The Second World War shattered the world. After the war Europe was spent, its power and glory evaporated in an orgy of violence created by technological advances and new ideologies of hate and murder harnessed by cruel dictators. After the Second World War, new nations took the world’s center stage, and these nations’ ideology and governmental forms were diametrically opposed. The “Cold War” started immediately after WWII, involving new nations in a new kind of war and competitive diplomacy.
How Many Dead?
Estimates of the number of dead vary greatly, but deaths from battles (military) were at least 65 million between the USSR, Germany, United States of America, United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan. Estimated civilian deaths not associated with battles are over 35million. The number killed in China is unknown, but it would be millions. In Japan, the total dead are unknown although there are good estimates. In my opinion, the Soviet Union understated its death toll by at least one-half to hide their casualties from the West. After the fall of the Soviet Union scholars examined the archives to try to determine the total number of Soviet deaths in WWII. Most think fifty million (50,000,000) citizens of the USSR were killed (At the Abyss, T.C. Reed, Ballantine Books, 2004, p 296). If this number is accepted then the death toll from WWII exceeds 100 million.
In addition, wars in Ethiopia, Spain, Korea, Manchuria, and China prior to the “official” start of WWII add hundreds of thousands to the count. China suffered immeasurably during the war. The Japanese launched yearly “rice offensives” at harvest time, stealing the rice crop for shipment to Japan. The number of Chinese dying from starvation because of Japanese actions would be hundreds of thousands at least. The numbers who starved or died of neglect in Eastern Europe after WWII are not included in the official count in spite of dying as a direct result of the war. Although reasonable estimates put the total dead at about 65 million, this number is probably low. In my opinion, WWII destroyed well over 100 million lives worldwide, especially if fatalities in conflicts like Korea, China, Spain, and Finland before the war are counted, and deaths from noncombat causes suffered immediately after World War II from starvation, disease, and wounds are included (for example, radiation sickness).
Compare 1914 and 1939
At this point, we should analyze the major similarities and differences between 1914 and 1939:
In both cases, horrible wars exploded from Central Europe and engulfed the world. In both wars, the major players were practically the same. Germany was the centerpiece in Western and Eastern Europe in both wars. England, France, and Russia fought in 1914 for the Allies, but in 1939 the USSR signed a peace treaty with Hitler leaving France and England alone to face Germany until June 1941. In 1914, Japan was with the Allies; however, in 1941 they were with the Axis. In both wars the United States of America attempted to remain neutral, eventually entering the wars with decisive consequences.
Prior to World War I, the “Concert of Europe,” an informal system of conflict resolution, encouraged great powers to work out disagreements through diplomatic exchanges thus resolving threats of war. This was a balance of power system. In 1914 the system of diplomacy utterly failed after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, and nations moved on impulse rather than rationality.[212] From 1919 to 1939, the League of Nations failed to act in several cases of aggression by Japan, Italy, and Germany, consistently losing credibility. Compounding the League’s inaction was the policy of appeasement adopted by England and France in the hope of avoiding war; however, this lack of resolve led the Axis partners to increasingly belligerent actions.
World War II was the direct result of Hitler’s appointment to German Chancellor in 1933. Excluding the USSR, nations fighting for the West in the Second World War opposed the governmental philosophy of the Nazis in every possible way.[213] Totalitarian dictatorships of the Axis fought to rule the world against democracies fighting to shield their way of life. Japan’s policies mimicked Hitler’s with Japan openly stating that totalitarianism was superior to democracy. It was a winner-takes-all contest. As such, the worldwide battles determined if democracy and individual freedom would survive. Never was the purpose for war clearer.[214]
In 1900, the world was a relatively stable place; however, in 1939, the world faced turmoil from China to Europe due to revolutionary ideologies and power-hungry dictators. The “old order” was still in place prior to WWI and it tended toward conservative and practical government. The Great War of 1914-1918 shattered European societies and revolutionary leftist movements, such as communism, gained substantial popular support. The backlash from anti-revolutionaries supported rightist movements like the fascist[215]trying to block the march of the communists to power. The problem with the revolutionary movements of the 1930s (communist, socialist) was their adoption of violence to achieve their ends. With labor strikes and armed force, the revolutionaries threatened governments and industry alike. The response of the right wing anti-revolutionary parties (fascist) was to adopt force to restrain the left. Undeclared civil wars broke out in many European nations, and governments were not stable enough or strong enough to control the situation. In Japan, the violent nature of militarism resulted in the assassination of two prime ministers and the endless war in China. Pre-World War I this was not taking place, as internal or external forces struggling for primacy could not easily challenge the established governments.
Japan had strove for recognition as a major world power since 1900. By skillfully playing her position Japan gained colonies from World War I, but not the recognition she craved. Before World War II, Japan defined itself as a “have not” nation believing America and Britain remained wedded to the status quo to maintain their imperial power. Japan decided to act with naked force to establish itself as a “have” nation. It would do so to shatter the status quo and the imperial powers; hence, avoiding being forever blocked by the old order. The same reasoning held true in Germany and Italy. All the Axis powers believed they had to challenge the status quo to gain economic power, resources, and respect. To the Axis, the Western nations supported the status quo and argued for peace, morality, and humanity only because it maintained their power. Axis leaders believed without a change in the power structure, through war if necessary, they would always be second tier nations.
Prior to World War I, European great powers aimed at peace. No major nation in World War I supported violence as a key component of national policy. Prior to World War II the fascists and communists proclaimed violence was well within the purview of their philosophies. The communist, socialist, fascist, and militarist claimed democracy was failing and caused exploitive imperialism, the Great Depression, the Great War, and created vastly unequal classes. The radicals said democracy had the working poor dying and starving while war profiteers grew rich on the peoples’ blood. These claims found ready support among the dispossessed of Europe and within the “have not” nations of the Axis. Communists leftist established violent revolutionary cells all over Europe trained in pushing an international revolution, and they struggled to seize governments by subversive means. Meanwhile, the fascists won elections, took control of entire nations, and used national power to smash the leftist. The fascist tactics established repression and violence as suitable policies for national control. Most Europeans welcomed the end of chaos, even by an oppressive government. Oppression of the people was a given under the radical left or right. The communist, fascist, or militarist nations all embraced violence to control their dominions.[216] Post 1919, the Soviets, Germans, Italians, and Japanese abandoned all philosophical niceties and just conquered whom they wished. Power alone was lord.
In World War I, the Russian Empire helped the Allies from the first and played a critical role in staving off Allied defeats in 1914. Prior to Hitler’s invasion of Poland in 1939, Stalin signed a peace treaty with Hitler allowing the Nazis to strike west without the threat of a two-front war. In 1914-1918 France held the line against Germany at tremendous cost. In 1940, France fell six weeks after the German assault began. The fall of France had major repercussions, as Japan decided to assail Allied interests in the Pacific, and England was left fighting alone until the Nazis invaded the USSR in the summer of 1941.
Comparing 1914 and 1939: in 1914, war was outright foolish. In 1939, it was a necessity. By avoiding a European war in 1914 the world could have progressed along paths of democracy and steady increases in personal liberty and wealth. If democracy continued sidestepping war with Hitler in 1939, the Axis may have created a world hell itself would envy.
Deciding Factors
Some of the deciding factors of the war in order of importance were:
1) Poor decisions by Hitler, the leader of Nazi Germany,
2) The breaking of the German and Japanese codes by English and US code breakers,
3) The amazing performance of the Soviet Union against the German Army in 1941,
4) The considerable industrial might of the United States,
5) The unbreakable will of the English people,
6) The quality of Allied leadership—they made good decisions,
7) The fall of France, and
8) The good luck of the Allies.
Some of this will need explaining.
1) Better decisions by Adolph Hitler would have changed everything. One example should suffice for now. If Hitler had followed his general staff’s war plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union, he may have been able to knock the USSR out of the war (obtain a favorable peace) by 1942, thereby releasing enormous numbers of veteran troops and their equipment to defend his Western European empire.
2) The code breakers were critical. Assume for one moment that Hitler broke the Allies’ codes, and the Allies did not break the Nazi codes. One can see German submarines accurately directed to Allied convoys, Allied bombing raids consistently intercepted, massed Axis units throwing the D-Day invasion into the sea, the Battle of Stalingrad stalemated, and Rommel stopping Montgomery at El Alamein. Just defeating the D-Day invasion would have changed the war and the world immensely. Had Japan broken the American codes, she could have annihilated the US carriers at Midway and intercepted the US invasion force steaming for Guadalcanal. Outside of Hitler’s incredibly poor decisions, breaking the Axis codes was the most important event of the war.[217]
3) The USSR’s miraculous performance saved the West. The USSR suffered horrifically in 1941 when the Germans invaded. German generals were right to be happy with the way the war was going; after all, they destroyed an army at least their size and seized enormous amounts of territory. How could anyone believe a nation could take that kind of punishment and survive—much less turn and destroy the invader? Nevertheless, the Soviets did just that. In 1941 the USSR absorbed the loss of over 2 million troops, nearly all of its air force, huge numbers of tanks plus other military equipment, and moved its heavy industry east so the Germans could not capture it (this alone was a miracle). The Soviets lost vast amounts of farmland, resources and numerous cities. By winter the Germans reached Moscow, but were too exhausted to storm the city. The Russians held on and successfully counterattacked the Germans pushing them back from Moscow. They later amassed new armies with better equipment, aircraft, and artillery to smash the Nazis. Had the USSR quit in 1941 or 1942, a considerable number of German troops would be released (1 to 2 million) to Western Europe. These veteran German troops could have prevented any successful invasion of Western Europe. Hitler would own Europe, and the United States and England could not have taken it away. The Wehrmacht was never the same after 1941, because their best men perished in the Soviet maw.
4) The industrial might of the United States of America supplied war production in enormous amounts to all Allied forces. The United States fought a two-front war, in the Pacific and Europe, and supplied them both. In addition, America imagined a wealth of new designs, then produced them in great quantities with superb quality. Without the influx of US equipment, the Soviet war against Hitler might have faltered; the English may have lost at El Alamein (they used huge numbers of US tanks and artillery); the postponement of D-Day was certain; and every sinking of an Allied supply ship would increase in importance. Everything changes without abundant supplies from the United States of America.
5) If England had given up the war and made peace with Germany in 1940, after the fall of France, Hitler could turn on the USSR with all his forces, including an undamaged air force, and may have prevailed. England’s defiance was critical for the West’s eventual victory. Without England, an invasion of Europe would be almost impossible. England held on with no allies while Hitler bombed them and sank large numbers of their merchant ships. The will of the English people, fighting on against the odds in 1940, doomed the Nazis.
6) Allied leadership made good decisions throughout the war. World War II was a technological war, and the Allies recognized this and began developing the winning technology right away (Hitler had ordered long-term research stopped). The Allies ordered a total war status when the war started (Hitler did not), and Allied leaders usually refrained from interference with the professionals in waging war. Hitler interfered with his generals constantly. Eventually, Hitler began running the war in detail ignoring the expertise and the decades of experience possessed by his professional warriors (another very bad decision by Hitler). Overall, Allied decision making was excellent. The Axis decision making was deeply flawed.
7) The Fall of France in 1940 was a key moment in the war. The reasons for France’s defeat are complex; however, when France fell everything changed. The French had enough men and high-quality tanks, but they did not have Germany’s new methods of war. If attacking through Belgium (like WWI) as originally planned, the Germans would run head-on into the best troops of France and England, and even the excellent German warfare methods might not have broken the Allies easily. In computer war games with the best French and British divisions in head-on conflict with the best German divisions, a steady, but not disastrous, Allied retreat results. Germany wins the war game after much destructive fighting. Germany’s real world victory resulted from a brilliant and well-executed plan developed by General Von Manstein and forced on the German generals by Hitler (this was a great decision by Hitler).[218] The quick fall of France negated the need for large formations of German troops in Western Europe. Japan’s thinking about their plans changed with the fall of France. England was battered and Japan correctly thought this weakened Britain’s Far East forces. Hitler’s later attack on the Soviet Union took a major antagonist off Japan’s northern frontier and opened the way for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Hitler invaded the USSR because only a weakened England remained in the west. All of this happened because France crumbled before the German onslaught.
8) Good luck is often the key to victory in war, and the Allies enjoyed exceptional luck. At Pearl Harbor the Japanese managed a surprise attack of the first order; however, the main targets, the US aircraft carriers, were all at sea. By pure luck the US Navy retained its foremost assets intact. At Midway the Americans miraculously surprised and sunk four Japanese carriers. The United States possessed only one modern carrier airplane at the time, the Dauntless dive-bomber. This solitary up-to-date weapon arrived over the Japanese carriers at the moment they were devoid of air cover and had numerous bombs and torpedoes improperly stowed around their decks. The American bombs hit the Japanese carriers at their most vulnerable minute with devastating results. In 1939 brilliant Polish code breakers were deciphering the German codes and had obtained a GermanEnigma machine. The Polish code breakers luckily escaped after the Nazi invasion and gave everything to England. The war could have changed dramatically if the Polish code breakers had fallen into Nazi hands.
World War II Begins
1939
After appeasing Hitler for months, and having him break his word and his treaties, England and France faced down the Nazis over Poland in September of 1939. It had been a sinuous road to this point. March of 1936 saw Hitler abolish the Treaty of Versailles by his reoccupation of the Rhineland. France wanted to move, but England did not, and France would not challenge Hitler alone. Hitler’s seizure of Austria (Anschluss—reunification) took place in 1938, followed by the 1938 Munich conference where England and France gave Germany a large part of Czechoslovakia rather than risk war. The worst part of the Munich capitulation only surfaced since the 1970s. Newly released British Cabinet notes reveal Chamberlin made a deal to dismember Czechoslovakia with the Nazi dictator long before the conference. The USSR had promised support to France and England if they stood up to the Nazis at Munich. As Stalin watched the Allies cave he decided Hitler was a more reliable partner than the cowardly West. Hitler promised peace and stability (again), and then he completely subjugated the rump state of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. This move stunned Neville Chamberlin who overnight saw the light and turned on the Axis like an angry mongoose. Hitler quickly followed up his Czechoslovakian conquest with territorial demands on Poland, but this time the Western Allies guaranteed Poland’s territorial integrity.
Some say this was an abrupt about-face by England and France, confusing Hitler and not allowing him time to readjust to the new Allied policy. After all, he watched them run yellow so many times before, how could he reasonably expect firmness this time? However, after the Fuehrer “annexed” Czechoslovakia, trashing his promises to England’s Neville Chamberlin that his territorial ambitions were over, Hitler received confirmation that England and France would stand no more. Chamberlin made several speeches in the House of Commons saying conclusively that appeasement was at an end, and promising Britain and France would block Hitler’s next move. By scuttling the Munich agreement Hitler convinced the Western Allies his word was worthless and force alone would deter the deceiver. Any rational man would have known that invading Poland assured war with Britain and France.
Poland, probably unwisely, rejected Hitler’s threats. The Fuehrer was poised to invade, but word reached the dictator that both England and France promised a declaration of war if Germany invaded Poland. For a moment Hitler hesitated; however, he had seen England and France back down many times, so he hypothesized there would be no war over Poland of all places. After all, the Allies could do nothing to help Poland directly. Moreover, there was Stalin to consider. The entire world knew the USSR and Germany signed an alliance guaranteeing the Nazis safety in the East. Poland could not win, and the Allies could not help. Hitler threw the dice once more gambling England and France would fold. Dreadfully miscalculating, Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. England and France declared war; nevertheless, the Poles were isolated and, unknown to them, trapped in a massive vice.
Hitler possessed largely mechanized armies and modern air forces, and Poland did not. In the first hours of combat the Polish air force succumbed to heavy damage, and its poorly placed troops quickly found themselves surrounded and crushed by armored double envelopments. The remaining Polish troops fell back toward their capital of Warsaw, all the while radioing France and England to help. The Allies could do little to assist the Poles. One possible move involved launching a significant offensive in the west, forcing the Germans to pull troops away from Poland to protect their western frontier. The French and English failed to launch any major offensives in the West. According to Winston Churchill in his book The Gathering Storm, France lacked the ability to launch an offensive so soon after the war began. This lack of boldness doomed Poland, but the Poles bravely fought on. Then an unexpected blow fell from the East. The USSR had made a secret deal with Hitler to split Poland, and after the German attack was underway the USSR invaded, overwhelming the scant Polish resistance. England and France did nothing. (No declaration of war against the Soviets.) Stalin engaged in the same actions as Hitler, but England and France feared expanding the war, and as a result Stalin got away with assassinating Poland. After Poland fell the Russians and Germans exterminated millions of Poles, subjecting them to shocking atrocities that were discovered long after WWII.[219]
After Poland fell a period of non-action ensued (the “phony war.”) During this time the Germans adjusted their Blitzkrieg tactics by adopting the lessons learned in Poland. During the lull, the German general staff approached Hitler with a bold plan to capture Norway. In April 1940 Hitler launched the plan, and using a combined naval and air assault overran the nation. Hitler approved the plan because he needed the raw materials Norway could supply, and it would protect his vital steel ore supply from Sweden. The invasion’s success thwarted an English plan to violate Norway’s neutrality by mining their coastal waters[220] to stop the flow of raw materials to Germany. The German U-boats discovered, to their dismay, that their torpedoes were defective. Germany returned to WWI torpedoes, but at least they discovered the problem. Norway remained in Nazi hands for the remainder of the war.
The Battle of France
May and June 1940
France and England now stood against Germany in the West. The capture of Norway, the quick defeat of Poland and the assistance of the USSR in its slaughter, traumatized the Allies. The Germans had unleashed a new kind of warfare. Their mechanized units sped across Poland disrupting the Poles’ attempts to form defensive lines. Their use of aircraft to bomb ahead of advancing German tanks disheartened the Polish troops at the key points of attack, and allowed German breakouts when and where desired. The French and English realized this, but they neglected altering anything at this stage because extensive retraining and reorganization of their armies was required, and they thought they knew where the Germans would strike; thus, negating the German mobility advantage. While it is not wise for comprehensively trained modern armies to improvise on the eve of battle, one must adjust to circumstances. Surely some essential changes could be made while keeping the troops within their training. In this task of adjustment the Allies failed. They also failed in an essential element of defensive planning; hold something back for the unexpected (thereserves).
In spite of Hitler’s demands, bad weather allowed his generals to postpone the attack on France. For months the front remained static in what was termed the Phony War, but events brought on by the delay were not transpiring in the Allies favor. Germany studied its invasion of Poland and determined a lot had gone wrong. During the pause, the Wehrmacht made critical modifications to its armored tactics helping immensely in the coming battles. The Germans originally planned an attack through Belgium, and the English and French guessed as much. The Belgians should have cooperated with the Allies, but they stubbornly stuck with their suicidal policy of neutrality. (Just like WWI). As a result, the Allies had to wait until the Germans entered Belgium before they could advance to defensive positions within that country. The French and English were certain the German attack could not fall further south because of a massive French defensive system of guns and forts named the Maginot Line, after its creator. However, the line did not extend all the way to Belgium. Between the end of the defensive line and Belgium grew a dense forest which French planners thought was too difficult for mechanized forces to cross; thus, the Maginot Line stopped at the forest. Even worse, the defense of the forested area depended on second-class troops comprised of older conscripts with few modern weapons. Of course, this was the fatal disposition because it was through this forest the German mechanized armored forces struck.
Figure 53 The Fall of France 1940
Strangely, the German plan changed only after an aircraft accident where a German officer, ineptly carrying the plans of attack, crashed in Belgium. The plans were recovered from the wreck and confirmed Allied speculation about the German assault in the West. Back in Germany Hitler remained calm because he never liked the plan anyway and wanted his generals to create a better one. One German general, Eric Von Manstein, did have another plan, but his superiors on the general staff had dismissed it. Von Manstein had worked up an idea to attack with mechanized units through the forested area (the Ardennes) ignored by the Allies. The plan called for a feint (false attack) into Belgium which would draw the Allied units north. This would be followed by the Wehrmacht’s main attack coming from east to west toward the sea from the Ardennes Forest, thereby trapping numerous Allied units in Belgium. Once cut off from supplies and reinforcements destruction of the Allied armies could proceed. Thereafter, the Germans would turn on the remainder of France. Once briefed, Hitler instantly adopted this audacious idea. The plan went forward over the strong objections of his staff officers who had the plan jammed down their throats by the Fuehrer. It was perhaps Hitler’s best military decision (One of the few good military decisions).
When the German blow fell on May 10, 1940, the French and English troops hurried into Belgium anticipating the German main attack. The Germans moved units into Belgium to draw the Allies in, and the Allies took the bait. The Germans began assaults on the Belgian forts around their main cities. These forts fell at once as brilliant German planning overcame the defenders. As the Belgian Army disintegrated, the Allies prepared their positions well inside Belgium for the expected German onslaught. Then disturbing reports filtered in of heavy fighting near the Ardennes forest, soon followed by the bad news of a German breakthrough at Sudan. The Allies began to realize they were in the wrong place.
The reports of strong German breakthroughs were correct. German armored units struck through the forest sweeping past the surprised and ill-prepared defenders. The German spearheads crossed the Muse River and turned west moving quickly toward the English Channel. German aircraft dominated the sky, bombing Allied columns moving south and disorganizing units in front of the German onslaught. Allied air attacks on German bridges constructed on the Muse River failed, resulting in heavy aircraft losses. French tanks supported their infantry; thus, only small groups of tanks were operating within the infantry units. The Germans assembled their tanks into large dominant armored strike forces comprised of many tanks using combined arms warfare. They overwhelmed the small confused tank units comprising French and British armored opposition. The German armored units hit like a wrecking ball, demolishing all before them.
As German mechanized units pushed forward against panicked opposition the far away French High Command lost touch with the front, mainly because modern communication equipment was lacking (such as telephones or radios).[221] French lack of mechanization prevented rapid movement, and inadequate French communication prevented rapid reorganization; consequently, they failed to stop the fast moving Germans.
Soon the Germans reached the sea trapping a number of Allied divisions. The British Army retreated to the port of Dunkirk on the orders of Lord Gort, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force. Lord Gort gave the command without London’s authorization but saved the British Army by the decisive decision. For unknown reasons, Hitler stopped the Axis advance on the port. [222] During the delay, the English army managed to escape by sea through the efforts of the British Navy and hundreds of civilian boats sailing into action to save the troops trapped at the seaside. When the Germans resumed their advance the rescue of three hundred and forty thousand troops from Dunkirk was complete (about one hundred thousand were French). After a pause to refit, the Wehrmacht carried out the second phase of their plan storming past Paris into the remainder of France. The French reorganized into hedgehog redoubts, but they lost so many units in previous combat they stood no chance. After Dunkirk the British withdrew all RAF[223] aircraft to defend their island home. France objected, but England could not afford to lose its air force fighting in France. France had no strategic reserve (why is obscure), and the nation’s fighting spirit was gone.
The campaign in France ended on June 25, 1940. The Germans allowed the French to keep a small part of their nation in the south of France,[224] but the Germans governed the rest. Hitler wanted the French Atlantic ports for his submarines. France’s empire still existed, but France elected to surrender without moving the fight to their empire. The French Empire became a German puppet, although the Free French under General Charles de Gaulle continued to fight the Germans from England. The French suffered another indignity, although the British administered this blow when Churchill, Britain’s new Prime Minister, ordered the French fleet sunk to prevent its use by the Nazis. France was furious.
With France defeated Hitler may have assumed England would desire peace. Churchill, Britain’s Prime Minister, emphatically said no. Many speculated about Germany invading England, even though it was autumn and only a few weeks of good weather (if it could be called that) remained. No invasion could be mounted without air superiority. Accordingly, Hitler launched coordinated air attacks on England’s RAF that entailed bombing airfields and aircraft industries. This air action was the Battle of Britain.
Battle of Britain
August to October 1940
Starting in August 1940, the German Luftwaffe began concentrated daylight attacks on English airbases and its aircraft industry. Hitler’s goal was to destroy the RAF and then stage an invasion of England. Well . . . maybe. From the start the Germans were at a disadvantage. As designed, theonly use of the Luftwaffe was to support the German Army; thus, close air support was their mission, not bombing an enemy nation into submission. German aircraft were short ranged, the bombers were two-engine affairs with almost nonexistent defensive firepower, and they carried light bomb loads. Up against modern fighters such as the Spitfire or Hurricane they were absolutely inadequate. General Kesselring knew the weaknesses of the equipment, and, as one of the architects of the air assault, limited their key operations to southern England. Royal Air Force production areas were bombed, but this was more difficult than getting at the airfields. Air warfare against cities was not new as WWI saw numerous long-range bombing raids; nonetheless, air attacks on a world power to attain air superiority was new. Kesselring understood and followed Clausewitz’s principles (defeat the enemy’s army in the field).[225] He wanted to defeat the Royal Air Force by destroying its bases of operation, pilots, aircraft, and ability to construct aircraft.
Radar was England’s technological ace in the hole. Although primitive, the English radar stations detected incoming flights of bombers, supplying information on course and speed. Britain’s Fighter Command, under Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, then launched the intercepting fighters. The ME-109s sent to protect the bombers could not stay long over the target, thus, protecting the bombers was problematic. Furthermore, each German pilot shot down was lost to death or captivity, whereas the English pilots shot down could be recovered to fight again (unless KIA).[226] From the start the Luftwaffe took a beating. Nonetheless, the experienced Nazi pilots shot down numerous RAF aircraft, and the bombers damaged the airfields significantly. Dowding worried he might lose the fight allowing Germany to gain air superiority over Southern England.
However, fate intervened, and Hitler ordered the bombing switched to London thereby wrecking the German staff’s planning at the moment victory winged into view. This violated Clausewitz’s principle of defeating the enemy’s army (air force in this case) before doing anything else. London was further away from Luftwaffe air bases resulting in more time over enemy territory, with its flack and fighters, and less time over the target. The new raids caused extensive damage to London and the Luftwaffe, in addition to allowing the RAF to recover their losses then attack with renewed vigor. As winter approached and losses worsened, the Luftwaffe suffered defeat by Hitler’s decision, radar, and English determination. The fact that British bombing raids heavily damaged the Nazi invasion barges is another seldom-discussed key factor. Fighter Command won the battle by just surviving.
Invasion?
Watching documentaries on the Battle of Britain, we hear the narrator deeply intone that should Britain lose the crucial air battle a Nazi invasion would surely follow. This idea is pure propagandistic humbug. The RAF was hard pressed, but it retained valuable options beyond total destruction. Germany lacked the resources to invade England even if it won the air battle by a wide margin. Plus, the battle started in August, far too late to seriously contemplate an invasion because of the approach of winter and bad weather.
