The collection of disputed questions gathered together as On the Power of God dates from 1265 to 1266, while Thomas was teaching in Rome and just prior to commencement of work on his masterpiece, the Summa theologiae. The disputed question on the simplicity of God deals with fundamental aspects of Thomas’s teaching on the human capacity to know and to talk about God.
Aristotle’s insistence that it is only with great difficulty and prolonged effort that we can establish the existence of anything beyond the realm of sensible objects was one that Thomas took to heart, not least because it so obviously harmonized with what is found in Scripture. The connatural object of the human mind is the essence of sensible reality. Our language is fashioned primarily to talk about such things. If our study of sensible objects provides a basis for proving that there are beings which are not material and changeable, we do not devise a new vocabulary to speak of what might be called metaphysical beings. Rather, the language first used to speak of material objects is extended in meaning to encompass immaterial beings as well. This extension of meaning of familiar language provides an Ariadne’s thread that enables us to return from the metaphysical stratosphere to the palpable objects of our sense experience. Theseremain our touchstone of certainty and the native habitat of our language.
A problem encountered in efforts to speak of the human soul and human thinking and willing as activities which are not physical changes is exacerbated when human language is employed to speak of God. Our knowledge of God is indirect, oblique, dependent on knowledge of sensible reality.
It may be thought that this difficulty disappears in the realm of faith when God reveals himself to us, in Scripture and in his divine son. For Thomas, revelation is merely a special case of the epistemological and terminological problem. God speaks to us in our language and mercifully observes what is for us the natural way of knowing.
The pattern of our efforts to know and talk about God is first to see how unlike the things of our immediate experience he is. Negative terms such as ‘immobile’ and ‘timeless’ and ‘immaterial’ are devised to express this. And yet there are certain things we affirm of God: that he is good, just, wise and loving. Of course these terms are learned in speaking about good, just, wise and loving human beings. How can God and creature share these terms?
This magnificent disputed question on the simplicity of God anticipates discussions that will occupy Thomas in the Summa theologiae. But here they receive a far more detailed and exhaustive treatment.
On the Power of God
QUESTION 7
ON THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD
This disputation addresses eleven questions: (1) whether God is simple; (2) whether in God substance and essence are the same as existence; (3) whether God is in a genus; (4) whether ‘good’, ‘just’ and ‘wise’ are incidental predicates of God; (5) whether those names signify the divine substance; (6) whether they are synonyms; (7) whether such names are said of God and creatures univocally or equivocally; (8) whether a relation exists between God and creatures; (9) whether relations between God and creatures are relations in creatures; (10) whether God is really related to creatures such that the relation is really in God; (11) whether temporal relations are relations of reason in God.
Article 1: Is God simple?
It seems that he is not.
1. From one simple thing only one thing comes, for a thing causes something the same as itself, according to the Philosopher. But a multitude of things proceeds from God. Therefore, he is not simple.
2. Moreover, when the simple is attained it is attained as a whole. But God is attained by the blessed since, as Augustine says, the greatest happiness is for the mind to attain God. Therefore, if he were simple, he would be attained as a whole by the blessed, but what is attained as a whole is comprehended. Therefore God is comprehended by the blessed – which is impossible. Therefore, God is not simple.
3. Moreover, what is the same does not satisfy the characteristics of different causes, but God does, as is evident in Metaphysics II. Therefore, there must be different things in him and he must accordingly be complex.
4. Moreover, wherever there is this plus that, there is composition; but in God there is this and that, namely, property and essence. Therefore, in God there is composition.
5. But it will be said that his property is the same as his essence. On the contrary: an affirmation and its negation are not verified of the same thing. But the divine essence is communicable to the three persons and incommunicability is a property. Therefore, property and essence are notthe same.
6. Moreover, that of which different categories are predicated is complex. But substance and relation are predicated of God, as Boethius says. Therefore, God is complex.
7. Moreover, in any thing there is substance, power and activity, as Dionysius says, from which it seems that activity follows power and substance. But there is plurality in the divine activities. Therefore, multitude and composition are to be found in his substance.
8. Moreover, wherever many forms are found, there must be composition. But there are many forms in God because, as Averroes says, all forms are actually in the first mover just as all are potentially in prime matter. Therefore, there is composition in God.
9. Moreover, whatever comes to a thing after it is complete is accidental to it. But some things are said of God temporally, for example, that he is creator and lord. Therefore, they are accidental to him. But there is composition of an accident with its subject. Therefore, there is composition in God.
10. Moreover, wherever there are many things there is composition. But there are three persons in God, that is, three things, as Augustine says. Therefore, there is composition in God.
ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Hilary says, ‘God is not made up of components in the human way, such that in him there is what is had and that which has.’
2. Moreover, Boethius says, ‘That truly is one in which there is no number.’ But wherever there is composition, there is number. Therefore, God is without composition and wholly simple.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that God must be held to be simple in every way. For now this can be proved by three arguments. Of which the first is this. It was shown in another disputation that all beings come from a first being, which we call God. However, in one and the same thing, which is at one time potential and at another time actual, potency is temporally prior to actuality even though by nature it is posterior. Absolutely speaking, act must be prior to potency, both in nature and in time, because every potential being is made actual by some actual being. Therefore, that being which makes all other beings actual and is himself from nothing else must be First Act without any mixture of potency. For if he were in any way potential, there would have to be a prior being through which he would become actual. In a complex thing of whatever kind of composition, potency is mingled with act. For in complex things, either one of the things of which it is composed is in potency to the other, like matter to form, subject to accident, genus to difference, or at the least all the parts are in potency to the whole. For the parts are as matter and the whole as form, as is evident from Physics 2. Thus no composite thing could be First Act. The first being that God is must be Pure Act, as has been shown. Therefore, since it is impossible that God be composed, he must be completely simple.
The second argument is this. Since composition is only of different things, these different things require some agent to unite them, because the different, as such, are not united. But for a composite to exist is for the things of which it is composed to be united. Therefore, since every composite thing must depend on some prior agent, the first being, who is God, from whom all things come, cannot be composite.
The third argument is this. The first being, who is God, must be most perfect and consequently the best, for the principles of things are not imperfect, as Pythagoras and Leucippus thought. The best is that in which no goodness is lacking; for example, the whitest is that in which nothing black is to be found. But this is impossible for any composite thing, since the good that results from the composition of parts, thanks to which the whole is good, is not in each of the parts. Hence the parts are not good with the goodness that is proper to the whole. Therefore, what is best is most simple and lacks all composition. This is the argument the Philosopher gives1 and Hilary too when he says that because God light he is not affected by the obscure and because he is power there are no weaknesses in him.
Ad 1. It should be said that Aristotle does not mean that a multitude cannot proceed from one, for since the agent causes something similar to itself and the effect imperfectly represents its cause, that which is united in the cause must be multiplied in the effects, much as all generable forms are, as it were, in the sun, which as its effects are distinct. Thus it comes about that through one capacity a thing can bring about different effects, as fire by means of its heat can both liquefy and solidify, make soft and hard, burn and char. And through the power of reason a man can acquire different sciences and perform the works of different arts. How much more, then, can God through his simple power create many things. The Philosopher means that something that remains the same does not cause different things at different times if it acts with the necessity of nature, unless this happens accidentally because of the diversity of matter or of some other accident. But this is not relevant here.
Ad 2. It should be said that the whole God is attained by the mind of the blessed but not wholly, because the mode of the divine knowability infinitely exceeds the mode of created intellect. Thus the created intellect cannot understand God as perfectly as he is intelligible and accordingly cannot comprehend him.
Ad 3. It should be said that one and the same God has the character of different causes because as pure act he is an agent and the exemplar of all forms, and as pure goodness he is the end of everything.
Ad 4. It should be said that property and essence in the divine do not differ really but in understanding alone, for paternity itself is the divine essence, as will be made clear later.
Ad 5. It should be said that what is one in being and different in understanding can have contradictories predicated of it, as the Philosopher says; it is evident that a point which is really one can be understood differently as beginning and end, but insofar as it is the beginning it is not the end and vice versa. Hence, since essence and property are the same in reality and differ in understanding, there is nothing to prevent the same thing from being communicable and incommunicable.
Ad 6. It should be said that absolute and relative do not really differ in divine things, but only in understanding, as has been pointed out, and thus no composition comes from this.
Ad 7. It should be said that God’s activity can be considered either on the part of the doer or of the done. If on the part of the doer, there is only one activity in God, which is his essence, for he does not do things by an action that would intervene between God and his willing, which is his very existence. But considered on the side of what is done, there are indeed different activities, since through his understanding there are diverse effects of the divine activity. But this does not introduce any composition in him.
Ad 8. It should be said that the form of the effect is found in one way in the natural agent and in another way in one who acts through art. For in that which acts by nature the form of the effect exists insofar as the agent assimilates its effect to its own nature, since every agent produces something like itself. This happens in two ways, for when the effect is perfectly like the agent, and equal to the power of the agent, the form is in the effect and cause according to the same account [ratio], as is evident in univocal agents, for example, when fire generates fire. But when the effect is not perfectly assimilated to the agent, and is not made equal to the power of the agent, then the form of the effect is not in the agent in the same sense, but in a more eminent way, as is clear in equivocal agents; for example, the sun generates fire.
In agents that work by art, forms of the effects pre-exist with the same account but not in the same way of existing, for in the effects they have material existence and in the mind of the artist intelligible existence. Something is said to be in the intellect both as that which is understood and as the species whereby it is understood, but the forms of art are in the mind of the artist as that by which something is understood. For it is because the artist conceives the form of the artefact that he produces it in matter. But the forms of things are in God in both ways, for although he acts through intellect, this is not without the action of nature. In lesser artefacts, art acts in virtue of extraneous nature, which it uses as an instrument, as the potter uses fire to make bricks. But the divine art does not use exterior nature in acting, but in virtue of its own nature causes its effect. Therefore the forms of things are in the divine nature as in an operative power, but not according to the same account, since no effect is equal to his power. Hence all forms which are multiplied in effects are as one in him, and thus no composition arises from this. Similarly, there are in his intellect many things understood through one and the same thing, namely his essence. But that many are understood through one does not introduce composition in the one understanding. Hence, from this it does not follow that there is composition in God.
Ad 9. It should be said that the relations which are said temporally of God are not really in him but only according to understanding. There is a real relation when one thing really depends upon another, whether absolutely or in a certain respect. Thus there is a real relation of knowledge to the thing known, but conversely only a relation in understanding, as is clear from the Philosopher. Therefore, since God does not depend on anything else, but rather all things depend on him, in other things there are real relations to God, but there can only be a relation of reason between him and things, because the intellect cannot understand a relation of this to that without understanding a relation of that to this.
Ad 10. It should be said that the plurality of persons introduces no composition in God. For the persons can be considered in two ways: first, as compared to essence with which they are really the same, and thus no composition results; second, as they are compared with one another, and then they are compared as distinct, not as made one. So no composition comes from this side either, since every composition is a union.
Article 2: Is substance or essence in God the same as existence?
It seems that it is not.
1. For Damascene says, in On Orthodox Faith I, that God exists is indeed manifest to us, but what he is in substance and nature is incomprehensible and entirely unknown. But the same thing cannot be at once known and unknown. Therefore, God’s existence and his substance or essence are not the same.
2. But it will be said that even God’s existence is unknown to us as to what it is, just like his substance. On the contrary: whether a thing is and what it is are two different questions, one of which we know and the other of which we do not, as is plain from the authority quoted as well. Therefore, that which answers to the question whether God exists and that which answers to the question what he is are not the same; existence answers to whether he is, and substance or nature to what he is.
3. But it might be said that God’s existence is known, not in itself, but in the likeness of the creature. On the contrary: in the creature are existence and substance or nature, and since God has both, he is like God in both, in that the agent causes something like himself. If therefore God’s existence were known through the likeness of created existence, his substance would have to be known through the likeness of created substance, and then we would know of God not only that he is, but what he is.
