CHAPTER ONE
ENDING WARS
1. Paul Kecskemeti (1958) was especially interested in what he called “strategic surrender,” the decision to lay down one’s arms before one’s military had been utterly defeated. Although his book broke new ground in thinking about surrender as an important political phenomenon, his theoretical discussion tended to be more descriptive than predictive, and he focused more narrowly only on why a losing belligerent accepts strategic surrender, excluding questions like why states decide to fight to the absolute end, why states negotiate to terminate wars short of strategic surrender, and why states decide to pursue total victory. Fred Ikle’s 1971 (2005) book Every War Must End, likely inspired by the mess of the Vietnam War still ongoing when he wrote it, is deeply skeptical of rosy prewar plans for fighting wars to short victorious conclusions. The book is deeply infused with respect for the Clausewitzian fog of war and other factors that make even simple things in war so difficult, and speculates on the importance of domestic politics for war termination. Other major war-termination books include Pillar (1983) and Goemans (2000).
2. Schelling (1960, 5).
3. Clausewitz (1976, 69). Italics in original.
4. Thucydides (1998).
5. Fearon (2004); Walter (2002). This book builds on past theoretical work. For example, Walter (2002, esp. chapter 2) says little about belligerent wartime behavior when noncompliance fears are high (in her application, when third-party security guarantors are absent). For example, her models allow for post-settlement defection outcomes, but do not allow for the possibility of absolute war outcomes, only for the continuation of war. Powell (2006) does not explore exactly how war solves the commitment problem, but rather merely assumes that launching the war solves, or provides the chance to solve, the commitment problem.
CHAPTER TWO
BARGAINING, INFORMATION, AND ENDING WARS
1. Helmuth von Moltke. Quoted in Brodie (1973), 11.
2. On the bargaining model of war, see Powell (2002); Reiter (2003).
3. See Goldstein (2001).
4. Powell (2006).
5. Mansfield and Snyder (2005).
6. Chapman and Reiter (2004); Lai and Reiter (2005); Baum (2002).
7. Goodwin (2005, 342).
8. Harcave (2004, 109).
9. Berman (1982, 145–53).
10. Mansfield and Snyder (2005); Gelpi (1997); Fordham (2002); Pickering and Kisangani (2005); Meernik (2001); Oneal and Tir (2006); Lai and Slater (2006)
11. Leeds and Davis (1997). Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) argue that international conflict—even unsuccessful conflict—does not necessarily impose domestic political costs on political leaders. Hence, if one argues that state leaders assess the costs and benefits of war only in terms of domestic politics, one might not agree with the assumption that war is always costly, as war does not always impose domestic political costs.
12. Fearon (1995b).
13. For a formal critique of the point that mutual optimism makes war more likely, see Fey and Ramsay (2007). Their basic point is that in the prewar phase, a belligerent observes the optimism of its adversary, updates its beliefs accordingly, and war-avoiding bargaining space will open. Note that their model does not allow for a belligerent to believe that its opponent has a false faith in its military strength or might be bluffing.
14. See Stam (1996) and Reiter and Stam (2002). Studies have discovered that certain factors are systematically related to war-causing disagreement about the balance of power. Specifically, war-causing disagreement about military– industrial capability is likely to be lower between states that have higher levels of trade with each other (Reed 2003a), between states with international ties such as alliance or joint membership in international governmental organizations (Boehmer et al 2004; Bearce et al 2006), and as the power disparity between two states grows (Reed 2003b).
15. Forster (1988, esp. 94–95).
16. Quoted in Guderian (1952, 190).
17. Myllyniemi (1997, 80).
18. See Reiter and Stam (2002, 16–17).
19. Gordon and Trainor (1995)
20. Byman and Waxman (2000).
21. Pollack (2002a, 104–14).
22. On the importance of military strategy and force employment for determining battle and war outcomes, see Biddle (2004); Stam (1996).
23. May (2000).
24. Oren (2002).
25. Fearon (1994).
26. Quoted in Reiter and Stam (2002, 22).
27. Quoted in Goodman (1978, 96).
28. Pape (1996).
29. Quoted in Mueller (1980, 497).
30. Yuen (2007).
31. Owsley (1931, 24–25)
32. Huth (1988, 129–38); Press (2005, 46–62).
33. Quoted in Stueck (1995, 63).
34. After the Six-Day War, Egypt became more confident in its relative military power by securing Saudi coordination on the use of the oil weapon against the West as well as Soviet logistical and political support, helping encourage it to attack Israel in October 1973. Herzog (1998, esp. 31).
35. Lai (2004).
36. See, e.g., Fearon (1995b).
37. Some scholars have critiqued this information approach. There is a broad body of literature critical of the idea that individuals update their beliefs in accordance with Bayes’ Rule, an assumption of the formal information models (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tverseky 1982; Rosen 2005). Dominic Johnson (2004) offered a more innovative critique, using evolutionary biology to predict that individuals are generally predisposed to be overconfident, meaning that political and military leaders might be unlikely to draw the correct inferences from observed battle outcomes. Others have proposed that the assumption that there is a common metric of combat performance used by all belligerents within a war may not be valid, impeding the process by which information revealed by combat facilitates war termination (Garner 1998; Garofano 2002; Kirshner 2000). A further critique is that decision-makers during wartime when faced with bad news from the battlefield may change military strategy rather than offer diplomatic concessions (Gartner 1997).
38. Simmel (1904, 501); Kecskemeti (1958, 9); Coser (1961); Blainey (1988, originally published 1973, 56, 122); Rosen (1972). Paul Pillar’s 1983 book was perhaps the first to propose that war termination should be thought of as bargaining, and to draw on the bargaining literature from economics. I build on Pillar’s work in important ways. As discussed in this and the following chapter, my theory is framed around two fundamental problems in bargaining—incomplete information and commitment credibility—concepts that develop Pillar’s ideas about bargaining. I also provide deeper empirical examinations, exploring how bargaining between belligerents played out during actual wars.
39. Wagner (2000); Filson and Werner (2002); Slantchev (2003b); Smith and Stam (2004); Powell (2004); see also Goemans (2000). It would be fruitless to try to identify one model as clearly superior to the others, since the constraining nature of the technology of formal modeling often means that although a model may be more sophisticated in one area, it may be less sophisticated in another. For example, one model may have the advantage of incorporating domestic politics, but the drawback of having only a finite number of possible battles (Filson and Werner 2004). Another model may relax the assumption of common prior beliefs, but omit the possibility of signaling through diplomacy (Smith and Stam 2004).
40. This assumption that the likelihood of winning any particular battle is strong and perhaps controversial. In chapter 3,I relax this assumption by allowing that the exchange of parts of the disputed good can shift the balance of power. More generally, one might propose that states might try to increase their chances of winning battles during war, perhaps by increasing mobilization or changing military strategy (Gartner 1997). As noted in the conclusion, if this is true, then this may be a reason why combat outcomes do not efficiently translate into changes in war-termination offers as predicted, since a losing belligerent may still hold on to hope that the tide of war will change.
41. There are some complete information bargaining models of war, including Slantchev (2003b), Tarar and Levontog ̆lu (2006), Levontoglu and Slantchev (2007), and Powell (2006). Smith and Stam (2004) is also technically a complete information model, although it takes the unconventional approach of relaxing the assumption that the two belligerents have common prior beliefs.
42. Wagner (2000); Clausewitz (1976).
43. Werner (2000) presents a model in which a belligerent adjusts its war termination offer in order to affect the decision of a third party to intervene.
44. Slantchev (2003b); Filson and Werner (2002); Powell (2004). Of course, this basic insight that one’s own diplomatic moves affect the beliefs and diplomatic moves of the other side is not new, nor is it unique to formal analysis. See Ikle ́ (1964, 194).
45. Admati and Perry (1987); Cramton (1992).
46. Goemans (2000).
47. An emerging domestic politics proposition is that war termination becomes more likely after one or more of the belligerents experiences regime change. See Stanley-Mitchell (2002); Croco (2007).
48. Mueller (1985); Gartner and Segura (1998); Gelpi et al (2005); Berinsky (2007).
49. Reiter and Stam (2002, chapter 6)
50. www.military-quotes.com/otto-von-bismarck.htm (accessed November 9, 2007).
CHAPTER THREE
CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS AND WAR TERMINATION
1. Barbara Walter (2002) applied it to the termination of civil wars, arguing that civil wars are more likely to end in a negotiated settlement if third parties are willing to intervene and enforce the settlement terms.
2. Morgenthau (1967); Blainey (1988, originally published 1973); Waltz (1979), Mearsheimer (2001). Wagner (2007) is an extensive discussion of bargaining and war, but focuses primarily on the causes of war. He (chapter 5) notes that not all war-agreements enjoy compliance, although he does not explore absolute war as a solution to the problem of noncompliance.
3. Eric Labs (1997) folded the basic logic of the commitment and information hypotheses into a single offensive realist theory. He proposed that states expand their war aims given opportunity and threat, and opportunity roughly correlates with victory in the battlefield (as envisioned by the information proposition in chapter 2), and threat roughly correlates with fear of the adversary attacking in the future.
4. Muthoo (1999, 339–40). Note that even the economics models on the “ratchet effect” described here assume that contracts are enforced, but examine an environment of short-term contracts that are frequently renegotiated.
5. See, e.g., Wagner (2000), Filson and Werner (2002, 2004), Powell (2004), Slantchev (2003b).
6. Mearsheimer (2001); Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996).
7. Keohane (1984). Gelpi (2003) was perhaps a bit more optimistic, proposing that the mere existence of an agreement creates a norm that makes further conflict less likely.
8. Wendt(1999).
9. Downs, Rocke and Barsoom (1996); Fearon (1998); Koremenos et al (2001); Blaydes (2004).
10. Clausewitz (1976, 80).
11. Fortna (2004b); Werner and Yuen (2005); Werner (1999); Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter (2008).
12. Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter (2008). See also Fortna (2004), Werner (1999).
13. Axelrod (1984); Kydd (2005).
14. Blainey (1988, 183).
15. Clausewitz (1976, 77).
16. Thucydides (1998, 301).
17. Clodfelter (2002, 361).
18. Sanford (2005). At the 1943 Teheran conference, Stalin jokingly suggested executing 50,000–100,000 German military officers (Bohlen 1973, 147). Germany applied the annihilationist approach elsewhere, for example making plans in autumn 1941 for the elimination of all two million of Leningrad’s civilians to follow the city’s capture by German forces (Dunmore (2001, i). During World War II, the American public and leadership also considered genocide as possible solutions to the postwar commitment problem (see chapter 6).
