Thinking about how to act well is a far cry from acting well, at least when the thinking is on the level of generality. There is, however, another kind of thinking, that embedded in the singular action. From the beginning philosophers, like the rest of us, pondered the transition from general reflections about good actions to the actual performance of them, and discursive transitions in thought seemed relatively simple compared to the transition from thought to action.
To act is to choose and all choices are singular. Choice does not seem to be adequately described merely as a mindless leap; rather, it is minded, conscious, an opting for what we think best. Like Aristotle, Thomas wavered between calling human action a choosing knowing or a knowing choosing; in either case, there are two components, mind and appetite. But actions have their antecedents, they are performed against the background of earlier performances; the agent acquires a history and with it a bent or inclination to act as he has before. Thus mind and will, powers that at the outset might go this way or that, acquire a character of stability. Habits are acquired. Habits, however, are good or bad, depending on whether they incline us to what is fulfilling of us or not. Thus is the subject of virtue – of good habits – introduced. In the following key questions of the Prima Secundae of the Summa theologiae, Thomas defines virtue and begins to look into the many kinds of virtue.
Summa theologiae, First Part of the Second Part,
Questions 55-7
QUESTION 55
ON THE VIRTUES
Next we must consider habits in a special way and since, as was said, habits are good or bad, we must first speak of good habits, that is, the virtues, and of other things linked to them, namely the gifts, beatitudes and fruits. Then we will take up bad habits, namely vices and sins. With respect to virtues, there are five things to be considered: first, the essence of virtue; second, its subject; third, the kinds of virtue; fourth, the cause of virtue and, fifth, certain properties of virtue. With respect to the essence of virtue, there are four issues: (1) whether human virtue is a habit; (2) whether it is an operative habit; (3) whether it is a good habit; (4) the definition of virtue.
Article 1: Is virtue a habit?
It seems that it is not.
1. Virtue is the ‘utmost of a power’, as is said in On the Heavens 1.11. But an utmost is reduced to the genus of which it is the utmost, as point to the genus of line. Therefore virtue is reduced to the genus of power, not habit.
2. Moreover, Augustine says in On Free Will 2.19 that ‘virtue is the good use of free will’. But the good use of free will is an act. Therefore, virtue is not a habit, but an act.
3. Moreover, we do not earn merit because of habits but because of acts, otherwise a man would be earning merit continuously, even while sleeping. But we gain merit by the virtues. Therefore the virtues are not habits but acts.
4. Moreover, Augustine says in On the Morals of the Church 15 that ‘virtue is the order of love’, and in the Eighty-three Questions 39 he says that ‘the order that is called a virtue is enjoying what ought to be enjoyed and using what ought to be used’. But order or ordering signifies an act or relation. Therefore, virtue is not a habit but an act or relation.
5. Moreover, human virtues are like natural virtues. But natural virtues are powers, not habits. So the same should be true of human virtues.
ON THE CONTRARY:
The Philosopher in the Categories says that knowledge and virtue are habits.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that virtue signifies the perfection of a power, but a thing’s perfection is read chiefly in terms of its end. But to act is the end of a power. Hence a power can be said to be perfected insofar as it is determined to its act. Now some powers are such that they are of themselves determined to their acts, such as the natural active powers, and these powers are themselves called virtues. But rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determined to one thing but are indifferently related to many; they are determined to acts by habits, as is clear from the foregoing. 1Therefore, human virtues are habits.
Ad 1. It should be said that sometimes virtue means that which is of the virtue, namely its object or its act, as faith sometimes means that which is believed, sometimes believing itself, and sometimes the habit whereby it is believed. Hence when virtue is said to be the utmost of a power, virtue is taken for the object of virtue. That of which a power is ultimately capable is that to which the power is said to extend, as when one can carry one hundred pounds and no more, his capacity is one hundred pounds, not sixty. The objection assumes that virtue is in essence the utmost of a power.
Ad 2. It should be said that the good use of free will is called virtue in the same sense, because it is that to which virtue is ordered as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else but the good use of free will.
Ad 3. We are said to merit because of something in two ways. In one way, as we are said to run because of running, and in this way we merit by acts. In another way we are said to merit by that which is the principle of meriting, as we are said to run because of the motive power. It is in this way that we are said to merit by virtues and habits.
Ad 4. It should be said that virtue is called the order or ordering of love because of what virtue is for, since love is ordered in us by virtue.
Ad 5. It should be said that natural powers are of themselves determined to one, but rational powers are not. Therefore, the analogy limps, as has been said.
Article 2: Is human virtue an operative habit?
It seems not.
1. Cicero says in the Tusculan Questions 13 that virtue is to the soul as health and beauty are to the body. But health and beauty are not operative habits, so neither is virtue.
2. Moreover, in natural things there is not only a capacity (virtue) for acting, but also for being, as is clear from the Philosopher in On the Heavens 1.12: some things have the capacity to exist always, others for a given time but not always. But human virtue in rational matters is like natural virtue in natural matters. Therefore, human virtue too is not only for acting, but also for existing.
3. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Physics 7 that virtue is the disposition of the perfected for the best. But the best to which a man can be disposed by virtue is God himself (as Augustine proves in On the Morals of the Church 2.3), to whom the soul is disposed by assimilation to him. Therefore, virtue seems to signify some quality of soul as ordered to God, as making us like him, not in being ordered to operation. Therefore it is not an operative habit.
ON THE CONTRARY:
There is what the Philosopher says in Ethics 2.6, namely that the virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that virtue, as the meaning of the word suggests, implies the perfection of a power, as was said above. Hence, since there are two kinds of power, namely that to exist and that to act, the perfection of each is called virtue. But the virtue or capacity to exist arises from matter, which is potential being, whereas the capacity to act arises from form, which is the principle of acting insofar as a thing acts to the degree that it is actual. But in man’s make-up, the body is as matter, the soul as form, and with respect to body, man is like other animals. Similarly, with respect to powers common to soul and body; only the powers which are proper to soul, that is, rational powers, belong to man alone. Therefore, human virtue, of which we are speaking, cannot pertain to body, but only to what is proper to soul. Hence human virtue is not ordered to existence, but rather to acting. Thus it is of the definition of human virtue that it be an operative habit.