If Fighter Command was being destroyed, it could pull its aircraft out German range and await the invasion while rebuilding its strength. Also waiting out of range would be the English Navy with its aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and more. Upon sighting a German invasion armada, it would sail into action with all available land, sea, and air support.[227] Even with total air superiority, Germany could not have overcome such an onslaught of British ships and aircraft.[228] The Battle of Britain was history’s first struggle to gain air superiority over another nation’s territory. The Germans failed while significantly damaging their air force. This hampered Luftwaffe operations in Russia the following summer. Hitler may have been trying to get England to quit the war through this air effort; however, who can know the mind of Adolf Hitler?
The Battle of the Atlantic
September 1939 to May 1943
As the Luftwaffe suffered defeat over Britain, the war’s longest campaign started in the Atlantic.[229] However, Germany lost the Battle of the Atlantic before it started. This was a technological fight from the first, and at the start of the campaign the Germans held several advantages.Admiral Karl Donitz (also Doenitz), the German U-boat commander, devised a new way of waging war with submarines. Donitz recognized the two highest hurdles for submarine warfare were spotting a convoy and then successfully attacking it. Believe it or not, finding the convoy was the hardest part, but once found the submarines needed to sink several ships to gain victory. First, a line of scout submarines (sub) was deployed to spot convoys. After a sub acquired a convoy they radioed the position, speed, and direction of the ships to U-boat headquarters in France. Second, German HQ radioed a number of subs and ordered their convergence on the convoy for a large coordinated attack designed to inflict maximum damage while overwhelming the convoy escort. Donitz’s wolf pack concept gave the Germans a critical advantage during the first months of the war. The problem in modern war is technological and tactical advantages disappear fast.
The Germans lost before they started because they produced so few modern oceangoing submarines prior to September 1939. The majority of their subs were coastal types, designed for shallow water and not cruising on open seas. In the critical prewar years Germany produced few oceangoing subs, and one year they produced just ONE U-boat. During the essential months of 1939, Germany had twelve oceangoing subs, and struggled to keep four U-boats on the western approaches to England.[230] Even with so few U-boats, ace German captains sank numerous British merchant ships. The Royal Navy swiftly took countermeasures to avoid the wolf packs through the code breakers by just routing the convoys around the subs with known locations. With so few subs an effective picket line was impossible. The few U-boats available at war’s outbreak doomed the Nazi effort. Donitz needed three hundred oceangoing U-boats for his campaign. The admiral possessed twelve, about 4 percent of his needs.
Documentaries on the Battle of the Atlantic show German U-boats attacking from under water in daylight. In fact, few attacks occurred this way. Underwater, a U-boat was very slow and could not keep up with a convoy; therefore, Germans carried out their attacks at night on the surface. U-boats stayed on the surface when searching for convoys and, once the quarry was spotted, tracked it at a safe distance while surfaced. Underwater, the U-boats found it impossible to spot or track convoys; thus, surface operations were imperative. After a Wolf Pack assembled, the German U-boat captains awaited darkness then skillfully approached the convoy, on the surface, avoiding the escorts. Once in close, the subs, gliding low in the sea, either fired their torpedoes outside the convoy perimeter, or—if expert and fearless—sailed into the convoy itself, between the lines of ships,and commenced their attack from point blank range.
For the first few months of the war an extremely small set of brilliant U-boat commanders accounted for the majority of English shipping losses. As these superb captains and their crews were destroyed Britain’s shipping losses declined, illustrating the impact of a few extraordinary men.
By 1943, the technological advantage lay completely with the Allies as new submarine detection and fighting methods forever shifted the tide. The increasing Allied ability to place aircraft above the convoys ended the U-boats’ operational effectiveness, and Allied shipping losses fell significantly. To illustrate: in 1942 Allied shipping losses were 8,245,000 tons, for the loss of 85 U-boats; in 1943 Allied shipping losses were 3,611,000 tons for the loss of 287 U-boats. The tide turned dramatically in May of 1943 and Germany lost the undersea struggle.
All this Allied technological innovation and its rapid deployment was assisted by decisions at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, where Roosevelt and Churchill met to co-ordinate strategy. The leaders agreed the U-boat was the number one menace to the Allied cause and directed extra resources to defeat the German undersea navy. Interestingly, their second priority was defeating the Luftwaffe, hence showing the technological orientation of the Allies. Meanwhile, Hitler’s U-boats lacked resources until it was far too late in the battle because Hitler put other priorities ahead of the Atlantic struggle. In fact, 98 percent of Allied shipping crossed the Atlantic without incident. This victory is directly attributable to the Allied emphasis on defeating the U-boat threat as their firstpriority. Nonetheless, from 1939 and up through May 1943, the Germans were causing major concerns with their U-boat offensives. During the Battle of the Atlantic, the Germans sank 2,603 Allied ships for the loss of over seven hundred submarines. In Operation Drumbeat alone the United States lost three hundred and ninety seven ships between January and June of 1942.
The Battle of the Atlantic, and the entire war, completely depended on another factor: industrial production.
Industrial Production
(Entire war) 1939 to 1945
Most students of war like concentrating on battles won and lost, great personalities dominating the era, or the machines of war; however, the available resources properly committed to numerous battles habitually decide wars between great powers. As such, the ability to harness and properlydirect these resources is vital to the outcome of war. The nations marshaling their resources most effectively, turning those resources into what is most necessary for success, and then efficiently delivering the end product, all but assures ultimate victory. Resources include more than weapons, because properly trained men, new methods of war, and new methods of production are critical to victory. This study of stuff is termed logistics.
During the war, Hitler made many errors (to say the least), but perhaps his most important blunder was not ordering total war production prior to 1943 (or prior to 1939 for that matter). Haunted by WWI’s citizen depravations the Fuehrer wanted Germans to enjoy some consumer goods, and he hoped the war would be short. Another major error was stopping development of weapons systems (aircraft for example) taking longer than a year to move to production. Both of these decisions were directly responsible for Germany’s destruction by 1945. If Hitler had made the opposite decisions and allowed continued research on all weapons systems, and went to full production by 1940, then the delivery of jet aircraft, new tanks, new submarines, and a lot more would have taken place years sooner than actually delivered. For example, if Germany had developed and produced in quantity the ME-262 jet aircraft eighteen months sooner, the Allies may have lost air superiority over Europe thus delaying the D-Day invasion (I know . . . a lot of very big ifs).
The Allies went to total war production immediately. In the United States the huge supply of idle machinery from the Depression went back into use, out of work men got work, and a host of other economic changes took place after 1941. The Great Depression was no more, and all that pent-up potential exploded in a torrent of production and innovation stunning the Allies of the United States as well as its enemies. It took more than idle production availability to cause this industrial flood of supplies and equipment. The organization of industry, the ability to control quality as well as turn out large quantities of materials, and the ability to develop new methods of war and new methods of war production were as necessary as the machines and men of war. Immediately after Pearl Harbor General George Marshal reorganized the war department to reflect the new realities and methods of war. Even considering this change on the eve of war would chill most leaders, much less after the war had started and things were going badly. The same reorganization was happening in American industry. This was one of the secrets of success for the United States in WWII. The Americans were willing to reorganize, reshuffle, and reinvent almost everything if it would better serve the war effort. Flexibility of this nature allowed innovation on a grand scale. Often the innovation was stunning. For illustration, reflect on the Kaiser Company’s construction of transport ships in weeks using prefabrication methods rather than months by normal shipyard methods.[231]
The US Armed Forces ensured their fighting men received excellent weapons. The Americans quickly designed, tested, and put into production new aircraft that easily out performed aircraft developed before 1940. The M-1 semiautomatic rifle, designed just before the war, was rushed into production, and in months all the soldiers, airmen, and marines of the United States carried this excellent rifle. The M-1 displays the skill of the United States in focusing its efforts on where they would do the most good. The United States and the British developed new methods of anti-submarine warfare, crushing the Nazi’s undersea threat by May of 1943. In the Pacific War, the US Marines militarized a civilian amphibious tracked vehicle (LVT—landing vehicle tracked), for scaling coral reefs. First used at Tarawa, it saved the invasion. Large landings, such as D-Day, required large transports, but the Allies went further developing huge transports capable of unloading directly onto enemy beaches. This was the LST (landing ship tank). This one craft made large amphibious assault less complicated and more successful. It was one of hundreds of Allied innovations focusing on the best use of available resources.
Coupling new industrial innovations with new methods of war greatly facilitated crushing the Axis. As an example, the US Navy invented the “seatrain” concept. With seatrain the US Pacific Fleet resupplied at sea eliminating steaming back to port for supplies and refueling. This idea, and the construction of cargo ships and oilers to realize the concept, allowed the US Fleet to strike suddenly anywhere in the Pacific. Admiral Nimitz rapidly crossed Pacific, stunning the Japanese Navy and ruining its capacity to adapt. It was a major reason for Japan’s defeat by 1945. This again displays the Allied aptitude for focusing resources on ideas yielding remarkable results once implemented.
The Axis failed miserably in the realms of production and focusing the use of resources. In Germany the prime cause was Hitler. His poor decisions in military and industrial matters doomed his nation. One decision was right. He appointed Albert Speer as armaments minister in 1942. Speer displayed outstanding organizational genius. Under his oversight, the Third Reich increased armament production during the height of Allied bomber offensives against its industries. Over thirty months (1942 to 1944) he increased production fourfold. Speer receives little credit for his feat, possibly because his genius prolonged the war; yet, there is no denying he accomplished miracles of production.
For instance, Speer joined, for the first time in the Reich, minds in German universities with the need for faster construction of better submarines. Germany soon developed a superior submarine drive system that pushed the submarine’s underwater speeds beyond their surface speeds.[232]Speer adopted new prefabrication construction methods, significantly decreasing submarine construction time. It all came too late for the Reich. Allied bombing destroyed the new submarines in dry dock. If such submarines had been put to sea one year earlier, the Battle of the Atlantic could have gotten extremely dangerous for the Allies.
Germany brought its war experience to the industrial front on a few occasions. Panther tank development, although flawed, came from hard experience fighting the Soviet T-34 (the best tank of the war). An entirely new weaponry concept, the assault rifle, flowed from exceptional German field research. Their original German assault weapon, Sturmgewehr 44, became the prototype for the famous Russian AK-47.[233] The Sturmgewehr was arguably the best rifle of the war. Once more, the German idea failed to influence the war, but it exhibited German talent in conceiving an idea from combat experience then bringing it to fruition even as its industrial base was being devastated. The Sherman tank shows the Allies occasionally failed at marrying combat experience with equipment.[234] Somehow, the news that the Sherman was outclassed by German tanks in 1944 failed to reach Allied decision makers in Washington.
Hitler simultaneously maintained numerous overlapping projects, some of them outrageous, thereby squandering valuable resources of every nature. Hitler should have ordered production one very good but easy-to-construct and maintain tank, rather than several excellent but hard-to-build tanks. Germany needed to focus their limited resources on practical projects that could be in the field in a reasonable time. Case in point, the ME 262 jet fighter. Hitler demanded a combination fighter and bomber, thereby delaying production and squandering resources. To really impact the war an early unleashing of the ME 262 in quantity was necessary. Hitler also expended a tidal wave of human effort and hard-to-get materials on vengeance weapons such as the V-1 and V-2 rockets. The V-1 was a simple piece of equipment, easy to produce, modest in cost, and effective in reaching London. Increasing its effectiveness only required a little more effort on improving the guidance system and speed. Hitler instead opted to expend valuable resources on the V-2. Directing these men and materials to speed production of the ME 262 would have increased their impact exponentially.
One set of wasted Nazi resources is difficult to discuss. Hitler ordered the destruction of the Jews, Gypsies, Slavs, Poles, mentally retarded, mentally ill, the old, the sick, the infirm, and more under the “final solution” for his Jewish problem. Millions went to the Nazi industrial killing centers. In purely economic terms this was a massive waste of resources. The use of the trains and trucks to transport these millions of victims misdirected vital transportation units to tasks unrelated to winning the war. In addition, troops were guarding the camps, workers constructing and then maintaining the facilities, and resources were also expended destroying evidence of the evil acts. Many of the murdered were loyal Germans who would have fought for their country. The thousands of men used in this killing effort were sorely needed to fight or work in factories. Some of the murdered were experts in vital fields or highly trained workers, impossible to replace. On the Eastern Front, groups of SS troops (Einsatzgruppen) roamed about killing Slavs by the hundreds of thousands, thereby misusing those resources and turning the entire population against Germany. Recognizing that the minds directing this industrialized murder were twisted, I know I am attempting logic where no logic can apply. Still, we must recognize the massive expenditure and wastage of resources extensively degraded the Nazi war effort. It also proved the true depths of evil confronted by the Western Democracies. The death camps forever answered the question, why did we fight?
Italy’s industrial base was unprepared for war because of outdated methods and machinery. Italian industry had no capacity to produce the quantity of military equipment needed, and it struggled with changes to new manufacturing methods. Thus, Italian troops fought with outdated and difficult to fix equipment. In the North African campaign photos of Italian tanks often show sandbags piled all over them. This was necessary because Allied projectiles easily penetrated the armor. Men saddled with outdated poor quality weapons are seldom highly motivated warriors.
Japan adopted modern industrial methods of design and production before 1910; thus, Japan began the war with excellent weapons of their type. The Japanese “long lance” torpedo (twenty-one inch, oxygen propelled) was the war’s best, and Zero fighters excelled in 1941 (note these are naval developments). A few powerful families (the zaibatsu), following Japanese military directions, operated the Japanese industrial base; however, the Imperial Army was slow to innovate. During the war, Japan failed to develop new weapons or new methods of production. The Kamikaze concept[235] grew out of desperation to make do with out-of-date aircraft that were good for nothing except ramming American ships. Why the Japanese failed to develop newer aircraft, rifles, machine guns, and tanks is difficult to understand. Japan’s industrial giants had two or more years to design and deploy newer weapons before the US bombing campaign became a factor.
The Japanese built excellent ships throughout the war. What the Japanese needed to do was build sufficient merchant shipping to supply their war needs. All of their important raw materials and much of their food came from the south by ship. When American subs began sinking large numbers of cargo vessels Japanese shipbuilders failed to replace the losses. Prewar Japanese planning ignored protection for merchant shipping. For the first six months of the war, because of defective American torpedoes, little damage was done to Japan’s merchant marine; however, after correcting the malfunctions, US submarines extensively damaged the Japan’s cargo fleet. As this disaster unfolded Japan’s leaders ignored the problem. They delayed using the convoy system, failed to develop adequate anti-submarine warfare methods, and did not commit enough ships to protect their vital merchant fleet.
We should note here that industrial and military cooperation between the Axis partners was nil. If Japanese plans for the Long Lance torpedo had made it to Germany before the war the course of the conflict could have changed dramatically. If Japan had adopted German anti-shipping submarine warfare methods the Pacific War would have grown much harder for the Allies.
England’s industry performed well, especially its aircraft industry. England produced the Lancaster, one of the best bombers of WWII, as well as many other superb aircraft. The LST, conceived and designed in England, was built in the United States, showing the knack of the two allies to work closely together toward common goals. The P-51 Mustang was an aircraft that both the United States and England contributed to designing and constructing. Cooperation among allies at this level within the industrial base is phenomenal, and a key reason the Allies won the war. English industry turned out enough freighters, rifles, aircraft, and the like to keep them in the war. The US could, and did, produce these items in such superabundance it became a war-winning factor all by itself.
The Crucial Years
1939 to 1942
The early days of the war were critical because decisions made then caused nearly irreversible impacts on future events and operations. We have discussed many critical decisions above, but note how many were made early in the conflict. Once in place, decisions can take on a life of their own becoming impossible to reverse. I like to think of these as foundational decisions. Allied victory was constructed on excellent foundational decisions early in the war. By contrast, the Germans and Japanese made especially poor foundational decisions. Hitler’s decision to start the war was partially based on an economic problem. His mishandling of the Germany economy placed it on bankruptcy’s edge, and only a conquest with the attendant plunder of raw materials, slave labor, and perhaps precious metals could save it and him. That was a foundational decision of the first order, and very stupid.[236]
North Africa
1940 to 1943
The tank battles in North Africa’s deserts became the stuff of legend. Tanks in the desert are somewhat like ships at sea. Aircraft rule the sea, and the same is true in the desert. The side with air superiority held an unbeatable advantage. Early on the air forces were near equals, but once the Allies gained air superiority it was over.
Figure 54 Southern Approaches to Europe
Mussolini declared war on the Allies hoping to gain a Mediterranean empire. By attacking Egypt from Italy’s Libyan bases on June 10, 1940, and invading Greece through Albania on October 28, 1940, Mussolini fumbled the ball in the end zone. As both invasions turned disastrous, Hitler bailed Mussolini out by directing German units into the Balkans and North Africa. At Greece’s request, the British sent an expeditionary force; but, the Germans quickly rolled up another victory conquering Greece and Crete in the bargain (at a high cost). Hitler also delayed the invasion of the USSR by a few weeks. Whether or not this influenced the war is still debated (more on this later).
After the initial Italian assault in North Africa, British forces drove the Italians back through Libya and captured large numbers of troops and equipment. Mussolini was embarrassed, and it looked as if Britain would soon own North Africa from Egypt to Tunis. Unable to suffer this, Hitler sent a small force to help the Italians in 1940. From this decision the legendary Afrika Korps was born. Their leader, the intrepid General Erwin Rommel, went on the offensive right away. The Germans and their Italian partners soon pushed the English back into Libya, threatening their port redoubt at Tobruk. Back in London Churchill fumed while sending reinforcements, along with demands for new offensive efforts.
Rommel, one of the war’s great generals, consistently bewildered the British in North Africa. He commanded a small military force having so few good tanks it seems miraculous he won at all, much less for so long. The key was his tactical ability. Rommel attacked using combined arms methods mixed with surprise and just enough audacity. He positioned his antitank guns and artillery to support armored assaults. His anti-tank guns included the fearsome 88mm antiaircraft gun adapted to an antitank role. The 88mm could rapidly chew up any group of tanks, thus giving the Afrika Korps an edge in all engagements. On defense, he made the English run a gauntlet of antitank fire before engaging his armor. The English, never absorbing the gist of this, continually attacked without proper artillery or antitank support. Eventually, British General Montgomery used combined arms methods to beat Rommel, but the real key to Montgomery’s victories was overwhelming force. Hitler missed his chance to capture the Suez Canal by failing to reinforce Rommel long before El Alamein, but Hitler consistently refused to reinforce success and just as consistently reinforced failure.
The British took the offensive again in 1942, driving Rommel back toward his start points; but, even though outnumbered he was not to be out-generaled. He struck back at the first opportunity and drove the English east once again, this time conquering Tobruk in 1942. With the fall of Tobruk, Rommel captured some thirty-five thousand enemy troops and a first-rate port. Rommel was eager to press on to Cairo. Nevertheless, there was a rub—supplies.
Rommel’s superior was General Kesselring,[237] in charge of the entire Mediterranean theater of war, and he wanted to halt Rommel’s advance near Tobruk. Kesselring needed all available resources to assault Malta, a small island in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea, controlled by the British, and lying directly across Afrika Korps supply lines. This tiny island caused the Axis enormous problems because English subs and aircraft operating from there ravaged Rommel’s supply lines, often sinking one-half of the shipping bound for North Africa. The Italians worried about shipping losses and the Germans worried about the loss of supplies—especially fuel. The hardworking Allied code breakers knew the sailing time and course of Axis convoys traveling from Italy to North Africa, and this information allowed the despoiling of Italian shipping. (Think on what could happen if the Germans intercepted this much information about Allied convoys! Could one-half of the ships bound for Britain have been lost?)[238]
Rommel wanted Cairo, the key to Egypt, Suez, and perhaps the entire near east. Rommel’s reasoning was straightforward. The English were defeated and were on the run. A tight pursuit, pushing them hard, could result in breaking their army, thereby allowing German forces to win Cairo and the Suez Canal.[239]
Kesselring analyzed the issues differently. He knew Axis logistics (supply) problems were severe in the Mediterranean, and he deeply understood supplies were fundamental to winning any war, especially a war so heavily dependent on tanks and aircraft (both gas hogs).[240] Kesselring recognized the extended supply lines of the Afrika Korps could be their undoing. The British fell back on shorter supply lines, while the German supply lines stretched ever longer. English air power consistently increased, threatening to gain air superiority, and opening the lengthy German supply lines to air attack. Malta must be taken or the Axis faced disaster on the deserts of North Africa. A stop at Tobruk, permitting resource diversions for Malta’s conquest, was critical for supply line protection. Once the supply lines were secure, Rommel could advance on Cairo or defend Tobruk. Hitler decided it was “on to Cairo,” so Rommel kept his meager resources, and Britain kept Malta. German supplies were interdicted at ever-increasing rates even as Hitler refused critical reinforcements for Rommel. This was the key decision in North Africa. On such decisions, the fate of the world often turns.
El Alamein
June to October 1942
Rommel drove eastward until he confronted a new English line north of the Qattara Depression near the tiny railroad stop of El Alamein. The British general Auchinleck decided to forego other defensive positions and retreat to El Alamein, thereby gaining time for preparing a decisive defensive line. The depression, a sinkhole in the desert impassable by tanks or mechanized units, caused a shrinking of the battlefield to a narrow strip of land between the depression and the coast. Up until this point, the armies fought on an open desert without a southern flank. Anchoring defensive positions on the coast protected the northern flank, but the southern part of any position was just hanging in the air. Rommel made good use of this, and his panzers liked rounding the exposed flank to smash it in thus causing many British retreats. Anchoring both the northern and southern flanks ended the dashing war of maneuver Rommel used so well. Instead, Rommel faced a position requiring frontal assaults and static fighting, much like World War I, wholly favoring the English.
Upon arriving at El Alamein, Rommel realized that giving the English preparation time was not a good idea; so he launched a strong frontal attack on General Auchinleck’s forces with his combined German and Italian army in June of 1942. This was the FirstBattle of El Alamein, and it wasthe deciding battle in North Africa. It was now, before the arrival of massive British reinforcements, the Afrika Korps enjoyed its best chance of breaking through the tired and demoralized British.
Rommel’s major problem was the disparity in forces. He controlled eight infantry divisions and four armored consisting of 96,000 men including 56,000 Italians; however, only two of the armored divisions were German panzers. The other two were Italian units with outdated tanks. On paper, Rommel could muster 582 tanks, but only two hundred of them were reliable panzers. To make matters worse, the Axis air forces possessed less than five hundred aircraft. The British Eighth Army fielded 150,000 troops in seven divisions, three armored divisions of 1,114 tanks, 1,000 artillery pieces, supported by 1,500 aircraft, and they had dug-in positions to defend along with exact intelligence on Rommel and his army. A simple review of the forces makes one wonder how the Germans could succeed under any scenario. To win when the forces are lopsided, maneuver is essential; and at El Alamein maneuver was subtracted from victory’s equation. Rommel nearly succeeded anyway. In his estimation, one ridge stood between him and knocking the British out of this ideal defensive area, but that one ridge held against Rommel’s exhausted men and dwindling supplies of fuel and ammunition. The defenders of Ruweisat Ridge, a medium rise of land in the middle of the battlefield, stopped the Third Reich and one of its best generals. Not for the last time, lack of supplies played a key role in the defeat.
For less than appropriate reasons, Churchill replaced Auchinleck with General Montgomery.[241] As fall arrived in the desert, Rommel grew seriously ill and left for hospitalization in Europe.[242] Meanwhile, Montgomery had assembled 220,000 troops, 1,351 tanks, 1,500 aircraft, and over 900 artillery pieces. In tanks and aircraft, the English had a 3 to 1 or better advantage.[243] Montgomery was finally ready, Rommel was hospitalized, and the Germans were unaware the assault was about to begin. Montgomery’s timing was perfect (The code breakers again? Absolutely). Montgomery timed his attack to coincide with Allied landings in French North Africa—far behind Rommel. No matter what occurred at El Alamein, the Germans were in a vise and retreat would be compulsory after the North African landings.[244] El Alamein was a total English victory and a debacle for the Afrika Korps. It’s back broken, it retreated across 1,500 miles of harsh desert with the British Desert Air Force pounding them every step of the way. North Africa fell to the Allies in May 1943. German and Italian prisoners of war exceeded275,000, and over one-half were German. These veteran troops were irreplaceable.
General Kesselring knew the ultimate question of victory or defeat for Germany would not be answered in North Africa; however, total defeat in North Africa could unduly influence the true arena of decision—the USSR. Delay would equal success, but it required a well-thought-out defense in the rugged mountains of Tunis, Malta being in Axis hands, and more air power and sea support. An expensive undertaking, but such a strategy might have added a year to the Allied efforts in North Africa. It is entirely plausible that Kesselring, a master of defensive warfare, could have achieved this goal; nevertheless, he would not get the cooperation of the Fuehrer.
The USSR
June 1944 to August 1945
Barbarossa
Hitler invades the USSR on the same month and day Napoleon invaded Russia, June 22, 1812. This time it was 1941. The result was the same; the destruction of the invading army and its delusional leader, but how it came about was much different. The scale of conflict in the USSR was so immense that anything coming before it, or after, simply fades away in comparison. Millions of men were fighting across thousands of miles of terrain with every device of war available to them. Innumerable numbers of men, aircraft, tanks, trucks, horses, wagons, artillery, and a profusion of other equipment pushed the campaigns forward. Moreover, this war was personal. Hitler and Stalin despised one another and the governmental systems each man controlled. Murder and torture were commonplace. This was industrialized war set to the tune of uncompromising ideologies. Chaos was upon the world, and chaos had a name—Operation Barbarossa.
Hitler doomed his armies before his invasion was underway. Dread gripped the German generals upon Hitler’s announcement that an invasion of the USSR was set for launch in April or May of 1941. Britain remained unconquered, their navy and nation still intact, and her forces were trying to capture North Africa. How could Hitler even contemplate such a move since it would result in a two-front war?[245] Ever since Chancellor Bismarck’s time, Germany knew it was trapped between the power of Russia in the east, and France and England in the west. Because Germany was a central European land power, the generals understood war with the USSR and England would force expenditures of men and materials on two fronts simultaneously, thereby fatally diluting Germany’s combat power.