19. Valentino et al (2004).
20. Fazal(2007).
21. On foreign-imposed regime change solving commitment problems, see Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003, 419–21; 2006). See also Werner (1996, esp. 69– 70); Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter (2008).
22. On the post–World War II transformations of Japan and Germany, see Dower (1999) and Berger (1998).
23. http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1917/wilswarm.html (downloaded January 25, 2007).
24. The New York Times, 8 October 2002.
25. Beschloss (2002, 115–17).
26. The document declares that German military forces can only be used for national defense, or for purposes explicitly allowed for in the Basic Law. Basic Law is available at www.jurisprudentia.de/jurisprudentia.html (downloaded on October 30, 2006).
27. Available at www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/englishConstitution.html (downloaded October 30, 2006).
28. Available at www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/it00000_.html (downloaded January 25, 2007).
29. Available at www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/af00000_.html (downloaded November 17,2006).
30. Available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/ 12/AR2005101201450.html (downloaded November 17, 2006).
31. On the transformation of post–World War II Germany and Japan, see Berger (1998); Dower (1999).
32. Clausewitz (1976, 77, 69, 488).
33. Biddiscombe (1998).
34. Frank (1999, 315–21).
35. Clausewitz (1976, 580–81). Italics in original.
36. McPherson (1988, 849); Goodwin (2005, 713); Sherman (1990, 810–17).
37. Hasegawa (2005,219).
38. This is from the August 10, 1945 Byrnes Note sent from the U.S. to Japan, which Japan soon accepted. Quoted in Hasegawa (2005, 221).
39. Reiter (2006b).
40. McPherson (1988, 848).
41. On the structural determinants of insurgency, see Fearon and Laitin (2003). On the effectiveness of work or starve threats, see Liberman (1996). On the failures of the post-2003 occupation of Iraq, see Ricks (2006).
42. Reiss (1970, 96).
43. Wolford, Reiter, and Carrubba (2008).
44. Kolb (1989, 154). Thanks to Philipp Fuerst for translation from the original German.
45. Howard (1961, 371).
46. Quoted in Howard (1961, 372–73).
47. Slantchev (2003b, 628); Filson and Werner (2002, 821); Wagner (2000, 472).
48. Pillar (1983, 18–23) codes outcomes of all wars back to about 1800, but his categories are ill-suited for the discussion here since his Capitulation category combines absolute and limited outcomes.
49. Fazal (2007, 1). State death is defined as the “formal loss of control over foreign policy making to another state.”
50. Sarkees (1997).
51. Reiter and Stam (2007). See also Stam (1996), Reiter and Stam (2002).
52. Werner (1999); Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter (2008).
53. Werner (1999).
54. There is also a debate about whether or not regime type affects war aims. See Mearsheimer (1981); Werner (1996, 1998); Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003, 2006).
55. Fearon (1995b); Powell (2006).
56. Werner (1999); Fortna (2004b); Werner and Yuen (2005); Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter (2008); Mattes (2008). See also Weisiger (2008).
57. Lai (2004).
58. Van Evera (1999); Biddle (2004); Lieber (2000); Reiter (1995).
59. On leadership change and resolve, see Wolford (2007).
60. Walt (1996).
61. Bennett (1998).
62. Constructivism provides an additional answer, as norms or international behavior may prioritize respect for regime sovereignty and push states away from considering liquidating their neighbors. Under what Alexander Wendt (1999) calls Hobbesian anarchy, absolute war outcomes are more likely, whereas under Lockean anarchy, limited war outcomes are more likely. Page Fortna (2005) found that among interstate wars, draws are more common after 1945 than before, a pattern that is arguably consistent with the observation that there has been a shift since around 1945 away from Hobbesian anarchy towards Lockean anarchy. Wendt does not demark the beginning of Lockean anarchy at a particular point. Fortna’s win/lose versus draw distinction does not exactly map onto the limited versus absolute distinction drawn here. Some might also argue that democracies might be more likely to adhere to their international agreements. Notably, the empirical evidence that democracies are less likely to violate their international commitments is mixed. Gaubatz (1996); Leeds (1999); Lipson (2003); Reiter and Stam (2002, chapter 4); Leeds (2003); Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004); Simmons (2000, 2002); Mitchell and Hensel (2007); Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter (2008).
63. Wolford, Reiter, and Carrubba (2008).
64. Gartner (1997).
65. Pollack (2002b, 71); Hamza (2000, 244).
66. Blainey (1988, 197).
67. Herzog (1998).
68. Weems (1974, 162).
69. Pletcher (1973, 561). See also Fuller (1936).
70. Pletcher (1973, chapter 6).
71. Quoted in Jervis (1989, 4n, 4).
72. Baker (1995, 436–38); Woodward (2006, 11–12); Ricks (2006).
73. Ricks (2006).
74. Fortna (2004b).
75. On what conflicts attract peacekeepers, see Fortna (2004a).
76. Fortna (2004b); Diehl et al (1996); Werner (1999); Werner and Yuen (2005); Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter (2008); Beardsley and Schmidt (2007); Tanner (1993); Long (2007).
77. Oren (2002).
78. Schelling (1966).
79. Gaddis (1982).
80. Stam (1996); Jervis (1978); Fearon (1995a); Van Evera (1999). Military geography contains many different aspects, and some geographic features may make some kinds of operations more difficult and others easier (Collins 1998). For example, although rough terrain like mountains can make interstate wars less likely, it can make civil wars more likely, as it provides areas for insurgents to hide (Fearon and Laitin 2003).
81. Quoted in Wawro (2003, 227).
82. Quoted in Kolb (1989, 152, 213); quoted in Howard (1961, 231–32).
83. Van Evera (1999).
84. Liberman (1996).
85. Murray (1984,292).
86. Fearon (1997); Smith and Stam (2001); see also Wagner (2000, 479–80). Bargaining models in economics do not really capture this insight. The closest perhaps may be repeated bargaining models, which allow for the interdependence of rounds of bargaining, but this framework does not quite capture the dynamic envisioned here, in which bargaining outcomes affect bargaining power. See Muthoo (1999, chapter 10).
87. Fearon (1997); Smith and Stam (2001). This last idea is also generated in the offense-defense literature. See Van Evera (1999).
88. American and Soviet decision-makers in the Cold War saw asymmetries in value across different areas, despite their rhetoric about the world being zerosum. West Berlin in particular was seen as a “superdomino,” and conversely the USSR saw East Germany as a “super-ally” more important than others (Harrison 2003).
89. Oren (2002, 302–4); Segev (2007, esp. 387); Schiff (1974, 181).
90. Mueller (1994, 121–23); Bush and Scowcroft (1998, 488–90); Baker (1995, 436). Others have speculated that the Bush administration thought Saddam’s regime might collapse anyway after Kuwait’s liberation. Pollack (2002b, 46–47).
91. Woodward (1999, 185).
92. Bush and Scowcroft (1998, 477); Powell (1995, 485–86).
93. Bush and Scowcroft (1998, 473); Schwartzkopf (1992, 516).
94. Pape (1996, 217). Notably, although the war itself was seen as necessary to smash Iraqi conventional military power as well as liberate Kuwait, substantial elements of the Iraqi military, including parts of the Republican Guard, escaped. Pollack (2002b, 45–46); Ricks (2006, 6).
95. Pollack (2002b, 52).
96. Reiter (2006b).
97. Fearon (1995b).
98. Hassner (2003). See also Goddard (2006).
99. Schelling (1966); Selten (1978); Toft (2003); Walter (2006a).
100. Powell (2006); Fearon (2005b).
101. Tarar and Levontoglu (2006) state that a leader might claim all of a good publicly in order to generate audience costs, which in turn creates issue indivisibility and make war more likely. They discuss three episodes, none of which support the argument. The first is the Cuban Missile Crisis, in which the claim is that Kennedy demanded removal of Soviet missiles but would not have publicly agreed to removal of the Turkish missiles because of audience costs. However, Kennedy was willing to make further concessions if necessary to avoid war, specifically offering a public trade of Turkish missiles if Khrushchev rejected the offer of a secret trade (Bundy 1988, 435). The second is the 1991 Gulf War, and the interpretation is that Bush underestimated Iraq’s resolve for war and demanded too much. To the contrary, the Bush administration actually preferred the liberation of Kuwait through war rather than Iraq’s peaceful withdrawal from Kuwait, as the former would allow the destruction of Iraq’s military power as well as the liberation of Kuwait (Reiter and Stam 2002, 150–51). The third is the Fashoda Crisis in which Britain demanded total withdrawal from the small East African village in question. Here, the avoidance of war shows that Britain correctly estimated that French preferences would guide them to concede entirely rather than risk war.
102. Tarar and Levontoglu (2006).
103. Quoted in Palm (1971, 71–72).
104. Ritter (1973, vol. 4, 66).
CHAPTER FOUR
CONDUCTING EMPIRICAL TESTS
1. George and Bennett (2005, 179). See also George and McKeown (1985, 35).
2. George and Bennett (2005, 176).
3. On the importance of commitment problems in civil war termination, see Walter (2002).
4. See, e.g., Balfour (1979 281–82), and chapter 6.
5. Longhand personal notes of Truman, January 27, 1952, “Longhand Notes File, 1930–1955,” PSF, Box 282, Truman Library. See also the diary entry for May 18.
6. Kitchen (1976, 39). German officials systematically purged the documentary record of World War I to, among other things, reduce evidence of German war guilt. Herwig (1987).
