background context on the civil war in Algeria and the role of French torture, see Aussaresses (2004), Branche (2007), Branche (2001), Evans (2011), Horne (1977), Morgan (2007), Rejali (2007), 480ff.

5. For the U.S. diplomatic threats see the series of cables on Wikileaks summarizing the back and forth with German authorities, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BERLIN200_a.html, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BERLIN230_a.html, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BERLIN242_a.html, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BERLIN730_a.html.

CHAPTER 13

1. The vapors above liquid gasoline are actually what burn, not the liquid itself. The trouble is that there is usually a lot of vapor where there is liquid gasoline.

2. The transcript is available at http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/12/floor-statement-by-sen-mccain-on-senate-intelligence-committee-report-on-cia-interrogation-methods.

3. Data from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention WISQARS database. Available at http://webappa.cdc.gov/cgi-bin/broker.exe.

4. See http://www.wfp.org/hunger/stats.

5. In a subsequent work, Clarke and Primo (2012) alter their typology somewhat. Although I do draw on this later work, I find the first typology more helpful for my purposes.

POSTSCRIPT

1. The Forward, Findings, and Summary each have their own numbering within the combined pdf. All page references below are pdf pages, not the original document pages.

2. The only exceptions are some details in the narrative of Abu Zubaydah at the beginning of Chapter 1 and a few other scattered references.

3. The report explains why this is a conservative estimate and that the CIA itself admits it is still unsure just how many detainees were in the program (Central Intelligence Agency 2014, p. 75).

4. For this, and several other reactions by physicians to the CIA method, see https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_other/fact-sheet-rectal-hydration-and-rectal-feeding.pdf.

5. Although the CIA argues in its June 2013 response that the Senate report “overstates the number of instances” in several ways (Central Intelligence Agency 2014, pp. 81–82)), the Senate report rejects these claims, showing that it used very conservative counting rules for such instances (United States Senate 2014a, pp. 127–129)).

6. There is some irony here. Zarqawi was later located and killed by U.S. forces using noncoercive interrogation techniques on sources in Iraq. See Alexander and Bruning (2008).

7. This contrasts sharply with Thiessen’s torture apologia, in which he explicitly distances the CIA’s waterboarding technique from “true torture” partly on the basis that the distention and stomach-pressing was not part of the CIA program (Thiessen 2010, p. 131ff).

8. This, however, contradicts other official CIA claims as well as apologists of the program such as Bush speech writer Marc Thiessen that waterboarding always worked (Thiessen 2010, p. 102). To be fair, Thiessen may well have been misled by his CIA informants.

9. The HRW report, “Delivered into Enemy Hands,” is available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/09/05/delivered-enemy-hands.

10. Statistically: z = .56, p = .289, one-tailed test.

11. Once again the Republican response counts an innocent detainee’s response to the lesser torture methods against the effectiveness of those methods. Despite the fact that the CIA itself admits that Haji Ghalgi was only used as “‘useful leverage’ against a family member” (United States Senate 2014a, p. 42), the Republican response includes him in the list of “deceptive detainees” who were subjected to the “noncoercive” methods (United States Senate 2014b, p. 57).

12. The Republican response moved the goalposts right in front of the ball and very far from the original justification for the program, defining “performance metrics” including, among others, “improved information sharing” (United States Senate 2014b, p. 59)

REFERENCES

Ackerman, Spencer. 2011. “Some Will Call Me a Torturer: CIA Man Reveals Secret Jail.” wired.com, July 1, 2011. Available at http://www.wired.com/2011/07/am-i-a-torturer/all/1.

Alabama State Legislature. 1881. “Testimony Taken by the Joint Special Committee of the Session of 1880–1881 to Inquire into the Condition and Treatment of Convicts of the State.”; In the author’s possession.

Alexander, M. and J.R. Bruning. 2008. How to Break a Terrorist: The US Interrogators Who Used Brains, not Brutality, to Take Down the Deadliest Man in Iraq. New York: Free Press.

