Part III

Opening Moves, 1861–1862

In this part . . .

This part helps you to become familiar with the ...For Dummies method for discussing the major battles of the Civil War. Using the period from July 1861 to December 1862, this part examines the who, what, when, where, and why of each battle and how a battle or battles fit into a campaign plan. The armies begin to advance, and the initial encounters between largely untrained troops and inexperienced leaders are bloody and indecisive. The Confederacy wins in the Eastern Theater, but collapses in the Western Theater. Heroes are born, martyrs are created, and once promising leaders disappear quickly in failure. Both North and South steel themselves for a long and difficult struggle.

Chapter 8

In This Chapter

Setting the stage for battle

Making plans with the commanders

Understanding the significance of the battle

Becoming a hero: “Stonewall” Jackson

T he battle of Bull Run, as the Union called it, or Manassas, as the Confederates called it, was the first major engagement of the war. Many honestly believed that one large battle would decide the outcome of the war, almost like a Super Bowl — whoever lost would allow the other side to pursue its strategic goals unmolested. Also like the Super Bowl, civilians from Washington came with picnic lunches to watch the battle and cheer for the Union army. Everyone who volunteered wanted to get in the fight, afraid that the war would be over before they had a chance at glory.

As they quickly learned, war is not sport. Battles are contests of will, involving unimaginable confusion, excitement, and horrific violence. The shock of combat is unforgettable and convinced many an eager volunteer that he had seen enough of war to last a lifetime. Battles also create (and sometimes destroy) heroes. Bull Run created one of the greatest and most well known heroes in American military history: “Stonewall” Jackson.

The First Rumblings: “On to Richmond!”

The war began with neither side fully prepared to do anything. Neither side had a campaign plan to accompany the national strategy. Each side was more interested in putting together an armed force capable of defending its capital city. Nothing resembling an army would emerge for several months after Fort Sumter. Davis and the Confederacy, of course, had time on their side. With a defensive strategy, the Confederate armies (a generous term at this time) simply had to train and wait for the Yankees to invade. The longer the North waited to invade, the better prepared the Southern forces would be. It was the Union side, and especially President Lincoln, who felt the mounting pressure to do something. Months had gone by, and so far all the Union army had done was to build forts around Washington and capture the two undefended Virginia cities of Arlington and Alexandria across the Potomac River.

Taking command of Union forces: McDowell

General Irvin McDowell, a West Point graduate and Mexican War veteran who had been promoted from Major in the regulars to General only two months earlier, commanded an army of about 35,000 men. McDowell had no one available who had any real expertise in training large numbers of men and organizing them into brigades and divisions. Most of the men in his army were 90-day volunteers, who, by this time, had had enough of both the tedium of camp life and the oppressive heat of a Washington summer. They were ready to go home, battle or no battle. Lincoln, knowing the political implications of his army melting away in a few short weeks, and despite his best judgment that the army was not capable of performing effectively in battle, bowed to public pressure. People were anxious for the government to do something. In the Northern press and in the halls of Congress came the cry “On to Richmond!” Everyone believed that the army just had to march the short 100 miles down to the Confederate capital and turn the rebel government out. Besides, a rebel force was stationed only 30 miles away at Manassas, just waiting to get whipped. The road to Richmond, then, would have to lead through Manassas.

Waiting: Beauregard and the Confederates

The Confederate force, with about 22,000 men, was located at the small town of Manassas, a strategic road and rail junction that connected Washington and the northeast to the Shenandoah Valley, Richmond, and Lynchburg. A number of major roads also intersected there. Thus it was an ideal place for an army to defend a key transportation hub that allowed access to much of Virginia. It was also far enough away from Washington to be safe from a surprise attack, but close enough to pose a potential threat to the Union capital. This fact certainly did not go unnoticed among politicians in Washington, no doubt causing some sleepless nights. Perhaps fear for their personal safety led certain individuals to bellow “On to Richmond!” more enthusiastically than others. General P.G.T. Beauregard, the hero of Sumter, commanded the Confederate army. His troops were just as poorly organized as McDowell’s, and his 90-day heroes were also getting restless.

Not only did McDowell and Beauregard both have trouble training and organizing their armed mobs, they also had some operational planning problems. McDowell examined the possibility of maneuvering his army to cut off Beauregard’s line of supply and communications with Richmond. This would force him out of Manassas and lead to a battle on terms favorable to McDowell. McDowell figured he could accomplish this with about 30,000 men. It was a good plan, but it depended on some other factors. Although not exactly sure of Beauregard’s strength, McDowell believed he outnumbered his enemy.