7. Israel (1966, 264).
8. See, e.g., Goemans’ (2000, 101n–2n) critique of one of Gatzke’s (1950) translations.
9. Hasegawa (2005, 297–98; 2007); Frank (1999).
10. Stoddard (1890, 179).
11. Stephens (1870, vol. 2, 588).
12. Gilbert (1983, vol. 6, 405–6).
13. Braithwaite (2006, 222).
14. Mearsheimer (1983).
15. Quoted in Nicolson (1985, 88).
16. May (2000).
17. Gartner and Myers (1995); Zhang (1995, 154–55).
18. Li, Millett, and Yu (2001, 6, 246n).
19. Livermore (1957).
20. Desch (2002); Brooks (2003). Biddle and Long (2004) slightly revise the HERO dataset, making few corrections. Thanks to Stephen Biddle for providing me with the revised version of the dataset. Those corrections notwithstanding, HERO’s treatment of wars remains highly asymmetrical. Some twentiethcentury conflicts coded as wars by the Correlates of War project are not included by HERO, such as the Chaco War, the 1929 Japan–Soviet clash, the RussoHungarian War, the Sino-Indian War, the War of Attrition between Egypt and Israel, the Italo-Ethiopian War, the 1948 Indo-Pakistani War, the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, the Soccer War, the 1971 Bangladesh War, the Cyprus War, the UgandaTanzania War, the Sino-Vietnamese War, and others. Of those wars which are included, some wars (especially wars involving the United States) get much more extensive inclusion (that is, many more of their battles are included), whereas other wars get more scant coverage. For example, the single World War II campaign to capture the Pacific island of Iwo Jima is treated as twenty-seven separate battles, whereas the entire 1939–40 Winter War between Russia and Finland is treated as a single battle. Purely naval battles, such as the critical Battle of Tsushima in the 1904–05 Russo-Japanese War, are excluded. Besides generating problems of heterogeneity across wars, it also means that for those wars with few battles, there is insufficient information about how the ebb and flow of combat throughout the war informed the political leadership and may have affected war termination decisions.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE KOREAN WAR
1. Kim Il Sung made a speech to the North Korean military on June 5, 1950 declaring that in the event of war, North Korea would attempt to reunify the peninsula (Stueck 1995, 44). The Soviet Union supported the invasion in part because it hoped to secure a psychological advance from a Communist military victory there, and believed that the United States would not offer substantial military assistance. This belief stemmed from the Soviet reading of U.S. internal and public statements defining the American defense perimeter in the Pacific as excluding mainland Asian territories (Stueck 2002, 73). Most famously, perhaps, Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a public speech on January 12, 1950 defined the American defense perimeter in the Asia/Pacific region in such a way that it seemed to exclude Korea from its reach (Acheson 1969, 357). The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May went further, noting that the Soviet Union could conquer South Korea without U.S. interference because South Korea was not “very greatly important” (quoted in Leckie 1962, 37).
2. www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1950/scres50.htm; Truman (1956, vol. 2, 338–39); Acheson (1969, 450); Schnabel and Watson (1979, vol. 3, pt. 1, 107).
3. “Minutes of the 58th Meeting of the National Security Council,” June 28, 1950, 2, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
4. Leffler (1992, 365).
5. www.un.org/documents/resga.htm (accessed November 24, 2008).
6. Schnabel and Watson (1979, vol. 3, pt. 1, 109); FRUS 1950 (1977, vol. 1, 328).
7. Kennan (1967, 487).
8. FRUS 1950 (1977, vol. 7, 272); Foot (1985, 72–73). Note that Allison’s portrayal of his opinions during this period in his memoirs, is, in the words of one historian, “at best, misleading” (Gaddis 1980, 111n). The documentary record provides a clearer view of what he advocated at the time.
9. Foot (1985, 69).
10. Nerhem (2000); Kennan (1967). On the CIA, see FRUS 1950 (1977, vol. 7, 600–602); Stueck (1983).
11. Whitney (1955, 338); Collins (1969, 83); Schnabel and Watson (1979, vol. 3,pt. 1,222).
12. Foot (1985, 68). Other South Korean calls for crossing the parallel were made before Austin’s August 10 speech. In late July, there were unconfirmed reports from the Kuomintang news agency that the chairman of the South Korean National Assembly called for South Korean forces to be allowed to cross the 38th parallel. Daily Korea Summaries, Intelligence File Series, PSF, Truman Papers, Truman Library, July 24, 1950 (hereafter DKS). The DKS were daily summaries of the combat and political developments in the Korean War sent by the Director of Central Intelligence, Rear Admiral R. N. Hillenkoetter, to Truman. In early August, the commander of South Korean forces declared that annihilation of North Korean forces would make it possible to cross the 38th parallel and unify the peninsula (DKS, August 8, 1950).
13. “Special Message to the Congress Reporting on the Situation in Korea,” July 19, 1950, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=13560&st=&st1= (accessed September 7, 2006); “Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Korea,” July 19, 1950, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ index.php?pid=13561&st=&st1= (accessed September 7, 2006), italics added.
14. Acheson (1969, 451); see also Beisner (2006, 395–98).
15. Minutes of July 14 meeting, “Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949– 1953,” Box 67, Acheson papers, 3, Truman Library.
16. Stueck (1995, 383n). See also Kennan (1967, 488–89).
17. Austin (1950, 331).
18. Decisions made at the August 3, 1950 NSC meeting, “NSC Meetings File,” PSF Box 180, Truman Library.
19. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, volume 3 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), 1154.
20. Acheson (1969, 452).
21. Truman (1956, 358–59).
22. Memo of off-the-record comments between Acheson and correspondents, September 2, 1950, in folder Co–Cz of Acheson Personal Correspondence, 1949– 1952, Acheson papers, Box 63, Truman Library.
23. “A Report to the President by the National Security Council on United States Courses of Action With Respect to Korea,” September 9, 1950, www .trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korea/large/sec4/nsc81-3.htm (accessed September 7, 2006).
24. Labs (1997, 35–37). Specifically, one might mark the date of expansion as September 29, when Secretary of Defense Marshall formally told MacArthur that he now had the authority to advance north of the 38th parallel. Foot (1985, 74).
25. Note that the core political strategy throughout September did not change: UN forces should conquer North Korea, providing there was no intervention on the part of China and the Soviet Union. This was stated publicly by Truman on September 1, and was codified in NSC 81/1. The September 29 communication to MacArthur formally giving MacArthur authority to move north of the 38th parallel (as well as the September 27 JCS communication to MacArthur) concerned military strategy rather than political aims, and can best be termed a clarification of (rather than a change in) military strategy. Indeed, MacArthur had been informed on September 15, the day the Inchon operation began, that NSC 81/1 gave him legal authority to operate above the 38th parallel (Schnabel and Watson 1979, vol. 3, pt. 1, 228).
26. Memo from Bradley to Secretary of Defense, September 7, 1950, “NSC Meetings File,” PSF, Box 180, Truman Library.
27. Bradley and Blair (1983, 561).
28. Truman (1956, vol. 2, 359); Stueck (1995, 89); Acheson (1969, 452); Collins (1969, 146–47).
29. Leckie (1962, 39). MacArthur claimed in his memoirs that the pre-invasion South Korean military was deliberately left as an underequipped essentially constabulary force, so as to prevent it from attacking North Korea. Stueck (2002, 61–62); MacArthur (1964, 328–30); Hickey (1999, 27).
30. Quoted in Wainstock (1999, 7).
31. Quoted in Leckie (1962, 37). See also Bradley and Blair (1983, 530).
32. Leffler (1992, 365); Offner (2002, 358).
33. Ridgway (1988, 16).
34. DKS, July 6 and 7, 1950.
35. Schnabel and Watson (1979, vol. 3, pt. 1, 184).
36. Collins (1969, 81–85)
37. www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=13561&st=&st1= (accessed September 7, 2006).
38. Truman (1956, 351).
39. Stueck (1995, 77).
40. “Peace Offensives Concerning Korea,” August 24, 1950, in Merrill (1997, 432).
41. Stueck (2002, 88).
42. Schnabel and Watson (1979, vol. 3, pt. 1, 212–13).
43. DKS September 6, 1950.
44. Cagle and Manson (1957, 78–81).
45. Collins (1969, 125).
46. Collins (1998, 7).
47. Manchester (1978, 574).
48. Cagle and Manson (1957, 76).
49. Schnabel and Watson (1979, vol. 3, 210).
50. Quoted in Ridgway (1988, 39).
51. Quoted in Karig, Cagle, and Manson (1952, 169). In hindsight, Collins gives no hint about whether at the time he thought the plan likely to succeed or fail, either in his memoirs or at a 1976 retrospective conference. Collins (1969, 126–27); Heller (1977, 24–25); Schnabel and Watson (1979, vol. 3, pt. 1, 211n); MacArthur (1964, 347–49).
52. Bradley and Blair (1983, 544).
53. Acheson (1969, 448); Truman memo of briefing by Collins and Sherman, August 27, 1950, “Longhand Notes File, 1930–1955,” Box 281, PSF, Truman Library; Truman (1956, 358).
54. Schnabel and Watson (1979, 211).
55. Ibid. (1979, vol. 3, pt. 1, 211–13); Whitney (1955, 350–53).
56. MacArthur (1964, 351).
57. Merrill (1997, 383).
58. Schnabel and Watson (1979, vol. 3, pt. 1, 199–200; 213).
59. “Memorandum for the Executive Secretary, National Security Council,” September 26, 1950, folder 63, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
60. Truman (1956, 386).
61. FRUS 1950 (1977, vol. 7, 541).
62. “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense. Subject: Peace Offensives Concerning Korea.” From Frank Pace, Dan A. Kimball, and Thomas K. Finletter. August 24, 1950, General Data Folder, PSF, Box 206, Truman Library.
63. Foot (1985, 62).
64. Offner (1992, 367–68); Hamby (2005, 535).
65. Stueck (2002, 104).
66. Quoted in Sartori (2005, 23). The U.S. ignored increasingly strident Chinese warnings through the fall not to approach the Sino–Korean border. Scholars have offered a number of explanations as to why these warnings were ignored, including cognitive psychological accounts for ignoring discrepant information, and reputation-based accounts that propose China’s reputation in American eyes had suffered because of hollow threats China had made over Taiwan. Lebow (1981); Sartori (2005).
67. See “NSC-68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” April 14, 1950, available at www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm (downloaded August 4, 2008), Tractehberg (1991, chapter 3).
68. Quoted in Heller (1977, 26–27). See also Collins (1969, 144–46).
69. www.claremont.org/publications/precepts/id.163/precept_detail.asp (downloaded November 24, 2008).
70. LaFeber (1974, 83); FRUS 1950 (1977, vol. 7, 386).
71. See, e.g., FRUS 1977 (1950, vol. 7, 458–61).
72. FRUS 1950 (1977, vol. 7, 503).
73. Offner (2002, 380).
74. Note from Acheson to Paul Nitze, July 12, 1950, Acheson papers, ”Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949–1953,” Box 67, Truman Library; Christiansen (1995,270).
75. Schnabel and Watson (1979, vol. 3, pt. 1, 270–71).
76. Kennan (1967, 488,491).
77. Memo from Kennan to Acheson, August 23, 1950, “Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949–1953,” Box 67, Acheson papers, Truman Library.
78. Offner (2002, 358).
79. Jervis (1980); Kydd (2005, 113–115).
80. Supplemental Appropriations for 1951 (1950,272).
81. Ibid., 268.
82. Truman (1956, vol. 2, 332–33).
83. Leffler (1992, 376–377).
84. FRUS 1950 (1977, 461).
85. See, for example, Jian (1994); Zhang (1992); Christensen (1996).
86. Acheson (1969, 469, 477).
87. Ibid., 471; Truman (1956, 387–88).
88. Acheson (1969, 472).
89. Ibid., 476, 513.
90. George M. Elsey to Charles Murphy, April 24, 1951, Korea: New Peace Proposal 1951, Subject File, Harry S. Truman Administration, Elsey Papers, Student Research File: “The Korean War: The Prisoner of War Issue and the Search for Peace,” Truman Library.