Orders being what they are, the German general staff dutifully drew up plans for the invasion and used war games to study them.[246] The plans were revised until they satisfied the general staff. In these initial plans, the German staff officers made Moscow the principal objective of the invasion. Taking Moscow would disrupt Russian command and control systems, because Moscow was the transportation and communication hub of the nation, and taking Moscow would make troop movements from one battlefield to another difficult.
The original OKH (German army headquarters) plans called for a drive on Moscow with large forces. Plan 1 used army group center to push to Moscow with smaller but ample forces moving to take Leningrad. In OKH plan 2, the drive to Leningrad employed fewer units, and the campaign for Moscow was even larger. Adolf Hitler dismissed both plans and made up his own plan—which was not war gamed or deeply scrutinized by knowledgeable military men. The Fuehrer’s plan targeted Leningrad by removing large numbers of troops from the critical Moscow drive; thus, vital disconnects began between Hitler and his Wehrmacht army headquarters over the grand strategy. By the way, Hitler’s planning headquarters was OKW. Yep, there were two planning organizations, and Hitler disliked OKH because they had the temerity to argue with him.
Hitler made these demands late in time, and the generals could not dissuade him from this unstudied course of action. Why he demanded these changes is unknown, but Hitler often thought in economic terms rather than military terms. Gaining valuable raw materials such as oil, or cutting off others from the same, often weighed on his mind. The generals concerned themselves with demolishing the enemy’s army as quickly and efficiently as possible. OKH (army headquarters) detested Hitler’s plan, and, when time came to order the armies forward, they often shunned Hitler’s wishes and surreptitiously kept Moscow as the prime objective. Later in the campaign, Hitler completely absorbed the general’s functions and began moving forces himself, and in detail, confusing the goals of the invasion. The lethal decision changing the carefully planned offensive was another dreadful foundational decision which was irreversible.
General Guenther Blumentritt stated that Heinrich von Brauchitsch, Franz Halder, and Gerd von Rundstedt were all against the plan to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941. According to General Blumentritt:
All three realized the difficulties presented by the nature of the country from their experiences in the 1914-1918 war—above all, the difficulties of movement, reinforcement, and supply. Field Marshal von Rundstedt asked Hitler bluntly, “Have you weighed up what you are undertaking in an attack on Russia?”
The original date for the invasion was May 15, 1941, but bad weather and Italy’s Balkans problem postponed the date. Mussolini decided to invade Greece, for prestige mostly, and purposefully failed to inform Hitler of his plan. Italy’s invasion ran into trouble right away, its troops fell back, and Greek forces were soon poised to invade Italian territory. Then the English landed troops in Greece. Unable to stand idly by while his weak ally (dumb too) was invaded and his oil supplies threatened, Hitler sent his panzers into Yugoslavia and Greece. The action ended quickly as Britain fled before the Wehrmacht. Greece surrendered after German troops neared Athens. This operation was an additional example of the Wehrmacht’s superb fighting ability in 1941. On the heels of this victory, Hitler allowed a German parachute army to invade Crete. The Germans won a close fight, but the losses were heavy.[247]
Did this diversion cost precious time? The invasion date for Barbarossa moved to June 22; accordingly, about a month was lost on top of wear and tear on equipment, loss of men, fuel, and other resources. However, the German generals said bad weather delayedthe invasion date, and weather histories confirm their claim.
The battles in the USSR determined the outcome of WWII. Germany was tackling a giant. It needed an excellent plan of attack, outstanding leadership, and good luck at every turn. They received none of the above. The German leadership in the field was extraordinary, and the German generals and their troops performed skillfully; but, Hitler created a shoddy plan, made farcical decisions during the struggle, and the Soviets received the luck—like the worst winter in decades.
Barbarossa’s scale was unimaginable. Barbarossa easily overshadows the D-Day invasion, Battle of the Bulge, or the entire Pacific campaign. The Germans attacked the USSR with 3.5 million men, 3,400 tanks, and 1,945 aircraft. The Soviet forces comprised 2.5 to4.7 million men, 20,000 tanks, and 7,700 aircraft. The Germans caught the USSR by surprise, which is astonishing in itself because Stalin received numerous warnings of the coming assault; however, great spies are one thing, believing their information is another. Whatever the cause, the Russian Army suffered shocking losses because Stalin lacked good sense. The USSR lost 1,200 aircraft the first day, and subsequent Luftwaffe operations continued to destroy numerous outdated Soviet aircraft. As the offensive went forward German close air support of their troops was the difference between victory and defeat in numerous battles. Entire armies of Soviet troops were surrounded by the Germans and forced to surrender (six hundred thousand plus at Kiev alone); however, the German encirclements never managed to bag enough Russian troops to shatter their ability to resist. Many Russians avoided capture because of porous Wehrmacht lines. The Soviet losses of men and equipment became staggering. Stalin’s orders to shoot any man falling back helped the Germans bag a lot more men.
In spite of these majestic German victories, the Russians continued to counterattack consistently. The Russian’s secret tank, the T-34, surprised and astounded the German troops. Initially, nothing stopped the clanking monster. After discovering the awe-inspiring 88 mm flack cannon could demolish the Soviet T-34, morale improved; nonetheless, meeting a squadron of T-34s set German commanders on edge. The well-developed combined arms doctrine, and the Wehrmacht’s superb leadership, carried the offensive forward.
At first, the German invasion went well, killing or capturing millions in Soviet troops and spectacular amounts of equipment. As the drive proceeded the generals became more optimistic, and they made statements that they won the war in the first six weeks. An impartial observer can understand why. The Germans killed, captured, or wounded perhaps six million Russians and destroyed over one year’s worth of equipment production, enough to man and equip an army almost twice as large as the German invasion force. The estimates of USSR losses: 802,000 killed; 3,000,000 wounded; 3,300,000 captured; 21,200 aircraft destroyed; and 20,500 tanks destroyed. Major cities and industrial areas rich with raw materials fell to the invaders as well as thousands of square miles of farmland. This kind of damage would destroy any nation, right?
Figure 55 Operation Barbarossa 1941
After the war, Gerd von Rundstedt explained why the German Army failed to conquer the Soviet Union in 1941:
“Long before winter came the chances had been diminished owing to the repeated delays in the advance that were caused by bad roads, and mud. The ‘black earth’ of the Ukraine could be turned into mud by ten minutes rain—stopping all movement until it dried. That was a heavy handicap in a race with time. It wasincreased by a lack of railways in Russia—for bringing up supplies to ouradvancing troops. Another adverse factor was the way the Russians received continual reinforcements from their back areas, as they fell back. It seemed to us that as soon as one force was wiped out, the path was blocked by the arrival of a fresh force.”
In spite of terrible losses the USSR continued to counterattack Nazi units, and Soviet troops defended mother Russia fanatically, but the diverging three German drives continued. Then Hitler ordered a halt to Army Group Center’s advance in October of 1941. For two months that summer, General Bock’s troops sat at the Desna river. Worse, Hitler ordered huge numbers of troops redirected away from the advance on Moscow to battles of encirclement far to the south. Hitler failed to understand how difficult it was to move thousands upon thousands of men and their equipment in a new direction over land with very poor roads. The encirclements worked and bagged large numbers of Soviet troops, but the drive to Moscow stalled.
Leningrad was within the reach of the northern German thrust, but Hitler ordered a stop and that gave the Russians time to reinforce the city. When the German drive resumed they failed to make good headway. Hitler then ordered a siege, because fighting in a city was not his army’s prowess (he said in 1941—how soon he would forget). Leningrad would hold, although Soviet soldiers and civilians endured a 900 day siege producing inestimable famine and suffering. Hitler again, for reason unknown, threw away a key opportunity for victory.
General Guenther Blumentritt was convinced that the German Army could have taken Leningrad in 1941. He stated,
“Leningrad could have been taken, probably with little difficulty. But after his experience at Warsaw in 1939 Hitler was always nervous about taking big cities, because of the losses he had suffered there. The tanks had already started on the last lap of the advance when Hitler ordered them to stop—as he had done atDunkirk in 1940. So no genuine attack on Leningrad was attempted in 1941,contrary to appearances—although all preparations had been completed, including the mounting of long-range artillery that had been brought from France.”
As the Wehrmacht advanced, special killing squads (Einsatzgruppen) advanced behind the front killing Jews, Gypsies, and Slavs just for breathing. These roaming death squads murdered perhaps hundreds of thousands of civilians, but the numbers are uncertain. People initially welcoming the Germans as liberators, and eager to help overthrow Stalin, turned against the invaders and began resisting in every way possible. War is brutal in any event, but this war became more brutal by the hour. This was modern total war, a war of annihilation, devoid of mercy. No civilians and no soldiers, in the classical sense, existed any longer—only the living and the dead. And the living were in the business of creating many more dead.
Stalin allowed 2 million people to leave Moscow as the Germans drew close, but he stayed. Everyone who could walk assisted in building defenses for the communist capital. The world held its breath as the fascist slogged toward victory . . . then it began to snow. The temperature dropped like a stone, and the German advance froze—literally. With few winter clothes (poor logistical planning again), little shelter, and the wrong oil for their vehicles and guns, German troops froze to death as their equipment failed. Tank engines refused to run, machine guns jammed, and freezing, dog-tired men huddled in trenches trying to survive. Horses, the mainstay of the German supply system, died by the thousands. The Wehrmacht was finished. Not even Hitler’s towering rage could get freezing, worn out men to move in these conditions, especially after months of constant warfare.
German logistics experts predicted the greatest extent of the German advance. Before the invasion started, and not knowing the specifics of the various plans, they accurately predicted how far the Wehrmacht could progress before a long halt would be necessary.[248] Calculating the Russian railroads were a different gauge than Western European railroads (necessitating building new railroads from the Russian border on), the supplies available, fuel resources, amount of fodder required for the horses, the number of tires, the maintenance requirements, and so on, the logistic experts got it right. It was predictable. Hitler’s plan should have considered these estimates, but it did not. Modern military leaders know that amateurs study strategy and tactics, professionals study logistics. Hitler was an obvious amateur, and he made the fundamental error of downplaying logistics and ignoring the professionals. As in World War I, Germany now faced a long two-front war without sufficient resources, and military experts knew it. Hitler directed Germany to its doom, but it would take time for the ax to fall. Nonetheless, it was falling. Hitler had lost.[249]
As if to put an exclamation point on the fact, the Soviets launched an offensive in December of 1941 with fresh armies of Siberian troops who were quite used to winter conditions. Hitler issued his customary “no retreat!” order. The German forces fell back two hundred miles in spite of the order, but the Soviet offensive finally stalled. German losses were great, but they had held. The great professionalism of the German Army came through during the Siberian offensive. Freezing, starving men, operating near frozen equipment, shot the Soviet Siberian armies to pieces. Superior German tactics and field leadership accomplished a miracle. However, the German Army was clearly diminished by the ordeal. Never again would the German Army be the force it was in June of 1941. Its equipment improved, but the men were gone. Irreplaceable men, who successfully fought from Poland to Norway, France to the Balkans, and then to Moscow’s gates were gone forever, and with them the unbeatable Wehrmacht.
No Retreat
A controversy has arisen over Hitler’s “no retreat” order given as the Siberian Army’s offensive began. Many great historians (Shier, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, for one) argue this order saved the German Army. They believe that without this order the German Army would have disintegrated and suffered a butchering, just as Napoleon’s army retreating from Moscow had in 1812. I do not agree. The German Army of 1941 was not Napoleon’s army. The Wehrmacht would have prevailed because of its impressive leadership and discipline. In fact, a general retreat might have saved more men and equipment. [250] We can never know what may have occurred without the order. Hitler did give the order, and no rout occurred; that much we know. Nevertheless, why did no rout occur? Was it the order, or was it the men carrying it out? The men were the key, not the order.
Thus, the German Army faltered against terrific odds and it lost significant combat power. The Wehrmacht captured a large part of the Soviet Union in 1941, and should have gone over to the defense. Most postwar generals, and the German generals in 1941, think that would have been the wise move. Germany’s Army would be on the defense, and using its superior mobility with reserves still available could have imposed significant additional casualties on the attacking Soviets. It could take years, but a moderately successful defense might have pried peace overtures out of the Soviet Union. Hitler—ever the blockhead—demanded the outright conquest of the USSR and threw away this defensive advantage.
Moving Soviet Factories to the Urals
The Soviets accomplished numerous miracles in WWII; however, the movement of their heavy industry to the Ural Mountains stands out. When it became apparent the Germans would overrun large parts of the western USSR, the Soviets dismantled their heavy factories and moved them east, well past Moscow, to the Ural Mountains. The Soviets accomplished this feat of innovation in record time, quickly putting the factories back in production. The loss of these manufacturing facilities would have extensively harmed Soviet logistics capabilities. While moving their aircraft factories, they retooled them to produce up-to-date aircraft superior to their Nazi counterparts. This was another foundational decision extensively contributing to the Soviet victory over Germany.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, WWII was taking another turn for the worst against the Axis, but for over a year it did not look that way.
Japan Enters the War December 7, 1941
Background
Japan had planned for a war against the United States since at least 1905[251] (the date of the Russo-Japanese War), and by 1930 America was the inevitable enemy. After 1930, militarist factions took over Japan’s government and began urging the conquest of the Far East. Even when the civilian government in Tokyo firmly opposed expansion the military did what it wanted. With Tokyo’s blessing, Korea was “annexed” as the diplomats would say at the League of Nations, and operated as a fiefdom of what was now Imperial Japan.
In September 1931, the Japanese military invaded Manchuria, winning control in six months. Many date this invasion as the true start of the Second World War because it was brutal fascist aggression that set the stage for future events. The Japanese formed a puppet state and requested its recognition by the League of Nations. The League refused, and Japan walked out. Japanese overseas troops were staging “incidents” to incite short but victorious conflicts with China, which Japan would settle after China granted Japan’s territorial demands. After conquering Manchuria, the Japanese triggered another “incident” at the Marco Polo Bridge which lead to another armed conflict with China. This time China refused Japan’s demands for territory and repatriations. By August of 1937 an all-out war raged in northern China, and the war was spreading. In November of 1937, Japanese troops occupied Nanking[252] and began a remorseless orgy of murder, rape, and plunder. Reports of these savage acts went by without real protest, and no action from the League of Nations and the Western Democracies.
In December of 1934 Japan allowed the Washington Naval Treaty (an arms limitation agreement) to expire. September of 1940 saw the Japanese government sign the Tripartite Pact with Hitler. It was a protective treaty with each guaranteeing to support the other in case of war. For Japan, the treaty’s main purpose was threatening the Soviet Union with a two front war if it attacked Japan. It was not a real military alliance in the normal sense of the word, but it took America by surprise and heightened the sense of confrontation with Japan.
A significant but little discussed event took place on the northern border of Manchuria in July 1938 when the Soviets and Japanese clashed at the Battle of Lake Hassan. The USSR, under Zhukov, beat the Japanese easily, and inflicted high casualties. In 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had quickly defeated Russia (pre-communist) on land and sea causing a stir in Europe. Thirty-three years later the Soviets handed the Japanese their heads in this one-sided land engagement. The Soviets expertly used numerous tanks and stunning new combined arms tactics, easily outclassing the Japanese in every phase of the battle. Soviet tanks made the Japanese equipment look like junk. Japanese antitank weapons proved useless against Soviet armor (wonder how the Germans missed this?).
Studying this battle extensively, the stunned Japanese determined that competing against the Soviets required a complete reworking of their armed forces, its equipment, battle tactics, and strategy. Japanese generals calculated it might take five years plus millions of dollars to remake its army. This was too much time and far too much money. Thus, Japan decided it must avoid attacking the Soviet Union. The push into China would continue, but to attack north was simply out of the question. The Japanese looked south after this battle for conquests. This decision held greatconsequences for the Western Democracies, especially the United States of America.
Japan’s military believed the war with China would be over within a few months after the Marco Polo Bridge incident, but China snubbed surrender and territorial concessions. Chiang Kai-Shek, the Nationalist Chinese leader, retreated into China’s hinterland, fought delaying battles, and allowed China to swallow the Japanese. Chinese Nationalist troops were poorly armed and led, and were often loyal to the local warlord rather than the central government. However, Chiang realized he did not have to defeat the Japanese. He only had to avoid a total defeat himself. The Chinese Communists were also present in force; nonetheless, they chose to sit out the war in their strongholds in the Northern provinces while allowing their Nationalist opponents and the Japanese to destroy one another. Later, they could step in, destroy the “winners,” and claim China as a communist state (it worked). The communists and the Nationalist had been fighting a brutal civil war for years before the Japanese invasion, which is one reason China was so weak.
The United States, concerned about Japanese aggression against China, put continual diplomatic pressure on Tokyo to end the war. Tokyo refused. As tensions grew Japan gained permission (through German persuasion) from the Vichy French to occupy French Indochina. Japan had also signed the Tripartite Pact in September 1940. America was incensed at these moves, and in August of 1941 put an embargo on oil shipments to Japan.[253] This was a disaster for the Japanese because they obtained about 80 percent of their oil from the United States.[254]
Japan decided war with the west was the only course open to them, and they began meticulous preparations for attacking the United States, British, Dutch, and Australian military units in the Pacific. The plan was to damage the US Fleet at Pearl Harbor then systematically move south, capturing the oil and resource-rich areas of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. Realizing the impossibility of successfully invading Australia or America, the plan required seizing large regions of the Pacific around their main objectives (Java, Singapore, Malaya, Borneo), thereby forcing the Americans and their allies to attack through the perimeter and march island by island to the Japanese homeland. Japan beleived Americans ought to tire of the war quickly, especially with defeats at sea and bloody island invasions sapping their morale, causing them to seek a negotiated peace. Japan would retain China plus whatever remained of her island empire. Many Japanese leaders realized a long war doomed Japan, but they hoped their calculations were correct and the United States and its Allies would quit after a short but bloody war.
Some historians argue the United States forced the Japanese into war with its oil embargo. These historians think the US left the Japanese no choice; therefore, the United States brought the war on itself with short sighted polices leaving the Japanese without options.
This position is brainless. All the United States was asking of Japan was to stop slaughtering the Chinese. Is that so hard? The Japanese simply desired war, even though many other options were open to them. If Japan pulled back from Indochina and stopped attacking in mainland China, the United States probably would have kept the oil flowing. America was deeply isolationist, and President Franklin Roosevelt wanted to avoid a war with Japan. Of the many courses of action open to Japan she decided only one was valid; thus, by absolutely rejecting all US demands she left war as the only option. National honor and the transition from a “have not” to a “have” nation all played key roles in Japanese thinking, but no matter how one slices it America was not threatening Japan or trying to expand American territory in the east. Expansion and war were Japanese national policies long before 1941, and China was the main target. It is interesting to note the USA had no plans to attack Japan over China. Because of isolationist sentiments, if Japan did nothing the USA’s only recourse was to economic sanctions.
The decision for war in 1941 may have revolved around intelligence gained from the German seizure of a British ship carrying memos from a British war cabinet meeting. In the memos Britain stated it had no resources for defending its Asian Empire. Japan may have acted because this allowed them to capture Britain’s Imperial holdings and limited them to one bona fide adversary, the US Navy.
Japan’s history included conducting surprise attacks before declaring war. Historically, these surprise attacks, such as Port Arthur before the Russo-Japanese War, heavily damaged the enemy’s naval capabilities giving Japan the edge. In 1905, Russia’s fleet had to sail long distances from the Black Sea to Japanese home waters and only then was able to engage Japan’s fleet. The Japanese were waiting, and they sallied forth at the best moment for the decisive battle with a tired and demoralized Russian enemy. After one splendid victory, shattering the enemy’s fleet, Russia requested terms. Knowing this, the US prepared for a surprise attack . . . right?
Deciding Factors In the Pacific
The Japanese would lose the war based on some of the factors listed below in no particular order:
1. Japan’s false assumptions were the foundations of defeat. For example, Japan believed its fighting spirit was superior to the West. Japan viewed war as a spiritual fight most of all, and only Japan possessed the necessary spirit to win. Japan, limited by its prewar assumptions, stuck with their original war plan; however, the US Navy came up with stunning new ways of advancing across the Pacific which the Japanese failed to match. All their major prewar assumptions proved false.
2. The Americans broke the Japanese codes which led to American victories at Midway, the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and other critical engagements. Assume Japan broke the American codes while the Japanese codes remained secure and the importance of code breaking becomes clear. Japan would know the US Fleet’s location, thus giving Japan a major advantage in each battle. Midway would turn into a terrible American loss, as would Guadalcanal and other crucial engagements.
3. Lack of Japanese war-production capability. The island nation of Japan had a good ability to turn out war materials; however, that capacity was far below that of the United States alone. Add in the production of Britain and Japan was completely outclassed. For example, this chart is the merchant ship tonnage produced during the war:
USA 33,993,230 tons
Japan 4,152,361
UK 6,378,899
Italy 469,606
4. Lack of production flexibility in developing better aircraft types, ships, or even small arms during the war. Japan could not effectively bring its war experience to its production lines, and failed to design newer and better weapons to place in the field.
5. Lack of doctrinal flexibility. Once the Japanese decided how to fight the war they stuck with those ideas. Meanwhile, the Allies changed war itself. Island hopping was one innovation destroying the Japanese assumption that each occupied island must fall for the Allies to reach their homeland. Japan’s planners also failed to account for the effect of submarine warfare on their merchant fleet. Japan’s merchant fleet incurred heavy damaged before the Japanese responded, and even the late response remained insufficient.
6. Staying with traditions too long. Because of the Japanese traditional belief in the decisive battle (one all or nothing battle), it became axiomatic to think about naval warfare those terms. The idea became an unstated assumption—which is the worst kind of supposition. This tradition (unstated assumption) remained unexamined and therefore unchallenged. Recognizing such an assumption is necessary for unclouded thinking. In fact, in a modern naval war the size of World War II many battles would take place and no one of them would be completely decisive. Another unstated, but natural, assumption was Japan would win the decisive battle. Even after several losses Japanese admirals kept saying that if they could bring the Americans into the decisive battle Japan could win the war. Japan’s leaders needed to recognize there were “decisive” battles, but Japan had lost them. In the Japanese mind this failed to compute, as Japan must win the decisive battle.
The Japanese assumptions about America refusing to fight long wars were closer to reality in 1940 than one might think. In War Plan Orange, the battle plan for war with Japan, US Naval planners assumed a war must be won quickly or US citizens would revolt. Even in 1919, Orange planners assumed the war must be won in less than two years or voters would tire of the effort and make the political decision to quit. The redoubtable Admiral Mahan concluded the American public could not even tolerate a two year conflict. He believed, as did the Japanese, that American society was fickle and had no stomach for hardships. Naval planners predicted that Orange (Japan) would wage a war of endurance trying to outlast the US. It is plain that the original Japanese assumptions were near the mark. It was the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor, Japanese brutality, and effective propaganda management that allowed the US to fight on past two years. (P. 26-30, War Plan Orange, Miller, 1991, US Naval Institute).
The stage was set for the largest naval war in world history, and it started with the United States, Britain, Holland, and Australia being frequently humiliated at the hands of the experienced and well prepared Japanese.
PEARL HARBOR and the
JAPANESE CENTRIFICAL OFFENSIVE
1941 & 1942
In my opinion, war is the art of ambush, and Admiral Yamamoto’s attack on Pearl Harbor was an excellent ambush.[255] Redact out Japanese bad luck at Pearl Harbor and the war’s history is different. Most documentaries covering the Japanese attack detail US errors, bad luck, and missed clues to the coming surprise attack. Seldom do such programs point out the Japanese errors or their extremely poor luck.[256] The key Japanese error was failing to launch a planned third wave attack against oil and dry dock installations at Pearl Harbor. Their bad luck included not finding theAmerican carriers in port and not getting the declaration of war delivered on time. Japanese errors and bad luck actually exceeded the bad luck and errors of the Americans.
Overwhelming US errors are well summarized in congressional investigations concluding there was a lack of “air mindedness” among American commanders. Also, while many calculated Japan would strike they assumed the strike location was the Philippines. Because of this false assumption when information came in suggesting an air attack on American units people were thinking Manila (in the Philippines) rather than Pearl Harbor. As a result surprise was total. The United States paid a heavy price for this surprise in men and material at Pearl Harbor.
The Western Democracies were unprepared for modern war. They were lacking the men, equipment, training, and the hard attitudes necessary for victory. Peace movements following World War I are partly to blame. Peace movements argued anything was better than war. The US only slowly awoke to the fact that some things are worse than war. Slavery and murder at the hands of power-mad dictators for example, but it took time for the average person to see the truth. War or slavery was the choice. War it would be, but a war the Western Democracies were ill prepared to fight.
Pearl Harbor was not the main objective of the overall Japanese offensive. Japan’s main goal was capturing the oil and resource-rich areas to the south of the Philippines, including Dutch Borneo, Sumatra, and Malaya. The attack on Pearl Harbor was aimed at crippling the striking power of the US Fleet long enough for the Japanese to seize their new empire and establish a defensive parameter. Japan needed to take key South and Central Pacific islands, build airfields, and fortify their positions against the eventual assault by the United States Navy.
Pearl Harbor
On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, at about 7:50 AM, 353 Japanese aircraft, flying in two waves, struck the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.[257] The US Pacific Fleet was smashed in one of the most successful attacks in history. The United States was at peace when the attack struck. Japanese diplomats in Washington DC were required to deliver a declaration cutting off all negotiations about thirty minutes before the attack. This message substituted for a formal declaration of war; however, Japan’s Washington Embassy did not have a good typist that day (it was Sunday and the secretaries were gone) so translating and typing the document took too much time. The result was the critical message telling America that Japan was breaking off diplomatic relations (going to war) arrived over an hour late. By then Pearl Harbor blazed with the wreckage of the US Fleet, and over 2,400 Americans lay dead from the assault.
The late delivery of this crucial message was a political blunder of the highest order—right up there with the Zimmerman Telegram of WWI. This was now a sneak attack. Admiral Yamamoto himself stated, “I can think of nothing that would infuriate theAmericans more . . .” He knew America well, and realized a sneak attack would drive the United States to crush Japan. After Pearl Harbor no terms were possible. Another result of Pearl Harbor was unintended; the sneak attack completely united the heretofore deeply divided nation. Prior to the raid, the United States was split between the isolationist and those wanting to enter the European war. Roosevelt promised in a speech for his unprecedented third term that he would not send US troops into a European war. Now that Hitler was conquering Europe the promise looked increasingly dumb; however, the Japanese attack coupled with Hitler’s declaration of war on the USA freed Roosevelt and Congress from any restraints.