Ad 1. It should be said that the mode of action follows the disposition of the agent, for a thing acts in the way in which it exists. Therefore, since virtue is the principle of an operation, there must pre-exist in the agent thanks to the virtue some similar disposition. But since virtue makes activity ordered, virtue itself is an ordered disposition in the soul, insofar as the powers of soul are in a certain manner ordered to one another and to that which is outside. Therefore virtue, insofar as it is a fitting disposition of soul, is like health and beauty, which are fitting proportions of body. But this does not prevent virtue from being a principle of operation as well.
Ad 2. It should be said that the virtue which [is a capacity] for existing is not peculiar to man, but only that virtue which is ordered to works of reason which are peculiar to man.
Ad 3. It should be said that since God’s substance is his action, the highest assimilation of man to God is by way of some operation. Hence, as was said earlier, happiness or beatitude, by which man is especially conformed to God, who is the end of human life, consists in operation.
Article 3: Is human virtue a good habit?
It seems that it is not.
1. Sin always consists in evil. But there is virtue in sin, according to I Corinthians 15.56: ‘The power [virtus] of sin is the Law.’ Therefore virtue is not always a good habit.
2. Moreover, virtue answers to a power, but a power relates to evil as well as good, according to Isaiah 5.22: ‘Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness.’ It seems therefore that virtue is related to both good and evil.
3. Moreover, according to the Apostle in 2 Corinthians 12.9, ‘For strength is made perfect in weakness.’ But weakness is a kind of evil. Therefore, virtue relates not only to the good, but also to evil.
ON THE CONTRARY:
Augustine says in On the Morals of the Church 6 that no one doubts that virtue makes the soul good, and the Philosopher says in Ethics 2.6 that virtue is what makes the one having it good and makes his action good.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that, as was pointed out earlier, virtue implies the perfection of a power, which is why a thing’s virtue is determined by the utmost of which a thing is capable, as is said in On the Heavens 1.11. But the utmost of which a thing is capable must be good, since every evil implies some defect. Hence Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 4 that every evil is a weakness. For this reason the power of anything must be ordered to the good. Hence human virtue, which is an operative habit, is a good habit, and operative of the good.
Ad 1. It should be said that good like the perfect is said metaphorically of evil things, for we speak of a perfect thief or bandit and a good thief or bandit, as is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics 4.16. In this way virtue too is spoken of metaphorically in evil things, and thus law is called the virtue or power of sin insofar as it is the occasion for the increase of sin and brings it, as it were, to its maximum.
Ad 2. It should be said that the evil of drunkenness and excess in drink consists in a defect of the order of reason. But it can happen that, along with the defect of reason, some lesser power is perfected with respect to that which is proper to it, although with a repugnance to or defect of reason. But the perfection of such a power, when it is accompanied by a defect of reason, cannot be called a human virtue.
Ad 3. It should be said that reason is more perfect to the degree that it is more capable of subduing or bearing the weaknesses of the body and the lower parts. Therefore human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be made perfect, not in the weakness of reason, but in that of body and the lower parts.
Article 4: Is virtue defined properly?
It seems that it is not.
1. The definition of virtue as ‘a good quality of mind whereby one lives rightly and uses no one badly and which God without our help works in us’ is not a good definition. Virtue is man’s goodness, for it makes the one having it good, but goodness is not called good any more than whiteness is called white. Therefore it is improper to say that virtue is a good quality.
2. Moreover, no difference is more common than its genus, since it divides the genus, but good is more common than quality, for it is convertible with being. Therefore good ought not to be put in the definition of virtue as the difference of quality.
3. Moreover, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 12.8, that pertains to mind which is in us and is not common to us and the beasts; but there are virtues of the irrational parts, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 3.10. Therefore not every virtue is a good quality of mind.
4. Moreover, rectitude seems to pertain to justice, which is why the right and just are said to be the same, but justice is a species of virtue. Therefore, it is improperly introduced into the definition of virtue when it is called that whereby one lives rightly.
5. Moreover, those who take pride in something use it badly, but many take pride in virtue, for Augustine says that pride undermines good works so that they perish. Therefore it is false that no one uses virtue badly.
6. Moreover, man is justified by virtue, but Augustine says, in commenting on John 14.12, ‘He who believes in me, the works that I do he shall do, and greater than these he shall do,’ that he who created you without your help, will not justify you without your help. Therefore, it is improper to say that God works virtue in us without our doing anything.
ON THE CONTRARY:
There is the authority of Augustine, from whose words the foregoing definition is taken, especially from On Free Will 2.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that this definition perfectly expresses the complete notion of virtue. The perfect account of anything is drawn from all its causes. The foregoing definition includes all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, as of anything else, is drawn from its genus and difference, when it is called a good quality, for the genus of virtue is quality, and its difference is good. It would be an even more fitting definition if habit replaced quality, since it is the proximate genus.
Virtue does not have a matter of which any more than the other accidents do, but it has a matter about which, that is, the object of the virtue, which could not be put in the foregoing definition because the virtue is determined to its species by the object, whereas here a common definition of virtue is offered, so that the subject is put in the place of the material cause, and so it is called a good quality of mind.
The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is action itself. But note that some operative habits are always inclined towards evil, such as vicious habits, and others incline sometimes to good and sometimes to evil, much as opinion relates to the true and false. But virtue is a habit which is always related to the good. Therefore, to distinguish virtue from habits which always relate to evil it is said to be that whereby one lives rightly, and to distinguish it from things which sometimes relate to good and sometimes to evil, it is said to be that which no one can use badly.
The efficient cause of infused virtue, whose definition is being given, is God, which is why it is called that which God works in us without us. If this particle were removed, the remaining definition would be common to all the virtues, both acquired and infused.
Ad 1. It should be said that being is what intellect first grasps, which is why we can attribute being to anything we grasp as well as one and good which are convertible with being. Hence we say that essence is being and one and good, and that unity is being and one and good, and similarly with goodness. This does not obtain in more particular forms, however, such as whiteness and health, for not everything that we grasp falls under the notions of white and healthy. But it should be realized that just as non-subsistent accidents and forms are called beings, not because they have existence but rather because by them something is, so too they are called being and one, not indeed by any other goodness or unity, but because by them something is good or one. It is in this way that virtue is called good, namely, because by it something is good.
