CHAPTER SEVEN

The Logic of War: Finland and the USSR, 1939–44

First, when you speak of Hanko, you proceed from the conversation with Stalin in the autumn of 1939. But we have warned you that we are laying down new conditions since there have been combat operations and blood has been spilled. . . . If these negotiations drag on, I cannot be sure at all, let me say it again, that the demands we have now presented will not be increased.

—Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov to Finnish ambassador to Sweden Juho Paasikivi, March 19, 1940

PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I, Finland was one of many ethnic regions that fell under the rule of the Russian tsars. After war broke out between Russia and Germany in 1914, many Finns saw that a German victory might provide political independence from Russia. About two thousand Finns traveled to Germany in 1915 and 1916 for military training and to serve in the Imperial German army to fight Russia. Following its exit from the war, Russia disgorged several new states, including Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland. Finland emerged as independent and non-Communist in May 1918, and with assistance from Imperial Germany proceeded to crush Bolshevik-supported Communist resistance to the new Finnish government. The new government in Helsinki signed a treaty of peace and recognition, the Treaty of Tartu, with the new Soviet government in 1920. This was followed by a treaty of non-aggression in 1932.¹ The 1932 agreement did not prove enduring, however, as Finland and the Soviet Union fought two wars over the next twelve years, the 1939–40 Winter War, and the so-called Continuation War, in which alongside Nazi Germany Finland fought the Soviet Union from 1941–44.

This chapter explores war termination during these two wars, examining both Soviet and Finnish war-termination decisions. How did the Helsinki and Moscow governments think about ending these wars? More pointedly, why did the Soviet Union not pursue an absolute victory in either war, despite in both wars enjoying (eventual) military successes and a large power advantage over Finland?

Information factors were perhaps as dominant here as for any other cases examined in this book, as war aims tended to move in concert with battlefield outcomes. In the Winter War, the initial wave of Finnish military successes caused Stalin to decrease Soviet war aims, and then new Soviet military successes in the latter portion of the war caused Soviet war aims to creep up. Increases in Soviet demands were curtailed by new information about impending Anglo-French intervention on behalf of the Finns, pushing the Soviets to accept limited gains rather than the absolute defeat of the Finns. Similarly, in the Continuation War the Finns kept high war aims at the outset while the Soviets made concessions during the initial period of Finnish/German military success. As the tide of the war turned against Finland and Nazi Germany, Soviet war aims increased and Finnish aims decreased. The Soviets accepted limited victory over Finland short of absolute conquest in 1944 because of pressing military needs elsewhere.

Although each side doubted the trustworthiness of its adversary, high costs often prevented either side from pursuing absolute victory, as predicted by chapter 3. For the Soviets, pursuing absolute victory in the Winter War risked Anglo-French intervention, an unacceptable danger. In the Continuation War, absolute victory over Finland was not worth the cost of distraction from the defeat of Nazi Germany. For the Finns, the costs emerging from the military impossibility of conquering the Soviet Union alone in the Winter War, and with a weakened Germany ally in the latter phase of the Continuation War, precluded the pursuit of absolute victory. Costs aside, Moscow was more willing to accept limited war outcomes despite commitment fears because in each war it was able to acquire strategic pieces of territory thought to improve Soviet border security and reduced the likelihood of Finland breaking its war-ending commitments and reattacking.

CAUSES OF THE WINTER WAR: THE SOVIET SEARCH FOR SECURITY

The first steps to the 1939–40 Winter War were taken in the infamous August 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. This nonaggression agreement and its secret protocol secured Germany’s eastern front in the short term from Soviet attack, giving Germany time to make conquests in the near east (Poland), the north (Denmark and Norway), and the West (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). In exchange for Soviet neutrality, the agreement recognized an expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence into the Baltic region, specifically including Finland within its sphere. It also bought the Soviet Union time, in the sense that it opened the door to a possible long war between Germany, Britain, and France. Stalin hoped such a war might leave all three states exhausted, thereby enhancing Soviet security and creating political and other opportunities.²

After the German–Soviet dismemberment of Poland in October 1939, Moscow replaced the soft tone of its diplomacy towards Finland with a harder, more demanding edge.³ The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact boosted Stalin’s confidence that he could consolidate the Soviet position in the region without German interference.⁴ Specifically, the Soviets were able to focus on improving their military posture in the Baltic Sea. The disappearance of the Baltic States, as essentially provided for in the Molotov– Ribbentrop Pact, opened the door for the reemergence of the Soviet Baltic fleet, based in Leningrad. The Baltic States occupied the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland, a waterway through which the Soviet Baltic fleet would have to pass after exiting its homeport of Leningrad. If the Soviet Union could also secure the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland, territory that in fall 1939 was part of sovereign Finland, it would give the Baltic Fleet the opportunity to navigate the entire Baltic Sea with impunity, enhancing Soviet influence in the region. Further, more complete control of the Gulf of Finland would improve the security of Leningrad, located at the eastern edge of the Gulf of Finland.⁵

