PREFACE
1. Whitlock 2019.
2. Quoted in Whitlock (2019).
3. Davis 2012a. See also Davis 2012b, 2019.
4. Donovan 1970; Bacevich 2005.
CHAPTER 1
1. Brewer 2009, 3–13.
2. For a firsthand account of the operation of the CPE, see Creel 1920.
3. Axelrod 2009.
4. See Winkler (1978) for a detailed discussion of the OWI.
5. Roosevelt 1942.
6. Writer’s War Board 1942, 5.
7. Howell 1997, 795.
8. Howell 1997, 796–97.
9. United States Information Agency 1998, 5. For more on the operations and influence of the USIA, see Elder (1968), Snyder (1995), and Osgood (2006).
10. See Wilford (2009) for a discussion of the history and activities of Operation Mockingbird.
11. Sessions 2016, 248.
12. Fulbright 1971, 33–34.
13. Fulbright 1971, 35–38.
14. Fulbright 1971, 149–50.
15. Andrzejewski 2015, 7.
16. Andrzejewski 2015, 20.
17. Paul and Matthews 2016. The authors limit their discussion of the “firehose of falsehood” model to Russian propaganda internationally. But the same characteristics they highlight as part of this model also apply to the U.S. government domestically and abroad.
18. Fulbright 1971, 29.
19. Fellows 1959.
20. Irwin 1936, 3.
21. https://www.lexico.com/definition/propaganda.
22. Marlin 2013, 12.
23. Jowett and O’Donnell 1986, 7. For a review of various definitions of propaganda across disciplines, see Jowett and O’Donnell (1986, 2–7).
24. Nelson and Izadi 2009, 338.
25. Stanley 2015, 11.
26. Nelson and Izadi 2009, 338.
27. Mearsheimer 2011, 20.
28. See Marlin (2013, 4–13) for a review of the various definitions of propaganda.
29. On some of the important differences between private advertising and government advertising, see Schumpeter (1950: 263), Wagner (1976) and DiLorenzo (1988, 67–68). As Wagner (1976, 96) puts it, “The absence of alternative suppliers of credence services [services for which consumers cannot observe qualities after purchase], suppliers which exist in the private market, serves to strengthen the selling position of the government. Advertising, then, serves essentially a reassuring and reinforcing function within the structure of the monopolistic state.” The implication is that “the function of public advertising is to maintain public acquiescence in social patterns in which instances of felt discomfort are attributable to government action, but the picture portrayed nonetheless is one that calls for the provision of still more public services” (Wagner 1976: 97).
30. Norton 2017, 543.
31. Brewer 2009, 7.
32. Fulbright 1971, 22.
33. Crawford 2019.
34. On the topic of whether America is safer from terrorist threats, see Mueller and Stewart (2021) and DePetris (2019).
35. Our list has some overlap, but also some differences, with that presented by Black (2001, 133–34).
36. Sapolsky (2017, 387–424) explores the neurobiological foundations of the “us versus them” dichotomy which helps explain why governments so often rely on this technique for manipulation. We thank Yahya Alshamy for raising this point.
37. Bush 2001a.
38. Bush 2003b.
39. Patrick and Thrall 2007, 102.
40. Jacoby 2000, 751. See also Edelman 1993; Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Chong and Druckman 2001; Hiebert 2003.
41. Brewster 2009.
42. Friedell 1969; Lewis 1969; Chwe 2001.
43. Porter 1994, 12, italics in original.
44. Robin 2004, 2.
45. Higgs 2006b; Coyne and Hall 2018, 21–25.
46. Higgs 2006b, 447–48.
47. Berger and Luckmann 1966, 87.
48. MacArthur 1965, 333.
49. Stanley 2016.
50. Higgs 1987.
51. On the differences between “hegemonic propaganda theory,” which holds that political leaders enjoy unparalleled power to directly control opinions, with “classical propaganda theory,” which holds that propaganda is situational and context specific and encourages the receiver to select a particular opinion among a range of acceptable options at a particular time and place, see Patrick and Thrall (2007) and the literature cited therein. Our analysis is closer to the classical theory in that it places the ultimate power in the hands of the citizenry.
52. Patrick and Thrall 2007, 101–2.
53. This is consistent with political science scholarship that finds that “Americans’ foreign policy attitudes are structured, meaningful, and accessible” (Kushner Gadarian 2010, 1048).
54. See Sharp (2012), 7–32 and the references therein.
55. As Hayek (1961) noted, commercial advertising is one influence on consumer tastes, but it does not solely determine those tastes. The consumers of information ultimately determine what they believe and desire.
