PART TWO
After completing his lengthy apprenticeship and being named master, Thomas was not immediately welcomed into the professorial ranks at the University of Paris. Indeed, it took a papal intervention to counter the reluctance of the secular masters to his elevation. Among the reasons for this resistance was a reluctance to recognize the new mendicant orders in general and the appropriateness of their members becoming masters of theology in particular. Thomas could not be expected to remain silent when the very legitimacy of his religious vocation was called into question. It would be possible, if somewhat distorting, to make his response to the attacks on his Order the centrepiece of his first stint as a regent master in Paris. Polemical skills that will remain quiescent until the flare-up of Latin Averroism ten years later are vibrantly on display.
The principal opponent of the mendicants was William of St Amour, who had set down his condemnations in a Treatise on the Perils of the Last Days.Casting the followers of St Francis and St Dominic in the role of Antichrist is a rhetorical excess that would seem to discredit the discrediter, but Thomas took this attack with great seriousness, responding to it in detail in Against Those Impugning Religion and the Cult of God, thought to have been written in 1256. In it Thomas defended the new Orders and justified the teaching mission of the mendicants and their roving commission as preachers and confessors. An irony of this is that Thomas was unaware when he wrote this response that William’s work had already been condemned.
What was Thomas’s day like as a regent master resident in the Dominican convent on the Rue St Jacques? His day began with Mass – the saying of his own and the hearing of another. It was still very early in the day when Thomas gave his lecture. His was followed by that of the bachelor apprenticed to him. The afternoon was given to disputation, and to this we owe the series of disputed questions brought together under the portmanteau title On Truth.
Disputation, along with lecturing and preaching, made up the threefold task of the master. Lecturing was the lectio, the reading and explication of a book of Scripture or the Sentencesof Lombard. Here the indispensable task of assimilating a tradition was observed. One must grasp the authors (auctores) who were authorities (auctoritates) in one’s discipline. The scholar was engaged in a communal enterprise that antedated him and would continue when he was no more. T. S. Eliot’s ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ discusses the delicate dialectic that the poet must engage in between the old and the new, the poetic tradition and his contribution to it. Mutatis mutandis, the essay can be taken to describe the task of the medieval scholar.
Mastering texts might seem to threaten a backward-looking attitude, a nostalgia for a lost golden age, but for two things. First, the concept of a commentary developed, so that room was made for an independent discussion of themes raised by an authoritative text – after the scholar had shown that he understood the text as such. Furthermore, there was the second magisterial task, namely, to dispute. In a dispute the master offered to defend a given resolution of a question. But this was prefaced by a search for the best arguments in favour of the opposite answer. With those before him, the master would redirect the discussion by first appealing to an authority that favoured his proposed answer – sed contraest. Then he would develop arguments on behalf of his proposed resolution of the question. Finally, since the value of a solution can best be seen in its ability to handle initially attractive objections, the master took up the counter-arguments one by one.
The disputed questions that have come down to us are not transcripts of the lively occasions that filled the afternoons at St Jacques. But they are directly and essentially connected to them. As made available for copying, they retained the living language of thought, the conversation of the soul that Plato spoke of which requires more than one voice, recognizes a plurality of plausible answers to a question and then defends an answer against its worthy competitors. Thomas found this method so congenial that he adapted it for use in his masterpiece, the Summa theologiae.
Appropriately, then, the readings selected for this part rely heavily on the Disputed Question on Truth. But the selections begin with two commentaries on Boethius, commentaries of two significantly different kinds, which are of fundamental importance in grasping the mind of Aquinas.
Although the writings of Boethius had been commented on frequently in previous centuries, Thomas Aquinas was the only one to do so in the thirteenth century. He commented on two of the so-called theological tractates of the Catholic scholar who had been brutally executed by Theodoric the Ostrogoth emperor in 524 at Pavia. Prior to his death, Boethius wrote the deathless Consolation of Philosophy, the most copied book after the Bible in the Middle Ages. Thomas’s commentaries give no indication that he was aware of earlier commentaries on Boethius and it may well have been through his mentor Albert the Great that his interest in Boethius began.
On the Trinity and On the Hebdomads are the two tractates on which Thomas commented, and the first is incomplete, breaking off in the middle of Boethius’s second chapter at a point which caused scholars to rue the fact that he did not continue. Both commentaries are placed roughly in the year 1257, therefore during Thomas’s first regency. Were they public courses? Were the courses available only to residents of the Dominican convent of St Jacques? They seem to have been written for Thomas’s edification, and thus establish a precedent of enormous importance. Later, burdened with his magisterial duties, he would none the less find time to comment on a dozen works of Aristotle.
The Boethian commentaries are good examples of the two kinds of commentary Thomas wrote. His commentary on the Sentences consists of a close analysis of the text ( divisio textus ) followed by questions suggested by the text but often only remotely related to it. The commentary of On the Trinity is like that, except that the relation between the expositio and the quaestiones is closer. Each expositio is followed by two questions comprising four articles apiece. There are six in all. Questions five and six have exerted an enormous influence on Thomistic interpretation, because the text in Thomas’s own hand exhibits a series of drafts of a crucial discussion until he hit upon the tack he wished to take. The first two questions discuss matters of supreme importance, and they are included here.
The Exposition of Boethiu’s On the Trinity
QUESTION 1
ON KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE
A twofold question occurs. The first concerns knowledge of divine things, the second the manifestation of them, and four things need to be asked about the first: (1) whether the human mind needs a new illumination of divine light for knowledge of the truth; (2) whether it can come to knowledge of God; (3) whether God is the first thing known by the mind; (4) whether it is sufficient unto itself to come to knowledge of the divine trinity.
Article 1: Does the human mind need a new illumination of divine light for knowledge of the truth?
The first question asks if the human mind needs a new illumination of divine light in order to know any truth.
And it seems that it does.
1. In 2 Corinthians 3.5 it is stated: ‘Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything…’ But the perception of truth takes place through knowledge. Therefore the human mind cannot know any truth unless it is illustrated anew by God.
2. Moreover, it is easier to learn the truth from another than to look for it on one ’s own. Hence those who know things on their own are preferred to those who can learn from others (Ethics 1.2). But a man cannot learn from others unless his mind is inwardly taught by God, as Augustine says in On the Teacher and Gregory in his Homilies on the Gospel 30.3. Therefore no one can discover truth on his own unless his mind is illumined anew by God.
3. Moreover, as the bodily eye is to seeing bodies, so is the intellect to knowing intelligible things, as is clear from On the Soul 3.4. But the bodily eye can see bodies only by means of the supervenient illumination of the material sun. No more then can the human intellect know truth unless it is illumined by the light of the invisible sun which is God.
4. Moreover, acts are said to be in us if we have within us the sufficient principles for their exercise. But knowledge of the truth is not in us, since there are many who labour to know the truth yet are unable to do so. Therefore we do not have within us principles sufficient for knowing the truth. In order to know it, then, we must be helped from without.
5. Moreover, the operation of the human mind is more dependent on divine light than the operation of lower sensible creatures. Although the latter have forms which are the principles of natural operations, yet they cannot bring off their own operations unless they are helped by the supervenient light of the sun and the stars. (On the Soul 3.4) Hence Denis, in On the Divine Names 4, says that the light of the sun ‘contributes to the generation of visible things and moves them to life, nourishes and increases them’. Therefore neither does the natural light, which is, as it were, its form, suffice for the human mind to know truth, unless another light, namely the divine, supervenes. The same conclusion follows.
6. Moreover, whenever causes are ordered per se and not per accidens an effect does not proceed from the second cause without the operation of the first cause, as is clear from the Book of Causes 1. But the human mind is subordinated to uncreated light essentially and not accidentally. Therefore the operation of mind, which is its proper effect, namely, knowledge of the truth, cannot proceed from it without the operation of the first uncreated light, which operation would seem to be nothing other than illumination. The same conclusion follows.