Around this time, a Soviet Naval War Commission studied the security environment in the region. The concern was that if Finland were to join the Anglo-French or German belligerent blocs, then an invasion could be launched from Finnish territory. Absent an outright invasion, Soviet naval passage through the Gulf of Finland could come under serious threat from mines or coastal artillery. The Soviets also worried that Finnish airfields might be used by a foreign power to launch airstrikes against the Soviet Baltic and Northern Fleets. The Commission recommended that the USSR acquire bases and coastal artillery batteries on the Hanko and PorkkalaUdd peninsulas and control the Suursaari and Suur-Tiuta ̈rsaari islands.⁶

In negotiations beginning on October 12, 1939, the Soviet delegation made a series of demands of Finland reflecting these security concerns. The delegation demanded that the USSR and Finland sign a mutual assistance pact, a Red Army base be established on the Hanko peninsula, all islands in the Gulf of Finland be ceded to the USSR, Finland hand over anchorage facilities at the port of Lappohja, and Finland make territorial concessions in the areas around Leningrad and Murmansk to improve the security of those two cities. In justifying these demands, Stalin bluntly told the Finns that these concessions were necessary to protect Leningrad in the event of war with either Britain or Germany (as discussed in the previous chapter, Stalin placed little faith in agreements with Hitler). In the course of the negotiations, the Finns made some concessions to Soviet demands, but they were not sufficient to satisfy Stalin. The Soviet Union renounced the 1932 nonaggression pact on November 28.⁷ On November 30, 1939, the Soviet Union attacked Finland, initiating the Winter War (see figure 7.1).

THE COURSE OF THE WINTER WAR

At the outset of the Winter War, the Soviets sought to impose regime change on Finland as a means of achieving absolute victory. The Soviets set up the “Democratic Government of Finland” under Finnish Communist O. W. Kuusinen. This was known as the Terijoki government, as it was set up in the Finnish border village of Terijoki. A treaty of recognition was signed between the Terijoki government and Moscow.⁸ Soviet desires for regime change in Finland were strongly driven by concerns about Finland’s trustworthiness, and the credibility of its commitments. Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Vyacheslav Molotov informed the Soviet ambassador to Berlin on November 30 that

. . . we have not found it possible to come to terms with the present Government of Finland and we see that we won’t get anywhere. Whatever promises it has given [have] been broken right away. The Government of Finland has all along been seeking to cheat us. You cannot rule out the possibility of Finland having a different government, one friendly towards the Soviet Union as well as towards Germany. That government will not be Soviet, but one of a democratic republic. Nobody is going to set up Soviets over there, but we hope it will be a government we can come to terms with so as to ensure the security of Leningrad.⁹

At the outset of the war, Moscow expected a rapid victory. The leadership planned for twelve days of combat, but thought that fighting might be unnecessary, as the Finns might simply surrender at the outset of hostilities.¹⁰ Such expectations were not completely outlandish, as the USSR began the war with substantial material advantages, including ratios of three to one in manpower, 80 to 1 in tanks, five to one in artillery, and more than five to one in aircraft, seemingly more than enough to ensure swift victory, especially if one follows the standard military rule of thumb that an attacker needs a three to one advantage to prevail.¹¹

The course of the war can be broken into two phases, the first half of the war during which the Finns successfully parried the Soviet advance, and the second half of the war when the Red Army (finally) enjoyed battlefield success. In the first phase, the Red Army suffered a string of embarrassing defeats, failing to achieve decisive victory within the twelve days allotted by its prewar plans.¹² The Soviet advance was slowed by Finnish mines, poor Soviet command and control, insufficient Soviet preparation to conduct river crossings, lack of training or equipment for winter warfare, poor Finnish roads, and Finnish guerrilla tactics. At the end of the first week of combat, the bulk of the Finnish army was able to escape annihilation or capture, retreating behind the system of fortifications known as the Mannerheim Line. A new Soviet offensive launched on December 15 fell short, as Soviet forces suffered heavy casualties (three fifths of Soviet tanks thrown in to the massive attack were destroyed). As the Soviets were planning a new offensive against the city of Viipuri¹³ around December 23, the Finns launched a preemptive counteroffensive, disrupting Soviet plans and destroying two Soviet divisions. The Soviets officially declared their operation Ladoga to have failed on December 28. Finnish forces enjoyed impressive successes elsewhere in late December, as well.¹⁴

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By the end of December, Moscow decided on a change in course. The Soviets concluded that concessions were necessary to end the war quickly. Most straightforwardly, the Soviets were confronted with the unavoidable reality of the poor performance of their troops against Finnish forces, a performance much worse than they had hoped for before the war broke out. Stalin’s decision to lower Soviet war aims in the wake of unexpectedly poor Soviet battlefield performance is consistent with the information proposition that discouraging combat outcomes encourage concessions.