91. Trachtenberg (1991, 122–23). Later in the war, at his most exasperated Truman would vent in his diary that the only way to break the negotiations logjam was to threaten the USSR and China directly and openly with nuclear war if they did not immediately accept peace terms. It does not appear that he ever voiced these frustrations as serious policy proposals, however. Longhand personal notes of Truman, January 27 and May 18, 1952, “Longhand Notes File, 1930–1955,” PSF, Box 282, Truman Library.
92. Acheson (1969, 478).
93. Minutes of August 14 meeting, “Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949– 1953,” Box 67, Acheson papers, Truman Library.
94. Foot (1985, 123–30); Risse-Kappen (1995, 46–51).
95. Quoted in Foot (1985, 23).
96. Schnabel and Watson (1979, vol. 3, pt. 1, 439).
97. FRUS 1951 (1977, vol. 7, pt. 1, 152–54).
98. Ibid., 159.
99. Ibid., 164–67; 189–94.
100. Schnabel and Watson (1979, vol. 3, pt. 1, 480–81).
101. Stueck (1995,207).
102. Acheson (1969, 531).
103. U.S. Congress, Senate, Military Situation in the Far East (1951, part 3, 2126). See also Foot (1991, 45–46).
104. Quoted in Stueck (1995, 216).
105. Quoted in Zhang (1995, 157).
106. Stueck (1995,216–17). At least as late as March 1951, Mao was planning military operations to prevent a stalemate at the 38th parallel (Zhang 1995, 144–45).
107. Stueck (1995,208).
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid., 244.
110. Ibid.
111. U.S. Congress, Senate, Military Situation in the Far East (1951, part 5, 3605).
112. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951 (1983, vol. 7, 1293).
113. Longhand personal notes of Truman, January 27, 1952, “Longhand Notes File, 1930–1955,” PSF, Box 282, Truman Library.
114. Longhand personal notes of Truman, May 18, 1952, “Longhand Notes File, 1930–1955,” PSF, Box 282, Truman Library.
115. Quoted in Weathersby (1998, 109).
116. Robert A. Lovett to Senator Francis Case, October 30, 1952; OF 471-B: Prisoners of War (Koran Action), Truman Papers, Student Research File: “The Korean War: The Prisoner of War Issue and the Search for Peace,” Truman Library; Wallace Carroll to Gordon Gray, December 28, 1951; 383.6: Report on Situation with Respect to Repatriation of Prisoners of War; Class 300—Administration, 1951–53, PSB Files, Truman Papers, Student Research File: “The Korean War: The Prisoner of War Issue and the Search for Peace,” Truman Library; JCS Chair Omar N. Bradley to George C. Marshall, August 8, 1951, 383.6, Report on Situation with Respect to Repatriation of Prisoners of War; Class 300—Administration, 1951–53, PSB Files, Truman Papers, Student Research File: “The Korean War: The Prisoner of War Issue and the Search for Peace,” Truman Library.
117. Quoted in Gaddis (1987, 176). See also Reiter and Stam (2002, chapter 3).
118. Stueck (2002, 149–50).
119. Records of discussions at Princeton Seminars, February 13–14, 1954, folder 1 of 2, Reel 3, Track 1, p9, Box 81, Acheson Papers, Truman Library.
120. Christensen (1996, 151–52).
121. First quote from Chai (2001, 188). General Chai led the Chinese military mission to North Korea from August 1950 through 1955. The second quote is from Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, quoted in Stueck (1995, 241). Interestingly, Stueck (242) takes issue with Burke’s characterization.
122. Stueck (1995,230–32).
123. Ibid., 279.
124. Jian (2001, 114).
125. Sale (1998, 160); LaFeber (1997, 117). Both these sources cite the documentation and analysis in Christensen (1995, esp. 268–69). Importantly, although Christensen argues that Truman by November recognized that the China threat helped boost support for the increase in defense spending, he does not argue that Truman approved NSC 81/1 or crossed the 38th parallel in order to increase defense spending.
126. Quoted in Christensen (1995, 268–69).
127. See, e.g., Foot (1985, 69–70).
128. Daily Opinion Summaries, Department of State, Nos. 1416-8, July 20, 21, and 24, 1950, Elsey Papers, Box 72, Truman Library.
129. Oshinsky (1983, 166–67).
130. Acheson (1969, 364–66); Reeves (1982, 328–29).
131. In his April 10, 1951 diary entry, Truman notes of the political fallout from MacArthur’s dismissal, “Quite an explosion. Was expected but I had to act.” Ferrell (1980,251).
132. Oshinsky (1983, 194); Hamby (1995, 558).
133. Although some scholars have found in the Korean War a statistically significant relationship between the accumulation of casualties over time and the decline of support for the war, the actual relationship is more complex and nonlinear. Gartner and Segura (1998); Mueller (1985).
134. Christensen (1996, 152); Gaddis (1980, 111).
135. Mueller (1985, 50–51).
136. Ibid., 51. Italics in original.
137. Clodfelter (2002, 737).
138. Stueck (2002, 169).
139. Ambrose (1983, vol. 1).
140. Stueck (2002, 170–73).
141. Mueller (1985, 80).
142. Ambrose (1984, vol. 2, 30–35, 52); Gaddis (1997, 107–8).
143. Zhang (1995, 233–34); Ping (2001, 63).
144. Oshinsky (1983, 346).
145. Gaddis (1997, 109); Weathersby (1998, 108–10).
146. Stueck (1995,2002).
147. Volkogonov (1991, 570). See also Chang and Halliday (2005, 390–91).
148. Jian (2001, 112–16).
149. Truman (1956, 332–33).
150. Quoted in Leffler (1992, 365–67).
151. Minutes of a cabinet meeting, July 14, 1950, “Memoranda of Conversations File, 1949–1953,” box 67 Acheson papers, Truman Library.
152. Collins (1969, 83).
153. Quoted in Zhang (1992, 83, italics in original; also 83n).
154. FRUS 1950 (1977, vol. 7, 506).
155. Quoted in Beisner (2006, 399).
156. Quoted in Beisner (2006, 399). See also Acheson (1969, 451).
157. Hughes (1963, 104–5).
CHAPTER SIX
THE ALLIES, 1940–42
1. Self (2006, 399).
2. Self (2005, 453–44).
3. May (2000, esp. 8–9, 205–9).
4. Self (2005, 446; see also 450–1).
5. Ibid., 456; Self (2006, 402–3).
6. Reynolds (1996,202)
7. Self (2005, 445).
8. Ibid., 455.
9. Reynolds (1996,202–3).
10. May (2000, 18).
11. Quoted in Self (2006, 400).
12. May (2000).
13. Roberts (1991,211).
14. Lukacs (1999). Lukacs’ remark relates to the title of the fourth volume of Churchill’s six-volume history of World War II. Volume four was titled The Hinge of Fate, and covered the campaigns of 1942.
15. Colville (2004, 116); Self (2005, 533); Reynolds (1985, 157).
16. Reynolds (1985, 149).
17. Eden (1965, 123).
18. Nicolson (1967, 89).
19. Churchill (1949, vol. 2, 89). The report was written before the Dunkirk evacuation enjoyed success. It is not exactly clear whether or not the report presumes the successful evacuation of British troops from Dunkirk in its assessment of the weakness of British homeland defenses.
20. Gilbert (1995, vol. 2, 163–65); Roberts (1991, 218–19); Pimlott (1986, 27).
21. Quoted in Lukacs (1990, 95). This quotation from the report is not contained within the excerpt in Churchill (1949, vol. 1, 89), meaning that again Churchill provided an edited view of history in his own writings.
22. Churchill (1949, vol. 2, 89).
23. Reiter (2007).
24. Dalton (1957, 335); Reynolds (1985, 149).
25. Macleod and Kelly (1962, 343–44). “[Home]” inserted by Macleod and Kelly.
26. Ibid., 346.
27. Barnes and Nicholson (1988, 619). See also Eden (1965, 129).
28. Mcleod and Kelly (1962, 345). Undersecretary of State Alexander Cogan, a member of the War Cabinet, agreed, noting in his diary on May 28, “Prospects of B.E.F. look blacker than ever. Awful days!” Dilks (1971, 291).
29. Nicolson (1967, 89–90). Minister of Information Duff Cooper had similar thoughts, fearing surrender and seeing death as perhaps preferable in the event. Cooper (1953,284).
30. Colville (2004, 113).
31. Gilbert (1995, vol. 2, 180).
32. Lukacs (1999, 176–77).
33. General Alfred Jodl diary entry for May 20, 1940, available at avalon .law.yale.edu/imt/1809-ps.asp (downloaded November 29, 2008).
34. Lukacs (1990, 80).
35. Costello (1991, 186).
36. Lukacs (1990, 98).
37. Pimlott (1986, 28n).
38. Gilbert (1983, vol. 6, 435–36).
39. Quoted in Jenkins (2001, 611).
40. Richard Austen Butler, an assistant to Halifax, may have put forth an unauthorized peace feeler on June 17, 1940. According to one report, he told the Swedish ambassador to Britain that “no opportunity for reaching a compromise would be neglected if the possibility were offered on reasonable conditions,” and that Churchill might be replaced by Halifax on June 28, at which point negotiations with Germany might become possible. However, in the days that followed the Swedish ambassador told his government that he doubted that Butler’s views were official, and the Swedish government was officially instructed that the British government had no interest in negotiations with Germany. Historians have concluded that it is doubtful that this feeler was authorized by Halifax, much less Churchill himself (Roberts 1991, 232; Munch-Peterson 1986).
41. Gilbert (1995, 169). Interestingly, in his postwar memoirs/history of World War II, Churchill denied that there was any consideration of terms, noting somewhat self-servingly that, “Future generations may deem it noteworthy that the supreme question of whether we should fight on alone never found a place upon the War Cabinet agenda. It was taken for granted and as a matter of course by these men of all parties in the State” (Churchill 1949, vol. 2, 177). This inaccuracy has been called “the most breathtakingly bland piece of misinformation to appear in all these six volumes” (Jenkins 2001, 610).
42. Quoted in Roberts (1991, 227).
43. Ibid., 216–17. Relatedly, in a May 26 War Cabinet meeting, he remarked that “Herr Hitler thought that he had the whip hand. The only thing to do was to show him that he could not conquer this country.” Gilbert (1995, vol. 2, 158).
