5
Andrei Kazakevich
There is a Thorn – it looks so old,
In truth, you’d find it hard to say
How it could ever have been young,
It looks so old and grey…
And all have joined in one endeavour
To bury this poor Thorn forever.
William Wordsworth, The Thorn, 1798
‘10 July 1994, Sunday. I have never noticed the information printed under the date (in an office desk calendar). This time, though, I read it: “Sunrise at 04:51, sunset at 21:38. Daytime length 16 [hours]:07 [minutes]”. Then I thought: “What a long day that will be…”’ (Kebich, 2008, p. 8). On that long day, the second round of the presidential elections was held, when Viacheslav Kebich, the undisputed leader of the Belarusian nomenklatura, who had practically all the reins of power in his hands, suffered a devastating defeat from an outsider and until then little-known Aleksandr Lukashenko. This event put an end to the political domination of the Belarusian nomenklatura that had lasted for about 45 years. The consequences of the event still have their impact on the present political development of Belarus.
In this chapter, I will chart the political history of this political group, from its birth at the end of the 1940s, then its prosperity in the 1950s to 1970s, its decline in the 1980s, to its collapse in the beginning of the 1990s. The main attention will be paid to the description of its inner structural contradictions, dynamics of appointments at the top level of power, and its relationship with the Centre of the Union. I will show the mechanisms of the formation of various groups within the political elite of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and the reasons for their decline and collapse.
Overview of historiography and methods
The politics of the late Soviet period is, however, not a popular topic for research. A certain role is played by political sensitivity. Until now, Belarus has emphasized its continuity with the Soviet period and does not encourage the discussion of its ‘dark side’. Besides, those who made their careers during the Soviet era, still hold strong positions in academic circles. It is not yet history for them; it is merely the past that is not worth digging into so as to avoid old grievances and conflicts.
A few special monographs are fully or partially devoted to the post-war political history of Belarus. They include many useful facts and materials but their main drawback is the absence of proper politics, i.e., the struggle among people and groups for influence and power. Such a tradition was rooted back in the Soviet times. For instance, the five-volume History of the Belarusian SSR has a separate volume about the post-war development (Filimonau, 1975). There is, however, only one episode in it that series, which describes the resignation of Beria in 1953, where one can see political conflicts: ‘The attempt of the political adventurist Beria and his accomplices to stage a coup d’état, kill leading figures of our party and the state, including prominent persons of the national republics, proved to be a failure’ (103). In all other cases, the reshuffle of senior staff looks very similar, without any explanation of the reasons, circumstances, and consequences, which does not provide for the reconstruction of proper political history. At the same time, the main focus of the description is on the presentation of economic and social statistics, the intensity of potato and other agricultural crop cultivation, success in the growth of living standards, materials of the Congresses of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Belarus (CPB),1 etc. Similar information is presented in other publications of that kind from the Soviet period (Ignatenko, 1977, pp. 439–616).
Unfortunately, such a tradition has been preserved in contemporary Belarusian publications. Similarly, the publication of the Belarusian National Academy of Science analyses the system of public administration, the state of public life, and economic development, but it does not touch upon internal political development in the Belarusian SSR. See, for example, Kavalenia (2012, pp. 136–438) and Kastsiuk (2007, pp. 5–154; 2008, pp. 337–542). This pertains not only to the publications supported by the government but also to the ones prepared without government funding. In contrast to the former, non-governmental publications are more critical of the peculiarities of the Soviet development of Belarus, such as on Russification, dependence on the Union Centre, disproportionate economic development, ecologic issues, and the agricultural crisis. Strangely, even the many difficulties and specificities of the relationship between Minsk and Moscow are not specifically tackled in these publications, not to mention the internal politics of the Belarusian SSR (Golubei, 2016, pp. 3–79; Miranovich, 2003, pp. 161–198; Shybeka, 2003, pp. 338–400).
A somewhat more detailed consideration of Soviet politics began in 1988, when the opposition to the CPB – the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF) was founded. This pertains to the abovementioned publications as well as to the various ones concerned with the modern political development of Belarus (Ekadumau, 2001, pp. 9–17; Natchyk, 2005, pp. 17–37; Ignatsik, 2011, pp. 8–27; Kazakevich, 2011, pp. 157–166). Belarusian historiography practically does not touch upon the political history of the post-war period. All the development after Stalin’s death and until the emergence of the BNF in 1988 is presented as a monotonous, apolitical period without any visible changes and practically without any political events on the republican level.
A certain understanding of the political development of the Belarusian SSR is provided by biographical works, where one can find different conflicts and other processes within the Belarusian nomenklatura: for instance, the biographies of the leaders of the Belarusian SSR (Ioffe, 2008), Panteleimon Ponomarenko (Ioffe, 2015), Kirill Mazurov (Golubeva, 2018), Piotr Masherov (Velichko, 2018), and others. Memoirs also play their role, like the recollections of Kirill Mazurov (1987), Viacheslav Kebich (2008), Nikolai Dementei (2005), Vasilii Leonov (2003), and others.
In accordance with the tradition, except for separate and very important fragments, politics suddenly ‘emerged’ here in 1988. Political events, down to the smallest details, emotions, and motives, start to be scrupulously detailed with the beginning of the independence period. The description of earlier events, as a rule, was once again very sterile and consisted only of mentioning separate facts, the contribution of Soviet leaders to post-war development, and, rarely, giving the sense of people of flesh and blood acting. Thus, a comprehensive reconstruction of the political processes, motives, and reasons for top-level leadership changes, group interests, and conflicts became practically impossible.
In this kind of situation, a modest body of literature on Belarusian Soviet politics within the framework of Western Soviet Studies would be useful. In the circumstances of the Cold War, foreign authors were specifically interested in political coalitions, disagreements, and conflicts. They collected relevant information bit by bit mainly from publicly available sources. Unfortunately, only a few such publications were directly related to Belarus. Undoubtedly, the most important work is written by Michael Urban (1989) published in the USA and translated into Belarusian in 2010. The book covers the period between 1966 and 1986 and gives a detailed description of group divisions within the Belarusian nomenklatura, factional and regional politics, the representation of various groups within the elite, and so on. The analysis of Belarusian nomenklatura politics in the 1980s is especially useful and detailed, particularly with regard to the appearance of the Minsk City Industrial Group (MCIG) on the political stage. Indeed, the phenomenon of the MCIG was first identified and described by Urban (2010, pp. 134–155). Other international works on Belarus also carry certain importance such as Vakar (1956) and Knight (1982). The understanding of political processes is also greatly supported by the publications devoted to Soviet politics in general and particularly to agricultural policy and issues related to the relationship between the union republics and the Centre (Werner, 1972; Harasymiw, 1984; Blackwell, 1979; Breslauer 1986; Miller, 1977), and especially the research by Willerton (1992) on patronage networks and informal contacts.
Methods
It is impossible to cover all aspects of the Belarusian SSR’s political development within the scope of this chapter. Thus, we will focus mainly on the processes in the highest ranks of the leadership, which, for the purposes of the present chapter, we limit to the members of the Bureau of the Central Committee (CC) of the CPB (CPB(b) before 1952). We will also employ as fully as we can the results of other few studies on the Belarusian Soviet elite. This will leave out many important aspects of politics on the republican, institutional, and regional levels. Furthermore, the formal membership of the Bureau did not always reflect the real political situation. Nevertheless, this kind of approach in general is precise enough to reflect the political evolution of the Belarusian SSR in the post-war period and can be a starting point for further research in the field.
On the basis of the analysis of political developments, earlier studies in Belarusian and Western historiography, the analysis of the membership of the CC CPB Bureau, and biographical and memoir literature, I will make an attempt to present a comprehensive depiction of the political history of Belarus from the early 1940s until the beginning of the 1990s. Political history is primarily understood as the formation, development, and decline of different political groups at the top leadership level, the relationships among these groups, changes in top positions, and the relationship of the top leaders of the Belarusian SSR with the Centre in Moscow. The mechanisms, reasons, and the political sense of the ongoing changes as well as their influence on the further political development of Belarus will also be analysed.