Ad 2. It should be said that the good put into the definition of virtue is not the universal good that is convertible with being and thus in more than quality, but it is the good of reason; according to Dionysius, On the Divine Names 4, the soul’s good is to exist according to reason.
Ad 3. It should be said that virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul save insofar as it participates in reason, as is said in Ethics 1.13. Therefore, reason or mind is the proper subject of human virtue.
Ad 4. It should be said that to justice belongs the proper rectitude which concerns the external things that men use and that are the proper matter of virtue, as will be made clear below.1 But the rectitude that implies an ordering to the fitting end and to divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as has been said above, is common to every virtue.
Ad 5. It should be said that someone can use virtue badly as an object, as when he thinks badly of virtue or hates it or takes pride in it, but not as a principle of use, such that the act of virtue is evil.
Ad 6. It should be said that infused virtue is caused in us by God without our acting but not without our consent. That is how ‘God works in us without us’ must be understood. God indeed causes the things we do but not without our acting, for he works in every will and nature.
QUESTION 56
THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE
With respect to the subject of virtue, there are six things to be asked: (1) whether virtue is in a power of the soul as in its subject; (2) whether one virtue can be in several powers; (3) whether intellect can be the subject of virtue; (4) whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites can be the subject of virtue; (5) whether the sensory apprehensive powers can be; and (6) whether will can be the subject of virtue.
Article 1: Is virtue in a power of the soul as in its subject?
It seems that it is not.
1. Augustine says in On Free Will 19 that virtue is that whereby we live rightly. But living is due, not to a power of the soul, but to its essence. Therefore, virtue is not in a power of the soul, but in its essence.
2. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Ethics 2.6 that virtue is that which makes the one having it good and renders his action good. But just as action comes about through a power, so having virtue comes about through the essence of soul. Therefore, virtue pertains rather to the essence of soul than to its power.
3. Moreover, a power is in the second species of quality. But virtue is a kind of quality, as has been said, but there is no quality of quality. Therefore, virtue is not in a power of soul as in its subject.
ON THE CONTRARY:
Virtue is the utmost of a power, as is said in On the Heavens 1.11. But the utmost is in that whose utmost it is; therefore, virtue is in a power of the soul.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that there are three ways in which it can be shown that virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the very definition of virtue, which implies the perfection of a power; perfection is in that of which it is in the perfection. Second, from the fact that virtue is an operative habit, as it is said to be. But every activity is from the soul by way of some power. Third, from that which disposes for the best, the best being the end, which is either the activity of the thing or something achieved by an activity arising from a power. Hence human virtue is in a power of the soul as in its subject.
Ad 1. It should be replied that something is said to live in two ways. For sometimes to live means the existence of the living thing and pertains to the essence of soul; at other times to live means the activity of the living thing, and thus one lives rightly by virtue insofar as one acts rightly by means of it.
Ad 2. It should be said that what is called good is either the end or is ordered to the end. Therefore, since the good of the agent consists in action, by the very fact that virtue makes the agent good it is referred to action and consequently to power.
Ad 3. It should be said that one accident is said to be in another as in a subject because it inheres in substance by the mediation of the other accident, not because one accident can sustain another. Colour inheres in body by the mediation of surface, so surface can be called the subject of colour, and only in that sense can the power of the soul be called the subject of virtue.
Article 2: Can a virtue be in several powers?
It seems that it can.
1. Habits are made known through acts, but one act arises differently from different powers, as walking arises from reason as directing it and from will as mover and from the motive power as executing it. Thus one habit of virtue can be in several powers.
2. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Ethics 2.4 that three things are required for virtue: knowing, willing and changeless acting, but knowing pertains to intellect, willing to will. Therefore, virtue can be in several powers.
3. Moreover, prudence is in reason since it is right reason about things to be done, as is said in Ethics 6.5. But it is also in will, since it cannot be if the will is perverse, as is said in the same place. Therefore, one virtue can be in two powers.
ON THE CONTRARY:
Virtue is in a power of the soul as in its subject. But the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore the same virtue cannot be in several powers of the soul.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that something can be in two things in two ways. First, such that it is equally in both, and in this way it is impossible for the same virtue to be in two powers, because the diversity of powers is taken from the general conditions of objects and the diversity of habits from special conditions, hence wherever there is diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits, but not conversely. Second, something can be in two or several things, not equally, but in an ordered way. In this way one virtue can pertain to several powers such that it is in one principally and extends to others by way of diffusion or by way of disposition, insofar as one power is moved by another, and insofar as one power receives from another.
Ad 1. It should be said that the same action cannot pertain to different powers equally and in the same order, but according to different notions and a different order.
Ad 2. It should be said that knowing is a prerequisite of moral virtue insofar as moral virtue acts according to right reason. But moral virtue consists essentially in desiring.
Ad 3. It should be said that prudence is really in reason as in a subject, but presupposes the rectitude of will as a principle, as will be said below.
Article 3: Can intellect be the subject of virtue?
It seems that it cannot.
1. Augustine said, in On the Morals of the Church 15, that every virtue is love. The subject of love is not intellect, however, but only the appetitive power. Therefore, no virtue is in intellect.
2. Moreover, virtue is ordered to the good, as is clear from the foregoing. But good is the object of the appetitive power, not of intellect. Therefore the subject of virtue is the appetitive power, not intellect.
3. Moreover, virtue is that which makes the one having it good, as the Philosopher says. But the habit perfecting intellect does not make the one having it good, since it is not because of knowledge or art that a man is called good. Therefore, intellect is not the subject of virtue.
ON THE CONTRARY:
The mind is called intellect most of all, but the subject of virtue is mind, as is clear from the definition of virtue discussed earlier. Therefore intellect is the subject of virtue.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that, as has been pointed out, virtue is the habit whereby one acts well, but a habit is ordered to a good act in two ways. In one way, insofar as through such a habit a man acquires the capacity for the good act, as a man has the capacity to speak well thanks to the habit of grammar. But grammar does not bring it about that a man always speaks well, for the grammarian can speak infelicities or solecisms. And it is the same in the other sciences and arts. In another way, a habit can give not only the capacity of acting but also bring it about that one uses the capacity rightly, as justice not only brings it about that a man has a will prompt to do just things, but also brings it about that he acts justly.
