{300} SECTION XII
After the collapse of the Tokugawa regime, the new Meiji government (1868–1912) attempted to centralize and transform Japan, ushering in a period of rapid reform. Following the lead of domains such as Chōshū, which was dissolved in 1869, other domains (han) were abolished in favor of prefectures and the samurai status was ended as well. Daimyō and high-ranking warriors were given generous stipends and made into a new nobility, and supported the Meiji government, but the new regime abolished the samurai status and granted them the virtually meaningless class status of shizoku. The government struggled to pay the stipends of all samurai, leading to resentment, and ultimately revoked the warriors’ right to wear swords. The official government edict is reproduced below (see The Japan Mail: Abolishing of the Samurai Right to Wear Swords). After the government created a conscripted army, Saigō Takamori (1828–77) of Satsuma seized an armory and attempted an uprising. He tried and failed to capture Kumamoto castle; his defeat by the Meiji government’s new army represented the last gasp of the samurai as a fighting force. The Diary of Kidō Takayoshi (p. 302) describes this uprising and how it was fought primarily with rifles and cannon.
1. The Japan Mail: Abolishing of the Samurai Right to Wear Swords1
The 1876 edict ending the samurai’s right to wear swords also effectively ended the order as a whole. The edict is reproduced below, along with commentary from the 1876 Japan Mail. The social position of “samurai” lingered in the Ryūkyū Kingdom, which was incorporated into Japan. Although the Ryūkyū equivalent to the samurai, the gozoku order, was abolished on 1.9.1872,2 it {301} was not until 1914 that people could no longer register as having higher status; this was the final, official end to the samurai order.3
Abolution of the Practice of Wearing Swords
(From the “Nichi Nichi Shimbun,” April 4, 1876)4
Memorial from the Minister of War respecting the abolition of the wearing of swords—(taken from No. 4 of the Native and Foreign Army News).
It has for years been the established custom for the military class (i.e., the samurai) in this country to gird on two swords, the reason therefore being that though the advantages of the sword, it being a weapon used in war, were limited to repelling enemies and protecting one’s self, still, on the conclusion of war, it was impossible in view of the habits relevant under the feudal system that it should be laid aside. However, times having changed, the samurai are released from the necessity of military studies, the Han have restored their lands to the Government, and, in 1873—greatest change of all—the conscription was enjoined and is now in force throughout the whole country. Previous to that measures had been taken against foreign war or internal disturbance by the establishment of the Imperial Guard for the protection of the Court, and of garrisons for controlling the seven circuits. The safety of town and country, too, had been provided for by the organization of a police force in each ken and fu and evildoers were arrested by it. By these measures human safety has been sufficiently provided for and the Emperor’s behests are observed, and not the smallest distrust of them aroused. Notwithstanding all this, however, a large number of the nobles and entry throughout the country still continue to wear the sword in accordance with the old custom. These obstinate and unpolished men, unobservant of the changes which have occurred in the spirit of the times and in the military system, trust to themselves to keep off their enemies by the sword and to ensure thereby their own safety. Not only, however, is this practice of wearing dangerous weapons of no advantage to the empire, but owing to it the habit of assassination and wounding lingers under the false name of military spirit. As long as the wearing of the sword is not put a stop to serious trouble may arise to the Government at any time. The fact, besides, of there being persons not soldiers wearing military weapons considerably affects the latter’s privileges, and {302} I therefore beg that orders may be speedily issued abolishing the sword, and the Japanese people thus caused to advance in the path of civilization.
I reverently await your order.
(Signed) Yamagata Aritomo,
Minister of War.
December 7th, 1876.
2. Selections from The Diary of Kidō Takayoshi5
Kidō Takayoshi (1833–77), the son of a doctor from Chōshū domain, became an important leader of the Meiji Restoration. He helped establish an alliance with Satsuma, which brought down the Tokugawa bakufu. In the passages selected below, he describes the 1877 rebellion of Saigō Takamori, another Meiji leader from Satsuma. Takamori, dissatisfied with Meiji policies, decided to rebel and seized arms and cannons from the local armory. Meiji forces, which were conscripted, relied on modern guns and ammunition and held off the rebellion at the castle of Kumamoto. As Takamori’s forces ran out of ammunition, this new army advanced inexorably and utterly annihilated his rebel forces. With their ammunition supplies dwindling, some futilely relied on their swords to attack the enemy, and this led the revolt to have been mischaracterized as one in which Saigo and his men were the “last samurai,” who eschewed modern weapons.