56. Yanagizawa-Drott 2014, 1947.
57. Utley 2018.
58. Stanley 2015, 11.
59. Stanley 2015, 11.
60. Ostrom 1991; Boettke 2018; Aligca, Boettke, and Tarko 2019.
61. Mearsheimer 2011, 91.
62. Donovan 1970, 25–26, emphasis in original.
63. Vagts 1937, 15.
64. Tocqueville (1835–1840) 1988: 285; Coyne and Hall 2018.
65. Fulbright 1971, 14.
66. Bacevich 2005, 1.
67. Bacevich 2005, 225.
68. Coyne and Hall 2018.
69. Orwell 1968: 139.
70. See Higgs 1987, 2006a, 2012; Coyne and Hall 2018.
71. Lippmann 1922; Lasswell 1927, 1938; Bernays 1928; Ponsonby 1928; Doob 1935; Knight 1936; Arendt (1951) 1973, 1972; Ellul 1973 Altheide and Johnson 1980; Jowett and O’Donnell 1986; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Smith 1989; Nelson 1996; Sproule 1997; Pratkanis and Aronson 2001; Chomsky 2002; Cunningham 2002; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2004; Patrick and Thrall 2004, 2007; Strömberg 2004; Eisensee and Strömberg 2007; DiMaggio 2008; Brewer 2009; Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan 2009; Olken 2009; DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010; Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya 2011; Marlin 2013; DellaVigna et al. 2014; Selgin 2014; Yanagizawa-Drott 2014; Adena et al. 2015; Schuessler 2015; Stanley 2015; Little 2017, Zollmann 2017; Seagren and Henderson 2018; Testa 2018.
72. For an accessible introduction to political economy, see Holcombe (2016). For more advanced treatments, see Mueller (2003), Rowley and Schneider (2004), and Reksulak, Razzolini, and Shughart (2014).
73. Eggertsson 1990; North 1990; Furubotn and Richter 1997; Menard and Shirley 2005.
74. On the connection between political economy and institutional economics, see Boettke, Haeffele-Balch, and Storr (2016).
75. Buchanan 1979.
76. Exceptions include Seagren and Henderson (2018) and Schuessler (2015), who incorporate political economy insights.
77. Sunstein 2005; Kaufmann 2006; Mueller 2006; Thrall and Cramer 2009; Goodman 2013; Unger 2013; Preble and Mueller 2014; Porter 2015; Levine 2018.
78. Thrall and Cramer 2009, 6–9.
79. Schuessler 2015, 24.
80. In this regard we follow Schuessler (2015), 24–25.
CHAPTER 2
1. See Buchanan (1975) for this rendering of the protective state.
2. See, for example, Ferejohn (1986).
3. Dunne 1995, 409.
4. Holcombe 2005.
5. On the centrality of the principal-agent problem in democratic politics, see Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Besley (2006), and Higgs (2018).
6. See Buchanan (1954), Miller (1999), and Wagner and Yazigi (2014) for an analysis of the key differences between individual choice in private markets versus choice in political settings.
7. On rational ignorance see Downs (1957), Bohanon and Van Cott (2002), Heckelman (2003), Gelman, Silver, and Edlin (2012), Somin (2013), and Brennan (2016).
8. Somin 2013. For specific examples from foreign policy, see U. Friedman (2012) and G. Friedman (2014).
9. We thank Diana Thomas for raising this point. On the role of systematic biases in democratic politics, see Caplan (2007).
10. “During any six-year period (say, from November 1994 through November 2000), each voter is allowed to vote twice for a president/vice president team, four times for a U.S. representative, and a maximum of three times for a U.S. senator” (Boudreaux 1996, 117).
11. Higgs 2012, 34–46.
12. A hawkish position regarding U.S. foreign policy was rewarded by voters in the 2004 presidential election (see Kushner Gadarian 2010). This voter response may be, at least partially, a product of the post-9/11 government propaganda that framed the Bush administration as being “tough” against the supposed existential terrorist threat. As Kushner Gadarian (2010, 1061) notes, the “trustee model” of government, whereby citizens forgo close representation so that those in power can protect them from threats, “becomes problematic when leaders artificially create crises to maintain power, provide false information about the consequences of policy, or cynically portray their foreign policy positions in elections.” We thank Yahya Alshamy for raising this point.
13. See Higgs (1987) on the “ratchet effect” and Coyne and Hall (2018) on the “boomerang effect” of government crises and intervention on the growth of government.
14. Higgs 2012, 44–46.
15. On the logic of interest groups, see Olson (1965). Becker (1983) discusses the legislature as a political marketplace.
16. Melman 1970, 1974; Higgs 2006a; Duncan and Coyne 2013a, 2013b, 2015; McCartney and McCartney 2015.
17. Mueller 2006.
18. Edelman 1985,4.
19. Gates 2014.
20. Niskanen 1971, 1975, 2001.
21. Tullock 1965; Wagner 2007.
22. Whitlock and Woodward 2016.
23. Steinhauer 2015.
24. See Horton 2015.
25. Mearsheimer 2011, 57.
26. Koppl 2018, 230–1.
27. For a history of executive orders and the U.S. classification system, see Quist (2002, 44–77).
28. Executive Order No. 8381, January 2, 1938, “Defining Certain Vital Military and Naval Installations and Equipment,” https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-8381.htm.
29. Executive Order No. 10290, September 24, 1951, “Prescribing Regulations Establishing Minimum Standards for the Classification, Transmission, and Handling, by Department and Agencies of the Executive Branch, of Official Information Which Requires Safeguarding in the Interest of the Security of the United States,” https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-10290.pdf.