4. Moreover, one thing is said to differ from another by its substance. But that which is common to all provides no difference among them; hence the Philosopher says that being ought not to be put into the definition because the defined is not distinguished from anything else in that, since to be is common to all. But God is something distinct from all other things. Therefore, his existence is not his substance.
5. Moreover, only things whose existence is different are themselves different. But the existence of this thing is not different from the existence of that as existence, but rather insofar as it is in this or that nature. If then there should be some existence which is not in any nature other than existence, this will not be different from any other existence. Thus it follows that if the divine substance is his existence, he would be the existence common to anything.
6. Moreover, the being to which no addition is made is the being common to all. But if God were himself existence, he would be the being to which no addition is made, and therefore common, and then he would be predicated of everything and would be a God mixed with all things. Which is heretical and in disagreement with the Philosopher in the Book of Causes saying that the first cause rules all things without being confused with them.
7. Moreover, nothing is said of that which is wholly simple by way of concretion. But existence is such, for existence seems to relate to essence as white does to whiteness. Therefore, it is unfitting to say that the divine substance is existence.
8. Moreover, Boethius says that everything that is participates in that which is existence in order to be, and participates in something else in order to be something. But God exists. Therefore, besides his existence there is in him something else thanks to which he is something.
9. Moreover, what is most imperfect ought not to be attributed to God who is most perfect. But existence is most imperfect, like prime matter, for just as prime matter is determined by all forms, so existence, since it is most imperfect, has to be determined by all proper categories. Therefore, just as prime matter is not in God, so neither should existence be attributed to the divine substance.
10. Moreover, that which is signified in the manner of an effect does not belong to the first substance, which has no principle. But existence is such, for every being has existence according to the principles of its essence. Therefore, it is unfitting to say that the substance of God is existence itself.
11. Moreover, every proposition in which a thing is predicated of itself is self-evident. But if the substance of God were his own existence, subject and predicate would be the same in ‘God exists’. Therefore, it would be a self-evident proposition, which seems false, since it is demonstrable. Therefore, God’s existence is not his substance.
ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Hilary says in On the Trinity : ‘Existence is not an accident of God, but his subsistent truth.’ But that which is subsistent is the substance of the thing. Therefore, God’s existence is his substance.
2. Moreover, Rabbi Moses says that God is not being by essence, nor living by life, nor powerful by power, nor wise by wisdom. Therefore in God essence is not other than his existence.
3. Moreover, a thing is properly denominated from its quiddity, for the noun properly signifies substance and quiddity, as is said in Metaphysics 4. But this nominal phrase ‘that which is’ is of all names the most proper name of God, as is clear from Exodus 4. Therefore, since this name is imposed from that which is existence, it seems that God’s existence is his substance.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that in God existence is not other than his substance. In evidence of which it should be considered that, since causes producing different effects have one effect in common besides the different ones, it is necessary that their common effect should be produced by the power of some higher cause whose proper effect it is. And this because, since the proper effect is produced by a cause according to its proper nature or form, different causes having different natures and forms must have different proper effects.
Hence, if they have some effect in common, it cannot be their proper effect, but that of something higher, in virtue of which they act. Just as it is evident that different compounds all heat, such as pepper and ginger and the like, although each has its proper effect different from those of the others. Hence the common effect has to be referred to a prior cause whose proper effect it is, namely fire. Similarly, in celestial motions, each planetary sphere has proper motions as well as a common one which must be proper to some higher sphere moving them all according to diurnal motion.
But all created causes have one common effect, which is existence, although each has its proper effect by which they differ from one another. For heat causes something to be warm, and the builder causes a house to be. Therefore they have in common the fact that they cause existence, but differ in that fire causes fire and the builder causes a house. There must therefore be some cause higher, by whose power all cause existence and of which existence is the proper effect. And this cause is God.
The proper effect of any cause proceeds from it according to a likeness to its nature. Therefore, that which is existence must be the substance or nature of God. On account of which it is said in the Book of Causes that the Intelligence gives existence only insofar as it is divine, and the first effect is existence and before it nothing else is created.
Ad 1. It should be said therefore that being and existence are said in two ways, as is evident from Metaphysics 5. For sometimes it signifies the essence of the thing, or the act of being; sometimes it signifies the truth of the proposition, even in things which do not have existence, as we say that blindness exists because it is true that a man is blind. When therefore Damascene says that the existence of God is manifest to us, he understands the existence of God in the second way and not the first. In the first way the existence of God is the same as his substance, and just as his substance is unknown to us, so is his existence. But in the second way we know that God exists, since we form this proposition in our intellect from his effects.
The solution to the second and third difficulties is clear from this.
Ad 4. It should be said that the divine existence which is his substance is not common existence but is an existence different from any other existence. Hence, by his existence God differs from every other being.
Ad 5. It should be replied that, as is said in the Book of Causes, the existence itself of God is distinguished and individuated from any other existence in this that it is subsistent existence, and does not advene to any nature that is other than this existence. All other existence, not being subsistent, must be individuated by the nature and substance which subsists in that existence. Of these it is true that the existence of this is other than the existence of that because it is of another nature. Just as if there were one heat existing of itself without a matter or subject, it would be distinguished from every other heat by that very fact, although the heat in this subject differs from the heat in that because of their subjects.
Ad 6. It should be said that the ‘common being to which no addition is made’ does not mean no addition can be made to it; but the divine existence is not common existence. Just because in the common animal the difference rational is not included, this does not mean that no addition to it can be made, for there is also the irrational animal, which is a species of animal.
Ad 7. It should be said that the mode of signifying in our talk of things follows on our mode of understanding, for speech signifies the conceptions of the intellect, as is said in On Interpretation I. But our intellect understands existence in the way it is found in lower things, from which our knowledge begins and in which existence is not subsistent but inherent. Reason discovers that there is a subsistent existence and then, although what is called existence is signified in the manner of concretion, the intellect attributing existence to God transcends the mode of signifying, attributing to God what it signifies, but not the mode of signifying it.
Ad 8. It should be said that the saying of Boethius is to be understood of things to which existence belongs by participation, not by essence; that which is through its essence, if we attend to the import of speech, ought rather be called that which is existence than that which is.
Ad 9. It should be said that what I call existence is the most perfect of all things, which is clear because act is always more perfect than potency, and designated form is understood to be actual only when it is held to exist. For humanity or fieriness can be considered as existing in the potency of matter or in the power of the agent or even in the intellect, but that which has existence is made to be actually existent. It is thus clear that what I call existence is the actuality of all acts, and because of that is the perfection of all perfections. Nor should it be understood that something more formal could be added to that which I call existence, determining it, as act determines potency. This kind of existence is other in essence from that to which it is added and which determines it. Nothing extraneous can be added to it, since nothing other than non-being is extraneous to it, which can be neither form nor matter. Thus existence is not determined by another as potency is by act but rather as act is by potency. For in the definition of forms their proper matter is put in place of difference, as when we say the soul is the act of a physically organized body. In this way, this existence is distinguished from that, insofar as it is this nature’s or that’s, which is why Dionysius says that although living things are more noble than existent things, still to be is more noble than to live. For living things not only have life, but along with life they have existence.
Ad 10. It should be said that the order of ends follows the order of agents, such that the ultimate end answers to the first agent, and proportionately through the order other ends to other agents. For if the ruler of the city and the leader of the army and a single soldier be considered, it is clear that the ruler of the city is first in the order of agents at whose command the leader of the army marches to war, and under him is the soldier, who, at the command of the leader of the army, puts his hand to fighting. The end of the soldier is to slay the enemy, which is ordered to the victory of the army, which is the end of the leader, and this is further ordered to the good condition of the city or realm, which is the end of the ruler and king. Therefore, existence which is the proper effect and end of the activity of the first agent must hold the place of ultimate end. The end, though it is first in intention, is last in execution and is the effect of other causes. Therefore, created existence, which is the proper effect answering to the first agent, is caused by other principles, although what primarily causes existence is the first principle.
Ad 11. It should be said that a proposition can be of itself self-evident but yet not be such for this or that person. As when the predicate is of the definition of the subject yet the definition of the subject is unknown to someone. For someone ignorant of what a whole is the proposition stating that the whole is greater than its part would not be self-evident. For such propositions become self-evident when their terms are known, as is said in Posterior Analytics 1. But this proposition, ‘God exists,’ taken in itself is self-evident, because subject and predicate are the same. But it is not self-evident to us because we do not know what God is. So for us it requires demonstration, but not for those who see the essence of God.
Article 3: Is God in some genus?
It seems that he is.
1. For Damascene says that substance in matters divine signifies a species common to persons similar in species, and hypostasis points out the individual, namely Father, Son and Holy Spirit, Peter and Paul. So God is compared to Father, Son and Holy Spirit as species to individuals. But wherever species and individual are found, there genus is found, because the species is made up of genus and difference. Therefore it seems that God is in some genus.
2. Moreover, things that are in no way different are wholly the same. But God is not the same as other things. Therefore he differs from them in some way. But whatever differs from another, differs from it by some difference. Therefore, in God there is some difference, by which he differs from other things. It cannot be something accidental, because there is no accident in God, as Boethius says in On the Trinity . But every substantial difference divides some genus. Therefore, God is in a genus.
3. Moreover, things can be the same either in genus, or species or number, as is said in Topics 1.4. Therefore, different as well, for if one of opposites is said in many ways, so is the other. Therefore, God is different from creature only numerically, or numerically and specifically; and so it follows that he agrees with the creature in kind and thus is in a genus. If he differed generically from the creature, he would have to be in some other genus than the creature, since diversity springs from multiplicity, and thus generic difference requires a plurality of genera. Therefore, however you look at it, God must be in a genus.
4. Moreover, to whatever the notion of the genus substance fits, is in a genus. But the notion answering to substance is that which exists of itself, which especially belongs to God. Therefore, God is in the genus of substance.
5. Moreover, whatever is defined must be in a genus. But God is defined, for he is said to be pure act. Therefore, God is in some genus.
6. Moreover, whatever is predicated of something expressing what it is, and extends to others as well, either relates to it as species or as genus. But everything predicated of God is meant to express what he is, for all the categories, when they become divine predicates, amount to substance, as Boethius says. But it is evident that these pertain not only to God but also to other things, and thus they are in more. Therefore, either they are compared to God as species to individual or as genus to species, and either way God must be in a genus.
7. Moreover, anything is measured by the least in its genus, as is said in Metaphysics 10. But, as the Commentator says at that place, that by which all substances are measured is God. Therefore, God is in the same genus as other substances.
ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Whatever is in a genus, adds something to the genus, and consequently is composite. But God is wholly simple. Therefore, he is not in a genus.
2. Moreover, whatever is in a genus can either be defined or included in some defined thing. Since God is infinite, he is not like that. Therefore, he is not in a genus.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that God is not in a genus, which for now can be shown by three arguments. First, because nothing is put in a genus because of its existence but by reason of its quiddity, which is clear from this that the existence of anything is proper to it and distinct from the existence of any other thing, but the notion of substance can be common. Because of this the Philosopher too says that being is not a genus. God, however, is his own existence. Hence, he cannot be in a genus.
The second argument is this. Although matter is not a genus, nor is form difference, yet the notion of genus is drawn from matter, and the notion of difference is drawn from form; for example, in man sensible nature is that from which the notion of animal is drawn, and is material with respect to reason, from which the difference rational is drawn. An animal is something that has a sensitive nature, the rational is what has reason, hence there must be a composition of matter and form or of act and potency in anything that is in a genus. This cannot be the case with God, who is pure act, as has been shown. It remains therefore that he cannot be in a genus.
The third argument is this. Since God is absolutely perfect, he comprehends in himself the perfections of all genera, for this is the meaning of the absolutely perfect, as is said in Metaphysics 5. Whatever is in a genus is determined by the things that are of that genus, and thus God cannot be in some genus, for then he would not be of an infinite essence, nor of absolute perfection, but his essence and perfection would be limited to the range of one limited genus.