7. Moreover, as the will is to willing well, so is the intellect to understanding correctly. But the will cannot will well unless it be aided by divine grace, as Augustine says (Against Two Pelagian Epistles 1.3). Therefore, neither can the intellect understand the truth unless it is illumined by the divine light.
8. Moreover, that for which our natural powers suffice is ascribed to our powers irreprehensibly, like running and building. But it is reprehensible of one to ascribe his knowledge of truth to his own ability, according to Ecclesiasticus 51.23: ‘To him that giveth me wisdom will I give glory.’ Therefore our powers do not suffice for knowing truth. The same conclusion follows.
ON THE CONTRARY:
1. The human mind is divinely illumined by a natural light, according to Psalm 4.7: ‘The light of thy countenance is sealed upon us, O Lord.’ If therefore this light, which is created, does not suffice for knowing truth, but requires a new illumination, by parity of reasoning the superadded light would not suffice but would need another light, and so on to infinity, a process which could never be finished, with the result that it would be impossible to know any truth. We should stay with the first light, therefore. That is, the human mind by its natural light, without any other superadded, can know the truth.
2. Moreover, just as the actually visible suffices to move sight, so the actually intelligible suffices to move the intellect, if it is proportioned to it. But our mind has within it the ability to make something actually intelligible, namely, the agent intellect, and this intelligible is proportioned to it. Therefore the mind does not need some new illumination in order to know the truth.
3. Moreover, as bodily light is to bodily vision, so is the intellectual light to the vision of intellect. But any bodily light, no matter how slight, causes something bodily to be seen, if only itself. Therefore, the intellectual light too, which is connatural to mind, suffices for knowing some truth.
4. Moreover, all artefacts depend on some knowledge of truth, since knowledge is the principle of them. But there are some artefacts which are products of free will as such, according to Augustine, such as building a house and the like. Therefore the human mind without any new divine illumination suffices to know some truth.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that the difference between active and passive powers is this, that the passive powers cannot actually perform their proper operations unless they are moved by the active: sense cannot sense unless it is moved by the sensible. But the active powers can operate without being moved, as is evident in the powers of the vegetative soul.
In the realm of intellect there are two powers, an active, namely agent intellect, and a passive, possible intellect. Some indeed held that only the possible intellect is a power of the soul, whereas the agent intellect is a kind of separated substance. This is the opinion of Avicenna, a consequence of which is that the human soul cannot actually engage in its proper operation, which is knowledge of the truth, unless it is illumined by an outside light, namely of that separated substance which he calls the agent intellect.
But the words of the Philosopher in On the Soul 3.5 seem rather to mean that the agent intellect is a power of the soul, something in harmony as well with the authority of Sacred Scripture which professes that we are signed with an intelligible light (Psalm 4.7), with which the Philosopher’agent intellect agrees. Thus he posits in the soul with respect to intelligible activity, which is knowledge of truth, both a passive and an active power. Hence just as other active natural powers conjoined with passive powers suffice for natural operations, so the soul having within a passive and active power suffices for the perception of truth.
However, since any created active power is finite, its sufficiency is limited to determinate effects. Hence it cannot achieve other effects unless a new power is added. There are some intelligible truths to which the efficacy of the agent extends, such as the principles which a man naturally knows and the things which are deduced from them, and for knowledge of these no new intelligible light is required, but the naturally inborn light suffices. But there are things to which these principles do not extend, such as what pertains to faith and exceeds the capacity of reason, future contingents, and the like. The human mind cannot know these unless it is illumined by a new light superadded to the natural.
Although the addition of a new divine light is not needed for knowledge of those things to which natural reason extends, divine activity is needed. Over and above the operation whereby God institutes the natures of things, giving each thing its form and proper powers, thanks to which it can exercise its operations, He also brings about in things the works of his providence, directing and moving the powers of all things to their proper operations. The created universe is subject to divine governance much as instruments are to the governance of the artisan and natural qualities to the nutritive powers of soul, as is said in On the Soul 2.4. Thus just as from natural heat the work of digestion follows according to the rule which the digestive power imposes on heat, and all the powers of bodies below act insofar as they are moved and directed by the powers of the celestial bodies, so all created active powers operate insofar as they are moved and directed by the creator. Therefore in any knowledge of truth the human mind stands in need of divine operation, but in knowing natural things it does not require a new light, but only its own motion and direction, although in other things it needs a new illumination. It is because Boethius speaks of these things in the text that he says in the preface of On the Trinity, ‘I have very long pondered this question, so far as the divine light has deemed it fitting for the spark of my intelligence to do so.’
Ad 1. It should be said that although we are not sufficient of ourselves to know anything without divine operation, it is not necessary that in all our knowledge a new light is infused in us.
Ad 2. It should be said that on this basis God teaches us within with respect to the naturally known, as the natural light causes in us and directs it to the truth, in other things, however, by infusing a new light as well.
Ad 3. It should be said that the illumination of the material sun does not bring about in the bodily eye some light connatural to it, through which it can make things actually visible, as does happen in our mind by the illustration of the uncreated sun. Therefore the eye always needs an exterior light, but mind does not.
Ad 4. It should be said that where intelligible light is pure as in the angels it makes manifest without difficulty all naturally known things, which is why there is in them knowledge of all natural things. In us however the natural light is obscured because of its conjunction with body and bodily powers, and impeded so that it cannot freely know even naturally knowable truth, according to Wisdom 9.15: ‘For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul…’ Thence it is that it is not wholly in our power to know truth, namely, because of impediments. But anyone has it more or less in his power, insofar as the intelligible is purer in him.
Ad 5. It should be said that bodies here below, although they need to be moved by heavenly bodies in order to act, do not, however, need to receive new forms to effect their proper operations. Similarly it is not necessary that the human mind, which is moved by God to know naturally known things, be infused by a new light.
Ad 6. It should be said that, as Augustine remarks in his literal commentary on Genesis 8.12, as air is illumined by the present light, which were it absent would immediately be darkened, so is it with the mind illumined by God. Therefore God always causes even the natural light in the soul, not different lights, but the same, since he is cause not only of its becoming but of its being. In this way God continuously operates in the mind, when he causes in it the natural light and directs it, and thus mind is not moved to its proper act without the operation of the first cause.
Ad 7. It should be said that will can never will well without the divine impulse, but it can will well without the infusion of divine grace, though not meritoriously. Similarly intellect cannot know any truth without divine movement, but it can without the infusion of a new light, although not those things which exceed natural knowledge.
Ad 8. It should be said that by the very fact that God by conserving in us the natural light causes and directs it to seeing, it is manifest that the grasp of truth ought to be especially ascribed to him, just as artistic activity is attributed to the artist rather than to his chisel.
Article 2: Can the human mind attain knowledge of God?
We raise the second question thus: Can God be known by us?
And it seems that he cannot be.
1. That which remains unknown to us at the highest level of our knowledge is in no way knowable by us. But God, in the most perfect level of our knowledge, is attained only as unknown, as Denis says in the Mystical Theology 1. So God is in no way knowable by us.
2. Moreover, whatever is known is known through some form. But, as Augustine says, God escapes every form of our intellect. Therefore he is in no way knowable by us.
3. Moreover, there must be some proportion between the knower and knowable, as between its object and any power. But there can be no proportion between our intellect and God, any more than there can be between the finite and infinite. Therefore, there is no way the intellect can know God.
4. Moreover, since potency and act are found in the same genus, for example, those which divide every genus of being, no potency has a correlative act outside its genus, as sense cannot know intelligible substance. But God is beyond any genus. Therefore he can in no way be known by an intellect which is in a given genus. But that is the case with our intellect. Therefore, etc.
5. Moreover, take away what is first and all things that follow on it are taken away. But the quiddity of a thing is the primary intelligible, which is why that which a thing is is said to be the proper object of intellect (On the Soul 3.6), and the what is said to be the means of demonstrating whether a thing is and all the other conditions of a thing. But we cannot know of God what he is, as Damascene says in On the Orthodox Faith 1.2. Therefore we can know nothing of him.
ON THE CONTRARY:
1. There is what is said in Romans 1.20: ‘Men can from the things that are made come to knowledge of the invisible things of God.’