30. Huard 1956, 179–90.
31. Setty 2012, 1567.
32. Goitein and Shapiro 2011, 4–5.
33. Aftergood 2009, 404.
34. For a discussion of experts and how the centralization and monopolization of information can result in mistakes and abuses, see Levy and Peart (2016) and Koppl (2018).
35. Huard 1956, 219.
36. Parks 1957–1958, 23–24.
37. Setty 2012, 1572; Cole 2003.
38. Setty 2012; 1574.
39. See Burr (2019) for a discussion of the present-day dysfunctions in the U.S. government’s system of declassification.
40. Kristian 2017.
41. Carlson 2017.
42. Knox 2017.
43. Hedges 2002, 143.
44. Lippmann 1922, 43.
45. Lippmann 1922, 44.
46. See Kuran 1997; Little 2017.
47. Porter 1994; Bacevich 2005; Coyne and Hall 2018, 27, 111.
48. Quoted in Bailey (1997).
49. Dalberg-Acton 1907, 504.
50. On the selection mechanisms behind this tendency, see Hayek (1944), Higgs (1997), and Coyne and Hall (2016).
51. Mearsheimer 2011, 93.
CHAPTER 3
1. Gallup 2017.
2. Gallup 2017.
3. Gallup 2017.
4. Gallup 2017.
5. Gallup 2017.
6. Brewer 2009, 248.
7. See Hahn (2012b) for a more thorough examination of the history of U.S. involvement in Iraq.
8. United States Department of State 2017.
9. See Hahn 2012b, 59–60.
10. United States Department of State 1958.
11. Morris 2003.
12. Quoted in PBS (1990).
13. Dietrich 2011.
14. Hahn 2012a.
15. BBC News 2013.
16. ABC News 2008.
17. ABC News 2008.
18. Human Rights Watch 2002.
19. Human Rights Watch 2002.
20. Hahn 2012b, 77–78; Battle 2003.
21. White House 1983.
22. White House 1984.
23. Gompert, Binnendijk, and Lin 2014.
24. Gompert, Binnendijk, and Lin 2014.
25. Hahn 2012b, 121.
26. See Project for the New American Century, letter to President Clinton, January 26, 1998, https://www.noi.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/iraqclintonletter1998-01-26-Copy.pdf.
27. Clinton 1998b.
28. See “The Iraqi Liberation Act,” Public Law 105–338 of the 105th Congress, 1998, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-112/pdf/STATUTE-112-Pg3178.pdf.
29. Bush 1999b.
30. Bush 1999a.
31. Quoted in Frontline (2008).
32. Quoted in Frontline (2008).
33. Quoted in Borger (2006).
34. Quoted in Frontline (2008).
35. Quoted in Frontline (2008).
36. Quoted in Frontline (2008).
37. James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy 2001, 40.
38. Moran 2013.
39. Bush 2003d.
40. United States House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform 2004.
41. Quoted in Meet the Press (2006).
42. Benjamin 2002.
43. Benjamin 2002.
44. Director of Central Intelligence 2002.
45. Quoted in Frontline (2008).
46. Quoted in Frontline (2008).
47. Quoted in Frontline (2014).
48. Quote in Frontline (2005).
49. Powell 2003.
50. Brewer 2009, 243.
51. Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks 2003, 2.
52. Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks 2003, 3.
53. Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks 2003, 3.
54. Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks 2003, 4.
55. Bush 2002a.
56. Bush 2003d.
57. Cheney 2002a.
58. Quoted in Stein and Dickinson (2006), emphasis added.
59. United States House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform 2004, iii.
60. For a time line of the UN weapons inspections in Iraq, see CNN (2017).
61. United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspections Commission 2003.
62. Director of Central Intelligence 2002.
63. ElBaradei 2003.
64. Wilson 2003.
65. Warrick 2003.
66. United States House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform 2004, 5.
67. United States House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform 2004,5.
68. United States House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform 2004, 11.
69. ElBaradei 2003.
70. Hammond 2012.
71. Quoted in CNN 2002.
72. Quoted in Barstow, Broad, and Gerth 2004.
73. Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks 2002.
74. New York Times, “Complete Results,” September 8, 2002 (http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/national/20020908_POLL/020908poll-results.html).
75. Ibid.
76. Western 2005, 119–20.
77. Larson and Savych 2005,149.
78. Newport 2002.
79. Saad 2002.
80. Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks 2002.
81. Quoted in Breslow 2016.
82. Bush 2002b.
83. Bush 2003a.
84. Bush 2003c
85. Bush 2003a
86. Boucher 2003.
87. Carney 2011.
88. Brockes 2003.
89. United States Central Intelligence Agency 2020.
90. Brockes 2003.
91. Brewer 2009, 251.
92. Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks 2003: 8
93. Kohut, Doherty, and Gross 2004,11.
94. Gallup 2017.
95. Gallup 2017.
96. United States House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform 2004, 30.
CHAPTER 4
1. Patrick and Thrall 2007, 96.
2. Patrick and Thrall 2007, 96.
3. Patrick and Thrall 2007, 104.
4. McClellan 2008, 174
5. McClellan 2008, 175, emphasis added.
6. McClellan 2008, 142.
7. Brewer 2009, 242.
8. BBC News 2001b. In October 2002 the Coalition Information Center was renamed the Office of Global Communication.
9. Gordon and Miller 2002.
10. Quoted in Frontline (2006).
11. Quoted in Meet the Press (2002).
12. Quoted in Frontline (2006).
13. Quoted in Frontline (2006).
14. Project for Excellence in Journalism 2003.
15. Quoted in Brewer (2009), 252.
16. Purdum and Rutenberg 2003. The merits of embedded journalism have been hotly debated by journalists. See Project for Excellence in Journalism (2003) and Farrell (2010) for a more thorough discussion of this debate.