McDowell cast a wary eye to the northwest part of Virginia near Winchester, the gateway to the Shenandoah Valley. There, a force of 12,000 Confederates under General Joseph E. Johnston stood guard. Johnston was one of the most outstanding soldiers of the pre-war army, and one of the highest-ranking officers to resign from the U.S. Army to join the Confederacy. A West Point graduate, American Indian fighter, and one of the heroes of the Mexican War, he was a model of courage and competence. Confronting this force and this commander was an army of 18,000 Union troops under Major General Robert Patterson, also a Mexican War veteran, but a veteran of the War of 1812 as well. His military experience had been with the Pennsylvania militia. McDowell’s plan depended on the Confederates at Manassas not receiving any reinforcements from the Confederate army at Winchester. General Patterson’s job was to keep an eye on Johnston and to keep him from sending reinforcements.

Beauregard knew the size and plans of the Union army, thanks to numerous spies and leakers in Washington. He realized that without Johnston’s Confederate army to come to his aid, McDowell would have the advantage, forcing him to abandon this key position. Thus his orders to Johnston were to move by rail to Manassas after McDowell’s army began its advance, and somehow convince Patterson that his 12,000-man army hadn’t left Winchester. Beauregard could not fight McDowell’s army alone. He needed Johnston’s force to arrive at Manassas. Their combined armies then could beat McDowell. But for this plan to work, Patterson had to be deceived into believing Johnston’s army had not moved.

Marching into Battle (Sort Of)

The largest army ever seen in North America up to that time began its advance on July 16, 1861. Irvin McDowell had over 35,000 men organized into five divisions, each division had from two to four brigades, thirteen in all. Because of fears among the politicians that Washington would be completely exposed to attack if McDowell took all his army, he left behind about 5,000 men to guard roads and secure the line of communication to Washington. A well-trained army could have made the march quickly and efficiently in less than 48 hours and still have been ready for battle. McDowell’s troops moved at a snail’s pace. Not only did McDowell carefully check the routes of advance for any potential enemy forces, his troops seemed to think they were on an extended camping trip. Tens of thousands of men marching on dry dirt roads raised enormous clouds of dust so thick that breathing became difficult; the day was hot, and the men were not used to walking such a distance. So, whenever the men got hot, tired, or thirsty, they simply jumped out of ranks to pick blackberries, crowd around wells for a drink, or lay in the grass until they felt like walking again. The first day they made 5 miles. On July 18, McDowell again halted the army to wait for the supply wagons to catch up and to gather his army together. They were about 6 miles away from Bull Run.

Organizing the armies: Disposition of forces on the battlefield

Beauregard, using the terrain available, decided to defend along a steep-banked stream called Bull Run. The main road McDowell was following crossed the stream at a large sturdy stone bridge. Beauregard stretched his forces to cover the fords (shallow places in the creek where troops or horsemen could cross in large numbers). His flanks (the left and right limits of a military unit or army) were open and unguarded, however. As long as McDowell didn’t discover this, Beauregard would accept the risk. He was also feeling confident. Johnston and his Confederate army were on the way, traveling by rail. Union General Patterson was fooled by the vigorous activities of Confederate cavalry into believing Johnston’s army was about to attack him . The conductor of this well-performed ruse was Jeb Stuart, who had accompanied Robert E. Lee to suppress John Brown’s Harpers Ferry raid. After service with the U.S. cavalry out west, Stuart joined the South and was now displaying exceptional talents with his horsemen.

Interestingly enough, McDowell and Beauregard had battle plans that were exact mirror images of each other. McDowell wanted to make a limited frontal attack with a small portion of his army at the stone bridge to keep Beauregard looking to his front, while the remainder of the army swept around the Confederate left flank and crossed Bull Run at an unguarded ford to get behind Beauregard’s army. Beauregard, for his part, wanted to place his main defense at the stone bridge to protect the main road, but he intended to use most of his army to swing around McDowell’s left flank and get behind his army. Both were good plans. It would become a question of who would be able to get his ill-disciplined and sluggish troops to move first.

Railroads: A first at First Manassas

Johnston’s arrival by rail to Manassas marks the first time in military history that the railroad had been used to bring troops quickly into battle. Without the railroad, Johnston’s army would have had to spend many days on the march, arriving tired and worn out. The use of the railroad cut the movement time significantly, allowing Beauregard to mass Confederate forces at a single place to achieve a decisive effect on the enemy. After Manassas, generals would use railroads to concentrate widely dispersed forces and fight a battle. Troop movement by rail is still a hallmark of modern war.

Opening Moves: Key Decisions and Events

McDowell got going first on the morning of July 21 with an artillery bombardment in front of the stone bridge (see Figure 8-1). According to plan, the rest of the Union army slowly crossed Bull Run and began to move slowly and deliberately against the Confederate left. The Confederates were equally slow to respond, and Union forces soon were in the rear of the Confederate army. Beauregard shifted his units to face the enemy, gathering forces to occupy the critical terrain on the battlefield, a hill owned by a widow named Henry called, not surprisingly, Henry House Hill.