44. Gilbert (1995, vol. 2, 180).
45. Ibid. This was a key point which Halifax did not grasp. Roberts (1991, 215–17).
46. Quoted in Gilbert (1983, vol. 6, 403).
47. Ibid., 444.
48. Gilbert (1995, vol. 2, 168).
49. Quoted in Jenkins (2001, 607).
50. Lukacs (1990, 96).
51. Gilbert (1995, vol. 2, 185).
52. Quoted in Roberts (1991, 236). See also note 48.
53. Gilbert (1995, vol. 2, 181).
54. Gilbert (1991, vol. 2, 157).
55. Reynolds (1985, 148–49).
56. Gilbert (1995, vol. 2, 181).
57. Pimlott (1986, 28).
58. Churchill (1949, vol. 2, 100).
59. Lukacs (1990, 38–39).
60. Gilbert (1991, 553–54).
61. Ibid., 588, 595–601.
62. Ibid., 615.
63. Ibid.
64. Dalton (1957, 335–36).
65. Gilbert (1995, vol. 2, 158).
66. Ibid., 153.
67. Ibid.
68. Quoted in Gilbert (1991, 646).
69. Mcleod and Kelly (1962, 386).
70. Quoted in Roberts (1991,212).
71. Stevenson (1988).
72. Gilbert (1995, vol. 2, 158).
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., 169.
75. Lord (1982, 272–73); Sebag-Montefiore (2006, esp. xi–xiv).
76. Lawlor (1994, 68–69); Mcleod and Kelly (1962, 362, 365).
77. Gilbert (1995, vol. 2, 202); Legro (1995, 163).
78. Quoted in Reynolds (1985, 154). Brackets in Reynolds.
79. Dilks (1971, 308).
80. Lawlor (1994, 65).
81. Ibid., 67.
82. Reynolds (1985, 167); Reynolds (1996, 206–7).
83. Reynolds (1996, 205–6); Gartner (1997, chapter 4).
84. Quoted in Jenkins (2001, 600).
85. Pimlott (1986, 27); Reynolds (1985, 162). Some at the time argued that with luck, even without American intervention, the German economy itself might collapse under the weight of mobilization as early as 1942 (Reynolds 1985, 157–58).
86. Quoted in Costello (1991, 99). Italics in original.
87. Ibid., 203–4.
88. Colville (2004, 113).
89. Gilbert (1995, vol. 2, 163).
90. Reiter and Stam (2002, 98).
91. Note that the portrayal here has emphasized British perceptions of the military outlook rather than the actual outlook; some historians have been highly critical of the accuracy of British judgments about the future course of the war at this stage (Reynolds 1985, esp. 167). Further, the interpretation here is consistent with the description of 1940 Anglo–German relations offered by Robert Powell (2006). Powell notes that incomplete information is an unsatisfactory explanation for Germany’s decision to attack Britain in summer 1940. He notes that Germany attacked in the West not because of uncertainty about British intentions, but rather because it knew Britain would not make a separate peace, and hence Britain needed to be subdued in order to permit Germany a free hand to attack the Soviet Union. This chapter provides an explanation of why Britain would not make concessions, even believing Germany’s intentions to be malign and its capabilities to be considerable: the British belief that any German commitment to abide by a warending agreement would not be credible, and that the only means of providing real peace was through military victory.
92. Sherwood (1950, 454–55, 491, 504).
93. Ibid., 465.
94. Roosevelt to Churchill, March 7, 1942, Kimball (1984, vol. 1, 390).
95. Dallek (1979, 331); www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=16219 (downloaded October 15, 2007). See also Roosevelt (1950, vol. 2, 1298–99); Berinsky (2007, esp. 988).
96. Sherwood (1950, 498).
97. Gartner (1997, 97); Churchill (1950, vol. 4, 126).
98. Glantz and House (1995, 105–7); Israel (1966, 253–54).
99. Israel (1966, 252).
100. Quoted in Gilbert (1986, vol. 6, 78).
101. Israel (1966,249).
102. Ibid., 255.
103. Reiter and Stam (2002, 35–37).
104. Roosevelt at some points incorrectly gave the impression that the idea of unconditional surrender emerged originally at the January 1943 Casablanca conference (Sherwood 1950, 695–97).
105. Armstrong (1961, 16).
106. Quoted in Armstrong (1961, 17). See also Roosevelt’s statement just after Pearl Harbor (Beschloss 2002, 12), and the January 1, 1942 Allies’ Joint Statement (Davis 2000, 371).
107. Eden (1965, 439).
108. Notter (1949, 124–33); O’Connor (1971, 37); Pogue (1973, 32). The security technical committee within the security committee met in May 1943 to discuss postwar plans for Japan in particular. Although an array of views was expressed, the common assumption was that the war had to end with the destruction of Japanese militarism and the Japanese empire (Iriye 1981, 122–28).
109. June 1, 1942, 10:30 a.m. meeting with President Roosevelt, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Litvinov, Mr. Hopkins, and Messrs. Pavlov and Cross, 3, in The Papers of Cordell Hull (Washington: Library of Congress, 1975), reel 22.
110. Dilks (1971, 506).
111. Feis (1967, 109n).
112. Dower (1986, 53–55); Security Technical Committee, May 7, 12, 1943, p. 10, 12, Harley Notter papers, National Archive, College Park, Maryland; Janssens (1995,41).
113. Feis (1967, 108). On the effects of past experiences on foreign policy, see Reiter (1996).
114. “Minutes S-1, Meeting of April 15, 1942,” 3, Notter papers; “Minutes S-2, Meeting of April 29, 1942,” 1–2, Notter papers; Israel (1966, 264–65, 265n). Interestingly, although Davis supported unconditional surrender, he commented in a later meeting that the 1918 armistice had only limited applicability to the current circumstances because of different world conditions, such as the status of the British colonial empire. “Minutes S-3, Meeting of May 6, 1942,” 4, Notter papers.
115. “Minutes S-4, Meeting of May 20, 1942,” 1, Notter papers.
116. See the “Summary of Conclusions: The First Four Meetings of the Security Subcommittee,” May 21, 1942, box 76, Notter papers. On Japan, see “Conditions for Japanese Surrender to the United Nations,” May 27, 1942, prepared by General Strong, Notter papers.
117. “Minutes S-3, Meeting of May 6, 1942,” 1, Notter papers.
118. “Minutes S-4, Meeting of May 20, 1942,” 2, Notter papers. Records indicate that Norman Davis, a member of the committee, met with Roosevelt personally on May 18, 1942. “FDR: Day by Day—The Pare Larentz Chronology,” May 18, 1942, Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York.
119. Balfour (1979, 287–88). 120 Sherwood (1950, 227).
121. Quoted on Beschloss (2002, 12).
122. Quoted in Armstrong (1961, 18).
123. Foreign Relations of the United States 1944 (1966, vol. 1, 501–2).
124. Armstrong (1961, 20); Janssens (1995, esp. 438).
125. Butcher (1946, 609–10).
126. Beschloss (2002, 115–16).
127. Quoted in Dower (1986, 56–57).
128. Churchill (1950 vol. 3, 606–7)
129. Pogue (1966, 160–61).
130. Sherwood (1950,459).
131. Roosevelt (1950, vol. 1, 1304).
132. Beschloss (2002, 13).
133. Ibid., 13–15.
134. See, e.g., Forster (1997).
135. Erickson (1975,222).
136. Braithwaite (2006, 214–25).
137. Glantz and House (1995, 82).
138. Braithwaite (2006, 240); Conquest (1991, 248).
139. Barros and Gregor (1995, 220); Volkogonov (1991, 412–13); Ronay (1989);Pavlenko (1989).
140. Watson (2005, 193). There are also bits of evidence indicating possible Soviet interest in negotiations with Germany later in the war, although this evidence is generally much more indirect and circumstantial than what is available concerning the October 1941 episode. See Mastny (1979, esp. 77–78, 83– 84, 162).
141. There is also less reliable corroborative evidence, such as the September 5, 1941 message from Moscow to London hinting that the former was considering a separate peace with Germany, although this may of course have been posturing by Stalin to encourage Britain to put more pressure on Germany from the West. Welles (1950, 134).
142. Volkogonov (1991, 412–13).
143. Barber and Harrison (1991, 55n).
144. Ronay (1989).
145. Pavlenko (1989).
146. “The Beriya Case and ‘Blank Spots’ in Soviet History” (1988).
147. Chuev (1993, 14).
148. Sudoplatov and Sudoplatov (1994, 145).
149. Volgokonov (1991, 352–53).
150. MacKenzie (1994, esp. 510); Streim (1997, 295–97).
151. Quoted in Aspaturian (1963, 49).
152. Gorodetsky (1997, 347).
153. Sherwood (1950, 904).
154. Rosen (2005, chapter 4).
155. Braithwaite (2006).
156. Nove (1969,270).
157. Barros and Gregor (1995, 220); Volgokonov (1991, 413).
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE LOGIC OF WAR: FINLAND AND THE USSR, 1939–44
1. Trotter (1991, 5–6).
2. Ibid., 14; Barros and Gregor (1995, 3–5).
3. Jakobsen (1961, 106); Edwards (2006, 69–73); Myllyniemi (1997).
4. Edwards (2006).
5. Van Dyke (1997, 13–14); Vehvilainen (2002, chapter 3).
6. Van Dyke (1997, 14); Spring (1986, 216).
7. Van Dyke (1997, 17–21); Jakobsen (1961).
8. Trotter (1991, 58–59).
9. “The Winter War” (1990, 203).
10. Khrushchev (1970, 152).
11. Van Dyke (1997, 40)
12. Trotter (1991, esp. 35).
13. Viipuri is also known as Vyborg.
14. Van Dyke (1997, 77–81); Trotter (1991).
15. Khrushchev (1970, 153); Meretskov (1971, 112); Van Dyke (1997, 135).
16. Van Dyke (1997, 72).
17. Trotter (1991,238–39).
18. Edwards (2006, 206–7); Tanner (1957, 219–20).
19. Edwards (2006, 203–4).
20. Trotter (1991, 135).
21. Ibid., 241.
22. Van Dyke (1997, 164–65).
23. Jakobson (1961, 236–41); Van Dyke (1997, 166).
24. Jakobson (1961,248).
25. Van Dyke (1997, 176–78).
26. Jakobson (1961, 249); Tanner (1957, 212).
27. Van Dyke (1997, 175).
28. “The Winter War” (1990, 210).
29. Kollontai (1990, 197).
30. “The Winter War” (1990, 211; see also 205).