17. Quoted in Frontline (2006).
18. Quoted in Frontline (2006).
19. Quoted in Farrell (2010).
20. Barstow 2008.
21. Quoted in Barstow (2008).
22. Quoted in Barstow (2008).
23. Quoted in Barstow (2008).
24. Quoted in Barstow (2008).
25. McClellan 2008, 175.
26. McClellan 2008, 175.
27. Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks 2003, 12.
28. Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks 2003, 13.
29. Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks 2003, 16, emphasis in original.
30. Cheney 2002b.
31. The use of the American flag directly undermined the idea that the war was about “liberation” as opposed to “occupation.” For a further discussion of this issue, see Brewer (2009), 257.
32. Brewer 2009, 257.
33. Quoted in Frontline (2008).
34. Quoted in Frontline (2008).
35. Quoted in Frontline (2008).
36. Quoted in Frontline (2008).
37. Quoted in Frontline (2008).
38. Quoted in Frontline (2008).
39. Quoted in United States Senate Democrats (2007).
40. Diamond 2004.
41. Woodward 2004,150.
42. GlobalPolicy.org 2004, 35.
43. GlobalPolicy.org 2004, 37.
44. GlobalPolicy.org 2004, 39.
45. Globalpolicy.org 2007, 6–8.
46. Globalpolicy.org 2007, 10.
47. Globalpolicy.org 2007, 6.
48. Globalpolicy.org 2007, 8.
49. Globalpolicy.org 2007, 10
50. Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks 2003, 8.
51. Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks 2003, 6.
52. Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks 2003, 6.
53. Brewer 2009, 253.
54. See Antiwar.com (2006) for a gallery of these images.
55. Hersh 2007.
56. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 2014. For a firsthand account of torture at Abu Ghraib by a former interrogator, see Fair (2016).
57. Roberts 2002.
58. Brewer 2009, 247.
59. Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks 2003, 5.
60. Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks 2003, 6.
61. Gallup 2017.
62. See Kiely (2016).
63. Rivera 2011.
64. Haq 2015.
CHAPTER 5
1. National Hockey League 2014.
2. Esteban 2011.
3. McCain and Flake 2015, 64.
4. McCain and Flake 2015, 59–66.
5. Goodell 2016.
6. PBS 2002.
7. PBS 2002.
8. PBS 2002.
9. Quoted in Wakefield (1997), 22. The piece makes specific reference to the controversy surrounding the “work or fight” rule during the war and how it related to baseball. A complete discussion of this controversy is beyond the scope of this book. For a more complete accounting, see Kelly (2018).
10. PBS 2002.
11. Quoted in Wakefield (1997), 24.
12. Wakefield 1997, 37, 42.
13. For a more comprehensive discussion of these tensions in the interwar period, see L. Olson (2014).
14. Wakefield 1997, 70.
15. Wakefield 1997, 71.
16. Quoted in Wakefield (1997), 74.
17. Wakefield 1997, 74.
18. Lipsky 1985, 68–69.
19. Quoted in Der Derian and Shapiro (1989), 76
20. Lévi-Strauss 1962, 21, emphasis in original.
21. Guttmann 1986, 558.
22. Guttmann 1986, 559.
23. Guttmann 1986, 160.
24. Guttmann 1986, 160.
25. Guttmann 1986, 162.
26. Guttmann 1986, 163.
27. Robbie 2015.
28. Budowsky 2018.
29. Hester 2005, 46.
30. Lipsky 1981, 140.
31. Lipsyte 1975, 13.
32. Lipsyte 1975, 13.
33. Balbus 1975, 26.
34. Quoted in Broder (1991).
35. Quoted in Newsweek (1991).
36. Clinton 1998a.
37. Billings, Butterworth, and Turman 2012, 127.
38. Bairner 2001, xi..
39. Jones 2015.
40. Jones 2015.
41. Norman 2018.
42. Norman 2018. Football surpassed baseball in popularity in 1972 and the gap between the sports has widened ever since.