Stalin was also concerned about the effects of the war on Soviet reputation. A conventional reputation hypothesis might be that a belligerent ought to be wary of making concessions, as doing so might undermine its international reputation for toughness. However, Soviet behavior reflected an opposite dynamic, as reputation concerns contributed to Stalin’s decision to offer concessions. In a meeting at the end of December, Stalin worried that world powers were watching the Winter War carefully, and that the show of weakness against the Finns might undermine Soviet reputation, perhaps emboldening other powers to enter the conflict. To protect Soviet reputation, the war needed to be ended quickly.¹⁵

Importantly, Soviet fears of third-party intervention had been increasing since the USSR was ejected from the League of Nations on December 14.¹⁶ In the weeks to follow, Moscow received a steady stream of signals indicating a growing likelihood of British and French intervention in favor of Finland. Indeed, by January 29, Britain and France had approved sending a brigade group to Finland. They were to sail on March 12, arriving on March 20, although the dispatch of these forces was contingent on Norway and Sweden granting transit rights.¹⁷ Indeed, the Allies were considering even broader military action against the Soviet Union as a means of aiding Finland. One French general stationed in the Middle East suggested France strike Soviet oil fields in the Caucuses, a proposal consonant with the thinking of at least some Paris politicians.¹⁸

As the information proposition predicts, Soviet war-termination behavior shifted in response to battlefield and diplomatic developments. On the military side, Moscow revamped its strategy towards more limited territorial ambitions within Finland, and appointed a new commander of Soviet forces.¹⁹ On the diplomatic front, the Soviets reestablished contact with Helsinki by the end of January, and the Soviets dropped their demand for foreign-imposed regime change by recognizing the Helsinki government and cutting ties with the Terijoki government.²⁰

The second phase of the Winter War began when the Red Army broke through the Finnish Mannerheim Line on February 13, opening the door for the advance of Red Army forces and the encirclement of the Finnish army. One historian proposed that this development “utterly transformed” the negotiations.²¹ In reality, the political effects were not immediate. The Soviets did slightly increase their terms on about February 21, adding two small towns to their demands, although they did not mention demands for territorial gains in the Petsamo area or the A ̊land Islands.²² At this stage, the Finns made no concessions past their earlier negotiations stance.

Matters changed towards the end of February. When a new round of bad news from the defenders of Viipuri reached the Finnish leadership on February 29, the Finnish leadership finally decided to make concessions. But, on March 1, after the official Finnish reply to Soviet demands had been drafted but not yet sent, France and Britain substantially increased their offer of assistance, raising it from 20,000 troops to 50,000 troops and 150 bombers, and promising the arrival of these forces by late March. This decision was enough to encourage the Finns to hold off on agreeing to Soviet terms, and the official Finnish reply was not (yet) sent to Moscow.²³

Further important military and diplomatic changes occurred in early March. On March 3, the Finnish foreign minister informed the Soviets that peace could be had if Finland could keep the towns of Viipuri and Sortavala.²⁴ On March 5, and before replying, the Soviets enjoyed an important battlefield success, when they crossed the frozen Gulf of Viipuri and established a foothold on the shore, close to the town of Viipuri. This advance threatened the entire front, and Finnish resources were being stretched. All the Finnish reserves had been committed to battle, and the Finns were now starting to rely on the very young and very old to fill the ranks. At this time, the military command bluntly informed the political leadership that the situation was dire, and the front faced complete collapse absent imminent British or French military assistance or a ceasefire.²⁵

On March 5, the Soviets rejected the Finnish request to keep Viipuri and Sortavala. They also threatened to reintroduce the possibility of recognizing the Terijoki government and the pursuit of regime change in Finland, if the Finns did not accept the Soviet terms soon. The following day, they invited a Finnish delegation to Moscow to negotiate, but the Soviets rejected the idea of permitting a cease fire during the talks.²⁶ When negotiations in Moscow began on March 8, the Soviets increased their demands, requiring Finnish concessions on Hanko, the so-called Fisherman’s Peninsula, all of Karelia including Viipuri and Sortavala to the frontier established by Peter the Great, parts of Kuusamo and Salla, the Finnish construction of a railroad across Finland to improve Soviet communications with Sweden, and a Finnish commitment not to join an antiSoviet alliance. Highly consistent with the information proposition of chapter 2, Molotov directly connected the increase in Soviet demands with Soviet battlefield successes, calling such a dynamic the “logic of war.”²⁷ Molotov told Finnish ambassador to Sweden Juho Paasikivi on March 19, 1940, “First, when you speak of Hanko, you proceed from the conversation with Stalin in the autumn of 1939. But we have warned you that we are laying down new conditions since there have been combat operations and blood has been spilled.”²⁸ A key Soviet emissary in the talks, Soviet ambassador to Sweden Alexandra Kollontai took a similar line when she told Finnish Foreign Minister Va ̈ino ̈ Tanner on February 27: “Moscow’s first proposal to the Finnish government was more advantageous to you but you didn’t accept anything and missed your chance. If you turn down this proposal as well, my government may advance still tougher conditions.”²⁹ In reaction to demands placed by the Finns on March 10, Molotov stonewalled and replied, “If these negotiations drag on, I cannot be sure at all, let me say it again, that the demands we have now presented will not be increased.”³⁰ The Finns recognized their deteriorating situation, and that they now faced the choice of giving in to Soviet demands or, in the words of Finnish foreign minister Elias Erkko, being “wiped off the map.”³¹ A March 9 Finnish military report stated that “the present state of the army is such that further military operations would lead to nothing but the continuing weakening of the situation and fresh losses of territory.”³² The Finns signed the treaty on March 12, making substantial territorial concessions (for territory exchanges, see figure 7.1).³³ The war killed about 25,000 Finns, and perhaps ten times the number of Soviets. Actual casualty numbers are imprecise, in part because many bodies were lost in the snow, left uncounted. In his memoirs, Nikita Khrushchev estimated as many as a million Soviet dead.³⁴