Factions within the Soviet Belarusian nomenklatura
It is quite complicated to single out political groups and factions in Soviet Belarus, like in most other studies of a political elite. The membership of a ‘faction’ is rarely evident and can easily be disputed. Naturally, factions did not have a clear membership, structure, or bodies for decision-making and coordination of actions in the Belarusian SSR. Besides, separate Party officials could change their loyalty throughout their political career. Leaving a detailed analysis of the topic aside, which can be seen in other works with respect to the whole of the USSR (Blackwell, 1979; Blackwell and Hulbary, 1973; Cleary, 1974; Moses, 1976) and based on Belarusian materials (Urban, 1989), the core of the present research is the following approach to the identification of the political groups.
The partisans included all the participants and organizers of the partisan movement on the territory of Belarus between 1941 and 1944, primarily, the people who participated directly in military operations but also the organizers of the resistance at the Belarusian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (BHPM). Three groups can be identified in accordance with their relationship to the Party, bureaucracy, and combat experience among the partisans. Firstly, these are the people who had not been in prominent Party positions before the war but actively entered the partisan resistance and were recruited later to the Party structures. For our purpose, they can be called the ‘original partisans’. The most distinctive examples are Piotr Masherov (CC CPB First Secretary, 1965–1980, who was a teacher of physics and mathematics at a rural secondary school before the war), Nikolai Polozov (candidate then member of the CC Bureau, 1968–1987; a teacher at a rural school before the war), Stanislav Pilotovich (candidate member of the Bureau and CC Secretary, 1961–1972; head of a rural medical aid post and the Secretary of the Regional Komsomol for a few months before the war), and so on.
The second group comprises the ‘Party partisans’, who had been in prominent Party positions before the war and participated in combat operations after the German invasion. Participation in the partisan movement for them was a logical, though very important stage of their political biographies. Notable examples include Kirill Mazurov (the CC CPB First Secretary, 1956–1965, who was a Secretary of the Homiel (Gomel) gorkom (City Party Committee) of the Komsomol, then First Secretary of the Brest (obkom) Regional Party Committee of the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) before the war), Vasilii Kozlov (candidate then full member of the CC Bureau, 1962–1987; he was the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and Second Secretary of the Minsk obkom before the war), and Fiodr Surganov (Secretary, then Second Secretary, candidate then Bureau member, 1956–1977; he was the First Secretary of the Mahiliou (Mogilev) obkom of the Komsomol before the war).
Finally, the third group comprises the ‘organizers’ of the partisan resistance, who worked in the Belarusian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (BHPM). They did not participate directly in combat operations but were active in the organization of the resistance in line with their positions, as these functions had been assigned to the Party. It is noteworthy that most of them took leading positions in the Belarusian SSR at the beginning or during the war. The war and their participation in the organization of the partisan movement became an important stage in their political career. Prominent examples include Mikhail Zimianin (candidate then Bureau member and CC Second Secretary, 1945–1954; Komsomol First Secretary before and during the war) and Piotr Kalinin (Second Secretary, candidate then Bureau member, 1941–1953; First Secretary of Vilejka obkom before the war).
As far as the post-war political development of the Belarusian SSR is concerned, it is difficult to see any essential difference between the ‘original’ and the ‘Party’ partisans. A substantial political distance between them and the ‘organizers’ can, however, be traced throughout the whole period. As will be shown below, all the ‘organizers’ were dismissed from senior posts almost immediately after the ‘original partisans’, who had real combat experience, became much stronger.
Identification of all other groups and factions in the Belarusian nomenklatura is less obvious and presents methodological difficulties as there is no unified criteria to single them out. All such groups were quite loose; they did not have any organizational potential, regional basis, or identity. They appeared to be more akin to situational coalitions of functionaries (their clients). In most cases, the representatives of the group collaborated with the partisans and were not in political conflict with them. Two such groups, however, played an important role in the political development of Belarus in the 1970s – the Council of Ministers (Sovmin) Group and the Minsk City Industrial Group – although their structure and political organisation needs further analysis.
The ‘Sovmin’ Group and the Minsk City Industrial Group (MCIG)
The importance and influence of the Group was determined primarily by the power of the Centre, which, especially in the 1970s, was active in promoting the Group to the CPB CC Bureau and other leading positions. It is for this reason that Urban (2010, pp. 134–155) defines most of its representatives as the ‘clients of Brezhnev’ in his research. This kind of definition does not seem to be appropriate as it does not reflect the political nature of the Group, which had emerged before Brezhnev’s accession to power. Not all of its representatives were Brezhnev’s clients in the full sense of the word. The terminology in this case is not firmly established but our suggestion is to define the group as the ‘Sovmin’ Group. This kind of definition is conditional, as the Group was never solely related to the Council of Ministers. Most of its representatives were, however, related to their work in the Belarusian SSR Council of Ministers, in the ministries and state committees, and also other executive structures. All the key representatives of the Group were closely connected with the leadership of the Council of Ministers: Tikhon Kiseliov, (Chairman of the Belarusian SSR Council of Ministers, 1959–1978), Аleksandr Aksenov (Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 1978–1983), and Vladimir Brovikov (Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 1983–1986). As mentioned above, the phenomenon of the MCIG was thoroughly and successfully described in the research by Urban. That is why we fully accept his interpretation of the MCIG for the purposes of the present research.
Division into periods
The post-war history of the Belarusian Soviet elite can be divided into four main and two additional periods. Two additional periods make up the ‘pre-history’ (1941–1947): firstly, the start of the war until the appointment of Nikolai Gusarov as First Secretary, and particularly the active involvement of the top-level leadership of the CPB in the organization of the partisan movement. The second period comprised the creation of channels for the recruitment of partisans to the top positions of power. There is also a ‘post-history’ from 1994 to 2001 involving the nomenklatura’s participation in the independent Belarusian leadership in the role of a subordinated partner with their subsequent elimination from the political arena. In between, the four main periods are:
Consolidation, 1947–1956: this period was characterized by the consolidation of the Belarusian Soviet nomenklatura on the basis of the partisan groups, starting with the appointment of Nikolai Gusarov as First Secretary until the appointment to the same position of one of the leaders of the partisans, Kirill Mazurov, the first Belarusian in the post-war history of the Belarusian SSR.
Political predominance, 1956–1983: the political predominance of the Belarusian Soviet nomenklatura was the main feature of this period. Belarus was governed by popular and authoritative Soviet leaders – ‘partisans’ like Kirill Mazurov and Piotr Masherov. The influence of their group started to diminish from the beginning of the 1970s, however, as a result of the interference from the Centre. This period also included an interregnum of leadership by Tikhon Kiseliov, who was not a ‘partisan’ but generally preserved the continuity of the past decades.
Decline and fragmentation, 1983–1990: the decline, fragmentation and crisis of the leadership, and arrival of the weakly-formalized Minsk City Industrial Group at the top country positions occurred in the late Soviet period. It began with the appointment of Nikolai Sliunkov as First Secretary and ended with elections to the Belarusian SSR Supreme Soviet in 1990 and election of Viacheslav Kebich as the head of the government.
Political crisis and disintegration, 1990–1994: from the parliamentary elections in 1990 until the victory of Aleksandr Lukashenko in the presidential elections of 1994. This was a period of failed attempts of uncoordinated groups of the former Soviet nomenklatura to cling to power.
The Soviet regime and national liberation
Our great Socialist Motherland is an example of marvellous collaboration among big and small Soviet nations. It was possible only under conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which was established in our country as a result of the victorious October revolution, that the big and small, developed and underdeveloped, strong and weak nations and peoples of our country were able to receive full opportunities for their development.
(Krukouski et al., 1958, p. 5)
This is how nationality policy in the USSR was described in the academic Soviet history of Belarus. The liberation, in particular ‘national liberation’, was an important slogan of the Bolsheviks. Moreover, they promoted it as an important and unique achievement of their policy. The Soviet Socialist Republic of Belarus was declared in 1919, and formally it was a sovereign state. The political liberation of the Belarusians, however, did not happen.