Alexander, Matthew. 2011. Kill or Capture: How a Special Operations Task Force Took Down a Notorious Al Qaeda Terrorist. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Alleg, Henri, J. Calder, and J.P. Sartre. 2006. The Question. Lincoln, NE: Bison Books.

Alleg, Henri. 1960. La Question. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit.

Alleg, Henri, trans. Gila Walker. 2012. The Algerian Memoirs: Days of Hope and Combat. New York: Seagull Books.

Allhoff, Fritz. 2006. “A Defense of Torture: Separation of Cases, Ticking Time-Bombs, and Moral Justification.” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19(2):243–264.

Aristotle. 350. On Rhetoric. Available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.html. Accessed on June 30, 2012.

Arrigo, Jean Maria. 2004. “A Utilitarian Argument Against Torture Interrogation of Terrorists.” Science and Engineering Ethics 10(3):543–572.

Atkinson, Keith. 2007. “The Torturer’s Tale.” In The Phenomenon of Torture: Readings and Commentary, ed. William F. Schulz. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 104–109.

Augustine, Saint. 1984. Concerning the City of God against the Pagans. New York: Penguin.

Aussaresses, Paul. 2004. The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Algeria 1955–1957. New York: Enigma Books.

Bagaric, Mirko and Julie Clarke. 2007. Torture: When the Unthinkable Is Morally Permissible. Albany State University of New York Press.

Beccaria, Cesare. 1872. An Essay on Crimes and Punishments. Albany, NY: W.O. Little and Co.

Beestermöller, Gerhard and Hauke Brunkhorst. 2006. Rückkehr der Folter: der Rechtsstaat im Zwielicht? München: C.H. Beck.

Bentham, Jeremy, F.C. Montague ed. 1891. A Fragment on Government. London: Oxford University Press.

Boal, Mark. 2011. “Zero Dark Thirty.” Script, Sony Pictures. Available at http://flash.sonypictures.com/shared/movies/zerodarkthirty/zdt_script.pdf.

Bowden, Mark. 2003. “The Dark Art of Interrogation.” The Atlantic Monthly 292(3):51–76.

Bradbury, Steven G. 2005a. “Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee.” May 10, Washington D.C.: Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice.

Bradbury, Steven G. 2005b. “Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to the Combined Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.” May 10, Washington D.C.: Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice.

Bradbury, Steven G. 2005c. “Memorandum for John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees.” May 30, Washington D.C.: Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice.

Brady, H.E. 2004. “Introduction.” Perspectives on Politics 2(02):295–300.

Branche, Raphaëlle. 2001. La Torture et l’armee pendant la guerre d’Algérie, 1954–1962. Paris: Gallimard.

Branche, Raphaëlle. 2007. “Torture of Terrorists? Use of Torture in a ‘War Against Terrorism:’ Justifications, Methods and Effects: The Case of France in Algeria, 1954–1962.” International Review of the Red Cross 89(3):543–560.

Brecher, Bob. 2007. Torture and the Ticking Bomb. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Bufacchi, Vittorio and Jean Arrigo. 2006. “Torture, Terrorism and the State: A Refutation of the Ticking-Bomb Argument.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 23(3):355–373.

Bush, George W. 2011. Decision Points. New York: Random House.

Bybee, Jay S. 2002. “Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative.”; August 1, Washington D. C.: Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service. 2009. “Summary of the Security Intelligence Report in relation to Mohamed HARKAT.” Ottawa: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, February 6, 2009. Available at: http://www.justiceforharkat.com/download.php?view.197.

Carle, Glenn. 2011. The Interrogator: An Education. New York: Nation Books.

Cassidy, Sheila. 1977. Audacity to Believe. New York: HarperCollins.

Central Intelligence Agency. 1983. “Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual.” Washington D. C.:Central Intelligence Agency. Available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB27/02-01.htm.

