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Chapter II: Of Reproduction in General
We shall now make a more minute inspection into this common property of animal and vegetable nature; this power of producing its resemblance; this chain of successive individuals, which constitutes the real existence of the species; and without attaching ourselves to the generation of man, or to that of any particular kind of animal, let us inspect the phenomena of reproduction in general; let us collect facts, and enumerate the different methods nature makes use of to renew organized beings. The first, and as we think the most simple method, is to collect in one body an infinite number of similar organic bodies, and so to compose its substance, that there is not a part of it which does not contain a germ of the same species, and which cannot consequently of itself become a whole, resembling that of which it constitutes a part. This process seems to suppose a prodigious waste, and to carry with it profusion; yet it is a very common magnificence of nature, and one which manifests itself even in the most common and inferior kinds, such as worms, polyps, elms, willows, gooseberry-trees, and many other plants and insects, each part of which contains a whole, which by the single effect of expansion alone may become a plant or an insect. By considering organized beings, in this point of view, an individual is a whole, uniformly organized in all its parts; a compound of an infinity of resembling figures and similar parts, an assemblage of germs, of small individuals of the same kind, which can expand in the same mode according to circumstances, and form new bodies, composed like those from whence they proceed.
By examining this idea thoroughly, we shall discover a connection between animals, vegetables, and minerals, which we could not expect. Salts, and some other minerals, are composed of parts resembling each other, and to all that composes them; a grain of salt is a cube, composed of an infinity of smaller cubes, which we may easily perceive by a microscope: these are also composed of other cubes still smaller, as may be perceived with a better microscope; and we cannot doubt, but that the primitive and constituting particles of this salt are like-wise cubes so exceedingly minute as to escape our sight, and our imagination. Animals and plants which can multiply by all their parts, are organized bodies, of which the primitive and constituting parts are also organic and similar, and of which we discern the aggregate quantity, but cannot perceive the primitive parts except by reason and analogy.
This leads us to believe that there is an infinity of organic particles actually existing and living in nature, the substance of which is the same with that of organized bodies, just as there is, as we have recognized, an infinity of similar inert particles of inanimate bodies. And as it would perhaps be necessary for millions of small cubes of salt to accumulate in order to make the visible individual cube of sea-salt, so likewise millions of organic particles, like the whole, are required to form a single one out of that multiplicity of germs contained in an elm or a polyp; and as we must separate, bruise, and dissolve a cube of sea-salt to perceive, by means of crystallization, the small cubes of which it is composed; we must likewise separate the parts of an elm or polypus to discover, by means of vegetation and expansion, the small elms or polyps contained in those parts.
It therefore appears very probable, by the above reasons, that there really exists in nature an infinity of small organized beings, alike, in every respect, to the large organized bodies seen in the world; that these small organized beings are composed of living organic particles, which are common to animals and vegetables, and are their primitive and incorruptible particles; that the assemblage of these particles forms an animal or plant, and consequently that reproduction, or generation, is only a change of form made by the addition of these resembling parts alone, and that death or dissolution is nothing more than a separation of the same particles. Of the truth of this we apprehend there will not remain a doubt after reading the proofs we shall give in the following chapters. Besides, if we reflect on the manner in which trees grow, and consider how so considerable a volume can arise from so small an origin, we shall be convinced that it proceeds from the simple addition of small similar organized particles. A grain produces a young tree, which it contained in miniature. At the summit of this small tree a bud is formed, which contains the young tree for the succeeding year, and this bud is an organic part, resembling the young tree of the first year’s growth. A similar bud appears the second year containing a tree for the third; and thus, successively, as long as the tree continues growing, at the extremity of each branch, new buds will form, which contain, in miniature, young trees like that of the first year. It is, therefore, evident, that trees are composed of small organized bodies, similar to themselves, and that the whole individual is formed by the assemblage of small resembling individuals.
But, it may be asked, were not all these organized bodies contained in the seed, and may not the order of their expansion be traced from that source? For the bud which first appeared was evidently surmounted by another similar bud, which was not expanded till the second year, and so on to the third: and consequently, the seed may be said really to contain all the buds, or young trees that would be produced for a hundred years, or till the dissolution of the tree itself. This seed, it is also plain, not only contained all the small organized bodies which one day must constitute the individual tree, but also every seed, every individual, and every succession of seeds and individuals, to the total destruction of the species.