Figure 56 Pearl Harbor Air Raid, December 7, 1941
The Pearl Harbor raid destroyed the mighty US battleships, but ships at sea dodged destruction and three US aircraft carriers, the raid’s main target, were at sea. This was blind luck and nothing else. Japan’s bad luck should include the fact that the Japanese took several precautions to ensure the carriers were at Pearl before the attack, but every one of the precautions failed. Providence dispensed two vital breaks to the United States of America: the first was an attack coupled with a political blunder that united the nation as nothing else could, and second was the miraculous deliverance of all its most vital aircraft carriers.
Admiral Nagumo, the leader of the strike force hitting Pearl Harbor, decided to forgo the third wave attack on Pearl Harbor aimed at the construction yards, dry docks, and oil facilities. Because of this decision, made over the objections of the officers on his bridge, the United States was to have critical dry dock and oil facilities throughout the coming months when the Japanese had the edge in the Pacific. It was a poor decision, but Nagumo’s reasoning contained a bit of logic. He knew his force of six aircraft carriers were essential for the main thrust into the Southern Pacific. Nagumo also realized his main targets were not at Pearl Harbor, and he did not know where they were. If a US carrier surprised him he might have one or more of his carriers lost or heavily damaged. Nagumo stated it was going to be a long war (a different attitude from some of his superiors) and the aircraft, pilots, and ships would be needed. He did not want to lose them on a mission to tidy up the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nagumo’s first wave had lost 9 aircraft, but his second wave lost 20. A third wave assault might cost a lot more. In addition, waiting around for a third wave to return would take hours, and every hour exposed his fleet to assault by US submarines or carriers. His objective, crippling the US Fleet, was attained, so why incur additional risks?
Looking back over sixty years Nagumo’s error appears appalling; however, we should try to put ourselves into the situation at the time of the attack and realize Nagumo focused on a broader picture that included the South Pacific. What really hurts Nagumo, from a historian’s point of view, is all his fellow officers were in favor of the third wave assault. None-the-less, Nagumo’s strike force sunk the US Fleet at a cost of 29 aircraft lost. A cheap victory.
Japans’ Southern Offensive
1941 & 1942
Japan’s southern offensive was superlative. The closely planned attacks went off precisely and professionally with spectacular results. Everywhere Japan was ascendant. On most islands, such as Dutch Borneo, there was virtually no resistance, although Dutch engineers set the oil fields on fire, and the Japanese beheaded them for their trouble. Hong Kong, after light resistance, surrendered on Christmas Day 1941. There were two keys to the region: Singapore at the end of the Malay Peninsula (British), and Manila Bay in the Philippines (American). In both cases troops were available in sufficient numbers to put up a good fight, but in both cases, Japanese commanders utterly out generaled the Allied commanders, while inflicting appalling troop losses on the ill prepared Dutch, British, and US forces.[258]
Singapore
From Singapore the British could control the oil rich areas of the South Pacific. If this bastion held the Japanese would have trouble getting their merchant shipping back to Japan. When analyzing the defensive position at Singapore the English calculated an assault would most likely come from the sea. Of course, the British knew an assault could come down the Malaya Peninsula, but they assumed any such attack through the dense jungle would take months, giving them time to react. Unfortunately for the British the key to the area was no longer Singapore harbor, it was air power. The British long ago pulled most of their first line aircraft out of Malaya, and the remaining planes needed maintenance. The Japanese spotted the few completed air bases and quickly destroyed the sparse numbers of English aircraft. Japan easily gained total air supremacy.[259]
Even though resources were scarce, Churchill sent two of Britain’s most powerful ships to defend the Asian fortress: the Prince of Whales (a battleship) and the Repulse (a battle cruiser) along with four destroyers. When Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, commander of this striking force, gained intelligence of Japanese landings underway on the Malaya Peninsula he was determined to strike. He called for air cover from land-based aircraft, and he counted on darkness and poor weather to keep his ships invisible until he was on the Japanese transports, but luck had abandoned the striking force. On December 10, 1941, the weather cleared, no air cover appeared, and a Japanese submarine found the two large ships and reported their position. An all-out air attack sunk both ships in minutes.
The sinking of these two capital ships was an important moment in history. Never before had capital ships under power at sea and ready for battle been destroyed by aircraft. For a decade, the battleship admirals had claimed aircraft could not sink a battleship underway and ready for action—at least not easily. Aircraft had easily sunk battleships moored in port with surprise attacks, but this time fully manned and ready battleships swiftly slid beneath the waves after an air attack at sea. About 300 years of history also slid beneath the waves as aircraft now ruled the seas, and ships carrying those aircraft became the capital ships of the fleet.[260]
The British in Singapore were now without air cover or naval assets. Still, it seemed they should be able to significantly delay or stop a Japanese attack down the peninsula. In this they failed. British troops were not sufficiently trained in jungle warfare, did not possess the right equipment, and their commanders were unable to get a handle on how to stop the rapid Japanese advance. The Japanese were experienced jungle fighters and quickly outflanked defensive lines placed by the British. Consistently forced back, the British set up one defensive position after another, but flanking attacks, infiltration or landings from the sea jeopardized each site. Simple equipment, like the bicycle, hastened the Japanese advance leaving the British defenders reeling. Moreover, the Japanese brought tanks. British commanders thought the jungle was much too dense for tanks; nevertheless, like the Ardennes forest in Belgium, the Allies were mistaken once again. With tanks and bicycles the Japanese advanced rapidly keeping the English defenders off balance and preventing the construction of adequate lines of defense. By January 1942, the Japanese stood at the northern gates of Singapore.
Figure 57 Japanese Advance on Singapore
Singapore is an island, and the recently reinforced British forces should have held out against the exhausted Japanese force for months. Instead, Singapore was immediately subjected to artillery bombardment and aircraft attacks. The Japanese rapidly crossed to the island and captured the fortress in February of 1942. Approximately 130,000 men surrendered. It was a great defeat and the largest surrender in English history. Very few of these men ever saw Britain again. They would die of starvation and physical abuse in Japanese slave labor camps. The privates paid a high price for the ineffectiveness of their generals, as usual.
This disaster falls completely upon the British commanders for failing to prepare the peninsula for defense through properly training and equipping their men, preparing dug in defensive positions well ahead of time, and properly positioning their lines. Another general was displaying similar incompetence in the Philippines, only this commander was American.
The Philippines
General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964), an American icon lionized by the nation during and after World War II, was the man in charge of defending the Philippines and the vital harbor at Manila Bay. In this he utterly failed, causing thousands of men to die needlessly or suffer horribly at the hands of the merciless Japanese.
Prior to World War II the United States, as nations always do, planned for a war with Japan.[261] The planners assumed Japan would invade the Philippines at the outset of war. War Plan Orange (the code name for the plan; orange being the code word for Japan) called for a retreat to the Bataan Peninsula and the small island of Corregidor guarding the entrance to Manila Bay, the best harbor in the region.[262] The Japanese would have to take Bataan to control the Philippines. MacArthur was to fall back to fully preparedpositions on Bataan and Corregidor then hold out until the United States could send help. In fact, Washington knew help was impossible to send in a timely manner; as a result, the men on Bataan and Corregidor were doomed in all but the most favorable circumstances. The point of the defense was to prolong the conquest and remain a thorn in Japan’s side for as long as possible.
Figure 58 Japanese conquest of the Philippines 1942
MacArthur rejected this “defeatist” attitude and decided to defend the Philippines at the landing beaches and expel the invader. This was an unwise decision. The war planners in Washington knew the striking power Japan could bring against the isolated and distant islands and they knew the Japanese would have the initiative.[263] MacArthur decided on a defense requiring the American and Philippine forces to attack and repel the invader upon his landing. If the enemy took the beaches he would fight them all the way to Manila. Unfortunately, the Philippine forces were far from first line troops, and the American forces were few and without adequate equipment for such an adventure. In addition, MacArthur had no idea where the Japanese would land.
It gets worse. MacArthur utterly failed to prepare a defense on Bataan. Moreover, no food or medical supplies were stored on the peninsula. MacArthur failed to follow orders, and he failed to develop a backup plan in case his new plan collapsed. American troops would pay the price in blood for MacArthur’s incompetence in this critical matter.
Figure 59 Japanese assaults on Bataan 1942
The Japanese landings took place in the northern areas of Luzon on December 10, 1942, and then quickly moved south toward Manila. Regretfully, for the Americans, the critical battle had already taken place. After warnings that Pearl Harbor had been bombed, and pleas from his air commanders to allow them to strike Formosa where the Japanese air forces were concentrated, MacArthur did nothing. Soon thereafter, MacArthur’s entire air force was destroyed on the ground by Japanese air raids. Without air cover the navy was forced to leave stripping the islands of everything except infantry forces. Japan moved forward with complete air and naval superiority. There was no hope now.
Figure 60 Japanese Conquest 1942
In spite of the loss of his air force and his naval support, MacArthur insanely went forward with his plan to meet the invader north of Manila. Japan’s excellent veteran troops with air and sea support routed the combined Filipino and American forces. The Japanese then began maneuvering to surround Manila where the Japanese assumed the Americans would make their last stand. This assumption helped with the withdrawal to Bataan. As a complete military disaster stalked the defenders, General Wainwright (MacArthur’s second in command) managed to reposition key units allowing the army to reach Bataan. However, MacArthur failed to prepare Bataan for a siege and the hastily retreating army took little food or medical supplies with them. Wounds, disease, and hunger proved to be an enemy every bit as strong and effective as the Japanese at eliminating the defenders.
Bataan’s American and Filipino troops threw back Japanese attacks, including amphibious assaults on the western beaches; however, they continued falling back. Starving and ragged men fought while suffering from malaria and constant gnawing hunger. Food rations diminished to one thousand calories per day. Japanese artillery pounded the men, enemy aircraft bombed and strafed their positions, and to all this Allied soldiers possessed no effective answer. MacArthur kept demanding help from Washington, but after the defeat at Pearl Harbor no help was possible. The US Navy was just holding on around Australia, and the destruction of MacArthur’s air force doomed ships trying to gain access to Bataan, except occasional submarines and PT boats. The defenders fought on until May 8, 1942 when Wainwright surrendered the last of his emaciated command on Corregidor. The Philippines had fallen.
MacArthur missed the surrender because he was in Australia demanding that Wainwright fight on. Escaping by PT boat on February 22, 1942, along with the president of the Philippines, he then went by aircraft to the comforts of Australia. After Wainwright surrendered MacArthur demanded he be court-martialed. President Franklin Roosevelt had appointed MacArthur as the US Army’s commander for the Pacific Theater of War. The starving dying men he left behind would never understand Roosevelt’s decision.[264]
After the surrender of the Filipino and American forces the Japanese subjected the men to the vilest murder and torture. Japanese soldiers thought surrender was dishonorable, and quitting proved you were not a soldier. Few of the more than eighty thousand American and Filipino prisoners of war would return. Over twelve thousand died in the Bataan Death March alone. Meanwhile, from Australia, MacArthur avowed to the press corps, “I shall return . . .”[265]
While the conquest of Bataan and Singapore continued, Japan also pushed a rapid advance through the South Pacific. Sea control was critical, thus, a combined Allied force of American, British, Dutch, and Australian (ABDA) ships under Admiral Doorman (Dutch navy) attacked the Japanese at the Battle of the Java Sea on February 27, 1942. The small fleet was making a last gasp attempt to slow the Japanese juggernaut. Due to poor coordination among the Allied ships, and excellent tactical control by the Japanese commanders, a smaller Japanese force annihilated the ABDA force.[266] ABDA lost 5 cruisers, 5 destroyers, and 2,300 sailors. The disaster is right up there with Pearl Harbor. Japan lost four loaded transports. By May 1942, the Japanese fleet of eleven battleships, ten aircraft carriers, eighteen heavy cruisers, and twenty-eight light cruisers plus numerous destroyers had campaigned from Pearl Harbor to the Indian Ocean without the loss of a single major ship. Along the way they destroyed or damaged every battleship in the US Pacific fleet, damaged the US Far East squadron at the Philippians, annihilated the ABDA naval force, chased the Royal Navy from the southern seas, and forced the Australian navy back to its home waters. Total victory sailed with Japan. The only forces left in the Pacific that threatened them were the three US aircraft carriers that Japan missed at Pearl Harbor.
Admiral Yamamoto, Japan’s chief of naval operations, was lobbying for an effort in the Central Pacific to lure the US carrier fleet out to its destruction in a decisive action. He knew the United States would out produce Japan in a long war so he thought it a necessity to destroy the US aircraft carriers now, before the US Fleet recovered from its defeats. The Japanese high command wanted to continue the push to the south and draw the US Fleet into an action there. Yamamoto argued the US Navy must believe a vital asset was in jeopardy before they would choose to do battle with the more powerful Japanese Combined Fleet. He believed actions in the south would not draw the US Navy into battle. By attacking and seizing Midway Island he threatened Pearl Harbor by putting it in bomber range. The Doolittle raid on Tokyo (April 18, 1942) decided the matter.[267] If a US carrier task force could threaten the emperor[268] that threat must be eliminated; thus, the high command agreed to Yamamoto’s plan but with substantial changes.
Admiral Yamamoto’s plan was overly complex. It divided his forces in the face of the enemy, and it assumed the Americans would not fight unless forced to by dire circumstances.[269] Most military types will tell anyone who will listen that if you have the larger force use it all at one point of assault and gain absolute superiority over the foe. The Japanese plan put four carriers away from the main action at Midway. Two large carriers sailing with an invasion fleet to Port Moresby planned to return in time for the Midway action, but why take them so far away, and put them at risk, so near the date of the big show? These carriers failed to join the action at Midway, and this reduction of striking power haunted the Japanese fleet at the battle.
Yamamoto’s plans began to go wrong quickly. At the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 4 through 8, 1942, only pilots from the aircraft carriers saw the other fleet. For the first time in history two fleets fought it out never coming in sight of one another. When it was over, the US Navy lost the heavy fleet carrier Lexington and the Japanese lost a light carrier (Soho). In addition, the US Fleet carrier Yorktown suffered extensive damage. The loss of the Lexington was a hefty blow to the US Navy. On the surface, it seemed the Japanese won another victory; however, two Japanese fleet carriers Shôkaku and Zuikaku lost a large number of aircraft and pilots, plus they suffered battle damage and returned to Japan for repair and replenishment of pilots and aircraft. Thus, two fleet carriers were lost to the Midway operation and the Japanese invasion fleet turned back, thereby failing to invade Port Moresby. The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first strategic defeat for the Japanese navy.
The Japanese may have wondered why two US aircraft carriers happened to be hanging around the Coral Sea at that particular moment in time. It was not bad luck. The code breakers at Pearl Harbor’s station Hypo deciphered parts of a key Japanese code and through brilliant analysis unscrambled Yamamoto’s plan. Admiral Nimitz, now in charge of the US Pacific Fleet, had trusted his code breaking genius, Commander Rochqfort, and sent his carriers to intercept the Port Moresby invasion fleet. He would trust this same man and his team’s analysis again when they declared that Japan’s next objective was the tiny island of Midway. Nimitz sent ALL three of his available carriers to fight the Japanese fleet at Midway. By holding zero back Nimitz took a huge risk with his last and best naval units. Literally everything would ride on their performance and luck.
The Battle of Midway
June 4 to June 6, 1942
Many historians consider the Battle of Midway as the turning point of the Pacific War, and one of the most important naval battles of all time. It is a complex battle where decisions by Nagumo (same admiral who led the Pearl Harbor attack), and persistent bad luck doomed all four fleet carriers of the Japanese strike force. Instead of ambushing the Americans and sinking their carrier fleet, the opposite occurred. For the US Navy and its three available carriers the Battle of Midway was an immense gamble. Battle damage to theUSS Yorktown at the Battle of the Coral Sea, and six month repair estimates, only added to the risk. Nimitz ordered the repairs done in three days. American construction crews accomplished this marvel, and the Yorktown was off to the battle.[270]
We cannot go into all the details of the battle here, but the results were four Japanese fleet carriers burned and sunk, and one American fleet carrier (the damaged Yorktown) was lost to Japanese submarine action after being badly damaged by air attacks. Japanese personnel losses were high as well (over 2,000), and all of those lost were highly trained and experienced flight crew members. Some blame Admiral Nagumo for the loss, complaining he lacked aggressiveness; nevertheless, the planners were actually responsible for the loss, because they cut the striking power of the Japanese carrier fleet by one-half in side show actions at the Coral Sea and the Aleutian Islands. Better luck would have helped the Japanese. One of their critical search planes launched behind schedule and spotted the US fleet much too late. In carrier battles, the first carrier to spot the other fleet and launch its aircraft has an immense advantage. The Japanese search pattern was not as concentrated as it could have been because the Japanese were operating on the assumption the US Navy would be absent.[271] In the matter of searching for the other fleet the Americans enjoyed a large edge in its very-long-range Catalina seaplanes operating out of Midway, and American intelligence reports predicting the enemy fleet’s approach headings.
American luck, determination, and bravery played a large role in the battle. Commander Wade McClusky Jr, leader of a flight of USS Enterprise Dauntless dive bombers (SBD) running low on fuel, spotted a lone Japanese destroyer traveling at high speed and changed course to mimic the destroyer’s heading.[272] He found the Japanese carrier fleet and, unplanned, arrived over the enemy carriers concurrently with a flight of Yorktown’s SBDs led by Commander Maxwell Leslie.[273] Both attacked simultaneously without coordinating the attack. Japanese air cover was missing in action. The Zero fighters were landing to refuel after annihilating two flights of outdated American torpedo planes. Up until this moment in the battle numerous American attacks had scored no hits while suffering large losses.
During this instant America’s only good weapon, the Dauntless dive-bomber, appeared above the Japanese carriers. Three Japanese fleet carriers became sinking infernos, helped along to their doom by their ordinance crews leaving bombs and torpedoes improperly stowed, adding to the damage when they detonated.[274] The remaining Japanese carrier, the Hiryu, struck back heavily damaging Yorktown, but Hiryu was sunk in turn by Dauntless strikes from the USS Enterprise.[275] The damaged Yorktown was later sunk by a Japanese submarine.
Losing four first class carriers and their crews was a massive blow to the Japanese navy.
In several books on the battle, the titles sum up most people’s views on the action: Miracle at Midway, by Gordon Prange, and Incredible Victory, by W. Lord. Nimitz risked it all and won. After Midway, Yamamoto realized it was necessary to go over to the defensive and await the US Navy’s assault on the Empire’s vast new perimeter.
The South Pacific and Indochina
As all this transpired, the Japanese army was trying to conquer the rest of Indochina and New Guinea. The Japanese army and navy were also pushing south down the Solomon island chain toward Fiji and New Caledonia to establish air bases and make supplying Australia problematical for the Americans.
Since Japan was having trouble conquering China they decided to isolate the country by cutting off all outside help. To this end, they captured all of China’s major coastal harbors and towns by 1940. Japan attacked and gained control of Burma, cutting the BurmaRoad that was bringing supplies to the Nationalist Chinese. The United States flew supplies over the Himalayan mountains to China month after month in an effort to keep China in the war. Keeping China fighting and tying down Japanese resources there was a major US war aim.
In Burma, the Japanese administered a resounding defeat upon the English. Now the Japanese controlled all of Indochina and its vital natural resources. Burma was lost because of superior Japanese jungle fighting methods, Japan’s complete control of the air, superior numbers where it counted, and the toughness of the Japanese soldiers.[276] Japan was now on the border of India, but with long supply lines. Many feared Japan would go forward and conquer at least part of India; however, Japan’s resources were stretched to the limit. In fact, she had overextended herself dramatically. This error would compound other Japanese mistakes, thus making the defense of her newly won empire much harder.
In New Guinea, the Japanese again proved their robust nature. Since the invasion convoy bound for Port Moresby turned back after the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese decided to assault the port by crossing the Owen Stanly Mountains dominating the center of the island. The Allies, as usual, thought this mountain range was impassable because of height (over 6,000 feet high), extremely rugged terrain, and the uniquely hostile jungle. The Japanese thought otherwise, and attacked over the Kokoda Track in July of 1942. The Australians fought all the way but fell back just the same. The Australians and Americans dug in just outside of Port Moresby, determined to make a last stand.[277] In January 1943, thirty two miles from Port Moresby, the Japanese force received orders to turn back because of events on Guadalcanal. Reluctantly, the Japanese began their retreat. Nonetheless, the accomplishment of crossing the Owen Stanly range against stiff Australian resistance was a remarkable military accomplishment. The retreat also showed the psychological effects of war, as the same Japanese soldiers who went forward eating grass while shrugging off disease and the effects of battle while they were winning, lay down and died after they started losing. Victory gives men hope and purpose while defeat saps them of life itself.
Port Moresby remained under Allied control. Later, after a fierce set of battles on the border between India and Burma, the British forces successfully blocked the threat to India. In the Solomon Islands the Japanese were still advancing south down the island chain, building airbases as they went and putting garrisons on each island. The code breakers found clues the Japanese were building an airbase on the island of Guadalcanal. Another chapter in the Pacific War was about to open.
Guadalcanal
August 7, 1942 to February 9, 1943
This was the campaign (note: not a battle, a campaign or series of battles) that broke the back of Japan’s offensive power.[278] Midway certainly took the initiative away from the Japanese Empire, but Guadalcanal damaged their military nearly beyond repair. The Japanese losses in merchant shipping during the campaign were high, and this was one of the weakest areas of Japanese war preparation and production. Japanese and American losses in the campaign were steep. The difference was the Japanese faced a much harder task making up their losses in men (especially aircrew) and materials.
Ground Losses:
US—1,768 dead
Japan—25,600 plus another 9,000 dead of disease (estimates)
Naval Personnel Losses:
US and Allies—4,911
Japan—3,543
Ship Losses:
Allied—29 (does not include merchant shipping)
Japanese—38 (does not include merchant shipping)
Aircrew Losses:
US—420
Japan—1,200 (estimates)
Aircraft Losses:
US—615
Japan—880 (estimates)
The campaign for Guadalcanal centered on Henderson Field and air control. The US Marines landed on the island of Guadalcanal August 7, 1942 at the behest of Admiral King, the US Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral King realized a Japanese airfield at Guadalcanal was a threat to Australian supply lines; conversely, the US lacked the resources for such an early offensive move. Accepting the risk of defeat, King ordered a US Marine assault. (Like all leaders, he accepted the risk of getting a lot of other people killed) After an unopposed landing the marines successfully captured the nearly completed Japanese airfield. Completion of the airfield by the troops and engineers was urgent because Japan was moving swiftly to annihilate the US effort.
On the night of 8 August 1942, the US Navy and its Allies suffered a signal defeat at the hands of a Japanese cruiser force commanded by Vice-Admiral Mikawa off Savo Island. The Japanese skillfully avoided two Allied picket destroyers, completely surprising several Allied cruisers. Four Allied cruisers were sunk (one Australian, three American), plus one cruiser and two destroyers were damaged. 1,270 Allied sailors died, and 790 wounded.[279] The Japanese suffered light damage on three of its cruisers and about fifty killed. The Japanese force was set to destroy the still loaded transports and the supplies stacked high on the beach when, mysteriously, Vice Admiral Mikawa withdrew as he was on the verge of total victory. Why he failed to bombard the unprotected transports is a hard question. Admiral Mikawa stated aircraft could attack his ships at first light unless he got out of flight range. The decision was a tide-turning event. If he sank the supply transports and bombarded the supply stacked beaches a swift withdrawal would have been the only choice for the Americans. To protect seven cruisers Vice-Admiral Mikawa sacrificed an early and decisive win at Guadalcanal.
Some people reading about naval warfare erroneously think warships are the key to victory. The king of the seas is the transport—the lowly supply ship—that trundles along without glory or much of anything else. The carrier may be the queen of the seas and all the other warships the royal entourage; however, they all exist to get the cargo ship to its destination quickly and safely. That is why the Germans knew they could win the war with England if they could sink enough transports. All the battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and carriers in the English naval inventory would mean nothing if the transports were sunk. Who can eat a battleship? Do the soldiers, no matter how brave and resourceful, stand a chance without bullets? As Japan found out on Guadalcanal, troops who are starving to the point of death seldom attack enemy positions acceptably.
Recall that the US code breakers were unable to read Japan’s codes for months because of cipher changes after Midway; however, the United States did have a unique source of intelligence during the Solomon campaign, the Australian Coast Watchers. Hiding in the jungle with radios they transmitted vital information to the Americans on Guadalcanal. To illustrate; if US Marine pilots knew early enough Japanese air attacks were on the way they could scramble their Wildcat fighters and climb above the incoming raiders, then dive down on them as they approached the island. This tactic inflicted additional Japanese losses because the Wildcat performed best in a dive. Failure to warn the Wildcats soon enough would mean much higher US losses. Without the Coast Watchers every Japanese raid would be a near surprise.
The numbers of naval and air assets favored Japan at the start. Because of the threat of continued Japanese assaults on the transports, Admiral Turner, in overall charge of the Guadalcanal operation, decided to withdraw the navy along with the precious transports that were still partially loaded. His decision left the marines in the lurch without sufficient supplies, ammunition, or equipment. For months the US Navy opted for small convoys delivering just enough ammunition and food to Guadalcanal for the troops and airmen to carry on.[280] Somehow, with a minimum of supplies and support, the US Marines and US Army held on halting several Japanese assaults on Henderson Field’s perimeter. If Japan’s troops broke through and took the airfield it would be over for the invaders. Henderson Field was the key to the campaign.
Both navies began to understand that controlling the Slot was vital to winning the island contest. As a result, a number of naval battles took place around the Solomon Islands deciding the fate of the marines and army troops on Guadalcanal every bit as much as the ground fighting. Some of the sea battles were: the Battle of Savo Island, Battle of the Eastern Solomon’s, Battle of Cape Esperance, Naval Battles of Guadalcanal, the Battle of Tassafaronga, and the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands. In these exchanges both navies suffered high losses. More than once the US Navy was down to one operational carrier (the Enterprise once, and the Hornet once). In this naval war of attrition Japan could only lose. American production and training capability were coming on line and with it a massive outpouring of new and better equipment with torrents of well-trained men to accompany that equipment. Japan boasted an excellent navy at the war’s beginning, the equal of any in the world with its high training standards, fine ships, and aircraft. With this kind of force there is a need to strike swiftly and withdraw. In a war of attrition, the side with the largest army (or navy) and the best production ability wins.
