Introduction
1. MacCormick 1981, pp. 247–48.
2. Gellner 1971, p. 149.
3. Lukes 1988, p. 4.
4. Berlin 1986, p. 42.
5. Anderson 1983.
6. Raz 1986, p. 207.
7. Jewish nationalism has often been justified in terms of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust rather than through a theory of nationalism. The right of the Jews to a state, however, cannot rest on their painful history but on the fact that they are a nation like all others. Protestants were also persecuted in certain places, but it is not usually assumed that they could, on these grounds, demand the right to self-determination. Homosexuals and handicapped individuals were also victimised by the Nazis, and this might entitle them to compensation but not to national rights.
8. Williams 1985, pp. 163–64.
Chapter One
1. De Maistre, in Berlin 1990, p. 100.
2. Mill 1975, p. 84.
3. See, for example, Taylor 1985a and b, 1989; Carrithers et al., 1985; and Kymlicka 1989.
4. Geertz 1973, p. 35.
5. Ibid., p. 49.
6. Mauss 1938, p. 22.
7. Ibid., p. 3.
8. Lukes 1985, p. 293.
9. Mill 1975, p. 70.
10. Kedourie 1985, p. 37.
11. Rawls 1972, p. 448.
12. MacDonald 1949, p. 82.
13. Ibid. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Arblaster 1984, chaps. 2–3.
14. Berry 1986, p. 2.
15. Fichte’s Address to the German Nation expresses this view very clearly.
16. Berry 1986, p. 4.
17. Gutmann 1985, p. 23, [emphasis added].
18. Gaus 1983, pp. 2–3.
19. Rawls 1972, pp. 522–23.
20. Rawls 1985, p. 241.
21. Ibid., p. 289.
22. Ibid., 1985, p. 299.
23. A similar position is adopted by Lukes 1985, p. 298; and Kymlicka 1988, p. 190.
24. Kymlicka 1990, p. 209.
25. Taylor 1985b, 1:25–26.
26. Ibid., pp. 19–23. The reference here is to fundamental decisions that relate to questions such as the sort of person I wish to be rather than to ordinary mundane decisions, which are often made on the basis of comparisons rather than on evaluations. Decisions such as “Shall I go to the movies rather than to a friend’s?” or “Should I play chess or dominos with my children?” will most probably be decided on the basis of contingent compatibilities with other alternatives rather than on the basis of their evaluations of higher or lower, noble or base.
27. Ibid., p. 34.
28. Rawls 1985, pp. 41–42.
29. Collini 1988, p. 427.
30. Friel 1990, p. 47.
31. A comparison between intellectual curiosity about a culture and a potential interest in adopting it may help to clarify this issue. Membership requires more than saying, “It is a splendid language; I love the sound of it,” or “I appreciate the manners, the tradition, and the history of this people.” It requires a readiness to follow the culture, as well as to create special relations with its bearer.
32. Berlin 1990, p. 10.
33. Perec, in Shiloni 1989, p.106
34. Raz 1986, p. 203.
35. Mulhall 1987, p. 23.
36. Mill 1975, pp. 386–87.
37. Raz 1986, pp. 423–24.
38. Walzer 1989a, p. 41.
Chapter Two
1. I have relied on Raz’s definition of right: “X has a right if and only if X can have rights and, other things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding other person(s) under duty” (1986, p. 166).
2. MacDonald 1949, in Waldron 1984, p. 27.
3. This is a matter of enormous complexity, since we can reject our cultural affiliations while still cherishing certain of the values and habits of the old culture, as we can decide to retain our cultural identity while rejecting some of its values. The important element is that only those values, norms, and cultural practices we judge to be valuable can be adopted as guidelines.
4. Kymlicka 1989, pp. 186–87.
5. Sandel 1991, p. 31.
6. Ibid., p. 37.
7. Luck, therefore, plays a significant role in our ability to satisfy our preferences. When others share our preferences, a certain product may become readily available because popularity may help to increase production. If the product we desire is not readily available, however, the fact that others also want it may reduce our chances of obtaining it.