This is the principal difficulty, and we shall examine it with the strictest attention. It is certain, that the seed produces, by the single expansion of the bud, or germ it contains, a young tree the first year, and that this tree existed in miniature in that bud, but it is not equally certain, that the bud of the second year, and those of succeeding, were all contained in the first seed, no more than that every organized body and seed, which must succeed to the end of the world, or to the destruction of the species would be. This opinion supposes a progress to infinity, and makes each existing individual, a source of eternal generations. The first seed, in that case, must have contained every plant of its kind which has existed or ever will exist; and the first man must actually and individually have contained in his loins every man which has or will appear on the face of the earth. Each seed, and each animal, agreeable to this opinion must have possessed within it an infinite posterity. But the more we suffer ourselves to wander into these kind of reasonings, the more we lose the sight of truth in the labyrinth of infinity; and, instead of clearing up and solving the question, we confuse and involve it in more obscurity; it is placing the object out of sight, and afterward saying it is impossible to see it.
Let us investigate a little these ideas of infinite progression and expansion. From whence do they arise? What do they represent? The ideas of infinity can only spring from an idea of that which is limited; for it is in that manner we have an idea of an infinity of succession, a geometrical infinity: each individual is a unit; many individuals compose a finite number, and the whole species is the infinite number. Thus in the same manner as a geometrical infinity may be demonstrated not to exist, so we may be assured, that an infinite progression or development does not exist; that it is only an abstract idea, a suppression of the idea of finity, of which take away the limits that necessarily terminate all size; and that, of course, we must reject from philosophy every opinion which leads to an idea of the actual existence of geometrical or arithmetical infinity.
When we ask, how creatures are reproduced? And it is answered that this multiplication was completely made in the first body, is it not acknowledging that they are ignorant how it is made, and renouncing the will of conceiving it? The question is asked, how one body produces its like? And it is answered, that the whole was created at once. Can we receive this as a solution? For whether one or a million of generations have passed the like difficulty remains, and so far from explaining the supposition of an indefinite number of germs, increases the obscurity, and renders it incomprehensible.
There are two kinds of questions, some pertaining to the first causes, the others only to particular effects; for example, if it is asked why matter is impenetrable? it must either remain unanswered, or be replied to by saying, matter is impenetrable, because it is impenetrable. It will be the same with respect to all the general qualities of matter, whether relative to gravity, extension, motion, or rest; no other reply can be given, and we shall not be surprised that such is the case, if we attentively consider, that in order to give a reason for a thing, we must have a different subject from which we may deduce a comparison, and therefore if the reason of a general cause is asked, that is, of a quality which belongs to all in general, and of which we have no subject to which it does not belong, we are consequently unable to reason upon it; from thence it is demonstrable that it would be useless to make such enquiries, since we should go against the supposition that quality is general and universal.
If, on the contrary, the reason of a particular effect depends immediately on one of the general causes above mentioned, and whether it partakes of the general effect immediately, or by a chain of other effects, the question will be equally solved, provided we distinctly perceive the dependence these effects have on each other, and the connections there are between them.
But if the particular effect, of which we seek the reason, does not appear to depend on these general effects, nor to have any analogy with other known effects; then, this effect being the only one of its kind, and having nothing in common with other effects at least known to us, the question is insolvable; because, not having, in this point, any known subject which has any connection with that we would explain, there is nothing from whence we can draw the reason sought after. When the reason of a general cause is demanded, it is unanswerable because it exists in every object and, on the other hand, the reason of a singular or isolated effect is not found, because not anything known has the same qualities. We cannot explain the reason of a general effect, without discovering one more general; whereas the reason of an isolated effect may be explained by the discovery of some other relative effect, which although we are ignorant of at present, chance or experience may bring to light.