5 February 1876. Fair. Those who came to visit were Kusaka Yoshio, Sugiyama Takatoshi, Kawachi Naokata, Yamada Akiyoshi, Ōkura Kihachi (concerning Narushima), Assistant Minister Kodama, Kodama Jun’ichirō, Okudaira Shōsuke, and Onda Jinsuke. Ga Noriyuki brought over his translation of The Spirit of Laws. Hiraoka Michiyoshi . . . went with me to look for some land to build my new house. Two other visitors came.
{303} 18 March 1877. Fair. Several dozen visitors. Ōzaki Saburō who has arrived from Tokyo brought me a letter from Minister of the Right Iwakura. He also brought Prime Minister Sanjō’s order to me to go up to Kyoto. I have been a strong advocate of an attack from the rear in the Yatsushiro sector, but as this is outside my control I could not bring it about. Moreover, at Tabara we have been attacking the forts for seventeen or eighteen days; we have expended 600,000 to 700,000 rounds of ammunition daily; and casualties are running at 160 to 170 a day. Ours cannot be called a successful strategy. In the end we have made a big change in direction of policy with the adoption of the strategy of attacking from the rear, and I am a bit relieved. Consequently, Yamada Akiyoshi who has advocated this policy from the first has been ordered on the Nagasaki to take command of the forces attacking from the rear. We had been unable to convince others to take this step until today. I have no regrets; and I am satisfied to see him reach his objective, and to see this indication of cooperation and unity. I only hope, day and night, that this tragedy will yield quick results, and that it will sweep away the poisoned atmosphere and make the people rejoice. . . . With Shimaji Mokurai I went to Yamada Akiyoshi’s; then I went to Nakajima Nobuyuki’s, and at 11 I returned to my inn. The Public Procurator was given orders to day to strip Ōyama Tsunayoshi of his court rank. Nakahara Hisao and others went to Tokyo today with Okauchi. Kitashige came to talk.
21 March 1877. Rain, then clearing. Kawada Kagetomo, Akamatsu Renjō, and Nagayasu Wasō came to talk. At 10 I went to the Imperial Palace. I reported to the throne our decision to make the attack from the rear, and to send round a large force to the Yatsushiro sector in groups as the men arrived, and on correspondence from the front and intelligence reports. I requested that the Emperor go to the Imperial Study every day to receive the daily report on the state of the battlefront and other matters. I also reported in detail on the consumption of ammunition and on casualties. There were more than ten telegrams, one of which reported that our forces had launched a general offensive from Tabarazaka at 6 a.m. on the twentieth, seized Ueki, put it to the torch, and captured a number of enemy soldiers. Four big guns were taken, and 200 rifles; an ammunition dump was set afire. It was reported, however, that the rebel forts to the right and left have not been taken, and that the battle still rages around them. The situation with regard to the force attacking from the rear is still the same as reported yesterday.
The Emperor received a report from Iwamura. . . on the case against Maebara Issei and the other rebels in Yamaguchi prefecture last year.
At 4 I withdrew from the Palace. Shimaji came to my place with Ōzu Tetsuzen, who was arrested on suspicion in Kagoshima on 6 February, and experienced great difficulties for a time. He returned from there with the Imperial Envoy, and today he related to me the situation as it developed after 30 January. I sent a letter to Itō Hirobumi today.
{304} (Note) Tetsuzen travelled with the Imperial Envoy as far as Nagasaki, and returned on his own to Kyoto yesterday.
24 March 1877. Rain, then clearing. Itō Hōsei came to give me medical treatment. Iwakura Tomosada came to talk. At 10 I went to the Palace. Today I pleaded with Prime Minister Sanjō to send me to the Yatsushiro front. We have already dispatched more than five million soldiers to Yatsushiro for the offensive, in accordance with our resolution of a few days ago; consequently, some local civil government is necessary. Those in Yatsushiro have also requested it from the government. I withdrew from the Palace at 4; and, after withdrawing, I visited Priest Mokurai, and Renjō came to talk with us. On the way back I went to the Kyūkyodō, then to the Keika. As I had an appointment with Sugi Chō’u, I had dinner with him at a restaurant. Several telegrams came.