On the one hand, the Bolsheviks introduced a programme of ‘Belarusianization’, which provided for the transfer to the Belarusian language in government bureaucracy, standard and higher education, and many other initiatives for developing the Belarusian culture. The ongoing process could be called cultural liberation, which attained its fullest expression in late 1920s. Completely different tendencies determined the situation on the political level, and the role of the Belarusians in them was not a decisive one.
Bolshevik political theory required the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat with the Communist Party as its avant-garde in the newly created state. The problem was that the number of the Belarusians within the proletariat was insignificant. It was still smaller within the membership of the Communist Party. An absolute majority of the members of the national liberation movement were representatives of the petty nobility and peasants. They shared socialist ideas but did not support the Bolsheviks and neither did the majority of the peasants. In its turn, the Soviet government looked at the peasants with extreme political distrust and suspicion.
The political leadership of the Belarusian SSR of the 1920s and 1930s was not Belarusian in its composition. That pertained to the top-level leadership as well as to the mid-level officials. Paradoxically, even the policy of ‘Belarusianization’ was introduced in many cases by non-Belarusian cadres. The territory of the Belarusian SSR shifted significantly. At the start of 1922, it consisted only of six districts (paviets) of the former Minsk governorate (gubernija). Mahiliou and Viciebsk (Vitebsk) regions were only attached in 1924, while Homiel region was only added in 1926. At the same time, the inclusion of these territories meant the addition of previously established local Party leadership structures to the Belarusian SSR political leadership, which had been formed as administrations of the provinces of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR).
A considerable number of prominent Belarusian Soviet personalities were subject to repression in the 1930s, such as Aleksandr Cherviakov (head of the government of the Belarusian SSR, 1920–1937), which further weakened the Belarusian component of the new government. None of the leaders of the first years of Soviet Belarus lived to see the beginning of World War II. Neither the nature of Soviet power in the Belarusian SSR in the 1920s and 1930s nor the cadre policy of the pre-war period offered any basis for considering the formation of the Belarusian Soviet elite or the Belarusian nomenklatura. The system in general, however, was open for the recruitment of local cadres, which should have gradually led to the strengthening of their political importance. The process was hampered by Stalin’s policy directed at widescale changes in the Party apparatus, which included not only the purges and mass repressions, but also the regular inter-regional relocation of Party operatives.
The policy of largescale inter-regional redistribution did not last long, as it led to numerous conflicts, a deficit of cadres, provoked silent resistance at a local level, and, generally speaking, was not effective in the organizational sense. The number of Belarusians in the Party ranks was growing; ever more high positions were taken by the younger generation of the functionaries, who had joined the Party after the Revolution and the establishment of Soviet power. Sooner or later, the system had to promote them to the highest leading positions. The only question was when and through what mechanisms that would happen. Generally, this process was slower than in most of other republics. A number of coincidental institutional factors, political events, and personal circumstances led to the establishment of the Belarusian nomenklatura in the second half of the 1940s, and it was formed by the leaders and active participants of the pro-Soviet partisan movement of World War II (1941–1944).
Conditions for the establishment of the ‘partisan’ faction, 1941–1947
As mentioned above, the political development and the nationality policy of the Belarusian SSR had to lead, one way or another, to the formation of the Party elite, where local cadres and ethnic Belarusians would have dominant positions. That happened at different times in all republics of the USSR, with the exception, perhaps, of Latvia and Kazakhstan.2 The mechanisms of how local officials gained access to the top positions were, however, different.
In Belarus, the most probable option was the model based on gradual career growth of the local cadres within the Party. Other models did not have any institutional footing. The Belarusians did not have an influential patron in Moscow to rely on as a basis for the formation of a faction, like in the case of Georgia. There were no enterprises or industrial regions strategically important for the Centre which could have produced an influential group of Party functionaries, as in the case of the Ukraine. The ‘Baltic model’ built on the basis of those who had worked in the underground was also impossible.
The ‘natural’ scenario for the political development in Belarus was, however, changed by World War II. The partisan movement was organized in all the occupied territories of the USSR, and the leadership of the communist parties of all the occupied republics took part in its organization. Due to certain coincidental circumstances, however, the partisan movement in Belarus established much stronger long-term relationships and channels for recruitment to the Party nomenklatura than in other regions.
The most common explanation is the ‘popular’ nature of the resistance with high partisan activity and support from the population. According to the official data, over 374,000 people took part in the pro-Soviet partisan movement in Belarus (Pashkou, 1999, p. 414), so, about 4% of the population, or one partisan for every 25 residents. Leaving aside the accuracy of the data, the scale of the resistance in itself does not explain the formation of the political elite from the partisans. According to the same official data, about 1.3 million Belarusians and those born in Belarus took part in the combat operations of World War II. So, the number of the veterans who had been fighting in the regular military forces was at least threefold.
Michael Urban (1989, pp. 13–14) emphasises the combat experience of the partisans as the key factor for the faction’s formation:
The future political leaders of Belorussia were tempered in the crucible of partisan resistance. Operating behind enemy lines and in infrequent communication with Soviet authorities, the partisans enjoyed considerable autonomy in all aspects of their activity and organization. Out of the shared experience of wartime resistance and governmental administration in those areas liberated by the partisans, emerged a tightly knit cadre whose members rapidly ascended the political ladder in the postwar years and found their way into leading party and governmental posts in the BSSR by the mid fifties.
They acted behind enemy lines without permanent communication with the Soviet government, which allowed the partisans to have considerable autonomy in all aspects of their actions and organization. Closely-knit cadres arose from the general experience of the Resistance during the war and the governance of the liberated zones; they quickly climbed to the top in the post-war years, and found their way to the leading party and government positions of the Belarusian SSR until mid-1950s.
The independence of the partisans should not, however, be overestimated as their activity never reached a level of considerable autonomy. Most of the leaders of the partisan movement were not born in Belarus, and most of them were in prominent Party positions before World War II, so they were already part of the nomenklatura. In any case, there is no basis for the statement that the partisans became a political group during the war. This notion does not explain how Belarusian partisans advanced to top positions and why the same did not happen in other republics of the USSR. In our opinion, the start of the war and development of the partisan movement could not, as in other republics, advance the partisans to top political positions or advance only a few of them. The phenomenon of the ‘partisans’ in the Belarusian SSR should be linked to the political peculiarities of the partisan movement organization in Belarus.
The formation of the partisan movement in the USSR started immediately after the German invasion. It was, however, quite chaotic. The creation of partisan units was through three main organizational directions: through the NKVD (security forces) where the fourth unit was established for partisan purposes in August 1941, through military intelligence, and through the ‘political’ (Communist Party and Komsomol) line.
At the same time, there were two contradictory concepts of the partisan movement within the Union leadership. The security forces considered that the NKVD would play a decisive role, and this group was supported by Secret Police Chief Lavrentii Beria and the leadership of the Ukrainian SSR (Vasilii Sergeenko and Nikita Khrushchev). Beria believed that the concept of a largescale partisan movement with a centralized administration behind enemy lines was ineffective (Musial, 2018, p. 182). The other group was formulated by the Belarusian leader, First Secretary Panteleimon Ponomarenko, in August, 1941, and suggested the organization of the partisan movement under political (Party) leadership, not the NKVD and army. Musial (2018, p.183) summarized their thinking: ‘The partisan movement is the movement of the masses, and it has to be managed by the party, not by the military’. Competition between the two concepts on the Union and republican levels continued throughout the war. In Belarus, however, the political organization decisively prevailed and was implemented.
There was another difference between Belarus and other republics, primarily the Ukraine. In most cases, district and regional Party structures were put in charge of the organization of partisan units. In Belarus, however, the management of the process was taken over by the republic’s leadership, establishing an advantageous channel for the establishment of contacts between the leaders of the partisan movement and the top leadership on the republican, not regional level.
