VIII
This volume began with an examination of the various introductory issues related to the study of archaeology of the subcontinent. Geography, as we argued, is a major theme in this context. It is not the complexity of palaeogeography that we are concerned with here. It is rather the question of trying to understand the pattern of archaeological development in terms of various geographical configurations and their long-term geo-political implications, A few major points stand out. First, the subcontinent’s north-western ‘frontier’ fans out beyond the arid stretches and uplands of the present political boundary and reaches the Oxus and the eastern rim of Iran. This is the subcontinent’s most important ‘frontier’; elsewhere it is only a matter of having cultural and economic Jinks between the two slopes of a mountain without any major ramification beyond the slopes. Historically India and south-east Asia have interacted significantly not through the Arakan Yoma or the Patkoi range but across the Bay of Bengal. The nature of interaction between Tibet and Nepal and the north-eastern Indian region was primarily religious. Even when Tibet did play a role in the politics of Nepal and eastern India, as it did under Srong-tsan-Gampo in the second half of the seventh century AD, it was short-lived, and so was the Tibet-based incursion of the Chinese in 1962. However, the significance of the Indus-Oxus zone as the subcontinent’s cultural, economic and historical frontier should not be exaggerated in detail. It is not easy to define its boundary on the Indus side; its primary significance possibly lay on its western bank, and the whole area between the southern slopes of the Hindukush and the western bank of the Indus was possibly one of its core segments. As far as Iran is concerned, Iranian Seistan and Baluchistan and modern Pakistani Baluchistan no doubt formed a distinct orbit in the historical and prehistoric times, but again, the thrust of this orbit on the subcontinental side possibly petered out mostly in Baluchistan itself. Among other things, one remembers the distribution of cairn burial sites in Baluchistan, which had links with the Fars plain of the early historic period, but this distribution was confined exclusively to Baluchistan and did not touch the Indus valley in any way. Similarly, it is unlikely that the ‘bevelled-rim bowls’ which are hawked as a sign of Mesopotamian ‘Uruk’ expansion and whose presence at Miri Qalat seems to have generated some interest as a marker of Mesopotamia’s ‘civilizing mission’ in the east towards the Indus valley, would be found beyond Baluchistan in the Indus valley itself. It is only when there was a conscious and well-motivated thrust from a strong political power base in Fars or Khorasan or the Oxus valley that the Indus area came to constitute an active part of the Indus-Oxus interaction zone. Moreover, several sub-areas may possibly be outlined within this interaction belt, each with its own linkages and particular historical, economic and cultural impacts. For instance, Badakhshan, Chitral and the neighbouring heights possibly formed a smaller interaction zone within the broad sphere of Indus-Oxus interaction.
Second, while thinking in terms of ‘frontiers’, can one put them entirely beyond the maritime connections? One is not sure, because, as far as the Indus-Oxus frontier zone is concerned, the Sind–Gujarat coast’s links with the Gulf zone expanded its dimension. When both central Asian and Indus civilization traits turn up in the late third millennium BC context at Tell Abraq in Oman, one has to think of the whole network of links covering both the overland and maritime linkages of the subcontinent’s north-western frontier. It is these linkages which make us understand why there has always been a sizeable subcontinental presence in the Gulf or why the banias from the north-west have operated as far as Baku and St. Petersburg.
Third, while dealing with the developments in the subcontinent beyond the Indus-Oxus interaction zone, do we put emphasis only on the major agricultural units, the nuclei of most of the modern states, as we have done in the course of our text? Or, do we try to put our data in some other geographical framework? The modem state divisions contain within them some major but not necessarily homogeneous geographical realities, and a state-wise arrangement of data is certainly convenient both for presentation and modern understanding. However, the geographical characters of both regional and local linkages have to be understood both in terms of their geography and changing historical dimensions. For instance, the Gangetic delta—now divided between Bangladesh and India—is a meaningful geographical entity, but within it are a large number of interacting areas with their own linkages and historical dimensions. The Karatoya valley of modern Bangladesh has had historical links with the Brahmaputra valley in Assam, and similarly, the area of the old course of the Brahmaputra in Bangladesh has had links with Assam too. To understand the possible geographical implications of the locations of Mahasthangarh and Wari Bateshwar in Bangladesh, these geographical linkages have to be kept in mind. Such linkages were, of course, not always on the same scale. The scale was determined by historical forces, but it is useful to remember the possible range of geographical pulses. The flow of the subcontinental history and archaeology in terms of such linkages still remains to be worked out in depth and through time, but as far as we can see, this is a much more exciting approach than attempts to divide the subcontinent in terms of the arbitrary, static and a historical categories of perennial attraction, relative isolation and isolation.