CHAPTER 8

Foreign aid: Australia’s reputation at stake?

David Lowe

The year 2014 was a momentous one for Australia’s foreign aid program. In this year, the Australian government led by Tony Abbott ended the separate standing of the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and integrated it with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). Many supporters of the foreign aid program and many connected to its past and recent operations were dismayed. As if to confirm their worst fears, the government announced a substantial reduction in foreign aid funding in December that year. At the beginning of 2014 the foreign aid budget was announced at $5 billion a year and was set to grow; by the end of the year it was to be capped at $4 billion annually and to decline in real terms in coming years.¹

Behind the focus on spending there ran a rumbling debate on what these changes signalled about Australian values and Australia’s reputation overseas. Tim Costello, head of World Vision, declared that the government’s decision to reduce spending was ‘immoral’ and said that Australians needed to question their values as a nation.² Yet in the middle of 2014 the DFAT had produced a document, ‘Australian Aid: Promoting prosperity, reducing poverty, enhancing stability’, that had mentioned national values as fundamental to the foreign aid program. In addition to setting out the aims behind Australia’s aid program, it began by declaring that the program reflected ‘Australia’s values’ (and the government’s commitment to reducing poverty and lifting standards through sustainable economic growth).³ Missing from the 32-page document was any explanation of what ‘Australia’s values’ were. In the foreword, Foreign Affairs Minister Julie Bishop pivoted quickly from the fleeting mention of values to a mix of policy adjustments and ambitious goals – of prioritising aid for trade, private sector partnerships and empowering women and girls. Bishop’s key message was that foreign aid was about the pursuit of economic diplomacy for shared prosperity. ‘Aligning our diplomatic, trade and development efforts will ensure the aid program supports the Government’s commitment to put economic diplomacy at the heart of Australia’s interactions with the world.’⁴

Bishop’s language was a good example of how values and reputation often frame debates about the level and focus of Australia’s foreign program, but they are used too fleetingly and inconsistently; and, as in the example provided by Bishop, they can appear tokenistic alongside strings of connected interests and goals. All too often, what the public is presented with are statements that serve the immediate concerns of the government in office. But what if policymakers engaged more fully and consistently with Australians on the connection between foreign aid and Australia’s values and its international reputation?

There are indications that the Australian public connects foreign aid to values and reputation, however rubbery these concepts, more than they connect foreign aid to ‘harder’ ideas such as security. To tease this out further is to think historically, as an international reputation or set of national values implies a longer view. What connections have been drawn between articulations of Australian foreign aid efforts from the 1950s to the 1980s, and what values have been attached to them? The first four decades of Australian foreign aid represent roughly the first half of Australia’s official foreign aid efforts to date, and include the Colombo Plan, the establishment of a separate aid agency, the independence of Papua New Guinea (the biggest recipient of Australian aid), and a major public review of the aid program, the Jackson Review, in 1984.

As we shall see, in its mobilisation of ideas and the framing of foreign aid debate and policy, the government has shown occasional concern for Australia’s international reputation connected to the allocation of foreign aid. However, there remains a communications gap in Australia’s foreign aid efforts between values invoked by policymakers and the public’s view. Only select aid efforts have strong recognition and appeal with the taxpayer. One well-recognised example, at least to older Australians, is the Colombo Plan that provided opportunities for Asian students to study in Australia from the 1950s to the 1980s. More recently, short-term humanitarian efforts to provide relief in the wake of regional natural disasters have also proven popular.⁵ But the foreign aid program as a whole, providing assistance year in, year out, suffers from inadequate understanding and faltering public support.⁶ The result, according to a recent history of Australian foreign aid, is that, in addition to falling victim to sudden budget cuts, the aid program is only considered a serious part of Australia’s overseas policies by a small number of people. Most changes to the program have come about through incremental bureaucratic measures and the ‘court politics’ played by those in charge in Canberra.⁷