In spring 1942, Ponomarenko’s position received support, and the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (CHPM) under the Red Army General Headquarters was established on 30 May with the purpose of coordinating and developing the partisan movement across the entire occupied territory. Sergeenko and Taras Korneev became its deputies (representing the NKVD and military intelligence, respectively). Political supervision of the partisan movement had gained the upper hand but the situation on the ground was different. The Party functionaries (secretaries of the raikoms [district party committees], etc.) were also able to be the heads of regional partisan headquarters as well as the heads of relevant departments of the NKVD (Bakanov, 2017).
In the autumn of 1942, there was another attempt to put the partisan movement under institutional, this time military, control. On 6 September 1942, a new position of Commander-in-Chief of the partisan movement under Kliment Voroshilov was approved and the CHPM was placed under his command. On 19 November, however, the position was terminated. In February 1943, the CHPM was dismissed and recreated again in April, but the Ukrainian Headquarters was not included as it was reporting directly to the General Headquarters of the Army Commander-In-Chief. That happened essentially due to the conflict between Ponomarenko and First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Nikita Khrushchev, and the Deputy of the Ukrainian HPM Ilya Starinov. After the reorganization, the Belarusian line became the main one and the most active in CHPM operations until it was dissolved in January 1944.
While the ‘political’ and the ‘institutional’ approaches to the organization of the resistance were squabbling at the Union level, coordination in the occupied regions was different, and the top Party leadership in the western republics had their own priorities. For Belarus, however, the situation throughout the war was unambiguous. The top leadership of the Belarusian SSR and the Belarusian First Secretary personally considered the organization of the partisan movement as their priority. Moreover, it was to be performed on the basis of the Party and Komsomol structures instead of military intelligence or the NKVD. The successful and effective organization of the partisan movement along Party lines became a matter of personal ambition for Ponomarenko on the Union level. Belarus naturally became the testing ground for the creation of an ideal ‘partisan republic’ both in terms of real political and military activity and in terms of its character and identity.
The strong ties within the top Belarusian Party bodies to, and even their dependence upon, the successful organization of the partisan movement created favourable conditions for the recruitment of the participants in the partisan movement to top Party positions, including the Central Committee, which was unusual in comparison to other republics. Numerous acquaintances and formal and non-formal links were established among the top-level Party leaders of the Belarusian SSR and the partisans based on their experience of joint operations. All of this turned the partisans into a natural and important resource of recruitment for Party leaders at different levels together with career Party functionaries. Ponomarenko promoted the advancement of the partisans within the Party and became their first political ‘patron’. It is noteworthy that practically all prominent Soviet Belarusian officials generally held a good opinion of him (Mazurov, 1987, pp. 405–406; Kebich, 2008, pp. 111–112).
The first political challenge and consolidation, 1947–1956
The experience of the war and especially of the first post-war years showed the political potential of the participants and organizers of the partisan movement, who were local cadres and, at the same time, did not give any reason to doubt their political loyalty. As much as we can judge from the documents and political events, the partisans did not comprise a well-established political group at the end of the war with stable contacts, an identity, perceptions of common interests, and a leadership. This uncoordinated group of yesterday’s ‘original’ and ‘Party’ partisans and organizers of the partisan movement was not structured. Conversely, their representation in high party positions was growing. The personnel policy of Ponomarenko, who was associated with the partisan movement himself, was generally directed at reinforcing the partisans, whom he considered reliable and loyal cadres of the Soviet system despite many not having proper career experience in Party bodies.
The process did not evoke any obvious political disagreements inside the republic, while interference from the Centre was limited. The consolidation of the new group was progressing rapidly and successfully. The only serious attempt at reviewing the cadre policy and preventing the process of strengthening the positions of the former partisan was undertaken between 1947 and 1950, when Moscow appointed a new First Secretary of the Belarusian Communist Party, Nikolai Gusarov.
As noted above, during and immediately after the war, the functionaries related to the CHPM, the BHPM, and directly to the Soviet partisan movement on the territory of Belarus gradually buttressed their positions within the top leadership of the Belarusian SSR. The growth of the influence of the partisans, however, presented a problem of control for the Centre. Furthermore, the partisans did not enjoy the confidence of some Party functionaries due to their lack of Party experience.
In 1947, after some success in their formation, the partisans faced their first political challenge when Ponomarenko was moved to the position of the Chairman of the Belarusian SSR Council of Ministries, and then to Moscow in 1948.3 The new First Secretary, Nikolai Gusarov, was initially distrustful if not hostile towards the partisan cadres. In his memoirs, Ponomarenko (1992) said of Gusarov: ‘How were the bodies of the Party and the government formed in Belarus after the liberation? They took an “Ivan” from a partisan brigade, and that was it’. The representatives of the Belarusian Soviet elite often gave a negative assessment of Gusarov. Surely, this was politically related to the attempt of the new leader to slow down, if not reverse, the formation of the partisan faction. The results of Gusarov’s new policy appeared to be, however, modest. The local Party elite generally managed to unite, politically overpowering Gusarov and bolstered its position before the 19th CP(b) Congress in 1949 (the first post-war Congress).
Primarily, the consolidation progressed due to the eviction of the pre-war cadres, the extent of which can be compared to the composition of the CPB(b) Bureau following the 18th Party Congress in 1940. Of those elected in 1940, only Lavrentii Tzanava, the head of the NKVD, remained a member after 1949. Six members and candidates were removed from the membership right before or immediately after the beginning of the war (between 1940 and 1941). One was killed at the front (Vladimir Vaneev), but a further nine lost their seats between 1947 and 1949.
As per results of the plenum after the 19th Congress, four out of nineteen elected people were sent to the republic from Moscow (the First Secretary and the heads of the law enforcement structures), while eight out of nine others can be more or less attributed to the new partisan faction. Out of these, only Piotr Kalinin had been a member of the Bureau since the beginning of the war. All the others came to top political leadership after the end of the war, and four of them as the result of the 19th Congress (including Masherov, who would become the leader and the standard bearer for all the partisans from 1960s). The integrity of the group at this stage remained an open question, yet, the general picture was that the partisans had strengthened their position and became the dominant political group.
Nikolai Gusarov’s performance was not successful. As soon 1950, he was replaced by Nikolai Patolichev, who cooperated with the partisans and local cadres. If Ponomarenko was, in a sense, the first ‘patron’ of the group, Patolichev became its partner.4 The main political tendency during Patolichev’s leadership was the decisive rise of not only the organizers of the partisan movement but also its direct participants including the future leader of the republic, Kirill Mazurov, to key leadership positions.
After Stalin’s death in 1953 and during the confrontation between Lavrentii Beria and Nikita Khrushchev, the partisans were not very active. They refused to support Beria, however, at a crucial moment, when he tried to oust Patolichev (Chernyshova, 2020) In a later interview, Mazurov (1987) mentioned the situation:
We were summoned, and all of us – the secretaries, Belarusians and Russians – without any collusion came out against the proposed decision of the Presidium. The discussion was rough: the decision was wrong; it should be terminated… We were summoned the next morning, and it was announced that the decision of the Presidium of the CC was terminated.
The arrest and execution of Beria took place soon after the events described, and Khrushchev’s rise to power only strengthened the position of the partisans. The year 1956 was marked by a new stage in the political development of not only the partisan faction but also of all the Belarusian Soviet elite. Out of thirteen people within the ranks of the Bureau, nine can be attributed to the partisans; six of them had experience of military combat during World War II. Consequently, a ‘partisan’ faction was formed in a shape that determined the further development of the Belarusian SSR until the first half of the 1980s.
Domination, prosperity, and the beginning of the decline of the partisan faction, 1956–1983
On the one hand, the appointment of Kirill Mazurov as CPB First Secretary was a pivotal event and reflected the arrival of a new political era. On the other hand, it was a reflection of a tendency towards consolidation. At the time, the Belarusians and the partisans had strong and even dominant positions at the top leadership of the Belarusian SSR. The faction further ascended nine years later, when Piotr Masherov became First Secretary in 1965. He was destined to become the symbol of Belarusian Soviet wellbeing and, to a large extent, a prominent political personality in post-war political history.