From which it is further evident that God is not a species or an individual, nor does he have either difference or definition, for every definition is from genus and species, hence no demonstration can be made about him except through effects, since the middle of the demonstration of the reasoned fact is the definition.
Ad 1. It should be said that Damascene speaks by way of similarity and not properly, for God’s name, which is God, has a similarity to species in this that it is predicated of numerically many distinct substantial things, but it cannot properly be called species because a species is not something numerically one and common to many but one only in reason; the numerically one divine substance is common to three persons, hence the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God, but Peter and Paul and Mark are not one man.
Ad 2. It should be said that the different and diverse differ, as the Philosopher says, for the diverse, absolutely speaking, is what is not the same, but the different relates to something, for one thing differs from another with respect to something. If, then, we understand the term ‘different’ properly, then this proposition is false: ‘Existent things that in no way differ, are the same.’ However, if the term ‘different’ is understood broadly, then it is true, and thus it can be conceded that God differs from others. But it does not follow that he differs by some difference, but that he differs from others by his substance: this must be said of first and simple things. For a man differs from an ass by the difference rational, but rational does not further differ from ass by some difference, since then there would be an infinite regress, but by itself.
Ad 3. It should be said that God is said to be diverse in genus from creatures, not as existing in a genus, but as existing wholly outside a genus.
Ad 4. It should be said that being-of-itself is not the definition of substance, as Avicenna says. For being cannot be the genus of anything, as the Philosopher proves, since nothing can be added to being which does not participate in it, but difference ought not to participate in the genus. If substance could have a definition, despite the fact that it is the most general genus, it would be this: a substance is something of whose very quiddity it is not to be in another. And then the definition of substance would not belong to God, who does not have a quiddity apart from his existence. Hence God is not in the genus of substance, but is above every substance.
Ad 5. It should be said that God cannot be defined, for the defined is comprehended by the intellect of the one defining. But God is incomprehensible by intellect; hence when God is said to be pure act, this is not his definition.
Ad 6. It should be said that it is required for the notion of genus that it be univocally predicated. But nothing can be univocally predicated of God and creatures, as will be evident below. Hence although those things which are said of God, are predicated of him substantially, nevertheless they are not predicated of him as a genus.
Ad 7. It should be said that although God does not pertain to the genus of substance as contained in a genus as the species or individual are contained in genus, he can be said to be in the genus of substance by reduction, as a principle, much as the point is in the genus of continuous quantity, and unity in the genus of number. In this way he is the measure of all substances, as unity is of numbers.
Article 4: Are good, wise, just and the like predicated of God as accidents?
It seems that they are.
1. Whatever is predicated of something not as signifying substance but what follows on nature signifies an accident. But Damascene says that good and just and holy as said of God follow nature and do not signify substance itself. Therefore they predicate accidents of God.
2. But it will be said that Damascene speaks with respect to the mode of signifying. On the contrary. The mode of signifying follows the notion of genus and must be referred to the thing, for the genus predicate signifies the substance of the subject, since it is predicated of it as what it is. But the foregoing names signify in the manner of following on the nature by reason of the genus, for they are in the genus of quality, which in its proper signification relates to a subject, for quality is that by which things are signified as to how they are. Therefore this mode of signifying must refer to the thing, such that what is signified by the foregoing names are things following on the nature of that of which they are predicated, and consequently they are accidents.
3. But it might be said that these names are not predicated of God with respect to their genus, which is quality, for names imposed by us are not properly said of God. On the contrary: if the genus were removed from a thing, the species would be falsely predicated of it: what is not an animal is falsely called a man. If therefore the genus of the predicate, which is quality, is not predicated of God, it is not only improperly but falsely predicated of God, and thus it would be false to say that God is just or that God is holy, which is absurd. Therefore, it must be said that the foregoing names are predicated of God as accidents.
4. Moreover, the Philosopher says that what truly is – that is, substance – is accidental to nothing. Therefore, for the same reason what in itself is an accident is an accident wherever. But justice and wisdom and the like are of themselves accidents. Therefore, there are accidents in God.
5. Moreover, there is an exemplar in God of whatever is found in created things, for he is the exemplar form of all. But wisdom, justice and the like are accidents in created things. Therefore they are accidents in God.
6. Moreover, wherever there is quantity and quality, there is accident. But in God there seems to be quantity and quality, for there is similarity and equality in God, since we say that the Son is similar and equal to the Father. But quality is caused from the unit in quality as equality is from the one in quantity. Therefore, there are accidents in God.
7. Moreover, anything is measured by the first in its genus. But God is not only the measure of substances, but of all accidents, because he is the creator of substance and accident. Therefore, in God there is not only substance but also accident.
8. Moreover, that without which something can be understood is accidentally predicated of it. Porphyry proves that there are some separable accidents because we can think of white crows and white Ethiopians. But God can be understood without good, as is evident in Boethius. Therefore, good signifies an accident in God, and the same goes for the others.
9. Moreover, two things are to be considered in the meaning of the name God: that from which it is imposed and that on which it is imposed. With respect to both, however, the word wisdom seems to signify an accident, for it is imposed from that which makes one wise, which seems to be the action of wisdom; and that from which it is imposed is some quality, and thus in God there is some accident.
ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Boethius says that God, since he is a simple form, cannot be a subject. But every accident is in a subject. Therefore, in God there cannot be any accident.
2. Moreover, every accident depends on something else, but there cannot be such dependence in God, because what depends on another must be caused. God, however, is the first cause, in no way caused. Therefore there cannot be an accident in God.
3. Moreover, Rabbi Moses says that names of this kind do not signify intentions added to the substance of God. But every accident signifies an intention added to the substance of its subject. Therefore the foregoing names do not signify an accident in God.
4. Moreover, an accident is something that comes and goes without the corruption of the subject. But this cannot be in God, since he is immutable, as is proved by the Philosopher. Therefore there can be no accident in God.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that without any doubt it must be held that in God there is no accident, which for the present can be shown by three arguments.
The first argument is this. Nothing extraneous is joined to any nature or essence or form, even though that which has the nature, form or essence can have something extraneous, for humanity receives only what is of the notion of humanity. This is clear from the fact that anything added to or subtracted from definitions signifying essence changes the definition, something clear in numbers too, as the Philosopher says.
But man, who has humanity, can have something which is not of the notion of humanity, such as whiteness and the like, which are not in humanity but in man. In every creature the difference between that which has and what is had obtains. For in composite creatures there is a twofold difference, since the supposit or individual itself has the nature of the species, as man has humanity and existence besides: for a man is neither his humanity nor his existence. So there can be an accident in man but not in humanity itself or in his existence.
In simple substances there is only one difference, namely, that of essence and existence. For in any angel, the supposit is its nature, for the quiddity of the simple is itself simple, as Avicenna says; but it is not its own existence. Hence, the quiddity subsists in its existence. In substances of this kind an intelligible accident can be found, but not a material one.
In God there is no difference between the haver and the had, or of participant and participated; indeed he is both his nature and his existence, and therefore nothing alien or accidental can be in him. Boethius seems to have hit upon this argument when he says, ‘That which is can have something beyond what it itself is, but existence as such has nothing other than itself within it.’
The second argument is this. Since accident is extrinsic to the essence of the subject, and the diverse are only joined by some cause, it would be necessary, if there were an accident in God, that this be due to some cause. But it cannot be any extrinsic cause, because then it would follow that the extrinsic cause acts on God and would be prior to him, as mover to moved, and maker to made. For an accident is caused in a subject from without insofar as an external agent acts on the subject in which the accident is caused.
Similarly, it cannot be from an intrinsic cause, as is the case with proper accidents, which have their cause in the subject. For a subject cannot be the cause of an accident in the same way that it receives the accident, because no potency moves itself to act. So it is necessary that it be susceptible of the accident because of one thing and be the cause of the accident because of another. But then it would be composed, like things that receive accidents because of matter and cause accidents because of form. But it was shown above that God is not complex. Hence it is impossible for there to be any accident in him.
The third argument is this. The accident relates to its subject as act to potency, since it is a certain form of it. Hence since God is pure act without any admixture of potency, he cannot be the subject of accident. It is plain from what has gone before that in God there is no composition of matter and form nor of any substantial parts nor of genus and difference nor of subject and accident. It is evident then that the names mentioned do not predicate an accident of God.
Ad 1. It should be said that Damascene speaks of those names not with regard to what they predicate of God but with regard to that from which they are imposed to signify. For they are imposed by us from certain accidental forms found in creatures and he wishes to prove from this that the substance of God is not made known to us by such names.
Ad 2. It should be said that although quality is the genus of human happiness and wisdom and justice, it is not their genus as said of God, because quality, as such, is called being insofar as it in some way inheres in a subject. Wisdom and justice are not named from this, however, but rather from some perfection or act, hence they enter into talk about God by reason of the difference and not by reason of the genus. On account of this Augustine says that as much as we can we understand good without quality and great without quantity. Hence it is not necessary that the mode which follows on the nature be found in God.
Ad 3. It should be said that if good and just were univocally predicated of God, the predication would be false, the genus being removed. However, nothing is said of God and creature univocally, as will be shown below, so the argument does not follow.
Ad 4. It should be said that wisdom, which is an accident, is not in God, but another wisdom not univocally meant, and for this reason the argument has no force.
Ad 5. It should be said that examples do not always perfectly represent the exemplar. Hence sometimes what is in the exemplar is found only defectively and imperfectly in the example. This is especially so in the things which exemplify God who is an exemplar exceeding every creature in degree.
Ad 6. It should be said that likeness and equality are said of God not because there is quality and quantity in him, but because we predicate of God that which in us signifies quality and quantity, as when we call God great and wise and the like.
Ad 7. It should be said that accidents are called being only in relation to substance as first being. Hence accidents are not measured by some first that is an accident, but by the first one that is substance.
Ad 8. It should be said that anything without which a thing can be understood with respect to its essence has the note of accident, for we cannot understand what is of the substance of a thing while ignoring something that is of its substance, as if we could understand what a man is without understanding animal. We do not know God in his essence but think of him from his effects. So nothing prohibits our thinking of him from the effect of his being and not thinking of him from the effect of his goodness. For it is thus that Boethius speaks. However, it should be noticed that although we can in a way understand God without understanding his goodness, we cannot understand God by understanding that he is not good, any more than we could understand man by understanding him not to be animal, since this would remove the substance of God, which is goodness. The saints in heaven who see God in his essence, in seeing God, see his goodness.
Ad 9. It should be said that wisdom is verified of God with respect to that from which the name is imposed, and it is not imposed from this that it causes wisdom but from this that the things of wisdom are intellectually possessed. For knowledge as knowledge refers to the known, but insofar as it is an accident or form it refers to the knower. To possess the things of wisdom is accidental to man but not to God.
Article 5: Do the foregoing names signify the divine substance?
It seems they do not.
1. For Damascene says that each of the things said of God should not be taken to mean what he is in his substance, but rather to show that he is not some relation, or any of the things from which he is separate, or any of those things which follow on nature or activity. The existence which is substantially predicated of something signifies what its substance is. But the foregoing names are not predicated of God substantially as if signifying his substance.
2. Moreover, no name that signifies the substance of a thing can truly be negated of it. But Dionysius says that as to the divine, negations are true and affirmations incompact. Therefore, such names do not signify the divine substance.
3. Moreover, these names signify the procession of the divine goodness to things, as Dionysius puts it. But the goodness proceeding from God is not the divine substance itself. Therefore, such names do not signify the divine substance.
4. Moreover, Origen says that God is called wise because wisdom fulfils us. But this does not signify the divine substance, but its effect. Therefore, these names do not signify the divine substance.