28 March 1877. . . . Several telegrams came, reporting that about 500 shizoku in Fukuoka appeared to be ready to rise. We took prompt steps to suppress them. Letters arrived from Sugi Magoshichirō and Hiraoka Michiyoshi.
29 March 1877. Cloudy. Visitors came throughout the day. Among the telegrams was one reported on the fighting around Kidome and Ueki. There was a great many casualties in Kidome, and we have been unable to take the forts in that area, and have withdrawn to the earlier battle line. I can imagine the desperate fighting going on there, and believe that we must plan our strategy for the future, so discussed it with Itō Hirobumi. This morning Ōkubo Toshimichi came to talk; and Nakano Goichi also came to visit.
At night a letter arrived from Torio. In regard to the Imperial visit which we have discussed in the past, I believe that it should be undertaken without delay, since the troops stationed in Osaka are soon to be dispatched to the front. I proposed this to Kyoto by telegram.
31 March 1877. Fair. At 7 I went to the Palace. The Imperial party had already left, so I went to the railway station and began my attendance on the Emperor there for the trip to Osaka, where we arrived at 9:20. The Emperor rode horseback from the station to the Osaka garrison where he inspected the officer’s hospital, and took a short rest. Afterwards the garrison troops passed in review for His Majesty. (There were more than three battalions, two of which are to be dispatched to the front today together with four guns and their mounts. One of the battalions consists of recruits who are in their prime, and their spirit was especially high. This group is headed for the Udo front.)
Afterwards the Emperor made a tour of the hospital for enlisted men. (Out of 670 wounded men here, 300 arrived today. Further there were seventy men who {305} had been wounded in the Kumamoto garrison during the Jimpūren rising last year. All had suffered serious injuries, but the wounds of most have now healed. The Emperor also inspected them.) After the Emperor had his noon meal in the place prepared for his relaxation, and left for the railway station at 2. Ōkubo and Itō welcomed the Emperor today, and sent him off. They consulted me about the return of Yanagihara, member of the Chamber of Elders, in Tokyo in connection with the trail of Nakahara . . . , and about the proposal which I made yesterday.
The Emperor returned to Kyoto on the 3:40 train. There I withdrew from the Palace at 6; and I stayed at Hōjō Tai’ei’s tonight. Today the Emperor presented me with sake, fish, and cakes in recognition of my services in going to Osaka to work day and night on the dispatch of the expeditionary force.
2 April 1877. Cloudy. Nakajima Nobuyuki came to talk. I went down to Osaka on the 10:55 train. The performance of the Imperial Army in recent days has differed substantially from our expectations at the beginning, as I see it. If the situation continues for ten more days, the Kumamoto garrison may fall. If that happens, it is difficult to know how the situation in the nation may change. At present the prefectures have quieted down; but we must be prepared with counterplans in case things go wrong. Consequently, I discussed my six-point proposal with Ōkubo, Itō, and Torio. They agreed with my proposal, so we shall start working on it at once. Makimura Masanao came down from Kyoto in connection with the matter which I had entrusted to him last night concerning the movements of shizoku in Wakayama, Hikone, Tottori, Tamba, and Tango. Fukuchi Gen’ichirō who has returned from the battlefront in Kyushu gave me a detailed report on the present situation there. . . . I visited Tsukuda Motokiyo to discuss the matter of Hagi Castletown. Chamberlain Kataoka and Ōgi, and official of the ninth rank, are being dispatched to the battlefront in Yatsushiro; and they came to talk with me. I sent a letter to Yamada Akiyoshi. . . . Magobei returned from Tokyo, and brought me letters from my home, from Harada Isoemon, Sōbei, and Kawase Shinkō.
3 April 1877. Fair. Ōkubo Toshimichi and Itō Hirobumi came. As there have been some miscalculations in the last few days, I strongly hope that the government will give attention to the worst possible developments, and make preparations for handling them. Its members, however, to my great regret, swing from depression to euphoria in an instant. The plan on behalf of which I busied myself all day yesterday, and on which a tentative decision was reached, was wrecked because of a single telegram from Udo, and this was not even a report of a decisive victory. Even if it be considered a minor victory, the enemy has retreated to a position at Kawajiri with the ultimate intention of fighting a major defensive action at the Midori River. We must not hold them in contempt. Fukuchi Gen’ichirō and Narushima Ryūhoku {306} came to walk with me. Kōno Togama who has recently returned from Kōchi told me about the current situation there. Togama is soon to be dispatched to Kyushu to join the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, and to serve also as judge. Nakajima Nobuyuki and . . . came to talk. I went to Torio Koyata’s place, and I find that the decision about the matter which I discussed with him last night has gone altogether against my position. Ōkubo and Itō have changed their minds; and my efforts have come to naught. Here is an example of the saying “The promises of yesterday are as ephemeral as smoke.” It is strange that telegrams should change minds in this way. I alone have lost face in this affair. . . . Several telegrams arrived.