Frames and values

Any appeal to ‘Australian values’ is inevitably imprecise. At the broadest level, however, it implies connection to popularly held views. Values do surface regularly in statements of overseas policy. Early in its administration, and 17 years before the competing claims of Tim Costello and Julie Bishop, the Howard government addressed directly the matter of values. In 1997, the first Australian White Paper on Foreign (and Trade) Policy, In the National Interest, was produced. In it was a section on ‘national values’, declaring that Australia’s were those of a liberal democracy, which ‘include the rule of law, freedom of the press, the accountability of government to an elected parliament, and a commitment to a “fair go”’.⁸ The paper was strong in its commitment to racial equality and eliminating racial discrimination. It also listed human rights as an inseparable part of Australian foreign policy, and it tied foreign aid to both values and Australia’s international reputation: ‘Australia has a direct interest in an international reputation as a responsible member of the international community, committed to the rule of law, ready to assist in cases of humanitarian need, and a constructive contributor to the economic development of its neighbourhood.’⁹ Values also help explain relationships with others. Most recently, in 2021, Prime Minister Scott Morrison invoked common values underpinning Australia’s new trilateral security partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom (AUKUS), claiming that the three nations ‘have always believed in a world that favours freedom; that respects human dignity, the rule of law, the independence of sovereign states, and the peaceful fellowship of nations’.¹⁰

What resonance, if any, do these sorts of values have with what the broader population think? Opinion polls provide one, albeit imperfect, means of assessing this. Until the late 1980s, polling on foreign aid was irregular and the extremely varied framing of questions adds to the difficulty in charting trends with consistency. In their recent history of Australian public opinion and foreign policy Danielle Chubb and Ian McAllister found significant public acceptance of the foreign aid program up to the 1980s. The support was assisted by the greater visibility resulting from the creation of separate government aid agencies from 1974, when the first of a succession of standalone agencies, the Australian Development Assistance Agency, was established. It may be, Chubb and McAllister suggest, that the Cold War also ‘muted arguments’ against foreign aid. From then on, polling increased but there remain severe limitations in what it reveals. Since 1998 a steady number of Australians (around four in ten) have suggested that levels of aid spending were ‘about right’, an option that, depending on the level being spent, attracts both proponents and sceptics of foreign aid; but the number wanting less spending has been rising against those who want more. Over the last 30 years, when Australians have been asked how foreign aid should rank in government spending priorities, it has always come a distant last behind domestic areas such as health, education, defence and social welfare.¹¹

The language that politicians use to discuss policy significantly shapes public perceptions. Indeed, how the Australian public responds to foreign aid, as Chubb and McAllister argue, ‘is a consequence of how political elites choose to draw on the notion of shared national values to mobilise support or opposition for a policy’.¹² How and where political elites engage in such acts of mobilisation are important.

So where can we look for such mobilisations? Logically, we might turn to parliamentary debates, where contest and the task of persuasion are to the fore. A Dutch scholar, Maurits van der Veen, has examined the ‘framing’ of debates and policy documents on foreign aid in four European countries over a 50-year period. Van der Veen coded the debates in the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium and Norway according to seven broad frames used to justify foreign aid spending: security; power or influence; wealth or economic self-interest; enlightened self-interest; reputation/self-affirmation; obligation/duty; and humanitarianism.¹³

Applying Van der Veen’s approach to Australian parliamentary debates (now easily searchable through Historic Hansard) reveals that reputation/self-affirmation was the strongest means by which foreign aid was framed between 1945 and 1980 (predominantly deployed 36 times).¹⁴ Australian politicians drew on all of Van der Veen’s frames (security; power or influence; wealth or economic self-interest; enlightened self-interest; reputation/self-affirmation; obligation/duty; and humanitarianism), but there was a big gap between reputation and the next most-used predominant frame, humanitarianism (25 times), followed by enlightened self-interest (22) and power/influence (19).¹⁵

Let’s take just a couple of examples in which reputation has been foregrounded in Australian parliamentary debate on foreign aid. In 1967, Liberal Party member and government Treasurer William (‘Billy’) McMahon was reputation-minded when defending the level of foreign aid spending against criticism that it had not reached the UN target of 1 per cent of gross national product. McMahon proudly boasted that Australia’s level of foreign aid ranked second only to that provided by France, and that it consisted entirely of grants rather than loans:

TABLE 1Australian House of Representatives speeches featuring foreign aid, 1945–80, according to predominant means of framing, using Van der Veen’s seven frames.