2. Moreover, there is Jeremiah 9.24: ‘But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me…’ But this would be vainglory if we were not able to know him. Therefore, we can know God.
3. Moreover, only what is known can be loved, as is clear from Augustine in On the Trinity 10.1. But we are commanded to love God. Therefore, we can know him, since we are not ordered to do the impossible.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that something can be known in two ways. In one way, through its own form, as the eye sees the stone through the image of stone. In another way, through the form of something similar to it, as the cause is known by its likeness to the effect and man by the form of his image. And something seems to be known through its own form in two ways. In one way, through the form which is the thing itself, as God knows himself through his essence and so too the angel knows himself. In another way, through a form which derives from it, whether it is abstracted from it, and then the form is more immaterial than the thing, as the form of stone is abstracted from stone, or is impressed on the one understanding by it, as when the thing is simpler than the similitude through which it is known, as Avicenna says that we understand intelligences through their impressions in us. Because in this life our intellect has a determinate relation to forms which are abstracted from the senses, since they are compared to phantasms as sight is to colours (On the Soul 3.7), it cannot know God in this life through the form which is his essence – that is the way he is known by the blessed in heaven.
Whatever likeness might be impressed on the human intellect would not suffice to make his essence known since it infinitely exceeds any created form; that is why God is not accessible by the intellect through created forms, as Augustine says. Nor can God be known by us in this life through purely intelligible forms which might be some likeness of him because of our intellect’s connaturality with phantasms, as has been said. For effects are of two kinds. There are some which are equal to the power of their cause, and through such effects the power of the cause can be fully known, and consequently its quiddity; other effects are deficient in the aforesaid equality, and neither the power nor consequently the essence of the cause can be known through them, but only that the cause exists. Knowledge of the effect is a principle of knowing of the cause that it exists and functions as the quiddity of the cause does when it is known through its form. Every effect is related to God in this way. Therefore in this life we can only attain knowledge that he exists.
One of those who know of a thing that it is can do so more perfectly than another, because a thing is more perfectly known from its effect to the degree that the relation of the effect to the cause is manifested by the effect. Now this relation in the effect which does not attain to equality with its cause is based on three things, namely, on the progression of the effect from the cause, insofar as it approaches the likeness of its cause, and insofar as it falls short of it. Thus the human mind approaches knowledge of God in three ways, though it never attains to knowledge of what he is, but only that he is. First, insofar as his effectiveness in producing things is more perfectly known. Second, insofar as he is known as cause of more noble effects, which since they bear some likeness to him better display his eminence. Third, in this that he is known to be more and more distant from all those things which appear in his effects. Hence Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 7 that he is known as the cause, the excess and negation of all things.
In the pursuit of this knowledge the human mind is especially helped when its natural light is strengthened by a new illumination, such as the light of faith and the gifts of wisdom and understanding through which the mind is said to be raised above itself in contemplation insofar as it knows God to be everything that it naturally comprehends. But because it does not suffice to penetrate to seeing his essence, he himself is said to be in some way reflected by that excellent light, and that is what is meant by Gregory in his gloss on Genesis 32.30 ‘I have seen God face to face, ’ when he says, ‘The sight of the soul when it turns to God vibrates with the trembling of his immensity.’
Ad 1. We are said to know God as unknown at the term of our knowing in the sense that the mind is seen especially to progress in knowledge when it knows his essence to be above anything that can be grasped in this life and thus, although what he is remains unknown, we know that he exists.
Ad 2. It should be said that because God escapes every form of the intellect it is clear that what he is cannot be known, but only that he exists, as has been said.
Ad 3. It should be said that proportion is nothing else than the relation of two things to one another insofar as they agree or differ in terms of some conformity. This conformity can be understood in two ways. In one way, in that they agree in some genus of quantity or quality, like the relation of surface to surface or number to number, insofar as one exceeds or is equal to the other, or even of heat to heat. In this way there can in no wise be a proportion between God and creature, since they do not agree in any genus. This conformity can be taken in a second way insofar as they agree in some order, and in this way the proportion of matter and form and of maker and made and other such things is understood.
This kind of proportion obtains between the knowing power and the knowable, since the knowable is the act of the knowing power. The proportion of creature to God is like that of caused to cause and of knower to knowable, but because of the infinite excess of creator over creature there is no proportion of creature to creator as if the creature received his influx according to its complete power, nor that it knows him perfectly, as he knows himself perfectly.
Ad 4. It should be said that understanding and the understandable are in the same genus in the way that potency and act are. Although God is not contained in the genus of intelligible things, God is as it were comprehended under the genus, as participating in the nature of the genus, because he pertains to this genus as its principle. His effects are not outside the genus of intelligible things and that is why in this life he can be known through his effects and in heaven through his essence. Moreover, he seems to be called intelligible by negation rather than affirmation. Something is intelligible insofar as it is immune to or abstracted from matter. Negations are verified in matters divine although affirmations are indecipherable, as Dionysius says in the Celestial Hierarchy 2.
Ad 5. It should be said that when a thing is not known through its own form but through its effect, the form of the effect takes the place of the form of the thing: it is from the effect itself that the cause is known to exist.
Article 3: Is God the first thing known by the mind?
The third question is this:
Is God the first thing known by the mind?
And it seems that he is.
1. That through which all other things are known and through which we judge what we know of all other things is what is first known by us, as light is known by the eye before the things which are seen in the light, and principles before conclusions by intellect. But all things are known in the first truth and by it we judge of all things, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 9.7 and in On True Religion 31. Therefore the first truth, namely God, is that which is first known by us.
2. Moreover, when there are many ordered causes, the first cause flows into the caused before the secondary cause and stops last, as is said in the Book of the Causes 1. But since human science is caused by things, the knowable or intelligible is the cause of understanding in the human mind. Therefore the first intelligible flows into it first. But the influx of the intelligible into intellect, as such, takes place in order that it might understand. Therefore God, who is the first of intelligible things, is the first understood by our intellect.
3. Moreover, in every instance of knowledge in which those things which are prior and more simple are first known, that which is first and most simple is known first. But in human knowledge it seems that the things which first occur are prior and more simple, because being is that which the intellect first knows, as Avicenna says; but existence is first among created things. Therefore God, who is absolutely first and most simple, comes first to human knowledge.
4. Moreover, the end which is the last thing attained is first in intention. But God is the ultimate end of the human will to which all other ends are ordered. Therefore, he is the first in intention. But this can only be insofar as he is known. Therefore, that which the human mind must first know is God.
5. Moreover, that which has no need of any preceding activity in order that it might be the activity of something is first in the activity of that agent before that which needs some other activity; for example, wood already planed falls to the activity of one making a bench before wood not yet planed. But sensible things need to be abstracted from matter by the agent intellect before they are understood by the possible intellect. But God himself is most separate from matter. Therefore he is understood by possible intellect before sensible things.
6. Moreover, things known naturally and which cannot be understood not to be are first in our knowledge. But the knowledge of God existing is naturally imparted to us, as Damascene says. God cannot be thought not to be, as Anselm says in Proslogion 3. Therefore, God is the first thing known by us.
ON THE CONTRARY:
[1] According to the Philosopher all our knowledge takes its rise from the senses. Therefore, God is not the first but the last known.
[2] According to the Philosopher those things which are naturally posterior are first for us, and what in nature is less known is especially known by us. But creatures are posterior to and less known than God himself. Therefore God is known only last by us.
[3] Moreover, that which is promised as the ultimate reward is not the first, preceding all merits. But knowledge of God is promised us as the ultimate reward of all knowledge and action. Therefore, God is not first known by us.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that some taught that the first thing known by the human mind even in this life is God himself who is the first truth and that through whom all other things are known. But this appears to be false: to know God in his essence is man’s beatitude and it would thus follow that every man is happy. Moreover, since all the things said of the divine essence are one, no one would be mistaken about the things which are said of God, which experience shows is evidently false. Again, those things which are first in the intellect ’s knowledge must be most certain, hence the intellect would be certain it knows these things, which is patently untrue in the case in point. And this position is repugnant to the authority of Scripture which tells us in Exodus 33.20: ‘For man shall not see me and live.’