The information proposition accurately describes much of the wartermination behavior in the Winter War case. As predicted, when the Soviets suffered surprising setbacks on the battlefield during the first phase of the war, they lowered their war-termination offers from seeking regime change to seeking territorial gains. Notable, however, is the Soviet willingness to accept a limited war outcome as the Finnish military was collapsing in early March. This decision is inconsistent with the form of the information proposition which focuses on combat outcomes, as information from the battlefield indicated that the Soviets could have inflicted an absolute defeat upon Finland within a few weeks. However, it is consistent with the form of the information proposition that focuses on third-party intervention, as Soviet acceptance of a limited victory is probably best explained by increasingly strong signals of imminent AngloFrench intervention. Certainly, the Soviet Union feared that the balance of power would shift against them if British and French forces arrived, and for geopolitical reasons they very much wanted to avoid conflict with the Western powers. Absent that threat, the Soviet Union might have fought on longer to achieve a decisive and complete victory over Finnish forces, allowing it to impose a friendly government in Helsinki. The prospect of Anglo-French intervention was ultimately not enough to encourage the Finns to continue fighting on, given their deteriorating battle prospects. Finnish leaders feared that Helsinki might fall before Western help could arrive.³⁵

The role played by credible commitment fears in determining wartermination decision-making is mixed. The Soviets initially feared Finnish noncompliance with a war-ending commitment, in that their general fear was that Finland might in the future pose a threat if it aligned or allied with a great power. Stalin viewed written promises as inadequate. Despite the existence of the 1932 nonaggression pact, in prewar negotiations he still demanded territorial concessions to bolster the defenses of the Soviet border and Leningrad in particular, as a solution to the commitment problem. When Finland rejected these territorial demands, Stalin sought regime change in Helsinki as a more complete solution to the commitment problem.

For their part, the Finns had good reason to doubt Soviet credibility. The Finns knew that the Soviets had recognized Finland’s history of antiCommunism. The 1939 Soviet attack was itself a violation of the 1932 Soviet–Finnish nonaggression pact.³⁶ There was concern that low Soviet commitment credibility would mean that any deal ending the Winter War might not last long. Tanner made this argument to the Swedish government on February 26, 1940 when he argued for a Scandinavian defense pact: “In Finland it is believed that if peace is made now, it will not turn out to be a lasting one. The Soviet party may later present new demands, and the consequence may be a new war.”³⁷ Finnish willingness to accept a limited outcome reflected their understanding that a Finnish absolute defeat of the Red Army followed by a march on Moscow was practically speaking out of the question (or at least prohibitively costly). It might have been conceivable with major power support, but Germany sent no signals about sending military aid to Finland, and certainly British and French intervention would have been only for the defense of Finnish borders, not the overthrow of the Soviet government. As predicted by chapter 3, high costs served to force a fearful Finland to forgo the luxury of achieving a more enduring solution to a credible commitment problem.

The calculus for Finland shifted as its military fortunes declined in February and March. Despite facing an untrustworthy adversary, Finland saw that a limited outcome with substantial territorial losses and the possibility of Soviet defection was preferable to the looming alternative, Finland’s absolute defeat. On March 12, after reading a dire military report declaring that “the present state of the army is such that continued military operations can lead to nothing but further debilitation and fresh losses of territory,” Tanner told the cabinet that, “Our situation is such that we are faced by a forced peace. We must make haste before the collapse occurs. After that our views would not be asked.”³⁸ The Finns apparently took little comfort in Germany’s February 1940 suggestion that any concessions Finland might offer now as part of a war-ending deal would be regained once the general war amongst the major power wars ended.³⁹

A domestic politics proposition for Finnish war-termination behavior might argue that the Finnish government began to make concessions because of mounting public concern over casualties. However, the dynamic was more the opposite, as Finnish leaders feared that the public would not accept peace at the price of concessions, eager instead to fight on in the hopes of external military assistance. Even as the Red Army turned the military tide in February and March and Finnish casualties mounted, there was grave concern among the Helsinki leadership that the public would reject peace as a means of stopping the bloodshed.⁴⁰