While Japan’s generals were planning another large offensive to throw the Americans off Guadalcanal, the Japanese merchant marine reported they lacked the shipping to support an attack. Japan needed all its transport capability to keep shipping war materials to the home islands; thus, no transports could be spared for Guadalcanal. Japan decided to leave the island. The Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal was a perfect operation. The Americans discovered the retreat after an unopposed offensive found a few starving, sick, and abandoned Japanese troops.
Midpoint in the Second World War Europe: Key Decisions
July 1942 - June 1944
By mid-1942, important milestones approached the warring parties. In the East, Russia held on at enormous cost, saving Moscow, but the Germans retained the initiative. In the West, France was conquered, but England fought on while Spain stayed out.[281] In the Atlantic, German submarines won some significant victories, but Allied losses remained low enough to sustain the war effort. On the Pacific front, Japan swept all before it until the Coral Sea and Midway where she suffered strategic defeats.
Each warring power now faced a few critical decisions:
1) The Allies knew they must stay on the offensive and keep the Axis on their heels. In war conferences between the British and Americans prior to December 1941, they agreed Germany must be defeated first. The Allies continually held conferences during the war to decide what course of action was best for all concerned. This kept the Allies on the same page allowing a coordinated response to disorderly events. Good planning was a hallmark of the Allied powers.
2) Japan’s Pacific defeats made the decisions for them. Japan’s reverses put it on the defensive. She was smarter than Hitler in this respect because Japan at least recognized the changing situation. The empire could attempt to make headway against China, but even this would be difficult. Japan decided to defend its gains with fierce efforts aimed at causing her antagonists unacceptable losses. In retrospect, this was an appropriate decision because Japan was overextended and probably should have made this decision sooner.
3) The best German generals knew they had lost the war. However, Hitler demanded offensives in the East with the aim of destroying the USSR. This was another bad foundational decision by the Fuehrer. Germany’s best move was to adopt the strategic defensive, retreat to better lines of defense, and use its still ample mobile reserves to demolish Soviet advances.[282] The Germans would hope to bleed the Soviets until they decided to quit, and then attack in the west. However, Hitler demanded new offensive victories. This decision was opposed by the German general staff, and held extraordinary risks.
Axis (mis) Management
Both Germany and Japan conquered huge resource-rich areas with large numbers of people that, if used correctly, would add immeasurably to their industrial and military power. If Hitler had convinced people in the conquered areas of Russia and Eastern Europe to work and fight for him millions of additional men would be available to supplement his industrial and armed forces. If the Japanese had worked at creating a true cooperative effort within their conquered territories they too might have enjoyed additional war making potential. Fortunately for the Allies, the Axis utterly squandered these potential assets.
By mismanagement on a scale beyond comprehension Japan and Germany turned conquered peoples against them, failing to obtain a good return on the raw materials and physical assets they captured. The Axis planned for wars of conquest, but they failed to effectively plan for the well-organized use of their conquered resources during the war. They assumed that once these assets were seized they would simply do what they wanted with them (including the people). To their consternation people resisted murderous oppression and raw materials failed to simply up and move themselves to factories in the homeland. The skilled workers who knew how to extract the raw materials often ran away to avoid the oppressors. Those staying were enslaved, so they worked slow and made many “mistakes.”
A key element in this lack of resource management was failing to convince conquered peoples to join the fight against the Allies (especially the Russians). There were exceptions, but as a rule, people “liberated” by the Japanese and Germans found them harsh taskmasters. As a result, they came to resent their Axis overseers and refused to serve as their soldiers. Compare this result to the communist Chinese who recruited the central government’s own people to fight for them in China’s civil war. Had the Axis consistently convinced even a small percentage to join their camp a lot could have changed. This failure by the Axis to show proper concern for people falling under their sway was central to their loss of WWII. It seems no single decision drove this course of action. This was just collective stupidity on an extraordinary scale.
Hitler Attacks in the East
1942
( . . . or What’s in a name?)
In the summer of 1942 Hitler began operations to capture large amounts of land and resources south of Moscow. In this region there were ample supplies of oil, grain, and raw materials that could help the Nazi war machine. The attack’s direction surprised the Soviets and initially allowed the Germans to make good ground. Note that Stalingrad was NOT originally a major target of the advance.
As the German offensive wore on the front expanded. It was like going up a funnel rather than down; thus, German units became widely separated. Non-German units began to move into the line to fill the voids left by the expansion of the front. German units were superior to Italian, Romanian, and other friendly Axis forces in the quality of their equipment and training. Even in static defense non-German units could not repel a strong Soviet attack. As the Germans moved into Stalingrad the Soviets began reinforcing the city. If the Germans had moved swiftly the city would have fallen early, but hesitation resulted in disaster. As at Leningrad, the failure to take Stalingrad in a timely manner had dire unforeseen consequences. At Leningrad the result was a long siege where the Soviets retained the city. At Stalingrad the results were crippling German losses of men and material.
Figure 61 German Summer Offensive 1942
Before the battle at Stalingrad began the German general staff recommended bypassing the city, but Hitler thought he must conquer the city named after his archenemy. In making this irrational decision, Hitler condemned his forces to the type of battle every German general wanted to avoid. The entire point of the German Blitzkrieg was maneuver, that is, avoid the WWI style clash of attrition. Fighting in Stalingrad was committing the German Army to the wrong type of fight. Moreover, Hitler ordered his Sixth Army into a head-on clash against a Soviet army outnumbering his troops and fighting on smashed city terrain ideal for defense. Worse, the Soviets were receiving ample supplies and reinforcements. Worse yet, on the flanks of Stalingrad non-German units were in place because of a lack of Nazi units, and these flanking forces were not positioned for in-depth defense. The German line was therefore very weak at vital points on the flanks of the city.[283]
After a colossal struggle the Sixth Army reached the Volga (the river running on the eastern side of Stalingrad) leaving only a few Soviet pockets of resistance. At Stalingrad it was said even the rats fled the city, only men remained. Homo sapiens alone could inflict or withstand such slaughter. The battle’s descriptions are unbelievable. During the horror of the fight inside the city, Soviet General Zhukov was assembling forces outside the city on the German flanks. After months of building up, he was ready to spring his great trap. It was winter, and the freezing conditions impeded movement by the mixed Axis forces; conversely, these same conditions were ideal for the Soviet counterstrike designed to break through positions held by non-German troops and encircle the German Sixth Army in Stalingrad.
It was November of 1942 when massive Soviet attacks surprised and scattered Romanian units guarding Stalingrad’s flanks. A shallow Soviet double envelopment surrounded von Paulus’ army in the city. General von Manstein, leading a counterattack by the redoubtable Forth Panzer Army, tried to reach the trapped men but fell a few miles short. Von Manstein ordered Von Paulus to attack toward him to complete the breakout. Von Paulus refused saying it was impossible; however, the trapped general previously radioed Hitler requesting permission to break out, but Hitler refused(There’s a surprise). Hitler’s “not one step backward” order condemned the German Sixth Army and the foolishly loyal von Paulus to a sub-zero deathtrap.
After withstanding weeks of Soviet bombardment, little food, dwindling ammunition, and no heat Von Paulus surrendered his army in January of 1943. Over 330,000 German soldiers were killed or captured in the pocket, and probably a year’s worth of production from German factories vanished. Total losses for the Wehrmacht in the fight for Stalingrad were approximately 750,000. This was a grave defeat for the Wehrmacht and Germany, and they never recovered. Remember, the USSR suffered worse defeats in 1941 and not only survived but also regrouped, launching large counterattacks before Moscow. The fact that this defeat could finish Germany shows how thin their prospects of victory were in June of 1941. Stalingrad, with its constant attrition of German forces followed by the death of an entire German Army, wrecked all chances for success. The Soviets were on the offensive and receiving massive amounts of supplies from the USA and the United Kingdom. After Stalingrad, the power-hungry Stalin would strike until he possessed Hitler’s head and Germany’s homeland.
Hitler fought on, ordering one more offensive (limited—at Kursk), but the war in the East was impossibly lost. As usual, Adolf Hitler continued issuing “stand fast” orders only to witness his men’s extinction in the thunder and fire of massive Soviet mechanized assaults. Operation Bagration’s annihilation of Army Group Center[284] in June of 1944, blew open the door to Germany by virtually eradicating the Wehrmacht’s ability to defend the fatherland. Hitler’s unmitigated incompetence lost Germany’s best troops in the snow and mud of the USSR. He was next.
Eastern Front 1942 and 1943—Advance to the Black Sea from Stalingrad
War In The Atlantic
January 1942 and beyond
In January 1942, Admiral Donitz sent his U-boats west to attack shipping along the Atlantic seaboard of the wholly unprepared United States. Only a few submarines were available for this task, and the long voyage was a difficult mission for the Germans. The German submariners packed every inch of their undersea boats with food and supplies. To assist the assault, the Germans thought up special types of submarines called Mulch Cows that carried supplies to the central Atlantic and resupplied the submarines on station, thereby allowing them to remain in the critical war zone much longer.[285]
This assault on US shipping in American home waters was a phenomenal success. US merchant ships sailed alone, no convoys, and often sailed at night while US cities continued to burn their lights, creating perfect silhouette targets for the Germans. Often, the subs attacked at night on the surface using deck guns rather than the more valuable and limited torpedoes.[286] The British hounded the United States to adopt the convoy system, which Admiral King, commander of the US Navy, refused to do in spite of the fact the US Navy knew from WWI that convoys worked. Threehundred and ninety-seven (397) cargo ships hit the ocean bottom between January and June of 1942. This was a naval and logistics disaster. Admiral Earnest King was the man solely responsible for the failure to adopt convoys, a known remedy for submarine attacks. As merchant ships sailing along the US Atlantic coast plunged to the ocean floor, King steadfastly maintained that he did not have enough escorts for convoy protection and stated that a weakly protected convoy was worse than no convoy.[287]
King’s argument was pure rubbish. The English and the US had the experience and proof that convoys alone (without escorts) cut shipping losses tremendously. Every naval officer in WWI, in both the Royal and the US Navy, knew these facts. This is so because the submarine has problems locating ships. Locating one ship is about as hard as locating an entire convoy, because the convoy does not take up much more sea space. By sending ships out singly, it gives the submarine many targets. By sending out convoys the submarine has fewer targets because they are all concentrated in one relatively small area. After adopting convoys enemy submarines look at a lot of empty sea. Admiral King had to know this, but why did he block effective action while this Atlantic slaughter wasgoing on? There is no answer to this question. There is no excuse for failing and refusing to adopt convoys immediately to prevent the loss of so many vital cargo ships and their crews. This situation grew so critical that General Marshall, the general in charge of the entire war effort, asked President Roosevelt to order Admiral King to start using convoys. Apparently, it never came to that because a strongly worded letter from Marshall to King turned the tide. King adopted convoys. Nonetheless, King’s actions cost the Allies dearly in lives and material.
All this causes one to wonder, how many men does a leader get to needlessly slaughter before being relieved of command? Admiral King slaughtered many, Generals MacArthur and Clark many more, and the Generals of World War I on the Allied side hundreds of thousands more. Somehow, these “leaders” literally get away with murder. It is easy to understand how ruthless dictators such as Hitler and Stalin can throw away lives, but how can military leaders of democracies get away with such dim-witted brutality?
As 1943 began the Battle of the Atlantic came to a head. Admiral Max Horton determined he could protect the convoys from German wolf packs, and he was ready to prove it.[288] The turning point came in April and May of 1943 with convoy ONS-5 that was made up of forty-three merchant ships. ONS-5 was attacked by thirty U-boats in a coordinated wolf pack assault. After the battle’s end thirteen merchant ships were gone, but six U-boats were lost. Such losses were unacceptable to Donitz, but it would get even worse for the U-boats. In May of 1943 these Allied efforts paid off with the sinking of thirty German submarines in one month with the corresponding loss of only a few Allied cargo ships. Admiral Donitz would continue to send his submarines out to fight, but these would increasingly become suicide missions. The German submarine branch suffered a higher percentage loss rate than any branch of any other service of any warring nation (over 70 percent).
Some argue the German submarines failed as a strategic threat because the vast majority of supplies and troops crossed the Atlantic without a problem (about 98 percent), and the Germans never came close to sinking even the tonnage they calculated in 1939 as necessary to win the war at sea. However, this overlooks one important point: the Allies themselves at the Casablanca Conference designated the defeat of the German submarines as the number 1 priority. Thus, the submarines were a strategic threat because the leaders of the Allied nations thought so. The U-boat defeat in 1943 is traceable to the Allied decision assigning the Atlantic victory top priority, followed by the dedication of vast resources to achieve the goal. Germany’s top priorities vacillated with Hitler’s whim, and he failed to assign a high priority to the submarine fleet and its Atlantic struggle. Because the Allies decided to defeat the submarines first and the Germans adopted dissimilar priorities, there were far different end results. These decisions, one to give the fight top priority and the other to give the fight a much lower priority, shows what a difference alternate decisions can make. Germany’s submarines failed in 1943 because of the different priorities set by the two warring sides.
The Allied commanders foresaw the potential for the submarines to restrict the flow of supplies to England. They realized the submarine threat could prevent the assets of the United States from reaching Europe in quantity. The projection of US power across theAtlantic was the most importantlogistic factor for winning the war in Western Europe. Knowing the submarines could impair this essential effort, their defeat won top priority.[289]
North Africa
Allied Victory—1943
As Rommel retreated toward Tunisia after El Alamein, American and English landed on the west coast of Africa in Morocco, and began moving east, along with French forces that joined the Allies. The German and Italian formations were soon crushed, and in Mayof 1943 the Axis force in Africa capitulated. The conquest of North Africa was an epic victory. The scale of the conquest was beyond all expectations. Along with the capture of approximately 275,000 Axis soldiers, one-half of which were German, (equal to10 divisions or more, which is on a par with the debacle at Stalingrad in January 1943) the Western Allies had captured the initiative in the Mediterranean. Once the Axis lost the strategic initiative in the West their lack of manpower began to damage their ability to resist the next Allied moves. Everything was turning in favor of the Allies.[290]
Sicily and Italy
The Western Allies decided Sicily, a large island near the boot of Italy, was their next Mediterranean objective. It was an unpopular decision in the American military. The British, at the Casablanca Conference, convinced President Roosevelt that action was required in the Mediterranean; however, American military commanders wanted to invade the continent (France) at once. The English successfully argued that American strategy was much too ambitious; moreover, while the Allies built up their forces they could move against what Churchill called the “soft underbelly of Europe.” Good sounding phrase, but a total misconception. Anyone looking at a map could easily tell the soft underbelly was really a tough old gut. Finding good ground for defense is not always easy, but here in Southern Europe the ground was tailor made for defensive fighting. Why Churchill failed to recognize this is often debated, and it is another reason the Americans thought he was more interested in protecting the British Empire than winning the war quickly.
Figure 62 Invasion of Italy 1943
The American military voiced at least two objections to invading Sicily: First, Sicily and Italy’s terrain were ideal for defense. There were rugged mountains throughout, the river valleys were steep, the rivers were fast flowing, and they cut across the line of advance. Second, such an undertaking was secondary to the goal of destroying the German Army. Americans believed, as US Grant demonstrated against Lee in the American Civil War, the key to victory was the destruction of the enemy army (Clausewitz would have agreed). Britain wanted to whittle down the Nazi army before an all or nothing confrontation.
US military experts distrusted Churchill, whom they thought might be more interested in protecting the English empire than in defeating Germany. Churchill, for his part, was already worrying about the postwar world and the escalating power of the USSR. He was trying to convince the Americans that a move through the Balkans (the area north of Greece) might cut off the Soviet advance in that area preserving more free territory in Europe.
The Americans refused to wait around worrying about postwar Europe. They wanted to engage the Nazis, defeat them as soon as possible, and then go home. In the event, the Americans folded at Casablanca because Roosevelt insisted the United States immediately get into the ground action and stay in it. Waiting around to build up forces in England for six months to a year, while doing little else, was political suicide. Thus, the United States and England invaded Sicily after the conquest of North Africa and then moved on to Italy. Originally, the invasion agreement only included Sicily with the decision on Italy coming later. However, the conquest of Sicily went faster than expected making the invasion of Italy automatic.
The invasion of Sicily went well considering how new everyone was at massive amphibious operations. The true problem with the capture of Sicily was the escape of the Axis divisions across the strait to Italy with their supplies and equipment. With the Allies having local air control and total control of the sea allowing the Axis escape was a paramount blunder. To this day it is unclear how the Allies allowed this to happen. It was crucial to trap and destroy the Axis armies on Sicily. Apparently, the capture of the Germanand Italian armies on Sicily was not foreseen or planned. The Germans who escaped from Sicily played key roles in holding up the Allied advance up the Italian boot.[291]
With Sicily seized, the Allies quickly invaded Italy at the bottom of the boot and at the beaches of Salerno just south of Naples on the west coast. (See Figure 62) Montgomery proceeded to land at the toe of Italy’s boot and at the east near the top of the heel, while the Americans went ashore at Salerno. At Salerno, Kesselring’s troops put up a stiff defense from the heights overlooking the beaches. Following up with effective counterattacks, Kesselring nearly drove the Americans into the sea. Luftwaffe attacks on the fleet damaged several ships while German tanks drove within shouting range of the beach; nevertheless, naval gunfire broke the Nazi offensives, and Allied air power soon captured the sky over the beaches. After securing the beaches, the Americans struggled to expand the pocket and requested Montgomery hurry his advance; however, Montgomery did no such thing. When Montgomery did arrive the Germans were already pulling back to new and very well prepared lines of defense south of Rome—the Gustov line.
Figure 63 Italy—Allied Assaults on Gustov Line and Anzio 1943-4
Advancing past Salerno, the Allies ran into exceptionally well-chosen and prepared German positions on the Gustov line south of Rome. Kesselring and his German engineers chose this mountainous area because of its ideal defensive terrain features. After numerous bloody attempts to breach the line had failed, the Allies mounted an amphibious assault behind the Gustov line at Anzio on the western side of Italy just north of the Gustov Line and south of Rome. (See Figure 63) Unfortunately, the invasion’s commander was under specific orders from General Clark to attain the beach and then dig in. Following these orders doomed the Allied invasion to bloody stagnation. If the troops had moved inland at once, behind the Gustov line, a forced German retreat was axiomatic. This is one of the best ways to wage war, force your enemy out of superb positions without an assault as Sherman consistently accomplished on his march to Atlanta (see the US Civil War). Kesselring responded to Allied sluggishness by swiftly placing his men on the invaluable high ground above the beaches; thus, preventing a breakout and subjecting the trapped troops to monumental artillery poundings. It became clear that to get off those beaches help was necessary from the Allied troops along the Gustov line. The tables were turned, and the men originally assigned to get the help now had to give help if the Allies were going to hang on at Anzio.
The breakthrough came when the overall commander in Italy, British General Alexander, rejected General Mark Clark’s ideas, adopted his own direction, and mounted an offensive all along the Gustov line. The French colonial forces found that the Germans had severely thinned out of the center of their line to reinforce the troops fighting at Monty Casino itself. The Nazi line was quickly breached and the advance northward began. Then Mark Clark threw another monkey wrench into the gears. Alexander ordered Clark to take his forces, which were on the left flank of the advance, and turn right (east) to cut off the German retreat. Clark disobeyed these orders and instead made north for Rome and the glory of “liberating” the city. Rome fell on June 4, 1944, but the battle for Italy continued. The German forces escaped AGAIN to delay the Allied advance for additional months.
The problems in Italy were multiple, but poor leadership for the Allies is at the top of the list. Only after Alexander began to exercise more control over his subordinates did matters improve somewhat. General Clark disobeyed orders and moved on Rome rather than blocking the German retreat to a new defensive zone, but nothing was done to Clark. The fact that his actions would cost the lives of Allied troops assaulting yet another of Kesselring’s defensive lines to the north of Rome seems to have counted for little. All these years later it seems the original US thoughts were correct. The Italian campaign would continue until the end of the war with little to show for all the sacrifices of the troops involved on both sides.
Planning D-Day
With the Allies advancing up the Italian boot the Western Mediterranean was firmly in Allied hands, and planning for the invasion of Nazi occupied France could begin in earnest. General Eisenhower was appointed as overall commander, and Ike appointed British General Montgomery as ground unit commander. This was a massive undertaking and the largest amphibious assault ever mounted.[292]
The planning for Operation Overlord, as it would be termed, started long before the appointment of General Eisenhower. The pre-Eisenhower planners chose Normandy as the best area for invasion. They decided on May for the invasion because of the moon, tides, weather, and other considerations, and they called for three divisions to cross the channel supported by a large naval armada. Although the plan would undergo considerable change, the foundations were poured. The moment Eisenhower and Montgomery examined the plan they expanded the landing force to fivedivisions landing from the sea and three more airborne divisions airdropped behind the beaches on the first day. This expansion to well over one hundred thousand men increased the need for shipping, equipment, aircraft, and everything else by more than double. While it increased the chances for success it also increased the risk, because information leaks, increases in errors, and a host of other “friction of war” problems would naturally proliferate. The need for secrecy increased exponentially. If the Germans figured out the time and place of the landings the resulting slaughter would be indescribable. The raid on Dieppe was well remembered, and if the Germans could repeat that Allied disaster the consequences would be immense.[293] Allied failure at Normandy would mean, under reasonable presumptions, the Soviets would seek a separate peace with Hitler, which they had already tried. (Yes, we know about the A-bomb, but that discussion is too long and speculative for The Super Summary).
Midpoint in the Second World War—Pacific:
1943 & 1944
After the victory at Guadalcanal in 1943, US forces began to move up the Solomon island chain. In a series of bloody encounters the US Navy, Marines, and Army pushed north against fanatic Japanese resistance. On New Guinea, Australian forces pushed the Japanese back over the rugged Owen Stanley mountains in one of the most difficult campaigns of the war. American and Australian forces then began leapfrogging up the eastern coast, landing where the Japanese were not present, thus cutting off the Japanese garrisons they bypassed.[294]
At sea, Japan started feeling the full weight of American air power and innovation. In the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in March 1943, a Japanese troop convoy sailing to New Guinea from Rabaul harbor on New Britain was located at sea and totally destroyed by air attacks. B-25 aircraft (same type that bombed Tokyo) with six .50-caliber machine guns mounted to the nose for strafing ships, tackled the convoy. The pilots also used new skip-bombing methods to slam the bombs into the sides of the transports. The attackers sank all the transport ships and most of the escorts. The US Army Air Force under General McKinney developed these new techniques.[295]
“Island hopping” was the key to US strategy in the Pacific. The idea was simple. The Allies did not have to conquer every island held by the Japanese. By taking only a few vital islands, and cutting off support for the rest, the Americans smashed the original Japanese assumptions about fighting the war. With each passing month the speed of the American advance increased. Japan faced an enemy with techniques of war undreamed of in 1941. Knocked off balance by Allied methods and technology Japan’s leadership never regained its footing.
By November of 1943 the US Navy was prepared to start an advance across the Central Pacific. This line of attack was in addition to MacArthur’s line of advance in the South Pacific. The first target was the Gilbert Islands, and the key to this group of island atolls was Tarawa (Betio). The island’s importance came from its air base. The Japanese anticipated an attack and studded the island with defensive fortifications, including a tremendous number of protected machine gun emplacements (pillboxes), large caliber cannons, huge bunkers, and barbed-wire entanglements defending every approach to the island.
Throughout the Pacific campaign, the islands seized had enemy air bases or land areas where the Americans could build air bases. Tactically, the Pacific War was fought over who held what air base. The airplane was the centerpiece of the Pacific War. The goal of the Central Pacific advance was winning islands within air range of Japan, and starting a bombing campaign to destroy Japan’s infrastructure. The goal of the South Pacific advance was winning back the Philippines, and cutting Japanese supply lines to the home islands.
We must talk about storming a defended beach for a moment. Before World War II, invaders avoided going ashore at a defended beach. From the Trojan War through the first part of World War II, the way one combatant invaded another’s territory from the sea entailed going ashore on an undefended beach away from the target and then advancing on the objective overland. In World War I, the British invasion of Turkey at Gallipoli proved the point that an amphibious operation against defended shores was suicide. The Japanese commanders knew the history of offensive actions against defended beaches, and they knew the assaults were usually failures. They noted that many small islands in the Central Pacific had no place for an unopposed landing. In addition, airstrips could be placed on the islands with ample aircraft to defend them. The Japanese believed an island was an unsinkable aircraft carrier endangering any fleet sailing within range of its aircraft. At first the US thought the same thing.
Figure 64 American Dual Offensives Against Japan
By 1943 US Navy carrier forces had combined their air units for overwhelming aerial assaults razing Japanese air power on the island fortresses. Then the fleet sailed up and disgorged the troops who took the island. These actions punctured Japanese assumptions about defending their empire. The fact that the Americans quickly took heavily defended Pacific islands shocked Japan’s high command. Japan confronted an enemy doing the impossible, and doing it very well. The Japanese commander at Tarawa had stated that, “A million men could not take this island in a thousand years” (or something close to that), but the US Marine Second Division took it in three days. To be fair, the Japanese commander never heard of Amtracs (boats with tank treads). If he had known his confidence might have ebbed.
Tarawa
We will use Tarawa as an example of Pacific island assaults. For adequate reconnaissance of the Marshall Islands, the next target, Tarawa’s airfield was necessary. Weeks before the US Marines landed on Tarawa long-range B-24 Liberator bombers cratered the island and its runways. This bombing effectively ended air threats to the US Navy.
The Japanese possessed a critical terrain advantage—a coral reef surrounded the island about eight hundred yards from the beach that could stop the Higgins[296] boats. To overcome this defensive advantage the marines decided to employ tracked landing vehicles (LVT-1: Landing VehicleTracked), which could climb over the reef and continue to the shore. The marines discovered one hundred new LVT-2s in San Diego that were larger, faster, and carried a heaver payload than the LVT-1s. An all-out effort was undertaken to get these boats to Tarawa before the landing. They made it in the early morning hours on the day of the invasion. One hundred twenty-five LVTs assaulted Tarawa of which ninety were lost (72% casualty rate), but without them the invasion would have failed.