Central Intelligence Agency. 2003a. “CIA Memo re: Enhanced Interrogation Program, February 25, 2003.” Washington D. C.:Central Intelligence Agency. Available at: ACLU, The Torture Database, ACLU-RDI 4612, http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/CIA000507.pdf.

Central Intelligence Agency. 2003b. “Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees, January 28, 2003.” Washington D. C.:Central Intelligence Agency. Available at ACLU, The Torture Database, ACLU-RDI 4561, http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/DOJOLC001040.pdf.

Central Intelligence Agency. 2003c. “Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the [redacted], January 28, 2003.” Washington D. C.:Central Intelligence Agency. Available at: ACLU, The Torture Database, ACLU-RDI 4562, http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/CIA000559.pdf.

Central Intelligence Agency. 2003d. “Psychological Assessment of Zain al-Abedin al-Abideen Muhammad Hassan, a.k.a. Abu Zubaydah.” Washington D. C.:Central Intelligence Agency. Available at: http://www.aclu.org/files/torturefoia/released/082409/cia_ig/oig39.pdf.

Central Intelligence Agency. 2004a. “Background Paper on CIA’s Combined Use of Interrogation Techniques, December 30, 2004.” Washington D. C.:Central Intelligence Agency. Available at CIA-OIG, ACLU, The Torture Database, ACLU-RDI 4586, http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/DOJOLC001126.pdf.

Central Intelligence Agency. 2004b. “OMS Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee Rendition, Interrogation, and Detention, December 1, 2004.” Washington D. C.:Central Intelligence Agency. Available at ACLU, The Torture Database, ACLU-RDI 4587, http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/DOJOLC001145.pdf.

Central Intelligence Agency. 2004c. “Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (Office of the Inspector General, CIA), May 7, 2004.” Washington D. C.:Central Intelligence Agency Office of Inspector General. Available at ACLU, The Torture Database, CIA-OIG, ACLU-RDI 4611, http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/CIA000349.pdf.

Central Intelligence Agency. 2004d. “Waterboarding Guidelines, August 5, 2004.” Washington D. C.:Central Intelligence Agency. Available at ACLU, The Torture Database, ACLU-RDI 4579, http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/DOJOLC001095.pdf.

Central Intelligence Agency. 2005. “Horizontal Sleep Deprivation, April 22, 2005.” Washington D. C.:Central Intelligence Agency. Available at ACLU, The Torture Database, ACLU-RDI 4588, http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia_subsite/pdfs/DOJOLC001180.pdf.

Central Intelligence Agency. 2014. “CIA Comments on the Select Committee on Intelligence Report on the Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program.” Washington D. C.:Central Intelligence Agency. Director of Central Intelligence. June 27, 2013. Released December 9, 2014. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/CIAs_June2013_Response_to_the_SSCI_Study_on_the_Former_Detention_and_Interrogation_Program.pdf.

Cervantes, Miguel. 1605. Don Quixote. John Ormsby, trans. Available at: http://www.online-literature.com/cervantes/don_quixote/12/.

Cheney, Dick and Liz Cheney. 2012. In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Cho, In-Koo and David M. Kreps. 1987. “Signaling games and stable equilibria.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(2) (May): 179–221.

Clarke, Kevin A. and David M. Primo. 2007. “Modernizing Political Science: A Model-Based Approach.” Perspectives on Politics 5(04):741–753.

Clarke, Kevin A. and David M. Primo. 2012. A Model Discipline: Political Science and the Logic of Representations. New York: Oxford University Press.

Coffman, Kevin. 1983. “U.S. v. James C. Parker, John Glover, Carl Lee, Floyd Allen Baker, Docket No. H-83-66, (U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, September 1, 1983) (“Transcript of Trial, Volume III”).” In the author’s possession.