THE CONTINUATION WAR, 1941–44

In 1939, the Soviet Union was concerned about the possibility of Finland joining or being used by a great power adversary to attack the Soviet Union. The optimal solution was foreign-imposed regime change, and the lesser solution, ultimately adopted, was the acquisition of key strategic territories as a means of improving the defense of the Soviet homeland. In an April 1940 high-level Soviet government conference on the lessons of the Winter War, Stalin declared the war to have been inevitable and necessary as a means of, in particular, shoring up the defense of Leningrad.⁴¹ In one sense, the Soviets hoped the territorial exchange brought by the end of the war would solve the credible commitment problem of the Finns allying with a major power and posing a grave threat to Soviet territory.

As it turned out, the Winter War failed to provide such security. Part of the problem was Finnish recognition that the Soviet Union was unlikely to be satisfied with territorial concessions as a means to increase its security. Indeed, the Soviets viewed the control of small buffer states as critical to their security vis-a`-vis Germany.⁴² They viewed France as having made a great mistake in not occupying Belgium prior to the German attack, and did not want to make the same mistake themselves. This was the motivation behind the de facto 1940 Soviet annexation of the Baltic States, and Moscow saw the control of Finland also as ultimately being necessary. Molotov bluntly told the Lithuanian foreign minister that, “You must be realistic enough to understand that in the future small states will disappear. Your Lithuania together with the other Baltic states, including Finland, will be included within the honourable family of Soviet peoples.”⁴³ Finland recognized this mounting threat. For example, there was a war scare in summer 1940 when the USSR annexed the Baltic States and mobilized thirty divisions on the Finnish and Estonian borders, leading Finland to mobilize its military forces in anticipation of an imminent Soviet invasion. Rumors were circulating in Moscow that the Soviets would strike Finland after Germany invaded Britain. German intelligence predicted a Soviet attack on Finland in mid-August. Rumors circulated Helsinki in November 1940 that Moscow was seeking German acquiescence to a Soviet move to annex Finland.⁴⁴

During this period, the Soviet Union began to present Finland with new demands, many of which exceeded the terms of the treaty ending the Winter War. Moscow demanded mining rights to nickel deposits in the Pechenga area of Finland, the destruction of fortifications built on the A ̊land Islands during and after the Winter War, and the use of Finnish railroads for transporting Soviet troops between the USSR and the newly Soviet-controlled area of Hanko. The Finns conceded on the fortifications and rail demands, but not on mining rights.⁴⁵ When discussion about a possible union between Finland and Sweden emerged, Moscow’s threatening rhetoric in opposition killed the idea.⁴⁶

These moves greatly increased Finnish anxiety about Moscow’s willingness to adhere to the treaty ending the Winter War. All saw the end which befell the Baltic States, and there was concern that such a fate might await Finland. Sweden’s unwillingness to risk Soviet enmity by backing Finland, Finnish fears of the looming Soviet threat, and Finnish hopes of recovering its Winter War territorial losses all pushed Finland towards expanding its ties with Germany in 1940.⁴⁷

Germany, in turn, saw Finland as likely to be useful in the coming war with the Soviet Union, and sought to strengthen its military and economic ties with Finland. In August 1940, Germany started selling munitions to Finland, secretly, in exchange for a Finnish agreement to allow the transit of German troops en route to German-occupied northern Norway. After the Winter War, Germany directly warned the Soviets not to invade Finland, notably during a visit Molotov made to Berlin in November 1940. These warnings probably helped squelch Soviet plans for a new attack on Finland aimed at seizing the entire country. On the economic side, Germany coveted access to Finnish nickel deposits, and encouraged Finland to reject new Soviet demands regarding the nickel mines in Pechenga in January 1941. Germany’s interest in the region was driven in part by its control of the Baltic Sea, since such control provided an area for undisturbed U-boat crews to train to attack Anglo-American shipping in the critical Battle of the Atlantic. A hostile Red Navy able to break out of the Gulf of Finland would make the Baltic unusable for German U-boat training. By early June 1941, there were formal military agreements for Finnish–German cooperation in a war against the Soviet Union. By this time, there were 30,000 German troops in Finland, and some 100,000 square kilometers of Finnish territory were under German military control.⁴⁸

When Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Finland initially did not officially join the German attack. However, Finland took a number of actions around the time of the attack that pushed the boundaries of its official neutrality. Specifically, German mining vessels hid in Finnish waters the week before the attack, Finland allowed German troop transports through Lapland, Finnish submarines mined Estonian harbors the night before the attack, German bombers flew from Finnish bases to attack Soviet targets, and Finnish aircraft flew over the Soviet border, albeit on nonlethal missions. Finnish neutrality was more decisively breached when Soviet aircraft bombed Finnish bases being used by the German air force on June 25. These attacks inflicted considerable collateral damage on Finnish towns, and gave the Finnish government the cover it needed to declare war in the context of Soviet aggression against Finland. The Finnish attack on Soviet forces began around July 10, beginning the “Continuation War.”⁴⁹