The Japanese planned a fleet counterattack (Hei Operation 3) once they determined the US Navy’s next objective, but the Japanese high command was guessing where the blow would fall. They failed to envision the United States mounting two simultaneous offensives, one already underway in the South Pacific, and another through the Central Pacific. To prepare for the expected offensive, Admiral Koga, Japan’s chief of naval operations since Yamamoto’s death, concluded the Central Pacific activity was a feint, and moved 173 carrier aircraft and several cruisers to Rabaul in the South Pacific. On November 5 and 11, US Carriers launched two large raids on Rabaul, shooting down about 100 Japanese aircraft and damaging several cruisers. The loss of so many carrier pilots ended all counterattack plans. At the time, no American knew the impact of these raids, but they were critical to the success of the Gilbert’s (Tarawa) operation.
Figure 65 Betio (Tarawa) Map
A surfeit of errors plagued the Tarawa assault. Some of the important failings were: the naval command ships were too far away and unable to receive needed information or see the action; the fleet’s big guns were fired at a low angle and failed to demolish enemy pill boxes or bunkers which required plunging fire to destroy; marine radios were not waterproof causing nearly all to fail; and there was insufficient firepower at the squad level (flamethrowers and machine guns). A lot more went wrong, but this list is a sample of the problems.
The first two waves in Amtracs got ashore with acceptable losses; however, the low tide stopped the Higgins boats at the reef. The marines who were stuck at the reef had to either wait there under scalding enemy fire for an Amtrac to take them in, or attempt to wade ashore in chest deep water while receiving fearsome enemy fire. The Japanese 75mm dual-gun anti-boat cannons, along with the heavy 13mm machine guns, fired accurately and with devastating effects on the LVTs and the Higgins boats. Marine unit cohesion disappeared as men struggled ashore separated from their squads or companies without officers, radios, heavy weapons, or the ability to communicate with other units. Small packets of men under continuous fire huddled against a log seawall that was sticking up along the landing beaches a few feet from the ocean. LVTs burned all along the beach, splintered Higgins boats wallowed at the reef, and Japanese gunners scythed men down trying to wade ashore from the reef.
All the planning had gone wrong. The Japanese survived the naval and air bombardment; their guns were intact and firing accurately; hundreds of Japanese machine guns and cannons hammered at the marines; and the command structure ashore was disorganized. The commanders offshore lacked information. There was little or no communication even among the men who had reached the island, so assaults were uncoordinated. The Japanese suffered as well since the naval bombardment cut their communications, destroyed several key emplacements, and stunned the defenders; nevertheless, they successfully rallied and were directing enormous volumes of heavy and accurate fire onto the landing forces. The US Marines were in big trouble. The plans were useless now. In war, plans often fall apart leaving the troops alone to gain victory by their sacrifice. The marines on Tarawa, as individuals, determined to press forward into hell itself in search of triumph.
Slowly, with gallantry and fearlessness beyond comprehension, the US Marines inched forward. Marines by the hundreds died trying to reach that beach, but the United States Marine Corps kept coming. Once at the seawall, surviving men found enemy fire raining down, death everywhere, blinding smoke, confusion, and a lack of control. A couple of privates were all that remained of platoons. Corporals were in charge of the remains of companies. None of this mattered; the US Marines continued exchanging blows with the enemy. Tiny groups of men facing a torrent of enemy fire were scaling the sea wall and fighting inland. At Green Beach, the single remaining Sherman tank, name Colorado in marine scrawl, moved forward clearing a path for men to move inland. As the day wore on a recipe for catastrophe was cooking up. Disjointed units pinned on the beach without sufficient cover, stripped of heavy weapons, without communications between themselves or their ships, and lacking supporting fire, were facing their doom if the enemy counterattacked.
Then, a miracle. Before the first day was over, a group of Japanese standing atop a bunker was vaporized by naval gunfire. That group included the commander of the island, Rear Admiral Shibasaki and his staff. The Japanese were now without their top officers. This event was critical to the outcome of the battle.
As night descended the disorganized marines prepared for a counterattack aimed at driving them into the nauseating blood stained sea only a boot’s length away in places. Over one thousand Japanese and several tanks were available for the counterattack. A determined Japanese effort that first night, supported by tanks, could have destroyed the marines. The attack never came. Killing the Japanese commanders prevented the order from being given and probably saved the invasion. Over the next two days the marines completed the bloody capture of the island, enduring a well-planned counterattack during the night of the second day. When it was over, 997 marines and 30 navy corpsmen died taking the island, and 4,183 Japanese died in its defense. On this tiny rock in the vast Pacific, over five thousand men died battling for an airstrip.
This was a foretaste of the storm battles to come as the United States crossed the Central Pacific. Studies by the US Navy concerning errors at Tarawa changed future operations, lowering casualties in upcoming battles; yet, the cost was persistently high as each island invasion relentlessly devoured lives. Stunned by the swiftness of the American victory at Tarawa, the Japanese high command failed to effectively respond. By island hopping and a coordinated dual advance across the Pacific the United States kept the Japanese high command wondering where to commit their resources; and the Imperial Navy often guessed wrong. The Japanese expanded their defense zone too far, and being overstretched damaged their ability to respond to US initiatives.
After the seizure of the Gilbert Islands the United States used the bases to reconnoiter the islands in the Marshalls. Kwajalein was the next target of the Central Pacific campaign. Prior to the fleet move to the Marshalls, US Army, Air Force, and Navy carrier aircraft swept the islands free of Japanese air power, destroying 92 of 110 Japanese aircraft in the area. Using new firing methods, including plunging fire from battleships, the US Navy bombardment devastated Kwajalein. After Kwajalein, the Japanese abandoned the doctrine of a shoreline defense and opted for in-depth defenses in future battles.
Figure 66 Marines at Tarawa
Marianas and New Guinea
In May of 1944 the United States attacked the Marianas which included the islands of Saipan, Guam, and Tinian. These were large islands with tough in-depth defenses, but the speed of the US advance precluded the proper and complete preparation Japan desired. At Saipan, fighting through difficult landings and rugged terrain, the US Army and Marine Corps pushed Saipan’s desperate defenders back. The Saipan struggle ended with a Bonsai attack by 3,000 Japanese troops that initially overwhelmed American lines and resulted in 650 US Marine dead. The fatal charge ended Japanese resistance on the island by July 9, 1944. On Guam, the Japanese chose to assault US lines repeatedly, thereby destroying their units. Japanese Imperial forces finally retreated into the jungle interior to continue their resistance. After intense jungle fighting, Guam was secured by August 8, 1944.
As US amphibious forces fought for the Central Pacific, Australian and US Army troops were conquering New Guinea. Using code decrypts, MacArthur avoided Japanese strong points and landed in areas where US forces could set up a defense and cut off the isolated Japanese units. The campaign in New Guinea went on from 1942 through 1945, much of it fought by Australian troops under the worst possible conditions. The fighting was intense, bloody, and merciless. Japanese forces fought determined battles even when outnumbered and in poor tactical positions. General MacArthur never gave the tough Australians their due, mainly because he would not get all the credit for their accomplishments. Nonetheless, they were vital to Allied victory in the Pacific.
Figure 67 New Guinea & Rabaul Offensives
Storming the well-defended Central Pacific islands was costly for the marines and the army, but the advance was swift. The navy-marine-army team moved from Tarawa to Saipan in the Marianas in about eight months against stiff enemy opposition. In just a few months, between November of 1943 and July of 1944, Japan lost vast amounts of its empire, and the Philippines were now ripe for invasion. The losses of Guam, Tinian, and Saipan in the Marianas were demoralizing blows to the Japanese empire. Admiral Nagumo[297] was in charge of Saipan’s defense. After the US Marines gained the shore he radioed Tokyo, saying, “Hell is upon us,” and he did not mean his troops on Saipan. Nagumo knew that B-29 aircraft would start bombing the home islands as soon as airfields were constructed in the Marianas. And the American Seabees worked fast.
Japan knew the Marianas must be held or disaster would ensue. Their fall would cut off oil, rubber, and other war supplies to the homeland from the conquered Southern Pacific areas. Capturing those resource rich regions was the reason Japan started the war. Japan’s Imperial Navy planned an all out air attack on the US fleet to protect the islands. On June 19 and 20, 1944, Japanese Combined Fleet attacked the US fleet, fighting the Battle of the Philippine Sea. During the engagement the US Navy lost 123 aircraft (80 percent of the crews were recovered), and the Japanese lost approximately 600 aircraft and 3 fleet carriers. Japan’s losses were heavy due to a poor plan and green pilots. After the battle, only thirty-five Japanese aircraft were fit for action. The losses Japan suffered at the Battle of the Philippine Sea were irreplaceable. It was over for the Japanese Imperial Navy. At Leyte Gulf the Japanese navy would sortie out once more, but the carriers were bait, and the surface ships were on a suicide mission.
The Philippines—The Return of the USA
On 15 September 1944, just prior to the invasion of Leyte in the Philippines, the marines and army landed on the islands of Peleliu and Angour respectively. The battle for Peleliu and Angour lasted two months and cost an inordinate number of American lives. This landing was a Philippine invasion covering operation to secure the Allied flank from attack. Admiral Halsey thought the Japanese were too weak for offensive action from this quarter and recommended cancellation; unfortunately, the Joint Chiefs allowed the operation to continue. On Peleliu, the Japanese implemented a new plan for defense they would adhere to for the remainder of the war. The Japanese defenders settled into well prepared deep-cave positions and awaited the attackers. No suicide attacks, counterattacks, or aggressive maneuvers to hurl the enemy into the sea. Winning entailed killing the maximum number of Americans and nothing else. The best way to accomplish this goal was to avoid exposure to massive American firepower by digging in and forcing the enemy to assault well prepared positions. Fighting on Peleliu decimated the First Marine Division. The battles before Peleliu were bad, but every battle after Peleliu became horrific. Japan’s new tactic significantly drove up the cost of war.
Figure 68 US Assault on the Philippines 1944
American forces under General Douglas MacArthur began operations to retake the Philippines by landing at Leyte Island at the midpoint of the island group on October 20, 1944. This landing precipitated the Battle of Leyte Gulf (see below). Japan was well aware that holding the Philippines was essential, and months of hard fighting were required to secure the central Philippines. In January of 1945, the US Army landed on the main island of Luzon and advanced to the capital, Manila, which was recaptured in March after a cruel struggle. Fighting in the mountains of Luzon north of Manila went on until the end of the war, but the harbor and capital were in US hands again after protracted difficulties with Manila’s defenders.
Hammering Toward Victory—The Pacific
The Pacific: 1944 to 1945
By the end of 1944 in the Pacific, America was winning in the Philippines and threatening to cut the supply line of oil and other war making materials back to Japan. The capture of Saipan put the home islands within reach of America’s mighty B-29 bombers. Japan had lost the war;[298]however, the Japanese Military held a different view. The military believed Japan might be saved from invasion; therefore, they would continue fighting. The Americans and British had demanded unconditional surrender for all Axis forces since the Casablanca Conference. To the Japanese this meant America would depose their emperor, which was wholly unacceptable. They would die to the last man, woman, and child to preserve the emperor, their god on earth. The unconditional surrender pledge by Roosevelt at Casablanca, made to reassure the Soviets that the West would not make a separate peace with Hitler, backfired when considered against the backdrop of Japanese history and culture. Nothing would make Japan fight on more assuredly than a threat to remove their emperor.
Because of the importance of the Philippines, and the Allied threat to Japan’s supply lines if captured, the Japanese fleet made one more attempt to strike at American naval supremacy. On October 23 to 26, the Japanese launched the last of their sea power toward the American landings atLeyte Gulf.
The Japanese plan was complex, but it wisely took into account the aggressiveness of the US Navy.
Battle of Leyte Gulf—the Philippines
The key element of the Japanese plan was for its carriers, devoid of aircraft, to sail in from north of the Philippines as bait for the US Carrier fleet. (The Japanese Northern Force) The hope was that the US Navy, and its powerful carrier task force, would sail north to battle the carriers. Then two powerful surface forces would converge on the landing areas. Coming from the south, through the Surigao Strait, was a Japanese force of two large battleships, a cruiser, and four destroyers. (The Southern Force) From the north, through the San Bernardino Strait, came Japan’s force of five battleships, twelve cruisers, and thirteen destroyers. (The Central Force) The Central and Southern Forces were to converge on Leyte Gulf where the US Transports were located and blast them to bits. Attacking transports was a new tactic for the Japanese. They began to see the importance of supplies and, at last, focused their energy on destroying those vital elements of American power.
The plan went better than expected for the Japanese. The Americans, under Admiral Halsey, did chase the Japanese carriers, the San Bernardino Strait was left open, and the powerful Japanese Central Force sailed through and made for the landing zone at Leyte. Everything was set for a total Japanese victory, in that the cargo ships at the beach were unprotected. But, along the way to the landing zone, the Japanese encountered a diminutive force of small jeep carriers and destroyer escorts off Samar that was supplying close air and sea support for the troops ashore. The sudden appearance of Japanese cruisers and battleships caused great alarm among the little ships.
Commander of the central force, Admiral Kurita, then blew it by ordering a general attack. He had mistaken the escorts for the larger fleet carriers. In a display of courage beyond belief, the US destroyers counterattacked the Japanese fleet with their tiny five-inch guns and deadly torpedoes. Aircraft from the escort carriers attacked the Japanese ships with machine guns and antipersonnel bombs. During the fight, three US destroyers and three of the escort carriers were sunk. The much larger and stronger Japanese fleet lost three heavy cruisers. The remaining US vessels were escaping when they noticed the Japanese had turned north, away from the landing zone. What happened? Admiral Kurita had ordered his force north to regroup. After gathering his ships, he made a stunning decision. Kurita, concerned about the US Fleet’s return from their wild goose chase,decided to retreat through the San Bernardino Strait! [299] This decision defies all reason. Kurita knew his ships would be of no use later. His ONLY viable course of action was to continue and destroy the American transports and supplies at Leyte.
Meanwhile, the Japanese Southern Force approached Surigao Strait. The Americans were forewarned[300] and awaited the Japanese in the darkness at Surigao. US Admiral Oldendorf laid the perfect trap. As the trap was sprung the Japanese ships were wrecked by concentrated fire from numerous destroyers, cruisers, and the old battleships of Oldendorf’s line.[301] Meanwhile, the decoy Japanese carrier force lost two carriers from American aircraft attacks. Looking at what was accomplished by the successful deception of the Northern Carrier Force, the Japanese plan should have succeeded. If Kurita had destroyed the transports and the supplies it would have spoiled the US capacity to remain on Leyte.
Yet another missed opportunity for Japan. Remember Savo Island? The Japanese cruiser force battered the Allied cruisers guarding Guadalcanal’s supply ships. The transports were dead ahead and unprotected when the Japanese admiral failed to advance and destroy the cargo ships. The reader may recall that at Pearl Harbor Nagumo failed to launch a third strike, fearful of being detected by the missing US aircraft carriers. Another missed opportunity was the Battle of the Coral Sea. The Japanese invasion force turned back after the encounter with American carriers, an encounter the Japanese had not lost. Admiral Yamamoto wanted the fleet to continue on and invade Port Moresby. Had they done so, the Japanese stood an excellent chance of capturing the last Allied bastion on New Guinea. Then, Kurita’s Leyte retreat. At three key moments a major tactical victory was within the grasp of Japanese admirals, and they missed each one (the Coral Sea, Savo, Leyte). What caused the lapses of judgment on the part of these men? In each case the missed opportunity was substantial, and nothing stood between them and victory. Couple the destruction of fuel and harbor facilities at Pearl, the capture of New Guinea, winning at Guadalcanal, plus winning at Leyte, and Allied plans could have been significantly delayed.
The individual decisions of four admirals dramatically hurt Japan’s cause. History illustrates that often a few people control the hinge point of events. Different decisions by these four men, while not winning the war, would hand their leaders a better chance at controlling later events. The strategic decision for or against war is the most critical because it is foundational; however, numerous poorly made decisions at the decisive point of battle can doom any nation. The Allies made good decisions throughout the war at the strategic level,[302] and the Allied fighting men made good decisions at the tactical level. Given the totality of decisions made by the Allies and the Axis, the Allies did far better.
Submarine Efforts—Axis and the Allies
Any discussion of the Pacific and Atlantic wars must refer to the US Submarine efforts against Japan and German efforts in the Atlantic against Britain. At the start of the war, US Navy torpedoes were defective. Reports of their defectiveness reached ranking admirals in the navy, but they were ignored. Only after the admiral of the submarine forces threatened to resign were tests run on the torpedoes, and they were defective. The problem was the magnetic detectors on the warhead that were supposed to recognize when the torpedo was directly under a ship failed. In WWI the torpedoes had mechanical detonators. The torpedo hit the side of a ship, the mechanical detonator fired, and a hole was blown in the ships’ side. Between WWI and II, torpedoes were improved and a magnetic detonator was invented which detected when the torpedo was beneath the keel of the ship causing the torpedo to explode. This difference was critical because when the torpedo exploded under the keel of a ship it broke the ship’s back (so to speak), the ship would sink faster, and it would take fewer torpedoes to sink a ship—usually only one (for a merchant ship).
The Germans encountered the same problems with their torpedoes; thus, they switched to WWI mechanical detonators and the German submarines had to fire more torpedoes to sink a ship when one should have sufficed. German Type VII subs only carried twelve torpedoes. A German investigation discovered the officers in charge of testing the torpedoes in the Kregsmarine were the same people that investigated any later-alleged flaws. The quality control testers covered up the fact that the detonators were malfunctioning. In Germany, these men were quickly put to death (after a trial, of course). In the US, Navy investigators determined the men originally in charge of testing the torpedoes were the same men looking for later problems with those torpedoes. If these men disclosed the flaws in their original testing they could get into trouble, so they kept quite. Do the facts ring a bell? Only here, the US Navy failed to outwardly punish the men. They just fixed the problem and moved on.
The US Submarine service was terribly hampered by these malfunctioning torpedoes. Submariners risked their lives in the Philippines, for example, to get shots at Japanese ships landing troops on Luzon only to have the torpedoes breakdown. At Guadalcanal, US Coastal submarines operating in The Slot recorded several kills. This got the US Navy wondering why the coastal submarines were having so much more luck than the fleet submarines. No one thought to look at the torpedoes, although suspicions were growing. The small coastal subs were using World War I torpedoes because they were second class fighting machines, so they got the old stuff. The old stuff worked and gave the Japanese a lot of headaches. The new stuff did not work and gave the United States a lot of headaches. Fixing the torpedoes led to spectacular kill rates for US Submarines after 1943. The Japanese failed to concentrate on protecting their merchant shipping, and US Submarines began slaughtering their transports. By the end of the war, US Submarines effectively cut off ocean transportation to Japan.
Germany fared poorly in spite of great efforts. Effective code breaking, anti-submarine technology, convoys, and new fighting methods ended Germany’s chance of an undersea victory in 1943. Ultra and the defective German torpedoes were key elements in their downfall, along with the Allied decision at Casablanca to defeat the U-boat threat first.[303] The Japanese constructed excellent long-range submarines and possessed the best torpedo of any combatant. In spite of these wonderful weapons, Japanese tactical doctrine on how to use submarines failed them. Based on their ancient warrior’s code, enemy soldiers were the main targets of attack, not supply lines. As such, the Japanese totally misused their submarines by confining them to attacking warships instead of cargo ships. If the Japanese had placed a number of submarines between Hawaii and the US West Coast and attacked Allied cargo ships, they could have significantly hampered Allied operations in the Pacific.
Hammering Toward Victory—Europe
1944-1945
D-Day and Beyond
Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable anduncontrollable events.
—Sir Winston Churchill
Background to D-Day
Stalin kept pressing the Allies for a second front. Easy for Stalin to demand, but an invasion of Nazi occupied Europe was going to be a huge, costly, and risky undertaking. Yet it had to be done. A failure to invade France had the potential of leaving all of Europe in Soviet hands after the war. England and America realized the Soviets were gaining strength and would defeat Hitler. The only issue was the cost of victory. On the other hand, if the D-Day invasion were a failure, or if the Allies refused to invade, Stalin might choose to quit if Hitler offered a good-enough deal. If that were to occur, two mass murderers could rule Europe for decades.
The English, led by Churchill, wanted to put off the invasion until 1945 and continue to raid the periphery of the Third Reich. This strategy of waiting and raiding served the British well for hundreds of years. It worked against Napoleon of France, Philip of Spain, and others. In World War I, the British committed their army to the continent, and the cost was horrendous. The British now returned to the ancient formula and thought by using their control of the sea and raiding ability they could hurt Hitler’s forces and save their own for the final blow—when the “right” time arrived. The Soviets saw this as stalling, and constituted attempts by capitalist powers to bleed both Hitler and the Soviets white, then step in and claim all of Europe for their spoils.[304]
America had a different history and experience with war. The American Civil War formulated the ideas of war in the American military mind. Like Grant during the Civil War, the United States wanted to go straight at the enemy and destroy him as quickly as possible. US Generals disliked the periphery strategy of hitting the enemy here and there while waiting for the decisive moment to engage. The United States wanted to go ashore in France and have it out with the Nazis. They did not care to let the Nazis and Soviets kill each other off for a year or two before proceeding into France. In essence, the US wanted to win and go home.
Churchill could not fathom the American interest in an immediate sea assault on Nazi-occupied France. He knew casualties would be high, and the risk of a total defeat on the beaches was ever present. American generals could not understand England’s reluctance to hit the Nazis and drive them into oblivion. America had great confidence in its ability to destroy the Nazi army, but the British were more cautious. England was driven to near defeat in 1918, chased off the continent in 1940, and mauled in a large raid on the French port of Dieppe in 1942. The Americans had initially taken a beating in North Africa, but they looked at the experience differently. In American eyes they had learned, then turned, and destroyed the Nazis in Tunisia. Note how a different history results in different decisions and outlooks.
In a series of Allied conferences, the Soviets demanded, and then received, a guarantee from the Western Democracies to invade Nazi-occupied France in 1944. The British loathed the decision; but as Roosevelt and Stalin reached an agreement they went along. It was a good decision for the future of the world. The invasion of France freed Western Europe, saving it from occupation by the Soviets. As the aftermath of the war would demonstrate, this was vitally important.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower led the largest amphibious operation the world had ever seen (and is still the largest to this day). The planning for the assault was intensive. Just getting the troops to the beaches was a monumental undertaking. The Allies needed a new kind of ship for that job, one that could disgorge huge amounts of supplies as well as vehicles, artillery, and even tanks directly onto the beach. The ship was designed by the English and constructed in America—the LST (landing ship tank).[305] This ship became so important that the invasion itself came to depend on the numbers available. Operation Neptune was the code name for the task of getting the assault troops across the channel to France and bringing on the follow-up forces and supplies for the many divisions ashore in France. Neptune was an unqualified success. Not one ship was lost to enemy action crossing the channel.
Once the Allies were ashore they had to build up their forces more rapidly than the Germans. If the Germans could bring more troops to the invasion zone than the Allies, they could overwhelm them. Allied air power could close off the invasion beaches from German reinforcements by destroying all the rail lines, bridges, and roads leading to the invasion area. The problem was the air commanders did not want to give up their heavy bombers for this task. Author Harris, chief of Bomber Command for the British, steadfastly contended his air raids would win the war, and to divert his heavy bombers for even a few days—much less the weeks needed by Eisenhower—would hurt the war effort immeasurably. Harris argued, but Ike (Eisenhower) won and the bombers bombarded the area behind the landing area (as well as other areas to throw the Germans off). This air campaign was one of the most successful of the war. After the raids were over, the bridges were down, the railroads mangled, and roads destroyed over a vast area of France near the invasion point of Normandy.
Normandy was not a perfect spot; overall however, Normandy was the best beach area the Allies could find. Other beaches had heavier defenses, lacked sufficient beach exits, and were beyond the reach of air cover, among other evils.[306]
Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery decided a minimum of five divisions would go ashore on D-Day with more to follow as soon as possible. Prior to these men touching the shore, three airborne divisions would jump into France behind the beachheads to secure vital bridges, causeways, and road crossings (eight divisions total in the first wave of assaults—over one hundred thousand men). They would slow or stop advancing German units trying to reach the beachhead. It was a tall order for the paratroopers.[307] The paratroopers would go in at night, and the invasion would begin early that same morning. The ground troops had to reach the paratroopers before the Nazis could show up in force and demolish them.
The beaches were Utah, Omaha, Gold, Juno, and Sword. Utah and Omaha, on the right (if you are on a boat facing the land from the sea), were American sectors; Gold was British; Juno was Canadian, and Sword (the far left beach) was English. One division would go ashore at each beach with other divisions ready to follow on as combat allowed. The three paratroop divisions were the 101 (American), 82 (American), and the 6th (English). The airborne Americans would land behind Utah and Omaha while the English paratroopers would land on the left flank of Sword (looking from the sea) to secure vital crossing points over the Orne River and to stall Nazi attacks on the flanks of Sword.
In June of 1944, the Germans were in a poor position to defend the continent from invasion.[308] Allied aircraft ruled the skies and Allied ships ruled the sea. This prevented German reconnaissance flights or naval reconnaissance. Unknown to the Germans, all their agents in England were working for the Allies, and the Allies were reading the German codes in real time through the Ultra decrypt program. The French Resistance was feeding additional intelligence to the Allies and they performed key acts of sabotage. The Germans were blind and deaf while the Allies had eyes and ears everywhere.
German generals could guess where the Allies might strike. They knew the Allies demanded air cover, and that limited the places the Allies would land. Beach exits, tides, defenses, phases of the moon, weather etc., all played a role in the German analysis. However, weather was one part of the equation where they came up short. All the Nazi weather ships were destroyed by the English Navy. (The code breakers again) The Germans had problems knowing what the weather would be on any given day along the French coast. The Allies would know because of extensive weather stations at sea and ashore.
The Germans guessed that either the Pas de Calais in the north of France near Belgium or Normandy near Cherbourg were the likely landing areas. The Germans heavily fortified the Pas de Calais beaches because they thought this was the most likely landing spot. They were “aided” in this analysis by an elaborate Allied deception plan designed to make the Germans believe Pas de Calais was the invasion beach. General Patton was put in charge of a large fake army with dummy tanks, trucks, and troops that were visible everywhere. This deception worked so well the Germans thought Normandy was a ruse for a number of days after the landings.