I went to Ōkubo’s, but he was away. I put down in writing the feelings which I can no longer suppress. A letter came from Minister of the Right Iwakura.
4 April 1877. Fair. Visitors without a break. A letter arrived from Prime Minister Sanjō. I went up to Kyoto on the 12:30 train, aboard which were Nakamura Kōki and Sakuma Kazusuke. After arriving I went directly to Prime Minister Sanjō’s to tell him my idea on recruitment of the ablest soldiers and other things. From there I met Makimura Masanao and went with him to the Secretariat, where Nakajima Nobuyuki joined us. I went to Prime Minister Sanjō’s again to continue our discussion, and then I went to Makimura Masanao’s to confer with Kawada Kagetomo. We completed our talk which began several days ago. I sent a letter to Ōkubo and Itō today. Then I wrote to Ōkubo and Itō again intending to send Matatarō out with the letter tomorrow evening. After 11 I went to Hōjō’s to stay for the night.
5 April 1877. Fair. I went to Makimura’s at 10, and from there to the Palace. Prime Minister Sanjō came to the Palace. In observing the present situation, I have made advance preparations these last few days in case the worst should happen. Consequently, I instructed Kagawa Keizō to make secret. . . preparations for the Emperor to travel light. I withdrew at 1. I went to Makimura’s again, and took the noon meal with Fukuchi Gen’ichirō. Toda Saburō came to see me. From there I went with Makimura to Tani Tesshin’s place where we had a long talk about the direction things are taking. Tani’s views are not completely in accord with mine. Makimura and I left there to go to see Miura Kyūtarō whose views are substantially the same as mine with minor differences. I have gone about the city this way to argue on behalf of a firm course of policy hereafter. Itō Hirobumi came up to Kyoto to visit me; and we went to the Ikegami for a long confidential talk. On the way back I visited Nakajima Nobuyuki, went to Makimura’s again, visited Chō Sansu, met Sugi Magoshichirō, and returned to my inn before 10. I entrusted Nakajima Nobuyuki with letters to the Minister of the Right Iwakura, my family in Tokyo, Okudaira Nisui, Kawano Michinobu, and Harada Isoemon.
{307} Among the several telegrams which arrived, one reported that Miura Gorō had launched a strong offensive from the Yamaga front, and finally reduced Tosu fort. This was the first news of victory in a long while. Now that we have reduced Kidome, and also Tosu, we must be approaching the garrison in full strength. This link-up of our forces will have an incalculable effect on the course of the war. Judging from the rate of advance of our armies up to the present, and the number of days it has taken, we must be careful about predicting when it will occur. I was very much pleased to be informed by Fukuchi the other day that Miura Gorō’s military camp, from his observations, maintains strict order, and is very different from other camps. Miura is a sincere man, reserved in speech, my true friend; and he reveres me as an elder brother. I have long deplored that his ability has remained undiscovered while sycophants of clever words were promoted in office. That today, when we face a formidable enemy, Miura’s ability has become known to the world for the first time is not solely a matter for personal gratification. It is a stroke of good luck for all.
6 April 1877. Fair. I went to Makimura’s and from there I went to the Palace, arriving at 10. Fukuchi Gen’ichirō accompanied me; and he was summoned into the Emperor’s presence to give a detailed report to the Throne on his observations of the state of the war, the relative strength of the Imperial Army, the condition of the enemy troops, the achievements of the officers, the terrain, and the hardships of the people.