Finland’s war aims in 1941 went beyond the restoration of the territory lost in the 1939–40 Winter War. Even before the June 22 attack on the Soviet Union, Finland declared (privately) its agreement with the German war aim of absolute victory over the Soviet Union, and most importantly the overthrow of the Bolshevik government in Moscow.⁵⁰ Now that it was partnered with a revisionist major power, Germany, Finland saw that it was militarily feasible to overthrow the Soviet government. Finnish leaders declared their interest in such an outcome. General Carl Mannerheim often framed the war as an anti-Communist crusade, hoping that this war would destroy “Bolshevism once and for all.” For him, the eradication of Bolshevism was necessary to prevent Finland itself from being destroyed, noting in July 1941 that the war would “save us from ‘being wiped from the face of the earth’ which otherwise, knowing the Bolsheviks’ methods, would quite certainly have taken place in the near future.”⁵¹ Finnish President Risto Ryti described the war as the “final struggle against Bolshevism.” To a parliamentary delegation on July 21, Ryti remarked that war between Germany and the Soviet Union “is Finland’s only salvation. The Soviet Union will never give up its attempt to conquer Finland . . . if Germany now crushes the Soviet army, we may perhaps enjoy a century of peace.” The chairman of the Finnish Social Democratic Party and Finnish General Erik Heinrichs also supported overthrowing the Bolshevik government, the latter remarking that Soviet regime change could safeguard Finnish security for the first time in a millennium.⁵² Finnish leaders made similar points in (private) diplomatic conversations, arguing that the Soviet regime was likely to collapse following Germany’s defeat of the Red Army, and conversely that a Nazi defeat would open the floodgates to the spread of Communism in Europe.⁵³ Certainly, there was general confidence in Finland that Germany would win a war against the Soviet Union, borne from German victories in 1940. Before the German invasion, both Paasikivi and Mannerheim were confident that Germany was likely to win.⁵⁴ In September 1941, then Minister of Commerce Tanner told the American ambassador to Finland that there was, “No doubt [the] U. S. S. R. will lose [the] war against Germany.”⁵⁵ The following month, the American ambassador to Finland reported that Finnish president Ryti had told him that “with expected fall of Leningrad situation on Finnish front would largely clear and he hoped this would be the matter of few weeks only. He [Ryti] likewise expected fall of Moscow in relatively short time and German success further south was completing defeat of Bolshevik regime.”⁵⁶

The Continuation War initially went quite well for Finland, as did the larger German campaign against the Soviet Union. By December 1941, Finnish and German forces had advanced dozens of kilometers forward along a broad front past the 1941 Finnish–Soviet border. As noted in chapter 6, Stalin probably attempted to make territorial concessions to Hitler in October 1941 to end the war short of absolute defeat. Stalin also attempted in August to make a separate peace with Finland, offering territorial concessions in exchange for Finnish disengagement from Germany. The Finns ignored the offer, at least in part because they doubted the Soviets would observe the terms of any peace treaty.⁵⁷

In the first several months of the war, the role of third parties in Finnish war aims was complex. Britain and the United States certainly opposed Finnish collaboration with Nazi Germany, and tried to pressure Finland to exit the war, or at least not move beyond its pre–Winter War borders. Although Finland desired to maintain good relations with the Western powers, it also recognized its commitment to Germany, and hence did not comply with British and American requests. Under pressure from Moscow and despite lingering sympathy for Finland, Britain formally declared war on Finland on December 6, 1941.⁵⁸

By early 1943, the exhaustion of troops and material resources brought the Finnish offensive to a halt. The Finns remained confident in eventual German victory through early fall 1942, but by early 1943 their optimism had waned, largely in reaction to Allied successes at Stalingrad, North Africa, and elsewhere. Belief in German victory for members of Finland’s Coalition Party declined from 95 percent in September 1942 to 50 percent in February 1943, for members of the Agrarian Party from 95 percent to 46 percent, and for members of the Social Democratic Party from 65 percent to 19 percent.⁵⁹

On February 3, 1943, the Finnish leadership decided to seek a separate peace, albeit one that would not endanger its critical economic (and other) ties with Germany. Members of the Finnish government discussed reestablishing the 1939 border, although no official approach to the Soviets was made.⁶⁰ The top leadership agreed that it would be willing to sacrifice Eastern Karelia to achieve peace, if need be, although this decision was not communicated to the Soviets, nor was it debated in the Finnish parliament.⁶¹ A major reason for the shift was growing Finnish concern about the course of the German–Soviet war, highlighted by the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in late January and early February 1943.⁶²