Conroy, John. 2000. Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People: The Dynamics of Torture. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Criminal Investigation Division, U. S.Army. 1971, August 23. “Final Report of Investigation, 70-CID-121-00802, Carmon et al.” Col. Henry Tufts Archives, Labadie Collection, Hatcher Library, University of Michigan.

Dahlkamp, Jürgen, Gisela Friedrichsen, Felix Kurz, Caroline Schmidt, and Andreas Wassermann. 2004. “Machen Sie das!” Der Spiegel, 47, November 15, 2004. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-36625699.html.

Danaei, Goodarz, Eric L. Ding, Dariush Mozaffarian, Ben Taylor, Jürgen Rehm, Christopher J.L. Murray, and Majid Ezzati. 2009. “The Preventable Causes of Death in the United States: Comparative Risk Assessment of Dietary, Lifestyle, and Metabolic Risk Factors.” PLoS Medicine 6(4):e1000058.

Danner, Mark. 2004. Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror. New York: New York Review of Books.

Davies, Jeremy. 2012. “The Fire-Raisers: Bentham and Torture.” 19: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Long Nineteenth Century, 15. Available at http://www.19.bbk.ac.uk/index.php/19/article/view/643/866.

Department of Defense. 2003. “Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism.” Washington D. C.:Secretary of Defense, April 16. Available at http://www.defense.gov/news/jun2004/d20040622doc9.pdf.

Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility. 2009. “Report. Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists.” July 29, Washington D. C.: Office of Professional Responsibility, Department of Justice.

Department of the Army. 1992. “FM 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation.” Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Dershowitz, Alan M. 2002. Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dershowitz, Alan M. 2003. “The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss.” New York Law School Law Review 48:275–294.

Dixit, Avinash K., Susan Skeath and David H.J. Reiley. 2009. Games of Strategy. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Incorporated.

East India Company. 1665. A True Relation of the Unjust, Cruell, and Barbarous Proceedings Against the English at Amboyna, in the East Indies, by the Neatherlandish Governour, and Council There. Tho. Mabb, for William Hope at the Anchor.

Eco, Umberto. 1983. The Name of the Rose. William Weaver, trans. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Ekeland, Ivar. 2006. The Best of All Possible Worlds: Mathematics and Destiny. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

El-Masri, Khaled. 2005. “Khaled El-Masri v. George J. Tenet; Premier Executive, Transport Services, Inc.; Keeler and Tate Management LLC; Aero Contractors Limited, Does 1–20, Complaint. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division. December 6, 2005.” Available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/images/extraordinaryrendition/asset_upload_file829_22211.pdf.

Ensalaco, Mark. 2011. Chile Under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

European Court of Human Rights. 2006. Case of El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Judgment. Application no. 39630/09, December 13, 2012. Strasbourg: European Court of Human Rights. Available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115621#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-115621%22]}.

European Court of Human Rights. 2010. “Judgment, Case of Gäfgen v. Germany (Application no. 22978/05), June 1, 2010.” Available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-99015#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-99015%22]}.

Evans, Martin. 2011. Algeria: France’s Undeclared War. New York: Oxford University Press.

Fanon, Frantz. 1963. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press.

Federal Court of Canada. 2010. “Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1241, [2012] 3 F.C.R. 251.” Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, December 9, 2010, Available at: http://recueil.fja-cmf.gc.ca/eng/2012/2010fc1241.html.

Gardham, Duncan. 2009. “Al-Qaeda chief commits suicide in Libyan prison, report says.” The Telegraph, May 11. Available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/5310168/Al-Qaeda-chief-commits-suicide-in-Libyan-prison-report-says.html.

Gates, Scott and Brian D. Humes. 1997. Games, Information, and Politics: Applying Game Theoretic Models to Political Science. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Gibbons, Robert. 1992. Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Goldman, Adam. 2013. “The hidden history of the CIA’s prison in Poland.” Washington Post, January 23. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-hidden-history-of-the-cias-prison-in-poland/2014/01/23/b77f6ea2-7c6f-11e3-95c6-0a7aa80874bc_story.html.