Besides these, there is another kind of question, which may be called the question of fact. For example, why do trees, dogs, etc. exist? All these fact questions are totally insoluble, for those who answer them by final causes, do not consider that they take the effect for the cause; the connection particular objects have with us having no influence on their origin. Moral affinity can never become a physical reason.
We must carefully distinguish those questions where the why is used, from those where the how is employed, and more so from those where the how many is mentioned. Why is always relative to the cause of the effect, or to the effect itself. How is relative to the mode from which the effect springs, and the how many has relation only to the proportionate quantity of the effect.
All these distinctions being explained, let us proceed to examine the question concerning the reproduction of bodies. If it is asked, why animals and vegetables reproduce? We shall clearly discover, that this being a question of fact, it is insolvable, and useless to endeavour at the solution of it. But if it is asked, how animals and vegetables reproduce? We reply by relating the history of the generation of every species of animals, and of the reproduction of each distinct vegetable; but, after having run over all the methods of an animal engendering its likeness, accompanied even with the most exact observations, we shall find it has only taught us facts without indicating causes; and that the apparent methods which Nature makes use of for reproduction, do not appear to have any connection with the effects resulting therefrom; we shall be still obliged to ask what is the secret mode by which she enables different bodies to propagate their own species.
The question is very different from the first and second; it gives liberty of enquiry and admits the employment of imagination, and therefore is not insolvable, for it does not immediately belong to a general cause; nor is it entirely a question of fact, for provided we can conceive a mode of reproduction dependent upon, or not repugnant to original causes, we shall have gained a satisfactory answer; and the more it shall have a connection with other effects of nature, the better foundation will it be raised upon.
By the question itself it is therefore permitted to form hypotheses, and to select that which shall appear to have the greatest analogy with the other phenomena of nature. But we must exclude from the number, all those which suppose the thing already done; for example, such as suppose that all the germs of the same species were contained in the first seed, or that every reproduction is a new creation, an immediate effect of the Almighty’s will; because these hypotheses are questions of fact, and about which it is impossible to reason. We must also reject every hypothesis which might have final causes for its object; such as, we might say, that reproduction is made in order for the living to supply the place of the dead, that the earth may be always covered with vegetables, and peopled with animals; that man may find plenty for his subsistence, etc. because these hypotheses, instead of explaining the effects by physical causes, are founded only on arbitrary connections and moral conventions. At the same time we must not rely on these absolute axioms and physical problems, which so many people have improperly made use of, as principles; for example, that there is no fecundation made apart from the body, nulla foecondatio extra corpus; that every living thing is produced from an egg; that all generation supposes sexes, etc. We must not take these maxims in an absolute sense, but consider them only as signifying things generally performed in one particular mode rather than in any other.
Let us, therefore, search after an hypothesis which has not any of these defects, and by which we cannot fall into any of these inconveniences; if, then, we do not succeed in the explanation of the mechanism nature makes use of to effect the reproduction of beings, we shall, at least, arrive at something more probable than what has hitherto been advanced. As we can make moulds, by which we can give to the external parts of bodies whatever figure we please, let us suppose nature can form the same, by which she not only bestows on bodies the external figure but also the internal. Would not this be one mode by which reproduction may be performed?
Let us, then, consider on what foundation this supposition is raised; let us examine if it contains anything contradictory, and afterwards we shall discover what consequences maybe derived from it. Though our senses are only judges of the external parts of bodies, we perfectly comprehend external affection and different figures. We can also imitate nature, by representing external figures by different modes, as by painting, sculpture, and moulds; but although our senses are only judges of external qualities we know there are internal qualities, some of which are general, as gravity. This quality, or power, does not act relatively to surfaces but proportionably to the masses or quantities of matter; there are, therefore, very active qualities in nature, which even penetrate bodies to the most internal parts; but we shall never gain a perfect idea of these qualities, because, not being external, they cannot fall within the compass of our senses; but we can compare their effects, and deduce analogies therefrom, to give an account of the effects of similar qualities.