At the beginning of the 1950s, Kirill Mazurov was undoubtedly one of the most promising Belarusian leaders, whose only comparable rival in importance was Mikhail Zimianin (the Second Secretary, 1949–1953). Between 1940 and 1946, Zimianin was First Secretary of the Belarusian Komsomol; he was among the organizers of the partisan movement, and he remained in occupied territory for some time, though he did not take an active part in the combat operations.
Beria’s plan, which failed, envisioned Zimianin becoming leader of the republic in 1953. After Beria’s arrest, there were no signs of political disloyalty in Zimianin’s actions but his further successful career development occurred outside Belarus.5 The circumstances and reasons for the choice of Mazurov by Moscow in 1956 are not completely clear, as available sources do not explain his appointment. Mazurov’s victory reflected the battlefield partisans’ takeover of key positions in the Party instead of the organizers of the partisan movement who had previously dominated.
One way or another, the political success of the partisan group, as in other similar cases, was closely related to the policy of the Centre. The partisans and Mazurov personally supported Khrushchev in 1953 and gained political advantage following his victory in the power struggle to succeed Stalin. Relations between Minsk and Moscow were, however, not so warm. The relationship between Mazurov and Khrushchev deteriorated quite quickly due to differences in opinions on agriculture, administrative reform, and other new developments. Particularly, Mazurov opposed the corn campaign, the destruction of private subsidiary farming, separation of economic administration into industrial and agricultural sectors, and the creation of the system of Councils of the National Economy (Sovnarkhozy). Notably, Mazurov repeatedly expressed his disagreement publicly (see, among others: Golubeva, 2018, pp. 210–229).
This confrontation, however, did not cause the fall of either the partisan faction or Mazurov. Instead, it led only to the group’s new political success. The partisans became natural allies of Brezhnev in the process of Khrushchev’s removal. As a result of the rearrangements in the top leadership of the USSR, Mazurov was given the post of the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and full membership of the Politburo in 1965 – the highest position at the Union level ever taken by a Belarusian. Piotr Masherov became the leader of the republic and remained in the post until his accidental death at the peak of his popularity in 1980.
From the 1950s to the 1970s, we can identify the formation of a sort of ‘Mazurov-Masherov consensus’ in the development of the Belarusian SSR, which was marked by strong economic growth, industrialization, the presence of a popular leadership, a gradual transition of the education system and media to the Russian language, while certain aspects of the Belarusian culture were supported and there was substantial investment in the creation of a Belarusian Soviet identity and myth of the partisans.6 From the political standpoint, despite the influence and popularity of the two partisan leaders, especially that of Masherov, their political careers were not smooth. At the beginning of the 1970s, relations with the top Soviet leadership, primarily with Brezhnev, became strained.
The consolidation of the partisan faction started in the 1940s; they reached the leadership level of the republic in 1956, and the peak of their political influence at the CC CPB Bureau level can be quite precisely identified as between 1959 and 1971, when the partisans simultaneously held the posts of the first and the second secretaries of the CC. The politicians associated with the partisans accounted for 50–70% of the CC Bureau membership after the first post-war CPB Congress in 1949.
The turn of the tide started in 1971, so still during the ‘golden years’ of Masherov’s rule. As a result of the 17th CPB Congress, the political composition of the Bureau was ‘blurry’, primarily due to the ‘Sovmin’ group that was actively promoted to leading positions by the Kremlin (Urban, 1989, p.117) but also due to other functionaries, whose political profile is hard to clearly define. The rearrangements and weakening of the partisans was due to interference from Moscow. There were no signs of open confrontation among the groups, at least available sources do not allow us to establish any conflict. The partisans’ competitors did not have an institutional and regional basis or any internal unity. Yet, the expansion of their influence strengthened the isolation of the partisans in the republic. Nevertheless, Masherov remained a popular and influential Soviet politician and was even considered to be a possible successor to Brezhnev.
The composition of the Bureau membership in 1979 included only four members out of eighteen who could be definitely associated with the partisans; three more could be attributed as ‘partisan clients’; four belonged to the ‘Sovmin’ group; it is difficult to define the group affiliation of six other members, while one represented the Union structures (as the head of the Belarusian SSR KGB). The loss of political control seemed clear, yet, the problems of the partisans were not perceptible in the shadow of a popular leader.
The relationship with Moscow remained a problem for the partisan group throughout the whole period. The ascension of Khrushchev and Brezhnev to power promoted their political progress, but in both cases relations soon became strained. In the latter case, it led to a substantial weakening of the faction. These discrepancies were not related to expressions of political disloyalty or of nationalism. Primarily, they were related to issues of management organization and economic development, especially in the area of agriculture. Masherov’s popularity and his opposition to Brezhnev could also have played a negative role on the Union level. In Moscow, the ‘partisans’ were often characterized as limited, narrow-minded, and only pursuing their own narrow regional interests.
Mazurov took the position of First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers of the USSR and became a full member of the CC CPSU Politburo in 1965; he was pushed to resignation under pressure from Brezhnev and his entourage in 1978, which dealt another substantial blow to the partisan faction.7 The appointment of Mazurov brought him and the partisans to the top level of the Soviet politics, but the question of his real influence remains open. Following other American authors, Urban (2010, p. 29) makes the point that Mazurov ‘facilitated other partisans in reaching top positions in Moscow and turned the Belarusian faction into an important political group at the All-Union level’. A similar opinion is shared by Willerton (1992, p. 51), who identified nine clients and proteges of Mazurov in the CC CPSU between 1964 and 1982, two of them in the Politburo. Willerton (1992, p. 53) singled out the ‘Belarusian group’ during Brezhnev period as one of five important political networks in the composition of the Politburo and the Secretariat.8
Willerton is probably exaggerating. Mazurov did not create a noticeable group on a Union level, perhaps due to the fact that he could not build close and non-conflict relationship with Brezhnev and his political network and quickly fell into disgrace. There was something of a Belarusian ‘community’ in Moscow, but there is no basis for saying that there was a noticeable and united lobbying group. In any event, this cannot be compared in any way with Ukraine, Georgia, and some other republics. The relationship between Minsk and Moscow never reached such a level as, for instance, the relationship between Tashkent and Moscow during the reign of Sharaf Rashidov in Uzbekistan (see Chapter 4). Such a relationship gave the Uzbek leadership latitude to falsify reports on the delivery of cotton for many years and to implement various corruption schemes. Despite loyalty to the Centre, facilitating Russification processes, and achieving economic successes, the Belarusian Soviet elite did not succeed in exerting essential and sustained influence in Moscow nor did they enjoy special favours from the Soviet leadership.
The end of the ‘partisan’ period was not ultimately due to Mazurov’s dismissal from the political arena, nor Masherov’s accidental death, but because of the death of First Secretary Tikhon Kiseliov. It may seem strange, as the latter was not a partisan but rather, on the contrary, was a leader of another political group. Nevertheless, his short-lived leadership (1980–1983) preserved the ‘Mazurov-Masherov consensus’. In terms of internal policies and cadres, very little changed from the 1970s. Kiseliov was a representative of the older generation of the political elite that came to power in the 1950s, and in his politics he was closer to Mazurov and Masherov than to the politicians who came to power after 1983.9
Thus, the years of 1956–1983 were dominated by the partisan group in the Belarusain SSR under the leadership of two prominent personalities, Mazurov and Masherov, who enjoyed great public popularity in the republic and at the Union level. The peak of their political popularity came during the period of 1959–1971, when the share of the partisans’ membership of the Bureau accounted was 50–70%. The group failed, however, to create a privileged or sustainably favourable relationship with the top leadership of the USSR and also to gain stable influence on the All-Union level. Due to Mazurov and Masherov’s strained relations with Brezhnev, the position of the partisans was weakened at the top level of the Belarusian SSR leadership in the 1970s in favour of the strengthened ‘Sovmin’ group that was promoted by Moscow and because of the expansion of the number of non-affiliated functionaries. The partisan faction received a critical blow as a result of Kirill Mazurov’s forced resignation and Piotr Masherov’s death. Yet, the general ‘Mazurov-Masherov consensus’ remained until the death of First Secretary Kiseliov in 1983.