31. Foreign Relations of the United States 1940 (1959, vol. 1, 299).
32. Quoted in Screen (2000, 153).
33. Jakobson (1961,250).
34. Trotter (1991, 263); Condon (1972, 93); Khrushchev (1970, 155).
35. Screen (2000, 151).
36. Jakobson (1961, esp. 11).
37. Tanner (1957, 184).
38. Ibid., 227.
39. Ibid., 180. The Romanians made a similar argument, recalling their experience in World War I.
40. Jakobson (1961, 252); Tanner (1957, 183
41. Kulkov and Rzheshevsky (2002, 263–64).
42. On buffer states, see Fazal (2007)
43. Quoted in Vehvilainen (2002, 79).
44. Jokipii (1982, 86, 91); Foreign Relations of the United States 1940 (1959, vol. 1, 340); Ziemke (1959, 115).
45. Vehvilainen (2002, 80–81).
46. Jokipii (1982, 89).
47. Mann and Jorgensen (2002, 67); Vehvilainen (2002, 78–83); Menger (1997, 527); Erfurth (1979, 3–5); Jokipii (1982, 92).
48. Menger (1997, 527–29); Vehvilainen (2002, 87–88); Mann and Jo ̈rgensen (2002, 67); Jokipii (1982, 87); Polvinen (1985); Ziemke (1959, 113–21). On the German warning to the Soviet Union, see Berezhkov (1969).
49. Menger (1997, 530–31); Jokipii (1982, 103).
50. Ziemke (1959, 204n). Some in Finland also sought territorial gains along with regime change, specifically the acquisition of Eastern Karelia, a portion of Soviet territory that contained Finnish speakers. Acquisition of this territory would help build what was referred to as “Greater Finland.” Vehvilainen (2002, 91–92).
51. Palm (1971, 15); Screen (2000, 172–73).
52. Quoted in Vehvilainen (2002, 89); Ziemke (1959, 204n). See also Menger (1997, 532).
53. Foreign Relations of the United States 1941 (1958, vol. 1, 52, 59). Finland’s faith in Germany may have been misplaced, since Hitler as early as July 1941 ordered that Finland become a tributary state within the Third Reich after the war (Palm 1971, 18n).
54. Screen (2000, 172).
55. Palm (1971, 15); Foreign Relations of the United States 1941 (1958, vol. 1,67).
56. Foreign Relations of the United States 1941 (1958, vol. 1, 84).
57. Vehvilainen (2002, 90–97); Palm (1971, 20); Foreign Relations of the United States 1941 (1958, vol. 1, 56, 67).
58. Vehvilainen (2002, 96–100).
59. Ibid., 120.
60. Ibid., 121.
61. Palm (1971,24–25).
62. Ibid., 24.
63. Vehvilainen (2002, 121–22, 128).
64. Ibid., 123–24.
65. Ibid., 125.
66. Ibid., 1332); Churchill (1951, vol. 5, 399); Palm (1971, 81); Nevakivi (1996, 91).
67. Vehvilainen (2002, 132).
68. Ibid., chapter 7.
69. Ibid., 141; Glantz and House (1995, 202); Mawdsley (2005, 293–94).
70. Tuunainen (2006).
71. Vehvilainen (2002, 143–44).
72. Ibid., 145–46.
73. Ibid., 147–48.
74. Palm (1971,22–23).
75. Ibid., 21.
76. Quoted in Palm (1971, 77–78).
77. Vehvilainen (2002, 151).
78. Quoted in Palm (1971, 75–76).
79. Ziemke (1959,288).
80. Nevakivi (1996, 95–96); Ziemke (1959, chapter 14).
81. Nevakivi (1996, 93).
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
1. Civil war scholars have previously applied some of the theoretical ideas in chapters 2 and 3 to civil wars. Walter (2002); Fearon (2004, 2007).
2. Quoted in McPherson (1988, 316–17).
3. Quoted in Goodwin (2005, 356; also 349)
4. Ibid., 371.
5. Thompson and Wainwright (1920, vol. 1, 4–5).
6. Livermore (1957).
7. See, e.g., McPherson (1988); Basler (1953), et al.
8. See Livermore (1957).
9. For example, the independent variable equates minor battles (like the Battle of Fort Wagner, which involved only 7,000 troops) with major clashes (like the Battles of Gettysburg involving 160,000 troops and Antietam involving 127,000 troops). Livermore (1957, 140–41)
10. McPherson (1988, 857–58).
11. Goodwin (2005,445).
12. Oates (1977, 315).
13. McPherson (1988, 336).
14. Ibid., 535.
15. Ibid., 505.
16. Oates (1977, 315–16).
17. Pierce (1893, 33); Welles (1872).
18. Oates (1977, 299).
19. Ibid., 322.
20. Beale (1960, vol. 1, 143); Welles (1872, 847).
21. See Catton (1951, 316–21); Clodfelter (2002, 310).
22. Livermore (1957, 92–93).
23. Donald (1954, 150).
24. Beale (1960, vol. 1, 145).
25. Oates (1977, 253); Goodwin (2005, 404–5).
26. Goodwin (2005, 549).
27. Welles (1872, 841)
28. Oates (1977, 302).
29. Quoted in Oates (1977, 307).
30. Welles (1872, 844).
31. Basler (1953, vol. 5, 317–18).
32. Quoted in Nicolay and Hay (1890, vol. 6, 128).
33. Welles (1872, 873).
34. Beale (1960, vol. 1, 70). His public stance had not yet changed, however. As late as September 13, Lincoln expressed his doubts about the Emancipation Proclamation in a reply to Chicago Christians (Basler 1953, vol. 5, 419–25).
35. McElroy (1937, 358–62); Stroud (1959, vol. 2, 312–14); McPherson (1988, 567); Catton (1951, 322).
36. Donald (1954, 152); Beale (1960, vol. 1, 143); Catton (1951, 151–53).
37. See McPherson (1988, 558–63).
38. Carpenter (1866, 22, italics in original); Goodwin (2005, 468). See also Welles (1872, 845).
39. Smith (2002, 8).
40. Ibid., 52–64.
41. Quoted in McPherson 1988, (510; italics in original).
42. McPherson (1988, 526).
43. Ibid., 637.
44. Ibid., 664–65.
45. Ibid., 665.
46. Ibid., 670–71.
47. Ibid., 681.
48. McPherson (1988).
49. Rowland (1923, vol. 6, 145–46).
50. McPherson (1988, 742).
51. Oates (1977, 394); McPherson (1988, 757).
52. Quoted in (McPherson 1988, 771).
53. Basler (1953, vol. 7, 518n). Italics in original.
54. Oates (1977, 394).
55. Quoted in Goodwin (2005, 647).
56. Oates (1977, 395–96).
57. Basler (1960, vol. 7, 499–501, 506–8); McPherson (1988, 769).
58. Basler (1953, vol. 7, 506–7).
59. Beale (1953, vol. 7, 499–501).
60. Ibid., 451; Nicolay and Hay (1890, vol. 9, 221).
61. McPherson (1988, 770–71).
62. Nicolay and Hay (1890, vol. 9, 221).
63. Oates (1977, 388).
64. Stephens (1870, vol. 2, 619).
65. Quoted in McElroy (1937, 412, 414).
66. Callahan (1964, 246); Owsley (1931, 552–54).
67. Quoted in Gilmore (2007, 264); see also McElroy (1937, 414, 434).
68. Quoted in Saunders (1997, 163, 165). Italics in Saunders.
69. Stephens (1870, vol. 2, 610–14). In other statements at the time, both public and private, Lincoln took a different stance, holding fast to emancipation as a condition for peace. In a January 31 letter to Seward, Lincoln instructed that an “indispensable” condition of any settlement would be “No receding by the Executive of the United States on the Slavery question, from the position assumed thereon, in the late Annual Message to Congress, and on preceding documents” (Basler 1953, vol. 8, 279). A few days after the Hampton Roads meeting, Lincoln told General Grant privately that peace would require the end of CSA sovereignty and the abolition of slavery (Grant 1995, 405). It is possible that Lincoln was keeping his offer to the CSA secret to avoid damaging political repercussions. No one, including Stephens, kept written notes of the Hampton Roads meetings.
70. McPherson (1988, 822).
71. Note that this idea of war-termination diplomacy affecting the balance of power reverses the causal arrow of the bargaining model of war, which sees (perceptions of) the balance of power affecting war-termination diplomacy.
72. Davis (2001,29).
73. Potter (1942, 1–6).
74. Quoted in Goodwin (2005, 294).
75. Basler (1953, vol. 4, 172).
76. Quoted in Gilmore (2007, 231–32).
77. Basler (1953, vol. 7, 500).
78. Weingast (1998). For a critique, see Carpenter (2002).
79. Rowland (1923, vol. 5, 409–10); McElroy (1937, 367–68).
80. Dirck (2001, 235).
81. Coulter (1950, 553)
82. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (1899, series I, vol. 46, pt. 2, 1038).
83. Gilmore (2007,267).
84. Foner (1988, 35–36).
85. Ibid., 60–61.
86. Congressional Globe (38th Congress, 1st Session 296).
87. Foner (1988, 61); manifesto quoted in Kirkland (1927, 98–99).
88. Kirkland (1927, 138).
89. Foner (1988, 61–71).
90. Hunter (1877, 176).
91. Quoted in Crist (2003, vol. 11, 381n)
92. Quoted in Kirkland (1927, 122–23).
93. Crist et al (2003, vol. 11, 3–18); Kirkland (1927, 204).
94. Quoted in McPherson (1988, 852).
95. Toft (2003); Walter (2006a, 2006b).
96. Quoted in McPherson (1988, 246).
97. Ibid., 247–48.
98. Basler (1953, vol. 4, 436). At least prior to war not all subscribed to this view, as some Unionist elements in the North suggested permitting secession peacefully (McPherson 1988,250–52).
99. Pierce (1893, 106).
100. Quoted in McPherson (1988, 761).
101. Goodwin (2005, 645).
102. Quoted in Oates (1977, 395).
CHAPTER NINE
GERMANY, 1917–18
1. Stevenson (2004, 322).
2. There were only 176,000 American troops in France in December 1917 and 318,000 by March 1918, although by August 1918 there were 1.3 million Yanks in France to support the decisive final Allied offensive. Stibbe (2001, 164).
3. Van Evera (1999).
4. See Goemans (2000, 264).
5. See also Fischer (1967, 610–11).
6. Biddle (2004).
7. Ludendorff in particular was obsessed with preparing for the next war. For example, in May 1917 he fretted that diversion of nitrogen from German farmlands for munitions production would undermine agricultural production necessary during “the next war.” Bailey (1966, 60n).
8. In the words of one historian, this goal was “among the most prominent and consistent of the Berlin government’s war aims.” Stevenson (1982, 505).
9. Quoted in Stibbe (2001, 15).
10. Zuber (2002, esp. 271). German operational plans grew in the latter half of August towards pursuing French armies into the French interior, but this was more aimed at preventing French reinforcement than in conquering France (esp. 275).