If our eyes, instead of representing to us the surface of objects only, were so formed as to show us the internal parts alone, we should then have clear ideas of the latter, without the smallest knowledge of the former. In this supposition the internal moulds, which I have supposed to be made use of by nature, might be as easily seen and conceived as the moulds for external figures. In that case we should have modes of imitating the internal parts of bodies as we now have for the external. These internal moulds, although we can never obtain them, can be possessed by nature, just as she has the property of gravity, which penetrates to the internal particles of matter. The supposition of these moulds being formed on good analogies it only remains for us to examine if it includes any contradiction.
It may be argued that the expression of an internal mould includes two contradictory ideas; that the idea of a mould can only be related to the surface, and that the internal, according to this, must have a connection with the whole mass, and, therefore, it might as well be called a massive surface, as an internal mould.
I admit, that when we are about to represent ideas which have not hitherto been expressed, we are obliged to make use of terms which seem contradictory; for this reason philosophers have often employed foreign terms on such occasions, instead of applying those in common use, and which have a received signification; but this artifice is useless, since we can show the opposition is only in the words, and that there is nothing contradictory in the idea. Now I affirm that a simple idea cannot contain a contradiction, that is, when we can form an idea of a thing, if this idea is simple it cannot be compounded, it cannot include any other idea, and, consequently, it will contain nothing opposite nor contrary.
Simple ideas are not only the primary apprehensions which strike us by the senses but also the primary comparisons which form from those apprehensions, for the first apprehension itself is always a comparison. The idea of the size of an object, or of its remoteness, necessarily includes a comparison with bulk or distance in general; therefore, when an idea only includes comparison it must be regarded as simple, and from that circumstance, as containing nothing contradictory. Such is the idea of the internal mould. There is a quality in nature, called gravity, which penetratesthe internal parts of bodies. I take the idea of internal mould relatively to this quality, and, therefore, including only comparison, it contains nothing opposed or contrary.
Let us now see the consequences that may be deduced from this supposition; let us also search after facts corresponding therewith, as it will become so much the more probable, as the number of analogies shall be greater. Let us begin by unfolding this idea of internal moulds, and by explaining in what manner we understand it, we shall be brought to conceive the modes of reproduction.
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Chapter III: Of Nutrition and Growth
The body of an animal is a kind of internal mould, in which the nutritive matter assimilates itself with the whole in such a manner that, without changing the order and proportion of the parts, each receives an augmentation, and it is this augmentation of bulk which some have called expansion, because they imagined every difficulty would be removed by the supposition that the animal was completely formed in the embryo, and that it would be easy to conceive that its parts would expand, or unfold, in proportion as it would increase by the addition of accessory matter.
But if we would have a clear idea of this augmentation and expansion, how can it be done otherwise than by considering the animal body, and each of its parts, as so many internal moulds which receive the accessory matter in the order that results from the position of all their parts? This expansion cannot be made by the addition to the surfaces alone, but, on the contrary, by an intimate susception which penetrates the mass, and thus increases the size of the parts, without changing the form, from whence it is necessary that the matter which serves for this expansion should penetrate the internal part in all its dimensions; it is also as necessary that this penetration be made in a certain order and proportion, so that no one point can receive more than another. Otherwise some parts would expand quicker than others, and the form would be entirely changed. Now what can prescribe this rule to accessory matter, and constrain it to arrive perpetually and proportionally to every point of the external parts, unless we conceive an internal mould? It therefore appears certain that the body of an animal or vegetable is an internal mould of a constant form, but one in which the mass and the volume may be increased proportionally, by the extension of this mould in all its external and internal dimensions, and that this extension also is made by the intussusception of any accessory or foreign matter which penetrates the internal part, and becomes similar to the form, and identical in substance with, the matter of the mould itself.
But of what nature is this matter which the animal or vegetable assimilates with its own substance? What can be the nature of that power which gives it the activity and necessary motion to penetrate the internal mould? And if such a power does exist must it not be similar to that by which the internal mould itself would be produced? ...
These three questions include all that can be desired on this subject, and seem to depend on each other so much that I am persuaded the reproduction of an animal or vegetable cannot be explained in a satisfactory manner if a clear idea of the mode of the operation of nutrition is not obtained; we must, therefore, examine these three questions separately, in order to compare the consequences resulting therefrom.