Hence others said that the divine essence is not the first thing we know in this life, but rather the influence of its light, and in that sense God is the first thing known by us. But this cannot be maintained either, since the first light that flows divinely into the mind is the natural light whereby the intellectual power is constituted. But this light is not the first thing known by the mind – neither the knowledge of what it is, since much inquiry is needed to learn what the intellect is, nor the knowledge whereby its existence is known, since we only perceive that we have an intellect insofar as we perceive ourselves to understand, as is clear from the Philosopher in Nicomachean Ethics 9.9. But no one understands himself to understand except insofar as he understands something intelligible. From which it is clear that knowledge of some intelligible thing precedes the knowledge whereby anyone knows himself to understand and conse quently the knowledge whereby someone knows that he has an intellect. Thus the influence of the natural intelligible light cannot be the first thing known by us and much less any other influx of light.
Therefore it must be said that the first thing known by man can be understood in two ways: either according to the order of the different powers or according to the object of a single power. In the first way, since all our intellect’s knowledge derives from sense – what is knowable by the senses is known by us before what is knowable by intellect, that is, the singular or sensible is known before the intelligible.
Or, in another way, insofar as its proper object is the first thing knowable to any power. Since in the human intellect there is an active and passive power, the object of the passive power, that is, the object of the possible intellect, will be that which is made actual by the active power, or agent intellect, since a passive power should answer to its proper active power. But the agent intellect does not make separate forms intelligible since they are intelligible of themselves, but rather forms, which it abstracts from phantasms. It is such things, then, which our intellect first understands.
And among these those are prior which first occur to the abstracting intellect. But these are what include many things, either in the manner of a universal whole or in the manner of an integral whole. Therefore, the most universal is first known by the intellect, and composites before their components, for example, the defined is known before the parts of the definition. And insofar as there is a kind of imitation of intellect in the senses, which themselves in a way receive what has been abstracted from matter, in sense too the more common singulars are known first, as this body before this animal. It is thus evident that God and the other separate substances can in no way be the first things understood, but they are understood from other things, as is said in Romans 1.20: ‘From the things that are made…’
Ad 1. It should be said that from those words of Augustine and other similar remarks it should not be thought that uncreated truth is the proximate principle whereby we know and judge, but that we know and judge through a light imparted to us which is his similitude. Nor does this light have any efficacy save from the first light, just as in demonstrations secondary principles are only made certain on the strength of the first. But that imparted light need not be what is first known by us, since we do not know other things in it as if it were the means through which we know the knowable, but it is that which makes other things to be knowable. Hence it is not necessary that it be known otherwise than in those knowable things, any more than light is what is first seen by the eye except in the colour illumined.
Ad 2. It should be said that it is not the case in all ordered causes that the influence of one reaches to the ultimate effect. Hence it is not necessary that the primary intelligible influence our intellect in this way in order that it might understand, but it confers on it the power to understand. Or it might be said that although God is absolutely first in the order of intelligible things, he is not first in the order of things intelligible by us.
Ad 3. It should be said that, although those things which are first in the genus of things that the intellect abstracts from phantasms are first known by us, such as being and one, it is not necessary that the things which are absolutely first, which are not contained in the formality – ratio – of its proper object, should be first known by us.
Ad 4. It should be said that, although God is the ultimate end attained and the first intended by natural appetite, he need not be first in the knowledge of the human mind which is ordered to the end, but in the knowledge of the one ordering, as is the case with others that tend to their ultimate end by natural appetite. He is known from the beginning and intended in a general way insofar as the mind desires to be good and to live well, which it will only achieve when it has God.
Ad 5. It should be said that although separate substances do not need abstraction in order that they might be understood, they are not, however, intelligible through the light of the agent intellect, and that is why they are not first known by our intellect. It is only what is made intelligible in this way that is the object of intellect, as the visible is the object of sight thanks to bodily light.
Ad 6. ‘That God exists, ’it should be said, taken as such, is known by itself [per se notum] because his essence is his existence – this is how Anselm speaks – but not for us who do not see his essence. Knowledge of him is said to be innate in us because through principles which are innate in us we can easily perceive that God exists.
Article 4: Is the human mind sufficient of itself to reach knowledge of the divine Trinity?
The fourth question is opened thus:
It seems that the mind suffices for itself to come to knowledge of the divine Trinity by natural argument.
1. Whatever belongs to being as being is especially to be found in the first being. But trinity belongs to being as being, since it is found in all beings insofar as all things have mode, species and order, as Augustine says in On the Nature of the Good 3. Therefore it can be known by natural reason that there is a trinity in God.
2. Moreover, no perfection should be absent from God. But three is the number of any thing’s perfection, as is said in On the Heavens 1.1. Therefore trinity should be attributed to God, with the same conclusion as before.
3. Moreover, every inequality is reduced to a prior equality, as multitude to unity. But between God and the first created being there is inequality. There must precede, then, some equality, which since it must involve many, is some plurality in the divine.
4. Moreover, every equivocal is reduced to the univocal. But the procession of the creature from God is equivocal. We must posit prior to this, then, a univocal procession, whereby God proceeds from God, from which the trinity of persons arises.
5. Moreover, there can be no joyful possession of any good without sharing. But in God there is from eternity the most joyful sharing of the good. Therefore, he has an eternal sharing, which can only be of the divine persons, because no creature is eternal. We must therefore recognize in the godhead a plurality of persons.
6. Moreover, it can be known by natural reason that God is intelligent. But from the fact that he is intelligent it follows that he conceives a word, since this is common to every understanding thing. Therefore it can be known by natural reason that there is the generation of the Son and by the same argument a procession of love.
7. Moreover, Richard of St Victor says in On the Trinity 1.4, believe without a doubt, since for the explanation of some things, which necessarily are, there are not only probable but also necessary arguments. ’But that God is one and triune is necessary, because it is eternal. Therefore, there must be necessary arguments for it. From which the same conclusion follows.
8. Moreover, Platonists had knowledge of God only through reason. They recognized at least two persons, namely God the Father and the mind engendered by him, which contains the ideas of all things, which is what we say of the Son. Therefore, the plurality of persons can be known by natural reason.
9. Moreover, the Philosopher says in On the Heavens 1.1, ‘For through this number we apply ourselves to magnify God the creator. ’And thus the same as before.
10. Moreover, in this life we can in no way know of God what he is, but only that he exists. However, in a way we know that God is three and one, namely, through faith. Therefore this does not pertain to the question What he is, but rather to That he is. But we can know that God is through natural reason. Therefore it can also be known by natural reason that God is three and one.
ON THE CONTRARY:
[1] Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, as is clear from Hebrews 11.1. But that God is three and one is an article of faith. Therefore reason does not suffice for seeing that this is so.
[2] Moreover, every natural argument takes its efficacy from naturally known first principles. But that God is three and one cannot be deduced from naturally known principles, which are drawn from sense, since in sensible things nothing similar is to be found, for example, that there be three supposits of one essence. Therefore that God is three and one cannot be known by reason.
[3] Moreover, Ambrose says in On Faith 1.10, ‘It is impossible for me to know the secret of this generation; my mind fails; and not only my voice but even those of the angels fall silent. ’Therefore, natural reason does not suffice for knowing the divine generation and, consequently, the trinity of persons.
RESPONSE:
It must be said that God’s being three and one is only believed and can in no way be demonstratively proved, though some arguments of a non-necessary kind and of little probability except to the believer can be fashioned. This is evident from the fact that we know God in this life only from his effects, as is evident from the foregoing. Therefore, we can know of God from natural reason only what is perceived of him from the relation of effects to him, such as those which indicate his causality and eminence above what is caused and which remove from him the imperfect characteristics of effects. The trinity of persons cannot be perceived from the divine causality itself, since causality is common to the whole trinity. No more can it be said by way of removal. Hence in no way can it be proved that God is three and one.