Because something is called good or being simply speaking insofar as it is actual, not insofar as it is potential, a man is said to do good and to be good simply speaking because of such habits, that is, to be just or temperate, and similarly with the others. And because virtue is what makes the one having it good and makes his action good, only such habits are called virtues simply speaking, for they bring about an actual good work and make the one having it good simply speaking.
The first kind of habits are not called virtues simply speaking, because they do not make a good work except by way of a capacity for it, nor do they make one having them good simply, for a man is not called a good man simply because he knows or is an artisan, but good only in a certain respect, namely, a good grammarian or a good maker, which is why sometimes science and art are distinguished from virtue and sometimes are called virtues, as is clear from Ethics 6.2.
Intellect can be the subject of habits which are virtues only in a sense, and not only practical but also speculative intellect, without any order to will, and that is why the Philosopher in Ethics 6.2 mentions science, wisdom, understanding and also art as intellectual virtues.
The subject of the habits which are called virtues simply speaking can only be the will or some power moved by the will. The reason for this is that the will moves all the other powers which are in any way rational to their acts, as was said above, therefore a man acts well insofar as he has a good will. Hence the virtue that makes one actually act well and not only gives the capacity is either in the will or in some power insofar as it is moved by will.
The intellect is moved by will, as are the other powers, for one actually considers something because he wills it and thus intellect, insofar as it has an order to will, can be the subject of virtue simply speaking. And in this way speculative intellect or reason is the subject of faith, for intellect is moved to assent to the things of faith by the command of will, for no one believes unless he wills to. The practical intellect is the subject of prudence. Since prudence is right reason about things to be done, prudence requires that a man be well disposed to the rational principles for so acting, and these are ends to which one is well disposed by the rectitude of will, just as one is well disposed to the principles of speculative objects by the natural light of the agent intellect. Just as the subject of science, which is right reason about objects of speculation, is speculative intellect as ordered to agent intellect, so the subject of prudence is practical intellect as ordered to right will.
Ad 1. It should be said that Augustine’s statement should be understood of virtue simply speaking, and not taken to mean that every such virtue is simply love, but depends somehow on love insofar as it depends on will whose first affection is love, as has been said.
Ad 2. It should be said that the good of anything is its end; therefore, since the true is the end of intellect, to know the true is the good act of intellect. Hence the habit perfecting intellect with respect to knowing the truth, whether in the speculative or practical matters, is called virtue.
Ad 3. It should be said that this argument proceeds from virtue simply speaking.
Article 4: Are the irascible and concupiscible subjects of virtue?
It seems that they cannot be.
1. These powers are common to us and the brutes, but we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, which is why it is called human virtue. Therefore the irascible and concupiscible cannot be subjects of human virtues, because they are parts of sense appetite, as has been said.
2. Moreover, sense appetite is a power that uses a bodily organ; but the good of virtue cannot be in man’s body. The Apostle says in Romans 7.18, ‘For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, no good dwells.’ Therefore, sense appetite cannot be the subject of virtue.
3. Moreover, Augustine proves in On the Morals of the Church 5 that virtue is not in the body, but in the soul, because body is ruled by soul, hence one’s good use of body is referred entirely to soul, just as if I rightly steer horses by means of reins, the whole is due to me. But just as the soul rules the body, so does reason rule sense appetite. Therefore, it is due to the rational part that the irascible and concupiscible are rightly ruled. But virtue is that whereby one lives rightly, as has been said; therefore, virtue is not in the concupiscible and irascible, but in the rational part alone.
4. Moreover, choice is the chief act of moral virtue, as is said in Ethics 8.13, but choice is an act of reason, not of the irascible or concupiscible, as was said above. Therefore, moral virtue is not in the irascible or concupiscible, but in reason.
ON THE CONTRARY:
Courage is located in the irascible and temperance in the concupiscible. Hence the Philosopher says in Ethics 3.10 that these are virtues of the irrational parts.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that the irascible and concupiscible can be considered in two ways. In one way, in themselves, insofar as they are parts of sense appetite, and in this way they are not the subject of virtue. In another way they can be considered as they participate in reason insofar as they are fashioned to obey reason. Thus the irascible and concupiscible can be the subject of human virtue, for they are the principle of human acts insofar as they participate in reason. There must then be virtues in these powers.
That there are virtues in the irascible and concupiscible is clear. For an act which arises from a power insofar as it is moved by another can be perfect only if both powers are disposed to act well, as the act of the artisan can go well only insofar as the artisan and his instrument are disposed to act well. In those things with which the irascible and concupiscible are concerned insofar as they are moved by reason, there must be a perfecting habit for acting well, not only in reason but also in the irascible and concupiscible. And because the good disposition of the power that moves insofar as it is moved lies in its conformity to the moving power, virtue in the irascible and concupiscible is nothing other than the habitual conformity of these powers to reason.
Ad 1. It should be said that the irascible and concupiscible taken in themselves, as parts of sense appetite, are common to us and to the brutes. But insofar as they are rational by participation, as obeying reason, they are peculiar to man. And in this way they can be the subject of human virtue.
Ad 2. It should be said that just as man’s flesh does not of itself have the good of virtue but becomes the instrument of the virtuous act insofar as, moved by reason, we employ our members to serve justice, so too the irascible and concupiscible do not of themselves have the good of virtue but rather the infection of lust, yet insofar as they are conformed to reason the good of moral virtue comes to be in them.
Ad 3. It should be said that body is not ruled by soul in the same way that the irascible and concupiscible are ruled by reason, for body obeys soul on command without contradiction with respect to the things in which it is fashioned to be moved by the soul. That is why the Philosopher says in Politics 1.2 that soul rules body with a despotic rule, that is, as a master rules his slave, and the complete motion of body is referred to soul. Because of this there is no virtue in the body, but only in the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible do not obey reason on command, but have proper motions of their own which sometimes are opposed to reason, hence in the same book the Philosopher says that reason rules the irascible and concupiscible with a political rule, in the way free men who have a will of their own are ruled. Because of this there must be in the irascible and concupiscible virtues whereby they are disposed to act well.