Decline and fragmentation: the Minsk City Industrial Group, 1983–1990
‘Decline’ is the word extensively used in discussion about events in the Belarusian SSR at the beginning of 1990s, but it is much less used when referring to the events of the first half of the 1980s. In one way or another, many contemporaries recognized the ‘departure of a great epoch’ in 1980 (with Masherov’s death) or in 1983 (with Kiseliov’s death). Nevertheless, only very rarely have these events been given appropriate consideration in the historiography, for example, as Dementei (2005, p. 92) writes:
By recommending him [Nikolai Sliunkov, the new First Secretary after the death of Kiseliov], Moscow primarily expected that the top party leader would be able to strengthen the executive discipline and responsibility of the cadres in the republic, which the CC CPSU believed were somewhat weakened after P. Masherov’s death and due to T. Kiselev’s illness.
Even less attention has been paid to the analysis of the clear decline and fragmentation of the Belarusian nomenklatura. External observers pointed to positive and reform-minded changes in the Belarusian nomenklatura after 1983 with the rise to power of younger, educated functionaries, which seemed to offer a prelude to the Gorbachev era and perestroika. If the USSR had been able to avoid a deep political crisis, this might have been possible. The new generation of Belarusian Soviet nomenklatura was, however, completely unprepared for the upcoming political challenges of the era.
As mentioned above, the decline of the partisans in the highest leadership ranks of the Belarusian SSR started at the beginning of the 1970s, and the key factor was Mazurov and Masherov’s strained relationship with Brezhnev and his entourage, who took steps in order to weaken the political positions of the group in favour of the promotion of their own Brezhnevite clients to the top level leadership. The share of the partisans in the Bureau dropped from 30–40% to 20–30% by the end of the decade.
After 1983, with the accession of Nikolai Sliunkov to the post of CPB First Secretary, the cadre system of the Belarusian SSR underwent a serious purge.10 Strangely enough, the memoirs of those contemporaries do not even mention the event. It is possible that after the departure of key post-war leaders from the political arena significant changes were deemed to be natural and unavoidable. The cadre changes fitted well into the general policy of the new Soviet leader Yuri Andropov (1982–1984) in terms of the renewal of the cadres after Brezhnev’s death. The Centre, relying on local comparatively young functionaries, used the vacuum that evolved after 1983 to dismiss old cadres and renew the leadership. Only a few years, with the accession of Gorbachev, the Centre itself underwent a renewal of cadres. The cadre rearrangements in the Belarusian SSR facilitated the development of republican leaders’ governing experience and also strengthened their relations with Moscow. A noticeable weakening of the political potential and relationship with republican interests took place, however, which later led to disorganization and fragmentation.
New appointments to the highest leadership positions of the CPB reflected the rift in succession with the previous period and, most importantly, promoted those cadres to top positions who were closely related to the large industrial enterprises in Minsk (the Minsk City Industrial Group, MCIG). Most of these enterprises were under the All-Union control and their top executives were very well-connected in the Union ministries. Moreover, these newly appointed persons were practically unknown to the public at large, and they did not enjoy any noticeable authority.
We are far from Urban’s assertion that the MCIG should be viewed as a proper political group. The character of new appointments, further rearrangements, and political events at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, together with memoirs and interviews give us good reason to assess the group as probably being in the initial stages of formation, which were never finalised. The large industrial enterprises of Minsk were good sources of new cadres; however, there was no political unity between them. Moreover, they did not have sustainable vertical links to other branches of Minsk’s economy and lacked a well-developed regional basis (like the Donbass or Dnepropetrovsk regions in Ukraine).
In 1987, after only four years, Nikolai Sliunkov was replaced as First Secretary by Yefrem Sokolov. Neither politicians was able or had time to acquire any reasonable popularity or sustainable support in the republic. Sliunkov’s appointment in 1983 marked the transformation of the MCIG into the most important group at the level of the highest Party leadership. Between 1983 and 1990, the balance of power on the Bureau was based on the domination of the MCIG (40–50% of members) cooperating with the scattered and loyal remains of the old groups. In terms of representation, the peak of the MCIG’s influence was in 1986 when it was represented by eight out of nineteen members in the Bureau. By this time, all members of the partisan group had finally been ousted from the top leadership, and the removal of the old cadres was ongoing.11 By 1989, only one member of the Bureau out of eighteen, Mikhail Lagir, had been a member since in 1970s; all the others were appointed to their positions after 1980.
The Belarusian Soviet nomenklatura were aware of their organizational weakness, a crisis of leadership crisis, and lack of popularity. There was little enthusiasm among them in discussions about the expansion of the autonomy of the Belarusian SSR. Their reaction to notions of political reform was extremely negative. The republican leadership expressed little interest in culture and national ‘revival’. Their understanding of the interests of separate branches of the economy was much deeper than that of the republic and cultural integrity.
The leadership of the CPB took an extremely hard line with respect to the creation and activities of the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) from the moment its Organizational Committee was created in October 1988. As opposed to the other communist parties of the western USSR, the CPB leadership refused to maintain any contacts or participate in discussions with the new unofficial movements. The Belarusian Popular Front was the only popular movement in the Soviet republics that was forced to have its founding Congress outside the borders of the republic (in Vilnius, 24–25 June 1989), and the representatives of the Party leadership did not give any speeches at the Congress. Generally, the MCIG once again demonstrated the inability and unwillingness of the CPB leadership to engage in a sophisticated political game and to strive for sovereignty.
Nevertheless, at the end of 1980s the political situation generally appeared to be positive for the Belarusian nomenklatura. The popularity of the BPF and other alternative movements appeared to be limited. It was considerably lower than in the Baltic republics. As opposed to Ukraine, there were no regions in Belarus where the Popular Front would be able to garner a convincing majority. As a result, the elections to the new USSR Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989 were extremely successful, and democratic candidates scored victories in only a handful of districts and, it seemed, did not present any substantial political threat.
Crisis and disintegration: the end of independent political history, 1990–1994
On the surface, the beginning of the 1990s seemed to be successful for Belarusian nomenklatura, especially compared to the rest of the Soviet republics. The All-Union political and economic crisis led to a collapse in the popularity of the CPB and its leaders among the population, and also sharpened political differences within the party, though it did not have any serious political consequences. There was no serious schism in the Belarusian nomenklatura between the ‘conservatives’ and the ‘reformists’ either on the republican or regional level unlike in Russia or Ukraine. There was no rift in terms of the attitude towards sovereignty and nationality as was the case in the Baltic republics, Moldova, and, again, Ukraine.
The proponents of essential reforms in the Party constituted a small group, and there were no functionaries of the highest or mid-level among them. The main association of the ‘reformists’, the ‘Democratic Platform of the CPSU’, in contrast to Russia and the Ukraine, did not gain any appreciable political traction. Among the party leadership there were practically no supporters of the expansion of republican sovereignty and national revival. The number of the members of the CC CPB who sympathized with the promotion of the national culture and ideas was questionable; in any case, it was in single digits.12 The absolute majority had no affection for or were hostile to the reforms and sovereignty.
The lack of internal challenges was coupled with the weakness of the opposition and all the political groups representing political alternatives, the largest of which was the Belarusian Popular Front. As a result, the outcome of the elections to Supreme Soviet of the Belarusian SSR in spring 1990 was extremely favourable for the Belarusian nomenklatura. If the elected representatives of pro-Soviet forces were in the minority – 20–30% in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, while in Ukraine they managed to form a slim majority of about 52% (Boiko, 2002, pp. 135–149) – in Belarus the nomenklatura’s representatives received at least two-thirds of the seats. It is difficult, however, to determine a precise number due to the blurry political position of most deputies. Notably, no more than 30% of the deputies expressed at least some interest in the political agenda of the reformists (Kazakevich, 2010, pp. 58–60). The main opposition in the form of the BPF received only 7.5% of mandates (Paz’niak and Navumchyk, 2010, p. 13; Kur’ianovich, 2015, p. 27). Nevertheless, the outcome of the 1990 elections reflected the further disintegration of the Soviet elite and turned out to be critical for the influence of the MCIG. If its earlier influence was based on it being well-represented in the Bureau and other Party structures as well as on its good relations with Moscow, both of these factors started losing their importance after the elections.