Grey, Stephen. 2006. Ghost Plane: The True Story of the CIA Torture Program. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Haas, M. 2009. George W. Bush, War Criminal?: The Bush Administration’s Liability for 269 War Crimes. Westport: Praeger.

Hansen, Leroy. 1953. “General’s Cousin Tells of Tortures.” Tucson Daily Citizen, August 6, 1953, p.17. Available at http://newspaperarchive.com/tucson-daily-citizen/1953-08-06/page-17.

Haynes II, William J. 2002. “Action Memo. Counter-Resistance Techniques.” November 27, Washington D. C.: General Counsel, Department of Defense.

Hicks, David. 1983. “U.S. v. James C. Parker, John Glover, Carl Lee, Floyd Allen Baker, Docket No. H-83-66 (U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, September 1, 1983) (“Transcript of Trial, Volume V”).” In the author’s possession.

Hobbes, Thomas. 1839. Elements of Philosophy. Available at: https://archive.org/details/englishworkstho21hobbgoog.

Homza, Lu Ann. 2006. The Spanish Inquisition, 1478–1614: An Anthology of Sources. Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing.

Horne, Alistair. 1977. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962. New York: Viking Press.

Horton, Scott. 2011a. “The Interrogator: Six Questions for Glenn Carle.” Harpers Magazine, July 5, 2011. Available at http://harpers.org/blog/2011/07/unredacting-the-interrogator/.

Horton, Scott. 2011b. “Unredacting ‘The Interrogator’.”; Harpers Magazine, July 5, 2011. Available at http://harpers.org/blog/2011/07/unredacting-the-interrogator/.

Howes, Dustin Ells. 2012. “Torture Is Not a Game: On the Limitations and Dangers of Rational Choice Methods.” Political Research Quarterly 65(1):20–27.

Human Rights Watch. 2012. “Delivered Into Enemy Hands: US-Led Abuse and Rendition of Opponents to Gaddafi’s Libya.” http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/09/05/delivered-enemy-hands.

Ignatieff, Michael. 2005. “Moral Prohibition at a Price.” In Torture: Does It Make Us Safer? Is It Ever OK? A Human Rights Perspective, pp.18–27. Kenneth Roth and Minky Worden, eds. New York: The New Press/Human Rights Watch.

Imai, Kosuke, Luke Keele, Dustin Tingley, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2011. “Unpacking the Black Box of Causality: Learning about Causal Mechanisms from Experimental and Observational Studies.” American Political Science Review 105(04):765–789.

International Committee of the Red Cross. 2007. ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen ‘High Value Detainees’ in CIA Custody. Washington, DC: International Committee of the Red Cross.

Isikoff, Michael and David Corn. 2007. Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War. New York: Random House.

Isikoff, Michael and Mark Hosenball. 2005. “Al-Libi’s Tall Tales.” Newsweek, November 10. Available at http://web.archive.org/web/20051126201544/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9991919/site/newsweek/.

Jehl, Douglas. 2005a. “A Tortured Past.” New York Times, December 9. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/09/politics/09intel.html.

Jehl, Douglas. 2005b. “Report Warned Bush Team About Intelligence Suspicions.” New York Times, November 5. Available at http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article10887.htm.

Johnston, David. 2006. “At a Secret Interrogation, Dispute Flared Over Tactics.” New York Times, September 10. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/10/washington/10detain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

Karl, Terry Lynn. 2011. “U. S. Foreign Policy, Deniability, and the Political “Utility” of State Terror: The Case of El Salvador.” In The United States and Torture: Interrogation, Incarceration, and Abuse, ed. Marjorie Cohn. pp. 69–95. New York: New York University Press.