Ad 4. It should be said that there are two things in choice, namely the intention of the end, which pertains to moral virtue, and the preconception of that which is for the sake of the end, which pertains to prudence, as is said in Ethics 6.12. That there is a right intention of the end in the passions of the soul is brought about by the good disposition of the irascible and concupiscible appetites. Therefore, moral virtues which concern the passions are in the irascible and concupiscible, but prudence is in reason.
Article 5: Are the apprehensive powers of sense subjects of virtue?
It seems they are.
1. Sense appetite can be the subject of virtue insofar as it obeys reason; but the interior apprehensive powers of sense obey reason, for at the command of reason, imagination, the cogitative and memory act. There can therefore be virtue in these powers.
2. Moreover, just as rational appetite, that is, will, can be impeded in its act or indeed helped by sense appetite, so too intellect or reason can be impeded or even aided by the foregoing powers. Therefore, just as there can be virtue in the appetitive powers of sense, so too in its apprehensive powers.
3. Moreover, prudence is a virtue that has memory for a part, as Cicero says in his Rhetoric 2.53. Therefore, there can be a virtue in the remembering power as well, and by the same reasoning in the other interior apprehensive powers.
ON THE CONTRARY:
Virtues are either intellectual or moral, as is said in Ethics 2.1. But all the moral virtues are in the appetitive part and all the intellectual virtues in intellect or reason, as is clear from Ethics 6.1. Therefore, there is no virtue in the interior apprehensive powers of sense.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that there are habits in the interior apprehensive powers of sense; the Philosopher gives the chief reason in On Memory, saying that in remembering one thing after another custom is at work, which is a kind of nature, but a customary habit is nothing else than a habit acquired by custom, which acts as nature does. Hence Cicero in his Rhetoric 2.53 says that habit acts in the manner of nature, in agreement with reason. But in man what is acquired in memory, and in the other apprehensive powers of sense, by custom is not a habit as such, but something annexed to the habits of the intellective part, as was said above.1
If there are habits in such powers, they cannot be called virtues. For since virtue is a perfect habit by which one does only the good, virtue must be in a power which is completive of the good work. But knowledge of the true is not completed in the apprehensive powers of sense: such powers are preparatory to intellectual knowledge. So in such powers there are no virtues whereby the truth is known, but only in intellect or reason.
Ad 1. It should be said that sense appetite is to will, the appetite of reason, as something moved by it. Therefore the act of the appetitive power is consummated in sense appetite. Because of this, sense appetite is the subject of virtue. But the apprehensive powers of sense relate to intellect rather as movers, insofar as phantasms are to the intellective soul, as colours are to sight, as is said in On the Soul 3.7. Therefore, the work of knowledge terminates in intellect, which is why cognitive virtues are in intellect or reason itself.
Ad 2. From this the solution to the second is clear.
Ad 3. It should be said that memory is not said to be a part of prudence in the way that a species is a part of genus, as if memory were of itself some virtue, but because one of the things required for prudence is good memory, and thus in a way it is an integral part.
Article 6: Can will be the subject of virtue?
It seems that it is not.
1. A power does not need a habit with respect to what belongs to it as such. Since it is in reason, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul 3.9, it belongs to will as such to tend to the good grasped by reason. Every virtue is ordered to that, since everything naturally seeks its proper good, for virtue is a habit in the mode of nature, agreeing with reason, as Cicero says. Therefore, will is not the subject of virtue.
2. Moreover, a virtue is either intellectual or moral, as is said in Ethics 2.1. But an intellectual virtue is in intellect or reason as in a subject, not in will, but moral virtue is in the irascible or concupiscible as in a subject. Therefore, no virtue is in will as in a subject.
3. Moreover, all human acts, to which virtues are ordered, are voluntary. Therefore, if there were some virtue in the will with respect to some human acts, by parity of reason there would be a virtue in will with respect to all human acts. Therefore, either there will be virtue in no other power, or several virtues will be ordered to the same act, which seems absurd. Therefore, will cannot be the subject of virtue.
ON THE CONTRARY:
More perfection is required of the mover than of the moved. But will moves the irascible and concupiscible. Therefore, there is much more reason for there to be virtue in will than in the irascible and concupiscible.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that since a power to act is perfected by a habit, where a power does not suffice of itself it needs a habit perfecting it to act well, which habit is a virtue. But the proper notion of any power is taken from its object. Thus, since the object of will is the good of reason proportioned to will, as was said, the will needs no perfecting virtue for this.
But if there should be a good to be willed that exceeds the proportion of man’s will, whether with respect to the whole human species, such as the divine good, or with respect to the individual, such as the good of the neighbour, the will needs a virtue. Therefore the virtues that order man’s will to God or to neighbour are in the will as in their subject, such as charity, justice and the like.
Ad 1. It should be said that this argument applies to the virtues ordered to the proper good of the one willing, such as temperance and courage, which deal with human passions and the like, as is clear from what has been said.
Ad 2. It should be said that the rational through participation is not exhausted by the irascible and concupiscible but is true of the appetitive generally, as is said in Ethics 1.13, and will is included in the appetitive. Therefore any virtue of will will be a moral virtue, unless it is theological, as will be clear below.
Ad 3. It should be said that some virtues are ordered to the good of moderated passion, which is proper to this or that man, and there need be no virtue in the will for such things, since the nature of the power is sufficient here, as has been said. This is necessary only in those virtues which are ordered to some extrinsic good.
QUESTION 57
DISTINGUISHING THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES
Next we must consider how virtues are distinguished from one another. First, with respect to the intellectual virtues; then, the moral virtues, and third, the theological. Six things must be asked about intellectual virtues. (1) whether the habits of speculative intellect are virtues; (2) whether there are three of them, namely, wisdom, knowledge and understanding; (3) whether the intellectual habit of art is a virtue; (4) whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art; (5) whether prudence is a necessary virtue for man; (6) whether eubulia, synesis and gnome are virtues linked to prudence.
Article 1: Are the habits of speculative intellect virtues?
It seems not.