5. Moreover, in the Book of Causes it is said that the first cause is not named by the name of the first caused, which is intelligence. When, then, a cause is named with the name of its effect, this is not predication through essence but through causality. Therefore names said of God are not predicated of him substantially, but only causally.
6. Moreover, names signify conceptions of intellect, as is clear from the Philosopher. But we cannot understand the divine substance, for we do not know what God is, but only that he is, as Damascene says. Therefore we cannot name him with any name nor signify his substance.
7. Moreover, all things participate in the divine goodness, as is clear from Dionysius. But all things do not participate in his substance, but only the three persons. Therefore, divine goodness does not signify his substance.
8. Moreover, we can only know God from his likeness in the creature because, as the Apostle says, in Romans 1.20, ‘The invisible things of God are understood from the things that are made.’ But as we know him, so we name him. Therefore, we can only name him from the likeness of creatures. But when something is named from the likeness, the name is not predicated of it substantially but metaphorically. Thus it is clear that it is said of God secondarily, but primarily of that from which the likeness is taken. What signifies the substance of something is said first of it.
9. Moreover, according to the Philosopher, to signify substance is to signify this and nothing else. Therefore, if the name good signifies the divine substance, there will be nothing in the divine substance it does not signify, just as there is nothing in human substance that is not signified by ‘man’. But good does not signify wisdom, and thus wisdom would not be the divine substance and, by parity of reasoning, none of the others. Therefore, it cannot be said that these names signify the divine substance.
10. Moreover, as quantity is the cause of equality and quality is the cause of similarity, so substance is of identity. If, therefore, all such names signified the substance of God, they would suggest identity rather than equality and similarity, and thus the creature would be said to be the same as God insofar as he imitates his wisdom or goodness, or any of the others, which is absurd.
11. Moreover, in God, who is the principle of all nature, there can be nothing contrary to nature. The Gloss on Romans, ‘You are set against nature,’ makes clear he can do nothing contrary to nature, but that accident should be substance is contrary to nature. Therefore, since wisdom, justice and the like are in themselves accidents, it cannot be that in God they should be substance.
12. Moreover, when God is called good, this is a complex statement. But there would be no complexity if the goodness of God were his substance. Therefore, it does not seem that good signifies the divine substance, and for the same reason neither do the other names.
13. Moreover, Augustine says that God eludes every concept of our intellect and therefore cannot be included in intellect. But this would not be if these names signified the divine substance, because God would correspond to the concept of our intellect. Therefore names of this kind do not signify the divine substance.
14. Moreover, Dionysius says that the all good God is united to us when we know that in knowing we know nothing of him. But this would not be if what is conceived and signified were the divine substance. Therefore, the same conclusion as before.
ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Augustine says God is what it is to be brave and to be wise, and whatever you might say that signifies his substance. Therefore all such names signify the divine substance.
2. Moreover, Boethius says that when categories other than relation are used in divine predication, they all change into substance, much as ‘just’, although it seems to signify a quality, signifies substance, and similarly ‘great’ and others like them.
3. Moreover, whatever is said by way of participation is reduced to something said of itself and essentially. But the names mentioned are said of creatures by way of participation; therefore when they are taken back to God as to the first cause, they must be said of God essentially. And thus it follows that they signify his substance.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that some held that these names as said of God do not signify the divine substance, something Rabbi Moses most forcibly maintains. He says that such names should be understood of God in two ways: in one way, through the likeness of the effect, as God is called wise not because wisdom is something in him but because he accomplished his effects in the manner of the wise, that is, ordering each thing to its appropriate end, and similarly he is called living insofar as he acts in the manner of one having life, that is, acting of himself. In another way, by negation, such that when we say that God is living, we do not mean that life is in him, but we remove from God that mode of being whereby inanimate things exist. Similarly when we call God intelligent, we do not mean to signify that intellect is something in him, but we remove from God that mode of being whereby brutes exist, and so on with the others.
But both these ways seem insufficient and unfitting. The first, for two reasons, of which one is that on this interpretation there would be no difference between saying that God is wise and God is angry or God is fire. He is called angry because he acts in the manner of an angry person when he punishes, for this is what angry men are wont to do. He is called fire because he acts in the manner of fire when he cleanses, which fire in its way does. But this conflicts with the view of the saints and prophets speaking of God, who affirm some things of God and deny others, affirming that he is alive, wise and the like, and denying that he is a body or subject to passion. But according to this opinion, all things could with equal reason be said of and denied of God, this no more than that.
The second argument is this. Since according to our faith we hold that creatures did not always exist, which he concedes, it would follow that we cannot say that anyone wise and good existed before creatures did. It is obvious that before creatures existed none of these effects was achieved, neither in the manner of the good nor of the wise. But this is completely repugnant to faith, unless perhaps he means to say that before creatures it was possible to speak of the wise, not because he acted wisely, but because it was possible for him to do so. But then it would follow that something existing in God is signified by it, that is, substance, because whatever is in God is substance.
The second way seems absurd for the same reason. For the name of any species takes away some mode that does not belong to God; in the name of any species is included the signification of the difference by which is excluded the other species that is divided against it. Just as in the name of lion is included the difference quadruped by which the lion differs from the bird. Therefore if predications were made of God only to remove something, as we say God is living – because he does not have existence in the manner of the inanimate, as he says – so we can say that God is a lion because he does not exist in the manner of a bird. Moreover, the intellect always bases a negative on some affirmation, and from this it is clear that every negative is proved through an affirmative; hence unless the human intellect knew something affirmatively of God it could deny nothing of God. But it would know nothing, if nothing it says of God is verified of him affirmatively.
Therefore, according to the opinion of Dionysius, it should be said that names of this kind signify the divine substance, though deficiently and imperfectly. This is clear because every agent acts insofar as it is in act, and consequently brings about something similar. It is necessary that the form of the thing made is in some way in the agent, but diversely, because when the effect is equal to the power of the agent, it is necessary that the form is in the maker and made according to the same notion, for then the maker and the made would belong to the same species, which happens with all univocals, for man generates man, and fire fire. But when the effect is not equal to the power of the agent, the form is not in the maker and made according to the same notion, but more eminently in the agent. Insofar as it is in the agent, the agent has the power of producing the effect. Hence if the whole power of the agent is not expressed by what is made, it follows that the mode by which the form is in the agent exceeds the mode by which it is in the effect. And we find this in all equivocal agents, as when the sun generates fire.
It is clear that no effect is equal to the power of the first agent who is God; otherwise only one effect would proceed from that one power. But when from one power we find many and various effects proceeding, we are shown that any of those effects falls short of the power of the agent. Therefore, no form of any divine effect is of the same notion in the effect as in God. None the less, it must be there in a higher mode, and thus it is that all forms which are distinct in different effects and divided from one another are united in him as in one common power, just as all forms produced in lower things by the power of the sun are in the sun according to its unique power, to which all things generated by the action of the sun are assimilated in their forms.
So too the perfections of created things are assimilated to God according to his unique and simple essence. But when our intellect receives knowledge from created things, it is informed by the likenesses of the perfections found in creatures, such as wisdom, virtue, goodness and the like. Hence just as created things by their perfections are made similar to God, though deficiently, so our intellect is informed by the species of these perfections.
Whenever the intellect is assimilated to a thing through its intelligible form, then what it conceives and speaks according to that intelligible species is verified of the thing to which it is made similar through the species. For knowledge is the intellect’s assimilation to the thing known. What intellect, informed by the perfections of these species, thinks and says of God, must truly exist in God who answers to each of these species as that to which all are similar. If this kind of intelligible species in our intellect were made equal in similarity to the divine essence, it would comprehend him and this would be a perfect notion of God, as walking biped is a perfect notion of man.
But the species is not perfectly assimilated to the divine essence, as has been said; therefore, when the intellect attributes such names to God according to these conceptions, they signify the divine substance – not perfectly according as it is, but rather imperfectly as it is understood by us.
Therefore it should be said that each of these names signifies the divine substance, but imperfectly, not as comprehending it; and that is why the name He Who Is belongs especially to God, because it does not determine any form of God but signifies existence indeterminately. This is what Damascene means when he says that this name He Who Is signifies a boundless ocean of substance.
This solution is confirmed by the words of Dionysius, who says that because God precontains, simply and limitlessly, all existent things in himself, he is properly praised and named by diverse things. He says ‘simply’, because the perfections which are in creatures thanks to different forms, are attributed to God according to his simple essence; he says ‘limitlessly’ to show that no perfection found in creatures comprehends the divine essence such that the intellect could define God as that perfection is in him. This is also confirmed by what is said in Metaphysics 5, that the simply perfect is that which has in itself the perfections of all kinds, as the Commentator explains at that place.
Ad 1. It should be said that Damascene means that names of this kind do not signify what God is as comprehending and defining his substance; hence he adds that this name He Who Is, which indefinitely signifies the substance of God, is most properly attributed to God.
Ad 2. It should be replied that Dionysius says that negations of these names are true of God but does not assert that affirmations are false and incompact, but with respect to the thing signified they are truly attributed to God and in some way are in him, as has been shown; but with respect to the mode with which they signify they can be denied of God, for each of these names signifies some definite form, and thus they cannot be attributed to God, as has been said. Therefore, they can be absolutely denied of God since they do not belong to him in the mode signified, for the mode signified is according as they are in our intellect, as has been said; they belong to God in a more sublime mode, hence the affirmation is said to be not in every way fittingly conjoined because of the different mode. According to the teaching of Dionysius they are said in a threefold way of God, first affirmatively, as we say that ‘God is wise’; which we must say because there is in him some likeness of the wisdom flowing from him. Because wisdom is not in God as we understand and name it, it can truly be denied, saying ‘God is not wise.’ Wisdom is not denied of God because he falls short of it, but because it is in him more supereminently than it is said or understood, so we must say, ‘God is super-wise.’ And thus by this threefold manner of speaking according to which God is called wise, Dionysius conveys perfectly how these names are attributed to God.
Ad 3. It should be said that these names are said to signify the divine processions because they are first imposed to signify the processions as they are in creatures, and from their likenesses our intellect is led by the hand so that it can attribute them to God in a more eminent way.
Ad 4. It should be said that the word of Origen is not to be understood as meaning that when we say God is wise we mean to signify that God is the cause of wisdom, but that from the wisdom he causes our intellect is led to the point where it can attribute wisdom to him supereminently, as has been said.
Ad 5. It should be said that when God is said to be intelligent, he is named from his effect: because the name that signifies the substance of his effect cannot be attributed definitely to him according to the mode the name signifies; and thus this name although it belongs to him in a way, does not belong to him as his name, because what the name signifies is a definition; but it belongs to the effect as its name.
Ad 6. It should be said that this argument proves that God can not be named by a name defining his substance or comprehending it or equal to it: for in this way we do not know what God is.
Ad 7. It should be said that just as everything participates in the goodness of God – not numerically the same as he, but by similitude – so it participates in the existence of God. With this difference, however, that goodness implies the relation of some cause, for the good is diffusive of itself, but essence is signified in that in which it is, as at rest.
Ad 8. It should be said that in the effect there is found something in which it is like its cause and something in which it differs from its cause. It agrees with it either in matter or something like, as is evident in brick hardened by fire. Because the mud is heated by the fire, it is assimilated to fire, but because the heated is made heavy and hard it differs from fire, but it has this from the condition of matter. If, therefore, that in which the brick is made like the fire is said of fire, it would be properly said of it, and more eminently and first of all. For fire is hotter than the brick and again more eminently: because the brick is hot because heated but fire is naturally hot. But if we should predicate of fire that in which the brick differs from fire, this would be false; and a name having a condition of this kind in its concept could only be said metaphorically of fire. For it is false to call fire, the most subtle of bodies, gross although it can be called hard because of the violence of its action and its resistance to control. Similarly, in creatures there are things to be considered according to which they are made like God, which with respect to the thing signified imply no imperfection, like to be, to live, to understand, and so on. These are properly said of God, indeed more eminently and primarily of him than of creatures. There are other things in which creatures differ from God because of the fact that they are from nothing, such as potentiality, privation, motion and other like things, which are falsely said of God. Names that include such conditions in their concepts can be said of God only metaphorically, like lion, rock and the like, because they have matter in their definitions. Such names are said metaphorically of God because of a likeness of effect.