Kennedy, Thomas E. 2010. In the Company of Angels: A Novel. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Kershnar, Stephen. 2010. “For Interrogational Torture.” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19(2):223–241.

Kertész, Imre. 2009. DetektÍvtörténet. Budapest: Magvető.

Koppl, R. 2005. “Epistemic Systems.” Episteme, A Journal of Social Epistemology 2(2):91–106.

Krauthammer, Charles. 2004. “The Truth about Torture.” In Torture: A Collection, ed. Sanford Levinson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 307–316.

Kymlicka, Will. 2002. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press.

Landgericht Frankfurt am Main. 2003. Urteil vom 28. Juli 2003 5/22 Ks 2/03 3490 Js 230118/02. Frankfurt am Main: Landgericht. Available at http://openjur.de/u/168232.html.

Landgericht Frankfurt am Main. 2005. Schriftliche Urteilsgründe in der Strafsache gegen Wolfgang Daschner, 15.02.05. Frankfurt am Main: Landgericht. Document in the author’s possession.

Langbein, John H. 1978. “Torture and Plea Bargaining.” The University of Chicago Law Review 46(1):3–22.

Langbein, John H. 2006. Torture and the Law of Proof: Europe and England in the Ancien Regime. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Laver, Michael. 1997. Private Desires, Political Action: An Invitation to the Politics of Rational Choice. New York: SAGE Publications.

Lea, Henry Charles and Edward Peters. 1973. Torture. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Leopold, Jason. 2011. “CIA Kidnapped, Tortured “the Wrong Guy,” Says Former Agency Operative Glenn Carle.” truth-out.org, October 22, 2011. Available at http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/4154:cia-kidnapped-tortured-the-wrong-guy-says-former-agency-operative-glenn-carle.

Levin, Daniel. 2004. “Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Legal Standards Applicable under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A.” December 30. Washington D. C.: Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice.

Lichtbau, Eric and Eric Schmitt. 2011. “U.S. Widens Inquiries Into 2 Jail Deaths.” New York Times, June 30. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/us/politics/01DETAIN.html?pagewanted=all.

Lichtbau, Eric and Scott Shane. 2010. “Report Faults 2 Authors of Bush Terror Memos.” New York Times, February 19. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/us/politics/20justice.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1383307210-PVRt4FKt/7HcLVQXnin2cg.

Llorente, Juan A. and Gabriel H. Lovett. 1967. A Critical History of the Inquisition of Spain. Williamstown, MA: John Lilburne Co.

Mackey, C. and G. Miller. 2004. The Interrogators: Inside the Secret War Against Al Qaeda. New York: Little, Brown and Company.

Marty, Dick. 2006. Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States. Doc. 10957, June 12, 2006. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly. Available at http://www.assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2007/ENMarty_09072007.htm.

Mayer, Jane. 2008. The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals. New York: Random House.

McCarthy, Andrew C. 2006. “Torture: Thinking about the Unthinkable.” In The Torture Debate in America, ed. Karen J. Greenberg. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 98–110.

McCoy, Alfred W. 2006. A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

McDermott, Terry and Josh Meyer. 2012. The Hunt for KSM: Inside the Pursuit and Takedown of the Real 9/11 Mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. New York: Little, Brown.

McGirk, T., M. Calabresi, and E. Shannon. 2002. “Anatomy of a Raid.” Time 159(15):40–42.

McGrayne, Sharon Bertsch. 2011. The Theory that Would Not Die: How Bayes’ Rule Cracked the Enigma Code, Hunted Down Russian Submarines, & Emerged Triumphant from Two Centuries of Controversy. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Meek, James. 2005. “They Beat Me from All Sides.” The Guardian, January 13. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jan/14/usa.germany.

Mill, John Stuart. 1972 [1859]. On Liberty. London: Dent Everyman’s Library.

Mirbeau, Octave. 1899. Les Jardins des Supplices. Paris: Bibliothèque-Charpentier.