1. Virtue is an operative habit, as has been said above. But speculative habits are not operative, for the speculative is distinguished from the practical, that is, the operative. Therefore the intellectual habits of the speculative are not virtues.
2. Moreover, virtue is concerned with the things by which a man is made happy or blessed, as is said in Ethics 1.9. But intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human goods by which a man might acquire happiness, but rather natural and divine things. Therefore, such habits cannot be called virtues.
3. Moreover, science is a speculative habit, but science and virtue are distinguished as different genera, one of which is not put under the other, as is clear from the Philosopher in Topics 4.2. Therefore, speculative habits are not virtues.
ON THE CONTRARY:
Only speculative habits consider the necessary things that cannot be otherwise. But the Philosopher, in Ethics 6.1, posits intellectual virtues in the part of the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise. Therefore, speculative intellectual habits are virtues.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that since virtue is ordered to the good, as was said above, there are two ways in which a habit can be called a virtue, as was also said earlier,1 in one way, because it causes the capacity to act well, in another way, because it causes good use as well as the capacity. But the latter, we have seen, pertains only to those habits which look to the appetitive part, because it is the appetitive power of soul that causes the use of all powers and habits.
Therefore, since the intellectual habits of the speculative do not perfect the appetitive part nor involve it in any way but only the intellective part, they can indeed be called virtues insofar as they cause the capacity for good operation, which is the consideration of the true (for this is the good work of intellect). But they are not called virtues in the second sense, as causing the good use of the power or habit. Just because one has the habit of speculative science, he is not inclined to use it, but he is made capable of grasping the truth of the things of which he has knowledge, but that he use the knowledge had is due to the moving will. Therefore the virtues which perfect will, like charity or justice, cause one to use well such speculative habits. In this way there can be merit in the acts of such habits, if they are done out of charity. So Gregory in the Morals 6.37 says that the contemplative is of greater merit than the active.
Ad 1. It should be said that there are two kinds of work, the external and the internal. The practical or operative which is distinguished from the speculative is drawn from the external work, to which the speculative habit is not ordered. But it is ordered to the interior work of intellect, which is to think the truth and in this respect it is an operative habit.
Ad 2. It should be said that virtue is concerned with something in two ways. In one way, as with objects, and in this sense speculative virtues are not concerned with the things whereby a man is made happy, except perhaps insofar as the word ‘whereby’ means the efficient cause or the object of complete happiness, which is God, who is the highest speculable object. In another way a virtue is concerned with things as its acts. And in this way the intellectual virtues are concerned with things whereby a man is made happy, both because the acts of such virtues can be meritorious, as was said, and also because they are a kind of beginning of perfect happiness, which consists in contemplation of the true, as was said earlier.
Ad 3. It should be said that science is distinguished from virtue taken in the second sense, which pertains to the appetitive power.
Article 2: Are the only habits of speculative intellect wisdom, science and understanding?
It seems not.
1. Species ought not to be distinguished from their genus, but wisdom is a kind of knowledge, as is said in Ethics 6.7. Therefore, wisdom ought not to be distinguished from knowledge in enumerating the intellectual virtues.
2. Moreover, in distinguishing powers, habits and acts, which is done from objects, the distinction that is based on the formal nature of the objects takes precedence, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore different habits should not be distinguished according to their material object, but according to the formal notion of the object. But the principle of demonstration is the reason for knowing conclusions. Therefore, the understanding of principles ought not to be said to be another habit or virtue from the science of conclusions.
3. Moreover, an intellectual virtue is in what is rational essentially, but reason, even speculative reason, by syllogizing reasons both demonstratively and dialectically. Therefore, just as science, which is caused by a demonstrative syllogism, is called a speculative intellectual virtue, so should opinion be.
ON THE CONTRARY:
The Philosopher in Ethics 6.3 gives only these three speculative intellectual virtues, namely wisdom, science and understanding.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that speculative intellectual virtue is that by which the speculative intellect is perfected in considering the true, for this is its work. But the true can be considered in two ways. In one way, as known of itself [per se notum]; in another way, as known through another. That which is known of itself is as a principle, and is immediately perceived by intellect and therefore the habit perfecting intellect in this consideration of the true is called understanding, which is the habit of principles.
The true which is known through something else is not grasped immediately by intellect but by the inquiry of reason and has the note of a term. But this can come about in two ways. In one way, such that it is the ultimate in some genus; in another way, such that it is ultimate with respect to the whole of human knowledge, and because those things which are known later by us are in their nature the most known, as is said in Physics I.I, that which is ultimate with respect to the whole of human knowledge is that which is first and most knowable according to nature.
Wisdom is concerned with such things, since it considers the highest causes, as is said in Metaphysics I.I. Hence it properly judges and orders all things because a perfect and universal judgement can only be had by a resolution to first causes. Science on the other hand perfects intellect with respect to that which is ultimate in this or that genus of knowable things. That is why there are different habits of science insofar as there are different kinds of knowable thing, whereas wisdom is one.
Ad 1. It should be said that wisdom is a kind of science, insofar as it has that which is common to all sciences, namely, that it demonstrates conclusions from principles, but because it has something proper to it beyond the other sciences – it judges all things, not only with respect to conclusions but also with respect to first principles – it is a more perfect virtue than science.
Ad 2. It should be said that habits and powers are not distinguished on the basis of object or material object when the notion of the object is referred to the power or habit under one act, as seeing colour and light pertains to the same seeing power, since light is the reason for seeing colour and is seen at the same time as it. But the principles of demonstration can be considered apart from conclusions, or they can be considered along with conclusions, as the principles from which conclusions are deduced. To consider principles in this second way pertains to science, which considers conclusions as well, but to consider principles in themselves pertains to understanding.
Hence if one thinks about it correctly, these three virtues are not distinguished from one another on an equal basis, but in a hierarchical way, as happens with potential wholes, one part of which is more perfect than another, as the rational soul is more perfect than the sensible, and the sensible than the vegetative. In this way science depends on understanding as on the prior, and both depend on wisdom as on the very first, which contains within itself both understanding and science, as judging the conclusions of the sciences and their principles.