As the battle lines shifted back and forth around the hill, Beauregard shored up his defenses with Johnston’s troops arriving on the battlefield from the Manassas depot. Johnston’s lead brigade, which had arrived on the 20th after a rail and road movement of 57 miles in 25 hours, anchored the Henry House Hill defensive line. The same impassive Confederate soldier who had overseen the execution of John Brown — Thomas J. Jackson — commanded the brigade. Jackson, a Mexican War veteran and erstwhile college professor, had no illusions about war. Known for his unstinting devotion to duty, Jackson was not popular with either his soldiers or his fellow Southern officers. This mattered nothing to him; he drilled and disciplined his brigade with a single-minded intent to have them ready for the shock of combat. Protecting his brigade behind a fold in the ground behind the brow of the hill, Jackson waited for the enemy. His time and the brigade’s had arrived.

As the Confederate lines were breaking under the advancing Union masses, Confederate General Barnard E. Bee, attempting to keep his men together, shouted to them: “Look! There stands Jackson like a stone wall! Rally behind the Virginians!” These were Bee’s last words — he was killed immediately afterwards. But what last words they were! Bee had granted a man and his troops immortality. From that moment on, and for as long as people talk about the Civil War, they will talk about Stonewall Jackson and his Stonewall brigade. Jackson became the anchor that allowed the scattered Confederates to rally and find their courage again. Jackson’s skillful defense, combined with a steady number of fresh troops arriving on the battlefield gave the Confederates superiority at the critical point.

Battle Captain’s Report: First Battle of Bull Run (Manassas), July 21, 1861 Confederate Victory

Commanders: Union: Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, 35,000 men. Confederate: General P.G.T. Beauregard; General Joseph E. Johnston, combined force 32,000 men.

Phase I: McDowell initiates the battle with a movement to turn the Confederate left flank, while using artillery in front of the stone bridge to mask his movement and deceive the Confederates into thinking that the main attack is coming from the front. Beauregard, with the bulk of his forces spread down the wrong end of Bull Run, is initially fooled. He finds himself outflanked and outnumbered. He gathers his forces to defend Henry House Hill, the critical terrain on the battlefield. Thomas J. Jackson’s brigade, an advance unit from Johnston’s army, moves to a defensive position on the hill.

Phase II: Union forces are stopped on the Hill. Jackson’s brigade serves as the anchor point for the defense of the Hill. Both he and his men earn the nickname “Stonewall.” Reinforcements from Johnston’s army arriving by rail and road begin to threaten the Union right flank. The fresh troops make the difference, and a general Confederate advance causes the Union army to fall back in confusion that soon becomes a rout (panicked retreat). The Confederate army is too disorganized to take advantage.

Casualties: Union 2,900, Confederate 2,000. “Casualties” includes those killed, wounded, and missing. Some of the missing were captured, some were dead on the field but never identified, and some just ran away in panic and came back days later or not at all. Different sources give different figures for casualties in every battle.

Advancing to Victory: The Outcome

By four o’clock, the Union troops had had enough. They had been moving since before dawn, and most were tired, thirsty, and suffering from sensory overload. Without any orders, many simply quit the battlefield, drifting to the rear, convinced that they had done their fair share for the day. As a result, McDowell found his army steadily shrinking while Beauregard’s grew steadily larger. The Confederates now began to advance. This was too much for the Yankees. A halfhearted attempt was made to withdrawal in an orderly manner, but an increasing sense of panic seized the soldiers, and they began a stampede to cross the stone bridge and escape with their lives. They ran the entire 30 miles back to Washington. A gaggle of civilians, watching the battle while picnicking on the hills on the other side of Bull Run, got caught up in the traffic jam and contributed to the overall sense of panic.

The Confederates blundered after them, stopping about 4 miles from the battlefield, too exhausted and disorganized to follow. The Confederacy had won the first major battle of the war. Confederate President Davis, too anxious to wait in Richmond, arrived on the battlefield just as the panic among the Union troops had begun. The Confederate quartermaster gratefully collected the amount of arms, ammunition, equipment, and supplies abandoned by the Union army in its haste to return to Washington. The loss was a terrific shock to Northern morale and a great boost for Southerners, who bragged that they were invincible.