8. Waldron 1987, p. 21.
9. Ibid., pp. 21–22.
10. For a definition and a discussion of the concept of external preferences, see Dworkin 1977, pp. 234–38.
11. Kymlicka 1989, pp. 148–49.
12. Ranger 1983, p. 261.
13. Ibid., p. 238.
14. Steinberg 1981, p. 63.
15. Walzer 1989b, pp. 25–26.
16. Trilling 1972, p. 115.
17. Stevenson 1974, p. 78.
18. Williams 1971, p. 318.
19. Ibid., p. 322.
Chapter Three
1. Margalit and Raz 1990, p. 440.
2. Dinstein 1976, p. 102.
3. Carr et al. 1939, p. xvii.
4. Weil 1952, p. 95.
5. Deutsch 1969, p. 19.
6. Hertz 1944, p. 7.
7. Ibid., p. 3.
8. Dyson 1987, p. 591.
9. Although a territory could be construed as one of several features included in the definition of a nation, this territory need be neither well defined nor recognised—two indispensable attributes of state territory—in order to be of importance to the formation of a nation.
10. D’Entreves 1967, p. 318.
11. Seton-Watson 1977, p. 1.
12. Geertz 1973, p. 315.
13. Forsyth 1987, p. 506.
14. Sureda 1973, p. 17.
15. Although women were not granted voting rights, they were nevertheless considered part of the national community and were assumed to be indirectly represented through their fathers or spouses.
16. In Kohn 1966, p. 326.
17. Kedourie 1985, p. 14.
18. Smith 1986, p. 129.
19. Hegel 1967, p. 279.
20. Burke, in Waldron 1987b, p. 118.
21. Hegel 1967, pp. 218–19.
22. Ibid., p. 218.
23. Smith 1983, p. xxiv.
24. Ibid., pp. xxx.
25. Anderson cites some fascinating examples of the way in which new nations tie themselves to a fabricated past. For example: “The late President Sukarno always spoke with complete sincerity of the 350 years of colonialism that his ‘Indonesia’ had endured, although the very concept ‘Indonesia’ is a twentieth-century invention, and most of today’s Indonesia was only conquered by the Dutch between 1850 and 1910. Preeminent among contemporary Indonesia’s national heroes is the early nineteenth-century Javanese Prince Diponegaro, although the Prince’s own memories show that he intended to ‘concord [not liberate!] Java’, rather than to expel ‘the Dutch’” (Anderson 1983, p. 19).
26. Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, p. 1.
27. Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, p. 181, cited by Singer in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
28. Osterud 1987, p. 379.
29. Cobban 1969, p. 107.
30. Seton-Watson 1977, p. 7.
31. Renan (1882), in Snyder 1964, pp. 26–29.
32. Hampshire 1983, p. 145.
33. Quoted in Gellner 1987a, p. 6: “L’oubli et, je dirais meme, l’erreur historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la creation d’une nation” (Renan 1882, “Que’est-ce qu’une Nation?”).
34. Gellner 1983, p. 7.
35. Williams 1961, p. 57.
36. Gellner 1983, p. 7.
37. Anderson 1983, pp. 13, 15.
38. Only in the unlikely case that the whole of Europe should regard itself as one European nation, could self-rule and national self-determination be said to overlap.