Ad 1. It should be said that those things which are plural in creatures are really one in God. Therefore, although some trinity is found in any created being, it cannot be necessarily concluded from this that there is some three in God, except in our way of thinking, and such plurality does not suffice for the distinction of persons.
Ad 2. It should be said that the perfection of three is found in God even according to the unity of essence – not that his essence is numbered, but because it virtually contains every perfection of number, as Boethius says in On Arithmetic 2.8.
Ad 3. It should be said that, even removing the distinction of persons, there is equality in divine things, insofar as his power is equal to his wisdom. Or it might be said that there are two things to consider in equality, namely the plurality of individuals, between which a relation obtains, and the unity of quantity which is the meaning of equality. Therefore, the reduction of inequality to equality does not come about by reason of the plurality of individuals, but by reason of the cause, because just as unity is the cause of equality, so inequality is the cause of plurality. Therefore the cause of equality must be prior to the cause of inequality, not that there must be some equal things prior to any unequal things. Otherwise it would be necessary for there to be in the order of numbers something before unity and duality, which are unequals, or to find plurality in unity itself.
Ad 4. It should be said that although every equivocal is reduced to the univocal, it does not follow that equivocal generation is reduced to univocal generation, but to a generator that is in itself univocal. In natural things, we see that equivocal generations are prior to the univocal because equivocal causes exercise causality on the whole species whereas univocal causes do not, but only on one individual, which is why they are, as it were, instruments of equivocal causes, as inferior bodies are of celestial bodies.
Ad 5. It should be said that the reason a man cannot have a joyful life without sharing is that he is not of himself sufficient for all things. For this reason, animals which have of themselves everything they need do not require a shared life, but are solitary. God, however, is especially self-sufficient. Hence, even if the distinction of persons were taken away, there would still remain the greatest joy.
Ad 6. It should be said that in God the knower and the known are the same. That is why it does not follow from the fact that there is understanding in God that there must be in him some really distinct concept, as there is in us. But the trinity of persons requires a real distinction.
Ad 7. It should be said that the meaning of those words is apparent from what follows them:… ‘although it happens to escape our effort’. Therefore, all things necessary in themselves are either knowable in themselves or in other things, but it is not necessary that they should be thus known by us. Hence we cannot find, thanks to our efforts, a necessary argument to prove all necessary things.
Ad 8. It should be said that the position of the Platonists establishes nothing concerning the truth of the matter under discussion. For the Platonists did not claim that mind would be of the same essence with God the Father, but that it would be some other separate substance proceeding from it, and the third they posited was the soul of the world, as is clear in Macrobius. And because they called all separate substances gods, they called these three gods, as Augustine points out in The City of God 10.29. It is because they did not posit anything like the Holy Spirit as well as Father and Son – for the soul of the word is not a link between the other two, according to them, as the Holy Spirit is of Father and Son – that they are said to have failed in the third sign, namely in knowledge of the third person. Or it might be said, and commonly is, that they knew the two persons with respect to what is appropriated to them, power and wisdom, but not what is proper to them. Goodness, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, looks especially to effects that they did not know.
Ad 9. It should be said that Aristotle did not mean to say that God should be esteemed as three and one, but that he was honoured by three days of sacrifice and prayer by the ancients because of the perfection of the number three.
Ad 10. It should be replied that whatever is said of God is one with his simple essence, but that the things that are one in him are many in our intellect, which is why our intellect can apprehend one without another. That is why in this life we can know of none of them what it is but only that it is, and it happens that one of these [attributes] can be known to be without knowing another; for example, one might know that God is wise yet not know that he is omnipotent. In much the same way we can know by natural reason that God is, but not that he is three and one.
QUESTION 2
ON THE MANIFESTATION OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE
We pass on to the question of the manifestation of divine knowledge, about which four things are asked: (1) whether it is licit to treat of it by way of an investigation; (2) whether there can be any science of the divine; (3) whether in the science of faith which is from God it is licit to use philosophical arguments and authority; (4) whether things divine should be hidden behind obscure neologisms.
Article 1: Is it licit to treat the divine by way of investigation?
We open the question thus: It seems that it is not licit to investigate the divine by way of argumentation.
1. Ecclesiasticus 3.22: ‘Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability.’ But things divine especially are above man, particularly those which are of faith. Therefore it is not licit to scrutinize such things.
2. Moreover, punishment is only meted out for faults. But, as is said in Proverbs 25.27, ‘A searcher of majesty shall be overwhelmed by glory.’ Therefore to look into the things pertaining to the divine majesty is illicit.
3. Moreover, Ambrose says, ‘Away with arguments where faith is sought. ’But in divine matters, especially the trinity, faith is particularly needed. Therefore in this area it is not permitted to investigate the truth through arguments.
4. Moreover, Ambrose says, speaking of the divine generation, ‘It is not licit to scrutinize the highest mysteries; it is licit to know what comes to be but it is not licit to discuss how. ’By the same token, nothing pertaining to the trinity is licitly investigated by way of argument.
5. Moreover, as Gregory says in his Easter homily, ‘faith for which human reason seeks proof has no merit. ’But it is evil to get rid of the merit of faith. Therefore, it is not licit to scrutinize what is of faith by way of arguments.
6. Moreover, all honour is owed to God. But secrets are honoured by silence. That is why Denis says at the end of the Celestial Hierarchy, ‘Honouring the secret that is above us with silence. ’And this agrees with Psalm 64.2, according to the translation of Jerome, ‘To thee, God, praise in silence, ’that is, silence itself is your praise. Therefore we should engage in quiet inquiry into the divine.
7. Moreover, nothing is endlessly moved, as the Philosopher says in On the Heavens 1.7, because every motion is the pursuit of an end, which is not found in the endless. But God is infinitely distant from us. Since inquiry is a kind of movement of reason towards what is sought, it seems that divine things ought not to be asked about.
ON THE CONTRARY:
[1] There is what is said in 1 Peter 3.15: ‘Be ready always with an answer to everyone who asks a reason for the hope that is in you. ’But this cannot be unless what is of faith is inquired into by way of argument. Therefore the inquiry into the things of faith by way of argument is necessary.
[2] Moreover, as is said in Titus 1.9, of a bishop it is required ‘that he may be able both to exhort in sound doctrine and to confute opponents’. But those contradicting the faith can be refuted only by arguments. Therefore, in matters of faith arguments must be used.
[3] Moreover, Augustine says in On the Trinity 1.2.4, ‘With the help of our God we will undertake what they seek, an argument that the trinity is one God. ’Therefore a man may inquire into the trinity by way of arguments.
[4] Moreover, Augustine says in Against Felicianus, ‘Not improperly you discern these two, since setting forth argument you do not omit testimonies. I agree that he will follow what you prove ’ – namely that I might employ both argument and authority. And thus the same as before.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that since man’s perfection consists in union with God, a man must direct everything in him, insofar as possible, to divine things, such that the intellect is free for contemplation and reason free for inquiry into divine things, according to Psalm 72.28: ‘But it is good for me to be near God…’ That is why the Philosopher in Ethics 10.7 rejects those who say that man ought not to intrude himself into matters divine, but stay with the human, saying, ‘But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us. ’1
One errs in three ways in this matter. First, out of presumption, as when one so scrutinizes these things as if perfectly to comprehend them, the kind of presumption Job addresses (11.7): ‘Peradventure thou wilt comprehend the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly? ’ And Hilary say, ‘Do not plunge into the secret silence of that unthinkable nativity, nor intrude yourself, presuming to comprehend the most intelligible things, but understand that they are incomprehensible. ’ Second, the error that in matters of faith reason precedes faith not faith reason, such that one wants to believe only what reason can discover, when it suould be the reverse. Hence Hilary: ‘Begin by believing. ’ Namely, seek, ‘pursue, persist. ’ Third, pushing oneself beyond the way in which one is capable of scrutiny into divine things; as Romans 12.3 says: ‘Let no one rate himself more than he ought, but let him rate himself according to moderation, and according as God has apportioned to each one the nmeasure of faith. ’ All ought not to pursue the same amount: something can exceed the measure of one but not that of another.