The Soviet Union had, since the dark days of August 1941, grown its war aims vis-a`-vis Finland. In December 1941, Stalin told visiting British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that the Soviet Union demanded the restoration of the 1940 border, acquisition of the nickel-rich Pechenga area, rights to military bases in Finland, a defense pact with Finland, and reparations. Rumors also arose, spreading from Stockholm to Helsinki, that Stalin sought regime change in Finland, although elsewhere it appeared that Stalin was more interested in subjugating the Baltic States than Finland. The December 1941 terms were more or less restated in March 1943 to American representatives, with the addition that the Finnish army be reduced to peacetime strength. The same position was reiterated at the December 1943 Teheran conference.⁶³

The Finns continued to observe with concern the slide in Axis military fortunes throughout 1943, including the Soviet victory at the titanic battle of Kursk in July, the Western landing at Sicily, and Mussolini’s fall from power. Contact was made between Helsinki and Moscow in July, and the Finns suggested peace essentially on the basis of the 1939 borders. The Soviets rejected this offer out of hand.⁶⁴ At this stage of the war, some elements of Finnish society opposed the idea of a separate peace, doubting that any peace would endure.⁶⁵

Matters worsened for the Finns in January 1944. The Soviets broke through the blockade around Leningrad, pushing the Germans back some 200 kilometers, threatening Germany’s connection to Finland. The President and Prime Minister themselves agreed to settle on the 1940 border, although they had their doubts about public support for such a settlement. The Soviet negotiating position was at this point quite fluid. Stalin seemed to indicate at the Teheran conference with Churchill and Roosevelt in December 1943 that he was willing to accept a limited outcome with Finland, but a secret Soviet document drawn up around the same time called for the brutal military occupation of Finland at war’s end. On February 21, the Soviets established preconditions for negotiations, including severing relations with Germany, interning German forces, restoring the 1940 border, and returning all Soviet POWs. The Finnish government, with the support of the parliament, rejected the preconditions but supported continuing dialogue. In talks in late March, Molotov refused to reduce the preconditions, making the information proposition argument that, “I don’t understand why we should make concessions to you. Germany has already lost this war, and you are allies of Germany, so you can just accept a position that befits a defeated country.” The only concession Molotov offered was that German forces could be expelled rather than interned, although he further demanded the demobilization of the Finnish military. The Finns rejected the Soviet terms, in part because they provided no assurance that the Soviets would not eventually annihilate Finland. The Finnish president fretted that, “These conditions will destroy our independence.”⁶⁶

Domestic politics played a role in the Finnish rejection of Soviet terms. Va ̈ino ̈ Tanner, a leading Social Democrat and member of the ruling government, believed that any exit strategy from the war must be broadly popular. At this juncture, however, there was broad dissatisfaction with the Soviet terms both because they were seen as too harsh, and because some did not want to make a separate peace and abandon Finland’s ally, Germany.⁶⁷ Interestingly, this effect of domestic forces prolonging war is opposite to the domestic politics proposition that, especially in democratic settings, war fatigue will hasten war termination. Popular opposition to swift war termination is especially surprising considering that the Finnish population was suffering economically, with escalating food shortages in particular.⁶⁸

Finnish military fortunes continued to deteriorate in the months to follow. The Soviets launched a major offensive in June 1944, advancing quickly in the face of Finnish military inferiority and, in some cases, panic. Having learned from their tactical mistakes in the Winter War, the Red Army was this time able to capture Viipuri, suffering far fewer losses than it had in 1939–40. The Finns soon evacuated Eastern Karelia. Finnish lines stabilized in mid-June, and Germany sent additional troops in support. However, in exchange for this support, Germany in June extracted from the Finnish president a written commitment that Finland would not make a separate peace with the Soviet Union.⁶⁹

The Soviet offensive came to a halt by the end of June in an area north of Viipuri, due to the strengthening of Finnish defenses and the need for Soviet resources to be devoted to the offensive against German forces in Byelorussia. The last major battle of the war took place at Ilomantsi from July 30–August 9. The Finnish victory there ended the Soviet offensive into Finland and persuaded the Soviets to give up their demand for Finland’s unconditional surrender. The door to a settlement at last opened.⁷⁰ Around this time, in late July, Ryti stepped down as president and was replaced by Mannerheim. This move was seen within Finland as necessary to make peace with the Soviet Union since the Finnish commitment to Germany was in the form of a letter from Ryti to the Berlin government, and therefore binding on Ryti but not on any successor. Mannerheim was also widely respected as the former Commander in Chief, and he could make peace moves without suffering domestic political attacks.⁷¹

Peace talks began again in late August. On August 29, the Soviet Union communicated new, more lenient terms, agreeing to receive a Finnish delegation only under the conditions that Finland cut its ties with Germany and evict German troops. This constituted a reduction in demands since the Soviets no longer demanded surrender. The Finnish parliament agreed to Soviet terms for negotiations, and the two sides agreed on a ceasefire, starting on September 5.⁷²