Ad 3. It should be said, as was noted above, that the habit of virtue is determined to the good and in no way to evil. But the true is the good of intellect and the false is its evil. Hence only those habits are called intellectual virtues which always express the true and never the false. Opinion and conjecture can be of either the true or false, and therefore they are not intellectual virtues, as is said in Ethics 6.3.
Article 3 Is the intellectual habit art a virtue?
It seems not.
1. Augustine says in On Free Will 2.18 that no one uses virtue badly. But one can use art badly, for a given artisan can, thanks to knowledge of his craft, work badly. Therefore, art is not a virtue.
2. Moreover, there is no virtue of virtue. But there is a virtue of art, as is said in Ethics 6.5. Therefore, art is not a virtue.
3. Moreover, the liberal arts are more excellent than the mechanical arts. But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are speculative. Therefore if art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be numbered among the speculative virtues.
ON THE CONTRARY:
The Philosopher says in Ethics 6.3 that art is a virtue, but he does not include it among the speculative virtues whose subject he says is the scientific part of the soul.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that art is nothing other than right reason with respect to works to be made, the good of which does not consist in the human appetite being in a certain condition, but in this that the work that comes to be is good in itself. An artisan is not praised for the will with which he works but for the quality of what he makes.
Therefore art, properly speaking, is an operative habit, yet it is like speculative habits in this that in their case too what counts is the things considered, not the relation of human appetite to them. As long as the geometer demonstrates truths, the state of his appetite does not matter, whether he is happy or angry, any more than this matters in the case of the artisan, as was said. So art is a virtue in the way speculative habits are, since neither art nor a speculative habit causes a good work with respect to use, which is proper to the virtue perfecting appetite, but only with respect to the capacity to act well.
Ad 1. It should be said that when someone who possesses art makes a bad artefact, this is not a work of art, indeed it is against art, just as when someone who knows the truth lies when what he says is not according to knowledge but against it. Hence just as knowledge always relates to good, as was said, so too does art, and in this way it is called a virtue. But it falls short of the full sense of virtue because it does not cause good use: something else is required for that, though there cannot be good use without art.
Ad 2. It should be said that in order for a man to use well the art he has a good will is needed, which is perfected by moral virtue. Therefore, the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art, namely moral virtue, insofar as some moral virtue is needed for its good use. It is obvious that the artisan is inclined by justice, which causes rectitude of will, to make a faithful work.
Ad 3. It should be said that there is some work even in the objects of speculation, such as the construction of syllogisms or of congruous speech or numbering and measuring. Therefore, the speculative habits ordered to such works of reason are called arts by a kind of similitude, but liberal, to distinguish them from those arts which are ordered to their work by the exercise of body. The latter are in some way servile, insofar as the body is as servant to the soul and a man is free thanks to his soul. Sciences which are not ordered to any work are called simply sciences and not arts. The fact that liberal arts are more noble does not mean that they are more properly called arts.
Article 4: Is prudence a virtue distinct from art?
It seems that it is not.
1. Art is right reason with respect to certain works, but different kinds of work do not cause a thing to lose the note of art, for there are different arts concerned with very different works. Therefore, since prudence too is a kind of right reason about deeds, it seems that it too ought to be called an art.
2. Moreover, prudence is closer to art than to the speculative habits, for both are concerned with contingent things that can be otherwise, as is said in Ethics 6.6. But some speculative habits are called arts. So much the more should prudence be called an art.
3. Moreover, taking counsel well pertains to prudence, as is said in Ethics 6.5. But in some arts too there is deliberation, as is said in Ethics 3.3, for example, the military, navigation and medicine. Therefore, prudence is not distinct from art.
ON THE CONTRARY:
The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art in Ethics 6.5.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that where a different notion of virtue is found, there different virtues must be distinguished. But it was said earlier that some habits have the note of virtue solely from the fact that they give the capacity to do well, whereas others give not only the capacity but also the use. Art gives the capacity only for a good work because it does not engage appetite, but prudence not only gives the capacity for doing well, but also use, for it looks to appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude of appetite.
The reason for the difference is that art is right reason with regard to things to be made, whereas prudence is right reason with respect to things to be done. Making and doing differ, we are told in Metaphysics 9.8, because making passes into external matter, as in building, sawing, and the like, whereas doing is an act which remains in the agent, as in seeing, willing, and the like.
Therefore, prudence is to human acts of this kind, which are the use of the powers and habits, as art is to external makings, because both are right reason with respect to the things to which they are related. The perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters depends on principles from which reason syllogizes, as we said that science depends on understanding, which is the habit of principles, and presupposes it. In human acts, ends function as principles do in speculative matters, as is said in Ethics 7.8. That is why a man must be well disposed with respect to ends, something due to right appetite, if he is to have prudence which is right reason concerning things to be done.
Therefore, moral virtue, which rectifies appetite, is required for prudence. The good of artefacts is not the good of the human will but of the artefacts, so art does not presuppose right appetite. That is why the artisan who errs willingly is praised more than one who does so unwillingly, whereas it is more contrary to prudence to sin willingly than unwillingly, for rectitude of appetite is part of the notion of prudence, though not of the notion of art. It is clear, then, that prudence is a virtue distinct from art.
Ad 1. It should be said that all the different kinds of artefacts are outside man and therefore the notion of virtue is not altered. But prudence is right reason about human acts themselves, and this alters the notion of virtue, as was said.
Ad 2. It should be said that prudence is more like art than speculative habits with respect to subject and matter, for both are in the opining part of the soul and deal with what can be otherwise, but art is more like speculative habits than like prudence with respect to the notion of virtue, as has been said.
Ad 3. It should be said that prudence deliberates well concerning things that pertain to the whole life of man and to the ultimate end of human life. In the arts there is deliberation about things that pertain to the proper ends of those arts. Hence some, insofar as they deliberate well in the affairs of war or of the sea, are called prudent generals or captains, but they are not prudent simply speaking – only those who deliberate well concerning the things important for life as a whole are that.
Article 5: Is the virtue of prudence necessary if a man is to live well?
It seems that it is not.
1. As art, which is right reason, is to makable things, so is prudence to things to be done with respect to human life, since prudence is right reason in their regard, as is said in Ethics 6.5. But art is necessary only in order that makable things come to be, but not afterwards. Therefore, neither is prudence necessary in order for a man to live well after he is virtuous, but perhaps only in order that he might become virtuous.