The first, which relates to the nutritive nature of this matter, is in part resolved by the reasons we have already given, and will be fully demonstrated in the succeeding chapter. We shall show that there exists an infinity of living organic particles in nature; that their production is of little expense to nature, since their existence is constant and invariable; and that the causes of death only separate without destroying them. Therefore the matter which the animal or vegetable assimilates is an organic matter of the same nature as the animal or vegetable itself, and which consequently can augment the size without changing the form or quality of the matter of the mould, since it is, in fact, of the same form and quality as that which it is constituted with. Thus, in the quantity of aliments which the animal takes to support life, and to keep its organs in play, and in the sap, which the vegetable takes up by its roots and leaves, there is a great part thrown off by transpiration, secretion, and other excretory modes, and only a small portion retained for the nourishment of the parts and their expansion. It is very probable, that in the body of an animal or vegetable [a separation is made of the inert and organic parts of the food]; that the first are carried off by the causes just mentioned. Therefore only organic particles remain, and the distribution of them is made by means of some active power which conducts them to every part in an exact proportion, insomuch that neither receive more nor less than is needful for its equal nutrition, growth, or expansion.
The second question, is what can be the active power which causes this organic matter to penetrate and incorporate itself with this internal mould? By the preceding chapter it appears, that there exist in nature powers relative to the internal part of matter, and which have no relation with its external qualities. These powers, as already observed, will never come under our cognizance, because their action is made on the internal part of the body, whereas our senses cannot reach beyond what is external; it is therefore evident, that we shall never have a clear idea of the penetrating powers, nor of the manner by which they act; but it is not less certain that they exist, than that by their means most effects of nature are produced; we must attribute to them, the effects of nutrition and expansion, which cannot be effected by any other means than the penetration of the most intimate recesses of the original mould; in the same mode as gravity penetrates all parts of matter, so the power which impels or attracts the organic particles of food, penetrates into the internal parts of organized bodies, and as those bodies have a certain form, which we call the internal mould, the organic particles, impelled by the action of the penetrating force, cannot enter therein but in a certain order relative to this form, which consequently it cannot change, but only augment its dimensions, and thus produce the growth of organized bodies; and if in the organized body, expanded by this means, there are some particles, whose external and internal forms are like that of the whole body, from those reproduction will proceed.
The third question: is it not by a similar power that the internal mould itself is reproduced? It appears, that it is not only a similar but the same power which causes development and reproduction, for in an organized body which develops, if there is some particle like the whole, it is sufficient for that particle to become one day an organized body itself, perfectly similar to that of which it made a part. This particle will not at first present a figure striking enough for us to compare with the whole body; but when separated from that body, and receiving proper nourishment, it will begin to expand, and in a short time present a similar being, both externally and internally, as the body from which it had been separated: thus a willow or polyp, which contain more organic particles similar to the whole than most other substances, if cut into ever such a number of pieces, from each piece will spring a body similar to that from whence it was divided.
Now in a body in which every particle is like every other, the organization is the most simple, as we have observed in the first chapter; for it is only the repetition of the same form, and a composition of similar figures, all organized alike. It is for this reason, that the most simple bodies, or the most imperfect kinds, are reproduced with the greatest ease, and in the greatest plenty; whereas, if an organized body contains only some few particles like itself, then, as such alone can attain the second development. Consequently, the reproduction will be more difficult, and not so abundant in number; the organization of these bodies will also be more compounded, because the more the organized parts differ from the whole, the more the organization of this body will be perfect, and the more difficult the reproduction will be.
Nourishment, expansion, and propagation, then are the effects of one and the same and cause. The organized body is nourished by the particles of aliments analogous to it; it expands by the intimate susception of organical parts which agree with it, and it propagates because it contains some original particles which resemble itself. It only remains to examine, whether these similar organic particles come into the organized body by nutriment, or whether they were there before, and have an independent existence. If we suppose the latter, we shall fall in with the doctrine of the infinity of parts, or similar germs contained one in the other; the insufficiency and absurdity of which hypothesis we have already shown; we must therefore conclude that similar parts are extracted from the food; and after what has been said, we hope to explain the manner in which the organic molecules are formed, and how the minute particles unite.