43. Harris Poll 2011.
44. Harris Poll 2011.
45. Rapaport 2018. The only top 20 broadcast that wasn’t the Super Bowl was the series finale of M*A*S*H in 1983.
46. Gough 2020.
47. Scott 2016.
48. Segrave 2000, 51.
49. National Football League 2011.
50. Quoted in Fox Sports (2011).
51. Associated Press 2001.
52. Fox Sports 2011.
53. Brown 2004, 40.
54. Brown 2004, 40.
55. Brown 2004, 40.
56. Brown 2004, 40.
57. Quoted in Berkow (1991).
58. Real 1975, 36, 42.
59. Stossel 2001.
60. Quoted in Scott (2016), emphasis in original.
61. Billings, Butterworth, and Turman 2012, 133.
62. King 2008, 528.
63. Vinall 2003.
64. King 2008, 537.
65. Quoted in King (2008), 536.
66. King 2008, 536.
67. Montgomery 2003.
68. Montgomery 2003.
69. Montgomery 2003.
70. Quoted in Montgomery (2003).
71. Gabel 2008.
72. Bryant 2013.
73. McCain and Flake 2015, i.
74. McCain and Flake 2015, 5. The monetary accounting is further complicated by the structure of the NFL. While the league and its central office are one organization, the individual teams are their own private entities. It is unclear exactly how the DOD paid out various funds. One potential difficulty in calculating the precise magnitude of these payments relates to the tax status of the NFL and its teams. Until 2015, the league office of the NFL was considered tax exempt while the individual teams were not. Payments made to the NFL league office, for instance, may be easier to uncover because of reporting requirements than payments made to individual teams. We thank Alisha Harper for bringing this point to our attention.
75. Whitney 2019.
76. Quoted in Whitney (2019).
77. U.S. Army 2019, Facebook post, December 30, https://www.facebook.com/USarmy/posts/10157349611033558?__tn__=-R.
78. For a full accounting of Tillman’s life during his time with the Cardinals and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, see Krakauer (2009).
79. Quoted in Farmer (2002).
80. Quoted in Krakauer (2009), 173.
81. Quoted in Krakauer (2009), 173.
82. Quoted in Krakauer (2009), 173.
83. Quoted in Krakauer (2009), 173.
84. Quoted in Stow (2017), 159.
85. Krakauer 2009, 248.
86. While back in the United States between overseas deployments, Pat spoke to a friend from Arizona State about a possible meeting with MIT linguist and well-known U.S foreign policy critic Noam Chomsky after his return from Afghanistan. Pat would be killed before such a meeting could take place. See Fish (n.d.).
87. Krakauer 2009, 349.
88. Quoted in Krakauer (2009). 320.
89. At the time of Pat Tillman’s death, the rangers were separated into two distinct groups. Pat was in the first group. His brother Kevin was in the second. It quickly became common knowledge among Pat’s group that his death was the result of friendly fire. This information remained unknown to the second group, including Kevin Tillman.
90. Adapted from Krakauer (2009), 268.
91. Krakauer 2009, 334.
92. Quoted in Krakauer (2009), 334.
93. Quoted in Krakauer (2009), 336.
94. Associated Press 2007. For a more detailed accounting of these investigations, see Army Regulation 15–6, “Investigation Guide for Informal Investigations,” https://home.army.mil/riley/application/files/5515/1630/6429/15-6InvestigationOfficer.pdf.
95. Krakauer 2009, 339.
96. Quoted in Krakauer (2009), 337.
97. Quoted in Krakauer (2009), 340.
98. Krakauer 2009, 340.
99. Quoted in Krakauer (2009), 341. For more details on this specific incident, see 340–41.
100. Quoted in Krakauer (2009), 344. For more details on this specific incident, see 342–45.
101. Committee on Oversight and Public Reform 2008, 12.
102. Committee on Oversight and Public Reform 2008, 12.
103. Committee on Oversight and Public Reform 2008, 12.
104. Quoted in Krakauer (2009), 347–48.
105. See Gettleman (2004).
106. See Antiwar.com (2006) for a gallery of these images.
107. Krakauer 2009, 349–50.
108. Quoted in NBC News (2004).
109. Bush 2004.
110. Quoted in Krakauer (2009), 357.
111. Krakauer 2009, 359.
112. Krakauer 2009, 359.
113. Tillman 2007.
114. Campbell 2017.
115. Neuman 2017.
116. For a discussion of this controversy, see Mindock (2018).
117. Quoted in Schmitz (2017).
118. Pierce 2018.
CHAPTER 6
1. An image of this poster is available at https://c1.staticflickr.com/1/49/152324686_56b1ec90c8.jpg.
2. Schneier 2009.
3. Bowen and Rodrigue (n.d.).
4. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 2013.
5. Bowen and Rodrigue (n.d.).
6. For a more detailed summary of this deregulation and its implications, see Bailey (1985).
7. Team 2016.
8. Team 2016.
9. United States Department of Transportation 2018b.
10. McCabe 2013. A communist sympathizer, Ramirez Ortiz stated he wished to warn Castro of an assassination attempt by Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo. Ramirez Ortiz would be jailed multiple times in Cuba before escaping back to the United States in 1975, only to be sentenced to twenty years in prison for the incident.