Ad 9. It should be said that this argument proceeds from the assumption that it signifies substance definitively or circumscriptively, but none of these names signifies the substance of God in this way, as has been said.
Ad 10. It should be said that although in God such perfections are the divine substance itself, in the creature they are not substantial perfections. Therefore with respect to them creatures are not said to be the same as God, but like him.
Ad 11. It should be said that it would be against nature if wisdom were in God according to its meaning as an accident, but this is not the case, as is evident from the foregoing. Nor is the authority invoked relevant: God does nothing against nature in himself because he does nothing in himself.
Ad 12. It should be said that the complexity of the remark when it is said that God is good does not refer to any composition in God, but to the composition that is in our intellect.
Ad 13. It should be said that God eludes the form of our intellect because he exceeds every form of our intellect, but not such that our intellect cannot be assimilated to God according to any intelligible form.
Ad 14. It should be said that from the fact that our intellect is not equal to the divine substance, the substance of God exceeds our intellect and thus is not known by us; what is ultimate in human knowledge of God is that one knows that he does not know God, because he knows that what God is exceeds everything that we can understand of him.
Article 6: Are these names synonyms?
It seems that they are.
1. Names are called synonyms which completely signify the same thing. But all these names said of God signify the same, because they signify the divine substance, which is in every way simple and one, as has been shown. Therefore all these names are synonyms.
2. Moreover, Damascene says that in the divine all things are one, except non-generation, generation and procession. But names signifying one are synonyms. Therefore, all these names as said of God, apart from those that signify the personal properties, are synonyms.
3. Moreover, things that are the same as one and the same thing are the same as one another. But wisdom in God is the same as his substance, and similarly will and power. Therefore, wisdom, power and will in God are wholly the same, and thus it follows that these names are synonyms.
4. It will be said that these names signify the same thing but according to different notions and therefore are not synonyms. On the contrary, a notion to which nothing in things responds is false and vain. But if the notions of these names are many and the thing is one, it seems that these notions are vain and false.
5. But it will be said that these notions are not vain, since something in God answers to them. On the contrary. Created things are made like God insofar as they proceed from an ideal likeness in him. But the plurality of ideas or of ideal notions is not taken according to their relation to creatures, for God himself according to his one essence is the idea of all things. Therefore, the notions of the names we say of God from the likeness of creatures have nothing answering to them on the side of the divine substance.
6. Moreover, that which is maximally one cannot be the root and basis of multiplicity; but the divine essence is maximally one. Therefore the notions of the foregoing names cannot be founded or rooted in the divine substance.
7. Moreover, the distinction of relations which are really in God causes the plurality of persons. Therefore, if something in God answered to the common notions of the attributes, there would also be a multitude of persons in God according to the multitude of attributes. Thus there would be more than three persons in God, which is heretical. So it seems that these names are completely synonymous.
ON THE CONTRARY:
1. The adding of synonym to synonym is frivolous, as if one were to say clothing and garment. Therefore, if these names were synonyms, it would be frivolous to say that God is good, God is wise – and that is false.
2. Moreover, whoever denies one synonym of a thing, denies the rest. But there were those who denied his power but not his knowledge or goodness. Therefore, these names are not synonyms.
3. Moreover, this is clear from the Commentator on Metaphysics 11 when he says that these names as said of God are not synonyms.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that all who understand are agreed that these names are not synonyms. This would be easy to maintain on the view of those for whom these names do not signify the divine substance, but only certain added essential intentions or modes of acting on effects or even negations of creatures.
But supposing that these names signify the divine substance, as has been shown above, then the question is seen to involve a great difficulty, because then one and the same simple thing, the divine substance, is signified by all these names.
But it should be noted that the signification of a name does not refer immediately to the thing, but through the mediation of understanding, for speech is the sign of passions of the soul and these concepts of intellect are likenesses of things, as is evident from the Philosopher at the beginning of On Interpretation.
Names can be prevented from being synonyms either on the side of the things signified or on the side of the notions understood through the names, for the signifying of which the names are instituted. Of the names said of God, synonymy cannot be prevented by the diversity of the things signified, given what has been established, but only by the notions of the names which follow the conception of the things understood.
Thus the Commentator on Metaphysics 11 says that there is multiplicity in God only because of a difference in understanding, not in being, which we say is one thing conceived in many ways. For the different concepts in our intellect cannot be such that nothing answers to them in reality, for our intellect attributes to God the things of which they are the concepts. Hence if there were nothing in God either as to himself or as to his effects that would answer to these concepts, the intellect would be false in attributing them, as would all propositions signifying such attributes, which is absurd.
There are some notions to which nothing in the thing understood answers, but the intellect does not attribute the things of which these are the concepts to things as they are in themselves, but only as they are understood; this is clear in the case of genus and species, and of other intellectual intentions, for there is nothing in the things outside the mind whose likeness the notion of genus or species might be. Yet the intellect is not false because it does not attribute the things of which these are the notions, namely genus and species, to things as they exist outside the intellect but only as they exist in the intellect. Insofar as the intellect reflects on itself, it understands things existing outside the mind and it also understands them to be understood. Thus, just as there is some conception or notion to which the thing outside the mind answers, so there is a conception or notion to which the thing understood answers as understood. For example, to the notion or concept of man a thing outside the mind answers, but to the notion or concept of genus or species only the thing as understood answers.
It is not possible that the meanings of the names said of God be like that, because then the intellect would attribute them to God not as he is in himself but as he is understood, which is patently false, for then the sense of ‘God is good’ would be that God is so understood, and not that this is what he is.
Therefore, some say that to the different notions of these names different connoted things answer, which are the different effects of God. They mean that when God is said to be good, his essence along with some connoted effect is signified, such that the sense would be that God is and causes goodness, so that the diversity of these notions would be caused by the diversity of effects.
But this does not seem appropriate, because, since the effect proceeds from the cause according to similitude, the cause must be understood to be such before the effects. God is not called wise because he causes wisdom, but because he is wise and therefore causes wisdom. Hence Augustine says that because God is, we are, and insofar as we are, we are good.
It would further follow from this that names of this kind would be said of creatures first rather than of the creator, as health is said of the healthy before it is said of medicine. If when we say that God is good, nothing other than that God is the cause of goodness were understood, by the same token it would follow that all names of divine effects can be predicated of him, as we might say that God is heaven because he causes the heaven.
Again, if this were said of actual causality, it is evidently false, because on that basis we could not say that God was from all eternity good or wise or any such thing since he was not from all eternity a cause in act.
And if it be understood of virtual causality – as if he were called good because he has the power of diffusing goodness – then we will have to say that the term ‘good’ signifies that power. But the power is a supereminent likeness of its effect, as is the power of any equivocal cause, so it would follow that the intellect conceiving goodness would be made like that which is in God and that which God is. Thus something in God answers to the notion and conception of goodness and that God exists.
Therefore it should be said that there is something in God answering to all these many and diverse notions of which all these conceptions of intellect are likenesses. It is clear that there can be only one specific likeness of a form which has the same notion as it, but there can be many imperfect likenesses which fail in perfectly representing the form. Since then, as is clear from the foregoing, the conceptions of perfections found in creatures are imperfect likenesses and not of the same notion as the divine essence, nothing prevents the one essence from answering to all these conceptions, as imperfectly represented by them. Thus all notions are indeed in our intellect as in a subject, but they are in God as in the verifying root of these conceptions. The conceptions that the intellect has of a thing would not be true unless that thing answered to them by way of similitude.
The cause of the diversity or multiplicity of names is from the side of our intellect, which cannot come to see the essence of God as it is, but sees it through many deficient likenesses which come about in creatures as in a glass. If it should see the essence itself, it would not need many names nor would it need many concepts. Because of this, the Word of God, which is a perfect conception of him, is only one. Thus it is said in Zacharias 14.9, ‘In that day there shall be one Lord, and his name shall be one.’ That is, when the very essence of God is seen and knowledge of God is not gathered from creatures.
Ad 1. It should be said, therefore, that although these names signify one thing, they do so via many notions, as has been argued, and because of these they are not synonyms.
Ad 2. It should be said that Damascene means that in God all things are one as to the thing, except for the personal properties which constitute the real distinction of persons, but this does not exclude that what is said of God should differ in notion.
Ad 3. The response is obvious: because just as goodness and wisdom are the same thing as the divine essence, so with respect to one another, but the notions of the name differ, as has been said.
Ad 4. It should be said that it is already clear from the foregoing that God is in every way one, yet these many conceptions or notions are not false, because to all of them one and the same thing answers which is imperfectly represented by them. They would be false if nothing answered to them.
Ad 5. It should be said that there is unity through and through on the side of God; multiplicity is from the side of creatures. Just as when God understands creatures there is one intelligible form with respect to his essence and many with respect to different creatures, so our intellect rising to God from the multiplicity of creatures has many species relating to one God.
Ad 6. It should be said that these notions are not founded in the divine essence as in a subject but as in the cause of truth, or as represented by all, which does not derogate from his simplicity.
Ad 7. It should be said that paternity and filiation are opposed to one another and therefore require a real distinction of supposits, but not goodness and wisdom.
Article 7: Are such names said of God and creatures univocally or equivocally?
The answer seems to be, univocally.
1. The measure and the measured share the same notion, but the divine goodness is the measure of the goodness in the creature, and his wisdom of all wisdom. Therefore, they are said univocally of God and creature.
2. Moreover, things are similar when they share a form, but the creature can be made similar to God, as is evident in Genesis 1.26: ‘We will make man in our image and likeness.’ Therefore there is some sharing of form between creature and God, but all things that communicate in form can have something predicated of them univocally. Therefore, something can be predicated univocally of God and creature.
3. Moreover, the greater and less do not cause specific diversity. But when the creature is called good and God is called good they seem to differ in that God is better than any creature. Therefore the goodness of God and of creature are not specifically diverse, and good is predicated univocally of God and creature.
4. Moreover, things in different genera cannot be compared, as the Philosopher proves, for the velocity of alteration and the velocity of local motion are not comparable. But between God and creature some comparison is made, for God is called the highest good and the creature is good. Therefore, God and creature are of one genus and something can be predicated univocally of them.
5. Moreover, a thing is only known through the species of one notion, for the whiteness that is in the wall would not be known through the species in the eye unless there were one notion of both. But God through his goodness knows all beings, and so too with the other attributes. Therefore, the goodness of God and creature are of one notion, and good is predicated univocally of God and creature.
6. Moreover, the house which is in the mind of the artisan and the house which is in matter are of one notion, but all creatures proceed from God as artefacts from artisan. Therefore the goodness which is in God is of one notion with the goodness that is in the creature, and thus the same conclusion as before.
7. Moreover, every equivocal agent is reduced to some univocal agent. Therefore, the first cause that God is must be univocal. But something can be predicated univocally of the univocal cause and its proper effect. Therefore, something can be predicated univocally of God and creature.
ON THE CONTRARY:
1. The Philosopher says that nothing but a name is common to the eternal and temporal. But God is eternal and creatures are temporal. Therefore, there can be nothing common to God and creatures but a name. Thus names are predicated purely equivocally of God and creatures.
2. Moreover, since genus is the first part of a definition, to take away the genus is to remove the notion signified by the name; hence if a name is imposed to signify that which inheres in another, it will be an equivocal one. But wisdom said of the creature is in the genus of quality. Therefore, since wisdom said of God is not a quality, as has been shown, it seems that this name ‘wisdom’ is equivocally predicated of God and creatures.