10 April 1877. Rain all day. Takasaki Seifū, who was dispatched to the war front last month to give recognition to those who gave distinguished service, returned to Osaka last night; and he told me about the situation at the front, and the recent condition of things in Kagoshima. He says that the whole of Kagoshima is rebel territory now. When Lieutenant General Kuroda went down there, he destroyed arsenals, and disposed of any ammunition he could find. But after he withdrew, the situation returned to what it was earlier; and a certain Ikebe and a certain Beppu raised 1,500 men and set out for the Yatsushiro front. He says that when the Imperial Envoy and Lieutenant General Kuroda went to Kagoshima to meet Shimazu Hisamitsu and his son, the General was treated exactly as if he were still a retainer, and could not sit on the same level with Shimazu. Hisamatsu waited for him in a haughty manner. This is a very deplorable thing from the standpoint of the Imperial government; and that is why I proposed sending Major General Yamada to Kagoshima in the first place. The decision we came to some time ago was changed around completely by the personal relationships involved. If Lieutenant General Kuroda should meet Hisamitsu and his son as a private individual, it is proper that Kuroda should greet him with the utmost courtesy because of their old relationship. But to behave like this when Kuroda had gone to Kagoshima under Imperial orders and through his own request in order to clarify that one’s highest loyalty is to the national state seems as {308} if it were deliberate disobedience to the Emperor. At present, not a single one of the purposes of the Imperial government has been accomplished. Kagoshima having made such a move as this has prolonged the hardships which the people will able to endure. This is the most regrettable thing that has happened in my lifetime. Once I proposed that we dispatch a large force to Kagoshima with all speed; but Torio flatly refused to do this on the grounds that it would harden the rebels’ determination, and would accomplish nothing. But the problem of Kagoshima, with its arms and with its ammunition, does not allow us to delay any more. I tried my best to make a start on my plan for speedy dispatch of troops, but the majority was not with me. From what I heard from Takasaki today the battle for Higo is proving more difficult than the rebels expected. After the fighting started they shipped in an enormous amount of ammunition, having brought along a very small quantity at first. . . . He said that most of the guns were sent in afterwards. As Takasaki left the battlefront before Fukuchi Gen’ichirō, he had little new to report.
(One line is blank.)
Mayahara Akira. . . (the following is blank.)
(Note) The number of casualties which Takasaki reported from his battlefield investigation was 7,340.
17 April 1877. . . . Deep into the night I thought about our troubled times; year after year blood flows, and the people are in distress. We must reflect on the source of these difficulties. But the men who govern the country have grown accustomed to their long-practiced abuses, and none shows signs of self-examination.
22 April 1877. . . . Telegrams have been arriving since yesterday from Kuroda, the Chief of Staff, reporting that the battle for Mifune opened at 8 o’clock on the twentieth. Kawaji attacked from the rear, Yamada from in front and an angle, and Takashima provided support on the right flank. The rebels finally abandoned their fort, and suffered a great defeat. They even abandoned their dead as they took flight. The Imperial Army took over Mifune at 9, seizing arms and ammunition, and taking the severed heads of a large number of enemy soldiers. On this front was a large contingent of Satsuma soldiers, and twenty-five platoons of men put up a stout defense of the fort. (The number of men in each platoon is uncertain.) At 12 the two forces of Yamada and Kawaji took Mount Iida, Occupied Togama, and attacked Kiyama from the rear. The rebel moral was broken, it is reported. . . . At 4 a.m. on the seventeenth one battalion and one company of our forces opened the fighting at Ogiwara, Miyanohara, and Mukōzaka, taking the rebels unaware so that they have abandoned their arms and ammunition. Rebel casualties were enormous; those of our troops numbered thirteen.
1. This order, reproduced from the “Nichi Nichi Shinbun” on April 4, 1876, was published in English in the Japan Mail on April 10, 1876.
2. See the 1872 (Meiji 5) Daijōkan-fu no. 29. https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%A3%AB%E6%97%8F For this reference, I am indebted to Mark Ravina. Accessed August 26, 2021.
3. https://kotobank.jp/word/%E9%83%B7%E5%A3%AB-62146. I am indebted to Gregory Smits for this information.
4. The Meiji government adopted the Western calendar in 1873.
5. Brown and Hirota, The Diary of Kidō Takayoshi, vol. 3, February 5, 1876, p. 258; March 18, 1877, pp. 465–66, 21; March 21, 1877, pp. 467–68; March 24, 1877, p. 469; March 28–29, 1877, pp. 471–72; March 31, 1877, pp. 472–73; April 2–6, 1877, pp. 475–78; April 10, 1877, pp. 480–81; April 17, 1877, pp. 484–85; April 22, 1877, 488–89.