Ad 1. It should be said that those things are said to be above man which exceed his capacity, not what are naturally more worthy; as to what is more worthy, a man is made perfect insofar as he turns to them in his own way. But if someone exceeds his mode even in the consideration of lesser things, he easily falls into error. Thus the Gloss there says, ‘Heretics are made in two ways, namely when in the consideration of creator or of creatures they fall into error and depart from the truth. ’
Ad 2. It should be said that to search through – perscrutari – is to search even to the end. It is illicit and presumptuous when one searches divine things as if to arrive at the goal of comprehension.
Ad 3. It should be said that where faith is sought those arguments should be eschewed which oppose faith and try to precede it, not those which follow it in a fitting manner.
Ad 4. It should be said that although it is illicit to scrutinize the highest mysteries in such a way that one has the intention of comprehending them, which is clear from what follows, ‘It is licit to know that he was born, but not to discuss how he was born. ’He discusses the mode of nativity who seeks to know the very essence of that birth, since in divine things we can know only that they are, not what they are.
Ad 5. It should be said that there are two kinds of human argument. One is demonstrative, forcing the assent of intellect, and argument of this kind cannot be had of the objects of faith, but they can be had to refute those who assert that faith is impossible. For although the objects of faith cannot be demonstrated, neither can they be demonstratively disproved. If this kind of argument could be put forward to prove the objects of faith there would be no merit, since assent to them would not be voluntary, but necessary. Persuasive argument taken from things similar to what is of faith is not in conflict with the concept of faith, since it does not make them evident, since there is no resolution into the first principles grasped by intellect. Nor does it take away the merit of faith, because it does not force intellect to assent and thus assent remains voluntary.
Ad 6. It should be said that God is honoured by silence, not because nothing is said or asked about him, but because we understand whatever is said or asked to fall short of comprehension of him. Hence it is said in Ecclesiasticus 43.32: ‘Glorify the Lord as much as ever you can: for he will yet far exceed, and his magnificence is wonderful. ’
Ad 7. It should be said that since God surpasses every creature infinitely, no creature is moved to God in such a way as to be equal to him whether by receiving from him or by knowing him: that which is infinitely distant from the creature’s cannot be the term of the creature’s creature movement. But every creature is so moved as to be made more and more like God insofar as it can be. That is why the human mind should always be seeking to know God more and more according to its manner. As Hilary says, ‘He who piously seeks the infinite, though he will never reach it, ever advances. ’
Article 2: Can there be a science of divine things?
We open the question thus: It seems that there can be no science of the things which fall under faith.
1. Wisdom is distinguished from science. But wisdom is concerned with divine things. Therefore, science is not.
2. Moreover, as is said in Posterior Analytics 1.1, 1 of its subject every science presupposes what it is. But we cannot in any way know what God is, as Damascene says in On Faith 1.4. Therefore there can be no science of God.
3. Moreover, every science considers the parts and passions of its subject. But God who is a simple form has no parts to be distinguished, nor can he be the subject of properties. Therefore there can be no science of God.
4. Moreover, in every science argument precedes assent: a demonstration in the sciences causes assent to the knowable. But in matters of faith the opposite must obtain, namely that the assent of faith precedes argument, as has been said.2 Therefore there can be no science of God.
5. Moreover, every science proceeds from self-evident principles ‘accepted by anyone who hears them, ’as Boethius says, or from principles which are held on faith. But the articles of faith, which are first principles of faith, are not of that kind since they are neither self-evident nor can they be demonstratively resolved into self-evident principles, as has been said.3 Therefore there can be no science of divine things held onfaith.
6. Moreover, faith is of things not seen. But science is concerned with the seen, because the things treated in science are brought to light by science. Therefore there can be no science of the divine things held on faith.
7. Moreover, understanding is at the origin of every science, because from the understanding of principles one proceeds to knowledge of conclusions. But in matters of faith understanding is not the beginning but the end, because, as is said in Isaiah, ‘Unless you believe, you shall not understand. ’Therefore there can be no science of the divine things which are of faith.
ON THE CONTRARY:
[1] There is what Augustine says in On the Trinity 12.1.3 : ‘I assign to this science only that whereby wholesome faith which leads to true happiness is engendered, defended and strengthened. ’ Therefore there is a science of the things of faith.
[2] Moreover, the same is seen in what is said in Wisdom 10.10: ‘He gives them the science of the saints, ’which can only be understood as that which distinguishes the saints from the impious, namely, the science of faith.
[3] Moreover, speaking of the knowledge of believers, the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 8.7, ‘There is not science of everything, ’and thus the same as before.
RESPONSE: It should be said that since it is the definition of science that from some known things other things are necessarily concluded, and this comes about with divine things, obviously there can be a science of the divine. But knowledge of divine things can be taken in two ways. In one way, from our side, and thus only created things, knowledge of which we take from the senses, are knowable to us. In another way, from the nature of these things, and thus they are of themselves the most intelligible, and though they cannot be known by us in our manner of knowing, they are none the less known by God and the blessed according to his mode.
On this basis, there are two kinds of science of the divine. One according to our mode, which uses the principles of sensible things to make the divine known, and so it was that philosophers developed a science of the divine, calling divine science first philosophy. Another following the mode of divine things themselves, which grasps divine things in themselves, which indeed is impossible in this life, but some share in and likeness to divine knowledge comes about in us in this life insofar as through infused faith we adhere to first truth for its own sake.
Thus God, in knowing himself, knows other things according to his way of knowing, that is, by simple intuition, not discursively, so we, adhering to the first truth thanks to what we have grasped through faith come to knowledge of other things in our way, discursively, from principles to conclusions. In this science what we hold on faith are for us as it were principles and other things are conclusions. From this it is clear that this is higher than the other divine science taught by the philosophers, since it proceeds from higher principles.
Ad 1. It should be said that wisdom is not distinguished from science as something is distinguished from its opposite but because it adds to science. For wisdom, as the Philosopher says in Nicomachean Ethics 6.7,1 is the head of all the sciences, governing all the others insofar as it is of the highest principles, for which reason it is also called, at the beginning of the Metaphysics,2 the ‘goddess of the sciences ’, all the more so because it is not only of the highest but from the highest. It is the mark of the wise to order; therefore that highest science which rules and governs all others is called wisdom, much as in the mechanical arts they are called wise who command others, namely, the master builders. The name of science is reserved for the lower. In this way, science is distinguished from wisdom as a property is distinguished from a definition.
Ad 2. It should be replied, as was said above, that when causes are known through their effects, knowledge of the effects takes the place of knowledge of the essence of the cause, a requirement in those sciences which are of things which can be known in themselves. Thus, in order for us to have a science of divine things, it is not necessary that knowledge of essence be presupposed. Or it might be said that the fact that we know of him what he is not plays the role in divine science of knowledge of what he is, because just as a thing is distinguished from others by what it is, so too can it be by knowledge of what it is not.
Ad 3. It should be said that by ‘parts of the subject of a science ’ is to be understood not only subjective and integral parts, but all those things knowledge of which is needed for knowledge of the subject, though all such things are treated in the science only insofar as they are related to the subject. Whatever can be proved of something are called its properties [passiones], whether negations or relations to other things. Many such things can be proved of God from principles naturally known as well as from the principles of faith.
Ad 4. It should be said that in any science some things function as principles and others as conclusions. The argument set forth in science precedes assent to the conclusions, but follows assent to the principles, since it proceeds from them. In this science, the articles of faith do not play the role of conclusions but rather of principles which are defended against those impugning them, just as the Philosopher in Metaphysics 4 refutes those denying principles. They are also clarified through certain similitudes, much as principles known naturally are through induction but are not proved by demonstrative argument.
Ad 5. It should be said that even in some humanly devised sciences there are some principles which are not known to all, but must be accepted from higher sciences. In subalternated sciences certain things from higher sciences are supposed and believed which are known to be self-evident only in the higher sciences. The articles of faith, which are the principles of this science, relate to divine knowledge in this way, because what is self-evident in the science God has of himself are presupposed in our science and believed by us as pointed out by his messengers, as the physician believes the natural scientist that there are four elements.