Negotiations began on September 14. Soviet demands were more extensive than they had been earlier in the year. They now demanded not only the restoration of the 1940 border, the exit of German forces from Finland, the annexation of Pechenga, war reparations, and the demobilization of the Finnish army, but now also the lease of the Porkkala promontory in southern Finland, the acceptance of Soviet intervention in Finnish domestic affairs, and Finnish assistance in the punishment of war criminals. The Porkkala demand was especially troubling to the Finns, as that area was less than twenty kilometers from Helsinki. The Soviets wanted it because coastal gun emplacements there helped them secure the Gulf of Finland from naval threats. Eventually, the size of the war reparation demand was reduced and the two sides agreed to terms on September 19 (figure 7.1 describes territorial exchanges of the peace settlement).⁷³

War-termination behavior in the Continuation War demonstrates the importance of information. When the war was going badly in the initial months, Stalin offered concessions, which Finland in turn rejected because of its confidence in eventual Soviet defeat.⁷⁴ As the tide of war turned, the Finns shifted towards making concessions while the Soviets raised their demands. Peace became more likely as the summer 1944 Soviet offensive bogged down a bit, and more pressing Soviet needs elsewhere pushed them to start making concessions.

There were elements demonstrating the importance of commitment credibility, as well. Finland saw the war as offering the opportunity to solve the problem of an enduring Soviet threat by effecting regime change in Moscow. The Finns also explored other solutions to the commitment problem. When the United States urged Finland to accept Stalin’s August 1941 peace offer, the Finns inquired whether the U.S. or Britain might be able to offer some guarantees against the possible Soviet violation of a peace agreement.⁷⁵ Notably, the very territorial concessions that the Soviets demanded were intended to help alleviate the credible commitment problem by improving Soviet border security. From the Soviet perspective, Finland had reneged on the agreement ending the Winter War by allying with Germany and preparing for war. The Soviets demanded Finnish demobilization to neuter the Finnish offensive threat, as their concern was that Finland might rejoin Germany before the latter had been completely defeated. This was made apparent in an exchange between Molotov and Paasikivi during peace talks on March 27, 1944:

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The territorial demands were intended to reduce the chances of Finnish violation of any war-ending agreement. Acquiring the Porkkala promontory both gave the Soviets greater control over the Gulf of Finland, directly improving the naval posture of the Soviet navy in the Baltic Sea and improving the defenses of Leningrad, and put the Soviets in close striking range to Helsinki, posing a direct threat to the Finnish capital in the event of another war.⁷⁷ The fear of Finnish commitments being incredible was an important part of the Soviet desire for other territorial acquisitions as well. When Paasikivi offered the economically important Petsamo area for the strategically important Hanko and Northern Karelia areas in the 1944 negotiations, Molotov replied, “We do not agree to that. Three wars in twenty-five years is really too much. . . . We cannot tolerate that Finland every seven or eight years attacks us.”⁷⁸

As forecast by the theory, the fear of rising costs of fighting pushed Stalin to accept a limited war outcome with Finland, rather than pursue absolute victory. It is possible that the successful D-Day landings of June 1944 encouraged Stalin to settle with Finland quickly so as to permit a rapid march on Berlin.⁷⁹ Further, part of the limited war arrangement was the commitment by Finland to use its own military forces to expel the hundreds of thousands of German troops stationed in Finnish territory. This the Finns did, at the expense of some 1,000 Finnish dead and 3,000 wounded, thereby further freeing up Soviet resources for the drive to Berlin, as well as eliminating any possibility of renewed Finnish–German cooperation.⁸⁰ Moscow also saw that imposing foreign-imposed regime change on Finland might be prohibitively costly, because the Finnish Communists were small in number and weak by 1944.⁸¹

The theory explains the interplay of information and commitment dynamics during the Continuation War. The preferences of the two sides for various war settlements is well-explained by commitment concerns. Finland initially sought foreign-imposed regime change to eliminate permanently their untrustworthy Bolshevik neighbor. The Soviets desired a permanent solution to Finnish treachery. The flow of information from combat eventually convinced both sides that solving their commitment problems would be prohibitively costly, for the Finns because the tide of the larger German–Soviet war (and the Finnish role in it) eventually turned, and for the Soviets because of other pressing demands in the larger war, especially Stalin’s desire to crush Hitler quickly and decisively without distraction by the Finnish sideshow. Moscow’s willingness to accept the 1944 limited outcome was boosted by its recognition that the territorial exchanges in this settlement would provide a partial solution to the commitment problem.

FINLAND, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE EBB AND FLOW OF WAR

Finnish–Soviet relations from 1939–44 were defined by the surge and recession of the tides of war. Each side unsuccessfully sought to destroy the other. Both eventually accepted coexistence. These appetites for destruction were tamed by the flow of information from combat and international diplomacy, and on Moscow’s side they were sated by the acquisition of strategic territory guarding the approaches to the Soviet northwest. Information does not always play this prominent a role, however. The next chapter examines a war in which a steady flow of information failed to prevent a fight to the bloody finish.