There is, as we have said, a separation of the parts in the nutriment; the organic, from those analogous to the animal or vegetable, by transpiration and other excretory modes; the organical remain and serve for the expansion and nutriment of the body. But these organic parts must be of various kinds, and as each part of the body receives only those similar to itself, and that in a due proportion, it is very natural to imagine, that the superfluity of this organic matter will be sent back from every part of the body into one or more places, where all these organical molecules uniting, form small organized bodies like the first, and to which nothing is wanting but the mode of expansion for them to become individuals of the same species; for every part of the body sending back organized parts, like those of which they themselves are composed, it is necessary, that from the union of all these parts, there should result organized bodies like the first. This being admitted, may we not conclude this is the reason why, during the time of expansion and growth, organized bodies cannot produce, because the parts which expand, absorb the whole of the organic molecules which belong to them and not having any superfluous parts, consequently are incapable of reproduction.
This explanation of nutrition and reproduction will not probably be received by those who admit as the basis of their philosophy only a certain number of mechanical principles, and reject everything which does not depend on them; this is, they say, the great difference between the old philosophy and that of today: it is no longer permissible to postulate causes. It is necessary to give an account of everything by the laws of mechanics, and only those explanations are satisfactory which can be deduced from them.
And as that account which you give of nutrition and reproduction do not depend on these, we ought not to admit them. But I am quite of a different opinion from those philosophers; for it appears to me that, by admitting only a certain number of mechanical principles, they do not see how greatly they contract the bounds of philosophy, and that for one phenomenon that can be explained by a system so confined, a thousand would be found exceeding its limits.
The idea of explaining every phenomenon in nature by mechanical principles, was certainly a great and beautiful exertion, and one which Descartes first attempted. But this idea is only a project, and if properly founded have we the means of performing it? These mechanical principles are the extension of matter, its impenetrability, its motion, its external figure, its divisibility, and the communication of movement by impulsion, by elasticity, etc. The particular ideas of each of these qualities we have acquired by our senses, and regard them as principles, because they are general and belong to all matter. But are we certain these qualities are the only ones which matter possesses, or rather, must we not think these qualities, which we take for principles, are only modes of perception; and that if our senses were differently formed, we should discover in matter, qualities different from those which we have enumerated? To admit only those qualities in matter which are known to us, seems to be a vain and unfounded pretension. Matter may have many general qualities which we shall ever be ignorant of; she may also have others that human assiduity may discover, in the same manner as has recently been done with respect to gravity, which exists universally in all tangible matter. The cause of impulsion, and such other mechanical principles, will always be as impossible to find out as that of attraction, or such other general qualities. From hence is it not very reasonable to say, that mechanical principles are nothing but general effects, which experience has pointed out to us in matter, and that every time a new general effect is discovered, either by reflection, comparison, measure, or experience, a new mechanical principle will be gained, which may be used with as much certainty and advantage as any we are now acquainted with?
The defect of Aristotle’s philosophy was making use of particular effects as common causes; and that of Descartes in making use of only a few general effects as causes, and excluding all the rest. The philosophy which appears to me would be the least deficient, is that where general effects only are made use of for causes, but seeking to augment the number of them, by endeavouring to generalize particular effects.
In my explanation of development and reproduction, I admit the received mechanical principles, the penetrating force of gravity, and by analogy I have strived to point out that there are other penetrating powers existing in organized bodies, which experience has confirmed. I have proved by facts, that matter inclines to organization, and that there exists an infinite number of organic particles. I have therefore only generalized some observations, without having advanced anything contrary to mechanical principles, when that term is used as it ought to be understood, as denoting the general effects of nature.
Translated by J.S. Barr, with emendations by P. R. Sloan
Reading and Discussion Questions
1.In this reading Buffon distinguishes between “why” questions, “how” questions, and “what is the secret mode by which” questions. Which of these types does he think should guide our biological investigations? What is wrong with the other two types of questions?
2.What is an “internal mould” and how does it function in Buffon’s account of reproduction and nutrition?
3.Does Buffon believe that the laws of motion outlined by Descartes (and Newton) will be sufficient to describe the functioning of living creatures?