Analyzing the Strategies and Significance of the Battle

Tactically, the battle offered nothing. From top to bottom, this was a battle of amateurs that devolved quickly into a brawl between two armed mobs. Beauregard placed his troops in a poor position, almost inviting a flanking movement by the enemy. Neither commander used his forces effectively. Both were slow in organizing and moving forces, and after the shooting began, they had little control over what happened. For the most part their orders were ignored, lost, or forgotten in the confusion. McDowell never used half of his army. Beauregard left about a third of his force idle. To be fair, neither of these commanders had ever led an army before. In fact, neither commander had ever served in the combat arms: McDowell had been the adjutant general (a personnel specialist), and Beauregard had been an engineer.

Cavalry and artillery had little effect on the battlefield, because they were all misused or improperly employed. On the other hand, Beauregard’s use of the telegraph and railroad to amass forces and Johnston’s skillful deception made the Confederate victory possible. The battle had lasted about seven hours. In that time about 3,500 men had been killed and wounded. These were shocking numbers. Americans had never known such losses before in wartime. After the Civil War, Americans would not confront such a high number of battle deaths until World War II. But even then, casualties never reached the one-day totals of Civil War battles. For example, the marine assault on Tarawa in 1944, considered one of the toughest battles in the Pacific war, resulted in 3,100 casualties over four days.

Immediate and long-term results

The battle stiffened the resolve of the North to continue the war. The wishful thinking and Pollyanna attitude toward war ended. Public outcries for action stopped, which allowed the soldiers to do their primary jobs of drilling and training for an effective, disciplined fighting force. Both sides realized that war was serious business, and both governments began to mobilize resources for the long haul. Lincoln asked for 500,000 three-year volunteers and then authorized an additional 500,000. The South, after recovering from the general euphoria, also saw the writing on the wall. Davis called for 400,000 volunteers. The possibility of European recognition of the Confederacy rose after the battle, giving Southerners hope for additional support and giving Northerners nightmares. Strategically, the gateway to the Eastern Theater remained under Confederate control, along with the important road and rail junctions. Washington remained under continual threat of Confederate attack.

Naming schemes of the North and South

Each side named the battle differently. To the North, it was Bull Run, named after the stream that ran through the battlefield. To the South, it was Manassas, named after the important railroad junction that played such a large part in the Confederate victory. This became a standard pattern for the rest of the war. The North would usually name a battle for a stream, river, or creek on the field. The South would name the battle after the town located on or near the battlefield.

Heroes and Goats

Battles, like ballgames, have their heroes and goats. The actions of the heroes and goats usually determine the outcome of the contest. The heroes are the ones who stand out, who have done well, whether in victory or defeat. The goats are outstanding for their failures. The great difference is that in war, the stakes are very high, and men die because of error.

Heroes

These are the soldiers who stood out in the aftermath of this battle:

Stonewall Jackson: His cool courage under fire and his well-placed brigade of disciplined troops saved the Confederate defense of Henry House Hill. He became a superstar overnight (much to his confusion and embarrassment).

P.G.T. Beauregard and Joseph E. Johnston: They came out winners as Southern enthusiasm over victory allowed some blunders to be forgotten. They were considered brilliant military strategists and the primary hope of the Confederacy.

Jeb Stuart: Stuart’s brilliant cavalry action allowed Johnston’s army to move to Manassas unmolested. His great talent and flamboyant style made him a rising star.

Confusion at Manassas

The volunteer units that joined the Union and Confederate armies in 1861 came dressed and equipped according to their personal tastes and expense account. Neither side had established a standard uniform. One New York unit was made up largely of Scotsmen kilts, although they changed into trousers for battle. Some Union troops wore gray uniforms; Confederate units wore blue. In the confusion, dust, and smoke that engulfed the battlefield, nobody could tell friend from foe. Many soldiers shot their comrades, thinking they were the enemy. When fighting in the open, as Civil War units did, regimental battle flags were extremely important markers for soldiers. At Manassas, even the flags were of no use to either side. The original Confederate battle flag was red, white, and blue (the Stars and Bars as it was known). There was no wind on the battlefield that day, so the U.S. and Confederate flags looked exactly alike. Troops from both sides ran to gather under what they thought was their unit flag, only to find themselves in the midst of the enemy. After the battle, the Confederacy adopted a new battle flag based on the cross of St. Andrew so that it would not be mistaken for the U.S. national flag. This new battle flag became the most famous symbol associated with the Confederacy.

Goats

Here are some soldiers who also stood out, but for all the wrong reasons:

Robert Patterson: Patterson was long past his usefulness in the field, and completely outclassed by General Johnston, who was a far better soldier. Bamboozled even after warned to expect Johnston to try something sneaky, he was responsible for making Confederates look better than they really were.

Irvin McDowell: He proved to be a less-than-gifted commander of troops and never had another chance at army command. Despite his professional recommendation that the unprepared army not be sent into battle, McDowell became the scapegoat for the shortsightedness of others.