Ad 6. It should be said that what is seen in science proceeds from principles which are seen, since the science does not make the principles to be seen, but, the principles being seen, it makes the conclusions to be seen. In this way the science of which we speak does not make those things which are of faith to be seen, but from these makes other things to be seen in the way that certitude of the first is had.
Ad 7. It should be said that the first, though not always the proximate, principle of any science is understanding: sometimes faith is the proximate principle of a science. This is clear in subalternated sciences whose conclusions proceed as from their proximateprinciple from the belief in what is presupposed from the higher science, but as from the understanding in the higher science, where certain knowledge of these believed things is had, as from their first principle. Similarly the proximate principle of this science is faith, but its first principle is the divine understanding, in which we believe, but the end of faith is that we might come to understand what we believed, much as one knowing the inferior science might learn the higher and then things he had hitherto only believed would become understood and known.
Article 3: Is it licit in the science of faith that is concerned with God to use philosophical arguments and authorities?
We open the question thus: It seems that in matters of faith it is not licit to use philosophical arguments.
1. 1 Corinthians 1.17: ‘For Christ did not send me to baptize, but to preach the gospel, not with wisdom of words…’ which the Gloss explains as ‘with the doctrine of philosophers ’. And on verse 20, ‘Where is the disputant of this world? ’ the Gloss says, ‘The disputant is one who probes the secrets of nature and God does not receive such among his preachers. ’And later, on 2.4, ‘And my speech and my preaching were not in the persuasive words of wisdom, ’the Gloss says, ‘Although my words were persuasive, this was not through human wisdom as with the words of pseudo-apostles. ’From all of which it is seen that it is not licit to use philosophical arguments in matters of faith.
2. Moreover, on Isaiah 15.1, ‘Because in the night Ar of Moab is laid waste, ’the Gloss says, ‘Ar, that is the adversary, namely worldly knowledge which is an adversary of God. ’Therefore we should not use worldly science in those things which concern God.
3. Moreover, Ambrose says, ‘The sacrament of the faith is free of philosophical arguments. ’Therefore where faith is concerned, philosophical arguments and sayings ought not to be used.
4. Moreover, Jerome in his Letter to the virgin Eusthochius tells how in a vision he was assailed by divine judgement for having read the works of Cicero, and those standing by pleaded that lenience be granted youth and no punishment should be exacted for having sometimes read the books of the gentiles. Then imploring the name of God, he cried out, ‘Lord, if I ever had secular books and read them I denied you. ’If then it is not permitted to read and study them, much less is it licit to use them in divine treatises.
5. Moreover, worldly wisdom is frequently signified in Scripture by water and divine wisdom by wine. In Isaiah 1.22 inn-keepers who mix water with wine are censured. Therefore teachers who mix philosophical texts with sacred doctrine are to be censured.
6. Moreover, as Jerome says in the Gloss on Osee 2, ‘We ought not to have even words in common with the gentiles. ’But heretics use philosophical texts for the corruption of the faith, as is said in the Gloss on Proverbs 7.16 and Isaiah 15.5. Therefore Catholics ought not to use them in their treatises.
7. Moreover, just as every science has proper principles, so too does sacred doctrine, namely, articles of faith. It is not proper procedure in the other sciences to assume the principles of another science, but each must proceed from its own principles, according to the Philosopher in Posterior Analytics 1.7. Therefore it is not proper procedure in divine science to use the teachings of the philosophers.
8. Moreover, if someone’someone teaching is repudiated on a given point, his authority to confirm something is weakened; hence Augustine says that if we should concede that there is something false in Sacred Scripture its authority to confirm the faith would be destroyed. But sacred doctrine repudiates the teaching of philosophers on many points, because they are found to be mistaken about many things. Their authority, therefore, is not efficacious for confirming anything.
ON THE CONTRARY:
[1] The Apostle in Titus 1.12 uses a verse of the poet Epimenides, saying, ‘Cretans, always liars, evil beasts, lazy gluttons, ’and in 1 Corinthians 15.33, the words of Menander, ‘evil companionships corrupt good morals, ’and to the Athenians he uses the words of Aratus, ‘For we are also his offspring, ’as is told in Acts 17.28. Therefore it is licit for other teachers of Sacred Scripture to use philosophical arguments.
[2] Moreover, Jerome in his Letter to Magnus, orator of the city of Rome, having listed a number of teachers of Sacred Scripture, like Basil, Gregory and some others, adds, ‘All of whom so filled their books with the teachings of philosophers and their views that you don ’don know which to marvel at more, their worldly erudition or their knowledge of the scriptures. ’Which they would not have done if it were not licit and useful to do it.
[3] Moreover, Jerome in his Letter to Pammachius on the dormition of Pauline, ‘Therefore, it is fruitful for one to use worldly wisdom. ’
[4] Moreover, Augustine says in On the Trinity 2.1,’ I will not be slow to ask after the substance of God whether through the Scriptures or through creatures. ’But knowledge of creatures is set forth in philosophy. Therefore it is not improper if one uses philosophical arguments in sacred doctrine.
[5] Moreover, Augustine in On Christian Doctrine 40 writes, ‘If those who are called philosophers happen to have said anything true or suitable to our faith, not only should they not be feared, but such things must be taken as from unjust possessors and put to our use. ’And thus the same as before.
[6] Moreover, on Daniel 1.8, ’But Daniel purposed in his heart that he would not be defiled with the king’s table,’ the Gloss says, ‘If anyone unskilled in mathematics should write against mathematicians or one inexpert in philosophy against philosophers, who would not find it laughable? ’But sometimes the teacher of Holy Scripture must contest the philosophers. Therefore he must make use of philosophy.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that the gifts of grace are so added to nature that they do not destroy it, but rather perfect it; so too the light of faith, which is infused in us by grace, does not destroy the light of natural reason divinely placed within us. And although the natural light of the human mind is insufficient to manifest the things made manifest by faith, still it is impossible that those things which have been divinely taught us through faith should be contrary to what has been placed in us by nature. For one of them would have to be false, but since both come to us from God, God would have to be the author of falsity, which is impossible. Rather, since some imitation of the perfect is found in the imperfect, in things that are known by natural reason there are likenesses to the things taught by faith.
Sacred doctrine is based on the light of faith just as philosophy is based on the light of natural reason. Hence it is impossible that what pertains to philosophy should be contrary to what is of faith, though they fall short of it. For they contain certain similitudes and preambles to faith, much as nature is a preamble to grace. If something contrary to the faith should be found in philosophy, this is not philosophy, but rather an abuse of philosophy because of defective reasoning. Therefore it is possible to refute such an error making use of philosophical principles either by showing it is in every way impossible or by showing that it is not necessary. For just as the things of faith cannot be demonstratively proved, so what is contrary to them cannot be demonstrated to be false, but it can be shown that they are not necessary.
We can then use philosophy in sacred doctrine in three ways. First, to demonstrate those things which are preambles of faith, which it is necessary for faith to know, such as the things proven of God by natural arguments, namely, that God exists, that God is one, and the like, or whatever of God or creature is proved in philosophy that faith presupposes. Second, to make known the things of faith by means of certain similitudes, as Augustine in On the Trinity uses many similitudes taken from philosophical doctrines to manifest the trinity. Third, to resist what is said against the faith either by showing it to be false or by showing it not to be necessary.