11. Herwig (1972,212).
12. Fischer (1967, 103–4); Stevenson (1991).
13. Gatzke (1950, 13–14).
14. Quoted in Gatzke (1950, 15).
15. Stevenson (1982, 505).
16. Quoted in Fischer (1967, 113). See also Herwig (1972, 213).
17. Quoted in Herwig (1972, 215).
18. Gatzke (1950, 153); Herwig (1972, 214).
19. Herwig (1972,217).
20. Stibbe (2001, 123).
21. Stevenson (1988, 162).
22. Ritter (1973, vol. 4, 45–46).
23. Scherer and Grunewald (1966, vol. 2, 429–30).
24. Quoted in Zabecki (2006, 76).
25. Quoted in Gatzke (1950, 240).
26. Lutz (1934, 88–89).
27. Gatzke (1950, 248). The December 1917 decision overruled the September 1917 Council of Bellevue decision, which leaned towards allowing German negotiators to give up Belgium in exchange for peace. Bailey (1966, 71–79).
28. Quoted in Gatzke (1950, 244). Brackets in Gatzke.
29. Quoted in Calder and Sutton (1928, vol. 1, 260).
30. Scherer and Grunewald (1974, vol. 3, 341–48); Zabecki (2006, 96).
31. Hindenburg (1920, 357).
32. Fischer (1967, 113).
33. Ritter (1973, vol. 4, 200, also 203); Calder and Sutton (1928, vol. 1, 259).
34. Quoted in Gatzke (1950, 254).
35. Stevenson (1988, 35).
36. On the Franco–Belgian agreement, see Reiter (1996). On 1940, see May (2000).
37. Parkinson (1978, 144).
38. Fischer (1967, 609).
39. Quoted in Herwig (1997, 394).
40. Herwig (1997, 394); Ludendorff (1919, vol. 2, 163).
41. Stevenson (1988, 170).
42. Quoted in Zabecki (2006, 95).
43. Fest (1972, 301, 304); Haig quoted in Lloyd George (1934, vol. 4, 315; see also 313, 318–19); Rothwell (1971, 148); French (1995, 146).
44. Ritter (1973, vol. 4, 206); Parkinson (1978, 148).
45. French (1995, 157).
46. Goemans (2000).
47. The only other such moderately exclusionary, semirepressive regime in Goemans’ World War I study is Russia, although he notes (312) that the evidence regarding whether Russian behavior conforms with the expectations of his theory is thin and mixed.
48. Goemans (2000, 89–92).
49. Ibid., 98–105.
50. Asprey (1991, 291); Ritter (1972, vol. 3, 288).
51. Stevenson (1991, 104).
52. Herwig (2000, 193).
53. Asprey (1991,291).
54. Quoted in Herwig (1997, 315).
55. Herwig (2000, 193).
56. Ritter (1972, vol. 3, 306–7).
57. Stevenson (1988, 75).
58. Stibbe (2001, 167).
59. Herwig (2000, esp. 200–205) provides explanations for the failure of unrestricted submarine warfare to drive Britain from the war. See also Hull (2005).
60. Lloyd George (1934, vol. 3, 83–84). See also Halpern (1994).
61. See Newbolt (1928, vol. 4, 385); Herwig (2000, 192).
62. Fayle (1924, vol. 3, 93).
63. Gartner (1997, chapter 3).
64. Stevenson (1988, 76); Hull (2005, 224–25).
65. Snyder (1984, 1991).
66. Goemans (2000,262).
67. Gatzke (1950, 5–6). Goemans (2000, 266–67) includes a reduced version of this quote from Gatzke, and offers a different interpretation.
68. Retallack (1988,217).
69. Quoted in Peck (1978, 182).
70. Gatzke (1950, 147).
71. Quoted in Peck (1978, 181).
72. Stibbe (2001).
73. Quoted in Gatzke (1950, 29).
74. Ibid., 17.
75. Quoted in Herwig (1997, 378).
76. Quoted in Stibbe (2001, 185).
77. Herwig (1997, 378). But see also Peck (1978, 212–13).
78. Gatzke (1950,261).
79. Parkinson (1978, 108).
80. Goemans (2000, 117–18).
81. Herwig (1997, 374–75).
82. Ritter (1973, vol. 3, 448, 457).
83. Lee (2005, 132).
84. Quoted in Herwig (1972, 219–20). Italics in original.
85. Quoted in Asprey (1991, 359–60).
86. Lee (2005, 147); Kitchen (1976, 167).
87. Herwig (1997, 381–82).
88. Goemans (2000, 267); Gatzke (1950, 228).
89. Gatzke (1950, 245).
90. Kitchen (1976,29).
91. Feldman (1966, 138).
92. Herwig (1997, 195); Asprey (1991; 243–52); Parkinson (1978, 107–8); Feldman (1966, 138–41).
93. Kitchen (1976, 38–39). See also Asprey (1991, 249–50). Kitchen (1976, 39) notes that the extent of Bauer’s ties to the industrialists is hard to gauge because potentially compromising documents in Bauer’s personal papers have been destroyed. Although Feldman (1966, 141) notes that the Association of German Iron and Steel Industrialists wrote a memo in 1916 complaining about Falkenhayn, he argues that the “coup de grace” that brought Falkenhayn down was the Romanian debacle.
94. Herwig (1997, 196); Asprey (1991, 246–47).
95. Bailey (1980).
96. Asprey (1991).
97. Gatzke (1950, 251) argued: “To avoid [democratization’s] endless terror, Ludendorff put everything on one card, an all-out offensive against the west.” The key piece of evidence for Gatzke is an excerpt from a letter Ludendorff wrote on January 1, 1918: “I always hope that the Prussian franchise falls through. If I didn’t have that hope, I would advise the conclusion of any peace. With this franchise we cannot live. . . . Let the disturbances come. I would rather endure a terrible end than endless terror. Are there no more fighters left? Can the best among us be frightened by the bogie of ‘internal unrest?’ To look the danger straight in the eye and then at it! Only thus can we win; and if we should lose it would be better than acting against one’s conviction” (quoted in Gatzke 1950, 250–51; for original, see Knesebeck 1927, 164). Gatkze argues that this statement is critical, because, “The constant stress on the strategic necessity as the only argument for western annexations is belied by his statement that once the Prussian franchise had been conceded, any peace would suit him” (Gatzke 1950, 251). However, the quote does not quite support this interpretation, that annexation is only meaningful because of its domestic political implications. Rather, it seems more like any Western gains would be meaningless if the franchise is granted because of the horrors the franchise would present. He does not make the argument that gains in the West will help stem the franchise.
98. Bailey (1980, 159).
99. Stibbe (2001, 168).
100. Bailey (1980, 172).
101. Herwig (1997, 381); Zabecki (2006, 92–93). Goemans (2000, 267–68) also proposes that individual states feared a shift in the balance of power if expansion in the West was abandoned, since Eastern states would capture the economic benefits of the territorial acquisitions from Russia, and other states would get little or nothing. Goemans provides evidence of individual states lobbying for various pieces of Western expansion, but missing is any evidence that these pressures ultimately had any effect on the decision to continue the war or to maintain high war aims. Feldman (1966, 444) claims that, “The right wing deputies believed that a great German military victory would obviate the need for social and political reform,” but his citation in support of this claim is Rosenberg (1931, 210–11), and Rosenberg does not himself make the claim in the cited pages.
102. Herwig (1997, 376–81); Zabecki (2006, 92–93); Stibbe (2001, 166).
103. Herwig (1997, 305).
104. Zabecki (2006, 93–94); Ludendorff (1919, vol. 2, 161–65). Related to this point, Goemans (2000, 264) cites a critical February 19, 1918 statement by Ludendorff about the forthcoming offensives, in which Ludendorff stated that if the offensives fail, “In that case Germany must go under,” to which Goemans draws the inference that Ludendorff knew that the offensive risked Germany’s defeat. This quote comes from the memoirs of Prince Max of Baden, and notably Baden remarks that Ludendorff’s remarks here have often been misinterpreted, and that Max thought Ludendorff’s view was that “Our situation is such that we must either win or go under,” which is more like the idea that Germany needed to win the war at all costs (Calder and Sutton 1928, vol. 1, 258, 258n). Ludendorff’s statement (“Dann muss Deutschland eben zugrunde gehen!”) is translated slightly differently elsewhere, such as, “Then Germany will just have to suffer annihilation” (Goodspeed 1966, 196).
105. Goodspeed (1966, 192). For dissent, see Chickering (1998, 178–79).
106. Biddle (2004, chapter 5); Kitchen (2001, 233); Zabeski (2006, esp. 311– 13). However, Zabecki (312) wonders if even this outcome would have accomplished German strategic goals, as perhaps American forces would have streamed into Britain, and British and American forces might have prepared for an eventual counterattack, presaging the 1944 D-Day invasion.
107. Quoted in Tuchman (1962, 142).
108. Masefield (1916, 104).
109. Bailey (1966, 59–60) remarked: “Ludendorff’s arguments for a Hindenburgfriede, or peace of conquest, were several. One, although he never formulated it systematically, was that the army ought to have some sort of reward for its sacrifices. Another argument was that annexation was the only alternative to revolution, for Ludendorff believed that the German people would overthrow their government if the war ended without material reward. Still another was dynastic, for Ludendorff thought the German monarchy would be strengthened if the war ended with several new provinces under the scepter of the House of Hohenzollern. But for Ludendorff the most compelling argument of all for a Hindenburgfriede was that only such a peace would prepare Germany for ‘the next war.’ It was virtually dogma in the German General Staff that the present war would be followed by one final holocaust in which all of Germany’s neighbors would seek to deprive Germany of the spoils of the first war. Ludendorff insisted that Germany could only have a chance of winning ‘the next war’ if she shielded herself by annexing as much territory along her frontiers as possible.”
CHAPTER TEN
JAPAN, 1944–45
1. Quoted in Ienaga (1978, 139).
2. Sagan (1988); Barnhart (1984, esp. 450–53).
3. Quoted in Agawa (1979, 243–44). Not all had faith that this strategy would work, however. One high-ranking naval officer declared at an October 6, 1941 meeting that he “had no confidence that Japan could win the war.” Quoted in Ienaga (1978, 134).