Moore, Will H. and David A. Siegel. 2013. A Mathematics Course for Political and Social Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Morgan, Rod. 2000. “The Utilitarian Justification of Torture: Denial, Desert and Disinformation.” Punishment & Society 2(2):181–196.

Morgan, Ted. 2007. My Battle of Algiers: A Memoir. New York: HarperCollins.

Muñnoz, Heraldo. 2008. The Dictator’s Shadow: Life Under Augusto Pinochet. New York: Basic Books.

Nelson, Craig. 2003. The First Heroes. New York: Penguin.

Nelson, Deborah. 2008. The War Behind Me: Vietnam Veterans Confront the Truth about U.S. War Crimes. New York: Basic Books.

Nelson, Deborah and Nick Turse. 2006. “A Tortured Past.” Los Angeles Times, August 20, 2006. Available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-vietnam20aug20,0,4709695.story?page=4&coll=la-home-headlines.

Ohlin, J.D. 2010. “The Torture Lawyers.” Harvard International Law Journal 51:193.

Otterman, Michael. 2007. American Torture: From the Cold War to Abu Ghraib and Beyond. Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing.

Pape, Robert. 2015. “The Strategic Costs of Torture.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago.

Parry, John. 2010. “Do the ‘Torture Lawyers’ Have Guilty Minds?: A Response to Jens Ohlin.” Harvard International Law Journal Online 51:23, Lewis & Clark Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2010–2016.

Parry, John T. 2004. “Escalation and Necessity: Defining Torture at Home and Abroad.” In Torture: A Collection, ed. Sanford Levinson. Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 145–164.

Pennington, Kenneth. 2008. “Torture and Fear: Enemies of Justice.” Rivista internazionale di diritto comune 19(8):8.

Peters, Edward. 1973. Bibliographical Note. In Torture, ed. Henry Charles Lea and Edward Peters. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Peters, Edward. 1999. Torture. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Pfiffner, James P. 2010. Torture as Public Policy: Restoring U.S. Credibility on the World Stage. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Pfiffner, James P. 2014. “The Efficacy of Coercive Interrogation.” In Examining Torture: Empirical Studies of State Repression, ed. Tracy Lightcap and James P. Pfiffner. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 127–158.

Phifer, Jerald. 2002. “Memorandum for Commander, Joint Task Force 170, Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques.” Department of Defense, Joint Task Force 170, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, October 11.

Posner, Eric A. and Adrian Vermeule. 2006. “Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?” Michigan Law Review 104(4):671–707.

Posner, Richard A. 2004. “Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation.” In Torture: A Collection, ed. Sanford Levinson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 291–298.

Priest, Dana. 2004. “Al Qaeda-Iraq Link Recanted.” Washington Post, August 1. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30909-2004Jul31.html.

Priest, Dana. 2005. “Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake.” Washington Post, December 4. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/03/AR2005120301476.html.

Quigley, Bill. 2011. “Torture and Human Rights Abuses at the School of Americas-WHINSEC.” In The United States and Torture: Interrogation, Incarceration, and Abuse, ed. Marjorie Cohn. pp. 53–67. New York: New York University Press.

Rejali, Darius M. 2007. Torture and Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ricketts, Peter. 2002. “Iraq: Advice for the Prime Minister.” London. Letter to Prime Minister Tony Blair, PR 121, March 22, 2002. Available at: http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/0203ricketts.pdf.

Risen, James. 2006. State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration. New York: Free Press.

Rizzo, John. 2014. Company Man: Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA. New York: Scribner.

Rodriguez Jr, Jose A. and Bill Harlow. 2012. Hard Measures: How Aggressive CIA Actions After 9/11 Saved American Lives. New York: Threshold Editions.

Roth, Cecil. 1964. The Spanish Inquisition. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Rumney, P.N.S. 2006. “Is Coercive Interrogation of Terrorist Suspects Effective—A Response to Bagaric and Clarke.” University of San Francisco Law Review 40:479.