11. Engle 2011.
12. Federal Aviation Administration 2017.
13. United States Department of Transportation 2018a.
14. Engle 2011.
15. Meltzer 2015.
16. Meltzer 2015.
17. Meltzer 2015.
18. O’Connor 2016.
19. Beaven 2016.
20. Quoted in National Commission on Terror Attacks upon the United States (2004), 2.
21. See the National Commission on Terror Attacks upon the United States (2004).
22. For a more complete yet accessible accounting of the attacks, see Bergen (2018).
23. Bergen 2018.
24. See de Boer (1979) and Landes (1977) for examples.
25. Johnson 1976, 3–4.
26. Mueller and Stewart 2011, 40–41.
27. Mueller 2006, 2.
28. Mueller 2006, 2.
29. Saliba 2017.
30. Forrester, Weiser, and Forrester 2018.
31. Nowrasteh 2017.
32. Nowrasteh 2017.
33. Ritchie 2018.
34. World Bank 2018.
35. Data retrieved from the World Terrorism Database. Ambiguous cases of terrorism are included. Excluded from the analysis were the Las Vegas shooting in 2017 (while fuel tanks were hit by gunfire, they did not appear to be the intended target) and the bombing of a flight in 1982 en route to Honolulu, as the flight originated outside of U.S. airspace. Examples of non-U.S. targets within the United States include the Youth of the Star bombing of a Dominican airline in Miami in 1975, the detonation of a car bomb outside the El Al Airlines terminal in New York in 1973 targeting Israel, and others. Of the fifteen cases where the nationality of the target was not the United States, Israel and the former Soviet Union were the most frequent targets, followed by Venezuela and other countries.
36. United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 2018.
37. Roots 2003, 509.
38. Quoted in Smithsonian Magazine (n.d.)
39. Encyclopedia Britannica 2019b.
40. Ayers 2011.
41. United States Department of Homeland Security 2019, 13.
42. See Pekoske (2019).
43. “TSA by the Numbers,” Factsheet, https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/resources/tsabythenumbers_factsheet.pdf.
44. Bush 2001b.
45. Gowadia 2017.
46. Pekoske 2018.
47. United States Transportation Security Administration 2014.
48. “Surface Transportation,” For Industry: Resources, https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/surface-transportation.
49. Sural 2010. He is referring to an incident in which political reporter David Weigel refused a TSA pat down, stating, “If you touch my junk I’m going to have you arrested.” See Lapidos (2010) for a discussion of the incident.
50. Sural 2010.
51. Sural 2010.
52. Mueller 2019, 2.
53. Mueller 2019, 2.
54. Mueller 2019, 2.
55. Mueller 2019, 4. It is worth noting that fatalities are not evenly distributed across each year. The number of deaths increased in 2015 and 2016 as a result of activity by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (known also as ISIS or IS). This is also an extreme outlier in terms of fatalities. In 2016 an ISIS-inspired gunman murdered forty-nine people at Pulse Nightclub in Orlando, Florida. Without this incident, the number of fatalities would be cut by half.
56. Mueller 2019, 76.
57. Mueller 2019, 79.
58. Quoted in Shannon (2002).
59. Yang 2001, 58.
60. Belluck and Chang 2001.
61. Mueller 2019, 50.
62. Meltzer 2015.
63. Mann 2011.
64. Quoted in Wilson (2017).
65. Wilson 2017.
66. For a detailed account of the plot, see Puhl (2011), 324–29.
67. Laville, Norton-Taylor, and Dodd 2006.
68. Puhl 2011, 319.
69. Chertoff 2006.
70. Gonzales 2006.
71. Puhl 2011, 333.
72. Mueller 2011, 317–18.
73. In the wake of COVID-19, the TSA quadrupled the carry-on allowance for liquid hand sanitizer to twelve ounces. See Fletcher (2020).
74. “Liquids Rule,” Travel: Security Screening, https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening/liquids-rule.
75. Quoted in Puhl (2011), 337.
76. Straub 2011, 381.
77. Quoted in Shepherd (2007).
78. Quoted in Schneier (2007).
79. Quoted in United States Attorney’s Office Eastern District of New York (2007).
80. Straub 2011, 383.
81. Straub 2011, 378.
82. Straub 2011, 375.
83. Straub 2011, 378.
84. Straub 2011, 379.
85. Straub 2011, 382–83.
86. Anderson 2017.
87. Labott and Dougherty 2010.
88. Labott and Dougherty 2010.
89. Quoted in Harnden 2009.
90. Quoted in Harnden 2009.
91. CBC News 2009.
92. BBC News 2010.
93. Schecter and Ross 2010.
94. Schecter and Ross 2010.
95. Stewart and Mueller 2008, 155.
96. Schanzer 2018.
97. Quoted in Sforza (2010).
98. Quoted in United States Government Accountability Office (2017), 15.
99. Quoted in Sforza (2010).
100. Grabell 2016.
101. Grabell 2016.
102. Grabell 2016.
103. Stewart 2018.
104. United States Transportation Security Administration 2018.
105. Quoted in Schanzer (2018).
106. Stewart 2018; Winter 2018a.
107. Winter 2018b.
108. Quoted in Winter 2018b.
109. Electronic Privacy Information Center 2010.
110. Quoted in Knickerbocker (2010).
111. Quoted in Kravitz (2010).
112. Quoted in Schwartz (2009).
113. Quoted in Macedo (2010).
114. Kerley and Cook (2017).
115. Bradner and Marsh (2015).
116. United States Government Accountability Office 2010.
117. Quoted in Tien (2010).
118. Strickler 2010.
119. Quoted in Schwartz (2009).
120. Quoted in Schwartz (2009).
121. Quoted in Knox (2010).
122. United States Transportation Security Administration 2008.
123. Shahid 2010.
124. Electronic Privacy Information Center v. US Department of Homeland Security, 760 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D.D.C. 2011), https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2471526/electronic-privacy-v-us-dept-of-homeland-sec/.
