An embargo, or prohibition of trade with foreign nations, was integral to Jeffersonian Republican commercial policy and diplomacy from 1805 to 1814. The policy evoked heated debates among contemporaries and historians, the latter having variously described it as a form of pacifism, a preparation for war, an agrarian critique of commerce, and an extension of the Jeffersonian Republicans' deep commitment to the carrying trade. Rather than viewing individual measures as the embodiment of a particular worldview, however, the most famous embargoes—restrictions against Haiti in 1805 and 1806 and Jefferson's total Embargo Act of 1807—are best understood within the context of a diverse Jeffersonian Republican coalition acting within precarious geopolitical circumstances.
As Haitian revolutionaries fought for their independence from France, President Thomas Jefferson kept a watchful eye on the situation, adjusting economic policy to fit developments. At first, concerns about French designs in North America convinced him to allow the burgeoning American trade to the island to continue. The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 reduced these concerns, while the arming of private American vessels elevated the threat of open war against the French naval blockade of the island. News of bloody massacres at the hands of the Haitians heightened racist anxiety about an independent black republic so close to the United States's own slave populations. After first passing trade restrictions in March 1805, in February 1806, to the relief of concerned southerners and the chagrin of northern merchants involved in the Haitian trade, Jefferson and the Republican-controlled Congress refused to recognize the island's independence and prohibited trade to the revolutionaries. Legal trade resumed in the spring of 1810 but with restrictions against Haitian vessels entering the United States. Official recognition did not occur until 1862.
The impact of the Haitian embargo paled in comparison to Jefferson's more controversial embargo passed by Congress on 22 December 1807. In this instance, Jefferson and Republican loyalists sought to close American markets completely until France or Britain agreed to respect America's neutral commerce. In 1803 the resumption of war between the two rivals had increased European demand for American crops and served as a boon to U.S. commerce. British naval supremacy, especially after the Battle of Trafalgar in October 1805, left France particularly reliant on American merchants to transport their colonial goods. America's good fortune, however, depended on the willingness of belligerents to allow its ships access to enemy ports.
Good will eroded in early 1806 as the British navy blockaded Continental ports, challenged U.S. involvement in the colonial trade, and increased impressments of American sailors who, Britain suspected, had deserted the Royal Navy. In April, a large congressional majority responded by passing a NonImportation Act limiting the importation of certain British manufactured goods. The measure remained in effect for only a short time, however, in hopes that James Monroe, minister to Britain, and special envoy William Pinkney could reach a diplomatic settlement. Negotiations led to a draft treaty in December 1806 that appeared to meet many of America's commercial demands but that proved unsatisfactory to the administration and its Republican merchant advisers. Further negotiations between the two nations fizzled in the spring of 1807. In June, tensions heightened when the British frigate Leopard fired on an American warship, the Chesapeake, and forcibly removed four British deserters. In September, reports from France warned of the seizure of American ships suspected of funneling British goods into the Continent in violation of the Emperor Napoleon's 1806 Berlin decree. His Milan Decree of November 1807 confirmed that was French policy. Britain, in turn, responded with Orders in Council requiring neutral nations to stop at British harbors and pay transit fees. When Congress convened in December 1807, the administration contemplated war but ultimately asked members for an embargo to "keep our seamen and property from capture, and to starve the offending nations." Wide majorities in both houses complied.
From the beginning, then, Jefferson's embargo had both defensive and offensive purposes. It kept American vessels and resources out of harm's way, saving them for possible war. At the same time, it withheld American raw materials—especially cotton, timber, and wheat—as leverage to encourage the belligerents to acknowledge America's neutral rights. Smuggling, especially across the Canadian border, undermined the embargo's impact and led to subsequent legislation and executive orders banning trade with Canada and Spanish Florida and giving government officials expansive powers to inspect and seize suspicious vessels. American exports dropped to one-fifth of their pre-embargo levels. The coastal trade between states remained legal but large bonds were required. New England Federalists decried the measure as "Francophile" and denounced its heavyhanded enforcement as an egregious abuse of executive power. Joining them were a small number of states'-rights "Old Republicans" like John Randolph who lamented the centralization of authority and the rejection of the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty.
Despite many complaints and some violations, the embargo gained broad public support from a loyal Republican majority—in part because it preserved peace while simultaneously laying the groundwork for possible war. Petitions from Republican strongholds throughout the nation praised the measure, branded opponents as unpatriotic, and anticipated that this form of commercial warfare would win concessions from Europe. Supporters of the act argued that it offered "equal suffering from all"; the nation's diverse agricultural and commercial interests from all regions would share the hardships of protecting national honor and commercial rights.
Everyone did suffer, but to varying degrees. American artisans and nascent manufacturers, especially in mid-Atlantic localities, benefited from a lack of foreign competition. Southern planters and western farmers claimed they suffered the most, being deprived of markets for their crops or access to European finished goods. In all likelihood, however, New England commercial populations of fisherman, sailors, and merchants were hit hardest by the port closures. By late 1808 patience in this region ran out, sparking cries for secession that foreshadowed the Hartford Convention of 1814. In the meantime, initially optimistic reports from Europe about the embargo's impact gave way to more mixed notices, some even suggesting that French and British officials welcomed the policy. Federalist gains in state and national elections in the fall of 1808 suggested that neither the nation nor the Republican Party could bear the sacrifices much longer.
At the behest of northern Republicans, and more reluctantly the outgoing president, Congress backed away from a complete embargo, repealing it for good on 1 March 1809. In its place a Non-Intercourse Act opened trade with neutral nations while continuing the ban on trade with France and Britain. Some southern supporters of the embargo did not let the bill go quietly, however, arguing that NonIntercourse ended the policy of equal suffering, allowing northern merchants to trade but preventing southern planters access to their chief markets except through expensive, circuitous, and potentially illegal routes. South Carolina representative David Williams and Georgia representative George Troup unsuccessfully lobbied to extend the embargo and, if necessary, declare war. Instead, Congress and the incoming president, James Madison, placed their faith in the assurances of British minister David Erskine, whose diplomatic negotiations had appeared to settle the dispute. In light of these discussions and as an act of further good will, Madison announced the renewal of trade with Great Britain in April 1809. When Westminster refused to accept Erskine's agreement, however, Non-Intercourse was reinstated while Congress began an extended debate on how to proceed. Unable to reach any consensus on a policy that would affect different groups equally, in May 1810 a Congress close to adjournment passed Macon's Bill No. 2, which lifted all trade restrictions against France and Britain while empowering the president to reimpose Non-Intercourse if one of the belligerents lifted its trade restrictions and the other did not do so within the following three months. The measure was so weak it was openly mocked at home and abroad, where it had no impact in changing European policies.
During its fifteen months of enforcement, Jefferson's embargo became paradoxically a symbol of national and party unity and a source of sectional frustration and national weakness. Its negative legacy and lack of success tainted Jefferson's legacy and Republican political economy. Attempts at other forms of economic coercion were equally controversial and unsuccessful. In 1812 the declaration of war against Britain was preceded by a ninety-day embargo. In the summer of 1813 Madison sought a new embargo law, but Congress refused to pass it. Madison succeeded in getting another embargo later in 1813, but it was repealed in the spring of 1814 after Britain and its allies had secured the abdication of Napoleon.