3. Moreover, where there is no similarity, there cannot be anything commonly predicated, except equivocally. But there is no similarity between God and creature, for we read in Isaiah 40.18, ‘To whom then have you likened God?’ Therefore, it seems that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and creatures.
4. But it will be said that although God cannot be called similar to the creature, the creature can be called similar to God. On the contrary, we read in Psalm 82.2, ‘God, who will be like unto thee?’ as if to say, no one.
5. Moreover, nothing in the order of accident can be similar to substance; but wisdom in the creature is an accident whereas in God it is substance. Therefore, man cannot be likened to the divine wisdom through his wisdom.
6. Moreover, since in the creature to be is one thing and form or nature another, through form or nature nothing is made like that which is existence; but these names predicated of creatures signify some nature or form. But God is his existence. Therefore, the creature cannot be like God because these things are said of the creature, and thus the same as before.
7. Moreover, God differs from the creature more than number differs from whiteness. But it would be stupid to say that number is like whiteness, or vice versa. Therefore it is stupid to say that the creature is like God, and thus the same as before.
8. Moreover, when things are similar to one another, they agree in some one thing, and things which agree in one are transmutable among themselves. But God is in every way untransmutable. Therefore, there cannot be any similarity between God and creature.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that it is impossible for something to be predicated univocally of God and creature; this is clear because every effect of a univocal cause is equal to the power of the agent. But no creature, since it is finite, can be equal to the power of the first agent, who is infinite. Hence it is impossible that the creature should receive the likeness of God univocally.
Again, it is clear that, although the notion of the form existing in the cause and in the effect is one, yet the different mode of existing impedes univocal predication, for although the notion of the house which is in matter and the house which is in the mind of the artisan are the same – because the one is the reason for the other – still house is not predicated univocally of both because the species of the house in matter has material existence but it has immaterial existence in the mind of the artisan. Granting therefore, what is impossible, that goodness were of the same notion in God and creature, still good would not be predicated univocally of God since what in God exists immaterially and simply exists in the creature materially and multiplied. Moreover, being is not said univocally of substance and accident because substance is being as having existence of itself, and accident that for which to exist is to exist in something. From which it is clear that a diverse relation to existence impedes the univocal predication of being. God is related to existence differently than any creature, for he is his own existence, something that is true of no creature. Hence in no way can the creature be said univocally of God; and consequently none of the other predicates either, among which is First Being. When there is diversity in the first, diversity must be found in others; hence nothing is univocally predicated of substance and accident.
Some have said otherwise, however, holding that nothing is predicated analogically of God and creature, but purely equivocally. And Rabbi Moses was of this opinion, as is clear from what he says.
But this opinion cannot be true. In pure equivocals, which the Philosopher calls chance equivocals, nothing is said of one with reference to the other. But all the things said of God and creatures are said of God according to some relation to creatures, or vice versa, as is clear from all the opinions on the exposition of divine names. Hence it is impossible that it should be pure equivocation.
Again, all our knowledge of God is taken from creatures, so that if there were agreement in name alone, we would know nothing of God save some empty words with nothing to underwrite them.
It would also follow that all the demonstrations concerning God advanced by the philosophers would be sophistical. For example, if it were said that whatever is in potency is reduced to act by a being in act, and from this it were concluded that God is being in act, since all things are brought into existence by him, there would be a fallacy of equivocation. And so with all the others. Moreover, it is necessary that the effect be in some way like the cause; so nothing is predicated purely equivocally of effect and cause, but rather is predicated as healthy is predicated of medicine and animal.
On the other hand it must be said that nothing is predicated of God and creature univocally and that the things predicated commonly are not predicated purely equivocally, but analogically. There are two modes of this kind of predication, one in which something is predicated of two things with respect to a third, as being of quality and quantity with respect to substance, another in which something is predicated of two things because of the relation of one to the other, as being is said of substance and quantity.
In the first kind of predication there must be something prior to the two to which both have a relation, as substance with respect to quantity and quality, but not in the second, where it is necessary that one be prior to the other. Therefore, since nothing is prior to God but he is prior to creature, the second mode of analogy belongs to divine predication and not the first.
Ad 1. It should be said the argument proceeds from the measure which can be coequal to or commensurate with the measured; but God is not such a measure, since he infinitely exceeds everything measured by him.
Ad 2. It should be said that the likeness of creature to God falls short of the likeness of univocals in two things. First, because it is not participation in one form, as two things are hot by participating in one heat, for what is said of God and creature is predicated of God essentially and of creature by participation, such that this likeness of creature to God is understood as that of the heated to heat and not of one heated thing to another. Second, because the form participated in by the creature falls short of the notion of what God is, just as the heat of fire falls short of the notion of solar power, through which heat comes into being.
Ad 3. It should be said that the more and less can be considered and thus predicated in three ways. In one way, according to the quantity alone of the participated, as snow is said to be whiter than the wall because whiteness is more perfectly in snow than in the wall, yet of the same notion; so this difference of more and less does not cause diversity in species. In a second way, insofar as one is said by participation and the other through essence, as we say that goodness is better than the good. In a third way, insofar as it belongs in a more eminent way to one thing than to another, as heat to the sun rather than to fire. These two modes impede unity of species and univocal predication, and in this way something is predicated more and less of God and creature, as is evident from what has been said.
Ad 4. It should be said that when God is called the better or the highest good he is not compared to creatures as participating in a nature of the same genus with creatures, as species of the same genus do, but God is the principle of the genus.
Ad 5. It should be said that to the degree that an intelligible species is more eminently in something, to that degree there is more perfect knowledge of it; like the species of stone in the intellect rather than in the sense. Hence God can know things perfectly by his essence insofar as his essence is the supereminent, and not the equal, likeness of things.
Ad 6. It should be said that there is a twofold likeness between creature and God. One is of the creature to the divine intellect, and thus the form understood by God is of one notion with the thing understood, although it does not have the same mode of existing, because the form as understood is in the intellect alone, but the form of the creature is also in the thing. In another way insofar as the divine essence is a superexcellent likeness of all things and not of the same notion. From this kind of likeness but not the first, such terms as ‘good’ come to be commonly predicated of God and creatures. When God is called good the meaning is not that he understands the goodness of creatures, which is already clear from what has been said. Nor is house said univocally of the house which is in the mind of the artisan and the house in matter.
7. It should be said that the equivocal agent must be prior to the univocal agent because the univocal agent does not exercise causality over the whole species, otherwise he would be cause of itself, but only over an individual of the species. But the equivocal agent exercises causality over the whole species, so the first agent must be an equivocal cause.
As for the arguments advanced on the contrary:
Ad 1. It should be said that the Philosopher speaks of a natural and not a logical community. Things which have different modes of existing do not communicate in anything according to existence as considered by the natural philosopher, but they can communicate in some intention which the logician considers. Moreover, for the natural philosopher the elementary and celestial bodies are not of the same genus, whereas for the logician they are. Nevertheless the Philosopher does not mean to exclude analogical community, but only univocal, for he wishes to show that corruptible and incorruptible do not share a genus.
Ad 2. It should be said that although diversity of genus removes univocation it does not take away analogy, which is evident from the fact that healthy, as said of urine, is in the genus of sign, but as said of medicine it is in the genus of cause.
Ad 3. It should be said that there is no way in which God can be said to be similar to the creature, but only vice versa, because as Dionysius says we do not find in cause and effect a convertible similarity, but only co-ordinates, for a man is not said to be like his image, but vice versa, since the form on which similarity is based is in man before it is in his image. Therefore, we do not say God is like creatures, but vice versa.
Ad 4. It should be said that the statement, ‘No creature is like God,’ should be understood, as Dionysius explains in the same chapter, to mean that the effects have little of their cause and are incomparably inadequate to it. Which is not to be understood with respect to the quantity participated, but in the other two ways, as was said above.
Ad 5. It should be said that on the basis of an accident a thing cannot be similar to substance by the similarity that is based on a form of the same notion, but this does not preclude the similarity of effect and cause. For the first substance must be the cause of all accidents.
The same should be said in response to 6.
Ad 7. It should be said that whiteness is not in the genus of number nor is it the principle of the genus, and therefore there is no similarity to be expected of one to the other. God, however, is the principle of every genus and therefore all things are in some way like him.
Ad 8. It should be said that the argument is based on what communicates in genus or in matter, which is not the condition of God to creatures.
Article 8: Is there any relation between God and creature?
It seems there is not.
1. For relatives are simultaneous, according to the Philosopher, but the creature cannot be simultaneous with God, for God is in every way prior to the creature. Therefore, there can be no relation between creature and God.
2. Moreover, things between which a relation obtains must also be comparable to one another. But between God and creature there is no comparison, for things which are not of the same genus are not comparable, such as number and line. Therefore, there is no relation between God and creature.
3. Moreover, in whatever genus one relative is found, the other must also be found. But God is not in the same genus with the creature. Therefore, they cannot be said to be relative to one another.
4. Moreover, the creature cannot be opposite to the creator because a thing is not the cause of its opposite. But relatives are opposed to one another. Therefore, there can be no relation between creature and God.
5. Moreover, anything of which something new begins to be said can in some way be said to have come to be. Therefore it follows that if something is said of God relative to creature, God in some way came to be. Which is impossible, since he is immutable.
6. Moreover, whatever is predicated of something is predicated either as such or accidentally. But what implies a relation to creature is not predicated of God per se, because such predicates are predicated necessarily and always, and not accidentally. Therefore, in no way can such relatives be predicated of God.
ON THE CONTRARY:
Augustine says that the creator is said relatively to the creature, as lord to servant.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that relation differs from quantity and quality in this that quantity and quality are accidents abiding in a subject, whereas relation, as Boethius says, does not signify something abiding in a subject, but, as it were, in transit towards another. Hence the disciples of Gilbert de la Porre said that relations are not inherent, but assistant, which in a way is true as will be shown later.
Whatever is attributed to something as proceeding towards another is not a component of it, as action is not of the agent. Because of this the Philosopher proves in Physics 5 that there cannot be motion in the category of relation because without any change in that which is referred to another, the relation can cease solely because of a change in the other, as is evident in action, which is motion only metaphorically and improperly. We are said to change when from rest we begin to act, which would not be if relation or action signified something abiding in the subject.
From this it is clear that it is not against the notion of anything’s simplicity that there be many relations between it and others, indeed the more simple the thing, the more relations attend it. For the more simple a thing is the less limited is its power and thus its causality can extend to more. That is why it is said in the Book of Causes that the more a power is unified, the more infinite it is than any multiplied power. Some relation must be understood between a principle and the things that derive from it, not only the relation of origin, according to which the effects arise from the principle, but also the relation of difference, because the effect must be distinguished from the cause, since nothing is cause of itself.
Therefore, it follows on the supreme simplicity of God that infinite relations exist between creatures and him, insofar as he produces creatures different from himself, but in some way like unto him.
Ad 1. It should be said that those relatives are simultaneous in nature which refer to one another for the same reason, such as father and son, lord and servant, double and half. But those relatives in which there is not the same basis of referring on both sides are not by nature simultaneous, but one is naturally prior to the other, as the Philosopher says of sense and the sensible as well as of knowledge and the knowable. Thus it is clear that there is no need for God and creature to be by nature simultaneous, since there is not the same basis for referring on each side. Nor is it necessary even in relatives which are by nature simultaneous that their subjects be naturally simultaneous, but only the relations.
Ad 2. It should be said that not all things related to one another are comparable to one another, but only those whose relation is based on quantity or quality, such that one can be called greater or better, or whiter or something like that. The differences of relations can be referred to one another even when of different genera, for those which are of different genera are different from one another. None the less, although God is not in the same genus as creature, as though contained in a genus, he is, however, in every genus as the principle of the genus, and on this basis there can be a relation between creature and God as between the caused and the cause.
Ad 3. It should be said that it is not necessary for the subjects of relations to be of the same genus, but only the relations themselves, as is evident from this that quantity is said to be different from quiddity. And yet, as has been said, there is not the same notion of God and creatures, as things which are in different genera are in no way co-ordinates of one another.