2. Moreover, prudence is that thanks to which we deliberate correctly, as is said in Ethics 6.5. But a man can deliberate well both for himself and for others. Therefore a man need not have prudence in order to live well, but it is sufficient that he follow the advice of the prudent.
3. Moreover, thanks to intellectual virtue one always says what is true, never what is false. But this does not seem to be the case with prudence, for it is not human that one should never err in deliberating about what is to be done, since the things humans do are contingent and can be otherwise. Hence in Wisdom 9.14 we read, ‘For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.’ Therefore, it seems that prudence should not be called an intellectual virtue.
ON THE CONTRARY:
Wisdom 8.7 enumerates the other virtues necessary for human life, when of the divine wisdom it is said, ‘And if a man love justice, her labours have great virtues. For she teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life.’
RESPONSE:
It should be said that prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life, for to live well consists of acting well, and this involves not only what one does but how one does it, acting according to right choice and not only from impulse or passion. Since choice is of means to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things, namely, a fitting end and that it be fittingly ordered to that end. A man is fittingly disposed to the fitting end by a virtue which perfects the appetitive part of the soul, whose object is the good and end. In order that he be fittingly ordered to the fitting end a man must be directly disposed by a habit of reason because deliberation and choice, which bear on means, are acts of reason. Therefore, it is necessary that there be an intellectual virtue in reason by which reason is perfected in order that it be fittingly related to the things that are for the sake of the end. And this virtue is prudence. Hence prudence is a virtue necessary for living well.
Ad 1. It should be said that the good of art is not in the artisan but in the artefact since art is right reason about things to be made, and making, since it passes into exterior matter, is not the perfection of the maker but of the made, just as motion is the act of the movable. Art deals with the makable. But the good of prudence is in the agent himself whose perfection action is, for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as has been said.
Art requires not that the artisan act well, but that he produce a good work; it would rather be required that the artefacts act well – for example, that the knife cut well or the saw saw well – if acting rather than being acted upon were proper to them; but, after all, they do not have dominion over their acts. Therefore, art is not necessary in order for the artisan to live well but only for making a good artefact and preserving it. But prudence is necessary if a man is to live well, not only in order that he might become good.
Ad 2. It should be said that the action of a man who does something good not by following his own reason but moved by the advice of another is not in every way a perfect action of his with respect to reason directing and appetite moving. So if he does do something well it will not be well simply, which is to live well.
Ad 3. It should be said that the truth of practical intellect differs from that of speculative intellect, as is said in Ethics 6.2. The truth of speculative intellect consists of the intellect’s conformity with reality. But since the intellect cannot be infallibly conformed with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, no speculative habit of contingent things is an intellectual virtue, but only of necessary things. The truth of practical intellect consists in conformity with right appetite, a conformity which has no place in necessary matters which do not come about by the human will, but only in the contingent things that can come to be by us, whether internal doable things or external makable things. That is why the virtue of practical intellect is solely about contingent matters, art in the case of the makable, prudence in the case of the doable.
Article 6: Are eubulia, synesis and gnome virtues linked to prudence?
It seems not.
1. Eubulia is the habit thanks to which we deliberate well, as is said in Ethics 6.9. But to deliberate well pertains to prudence, as is said in the same book. Therefore eubulia is not a virtue linked to prudence, but prudence itself.
2. Moreover, it falls to the superior to judge the inferior. Therefore, that virtue seems supreme whose act is judgement. But synesis is good judging. Therefore synesis is not a virtue linked to prudence, but is superior to it.
3. Moreover, just as there are different things to be judged, so there are different things to be deliberated. But there is a single virtue with respect to all things that must be deliberated about, namely eubulia. Therefore, in order to judge well concerning what is to be done there is no need to have another virtue besides synesis, namely gnome.
4. Moreover, in his Rhetoric 2.53 Cicero sets down three parts of prudence, namely memory of the past, understanding of the present and looking forward to the future. And Macrobius, in the Dream of Scipio, mentions other parts of prudence, namely caution, docility, and other similar things. Therefore, these do not seem to be the only virtues linked to prudence.
ON THE CONTRARY:
There is the authority of the Philosopher who mentions these three virtues as linked to prudence.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that in all ordered powers that is primary which is ordered to the primary act. Three acts of reason are involved in human acts, of which the first is to deliberate, the second to judge and the third to command. The first two answer to the acts of speculative intellect, inquiry and judgement, for deliberation is a kind of inquiry. But the third act is proper to practical intellect as operative, for there is no cause for reason to command about things that a man cannot do. It is clear that in things men do, commanding is the chief act to which the others are ordered. Therefore, to the virtue that commands well, namely prudence, as to what is principal, certain secondary ones are joined, eubulia, which counsels well, and synesis and gnome, which are parts of the judicative, a distinction that will be clarified.
Ad 1. It should be said that prudence is deliberating well not as if to deliberate well were its immediate act but because it perfects this act by the mediation of a virtue subject to it, namely eubulia.
Ad 2. It should be said that judgement about things to be done is ordered to something further, for it can happen that one judges well of something to be done and yet does not bring it off correctly. The ultimate completion is had when reason commands well concerning what is to be done.
Ad 3. It should be said that a thing is judged by principles proper to it. Inquiry is not yet through proper principles because once these are had there is no need for inquiry, since the thing has already been found. So only one virtue is ordered to deliberating well, but two virtues are ordered to judging well, because the distinction lies in proper, not in common principles. In speculative matters there is one dialectic to inquire into everything, whereas demonstrative sciences, which judge, are diverse in diverse matters. Synesis and gnome are distinguished according to the different rules with which they judge, for synesis judges of things to done by appeal to common law, but gnome appeals to natural reason in those cases where the common law fails, as will be more fully explained later.1
Ad 4. It should be said that memory, understanding and foresight, as well as caution, docility and the like, are not virtues different from prudence, but relate to it in the manner of integral parts insofar as all are required for the perfection of prudence. There are also subjective parts or species of prudence, such as economic, ruling and the like, but the foregoing three are as it were potential parts of prudence because they are ordered as the secondary is ordered to the principal. And of this more will be said below.2