39. Thornberry 1989, p. 883.
40. Berlin 1969, pp. 157–58.
41. Donnelly 1989, p. 148.
42. Raz 1986, p. 207.
43. Rawls 1972, p. 60.
44. Walzer 1986, p. 231.
45. Ibid., p. 228.
46. Raz 1986, p. 209.
47. Dinstein 1976, p. 112.
48. Ibid., p. 116.
49. Houser 1971, p. 92.
Chapter Four
1. Elon 1987, p. 33.
2. MacCormick 1981, pp. 247–65.
3. Graham 1986, p. 140.
4. O’Brien 1988, p. 18.
5. Berlin 1972, p. 19.
6. Seton-Watson 1977, p. 445.
7. Popper 1962, p. 49.
8. Walicki 1982, p. 265.
9. O’Brien 1991, p. 29.
10. The terms used here to describe Kohn’s position are taken from Snyder 1954, pp. 118–20.
11. Barry 1983, p. 124.
12. Berlin 1969, p. 156.
13. Said 1987, p. 3.
14. Plamenatz 1976, p. 27.
15. Fichte 1968, p. 215.
16. Walzer 1989a, p. 9.
17. Smith 1983, p. 159.
18. Walzer 1989a, p. 38.
19. O’Brien 1988, p. 32.
20. Gordon 1952, p. 252.
21. In Walicki 1982, p. 74.
22. Ibid., p. 76.
23. Mazzini 1907, p. 43.
24. Treitschke 1977, p. 359.
25. Smith 1983, p. 257.
26. Ibid., p. 261.
27. Ibid., pp. 262–63.
28. Walzer 1989b, p. 35.
Chapter Five
1. Dunn 1979, pp. 55, 57.
2. Mazzini 1907, p. 41; emphasis added.
3. Williams 1981, p. 18.
4. Rawls 1972, pp. 570–72.
5. Berlin 1986, p. 42.
6. Norman 1983, p. 249.
7. Rawls 1972, pp. 475–76.
8. Dworkin 1986a, pp. 199–201.
9. This view is explored very convincingly in Blum 1980, pp. 77–79.
10. Dworkin 1986a, p. 200.
11. Sandel 1982, p. 33.
12. Ibid.
13. Waldron 1990, p. 629.
14. Nozick 1974, pp. 323–24.
15. Williams 1985, p. 265.
16. Sandel 1982, p. 179.
17. Rawls 1972, p. 153.
18. Hare 1981, pp. 101–2.
19. Rawls 1972, pp. 468–69.
20. Hare 1981, p. 99.
21. I thank A. De-Shalit for raising this objection.
22. Rawls 1972, p. 289.
23. Flanagan and Jackson 1987, p. 630.
24. Dagger 1985, p. 437.
25. Gewirth 1988, p. 294.
26. Ibid., p. 295.
27. Goodin 1988, p. 675.
28. Berlin 1979, p. 343.
29. Barry 1987, p. 354.
30. Mazzini 1907, p. 50.
Chapter Six
1. Sandel 1984, p. 94.
2. Ibid., p. 90.
3. Rawls 1985, p. 249.
4. Dworkin 1986a, p. 208.
5. Rawls 1972, p. 476.
6. Rawls 1985, p. 227, emphasis added.
7. Pogge 1988, p. 233.
8. Ibid.
9. Dagger 1985, p. 437.
10. Barry 1983, pp. 126–27.
11. Democratic theory faces a similar problem, and can offer no clear guidance on these matters: “controversies regarding boundaries present an important practical limit to the scope of democracy as a method of making collective decisions.” It may not be surprising, argues Whelam, that “democracy, which is a method for group decision-making or self-governing, cannot be brought to bear on the logically prior matter of the constitution of the group itself, the existence of which it presupposes” (1983, p. 148).
12. Rawls 1972, p. 13.
13. Barry 1983, pp. 128–30.
14. Ibid., p. 127.
15. Mazzini 1907, p. 53.
16. Ackerman 1980, p. 71.
17. Walzer 1983, p. 32.
18. Ackerman 1980, p. 88.
19. Ackerman 1980, pp. 72–73.
20. Ackerman 1980, p. 72.
21. Mill 1975, chap. 16.
22. Von Gunsteren 1988, p. 736.
23. Raphael 1970, p. 39.
24. For a very good critical discussion of political obligations, see Pateman 1985; and Simmons 1979.
25. Dworkin 1986a, p. 196.
26. Pateman 1985, p. 8.
27. Pitkin 1972, p. 60.
28. Ibid., p. 61.
29. Henry 1970, p. 276.
30. Raz 1986, p. 98.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 92.
33. Simmons 1979, p. 35.
34. Ibid., p. 194.
Chapter Seven
1. Seton-Watson 1977, p. 443.
2. Mill 1975, pp. 382, 384.
3. Kymlicka 1989, p. 4.
4. Hobsbawm 1990, p. 33.
5. Gray 1986, p. 75.
6. Mendus 1989, p. 13
7. Raz argues this point very convincingly in his criticism of Rawls. See Raz 1986, pp. 117–24.
8. Jones, in Mendus 1989, p. 118.
9. Young 1987, p. 60.
10. Pye and Verba 1966, pp. 4, 7.
11. Ibid., pp. 6–8.
12. Geertz 1973, p. 311.
13. Ibid., pp. 311–12.
14. Ibid., pp. 316–17.
15. Kymlicka 1989, p. 187.
16. Walzer 1991, p. 7.
17. Lijphart 1977, p. 10.
18. Ibid., pp 10–11.
19. Ibid., pp. 42–43.
20. Barry 1991, p. 146.
21. A very interesting discussion of possible solutions to national conflicts is to be found in Horowitz 1985.
22. Kasher 1985, p. 110.
23. Ibid., pp. 111–12.
24. Hirsch 1986, p. 437.
25. Mill 1975, p. 382.
26. Ibid., p. 383.
27. Gellner 1983, pp. 140–41.
28. Walzer 1983, pp. 38–40.
29. Ibid., pp. 36–39.
30. Pye and Verba 1966, p. 4.