Ad 4. It should be said that the opposition in relations differs from other oppositions in two ways. First, is that in the others one is said to be opposed to the other insofar as it removes it, for negation removes affirmation, and they are opposed on this basis; the opposition of privation and habit and of contrariety includes the opposition of contradiction, as is said in Metaphysics 4. But this is not the case with relatives: son is not opposed to father as removing him, but because of the basis for the relation to him. And from this the second difference results, because in other opposites there is always the perfect and imperfect, which comes about by reason of the negation which is included in privation and the other contraries. But this is not required in relatives, indeed both can be considered perfect, as is especially evident in symmetrical – aequiparantiae – relations and in relatives of origin, like equal, similar, father and son. Therefore relation and not the other oppositions is attributed to God. By reason of the first difference, the opposition of relation can obtain between creature and God though not any other opposition – since God rather posits than takes away creatures – but there is a relation of creatures to God. By reason of the second difference there is in the divine persons themselves – in which nothing imperfect can exist – the opposition of relation and no other, as will appear later.
Ad 5. It should be said that since coming to be is properly to be changed, it is not found in relation save accidentally, that is, because the thing on which the relation follows has been changed. A body that is changed in quantity becomes equal, not that change as such aims at equality, but is accidentally related to it. But it is not necessary for something new to be said of a relation that some change come about in it, but it suffices that there be a change in one of the extremes, for the cause of the relation between two things is something inherent in both. Hence, from whatever side there be a change in that which caused the relation, the relation between the two is taken away. On this basis, because some change comes about in the creature, a relation in God is said to begin. Hence insofar as something new is said of God, he cannot be said to have changed, sava metaphorically, because he is related to the likeness of the changed thing. ’O Lord, And thus we say, you are made a refuge for us.’ (Psalm 89)
Ad 6. It should be said that when such relations begin to be said of God because of change in the creature, it is obvious that the reason they are said of God is on the side of the creature and they are said accidentally of God. Not that there is any accident in God, as Augustine pointed out, but because of something existing outside himself, which is accidentally compared to him. For the existence of God is not dependent on the creature any more than the existence of the builder is on the house. Hence, just as it is incidental to the [existence of] builder that the house exists, so is it with God and creature. A thing is said to relate accidentally to another, when it can exist without it.
Article 9: Are the relations between creatures and God really in creatures?
It seems that they are not.
1. For there are relations which involve nothing real on either side of the relation, as Avicenna says of the relations between being and non-being. But there is no relation whose extremes are more distant from one another than that between God and creature. Therefore this relation does not involve anything real on either side.
2. Moreover, anything on which an infinite regress follows must be rejected. But if the relation to God be something real in the creature, there will be an infinite regress, for that relation will be something created, if it is a thing, and then there will be another relation of it to God, by parity of reasoning, and so on to infinity. Therefore, we should not say that the relation to God is something real in the creature.
3. Moreover, a thing is related only to one definite thing: double is not with reference to just anything, but to half, and father to son, and so with the rest. Therefore, it is necessary that according to the difference of the things related, there are differences in the things to which they are related. But God is absolutely one being. Therefore, all creatures cannot be related to him by some real relation.
4. Moreover, a creature is referred to God insofar as he proceeds from him; but the creature proceeds from God according to his substance. Therefore, he is referred to God according to his substance and not according to some supervening relation.
5. Moreover, a relation is midway between the extremes of the relation. But nothing can really be between God and the creature which is immediately created by God. Therefore, the relation to God is not something in the creature.
6. Moreover, the Philosopher says that if all appearances were true, things would follow our opinions and sensations. But it is clear that all creatures follow the opinion or knowledge of the creator. Therefore, all creatures refer substantially to God and not by some inherent relation.
7. Moreover, there seems to be less of a relation between greatly distant things, but the distance between the creature and God is greater than that between one creature and another. But the relation of creature to creature is not some thing, as it seems, for since it is not substance, it must be an accident, and thus it is in the subject and cannot be removed without a change of the subject: the contrary of which was said above about relation. Therefore, the relation of creature to God is not some thing.
8. Moreover, just as created being is infinitely distant from non-being, so it is infinitely distant from God. But between created being and pure non-being there is no relation, as Avicenna says. Therefore, there is none between created and uncreated being.
ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Augustine says that what begins to be said of God temporally was not said of him before and manifestly is said of him relatively, not because of any accident in God, as if something happened to him, but plainly because of an accident in the relative to which God begins to be spoken. But an accident is something in the subject. Therefore, the relation to God is something in the creature.
2. Moreover, whatever is referred to something by its own change is really referred to it. But the creature is referred to God by its own change. Therefore, it is really referred to God.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that the relation to God is something in the creature. In evidence of which it should be noted that, as the Commentator says in Metaphysics 11, some thought relation to be a second intention because it is the weakest being of all the categories. The things first understood are outside the soul, and intellect bears on them as things to be understood; what is thought secondly are called intentions consequent on our mode of understanding, and these the intellect understands secondarily insofar as it reflects on itself, understanding itself to understand and the manner in which it understands.
It would follow from this position that relation is not among the things outside the mind, but only in the intellect, like the intentions of genus and species, and of second substances.
But this cannot be. Only what exists outside the mind is placed in any of the categories. But the being of reason is contrasted with being divided by the ten categories, as is clear from Metaphysics 5. If relation were not among the things outside the soul, it would not be included as one kind of category. Moreover, the perfection and good that are in things outside the soul are based not only on something absolutely inhering in things but also on the order of one thing to another, just as the good of the army consists in the order of the parts of an army. The Philosopher compares the order of the universe to this order.
Therefore it is necessary that in things themselves there be an order and this order is a kind of relation. Hence, there must be relations in things themselves according to which one is ordered to another. One thing is ordered to another either on the basis of quantity or of some active or passive power. Only on the basis of these two does something exist in one with respect to another extrinsic thing. For something is measured not only by intrinsic quantity but also by extrinsic. By active power a thing acts on another and by passive power is acted upon by another. By substance and quality, however, something is ordered only to itself, not to another, except incidentally; that is, insofar as quality – or substantial form or matter – have the note of active or passive power and insofar as some notion of quantity is considered in them: thus what is substantially one is the same, the qualitatively one is the similar, and number or multitude cause the dissimilar and diverse in the same; the dissimilar is taken to be the more or less so than another: for thus something is said to be whiter than another. On account of this, the Philosopher in Metaphysics 5, assigning the species of relation, holds that some are caused by quantity and some by action and passion.
Therefore, it is necessary that things ordered to something are really referred to it, and that the relation is something in them. But all creatures are ordered to God as to principle and end, for the order of the parts of the universe among themselves is from the order of the whole universe to God, just as the order between the parts of the army is for the sake of the order of the army to the leader, as is clear from Metaphysics 12. Hence it is necessary that creatures are really referred to God and that this relation is something in the creature.
Ad 1. It should be said that the fact that when there is a mutual relation of creatures that posits nothing in either of the extremes this is not because of the distance between them but rather because the relation is not based on any order among the things but on one which is in intellect alone. Which cannot be said of the order of creatures to God.
Ad 2. It should be said that these relations are not referred to another by some other relation but of themselves, because they are essentially relations. It is not the same with things that have absolute substance, hence it does not follow that there is an infinite regress.
Ad 3. It should be said that the Philosopher in the same place concludes that if all are referred to the best, that which is infinite in species must be the best, and thus nothing prevents what is infinite in species from being referred to an infinity of things. But God is such, since the perfection of his substance is restricted to no genus, as was said above. On account of this, nothing prevents an infinity of creatures from being referred to God.
Ad 4. It should be said that the creature is referred to God, according to his substance as the cause of the relation, but according to the relation formally, just as something is called similar according to quality causally, but according to similarity formally. For the creature is denominated similar from it.
Ad 5. It should be said that an intermediate cause is excluded when the creature is said to proceed from God immediately, but not a mediating real relation, which follows naturally on the production of the creature; just as equality follows the production of quantity indeterminately, so the real relation naturally follows on the production of created substance.
Ad 6. It should be said that creatures follow on God’s knowledge as effect on cause, not as the proper notion of their being, as if a creature were nothing else than being known by God. This is the way those spoke who held that all appearances are true, and the thing to follow on opinion and sensation, such that for anything to be is for it to be sensed or thought by another.
Ad 7. It should be said that the relation that is nothing other than the order of one creature to another has one feature insofar as it is an accident and another insofar as it is a relation or order. For insofar as it is an accident, it is in a subject, but not insofar as it is a relation or order, but only because it is, as it were, passing into another and in a way taking up a position in the related thing. Thus relation is something inherent, though not insofar as it is a relation, just as action insofar as it is action is considered to be from the agent, but insofar as it is an accident it is considered as in the acting subject. So nothing prevents such an accident from ceasing to be without a change in that in which it is, because its nature is not perfected by the fact that it is in the subject but insofar as it tends to another. That being taken away, the notion of this accident is taken away as actual but it remains with respect to its cause, just as, matter being taken away, heating is taken away, although the cause of heating remains.
Ad 8. It should be said that created being is not ordered to non-being, although it has an order to uncreated being, so the similarity does not obtain.
Article 10: Is God really referred to the creature in such a way that this relation is something in God?
The answer seems to be yes.
1. The mover is really related to the moved, hence the Philosopher, in Metaphysics 5, identifies the relation of mover to moved as a species in the category of relation. But God is compared to the creature as mover to moved. Therefore, he is really related to the creature.
2. But it might be said that he moves creatures without any change in himself, and therefore is not really related to the thing moved. On the contrary, one of relative opposites does not cause the other to be called by the same name: for something is not double because it is half, nor is God Father because he is the Son. Therefore, if the mover is said relatively to the moved, the relation of moving is not in something because the relation of being moved is in it. Therefore, the fact that God is not moved does not prevent him being really related as mover to the moved.
3. Moreover, as a father gives existence to his son, so does the creator give existence to the creature. But a father is really related to his son; therefore, the creator is really related to the creature.
4. Moreover, things which are properly and not metaphorically said of God place the thing signified in God. But among such names Dionysius puts ‘Lord’. Therefore the thing signified by the name ‘Lord’ is really in God. But this is a relation to creature, therefore, etc.
5. Moreover, knowledge is really related to the knowable, as is evident in Metaphysics 5. But God is compared to created things as knower to known. Therefore, there is in God a relation to creatures.
6. Moreover, what is moved always has a real relation to the mover. But will is compared to the thing willed as mover to moved, for the desirable is an unmoved mover and appetite a moved mover, as is said in Metaphysics 12. Therefore, since God wills things to be, he seems to be really related to creatures.
7. Moreover, if God is not related to creatures, there seems to be no other reason for this than that he does not depend on creatures and because he exceeds creatures. But in a similar way celestial bodies do not depend on elementary bodies and exceed them disproportionately. Therefore, on this basis it would follow that there is no real relation of the higher bodies to the lower.
8. Moreover, every denomination is from form. But form is something inherent in the thing whose form it is. Since therefore God is named from relations to creatures, it seems that these relations are something in God.
9. Moreover, proportion is a real relation, for example double to half, but there seems to be a proportion of God to creature, since there must be a proportion between mover and moved. Therefore it seems that God is really related to the creature.
10. Moreover, since concepts are likenesses of things and words are signs of things, as the Philosopher says, these have one order for the learner and another for the teacher, for the teacher begins with things from which he receives knowledge in his intellect, of whose conceptions words are signs, but the learner begins with words by which he attains the conceptions in the teacher’s intellect, and from them knowledge of things. It is necessary that what is said of the foregoing relations is first known by some teacher. Therefore, with him such relative names follow the conceptions of his intellect which are consequent on things. Therefore, it seems these relations are real.