4. Bix (2000,446).
5. Krebs (2005); Hasegawa (2005).
6. Kido (1984, 327); Butow (1954, 13–14).
7. Butow (1954, 11n); On Toyoda, see Interrogations of Japanese Officials (vol. 2, 316). On Yonai, see Interrogations of Japanese Officials (vol. 2, 331). On Nagano, see Interrogations of Japanese Officials (vol. 2, 352). On Takata, see Interrogations of Japanese Officials (vol. 1, 262). On Nomura, see Interrogations of Japanese Officials (vol. 2, 393–94). Lieutenant Colonel Roji Tanaka agreed that Midway and Guadalcanal were the turning points. Interrogations of Japanese Officials (vol. 2, 530). Captain Toshikazu Ohmae, a staff officer, testified that after Guadalcanal he felt that Japan could not win but would not lose, that after the Marianas he had little hope, and that after Okinawa it was all over. Interrogations of Japanese Officials (vol. 1, 177).
8. Iriye (1981, 96–97).
9. Browne (1967, 163).
10. Quoted in Bix (2000, 458).
11. Ibid., 460.
12. The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial (1998, 31069).
13. Bix (2000, 450, 454); Coox (1988, 355).
14. Bix (2000, 469–70); Coox (1988, 358).
15. Quoted in Bix (2000, 469).
16. Butow (1954, 22n).
17. Hastings (2007, 44).
18. Bix (2000, 478); The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial (1998, vol. 65, 31074); Coox (1988, 363).
19. However, these changes did not indicate an increased Japanese willingness to offer concessions to the Allies. Iriye (1981, 97–98).
20. Butow (1954, 25n).
21. See Drea (1998, 194, 199).
22. Hasegawa (2005, 121).
23. Frank (1999, 89).
24. Drea (1998, 189).
25. Bix (2000, 453–66)
26. Quoted in Bix (2000, 476).
27. Ibid., 481. For a slightly different translation, see Drea (1998, 197).
28. Kido (1984, 374).
29. Drea (1998, 196); Butow (1954, 43n); Sigal (1988, 33–37).
30. Drea (1998, 39).
31. Frank (2007, 69).
32. Bix (2000, 489).
33. Ibid., 488; Reiter (2007). Others, like retired foreign minister Shidehara Kijuro, agreed that Japan must fight on (Bix 2000, 492).
34. Drea (1998, 199).
35. Hasegawa (2005, 38).
36. Quoted in Frank (1999, 99). See also Frank (2007, 259n).
37. Hata (2007, 52).
38. Quoted in Coox (1970, 88).
39. Quoted in Frank (2007, 80).
40. Hata (2007, 55).
41. Bix (2000, 503).
42. Quoted in Frank (1999, 89).
43. Quoted in Coox (1970, 87).
44. Hasegawa (2005, 79).
45. Kido (1984, 435).
46. Hata (2007, 57).
47. Bix (2000, 493–94); Frank (1999, 102).
48. Hasegawa (2005,215).
49. Frank (1999); Hasegawa (2005, 2007); Pape (1996).
50. Drea (1998,208).
51. Coox (1970, 89).
52. Drea (1998,213).
53. Slantchev (2003a) presents a complete information account of the Japanese decision to surrender. He is correct that Japanese decision-making was largely driven by their beliefs about their abilities to inflict costs on the U.S., but as described in this chapter, the Japanese beliefs about their abilities to inflict costs changed over time as they received new information.
54. Quoted in Hasegawa (2005, 219–20). The bracketed “no” is in Hasegawa.
55. In his quantitative tests, Goemans (2000, 56) declares that regimes receiving a score of -7 to 16 on the 0 to 20 Polity scale to be semirepressive and moderately exclusionary; World War II Japan is squarely in this range, receiving a coding of 11.
56. On Japan, see Ienaga (1978).
57. Shillony (1976). Jack Snyder (1991) categorized both World War I Germany and World War II Japan as cartelized regimes—regimes run by oligarchs that have limited but not fully democratic political institutions and leadership constraints. Notably, Goemans and Snyder offer loosely related hypotheses, since Snyder proposes that domestic political institutions in mixed regimes cause them to pursue imperial overexpansion, whereas Goemans proposes that domestic political institutions in mixed regimes cause them to pursue high war aims.
58. Shigemitsu (1958, 300).
59. Bix (2000, 473).
60. Hasegawa (2005,29).
61. Magic intelligence decrypt, July 13, 1945, p. A5. Available at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/31.pdf (accessed October 11, 2007).
62. Magic intelligence decrypt, July 12, 1945. Available at www.gwu.edu/ ~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/29.pdf (accessed October 11, 2007).
63. Hasegawa (2005, 59).
64. Reiter (2007).
65. Evans and Peattie (1997, 501); Morison (1963, 479–80).
66. Warner and Warner (1982, 320–21); Hattori (1996, 21). See also Bix (2000,482, 745n). Ohnuki-Tierney (2002, 161) is more skeptical of the effectiveness of the suicide operations, noting that of the 3,300 or so planes in the operation, only 11.6 percent hit their vessels. Saburo Ienaga (1978, 183) is even more skeptical, estimating a success rate of just 1–3 percent. However, it is difficult to calculate how effective such aircraft would have been if they had been employed in nonsuicide missions. One possible comparison is provided here in the text. Notably, pilots involved in these attacks were not Japan’s best pilots but instead mostly student conscripts and training pilots, and by this point (1944–45) American forces enjoyed substantial superiority.
67. Brown (1958, vii).
68. Hattori (1996, 18).
69. Warner and Warner (1982, 320).
70. In late 1944 and early 1945, Japan did launch some 9,300 “balloon bombs” against North America, although these conventional munitions ultimately did very little damage (Bix 2000, 481–82). This campaign is a poor candidate as a gamble for resurrection. Japan had launched direct (although small) attacks on the American homeland throughout the war. Also, the balloon bomb attacks introduced little risk to Japan, since many belligerents had already launched widespread conventional attacks on civilian targets throughout the war, so the balloon bombs would not be viewed as especially barbaric war crimes, in contrast to the use of biological weapons.
71. Tanaka (1996, 139–45); Barenblatt (2004, 189–90).
72. Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial (1998, vol. 65, 31068).
73. Hasegawa (2005, 37).
74. Quoted in Drea (1998, 199).
75. Kido (1984, 424, 428).
76. Frank (1999, 96). See also Kido (1984, 435).
77. Magic intelligence decrypt, July 12, 1945. Available at www.gwu.edu/ ~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/29.pdf (accessed October 11, 2007).
78. Frank (1999, 345).
79. Quoted in Frank (1999, 293–94).
80. Quoted in Bix (2000, 509–10).
81. Ienaga (1978,221).
82. Ibid., 221.
83. Snyder (1991).
84. See the testimony of Vice Admiral Paul H. Weneker, a German Naval Attache ́ serving in Japan during the war. Interrogations of Japanese Officials (N.d., vol. 1, 285). See also Hastings (2007, 40); Drea (1998, 187, 191–93, 197–98); Frank (2007). Some have argued that these false reports may have helped buoy the Emperor’s hopes that a decisive battle sufficient to force American concessions remained possible.
85. Quoted in Shigemitsu (1958, 271).
86. Quoted in Browne (1967, 160).
87. Ibid., 174.
88. Ibid., 165–76.
89. Coox (1975, 125, 131–36).
90. Kido (1984, 336);
91. Bix (2000, 480–81); Drea (197–98).
92. Coox (1975, 142–43).
93. See the testimony of Lieutenant General Ija Kawabe in Interrogations of Japanese Officials (N.d., vol. 2, 424).
94. Butow (1954, 42).
95. Drea (1998, 198).
96. As early as late December 1941, Prince Higashikuni encouraged Tojo to initiate peace talks with China, Britain, and the U.S., remarking that “This war must be terminated as soon as possible.” In February 1942, Kido thought that Japan could take advantage of the capture of Singapore to push for peace. He shared his thoughts with the Emperor, who in turn suggested to Tojo that Japan should seek peace as soon as possible. Tojo rejected both suggestions. Coox (1975, 142); Butow (1954, 14); Kido (1984, 328).
97. Coox (1975, 28–29).
98. Large (1992, 113).
99. Bix (2000, esp. 439); Hastings (2007, 41).
100. Kido (1984, 359); The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial (1998, vol. 65, 31070–71).
101. Shillony (1981, 61).
102. Kido (1984,428).
103. Drea (1998, 209). See also Hastings (2007, 42).
104. Coox (1970, 154).
105. Frank (1999, 315–19).
106. Drea (1998,201–2).
107. Ibid., 202.
108. Large (1992, 117–18).
109. Shillony (1981, 35–36); Bix (2000, 447, 481, 484–85). Certainly, the Emperor’s military strategy suggestions were sometimes ignored by the military, as when in the defense of the Solomon Islands a single lieutenant colonel blocked the Emperor’s repeated recommendation that Army Air Force units be dispatched in support of the defensive effort. Hata (2007, 48).
110. Quoted in Frank (1999, 311).
111. Giangreco (1997); Frank (1999).
112. Frank (1999, 195).
113. Hastings (2007, 481).
114. Frank (2007, 80).
CHAPTER ELEVEN
CONCLUSIONS
1. Perhaps another case is Britain in 1917–18, when it refused to try to reach a limited settlement with Germany because of fear that Germany might reattack in the future.
2. Walt (1996).
3. Reiter and Stam (2002, chapter 6).
4. On elite cues and the casualty–public opinion relationship, see Berinsky (2007).
5. Mueller (1985); Gartner and Segura (1998).
6. Goodman (1978).
7. Reiter and Stam (2002); Slantchev (2004).
8. On war duration, see Slantchev (2004). The nine wars are Mexico in the U.S.–Mexican War; China in the Boxer Rebellion; Greece in its 1919–22 war with Turkey; China in the 1931–33 Manchurian War; Bolivia in the Chaco War; Japan in World War II; Germany in World War I; Turkey in World War I; Russia in World War I.
9. Goemans (2000, 312).
10. Jones (1968, 118).
11. Bauer (1974, 312–13).
12. Betts (1977); Gelpi and Feaver (2002). See also Snyder (1991).
13. Rosen (2005, esp. 106–10).
14. Israel (1966, 230, 259).
15. Loewenstein and Moore (2004).
16. Reiter and Stam (2002, chapter 6).
17. Smith and Stam (2004) present a model of updating beliefs about the balance of power which incorporates variance around, as well as the mean of, beliefs.
18. Johnson (2004).
19. Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter (2008).
20. Walter (2002).
21. Available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (downloaded September 5, 2007).
22. Werner (1999); Lo, Hashimoto, and Reiter (2008).
23. Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006).
24. Peic and Reiter (2008).
25. Reiter (2006b).
26. MacFie (1975).
27. Mark Mazetti, “U.S. Finding Says Iran Halted Nuclear Arms Effort in 2003,” The New York Times, 4 December 2007, A1.
28. Glaser and Fetter (2005).
29. Reiter (2006a).
30. Reiter (2005).
31. Ginor and Remez (2007).
32. Reiter (2006a).