Our record in this field is very good. If there is to be any criticism it must be against the background that we are devoting almost 0.8% of our total national product to assistance for other countries. We are doing this willingly, freely and without any tags attached. No other country gives as freely as does Australia. No other country gives aid without tags.¹⁶

Five years later, his party colleague Len Reid bemoaned having to continually demand that the government provide more foreign aid to developing Asia:

Australia has done little to fill the vacuum created by Britain’s withdrawal from the South East Asian area. Most of these countries expect Australia to play a more dominant role in the area insofar as foreign aid is concerned. However, we have dismally failed, as little leadership or initiative is being given in this field.¹⁷

Some frames are more effective than others. A 2018 survey of 4000 Australians found that some frames were likely to elicit stronger support for Australia’s foreign aid program. The survey used three broader frames – ‘enlightened national self-interest’, ‘Australia as a global leader’ or ‘altruism’ – to test levels of support for a particular Australian aid initiative. While all three frames helped increase levels of support for aid, the ‘enlightened self-interest’ category was the strongest; with ‘altruism’ similar in impact.¹⁸

But the data swirls around, even in seemingly similar research exercises. Another study found that Australians were likely to support higher levels of foreign aid when they learned that British aid funding was much higher than Australia’s – a clear link to reputation.¹⁹ And in another study from 2016, it was moral obligation rather than national interest that people identified as important for determining when Australian governments should provide foreign aid.²⁰ These findings, for all their variability, are significant in two ways. First, they confirm that Australians connect notions of Australian values and reputation to the foreign aid program; and secondly, this goes to the issue of how to increase public support for the foreign aid program.

What insights do less public, internal reviews of the foreign aid program offer on connections to values and reputation? In Australia, the first such review was small-scale; in 1955, a review was conducted of the Colombo Plan. It concluded that the diplomatic impact of the Colombo Plan, the goodwill generated in parts of Asia, was probably more significant than poverty alleviation. The second review, nearly ten years later, was triggered by External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck. Writing to Prime Minister Menzies in September 1964, Hasluck commented that: ‘The impression I have after having participated since 1951 in Cabinet discussions is that this external aid has grown up as the result of a succession of decisions on a succession of largely unrelated proposals or requests.’²¹

In November 1964 a specially formed interdepartmental committee was created in Canberra to study ‘the philosophy and practice of Australia’s foreign aid’, and to prepare a report with recommendations about the pattern and administration of aid into the future.²² It covered everything that went by the name of aid, including expenditure in Papua New Guinea, international efforts, such as those under the Colombo Plan, and defence aid materials. It included the most senior public servants, was chaired by Canberra mandarin Sir Arthur Tange, and met 26 times before reporting at the end of March 1965.

The terms of reference also allowed considerable breadth in the purposes of foreign aid. Asked for their views, Australian overseas posts reported back in broad terms, which the committee used to inform six main purposes of Australia’s foreign aid. Firstly, the respondents said, foreign aid should demonstrate Australian concern with the development problems of under-developed countries. Secondly, it should promote respect and goodwill for Australia, with acceptance or at least sympathetic understanding of Australian policies, of the West, in world and domestic affairs. Thirdly, it should allow entry into influential and governing groups of the recipient countries, thereby facilitating good relations with Australia. Fourthly, it should foster in these countries political systems conducive to good relations with Australia, and creating conditions for sound economic development. Fifthly, it should encourage continued assistance to under-developed countries by our friends and allies, by demonstrating Australia’s intention to bear the present share of the load and perhaps more. And finally, it should help pursue Australia’s trade interests.²³

In addition to these, the final report added an extra four: a special commitment to Papua and New Guinea; a commitment to Commonwealth cooperation; commitments to multilateral aid efforts and to the World Bank; and to provide a fair share of humanitarian assistance.²⁴ These extra points were arguably the strongest connectors to values as they evoked an ongoing commitment to PNG, a reaffirmation of the Commonwealth as a force for good in international affairs and a sense of moral obligation that Australia needed to contribute to the shared task of assisting in development – the notion of the ‘fair share’ was present in 1965.

Analysing the key policy documents feeding into and including this major review from the perspective of Van der Veen’s frames is also suggestive. Consideration of 20 key documents generated by officers of Australia’s External Affairs Department (renamed Foreign Affairs in 1970 and then Foreign Affairs and Trade from 1987) for the purpose of the review, reveals that power and influence was the strongest means of framing the benefits flowing from Australian foreign aid (strongly present five times). This was closely followed by reputation (four times). The submissions featured deep thinking about the multidimensional aspects of aid provision and, as most were from overseas posts, also a high degree of reflection on how Australian efforts compared with others’ aid programs. All of the seven frames used by Van der Veen were present.²⁵