11. Moreover, such relatives as are said of God temporally are either relatives according to existence or according to talk. If they are relatives according to talk, nothing real is posited in either extreme. But this is false according to the foregoing, for they exist really in the creature related to God. So they must be relatives according to existence, and it seems therefore that they posit something real in both extremes.
12. Moreover, it is the nature of relatives that, when one is given, the other is given, and if one is taken away, so is the other. If, therefore, there is some real relation to God in the creature, there must be a real relation to creatures in God.
ON THE CONTRARY:
1. Augustine says in On the Trinity 5, that it is manifest that God is spoken of relatively because of an accident in the thing relative to which God begins to be talked of. Therefore, it seems that these relations are said of God, not because of something in himself, but according to something outside, and thus they posit nothing real in him.
2. Moreover, as the knowable is the measure of knowledge, so God is the measure of all things, as the Commentator says in Metaphysics 10. But the knowable is not related to knowledge by a relation which is really in it, but rather because of the relation ofknowledge to it, as is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics 5. Therefore, it seems that God is not spoken of relatively to creatures because of some relation which is really in him.
3. Moreover, Dionysius says, ‘We do not have conversion between causes and effects, for the effect is said to be like the cause, but not vice versa.’ What is true of similarity seems true of other relations. Therefore it seems that no more do the other relations bring about a conversion from God to creature, such that, because the creature is really related to God, God is really related to creatures.
RESPONSE:
It should be replied that when God is said to be related to creatures the relation is not really in him. In evidence of which it should be noted that since a real relation consists in the order of one thing to another thing, as has been said, a mutual real relation is only found in things in which on both sides there is some notion of order of the one to the other, which is found in all relations based on quantity, for since the notion of quantity is abstracted from everything sensible, there is the same notion of quantity in all natural bodies. For the same reason that one thing having quantity is really related to the other, the reverse is true.
But a quantity taken absolutely has an order to another according to the notion of measure and measured, and according to the name of whole and part, and other such things that follow on quantity. But in relations which are founded on active and passive power there is not always the order of motion from both sides. For that which always has the note of patient and being moved, or caused, is ordered to agent or mover, since an effect is always perfected by its cause and depends on it, hence it ordered to it as to its perfecter.
But agents or movers or even causes are sometimes ordered to patients, to the moved, to the caused, insofar as having brought about the effect or passion or moved, a certain good and perfection of the mover and agent results, as especially is evident in univocal agents which by acting bring about a likeness of their species, and to the degree possible preserve it in perpetuity.
The same is clear in all other things which are moved in moving or acting or causing, for by the motion itself they are ordered to producing effects, and similarly in all of them some good comes about in the cause from the effect. There are some things which are ordered to others, but not vice versa, because they are quite outside the genus of actions or powers which this order follows. As it is clear that knowledge relates to the knowable, because the one knowing, through an intelligible act, is ordered to the thing known which is outside the soul. The thing itself that is outside the soul is in no way touched by such an act, since the act of intellect does not pass out to change any external matter. Hence the thing itself outside the soul is completely outside the intelligible genus, and because of this the relation consequent on the act of intellect is not in it.
There is a similar argument concerning sense and the object of sense, for although the object of sense changes the organ of sense in its action, and because of this has a relation to it – as other natural agents to the things acted on by them – still the alteration of the organ does not bring about actual sensing, which is brought about by the act of the sense power, of which the sensible outside the soul is wholly incapable. Similarly man is related to a column as being to the right of it because of the power to move that is in him, according to which he can move to right or left, to front or rear, up or down. Therefore, such relations are real in the man or animal, but not in the thing that lacks this power. Similarly the coin is outside the activity through which the price comes to be, which is an agreement arrived at between men, and a man is outside the genus of the art-making activities through which his image is effected.
Therefore, a man does not have a real relation to his image, nor coin to price, but vice versa. God does not act through an intervening action which is understood as proceeding from God and terminating in the creature, but his action is his substance and whatever is in him is wholly outside the genus of created existence by which the creature is related to God. Nor does any good accrue to the creator from the production of the creature. Hence his action is supremely liberal, as Avicenna says. It is also clear that he is not moved to act, but without any change on his own part makes mutable things.
The result is that there is in him no real relation to the creature, although there is a relation of the creature to him, that of effect to cause. The Rabbi was multiply wrong when he tried to prove that there is no relation between God and creature because God, not being a body, has no relation to time or place. For he considered only the relation consequent on quantity, not that which follows on action and passion.
Ad 1. It should be said that the natural mover and agent move and act by means of action or motion which is between the mover and moved, the agent and the acted upon. Thus the agent as agent is not extraneous to the genus of the acted upon insofar as acted upon. Hence there is a real relation of both to the other, especially when that mediate action is the proper perfection of the agent. Consequently, that in which action terminates is its good. But this does not happen in God, as has been said, so there is no similarity.
Ad 2. It should be said that the fact that the mover is moved is not the reason why the relation of moving is really in it, but a sign. From this it appears that in a certain way it falls into the genus of the moved, from the fact that it is a moved mover, and it also appears that that to which it is moved is its good from the fact that it is ordered to it by its motion.
Ad 3. It should be said that the father gives existence of his own kind to his son, since he is a univocal agent, but it is not thus that God gives existence to the creature, so the similarity does not obtain.
Ad 4. It should be said that the word ‘Lord’ includes three things in its meaning, namely, the power of coercing subordinates, an order to the subordinate which follows this power, and being the term of the order of subordinates to the Lord, for in one relative the other is understood. This meaning of the word is saved in God with respect to the first and third, but not the second. Hence Ambrose says that this word ‘Lord’ is a name of power and Boethius says that dominion is the power whereby the servant is coerced.
Ad 5. It should be said that the knowledge of God compares to things differently than does ours, for it compares to them as cause and measure. Such things are according to the truth which God in his knowledge has ordered. But these things are the cause and measure of our knowledge. Hence just as our knowledge really refers to things, and not vice versa, so things really relate to God’s knowledge, and not the reverse. Or it could be said that God understands other things in understanding himself, hence the relation of divine knowledge is not directly to things, but to the divine essence itself.
Ad 6. It should be said that the desirable which moves appetite is the end; those things which are for the sake of the end do not move appetite except by reason of the end. But the end of the divine will is not something other than the divine goodness. Hence it does not follow that other things are compared to the divine will as movers to moved.
Ad 7. It should be said that celestial bodies really relate to inferior bodies according to relations consequent on quantity, because there is the same notion of quantity in both, and also according to relations consequent on active and passive power, because they move as moved by a mediate action which is not their substance, since some good of theirs is had from this that they are causes of the lower bodies.
Ad 8. It should be said that that from which a thing is denominated is not always a natural form but it suffices that it be signified in the manner of form, grammatically speaking. For man is denominated from action and from clothing and other like things which are not really forms.
Ad 9. It should be said that if proportion be understood as some definite excess, there is no proportion of God to creature. But if proportion is understood as a relation alone, then there is one between creator and creature, in the creature really, but not in the creator.
Ad 10. It should be said that although the teacher begins with things, the conceptions of things are received in the mind of the teacher in a way different from the way they are in the nature of things, but what is received is received in the manner of the receiver, for it is evident that conceptions in the mind of the teacher exist immaterially, although they exist materially in nature.
Ad 11. It should be said that this distinction of relatives according to existence and according to speech has nothing to do with a relation’s being real. For there are relations according to existence which are not real, like right and left in the column, and there are some relatives according to speech which imply real relations, as is evident in knowledge and sensing. Relatives are said to be according to existence when the names are imposed to signify the relations themselves, and they are said to be relatives according to speech when the names are imposed to signify the qualities or the like principally, on which relations follow. And this has nothing to do with relations being real or of reason alone.
To the last it should be said that although to posit one relative is to posit the other, it is not necessary that both be posited in the same way, but it suffices that one be posited according to reality and the other according to reason.
Article 11: Are these temporal relations in God according to reason?
It seems not.
1. A notion to which nothing corresponds is empty and vain, as Boethius says. But these relations are not really in God, as is clear from the foregoing. Therefore, the notion would be empty and vain if they were in God only according to reason.
2. Moreover, what is according to reason alone is only attributed to things insofar as they are in the intellect, like genus and species and order. But such temporal relations are not attributed to God only insofar as he is in our intellect, for thus it would be nothing to say that God is Lord since God is understood to pre-exist creatures, which appears false. Therefore, such relations are not in God according to reason.
3. Moreover, this word ‘Lord’ signifies a relation, since it is a relation according to existence. But God is not Lord according to reason alone. Therefore such relations are not in God according to reason alone.
4. Moreover, even if no created intellect existed, God would still be Lord and creator. But there cannot be any being of reason if no created intellect exists. Therefore Lord and creator and the like do not mean relations of reason alone.
5. Moreover, that which is only according to our reason was not from all eternity. But some relations of God to creature were from eternity, such as the relations implied by knowledge and predestination. Therefore, such relations are not in God according to reason only.
ON THE CONTRARY:
Names signify notions or concepts, as is said in the beginning of On Interpretation . But these names are clearly said relatively. Therefore, such relations must be according to reason.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that just as the real relation consists of an order of thing to thing, so the relation of reason consists in an order among things conceived, which can come about in two ways: in one way, insofar as this order is discovered by intellect and attributed to that which is said relatively, and relations of this kind are attributed to things understood insofar as they are understood, like the relation of genus and species, for reason discovers these relations in considering the order of that which is in the intellect to things which are outside it, or also the order of things understood to one another.
In another way, insofar as such relations follow on the mode of understanding, namely that intellect understands something as ordered to another, although intellect is not fashioned by intellect but rather it follows with necessity on the mode of understanding. Intellect does not attribute relations of this kind to that which is in the intellect, but to that which is in things.
And this indeed comes about insofar as some things which do not have an order in themselves are understood as ordered, although the intellect does not understand them to have the order, because this would be false. In order for things to have an order, it is necessary that both be beings and distinct (for there is no order between a thing and itself) and orderable to the other.
Sometimes, however, intellect takes two things as beings, of which one alone or neither is a being, as when it considers two future events, or one present and the other future, and understands the one as ordered to the other, saying one is prior to the other. Such relations are of reason alone, as following on the mode of understanding.
Sometimes it takes one as two, and understands it with some order, as when something is said to be the same as itself, and thus such a relation is of reason alone.
Sometimes it takes two as orderable to one another, between which no mediate order exists – indeed one of them essentially is order, as when a relation is said to be an accident of the subject. Hence this relation of reason to whatever other things is of reason alone.
Sometimes it takes something as ordered to another, insofar as it is the term of the ordering of the other to itself, although it is not itself ordered to the other, as when taking the knowable as the term of the order of knowing to it and thus with some order to knowledge: thus the word knowable signifies relatively, and it is a relation of reason alone. And similarly, our intellect attributes some relative names to God insofar as it takes God as the term of the relations of creatures to him, and such relations are of reason alone.
Ad 1. It should be said that something on the side of the thing answers to such relations, namely the relation of the creature to God. For just as the knowable is said relatively, not because it is related to knowledge, but because knowledge is related to it, as is said in Metaphysics 5, so God is said relatively because creatures are related to him.
Ad 2. It should be said that the argument proceeds from those relations of reason which are fashioned by reason and are attributed to things existing in the intellect. But these relations are not like that, but consequent on the mode of understanding.
Ad 3. It should be said that just as someone is really the same as himself and not just according to reason, although the relation is of reason alone, because of the fact that the cause of the relation is real, namely, the unity of the substance which intellect understands as a relation, so the power of coercing subordinates is in God really, which the intellect understands as an order to subordinates because of the order of subordinates to him. Because of this he is said to be really Lord, although the relation is of reason alone, and in the same way it is clear that he would be Lord even if no intellect existed.
From which the solution to the fourth is obvious.
Ad 5. It should be said that God’s knowledge is not related to the creature first and as such, as was said before, but to the essence of the creator, through which God knows all things.