125. Mellor 2010.
126. Ahlers 2013.
127. Competitive Enterprise Institute v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Cir. 2016), 8, https://epic.org/privacy/litigation/apa/tsa/bodyscanner/1639042-FTTUSA-Amicus-Brief.pdf.
128. Competitive Enterprise Institute v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 7.
129. Competitive Enterprise Institute v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 9.
130. Baskas 2011.
131. Associated Press 2011.
132. The Week 2010.
133. Quoted in Dominguez (2010).
134. NBC News 2014.
135. Johnson 2012.
136. Villafranca 2012.
137. Quoted in Johnson (2012).
138. Pittore 2011, 799.
139. It should be noted that Loewen’s plot is considered to be more politically motivated than an act of a radical Islamic terrorist. Despite his “conversion,” he was not a practicing Muslim, and no one in his family or friend group or the local Muslim community knew of his religion. He has been described as an “online Muslim only.” See Pittore (2011), 789–90.
140. Pittore 2011, 789.
141. Pittore 2011, 797.
142. United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 2013.
143. United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 2013.
144. Williams 2019.
145. Richards et al. 2019, 17, 14.
146. Pittore 2011, 795.
147. Higgs 2006b, 447–48; Coyne and Hall 2018, 21–25.
CHAPTER 7
1. United States Central Intelligence Agency 2008.
2. Quoted in Robb (2004), 59.
3. Quoted in Robb (2004), 60.
4. Bingaman 2000, emphasis added.
5. Robb 2004, 63
6. Alford and Secker 2017, 195–220.
7. Quoted in Tarabay (2014).
8. Seelye 2002.
9. Dancis 2018.
10. Dancis 2018.
11. Dancis 2018.
12. Quoted in Fraser (2003, 40).
13. Creel 1920, 273.
14. Creel 1920, 273.
15. Creel 1920, 282.
16. See Winkler (1978) for a detailed discussion of the OWI.
17. Encyclopedia Britannica 2019a.
18. Koppes and Black 1977, 89.
19. Koppes and Black 1977, 88–89.
20. Koppes and Black 1977, 91.
21. United States Office of War Information 1942, 1.
22. United States Office of War Information 1942, 30.
23. Dictionary.com, s.v. “Home Front,” http://www.dictionary.com/browse/home-front.
24. United States Office of War Information 1942, 36, emphasis in original.
25. United States Office of War Information 1942, 40–41, emphasis in original.
26. United States Office of War Information 1942, 114, emphasis in original.
27. United States Office of War Information 1942, 120, emphasis in original.
28. United States Office of War Information 1942, 73, emphasis in original.
29. United States Office of War Information 1942, 63.
30. United States Office of War Information 1942, 122.
31. United States Office of War Information 1942, 63.
32. Suid 2002, 136
33. Suid 2002, 136
34. Dancis 2018.
35. United States Department of Defense 1966, 3–4.
36. United States Department of Defense 1966, 3–4.
37. Suid 2002, 674–78.
38. Suid 2002, 674–78.
39. Anderson and Van Atta 1987.
40. Hersh 1972.
41. Janos 2018.
42. Vecchiarelli 2018.
43. Quoted in Maycock (2001).
44. Dancis 2018.
45. Dancis 2018.
46. Robb 2004, 303–5.
47. Robb 2004, 305.
48. Robb 2004, 305.
49. Suid 2002, 647–78.
50. It should be noted that information related to DOD involvement in the film industry post-9/11 is incomplete. We are limited in our analysis as the result of two issues. The first issue relates directly to the DOD’s monopoly over this information and the agency’s ability to grant or deny access to materials. The second issue relates to the information that has been released. While the DOD released information to historian Lawrence Suid, he has been largely unwilling to allow others to access that data. Since these files are now considered his private property and not that of the DOD, they are not subject to FOIA requests. For a more detailed accounting of these issues, see Alford (2016). We thank Matthew Alford and Tom Secker for clarification on these issues.
51. King 2001.
52. Quoted in King (2001).
53. Quoted in BBC News (2001a).
54. Cooper 2001.
55. Cooper 2001.
56. The films listed in the appendix are adapted from a more comprehensive list compiled by Alford and Secker (2017).
57. Alford and Secker 2017, 205–216.
58. Quoted in Barnes (2008).
59. Quoted in Barnes (2008).
60. Quoted in Barnes (2008).
61. Quoted in Barnes (2008).
62. Quoted in Raz (2008).
63. Quoted in Raz (2008).
64. Quoted in Turse (2008), 111–12.
65. Mirrlees 2017, 416.
66. Mirrlees 2017, 417.
67. Mirrlees 2017, 417–18.
68. Mirrlees 2017, 419.
69. Mirrlees 2017, 419.
70. Mirrlees 2017, 420.
71. Debruge 2009.
72. Quoted in Debruge (2009).
73. Mirrlees 2017, 427.
74. Quoted in Riesman (2012).
75. Secker n.d.
76. Lacy 2003, 614.
CONCLUSION
1. Quoted in Creel (1952), 149.
2. Mearsheimer 2011, 45–70.
3. Koppl 2018, 228.
4. See Kosar (2005) for more detail on the laws intended to constrain the executive branch.
5. Employment of publicity experts; restrictions, 5 U.S. Code § 3107, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/3107.