Less confidential but official depictions of Australian foreign aid have followed a similar pattern. In the collection of ministerial and government statements compiled by External Affairs in their monthly bulletin Current Notes on International Affairs, the frame of reputation/self-affirmation also loomed largest in relation to foreign aid in 1965 (and indeed in the previous lighter-touch review year ten years earlier). The next most-invoked frame was security in these public statements.²⁶

Taking the 1965 review into account alongside the other findings, we might tentatively conclude that while reputation/ self-affirmation bridges the two worlds of diplomatic confidential policy papers and public statements, the diplomatic realm is more attentive to power and influence, while public depictions of why foreign aid matters steer more towards security. In one confidential paper from 1972, preparing for the independence of Papua New Guinea, officials declared that the purpose of Australian foreign aid was the economic development of recipient countries, but the specific reasons why Australia should provide it ‘as set out publicly by previous ministers for foreign affairs, have been basically humanitarian’. Purpose and justifications were different things. They then suggested that Australia’s national interest was also involved, given the ‘strategic, economic and trade interest’ in promoting development; and concluded by dwelling on the hard-to-measure but important political value: ‘our record as a sympathetic aid-giver has greatly helped our image as a country which has a real desire to work peacefully with its neighbours’.²⁷

In 1984, a major review, the Jackson Report on Australia’s Overseas Aid program, tried to cut through such meandering by establishing a ‘trilogy’ of aid objectives upfront: humanitarian, foreign policy and trade objectives. ‘Surprisingly, perhaps’, said Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Gareth Evans afterwards, ‘recognition of the need for a clear statement of objectives for Australia’s aid was a major step forward’, given what he felt had been a lack of realism and a struggle to move beyond declarations of humanitarian good during the previous decade.²⁸ The language of objectives seemed to signal both a mainstreaming of Australia’s foreign aid within a growing Canberra bureaucracy focused on the prosecution of Australia’s interests overseas, and a desire to move past unprofitable debates over values underpinning aid.

Lessons from history: Reputation matters

Australian governments have failed to integrate foreign aid as a logical, publicly identifiable component of Australia’s overseas policies in ways that might resonate with the public in the same manner as security treaties, alliances, consular work and so on. This might be a legacy of Australia’s ambiguous status among ‘developed and developing’ countries. From the 1950s to the 1980s, Australian politicians and policymakers spent considerable time arguing that Australia was hybrid; part-developed and part-developing, and its commitments to foreign aid needed to be seen in this context. They also struggled to convey how Australia’s colonial government of Papua New Guinea might be folded into broader aims behind foreign aid. How did PNG’s dominance in Australia’s aid budget before (when it was not foreign aid but colonial or domestic funding) and after independence mesh with the notion of ‘our fair share’ and appeal to Australian values?

But the missed opportunity by governments to engage more consistently with the Australian public also arises from the mish-mash of aims, purposes and interests that have been publicly served up. Maurits van der Veen suggested that being closely involved in the provision of foreign aid was like working in a restaurant: the reality looks less appealing ‘once one scrapes away the veneer of official statements, glossy brochures and rigorously culled anecdotes’.²⁹

One of the strongest aims behind foreign aid that is shared by both governments and the Australian public lies in the concern for Australia’s reputation. The relativity of aid giving has always mattered. As Billy McMahon made clear in 1967, when Australian governments allocated aid they were conscious of what other governments were spending, and this influenced the scale and sometimes the nature of Australian foreign aid. Those involved in the politics and policy of Australian foreign aid before and after him have always kept a close eye on what others are doing; but they have not spent as much time explaining consistently why foreign aid matters and what is Australian about it.

Policymakers have not made enough of this broadly shared concern for Australia’s reputation. The Australian public will respond constructively when invited to think about foreign aid, when given sufficient clarity and opportunity, and foreign aid policy will benefit from more consistently engaged citizens. If Australian governments were to provide greater continuity in connecting aid to values, if they were to embed foreign aid with well-promoted, easily digested histories of Australia in its region and as an international citizen, then the policy benefits might be several. Governments could, working with public expectations, bring more stability to the foreign aid program. Stronger public engagement would render it less easily made a political football, and less likely to experience yo-yo ups and downs in promises versus actual budgets allocated. It could, at last, be elevated as an important aspect of Australia in world affairs, and no longer be the preserve of ‘court politics’ played out by a select few in Canberra.