Germany’s fundamental problem was how to defend the long coastline of Western Europe. One way is to keep a large reserve behind a weak outer line and counter attack wherever the invader strikes. Another is a cordon defense, where strong units are placed around the boundaries of the area to be defended with the goal of stopping the attacker at the boundary, then driving him back later with units assembled from other areas of the boundary defense. Two great German generals, Rommel and Von Rundstedt, disagreed on how to mount the defense of France. Rommel wanted a cordon defense because he believed Allied air power was so potent that it would shoot the German reserve troops to pieces before they arrived, and airpower would prevent the move from their reserve positions to the beachhead in a timely manner.[309] Von Rundstedt, very old school himself (anyone with “von” before his name was going to be old school), thought the large reserve was best. He disliked cordon defenses, as most modern military men do, because of its inherent inefficiency and lack of striking power on offense. Von Rundstedt thought the counterattack was the key. He did not want men all over the place knowing about 90 percent of them would be in the wrong spot when the attack came. Rommel insisted the battle must be won on the beaches on the first day of the invasion. Once the Allies were ashore in force, he thought, it was over because Allied air and sea power could continue to deliver troops to France without interruption, and Germany could not match the Allies’ power. Because of the lack of German intelligence and reconnaissance capability, Rommel opted for the cordon defense as his only alternative if he was to stop the Allies on the beaches.
Want to guess who settled the argument? Adolf Hitler—who else? Hitler divided the strategic baby and allowed Rommel to reinforce some of the beach areas with a limited number of troops, but also allowed Rundstedt a reserve. The problem was the reserve couldnot move unless Hitlerhimself gave the word. It could not be any worse. The Germans had no coherent strategy for defense, and their main units assembled for counterattack were in the hands of a man hundreds of miles away (and not very rational . . . to say the least).
Figure 69 The D-Day Plan
The Atlantic Wall Breached
As the invasion loomed, two things happened that changed the course of the battle. First, the weather changed for the worse. A large storm hit the channel and made an invasion impossible. Then the Allied weather advantage came to fruition. Allied weathermen told Ike and his commanders a window of “good” (well, good enough) weather would appear on June 6, 1944 and last for a few days. Ike polled the commanders and then said, “Go”. The room cleared and the invasion was on. The second thing that occurred was the veteran German 352ed division had moved into the Omaha Beach sector undetected by the Allies. On the German side, the bad weather gave them a break, or so they thought. Rommel went home for his wife’s birthday, and a lot of other generals and their staffs took time off. Lack of weather information had changed the course of the war. Alliedsurprise would be total.
Figure 70 D-Day Plus Six
The airdrop of troops into France did not go well. The pilots missed the drop zones, and some panicked in the flak and flew away from the drop zones before the men could jump. As a result, the paratroopers were scattered far away from their drop zones and objectives. The bridge crossing over the Orne River was the exception. The bridge fell to English glider and paratrooper units as the glider pilots put the aircraft down exactly where they should have, almost on top of the objective, totally surprising the guards. The rest of the paratroopers scattered behind the beaches began to mill around in the dark causing great confusion at German headquarters. Aggressive by training, the paratroopers joined themselves into ad hoc units and began attacking anywhere they could find the enemy. It was a mess, but it was confusing the Germans and causing delays—as planned.
As the fleet approached Normandy, Allied firepower pounded the beach areas in preparation for the landings. In the British sectors the naval gunfire was accurate, and overhead the bombers were on target. The British also developed a mass of special machines to help the troops get off the beach. They worked well.[310] British troop transports started closer to the beach than their American counterparts and reached the shore faster with fewer losses. On Gold, Juno, and Sword, the troops moved off the beaches rather quickly and established themselves inland. Unfortunately, they drove slowly inland, hence, failing to attain the first day’s objectives. A key objective, the town of Caen, remained in German hands. Utah Beach was no picnic, but the units were ashore and able to traverse the marshes behind the beach because paratroopers had seized the vital causeway crossings.
Omaha beach was appallingly different. The bombardment aircraft dropped their ordinance far behind the beach, failing to destroy German positions overlooking the landing area. Naval gunfire overshot the defenses, thus German defenses remained intact and the beach was without craters, depriving the landing troops of cover. The veteran German 352nd infantry division defended Omaha. Unlike many other units on the Normandy beaches, this was no static unit. It was sent to Normandy for rest and refit after fighting on the eastern front. These men knew how to fight. At Omaha Beach a steep escarpment overlooked the landing zones giving the defenders a grand view of the area below. Men landing here had to cross 200 to 300 yards of flat sand to reach a place capable of obstructing the swarms of German bullets roaring down upon them. German gunners directed cannon fire onto landing craft from field guns just behind the beach untouched by air attacks or naval bombardment. These cannons were firing directly into the landing craft, blowing men to atoms.
As the ramps dropped, German machine guns opened fire with predictably bloody results. One man stated that his captain was “filled with bullets by the time he got to the bottom of the ramp.” From undisturbed positions overlooking the beach, the veteran Germans fired down onto the men crawling or running for cover across the open landscape. American casualties on Omaha were terrible.
The so-called swimming tanks were sinking in the high waves on their way to Omaha Beach depriving the troops of needed armored support. Junior grade officers commanding a few LSTs laboring through high waves toward Omaha beach decided to deliver the tanks by running their ships onto shore. By this expedient, some tanks got to the beach and began firing on the German positions. Heavy German concrete emplacements defied the fire of such small guns, but the Germans in the trenches overlooking the beach worried about the return fire. The men of the US 1st and 29th Divisions pinned on the beach rejoiced to see at least some armor driving out of the LSTs.
Observing the dilemma of the troops ashore moved another group of navy men to extraordinary action. American destroyers began sailing very close to shore (one thousand yards), firing their five-inch guns at the German pillboxes and trenches overlooking Omaha Beach. This naval gunfire devastated the defenders. Pillboxes and bunkers were destroyed, and the excoriating fire on the men below the cliff began to abate. Finally, small groups of men started fighting their way off the beach, up the draws and the escarpment, toward the German positions above the beach. As these draws were taken and the escarpment breached, the Americans could attack the Germans from the flanks and the pillboxes and bunkers from behind. The 352 division requested reinforcements from the German High Command, but none were sent. This was a critical error. Reinforced, the 352 might have driven the Americans off their tiny initial gains, thereby splitting the Allied forces. To the east, the British beaches could have held, but to the west Utah beach would have been isolated and difficult to hold. But, no German reinforcements arrived and the 352 lost men and material as the day marched on, which eventually caused them to buckle. This allowed the Americans to expand their beachhead, although not by much, on the first day.
Omaha beach survived and the Allies were ashore in force. However, the day went badly in one other crucial area. General Montgomery planned to capture the town of Caen on the first day. The British and Canadian troops moving inland from Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches were unhurried, and the Germans quickly reinforced the area around Caen. The Germans knew this route was the key to gaining the open plain to Paris. By denying the invasion forces the Caen area, the Germans pulled a major coup. By the time the Allies broke out of Normandy thousands of men had died trying to capture Caen’s high ground.
The British and Americans were also starting to encounter the unanticipated Normandy hedgerow country. After the Allies were ashore they found the country behind the beaches arrayed with massive, deep, thick hedges. The roads were narrow and somewhat depressed below the bottom of the hedges. This was superb defensive terrain, and the Germans protected it with skill and courage. A war of attrition began that cost the Allies in casualties and time. As the Allies inched forward, the Germans moved more troops into the line, thereby preventing an Allied breakout. The next few days found the Americans fighting their way across the neck of land that held the city and port of Cherbourg. The goal was to close off the peninsula then attack north and seize the port. This effort was time-consuming, but the Americans moved relentlessly forward.
As the Americans captured the Cherbourg Peninsula, General Montgomery wanted to take Caen and the ridges beyond so he could break out into the plains behind Caen and strike for Paris. Monty mounted seven large attacks on the German positions, two of them quite large, and suffered heavy losses every time. Operations Perch, Epson, Windsor, Charnwood, Jupiter, Goodwood, and Spring were all costly failures. Operation Goodwood alone cost the Allies approximately four thousand men and four hundred tanks. Even though British troops took the town of Caen itself, the vital high ground remained in German hands. General Montgomery continued battering away at the entrenched Germans with high losses and few appreciable gains.
In the meantime, the Americans were making progress. The port of Cherbourg fell on June 26, but German engineers ruined the port and it remained unusable until August. At least the Allies had the Cherbourg Peninsula, a large area in which they massed troops, constructed airfields, and stationed aircraft for close air support.
Finally, the Americans decided they could break out in their sector near the town of St. Lo. After a massive air bombardment General Patton’s Third Army broke through the German lines, and the Sherman tanks, fast and reliable, were now in their element. Hitler was advised to allow redeployment to the River Seine, but predictably refused to retreat. Soon the German Army defending Normandy was in a trap. As General Patton advanced in a sweeping movement south and then north, General Montgomery advanced south soon forming a pocket around the town of Falaise. Unfortunately for the Allies, General Montgomery failed to close the pocket and a large number of German troops escaped; however, they lost their equipment and had no ability to resist the Allies effectively until rearmed and reconstituted as a fighting force.
After the war, General Montgomery claimed it was always his plan to tie down the Germans around Caen and have the Americans break out from the west and trap the enemy. General Montgomery was covering his reputation. Pre-invasion plans clearly demonstrate Montgomery’s desire to capture Caen for the expected breakthrough at that point. Montgomery formed no plans prior to the invasion for a breakout from the west by American forces. This possibility arose after the offensives mounted by General Montgomery failed at Caen. These offensives were massive in scale, and certainly not the kind of operation designed for tying down enemy troops. No mention of the American move to breakout came from Montgomery’s headquarters. The idea was American; however, Montgomery did see the merit of the plan and immediately adopted it.[311]
Once the breakout was accomplished the Germans retreated with speed until they could regroup. The Allied advance across France was very rapid. One key to the quickness of the advance was the Sherman tank and the American two and one-half ton trucks (duce and a half). Both units were reliable, fast, and fairly easy to fix if they did break. For all the problems the Sherman had in tank-to-tank engagements it was wonderful in the pursuit across France.
Figure 71 D-Day and Beyond
The Allies were racing to the Rhine. Paris fell rather quickly after De Gaulle’s French units disobeyed Eisenhower’s orders and diverted to the city. Eisenhower was forced to redirect troops to Paris, squandering valuable time and fuel. At least the Germans disobeyed Hitler’s orders to destroy the city. This diversion demonstrated the French war aims differed greatly from the English and Americans, and DeGaulle was going to pursue those aims no matter the cost to their fellow combatants. Because the Germans continued to hold the port cities on the Atlantic coast of France, and because a tremendous storm had wrecked one of the artificial harbors at Normandy, the Allies were having supply problems.[312] Moving fuel, ammunition, and all the rest from Normandy to the German border was expensive and time consuming (that troublesome word again, Logistics). Eisenhower wanted the port of Antwerp captured at once, but again General Montgomery dawdled, and the Germans reinforced the area thus causing the British troops delays and hard fighting after Montgomery finally directed his soldiers to take the area. Engineers worked on clearing mines and obstacles planted by the Germans to stop shipping from entering the port. All these problems caused a significant postponement in opening the vital harbor.
General Eisenhower followed a broad front strategy for the Allied advance where the entire front moved forward simultaneously, and all sectors enjoyed an equal call on supplies. General Montgomery wanted to limit the advance to a narrow area that would demand the lion’s share of supplies. At first Ike refused the idea, but as the supply situation grew critical, he thought allowing the remaining supplies to be used for a narrow front attack could end the war sooner. Ike told General Montgomery to go ahead withOperation Market Garden, an assault with paratroopers and the British Thirty Corps designed to cross the Rhine from British positions near Antwerp. The assault was commenced on September 15, 1944.
Market Garden was a colossal Allied defeat. The plan itself was badly put together, and vital intelligence was ignored. Crack Nazi troops were in the region for rest and refitting, and the plans for Market Garden fell into German hands early in the operation. Thirty Corps’ advance ran into deep trouble because the single road available for mechanized movement was easily defended. After days of pounding and no sign of Thirty Corps or communication from headquarters, the British paratroopers were done. Thousands of elite British paratroopers were killed or captured.[313]
On September 19, 1944, American units began assaulting the Huertgen forest. This assault was useless from a strategic point of view. The forest was classic defensive terrain, and German paratroopers were dug in there supported by heavy artillery. For some reason, American generals Bradley and Hodges thought the forest was vital, and threw nine divisions in all into the fight, battling for three months in an area where American firepower, air control, and ability to maneuver were useless. Huertgen was taken, but the cost was enormous for the advantage (if any) gained—twenty-four thousand US soldiers dead! US Generals Bradley and Hodges were responsible for this error in judgment and fully responsible for the lives of the men they sacrificed.
The Battle of the Bulge
December 1944
On December 16, 1944, Hitler launched a massive offensive through the Ardennes forest. This assault caught the Allies completely by surprise. Allied units stationed at the point of attack had either been manhandled in the Huertgen forest, or were green units moved into a quiet sector. Given the condition of the US units opposing the Germans, they fought well and delayed the initial German advance appreciably; nevertheless, the German blow made good ground in the first few days. The Battle of the Bulge was on.
This attack was the brainchild of Adolf Hitler, forever the gambler, who staked his empire on one very risky roll of the dice. He managed to keep the assault a secret mainly because of radio silence. Allied intelligence was coming in through Ultra (the reading of Nazi radio transmissions) almost exclusively. Ultra intelligence reports were so unfailing Allied generals relied on little else. Furthermore, the Allies thought the Germans could not mount such an offensive. The Allied generals believed the Germans were finished.
Figure 72 Battle of the Bulge, Dec 1944
Somehow, against all odds, Germany scraped together several divisions—armored included—and enough fuel to open a major offensive. Allied air operations failed to prevent this achievement, neither had enormous German losses in men and equipment over the past months in the USSR and on the Western Front. However, the men assembled for this undertaking were not well trained. The officers and most of the noncommissioned officers were veterans, but the troops were green. Moreover, the fuel supply was short. Capturing Allied fuel was necessary to keep the advance going.
Hitler’s plan contained other flaws. The road grid his armored divisions moved over was awful. Small winding mountain roads, with small bridges, would be tough enough to attack over in good weather; however, for the assault to work the weather must be bad—very bad. Snow and overcast weather kept the Allied air forces on the ground, and this was essential for victory. German tanks traversed slick snow-covered roads surrounded by hills and trees that could, and did, hide defenders. Knocking out the lead German tank in these conditions stopped the entire column. Bad weather, large tanks,[314] small winding roads, not much fuel, and a movement schedule that would prove impossible to keep, all added up to failure before the attack started. [315]The experienced German generals knew the results before the attack started, the loss of Germany’s reserves. Hitler had blundered again.
On the morning of the attack, the US Army troops under fire did not see Hitler’s move as stupid. German tanks, artillery, and infantry were advancing everywhere, while American troops were falling back or fighting from encircled positions. Some German troops had a new assault rifle, the Sturmgewehr 44, developed from studies of how German troops actually fought in the field. American troops did not like this new development either. Valiant last stands seldom win wars, but American units fighting valiant, if small, last stands significantly hampered the German advance at key moments in the offensive. This proved critical as the battle developed. Hitler’s goal was the port of Antwerp. He knew his forces must reach the River Meuse, cross it, and get on to Antwerp before the weather cleared.
The German assault soon began running out of steam. The 101st Airborne Division moved into a vital road junction at Bastogne and held on despite repeated German assaults. German units on the point of attack who were approaching the Meuse ran short of fuel and were beat up by American tanks and artillery. The flanks of the American line held at St.Vith, and American counterattacks began to threaten penetration near the base of the bulge. General Patton’s Third Army made a ninety-degree turn north in record time and began assaulting the Germans holding the area between himself and Bastogne. As the weather cleared on Christmas Day, Allied air power began to pound German tanks and supply lines while Patton’s army relieved the defenders at Bastogne. It was over. Hitler reluctantly ordered the retreat that spelled the end for Germany in the west. With his reserves destroyed, Hitler possessed nothing to hold back the Allied tide.
The Air War Over Europe
1940 to 1945
Thus far, we have circumvented the air war over Europe. In fact, it was a massive undertaking involving resources on a vast scale for England, America, and the Nazis. The air war, from the outset, caused controversy. Bombing of civilians was a difficult thing to justify, but it was a requirement of total war. The Nazis started it, said Bomber Harris, and the Allies would finish it in spades. “They have sown the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind,” is a well-known quote from Air Marshall Harris (known as Bomber Harris).
“The pioneer in the air war against Germany was the RAF. The RAF experimented briefly in 1940 with daylight attacks on industrial targets in Germany but abandoned the effort when losses proved unbearably heavy. Thereafter, it attempted to find and attack such targets as oil, aluminum, and aircraft plants at night. Thiseffort too was abandoned; with available techniques, it was not possibleto locate the targets often enough. Then the RAF began its famous raids on German urban and industrial centers. On the night of May 30, 1942, it mounted its first ‘thousand plane’ raid against Cologne and two nights later struck Essen with almostequal force . . . the weight of the RAF effort, compared with tonnages later employed, was very small—sixteen thousand tons in 1940 and forty-sixthousand tons in 1941 compared with 676,000 tons in 1944.” (The US Strategic Bombing Survey)
Thus started the night-area bombing of German cities. It was a practical matter. Daylight raids were too costly, and after dark it was impossibly difficult to locate a factory complex for pinpoint bombing.[316] Britain felt it had to use its only method of striking back, so it made the decision to “carpet” or area bomb the cities producing the machines of war, and if the “civilians” who worked and lived there were harmed, so be it.
When the Americans arrived with their B-17 “flying fortress,” they were sure they could carry out daylight raids against German industrial targets. The American’s thought by using the top-secret Norden bombsight the B-17s could put bombs right on the industrial target, thereby avoiding unnecessary civilian deaths and damaged homes. In fact, the B-17’s bombs seldom fell on the target when dropped from high altitudes. In the beginning, American losses were high but acceptable. The British raids were costing them far less in terms of crew and aircraft losses, but at times the raids missed entire towns. American airmen went forward with the daylight bombing, but the losses were climbing. Bomber Command kept trying to talk the Americans into joining the night raids, but American commanders thought they were on the right track. It went unsaid, but at first the US Airmen thought their approach avoided unnecessary civilian deaths and was therefore morally superior. This did not hold as the war progressed to firebombing entire cities, and any attempt to justify the bombing was summed up by “they started it.”[317]
On August 28, 1943, and October 14, 1943, the USAAF staged daylight attacks on the Schweinfurt ball bearing plants. Allied analysis of the Nazi war machine had shown these ball bearing plants were critical. An all-out effort might destroy the Achilles heel of Nazi industrial power. However, the ball bearing plants were deep within the Reich, and the raids were disasters.
“In the famous and much-discussed second attack on October 14, 1943, when the plants were again severely damaged, one of the decisive air battles of the war took place. The 228 bombers participating were strongly attacked by German fighters when beyond the range of their fighter escort. Losses to fighters and to flakcost the United States forces 62 planes with another 138 damaged invarying degree, some beyond repair. Repeated losses of this magnitude could not be sustained; deep penetrations without escort, of which this was among the earliest, were suspended; and attacks on Schweinfurt were not renewed for four months.” (USStrategic Bombing Survey)
This report is an understatement. German radar detected the attack’s approach, and the course taken by the bombers allowed the Germans to deduce the target. Additional fighters quickly arrived at key airfields along the route to intercept the B-17s both on their way to Schweinfurt and back. The raiders were butchered. Until long-range escorts could be developed, deep raids into Germany were cancelled. By December of 1943, the P-51 Mustang was reaching the end of its development and started becoming part of the Eighth Army Air Force.[318] In a few months, they would arrive in sufficient numbers to influence the air battles in early 1944.
The British were not deterred. Bomber Harris planned a prodigious series of night raids on Berlin to win the war outright through bombing the Nazi capital. Germany had been working on deterrent measures and put together both an improved radar system and a night interceptor network before the powerful British operation was underway. When the raids began on Berlin the British bomber force suffered high losses, and the losses increased as the size of the raids increased. During the three and one-half month battle of Berlin, the RAF lost over 1,000 bombers. Finally, even Harris had to admit the losses were too high, and the Berlin bomber offensive finally came to a halt.
As the escorts began to make their numbers felt, the long-range daylight raids could begin once more. A new general was at the head of the Eighth USAAF, General Doolittle, the same man who had led the daring raid on Tokyo, Japan, in 1942. General Doolittle saw at once that the use of US Air power was wrong. He changed the emphasis from attacking almost any German production facilities to attacking the German air force and its production facilities. General Doolittle sent the bombers up as bait to lure the German fighters into unequal contests with newer American and British fighters. The general also turned the Mustangs loose, in that he allowed some flights to fly apart from the bombers rather than close in to protect the larger aircraft. As a result, American and British pilots began to kill German aircraft at their airfields before they had even taken off. The resulting American air offensive against the German air force was a total success. Due largely to the genius of Doolittle, by June of 1944, the Luftwaffe was no longer a decisive factor in the war (recall this was the second objective of the Casablanca Conference).
After the defeat of the Luftwaffe, Allied bombers and fighters roamed the German skies at will, bombing and strafing everything. Doolittle had applied the precepts of the famous writer Clausewitz and his masterwork book On War. By defeating the enemy’s army in the field first, the Luftwaffe being Germany’s air army, so to speak, afterward he could do whatever he wanted. He wanted to bomb and machine gun Germany into submission, and his pilots did their best to accomplish the objective. In the end, Germany did not fall because of the Allied air offensive. The German air force was destroyed, and that gave the Allies tactical air control over the battlefield—which made an enormous difference in the outcome of numerous battles. At the Battle of the Bulge, for example, Allied air power played a significant role in turning the tide against the German offensive. And without total control of the air, D-Day’s amphibious assault may have been impossible.
When studying modern wars, think about how many battles were won when the winner on the ground controlled the air. It is quickly seen that the side ruling the sky has an enormous edge. If one cannot rule the skies, the airspace must at least be contested; otherwise the combatant controlling the air wins the ground battle.[319]
The problem with the bomber offensive was that the cost may not have justified the benefit gained. Of course, when people are saying the bomber will win the war there is a tendency to wonder if what was promised was delivered. In fact, it was not. The war in Europe was not won by air power. Troops still had to land and beat up the German Army to achieve victory. Air power severely damaged Germany’s ability to wage war, but the ground pounders won the war one step at a time just as they have done since Sargon conquered Ur in 2371 BC.
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey tried to assess the impact of the huge, and extremely expensive, bombing effort. In essence, the survey concluded that the air war failed to deliver on its war-winning promises. Yes, it had contributed, but so had the ships and all the rest of the combat arms support units. The USAAF and the Royal Air Force always considered themselves special, because they would do more to beat Germany than other Allied units. They were wrong. The fellow face down in the mud with bullets flying over his head was the ultimate key to victory. He always has been.
The result: the air war was important, but not of supreme importance. After the war, the major air forces of the world perked up because of the atomic bomb. Now they possessed a war-winning weapon, and air power was king. At least for a while. No doubt the bomb could destroy armies as well as civilization, but who would use it? In small wars, such as Korea (only a million or more killed there—very “small”), the Communist guessed the United States would not deploy the weapon, and they were correct. American scruples tied its hands and gave the communists an edge. The USSR stole the bomb quickly and cheaply through effective spying, and two (and later three, and then four, and so on) nations aimed nuclear warheads at one another. Meanwhile, wars continue to start, and many almost never end (Vietnam, etc.). What good was the bomb?
The air force never wanted to be “flying artillery,” but that was why they were originally attached to the army. Reconnaissance and close air support WERE the missions of importance in the First World War, and it turned out they may have been the most important in the Second World War. Germany’s entire air force was constructed around the tasks of reconnaissance and close air support.[320] Allied air forces wanted to be more. Because of theories put forth after the First World War by many air theorists, such as Italian General Giulio Douhet[321] and Sir Hugh Trenchard of England, aviators thought by bombing civilians the enemy nations would cave in. They thought the bomber would always get through. However, radar and other modern inventions soon showed the bomber would be detected and shot down unless it got some help. Moreover, bombing did not cause civilian populations to demand peace. And why anyone thought a totalitarian nation would listen to its people is another unanswered question.
Some have concluded that indiscriminate bombing, as well as using the atomic bomb, was a war crime. This is based on the idea that killing civilians is illegal and immoral; however, ever since Sherman’s “March to the Sea” civilians have been fair game in modern war. The civilians support the war, manufacture the machines of war, produce the food that keeps the army in the field, and provides the soldiers necessary to fight the war. Destroy the workers and the nation’s ability to fight dissolves. Thus, there are no civilians inmodern war. The Islamic terrorists know this, but many in the civilian world are loathe to admit this reality of our modern world.
Even with one thousand plane raids on Germany and around-the-clock bombing, air power did not work its predicted magic. It did kill many people and spread the misery of war far and wide. Now everyone suffered. Children and their mothers died right along with the soldiers. What a charming world we had invented.
The Eastern Front—After Stalingrad
The war in Europe was won for the Allies on the Eastern Front. The Soviets knew about the German offensive in the Ardennes through their excellent spy network in Nazi Germany (and everywhere else). Typical of the Soviets, they did not alert the Allies about the planned attack. Instead, they gathered their forces for another push at Hitler after his reserves were committed in the West. As the war in the East progressed, Soviet attacks were launched over a wide front with great effectiveness.[322] The ability to achieve deep armored penetration and encirclement destroyed German Army Group Center in Operation Bagration[323] and constituted the final extinction of any German hope of shielding the homeland from the rapacious swarms rushing from the east. Germany was unable to supply its troops with enough of anything, and the harsh Russian winters continued taking their toll. The basic Soviet attack consisted of enormous numbers of troops and tanks, supported by large numbers of aircraft and artillery, falling upon German positions in all-out attacks of the most violent nature. The USSR had complete control of the air. With new aircraft types produced in enormous numbers, the Luftwaffe was simply being swept aside. Stalin’s orders included shooting commanders who failed, so Soviet commanders drove their troops inexorably forward while ignoring losses. Hitler’s orders hindered the German commanders and prevented proper troop dispositions with the net result of defeat after defeat for the Nazis.
Spies were everywhere in the Nazi regime, and they were working for the Soviets. As a result, Stalin knew Hitler’s every plan. Before the battle of Kursk on July 4 through 20, 1943, the last German offensive in the east, the Soviets knew about the attack through their Lucy Spy Ring, and constructed numerous and deep defensive lines in front of the German assault positions. The USSR assembled 1,300,000 men; 3,600 tanks; 20,000 artillery pieces; 2,400 aircraft; laid over 1 million mines; and had 23 antitank guns perkilometer in the Kursk salient. The Soviets even knew the time of the German attack, and opened an artillery barrage on German positions just prior to the German assault. At Kursk, the Wehrmacht threw nearly fifty German divisions into the strike, but it was a tragedy for the German Army. The Soviets possessed so many men and tanks that losing twice as many as the Germans meant nothing.[324] After the attack was underway, the Soviets hit the German flanks and drove through them to endanger the starting positions of the Nazi attack, causing Hitler to break off the offensive. Germany’s losses were high, and they were losses the Reich could ill afford—in men or equipment.