6. Lobbying with appropriated moneys, 18 U.S. Code § 1913, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1913.
7. Announcement of payment for broadcast, 47 U.S. Code § 317, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/317.
8. Public Law 106–554 of the 106th Congress, December 21, 2000, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-106publ554/pdf/PLAW-106publ554.pdf.
9. Kosar 2005, 788.
10. Kosar 2005, 794.
11. Kosar 2005, 789.
12. Copeland and Simpson 2004, 6.
13. Kosar 2005, 790.
14. Hudson 2013.
15. H.R. 5736, 112th Congress, 2d Sess., May 10, 2012, https://www.congress.gov/112/bills/hr5736/BILLS-112hr5736ih.pdf. For more on the implications of removing the domestic dissemination ban contained in the Smith-Mundt Act, see Sager (2015).
16. Kosar 2005, 796.
17. de Jasay 1997, 3.
18. This and the subsequent subsections on whistleblowers draws on arguments first developed in Coyne, Goodman, and Hall (2019).
19. An existing literature on bureaucratic monitoring explores various issues with incentive alignment and compliance (see Moe 1985; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989; Huber and Shipan 2002; Lewis 2003) and identifies two alternative mechanisms for the congressional oversight of government bureaus—“police patrols” or “fire alarms” (see McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Weingast 1984; Lupia and McCubbins 1994a, 1994b; Figueiredo, Spiller, and Urbiztondo, 1999; Wangenheim 2011). The “police patrol” option for congressional oversight involves legislators taking a random sample of an agency’s behavior and monitoring for deviations. “Fire-alarm” oversight, in contrast, involves legislators waiting until there is a strong protest against bureaucratic behavior, which is then investigated and dealt with appropriately (see Coyne, Goodman, and Hall, 2019, 4).
20. On the overclassification of information, see Huard (1956), 219, Aftergood (2009), 404, and Goitein and Shapiro (2011), 4–5
21. Quoted in Bromwich (2016).
22. Some of these protections were formally codified in the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2014 (Title VI).
23. Halchin 2015.
24. Perry 2014, 9.
25. Poulsen 2019.
26. Ellsberg 2013.
27. For an overview of the legislation related to national security information, see Elsea (2006) and Vladeck (2015).
28. See Silver (2008), 458–61, and Lutkenhaus (2014). The government’s interpretation has been upheld by the courts in several cases, for example, Morissette v. United States (1952) and United States v. Morison (1988).
29. For an overview of the various aspects of the Espionage Act, see Mulligan and Elsea (2017).
30. Trudell 1986, 205–6; Silver 2008, 461–2.
31. Gathering, transmitting, or losing defense information, 18 U.S. Code § 793, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/793.
32. The punishments for violating the law can be found in 18 U.S. Code § 794, gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign government, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/794, and 18 U.S. Code § 798, disclosure of classified information (https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/798).
33. Biden 1982.
34. Schmidt 2013.
35. For a discussion of the potential for narrow opportunism on the part of whistleblowers as well as a potential solution, see Rahill (2014) and Coyne, Goodman, and Hall (2019).
36. Patrick and Thrall 2004, 28.
37. For the economic and political economy analysis of the media and its potential as a check on political opportunism, see Sen (1984, 1999), Bartels (1993), Mondak (1995), Besley and Burgess (2002), Djankov et al. (2003), Coyne and Leeson (2004, 2009a, 2009b), McMillian and Zoido (2004), Sutter (2004), Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Besley and Prat (2006), Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006), and Leeson and Coyne (2005, 2007).
38. DuVal 2006; Silver 2008.
39. An important precedent to this case was Near v. Minnesota (1931), where the Supreme Court held that prior restraint, or prepublication censorship, violated freedom of speech as per the First Amendment.
40. Silver 2008, 452–43.
41. See DuVal (1986), 582. For a summary of the relevant case law that has emerged after New York Times Co. v. United States (1971), see Duval (1986), 582n7, and Silver (2008), 452–72.
42. Savage and Kaufman 2013.
43. United States of America v. Progressive, Inc. (1979). See Silver (2012), 470–71.
44. Elsea 2013, 7.
45. Risen 2018.
46. Hedges 2002, 143.
47. Hedges 2002, 143.
48. Quoted in Byrne (2003).
49. Hedges 2002, 146.
50. Higgs 1987, 2006b, 2012.
51. Havel 1985/1986, 31, emphasis in original.
52. Havel 1985/1986, 35–36.
53. Havel 1985/1986, 39–40.
54. Sharp 2012, 28, emphasis in original.
55. Schumpeter 1950, 262.
56. Higgs 1987; Coyne and Hall 2018.
57. Higgs 2015, 276.
58. Ostrom 1991; Boettke 2018; Aligica, Boettke, and Tarko 2019.
59. Astore 2018.
60. Chodorov 1938, 2.