Rycroft, Matthew. 2002. “Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting, 23 July.” London. Letter to David Manning, S 195 /02, July 23, 2002. Available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB328/II-Doc14.pdf.

Salter, Mark and John McCain. 1999. Faith of My Fathers. Random House.

Scarry, Elaine. 1985. The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. New York: Oxford University Press.

Scharf, M.P. 2010. “The Torture Lawyers.” Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 20:389–473.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Schiemann, John W. 2012a. “Interrogational Torture: Or How Good Guys Get Bad Information with Ugly Methods.” Political Research Quarterly 65(1):3–19.

Schiemann, John W. 2012b. “Political Theory Is Not a Game: On the Dangers of Detached and Inhuman Normative Theory.” Political Research Quarterly 65(1):28–33.

Schwarz, Frederick A.O. and Aziz Z. Huq. 2013. Unchecked and Unbalanced: Presidential Power in a Time of Terror. New York: New Press.

Shane, Scott. 2008. “Inside a 9/11 Mastermind’s Interrogation.” New York Times, June 22. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/washington/22ksm.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

Shane, Scott. 2012. “No Charges Filed on Harsh Tactics Used by the C.I.A.” New York Times, August 30. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/us/holder-rules-out-prosecutions-in-cia-interrogations.html.

Short, A. Rendle and H.W. Bywaters. 1913. “Amino Acids and Sugars in Rectal Feeding.” British Medical Journal 1(2739):1361–1367.

Silverman, Lisa. 2001. Tortured Subjects: Pain, Truth, and the Body in Early Modern France. University of Chicago Press.

Soufan, Ali. 2009. “Testimony of Ali Soufan.” Available at http://fas.org/irp/congress/2009_hr/051309soufan.pdf.

Soufan, Ali H. 2011. The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against Al-Qaeda. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Sullivan, Andrew. 2007. “Verschärfte Vernehmung.” The Atlantic, May 29. Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2007/05/-versch-auml-rfte-vernehmung/228158/.

Suskind, Ron. 2006. The One Percent Doctrine. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Sussman, David. 2005. “What’s Wrong with Torture?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 33(1):1–33.

Tenet, George and Bill Harlow. 2007. At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

Thiessen, Marc A. 2010. Courting Disaster: How the CIA Kept America Safe and How Barack Obama Is Inviting the Next Attack. Washington D. C.: Regnery Publishing.

United States Senate. 2006. “Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on Postwar Findings about Iraq’s WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How They Compare with Prewar Assessments together with Additional Views.” Washington D. C.: United States Senate. Available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109srpt331/pdf/CRPT-109srpt331.pdf.

United States Senate. 2014a. “Select Committee on Intelligence Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Findings and Conclusions, Executive Summary.” Washington D. C.: United States Senate. Approved December 13, 2012, Updated for Release April 3, 2014, Deciassification Revisions December 3, 2014. Available at http://fas.org/irp/congress/2014_rpt/ssci-rdi.pdf.

United States Senate. 2014b. “Select Committee on Intelligence Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program, Minority Views, Additional Minority Views.” Washington D. C.: United States Senate. Approved December 13, 2012, Updated for Release April 3, 2014, Declassification Revisions December 3, 2014. Available at http://fas.org/irp/congress/2014_rpt/ssci-rdi-min.pdf.

Wallach, E. 2006. “Drop by Drop: Forgetting the History of Water Torture in US Courts.” Columbus Journal of Transnational Law 45:468.

Weiser, Benjamin. 2014. “Some Captured Terrorists Talk Willingly and Proudly, Investigators Say.” New York Times, October 13. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/14/nyregion/some-captured-terrorists-talk-willingly-and-proudly-investigators-say.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar.

Wisnewski, J. Jeremy and R. Dillon Emerick. 2009. The Ethics of Torture. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group.