The Supreme Soviet soon turned out to be the most important political institution in the republic, but the MCIG did not gain decisive influence in the parliament. The elected nomenklatura parliamentarians did not have any organizational unity and constituted a scattered collection of institutional and regional groups, which in no way reflected the political setup of the Belarusian SSR leadership in 1980s. The deputies who could be attributed to the MCIG were in a minority; they did not have any clear political position and were not able to offer a basis for the formation of a sustainable majority after the elections. It took them a long time to arrange a frail coalition in the Parliament consisting of the MCIG, remains of other ‘old’ nomenklatura groups, the agrarians, independents, etc. As a result, it took until spring 1992, two years after the election, to form a parliamentary majority in the form of the ‘Belarus’ coalition.
The position of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the formal head of state, also slipped away from the MCIG. In May 1990, Nikolai Dementei, a prominent nomenklatura representative, was elected to the post of Speaker. Dementei had worked as a CC Secretary for 10 years but was not directly connected to the MCIG. After the failure of the military coup in Moscow in August 1991, his place was taken by Stanislav Shushkevich, a reformist and supporter of democracy and independence. Shushkevich was an ideological and political opponent of the Soviet nomenklatura; yet, the latter only managed to force his resignation in January 1994.
By the end of 1990, the MCIG also lost key positions within the Communist Party. As a result of the 31st CPB Congress, which took place between 28 November and 1 December 1990, Anatol’ Malafeev was elected CPB First Secretary (formerly the First Secretary of Minsk raikom), and Aleksei Kamai was elected Second Secretary (formerly the First Secretary of Homyel raikom and a CC Secretary). Both made their careers in Homyel; both cooperated with the MCIG after the cadre rearrangements of mid 1980s but did not belong to the group. Calculating from the Party Plenary session protocols of 14 December 1990, out of 22 members of the Bureau, only about three were associated with the representatives of the MCIG. The outcome of the Congress disrupted the continuity of the political development since 1980. The composition of the new Bureau included only five former members, and the longest serving had only been a member since 1985. The CPB was rapidly losing its political position to the growth of the influence of the Supreme Soviet, and it completely disappeared from the political arena after the failed August 1991 Coup.
The only decisive success for the MCIG was the retention of control over the government, which, after the weakening and later the ban of the Communist Party, gained full executive power. Viacheslav Kebich remained the Chairman of the Council of Ministers; it also included Ling, Miasnikovich, and many other functionaries and executives associated with the MCIG. The remains of the MCIG represented by Kebich in coalition with scattered and atomized representatives of other pockets of former nomenklatura groups retained their power until 1994. Therefore, and perhaps due to that continuity, the composition of the government was relatively stable, especially compared to the political development of other former western republics of the USSR. This kind of stability, however, only underlined the internal weakness of the political institutions.
The Belarusian nomenklatura visibly stands out among all the other republics in its inability to create political institutions and engage in collective political activity. Kebich never attempted to create his own political party. Executive power remained non-partisan, and Kebich aspired to underline the technical, not the political character of his leadership as much as possible. As we have noted above, there was also no ‘self-organization’ in the parliament: political groups and factions were formed immediately at the first sessions of the newly elected parliaments of all other republics of the European part of the USSR. In Belarus, however, this process was prolonged for years, when the political structure of the Supreme Soviet remained extremely amorphous, while it took two years to form a majority coalition after the election. By 1990, the Belarusian Soviet elite was in a deep leadership and internal organization crisis, and the rise to power of a new, recently formed MCIG did not solve the issue. All of this made the Belarusian nomenklatura extremely unprepared to tackle the crisis of the Soviet political system, ‘sovereignization’, and creation of an independent state.
The presidential election of 1994 was destined to be the most important in determining the political future of Belarus. Three of the registered candidates were associated in some way with the Soviet elite. In total, they collected about 27% of the votes, which can be compared to the results for opposition democratic candidates of about 23%. The final winner turned to be a complete outsider, scarcely known before his candidacy – Aleksandr Lukashenko.
The major outcome of the collapse of the Soviet political elite, however, was not the defeat itself at the polls – it happened quite often at the time. It was the defeat suffered from an outsider non-politician, which was practically the only example its kind in the post-Soviet republics. Lukashenko’s election brought 45 years of history to an end: the poll signified be the end of the independent political history of the Belarusian Soviet elite. There were no future plans or any noteworthy attempts at a political comeback, which were attempted in other post-Soviet countries. Therefore, this all significantly simplified the creation of a sustainable authoritarian regime in Belarus in 1996.
Notes
1 It is noteworthy that the overview of the CPSU Congresses is sometimes presented with greater attention in the History of the Belarusian SSR than that of the CPB’s own Congresses.
2 At the beginning of 1990, for instance, the share of the Latvians in the Communist Party of Latvia (CPL) was 39%, Latvijas Valsts arhīvs (Latvian State Archives – LVA), PA-101. fonds, 63. apraksts, 66. lieta, 10–11. lapu. CC CPL statistical report on the composition of the Party organization as of 1 January 1990. Yet, Latvians comprised 52% of the population, according to the census of 1989. Weak representation of the Kazakhs in their Party structures can be explained by the population structure of Kazakhstan. According to the census of 1989, for example, the share of Kazakhs in the population of the republic was less than 40% (Natsional’nyi sostav, 2010, p. 4).
3 From 1944, the positions of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the First Secretary of the republican parties were merged. In 1947, these positions were separated again, and Ponomarenko took the positions of the Chairman of the Government.
4 For positive assessment of Patolichev’s performance by the partisans, see Smirnov, 2014, p. 570.
5 Zimianin worked at the Foreign Ministry of the USSR between 1953 and 1965 and conducted various diplomatic missions; later he was Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper Pravda (Truth), and a CC CPSU Secretary between 1976 and 1987.
6 Or, more accurately perhaps, a ‘Mazurov-Masherov-Kiseliov’ consensus, which included the tenure of Masherov’s successor Tikhon Kiseliov.
7 After his resignation, Mazurov did not return to Belarus and lived in Moscow until his death in 1989.
8 Between 1964 and 1981, according to Willerton (1992, p. 61), the Mazurov-Masherov-Zimianin network accounted for six to eleven people in the CC and the Central Revision Commission of the CPSU (Willerton, 1992: 61).
9 Kiseliov took charge of the Belarusian Council of Ministers in 1959, and he became a CPB CC Secretary even earlier, in 1955. Thus, his career developed simultaneously with the strengthening of the partisan faction.
10 Urban (2010, pp. 137–140) calculated that the changes impacted nearly 27% of key positions at the republican level and up to 44% of those at the regional level.
11 The last ones were Ivan Poliakov (member of the Bureau, 1966–1985; candidate and member of the CC CPB, 1961–1985), Nikolai Polozov (member of the Bureau, 1971–1986), and Vladimir Lobanok (candidate and member of the Bureau, 1962–1986).
12 In particular, in his memoirs at the end of the 1980s, Sergei Naumchik (2006, p. 15), one of the leaders of the BPF and a Supreme Soviet deputy between 1990 and 1995, singles out only two nationally-oriented functionaries in the top CPB leadership: Minsk raikom Secretary Piotr Kravchenko and Viciebsk raikom Secretary Yosif Naumchik. He similarly characterises just three more functionaries within the membership of the CC.
References
Bakanov, A. (2017) ‘Kto rukovodil partizanami’, Zhivaia istoriia, 11 March.http://lhistory.ru/statyi/kto-rukovodil-partizanami.