But one can err in two ways in using philosophy in sacred doctrine. One way is to use things contrary to faith, which is not philosophy, but its corruption or abuse; Origen did this. Another way is this, that the things of faith are reduced to the measure of philosophy, such that someone wishes to believe only what can be established in philosophy. It is rather the reverse that should be done, philosophy reduced to the measure of the faith, following the Apostle in 2 Corinthians 10.5: ‘Bringing your mind into captivity to the obedience of Christ. ’
Ad 1. From everything that has been said, it is clear that the teaching of philosophers ought not to be used as the principal thing, as if the truth of faith is believed on its account, but this does not disturb the fact that sacred doctors can employ it as secondary. That is why, on ‘I will destroy wisdom of the wise,’1 the Gloss says, ‘Let it not then be said that the understanding of truth is disapproved by God, but rather the prudence of those who rely on their erudition. ’In order that the whole of faith not be attributed to human power and wisdom but to God, God willed that the primitive teaching of the apostles should be in weakness and simplicity, to which afterwards, however, worldly power and wisdom being added, he shows through the victory of faith that the world is subject to God both in power and in wisdom.
Ad 2. It should be said that worldly wisdom is said to be contrary to God as to its abuse, in the way heretics abuse it, not as to its truth.
Ad 3. It should be said that the sacrament of faith is said to be free of philosophical arguments insofar as it cannot be confined with the bounds of philosophy, as was said.
Ad 4. It should be said that Jerome was so enamoured of the books of the gentiles that he contemned, in a way, Sacred Scripture; hence he himself says in the same place, ‘If when I returned to myself I began to read the prophets, the uncultivated style repelled me. ’And that this is reprehensible no one would doubt.
Ad 5. It should be said that argument ought not to be fashioned of metaphors, as the Master says in Sentences 3, Distinction 11, and Denis says in the Letter to Titus. Symbolic theology is not argumentative, especially since it is not the exposition of any author. It can be said however that it is not called a mixing when one of the two passes into the power of the other, but when both are altered in their nature. Hence those who employ philosophical texts in sacred doctrine, putting it to the service of the faith, do not mingle water with wine, but change water into wine.
Ad 6. It should be said that Jerome speaks of those words fashioned by heretics adapted to their errors. But philosophical disciplines are not like that, indeed it is only their abuse that leads to error, so there is no reason to avoid them.
Ad 7. It should be said that sciences which are ordered to one another are such that one can use the principles of the other, as subsequent sciences use the principles of prior sciences, whether they be superior or inferior.
Hence metaphysics, which is superior to all, uses what has been proved in the other sciences. Similarly theology, since all other sciences are, as it were, its servants and preambles in the order of discovery, although they are beneath it in dignity, can use the principles of all the other sciences.
Ad 8. It should be said that insofar as sacred doctrine uses philosophical texts for its own sake, it does not accept them on the authority of those writing them, but because of the arguments for what is said; hence it takes things well said and repudiates others. But when it uses them to refute others, it uses them insofar as they have authority for those being refuted, because the testimony of adversaries is efficacious.
Article 4: Should divine things be veiled and hidden with obscure words?
We open the question thus: It seems that in the science of the faith divine things ought not to be hidden by obscure language.
1. Because, as is said in Proverbs 14.6, ‘The learning of the wise is easy. ’Therefore it ought to be proposed without obscurity of language.
2. Moreover, Ecclesiasticus 4.28, ‘Hide not thy wisdom in her beauty, ’ and Proverbs 11.26, ‘He that hideth corn ’ – that is, according to the Gloss, preaching – ‘shall be cursed among the people. ’Therefore the words of Sacred Scripture ought not to be hidden.
3. Moreover, there is Matthew 10.27, ‘What I tell you in darkness ’ – that is, according to the Gloss, in mystery, – ‘speak it in the light’– namely as the Gloss says, openly. Therefore the obscure things of faith are rather to be disclosed than hidden by difficult words.
4. Moreover, teachers of the faith are obliged to both the wise and the simple, as is clear from Romans 1.14. Therefore they ought to speak in such a way that they can be understood by both the great and the small, that is, without obscurity of language.
5. Moreover, Wisdom 7.13: ‘Which I have learned without guile, and communicate without envy. ’But he who hides them does not communicate them. Therefore he seems guilty of jealousy.
6. Moreover, Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine 4.8, ‘Commentators on Sacred Scripture ought not to speak as if they propose themselves to be interpreted, but in all their remarks first and chiefly that they might be understood, speaking so clearly that he who does not understand is very slow.’
ON THE CONTRARY:
[1] There is what is said in Matthew 7.6, ‘Do not give to dogs what is holy, neither cast your pearls before swine, ’on which the Gloss says, ‘Hidden things are sought more avidly, and the concealed seems more venerable, and things long sought are cherished the more.’Since therefore it is fitting that the sacred writings be looked into with the highest veneration, it seems that they ought not to be broadcast, but passed on obscurely.
[2] Moreover, Denis says in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 1.5, ‘Do not tell others of the sacred praise unless like you they are godlike. ’By sacred praise he intends to embrace all the sacred writings, which you are to pass on only to those similar to yourselves. But if they were set forth in obvious language, they would be open to all. Therefore the secrets of faith are to be veiled in obscure language.
[3] Moreover, relevant here is what is said in Luke 8.10: ‘To you ’– that is, to the perfect – ‘it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God,’ that is, understanding of the scriptures, as is clear from the Gloss on ‘but to the rest in parables’. Therefore it must be hidden from the multitude by a certain obscurity of language.
RESPONSE:
It should be said that the words of the teacher ought to be so fashioned that they help not harm the hearer. There are some things which when heard harm nobody, such as all those things everyone is held to know; and these are not to be hidden but manifestly set forth to all. There are other things, however, which when set forth openly harm hearers; this happens in two ways. In one way, if the secrets of faith are disclosed to infidels who abhor the faith. For with them they come into derision and for this reason the Lord says in Matthew 7.6, ‘Do not give to dogs what is holy, ’and Denis in the Celestial Hierarchy 2, ‘Concealing what is holy from the unclean multitude I have kept it intact.’ Second, when subtle matters are proposed to the unlearned, who cannot perfectly comprehend the matter, they are led into error. Hence the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 3.1 ff., ‘And I, brethren, could not speak to you as to spiritual men but only as carnal, as to little ones in Christ, I fed you with milk, not with solid food. ’And on this in Exodus 21.33, ‘If a man open a pit…’, the Gloss of Gregory says: ‘He who understands in sacred writ things so high, protects with silence the sublime meaning from those incapable of grasping it, lest by scandal he should harm the simple believer or impede the non-believer who would believe. ’These things then should be kept hidden from those they might harm.
But a distinction in speaking can be made, such that what is made manifest to the wise apart is left unsaid in public. Thus Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine 4.1.9.23, ‘There are some things the full force of which is not understood, or scarcely understood, however much and often or how eloquently they are spoken, and such things ought never or only rarely out of some urgent need to be proclaimed to a popular audience. ’This distinction cannot be observed in writing, because books once written can come into the hands of anyone, and therefore they should be couched in obscurity of language, such that they are clear to the wise who can understand them and are hidden from the simple who cannot grasp their meaning. No harm is done by this, because those who understand, read, and those who do not understand, are not forced to read. Hence Augustine says in the same work, ‘In works written in such a way that they hold the attention of those who understand them and do no harm to those who do not read them. Is not this the point of discourse that true things, although they be difficult to understand, lead us on to the understanding of others?’
Ad 1. It should be said that the text is not relevant, for its meaning is not that the teaching of the prudent is actively easy, that is, that they easily teach, but passively, because they are easily taught, as is clear from the Gloss.
Ad 2. It should be said that those authorities speak of one who hides what should be made manifest, hence Ecclesiasticus 4.28 is preceded by, ‘And refrain not to speak in the time of salvation. ’But this does not exclude that those things which ought to be hidden should be concealed in obscurity of language.
Ad 3. It should be said that the teaching of Christ is to be plainly and publicly preached, such that to each is made plain what is important for him to know, not, however, that what it is not necessary to know should be made public.
Ad 4. It should be said that the teachers of sacred doctrine are not so obliged to the wise and simple that they must propose the same to both, but that to both they propose what is appropriate to each.
Ad 5. It should be said that it is not out of jealousy that subtle things should be hidden from the multitude, but rather the discretion due them, as has been said.
Ad 6. It should be said that Augustine is talking of commentators who speak to the people, not of those who commit something to writing, as is clear from what follows.