After Kursk, the battles on the Eastern Front droned on like bitter winter storms. Well prepared and informed Soviet units attacked, supported by thousands of artillery pieces pouring tons of explosives down on German positions. Soviet troops in prodigious numbers moved forward with clouds of Soviet aircraft overhead bombing and strafing German lines as the Soviet infantry advanced. Waves of tanks moved with the Soviet troops, sloshing through mud and snow, firing cannons and spewing bullets. Overwhelmed, the Germans would fall back or were ordered to “stand fast” by the Fuehrer, in which case they were decimated or obliterated depending on the Fuehrer’s next order and its timeliness. Even when the German troops could fall back, Soviet artillery and aircraft pummeled the withdrawing units. After retreating, the Germans would dig in again and await the next murderous Red Army assault. And so it would go, from 1943 until war’s end.
Figure 73 Soviet Operations 1943-1944
As the Soviets rolled unremittingly forward, Hitler began ordering nonexistent units around. Hitler threw away the lives of his men as the troops of his most hated enemy, Stalin, entered Berlin and began the final slaying of the Nazi beast. Hitler married his long-time lover Eva Braun, and then, on April 30, 1945, they both killed themselves in his bunker deep below ground in the Nazi capital. Members of his entourage took the lifeless Fuehrer and his bride to the surface, placed them in a shell hole, poured gas over them, and set them ablaze while giving the Nazi salute. They only returned to the bunker after Soviet shells began falling all around them. Even in death, the Nazi leader commanded the unshakable loyalty of those few left around him.[325]
The End in Europe
America, England, and the USSR made plans long before the capture of Berlin, and those plans allowed the Soviets the “honor” of conquering the Nazi capital. The Western Allies would halt at the River Elbe and await the Soviets. In spite of the agreement, Churchill wanted to continue on and capture Berlin before the Soviets; nonetheless, Eisenhower vetoed any such move. Eisenhower was not sacrificing even one soldier to gain Berlin and then hand it back to the Soviets. Churchill wanted to deny people and resources to the Soviets, and he wanted to keep people safe from slavery under Stalin. However, Eisenhower knew the Western Allies would keep their word and leave the area up to the Elbe River to the Soviets even if American and English troops crossed the line.
The last Fuehrer of the Third Reich was Grand Admiral Karl Donitz. Hitler appointed him in his will (yep, the murderer left a detailed last will and testament). The surrender of Nazi Germany took place on May 7, 1945. The Nazi leaders were rounded up, put on trial, and many were executed by the victorious Allied powers for their misdeeds. A new world organization was formed to try to prevent such terrible wars in the future. The United Nations, as it was termed, was the League of Nations reconstituted. It would have a major impact on the world, but not the one envisioned immediately after World War II.
The End in Asia
Japan was determined to fight on to preserve their emperor and their honor. However, in every area of conflict, the Allies were winning big. In Burma, the English, under General Slim, defeated the Japanese and were pushing them back to Rangoon and beyond.[326] The Philippines were American again; Manila was recovered by the US Army, and the Japanese supply lines to the oil and resources of the South Pacific were cut. American submarines eradicated the Japanese merchant fleet, and American bombers burned the guts out of Japan’s cities. The Japanese people were starving and dying by the thousands, but no thought of surrender was considered. Any burden was acceptable to the Japanese people when requested by the emperor.
Iwo Jima was invaded in February 1945. Once again, airfields were the target. American B-29 raids were flying around the island, adding many dangerous miles to the flights, and giving the Japanese early warning the bombers were inbound. By taking the island, the Americans would shorten the B-29 flights and use fighter aircraft based there to escort the huge bombers to Japan. The airfields could also be used to land damaged aircraft. Sulfur Island, Japan’s name for Iwo, fell after thirty days of bloody fighting. Casualties on Iwo Jima stunned the US Navy and Marine Corps. Using the same tactics developed on Peleliu, the Japanese dug into the island and had to be blasted out one hole at a time. It was difficult work, and the United States Marines again paid a heavy price for a tiny Pacific rock.[327] About 1,000 damaged bombers used the island for emergency landings. In fact, damaged B-29 bombers started using the airfield for landings before the island was conquered. The number of aircrew saved probably exceeded the deaths the marines endured in taking the island.
President Nixon gave the island back to Japan in the 1970s. One surviving marine said that if Americans understood the sacrifices made to conquer the island, we would never give it back. Such is the way of the United States of America, always forward looking and forever forgiving the wrongs of the past. Perhaps it is best to forget at least some history. In the Middle East, memories are thousands of years long, and fathers long ago murdered must be avenged in our day. The carnage continues because of ancient never forgotten wrongs. Some things are best forgiven and forgotten.
Battle of Okinawa
April 1 to June 21, 1945
The invasion of Okinawa, a very large island just south of Japan, was the last major land battle of World War II. It was a joint army and marine operation, with the army in overall land control, which began on April 1 of 1945 and lasted some eighty-seven days. After the marines landed they proceeded north, and the US Army split away and attacked south. Attacked may be the wrong word, because initially the troops encountered no Japanese resistance. Only after the US troops reached the rugged mountains did the fighting begin. In a relatively short period, the marines captured the northern part of the island; meanwhile, the US Army ran into a masterfully prepared defensive network in the south. The Japanese thoroughly dug in, constructing an elaborate maze of tunnels and defensive positions in the mountains. These interlaced positions were mutually supporting with machine guns, mortars, and heavy artillery zeroed in on likely paths of attack. The Japanese fire was murderous, and the army took unusually heavy casualties during its assaults. After seizing the north, the marines joined the army units attacking to the south. General Buckner, in charge of land operations on the island, kept ordering frontal assaults on Japanese lines that gained ground, but at a high cost in lives. The marines suggested an amphibious assault to flank the main Japanese line, but Buckner rejected the concept. Slowly, very slowly, the US Army and Marines made headway against the superbly placed Japanese defensive positions.
Out at sea, a situation developed that bode ill for the US fleet. Waves of Japanese aircraft began ramming American warships. The pilots were committing suicide in an attempt to sweep the US Navy from the sea. This tactic was experienced earlier, but by only a few aircraft, during battles off the Philippines.
Kamikazes (Divine Wind) committed themselves to die trying to sink the US fleet now threatening their homeland.[328] Japan’s outdated aircraft were unable to compete with newer American models. The Japanese pilots were unskilled, and the few remaining skilled pilots could make no difference against American strength. The idea of putting a person into an aircraft who was only trained to take off and crash into an American ship seems out of place to Westerners. It was the perfect solution for Japan, who could now put their out-of-date planes and untrained pilots to good use. Japan’s tradition of sacrifice for honor and the emperor allowed their young men to commit suicide in return for having died for the emperor. Everything fit together very well from the Japanese point of view. The Kamikaze was a guided missile. Instead of a computer or mechanical device guiding the missile, a man would do the job. Loaded with fuel and bombs, these aircraft became lethal weapons against the fleet. Their effect was dreadful. American ships were knocked out of action at the highest rates of the war, and American sailors were killed in distressing numbers. The US Navy responded with increased combat air patrols and destroyer pickets to meet the raiders as far away from the fleet as possible. Kamikaze pilots were poorly trained and often made the mistake of crashing into the destroyer pickets rather than going further to attack the carriers and battleships of the main fleet. Even so, the attacks were deadly.
Nimitz complained to the army about the slow pace of the land war as it was exposing his fleet to unnecessary hazards. In fact, about five thousand sailors died defending the fleet off Okinawa. Nimitz wanted to get the island conquered so his fleet could set sail to another location. General Buckner’s cooperation failed to appear. He continued the slow grind of the campaign in spite of navy protest. The key problem was differing doctrines of war. Marine units were trained to assault relentlessly, moving forward at great costs if necessary to conquer the enemy ashore so the fleet could rapidly leave the area. Warships prefer non-stationary addresses, because the enemy can find them easily if they stay in one spot. The ocean’s size is a major defensive weapon for a navy. Off the island of Okinawa, the ships were supplying the combat units and providing artillery support ashore. Japanese Kamikazes could find them without difficulty because of their fixed location.
US Army doctrine said nothing about moving quickly because of ships waiting offshore; thus, the army moved slower when attacking than the marines, taking fewer risks while advancing. The army refused to sacrifice its men for speed. In one instance off Makin in the Tarawa atoll, an escort carrier was sunk, and more lives were lost in that sinking than were lost taking the island of Makin. The navy thought the loss was due to the army’s slow advance in taking the island, thus requiring the carrier to hang around longer than necessary and attracting unwanted attention.
Nimitz and the army remained at loggerheads because of doctrine. The speed required by the US Navy went unacknowledged by the US Army, who dared not change their basic combat doctrine in any event. Military units have to stay within their training to avoid even greater difficulties. However, the US Navy did have a point in that the advance was agonizingly slow. The landings requested by the marines could have broken one of the toughest Japanese lines and quickened the advance. Constant frontal assaults, like WWI, did nothing for the attacking forces. Buckner refused to change, and the frontal assaults went on. Bad weather helped the defenders in killing their American tormentors, but the outcome was never in doubt. American power simply hammered the Japanese to dust. General Buckner died before the end of the battle, killed by an artillery shell that left the many others near him unscathed.
At last Okinawa was captured on May 6, 1945.[329] For the Allies, it was a grim ordeal, and it gave America fair warning of how difficult it would be to invade Japan. In the battle for Okinawa, 12,513 Americans were dead or missing and nearly 39,000 wounded. The Japanese lost 66,000dead, 17,000 wounded, and a very high 7,400 captured. At sea, the United States of America lost 79 ships sunk or scrapped, and 763 aircraft were destroyed. The Japanese lost 16 ships and over 3,000 aircraft. Approximately 150,000civilians on Okinawa were killed or missing. The Japanese flew over 1,900 Kamikaze missions, killing about 5,000 US sailors. The invasion of the home islands would be horrific if these numbers held true.[330]
Of course, the Japanese wanted the Americans to do something other than invade the home islands. A negotiated peace on almost any terms might be acceptable, but the emperor must stay. Japan tried to send peace feelers through the Soviets (they were not at war with Japan at this time) who conveniently failed to forward them to the United States. However, the Americans failed to understand the Japanese need to retain their god on earth, the emperor. Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945. President Truman (his successor) would honor the unconditional surrender demand, plus this concept was reaffirmed at the Potsdam Conference in 1945 (why it was affirmed is open to question).
Allied bombing raids on Japan were taking dire death tolls. The firebombing of Tokyo on February 23, 1945, killed an estimated one hundred thousand in the resulting firestorm. American submarines sunk Japanese shipping at a startling rate, thus causing starvation all over Japan. American aircraft mined critical straits and harbors, affecting large shipping losses and preventing the movement of food and supplies from one region to another by sea. American submarines achieved in the war with Japan what the Nazis wanted to achieve in the Battle of the Atlantic; the devastation of an island nation’s ability to wage war.
Operation Olympic
In spite of the challenge, Japan’s military rejected surrender. The Americans were putting together Operation Olympic (or Downfall), the invasion of the Japanese home islands, even as the Japanese readied themselves for the attack. The US assembled 14,000 aircraft and up to 100 aircraft carriers for the assault. However, Japan was producing suicide weapons in abundance. 10,500 aircraft were preserved for attacks on US invasion forces, hundreds of fast boats with high explosives inside were constructed for ramming American ships, and special long-lance torpedoes were prepared for carrying men who steered the torpedoes to their targets. Japan assembled and trained huge numbers of women and children to charge the Americans with sharpened sticks to cause a depletion of US ammunition before the following Japanese troops reached the American lines.[331]
Worse yet, and unknown to the Americans, with skilled radio traffic analysis and common sense the Japanese accurately deduced the landing area, the Southern part of Kyushu. Japan was quickly preparing hardened defensive positions in the escarpments overlooking the invasion beaches. The Japanese military finally decided that attacking warships was not the path to victory. All the suicide weapons would be directed at the transports, troopships, and landing craft. The LSTs were the highly prized targets instead of the battleships and carriers waiting further offshore (The PacificWar Companion, Editor, Daniel Marston, Osprey, 2005).
Figure 74 Planned Assault on Japan, Op Olympic & Coronet
The tactical adjustment of the Kamikaze attacks was probably more important than discovering the landing area. With thousands of Kamikazes aimed at troop transports and landing craft, the carnage would grow immensely. The losses of men would occur before reaching the beach; decreasing unit combat power and increasing the confusion of the landing force (recall Tarawa). Once ashore, caves overlooking the beach would rain down heavy artillery on the invaders. Coupled with bunkers and pillboxes firing machine guns and mortars into the troop concentrations on the shore (as they did at Iwo Jima), the American soldiers and marines would be in a fix. The Japanese also assembled fourteen field divisions with 625,000 troops on Kyushu by August 1945, a truly prodigious number. The “charge of the innocents” (my phrase) would come next, with thousands of women and children storming the American lines. Could American troops shoot down women and children by the thousands? Even if they did, the follow-on assault by the remains of the Japanese army would press the invaders to the limit. Naval gunfire and close air support would probably provide the edge for victory, but imagine the slaughter. Many analysts calculated the probable death toll for the Japanese alone at two million if Japan was invaded—but they mean the entire campaign.[332] I doubt these analysts realized the Japanese had figured out the American landing area, or knew how many suicide planes, boats, and other specialized equipment the Japanese were preparing.
The US Fleet experienced problems with the Kamikazes flying from Japan to Okinawa. Defending the fleet would be much harder if the aircraft were coming in huge numbers and flying much shorter distances. In addition, the Kamikazes would be aiming at the LSTs and other thin-skinned landing ships. Such a mass killing zone would be beyond anything experienced in human history. Over a million people could have died in the landing areas alone. Assuming the Americans got ashore and moved inland, Japanese suicide attacks would certainly continue. As massive waves of humanity threw themselves against the US lines, American politicians might have rethought the conquest of Japan. At that point, a negotiated peace may have taken place with a few American concessions, one of which would have been retention of the emperor.
Truman Uses the A-Bomb
Thankfully, all this is speculation because of the invention of the atomic bomb. After a warning from the world-renowned physicist, Albert Einstein, that Germany was seeking an atomic bomb, President Roosevelt ordered the United States to begin development of its own bomb.[333]Unfortunately for the United States, the Soviets penetrated the small group of top scientists working on the bomb, and the secrets of the bomb were delivered to the USSR without cost or risk.
President Truman ordered the atomic bombs dropped on Japan based on his analysis of the various options available to America. Many options were considered; although, in reality, the options were seriously limited. America could try to starve everyone to death or use conventional bombardment to pound Japan into submission; however, surrender was not likely in either case because of the possible removal of the emperor and the anticipation of such conventional methods by Japan’s leadership. Whether they were starved or bombed into submission, many months would pass causing perhaps millions of Japanese to suffer and die. Invasion was another course, and the one favored before the bomb emerged, except an invasion would result in innumerable deaths with both Americans and Japanese dying by the probable millions.
Truman’s verdict to use the atomic bomb was the only rational course of action. The deaths of 180,000 (estimated) Japanese in the two atomic attacks were little compared to the slaughter required by an invasion or the suffering induced by an extended blockade starving millions. The atomicattacks saved millions of lives. Moreover, Roosevelt agreed with Stalin that the USSR would invade Japan within a few months of the German surrender. Stalin was good to his word (for once) and invaded Manchuria shortly before the United States of America used the atomic bomb on Japan. Battle wise Soviet forces rolled over the Japanese defenders with ease. They would have kept going to the coast of China, and into the Japanese home islands, if the war had not ended. After the surrender of Japan, the Soviet advance stopped leaving at least South Korea free and China still engaged in a brutal civil war, but not under Soviet control.
Some have said Truman used the bomb to demonstrate its destructive ability to Stalin. Truman clearly stated he used the bomb to end the war, and nothing else. If Truman was anything, he was a straight and plain speaker. If we take Truman at his word, we have the definitive statement from the one man who made the ultimate decision to use the bomb. Moreover, he was right to use it. It ended the most brutal war in human existence. Suppose there was an additional motive in using the bomb to show Stalin its power. If it prevented World War III, who cares? That alone would save the lives of untold millions. In my opinion, Stalin was ready to start another world war, but as long as America alone possessed the atomic bomb, he was afraid of losing. After the Soviets built their own atomic bomb, the United States responded by creating the hydrogen bomb (much larger blast), and the USSR hesitated once more. Some have opined, and it is possible knowing the history of Stalin, that Stalin planned a Third World War because he believed the United States was too weak. He further believed the USSR could take the human losses and the United States could not; however, (my opinion) those close to him learned of his idea and then poisoned him. The record of the last few hours of Stalin’s life convinces me his associates did kill him, although the reasons are not clear. As history stands now, we will never know; but, perhaps, we should be thankful for a few men around Stalin who risked their own lives to save the world from the ultimate slaughter.
In the year 2010, so far removed from the realities of 1945, it is fashionable to fault President Truman’s use of the atomic bomb. Critics’ claim Japan’s surrender was close, and by just waiting the United States could have saved many lives. Those making the claims are wrong. Postwar analyses of the Japanese plans disclosed there was no thought of surrender. Even after two atomic bombs were dropped, the Japanese military disavowed surrender. Only the direct intervention of the emperor, with an unprecedented direct orderby him to the heads of the military and the cabinet, endedthe fighting. The emperor was not, by tradition, to speak at cabinet meetings. He was only to attend and listen, nothing more. In the event, the emperor broke all tradition and arose, ordering the military to quit. It is doubtful the emperor could have made this move without the shock of the atomic bomb. The military men cried, and some went home and committed suicide. If the emperor had refrained from speaking, the war would have continued and untold millions would have died in China (remember the Soviet invasion), Japan, and in the American invasion forces.
The first atomic bomb was dropped on the city of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. When no news came from Japan, Truman authorized the second bomb drop, and the city of Nagasaki was hit on August 9, 1945. Only after the detonation of the second bomb did word come from Japan that surrender was possible, but they still requested their emperor be allowed to hold his crown (it was not a condition). Truman relented and said the Japanese communication met the requirements of the Potsdam accords for unconditional surrender.
It was over. With the surrender of Japan, the fighting officially stopped, and the Second World War was at an end. A new world dawned, one much different than the last four hundred and fifty years. Europe was no longer the center of the world, and new powerful nations were emerging with weapons and methods of war changing the face of the future. The Allies celebrated as Europe and Japan smoldered, but a new war had already started. Former Allies soon confronted one another to decide what political philosophy would rule the world.
Let Us Learn
The best lesson from WWII? Be prepared. If you desire peace, prepare for war. The USA, the Great Britain, and France failed to prepare for war. Good men died in the Philippines, France, the USSR, Malaya, Pearl Harbor, and numerous other places because their nations failed to prepare for war. By wishing for the best, signing documents guaranteeing peace, and believing promises from men without morals the Western world’s leadership came very close to losing everything to an evil beyond description. You cannot wish away bad people or bad situations, you must prepare for them.[334]
In your life, be prepared for the future. Keep food on hand, fire extinguishers, medical aid kits, and think over ways to survive in the event catastrophe visits you. Look to preventing the catastrophe in the first place. WWII was avoidable if France and England had enforced the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler’s numerous violations allowed the Allies to intervene at many points, but they failed to interfere. If you look at what is going on around you many situations will cry out for early action, and postponement will result in much larger problems.
During your time on earth, you should compile ways of gathering good information. Discern what is happening, then react properly. Joseph Stalin rejected good information and nearly destroyed himself in the process. Don’t pull a Stalin. Stalin also shot people bringing him bad news, thus, he was denied the truth when he needed it most. Encourage people to approach you with good or bad news. Reward them for accurate information. It is critical to success.
Another lesson from the Second World War; before taking action prepare thoroughly. Get all the information you can, act on the information, anticipate hardships then plan and equip for them, and keep an open mind to other possible reactions to the information. Set reasonable goals, making sure available resources can meet them. If resources are short then scale back the project, reset the goals, or assemble the necessary resources over time. Seek the right mind set for achieving your stated goals. Be consistent in your actions. If you change plans constantly, defeat will stalk you. Hitler hit the Soviets without proper planning, and he was not prepared for setbacks. He set impossible goals, and he changed the goals midstream. Hitler was guilty of false assumptions about the Soviets, and he rejected advice from highly experienced men. Hitler blew it.
Finally, luck is necessary in huge undertakings. Yes, luck. It even makes a difference in small projects. Matters beyond your control must fall your way, or you will face trouble. If the Japanese had sunk the three US Pacific Fleet aircraft carriers at Pearl Harbor, as planned, the Pacific war would have changed dramatically. If the Japanese submarines or scout aircraft had spotted the US aircraft carriers earlier, Midway could have turned into a dire American defeat. If the Polish code breakers failed to escape Poland, the course of the war may have changed forever in Hitler’s favor. There are numerous other examples. Luck is not something one controls (at least, that is what we hear—see Scott Adams and Dilbert for another theory), and normal mortals must sit, allowing the fates to decide. Nevertheless, it is a key factor in life. Recognize that failure is not always someone’s fault. Realize events beyond the control of anyone might decide critical events and issues.
Remember, winning is relative. Setting proper end game goals enhance your chances of success. Good decisions, complete planning, and total commitment to reasonable goals can drive luck—at least partly—out of the equation.
You can do nothing about bad luck except struggle to rise above the circumstances. That is life. The USA was on the deck after Pearl Harbor, Bataan, Wake Island, and the Battle of the Java Sea, but America never gave up and came off the mat at the Coral Sea and Midway never to look back. Bad luck normally does not doom you; it only forces you to work harder to reach your goals.
Another great lesson is Win the Peace. After a conflict learn how to bring stability to the situation without embarrassing the vanquished. The best peace wins the conquered to your side, and makes them an asset.
Finally, the Second World War shows us how thin the veneer of civilization really is. The Nazi state quickly stripped away any semblance of being civilized. Normal everyday people adopted the Reich’s cruelty without question or opposition. Starting with the persecutions of the Jews, gypsies, slaves, mentally ill, and many others, the German state turned its citizens into soulless barbarians, willing to murder without question. Germans accepted crushing the target groups like cockroaches. Hitler made it look easy, and that is the problem. It was easy, and if Hitler could accomplish it so can others. Humanity is only a short step away from barbarism.
Books and References:
I have read hundreds of books on World War II. Here are a few of the best, in no particular order (* means superior):
*Cross Channel Attack, Harrison, Gordon A., 1950, Konecky & Konecky. The best book on the D-Day landings at Normandy.
*History of the Second World War, Hart, B.H. Liddell, 1970, Konecky & Konecky. One of the best books on WWII. Wonderful maps!
*Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Brilliant General, von Manstein, Field Marshal Erich, 2004, Zenith Press. How the war in the east was lost, from the mouth of the man who was there.
*Miracle at Midway, Prange, G., 1983, Penguin. A great account of the battle of Midway, easy to read, and authoritative. Considered a classic by most historians.
*The Oxford Companion to World War II, Dear & Foot, 1995, Oxford Press. Huge reference book, probably the best general reference on WWII.
The Coming of the Third Reich, Evans, Penguin, 2005
The Third Reich in Power, Evans, Penguin, 2006
*The Two Ocean War, Morison, Samuel Eliot, 1963, Back Bay Books. Morison can’t be beat on the naval war. Please recall that Morison, like many of the early authors, did not know about Ultra, and Magic, the code breakers who did so much to win the war for the allies.
*There’s A War to be Won, Perret, Goeffrey, 1992, Ballantine books. I love this book. So much is explained so well that it is hard to overstate the importance of reading this author.
At Dawn We Slept: the Untold Story of Pearl Harbor, Prange & Goldstein, 1982, Penguin. Prange on Pearl Harbor, what more do you need to know? Gordon Prange also wrote Miracle at Midway.
Dirty Little Secrets of World War II, Dunnigan & Nofi, 1995, Morrow. Fun!
Eagle Against the Sun, Spector, Ronald H., 1985, Random House. Easy to read, and comprehensive when it comes to the Pacific War.
Guadalcanal, Frank, R.B., 1992, Penguin. This is a must read book if you want to understand the Pacific War, and why everything changed after this epic campaign.
How Great Generals Win, Alexander, Bevin, 1993, WW Norton & Co. Some coverage of WWII generals. Alexander’s thoughts are always worth reading.
How Wars are Won, The 13 Rules of War from Ancient Greece to the War on Terror, Alexander, Bevin, 2002, Three Rivers Press.
Miracle at Midway, Prange,G., 1983, Penguin
Panzer Battles, von Mellenthin, FW, 1956, Konecky & Konecky
The Gathering Storm, Churchill, W., 1986, Mariner Books
The Pacific War Companion, From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima, ed. Marston, D., 2005, Osprey Publishing
The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Shirer, William, 1990, Simon & Schuster. A classic, but somewhat difficult to read. None-the-less, there are few better books on the regime.
The Rommel Papers, Rommel, Erwin, 1982, Da Capo Press
The Second World War 1939-1945, Fuller, J.C.F., 1948, Da Capo Press. Yet another must read book on WWII by an outstanding English analyst.
The Shattered Sward, The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway, Pershall and Tully, 2005, Potomac Books. Excellent book, somewhat controversial.
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Greenwood, 1946 (also available on line). First hand information, great statics, well written.
The US Army in World War II, The Fall of the Philippines, The War in the Pacific, Roberts, Greenfield general editor, 1953, National Historical Society. This is a series of books on the US Army in the Pacific War. Excellent detailed analysis of each campaign, but detail on other services and their role is small, and the impact of Ultra and Magic is missing because of the date of publication.
The World At Arms, The Reader’s Digest Illustrated History of World War II, Wright, Michael editor, 1989, The Reader’s Digest Association Limited. Excellent and pithy account of the world wide struggle.
War Plan Orange, The US Strategy to Defeat Japan 1897-1945, Miller, Edward S., 1991, Naval Institute Press. Surprising analysis of the Pacific War, and how the US planned for the conflict.
Wikipedia, the on line encyclopedia. Look under World War II or the various subject headings, such as: Pearl Harbor, D-Day et al.
The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans, Prange, Gordon W. (1999), Brassey’s, ISBN 1574882228
Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War, Buchanan Crown Publisher, 2009.