Boiko, O. (2002) Ukraina v 1985–1991 gg. Osnovni tendentsii suspil’no-politichnogo rozvitku. Kyiv: Institut politichnikh ta etnonatsional’nikh doslidzhen’ NAN Ukraini.
Blackwell, R.E. (1979) ‘Cadres Policy in the Brezhnev Era’, Problems of Communism, 28 (March-April), pp. 29–42.
Blackwell, R.E., and Hulbary, W. E. (1973) ‘Political Mobility Among Soviet Obkom Elites: The Effects of Regime, Social Background and Career Development’, American journal of Political Science, 17 (4), pp. 721–743.
Breslauer, G. (1986) ‘Provincial Party Leaders’ Demand Articulation and the Nature of Center-Periphery Relations in the USSR’, Slavic Review, 45 (4), pp. 650–672.
Chernyshova, N. (2020) ‘De-Stalinisation and Insubordination in the Soviet Borderlands: Beria’s Attempted National Reform in Soviet Belarus’, Europe-Asia Studies, 73 (2): 387–409. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1825629.
Cleary, J.W. (1974) ‘Elite Career Patterns in a Soviet Republic’, British Journal of Political Science, 4 (3), pp. 323–344.
Dementei, N. (2005) Uroki zhizni. Minsk: BELTA.
Ekadumau, A. (2001) Razvitstsio natsyianal’na-demakratychnaga rukhu i pazitsyi savetskai elity. Belaruskaia palitychnaia sistema i prezidentskiia vybary 2001. Minsk:Wschodnioeuropejskie Centrum Demokratyczne IDEE, Analitychnaya Grupa.
Filimonau, A.A. (ed.) (1975) Gistoryia Belaruskai SSR u piatsi tamakh. T.5. Belaruskaia SSR u peryiad stvarennia razvitoga satsyialistychnaga gramadstva i budaunitstva kamunizmu (1945–1974). Minsk: AN BSSR Institut gistoryi.
Golubei, V. (2016) Gistoryia Belarusi ad zakanchennia Drugoi susvetnai vainy da peryiadu budaunitstva nezalezhnai dziarzhavy (1945–2016). Minsk: Vydavets Zmitser Kolas.
Golubeva, N. (2018) Kirill Mazurov. O chem molchalo vremia…Minsk: Belaruskaia entsyklapediia imia Petrusia Brouki.
Harasymiw, B. (1984) Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Ignatenko, I.M. (ed.) (1977) Istoriia Belorusskoi SSR. Minsk: Nauka i tekhnika.
Ignatsik, K. (2011) ‘Mova, gistoryia, ekalogiia: aktsyi 1988–1990’, in Bulhakauu, V., and Dyn’ko, A., (eds.), Khryshchenne natsyi. Masavyia aktsyi 1988–2009. Minsk: Palitychnaia sfera, pp. 8–27.
Ioffe, E. (2008) Ot Miasnikova do Malafeeva. Kto rukovodil BSSR. Minsk: Belarus’.
Ioffe, E. (2015) Panteleimon Ponomarenko ‘zheleznyi Stalinist’. Minsk: Kharvest.
Kastsiuk, M.P. (ed.) (2007) Belarus’ u satsyial’na-ekanamichnykh i gramadska-palitychnykh pratsesakh 1946–2006. Minsk: Belaruskaia navuka.
Kastsiuk, M.P. et al (2008) Narys gistoryi belaruskai dziarzhaunastsi: XX stagoddze. Minsk: Belaruskaia navuka.
Kavalenia, A. (ed.) (2012) Gistoryia belaruskai dziarzhaunastsi u kantsy XVIII – pachatku XXI st: u dzviuk knigax. Minsk: Belaruskaia navuka.
Kazakevich, A. (2010) ‘Belaruski parlament epokhi nezalezhnastsi: evaliutsyia deputatskaga korpusu, 1990–2010 gady’, Palitychnaia sfera, 15 (2), pp. 44–70.
Kazakevich, A. (2011) ‘Vulitsa i zmena sistemy: aktsyi 1991’, in Bulhakauu, V., and Dyn’ko, A., (eds.), Khryshchenne natsyi. Masavyia aktsyi 1988–2009. Minsk: Palitychnaia sfera, pp. 157–166.
Kebich, V. (2008) Iskushenie vlast’iu: iz zhizni prem’er-ministra. Minsk: Paradoks.
Knight, A.W. (1982) ‘Pyotr Masherov and the Soviet Leadership: A Study in Kremlinology’, Survey, 26 (1), pp. 151–168.
Krukouski, M.I., Iukho, I.A., Gorbach, U.I., Doktarau, Z.U., Galauneu, A.I., Manin, Iu.M., Maneeu, A.K. (1958) Farmiravanne i razvitstsio belaruskai satsyialistychnai natsyi. Minsk: Vydavetstva Akademii navuk BSSR.
Kur’ianovich, A. (2015) Apazitsyia BNF u Biarkhounym savetse XII sklikannia. Dakumenty. Fakty. Kamentaryi. Smolensk: Inbelkul’t.
Leonov, V. (2003) Rabota nad oshibkami. Smolensk: Skif.
Mazurov, K. (1987) Nezabyvaemoe. 2nd edition. Minsk: Belarus’.
Miller, J. (1977) ‘Cadres Policy in the Nationality Areas: Recruitment of CPSU first and second secretaries in the non-Russian republics of the USSR’, Soviet Studies, 29 (1), pp. 3–36.
Miranovich, Ia. (2003) Nainoushaia gistoryia Belarusi. St. Petersburg: Neuski prastsiag.
Moses, J.C. (1976) ‘Regional Cohorts and Political Mobility in the USSR: The Case of Dnepropetrovsk’, Soviet Union, 3 (1), pp. 63–89.
Musial, B. (2018) Savetskiia partyzanty u 1941–1944 gadakh. Mify i real’nasts’. Smolensk: Inbelkul’t.
Natchyk, P. (2005) ‘Vybary Viarkhounai Rady BSSR u 1990 g.’, in Bulgakai, V. (ed.)Naunaushaia gistoryia belaruskaga parlamentaryzmu. Minsk: Analitychny Grudok, pp. 17–37.
Natsional’nyi sostav, veroispovedanie i vladeniia iazykami v Respublike Kazakhstan. Itogi Natsional’noi perepisi naseleniia 2009 goda v Respublike Kazakhstan (2010) https://stat.gov.kz/api/getFile/?docId=WC16200032705.
Naumchik, S. (2006) Sem gadou Adradzhen’niia, albo fragment nainoushai belaruskai gistoryi (1988–1995). Warsaw: Belaruskiia Vedamas’tsi.
Ogareff, V. (1980) Leaders of the Soviet Republics, 1971–1980. Canberra, Australia: The ANU Press.
Pashkou, G.P. (1999) Entsyklapedyia gistoryi Belarusi. Vol. 5. Minsk: Belaruskaia entsyklapediia imia Petrusia Brouki.
Paz’niak, Z., and Navumchyk, C. (2010) Deputaty nezalezhnastsi. Vilnius: Tavarystva Belaruskai Kul’tury u Letuve.
Ponomarenko, P. (1992) ‘Sobytiia moei zhizni’, Neman, 3–4, pp. 150–177.
Shybeka, Z. (2003) Narys gistoryi Belarusi (1795–2002). Minsk: Entsyklapedyks.
Smirnov, N. (2014) General Korzh. Neizvestnye stranitsy…Minsk: Zviazda.
Urban, M. (1989) An Algebra of Soviet Power. Elite Circulation in the Belorussian Republic 1966–86. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Urban, M. (2010) Belaruskaia savetskaia elita (1966–1986): algebra ulady. Vilnius: EGU.
Vakar, N. (1956) Belorussia: The Making of a Nation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Velichko, V. (2018) Petr Masherov. Belarus’ – ego pesnia i slava. Minsk: Mastachkaia litaratura.
Werner, H. (1972) The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960–1970. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
Willerton, J.P. (1992) Patronage and Politics in the USSR. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.